@claw-link/gateway-host 0.2.2 → 0.2.4
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +11 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/adapters/claude.js +7 -0
- package/src/adapters/cli.js +6 -1
- package/src/machine.js +46 -17
package/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -61,6 +61,17 @@ Change the Claude model by editing `.claude/settings.json` (e.g. `"model": "opus
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For Codex/Cursor, set the model via their CLI (`args_template` in the config, or the
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tool's own settings).
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**Permissions by scope** — each job carries a scope, and the Claude adapter runs with
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matching permissions automatically:
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| Trigger | Scope | Claude permissions |
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|---------|-------|--------------------|
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| Admin **Setup via Chat** / apply skill | `configure` | `--permission-mode acceptEdits` — may write workspace files (GUARDRAILS/SOUL/BOOTSTRAP/TOOLS/AGENTS) |
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| Customer chat + discovery | `customer` | `--disallowedTools "Write Edit MultiEdit NotebookEdit Bash"` — **read-only**, cannot edit config or run shell |
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So an agent's files are editable from the admin panel but never from customer/discovery
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chat. (Operator `args_template` overrides this for advanced setups.)
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## Commands
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After install the `clhost` command is available (aliases: `gateway-host`, `claw-host`):
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package/package.json
CHANGED
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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{
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"name": "@claw-link/gateway-host",
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"version": "0.2.
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"version": "0.2.4",
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"description": "ClawLink Host Gateway — a secure, outbound-only worker that bridges a local agent CLI (OpenClaw, Hermes, Claude, Codex, Cursor) to your ClawLink agents. No inbound ports; authenticated per-agent by a Host Token.",
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"homepage": "https://claw-link.co",
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"bin": {
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package/src/adapters/claude.js
CHANGED
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@@ -16,4 +16,11 @@ module.exports = makeCliAdapter({
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'--verbose',
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...(resumeId ? ['--resume', resumeId] : []),
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],
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// Admin "configure" turns may write workspace files (auto-accept edits, no shell
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// prompt); customer/discovery turns are strictly read-only (no Write/Edit/Bash) so
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// they can never modify the agent's config or hang on a permission prompt.
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permissions: (scope) =>
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(scope === 'configure' || scope === 'sub_configure')
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? ['--permission-mode', 'acceptEdits']
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: ['--disallowedTools', 'Write Edit MultiEdit NotebookEdit Bash'],
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});
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package/src/adapters/cli.js
CHANGED
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@@ -76,9 +76,14 @@ function makeCliAdapter(cfg) {
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// spawn never fails with ENOENT (coding workspaces are validated at setup).
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try { fs.mkdirSync(agent.work_dir, { recursive: true }); } catch { /* ignore */ }
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// Scope-based permissions: admin "configure" turns may write workspace files
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// (GUARDRAILS/SOUL/etc.); customer/discovery turns are read-only and cannot
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// edit or run shell. Operator args_template overrides take full control.
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const scope = job.scope || 'customer';
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const permArgs = (!Array.isArray(agent.args_template) && cfg.permissions) ? cfg.permissions(scope) : [];
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const argvFor = (rid) => Array.isArray(agent.args_template)
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? buildArgv(agent.args_template, { prompt: fullPrompt, sessionId: rid || '', systemPrompt })
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: cfg.defaultArgs(fullPrompt, rid, cfg.promptViaStdin);
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: [...cfg.defaultArgs(fullPrompt, rid, cfg.promptViaStdin), ...permArgs];
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let emittedAny = false;
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const runOnce = async function* (rid) {
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package/src/machine.js
CHANGED
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@@ -1,29 +1,58 @@
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'use strict';
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// Stable machine fingerprint for host binding.
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//
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//
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//
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//
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// Stable machine fingerprint for host binding. We bind an agent's token to ONE
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// machine so a stolen token can't be used elsewhere. The fingerprint MUST be
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// stable across reboots and network changes — earlier versions hashed MAC
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// addresses, which rotate (Tailscale/Docker/VPN/private-WiFi) and caused false
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// "host binding mismatch" errors. We now use the OS hardware machine id, with a
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// persisted random id as a fallback, and send only the HASH.
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const os = require('os');
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const fs = require('fs');
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const path = require('path');
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const crypto = require('crypto');
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const { execSync } = require('child_process');
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const { enrichedEnv } = require('./paths');
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const HOME_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), '.clawlink-host');
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function execSafe(cmd) {
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try { return execSync(cmd, { stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'], timeout: 4000, env: enrichedEnv() }).toString(); }
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catch { return ''; }
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}
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// Stable, hardware-tied id where available.
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function hardwareId() {
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try {
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if (process.platform === 'darwin') {
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const m = execSafe('ioreg -rd1 -c IOPlatformExpertDevice').match(/IOPlatformUUID"\s*=\s*"([^"]+)"/);
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if (m) return 'hw:' + m[1];
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} else if (process.platform === 'linux') {
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for (const p of ['/etc/machine-id', '/var/lib/dbus/machine-id']) {
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try { const id = fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8').trim(); if (id) return 'hw:' + id; } catch { /* next */ }
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}
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} else if (process.platform === 'win32') {
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const m = execSafe('reg query "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography" /v MachineGuid').match(/MachineGuid\s+REG_SZ\s+([\w-]+)/i);
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if (m) return 'hw:' + m[1];
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}
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}
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return
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} catch { /* fall through */ }
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return null;
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}
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// Stable random id persisted under the home dir (fallback when no hardware id).
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function persistedId() {
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const idPath = path.join(HOME_DIR, 'machine-id');
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try { const id = fs.readFileSync(idPath, 'utf8').trim(); if (id) return 'id:' + id; } catch { /* create below */ }
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try {
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fs.mkdirSync(HOME_DIR, { recursive: true });
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const id = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
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fs.writeFileSync(idPath, id, { mode: 0o600 });
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try { fs.chmodSync(idPath, 0o600); } catch { /* best effort */ }
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return 'id:' + id;
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} catch { return null; }
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}
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function machineId() {
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const
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const basis = (macs.length ? macs.join(',') : 'no-mac') + '|' + os.hostname();
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const basis = hardwareId() || persistedId() || ('host:' + os.hostname());
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return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(basis).digest('hex');
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}
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