@clawling/clawchat-plugin-openclaw 2026.8.14-1 → 2026.8.14-2

package/dist/src/api-client.js

@@ -153,8 +153,13 @@ export function createOpenclawClawlingApiClient(opts) {
         // `X-Device-Id` is sent on every request so the server can correlate
         // activity back to this plugin instance. Callers may override via
         // `extra` (e.g. tests) but the default is the channel id.
+        //
+        // A blank token gets NO Authorization header at all: `Bearer ` with an
+        // empty credential is a zero-segment JWT that the backend logs as
+        // malformed-token 401 noise (the unauthenticated plugin-report call sent
+        // one on every gateway entry).
         return {
-            authorization: `Bearer ${opts.token}`,
+            ...(opts.token.trim() ? { authorization: `Bearer ${opts.token}` } : {}),
             "x-device-id": CHANNEL_ID,
             ...extra,
         };

package/dist/src/config.js

@@ -221,6 +221,28 @@ function decodeJwtStringClaim(token, claim) {
  * wins; the mismatch is logged. Also derives userId from `sub` when nothing is
  * configured, mirroring the `oid` fallback above.
  */
+/**
+ * Reject an ownerUserId that is an unrendered provisioning-template
+ * placeholder — treat it as absent (fall through to the next source) instead
+ * of using it verbatim.
+ *
+ * 2026-08 production incident: a provisioner shipped the literal `usr_owner`
+ * (this repo's own test-fixture value) un-rendered; every affected agent
+ * passed the connect gate and hammered prod with `GET /v1/users/usr_owner`
+ * plus malformed-JWT retries for days. Dev/mock ids stay loose on purpose —
+ * only the known fixture literal and unmistakable template syntax
+ * ({{…}}, ${…}, <…>, %…%) are rejected.
+ */
+function rejectPlaceholderOwnerUserId(value, source) {
+    if (!value)
+        return "";
+    const looksUnrendered = value === "usr_owner" || /[{}<>%]|\$\{/.test(value);
+    if (looksUnrendered) {
+        console.warn(`clawchat ownerUserId from ${source} looks like an unrendered template placeholder ("${value}"); ignoring it. Fix the provisioning template — without a real owner id (or an oid claim in the token) the agent stays in activation-wait instead of hammering the backend.`);
+        return "";
+    }
+    return value;
+}
 function resolveUserId(token, configured) {
     const tokenSub = decodeJwtStringClaim(token, "sub");
     if (!tokenSub)
@@ -336,8 +358,8 @@ export function resolveOpenclawClawlingAccount(cfg, env = process.env) {
     const token = readOptionalString(channel.token) || readEnvString(env, CLAWCHAT_TOKEN_ENV);
     const agentId = readOptionalString(channel.agentId) || readEnvString(env, CLAWCHAT_AGENT_ID_ENV);
     const userId = resolveUserId(token, readOptionalString(channel.userId) || readEnvString(env, CLAWCHAT_USER_ID_ENV));
-    const ownerUserId = readOptionalString(channel.ownerUserId) ||
-        readEnvString(env, CLAWCHAT_OWNER_USER_ID_ENV) ||
+    const ownerUserId = rejectPlaceholderOwnerUserId(readOptionalString(channel.ownerUserId), "channel ownerUserId") ||
+        rejectPlaceholderOwnerUserId(readEnvString(env, CLAWCHAT_OWNER_USER_ID_ENV), CLAWCHAT_OWNER_USER_ID_ENV) ||
         // Fall back to the access token's `oid` (owner) claim. A provisioner may
         // inject token + userId but omit ownerUserId; without it the connect gate
         // (hasOpenclawClawlingConnectCredentials) never passes and the plugin sits

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@clawling/clawchat-plugin-openclaw",
-  "version": "2026.8.14-1",
+  "version": "2026.8.14-2",
   "description": "OpenClaw ClawChat channel plugin",
   "license": "MIT",
   "author": "CLAWLING PTE. LTD.",

package/src/api-client.ts

@@ -337,8 +337,13 @@ export function createOpenclawClawlingApiClient(opts: ApiClientOptions): Opencla
     // `X-Device-Id` is sent on every request so the server can correlate
     // activity back to this plugin instance. Callers may override via
     // `extra` (e.g. tests) but the default is the channel id.
+    //
+    // A blank token gets NO Authorization header at all: `Bearer ` with an
+    // empty credential is a zero-segment JWT that the backend logs as
+    // malformed-token 401 noise (the unauthenticated plugin-report call sent
+    // one on every gateway entry).
     return {
-      authorization: `Bearer ${opts.token}`,
+      ...(opts.token.trim() ? { authorization: `Bearer ${opts.token}` } : {}),
       "x-device-id": CHANNEL_ID,
       ...extra,
     };

package/src/config.ts

@@ -349,6 +349,30 @@ function decodeJwtStringClaim(token: string, claim: string): string {
  * wins; the mismatch is logged. Also derives userId from `sub` when nothing is
  * configured, mirroring the `oid` fallback above.
  */
+/**
+ * Reject an ownerUserId that is an unrendered provisioning-template
+ * placeholder — treat it as absent (fall through to the next source) instead
+ * of using it verbatim.
+ *
+ * 2026-08 production incident: a provisioner shipped the literal `usr_owner`
+ * (this repo's own test-fixture value) un-rendered; every affected agent
+ * passed the connect gate and hammered prod with `GET /v1/users/usr_owner`
+ * plus malformed-JWT retries for days. Dev/mock ids stay loose on purpose —
+ * only the known fixture literal and unmistakable template syntax
+ * ({{…}}, ${…}, <…>, %…%) are rejected.
+ */
+function rejectPlaceholderOwnerUserId(value: string, source: string): string {
+  if (!value) return "";
+  const looksUnrendered = value === "usr_owner" || /[{}<>%]|\$\{/.test(value);
+  if (looksUnrendered) {
+    console.warn(
+      `clawchat ownerUserId from ${source} looks like an unrendered template placeholder ("${value}"); ignoring it. Fix the provisioning template — without a real owner id (or an oid claim in the token) the agent stays in activation-wait instead of hammering the backend.`,
+    );
+    return "";
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
 function resolveUserId(token: string, configured: string): string {
   const tokenSub = decodeJwtStringClaim(token, "sub");
   if (!tokenSub) return configured;
@@ -498,8 +522,11 @@ export function resolveOpenclawClawlingAccount(
     readOptionalString(channel.userId) || readEnvString(env, CLAWCHAT_USER_ID_ENV),
   );
   const ownerUserId =
-    readOptionalString(channel.ownerUserId) ||
-    readEnvString(env, CLAWCHAT_OWNER_USER_ID_ENV) ||
+    rejectPlaceholderOwnerUserId(readOptionalString(channel.ownerUserId), "channel ownerUserId") ||
+    rejectPlaceholderOwnerUserId(
+      readEnvString(env, CLAWCHAT_OWNER_USER_ID_ENV),
+      CLAWCHAT_OWNER_USER_ID_ENV,
+    ) ||
     // Fall back to the access token's `oid` (owner) claim. A provisioner may
     // inject token + userId but omit ownerUserId; without it the connect gate
     // (hasOpenclawClawlingConnectCredentials) never passes and the plugin sits