@claude-flow/cli 3.54.0 → 3.55.0

package/dist/src/mcp-server.d.ts

@@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ export interface MCPServerOptions {
     daemonize?: boolean;
     timeout?: number;
     requestTimeoutMs?: number;
+    /**
+     * Bearer token every HTTP request must present (`Authorization: Bearer <token>`).
+     * http transport only. Prefer RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN / a token file over this
+     * field's CLI flag so the secret stays out of argv. Never logged or emitted.
+     */
+    authToken?: string;
 }
 /**
  * MCP Server status
@@ -49,6 +55,33 @@ export interface MCPServerStatus {
         metrics?: Record<string, number>;
     };
 }
+/** Exported for tests — see LOOPBACK_HOSTS. */
+export declare function isLoopbackHost(host: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * Explicit, documented opt-out of the non-loopback authorization gate in
+ * startHttpServer(). Exported for tests.
+ */
+export declare function isUnauthenticatedHttpAllowed(env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): boolean;
+/**
+ * The full startHttpServer() authorization gate, as a pure function:
+ * true means "refuse to start" (see the thrown error for why).
+ *
+ * A non-loopback bind is allowed when requests are authenticated (a bearer
+ * token is configured on the http transport) or the operator explicitly opts
+ * out with RUFLO_MCP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_HTTP=1. Loopback binds are never
+ * refused, with or without a token. Exported for tests.
+ */
+export declare function shouldRefuseUnauthenticatedHttp(host: string, env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, authenticated?: boolean): boolean;
+/**
+ * Resolve the HTTP bearer token. Precedence: explicit value (CLI flag), token
+ * file, then RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN. An unset/empty env var means "no token";
+ * a token that is set but malformed throws, so a typo can never silently
+ * start the server unauthenticated. Exported for tests.
+ */
+export declare function resolveMcpHttpAuthToken(input?: {
+    token?: string;
+    tokenFile?: string;
+}, env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, readFile?: (p: string) => string): string | undefined;
 export declare function parseMcpToolSelection(value: string | undefined): string[] | 'all';
 /**
  * Apply the existing `--tools` contract to advertised schemas. A selector can

package/dist/src/mcp-server.js

@@ -104,8 +104,72 @@ function processStartToken(pid) {
     }
 }
 /**
- * Default configuration
+ * Hosts treated as same-machine-only for MCP HTTP tool-call authorization
+ * purposes (see startHttpServer's non-loopback authorization gate below).
+ * Deliberately exact-string matching only (no DNS resolution) so anything
+ * not spelled exactly one of these three fails closed rather than open.
  */
+const LOOPBACK_HOSTS = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']);
+/** Exported for tests — see LOOPBACK_HOSTS. */
+export function isLoopbackHost(host) {
+    return LOOPBACK_HOSTS.has(host);
+}
+/**
+ * Explicit, documented opt-out of the non-loopback authorization gate in
+ * startHttpServer(). Exported for tests.
+ */
+export function isUnauthenticatedHttpAllowed(env = process.env) {
+    const v = env.RUFLO_MCP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_HTTP;
+    return v === '1' || v === 'true';
+}
+/**
+ * The full startHttpServer() authorization gate, as a pure function:
+ * true means "refuse to start" (see the thrown error for why).
+ *
+ * A non-loopback bind is allowed when requests are authenticated (a bearer
+ * token is configured on the http transport) or the operator explicitly opts
+ * out with RUFLO_MCP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_HTTP=1. Loopback binds are never
+ * refused, with or without a token. Exported for tests.
+ */
+export function shouldRefuseUnauthenticatedHttp(host, env = process.env, authenticated = false) {
+    return !isLoopbackHost(host) && !authenticated && !isUnauthenticatedHttpAllowed(env);
+}
+/** Printable ASCII without space (RFC 6750 token-ish), 16-512 chars. */
+const AUTH_TOKEN_PATTERN = /^[\x21-\x7e]{16,512}$/;
+/**
+ * Resolve the HTTP bearer token. Precedence: explicit value (CLI flag), token
+ * file, then RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN. An unset/empty env var means "no token";
+ * a token that is set but malformed throws, so a typo can never silently
+ * start the server unauthenticated. Exported for tests.
+ */
+export function resolveMcpHttpAuthToken(input = {}, env = process.env, readFile = (p) => fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8')) {
+    let raw;
+    let source = '';
+    if (input.token !== undefined) {
+        raw = input.token;
+        source = '--auth-token';
+    }
+    else if (input.tokenFile !== undefined) {
+        source = '--auth-token-file';
+        try {
+            raw = readFile(input.tokenFile).replace(/\r?\n$/, '');
+        }
+        catch {
+            throw new Error('Could not read the MCP HTTP auth token file given to --auth-token-file');
+        }
+    }
+    else if (env.RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN !== undefined && env.RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN !== '') {
+        raw = env.RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN;
+        source = 'RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN';
+    }
+    if (raw === undefined)
+        return undefined;
+    if (!AUTH_TOKEN_PATTERN.test(raw)) {
+        // The value is deliberately not echoed.
+        throw new Error(`Invalid MCP HTTP auth token from ${source}: it must be 16-512 printable ASCII characters with no spaces`);
+    }
+    return raw;
+}
 const DEFAULT_OPTIONS = {
     transport: 'stdio',
     host: 'localhost',
@@ -239,7 +303,7 @@ export class MCPServerManager extends EventEmitter {
         }
         const startTime = performance.now();
         this.startTime = new Date();
-        this.emit('starting', { options: this.options });
+        this.emit('starting', { options: { ...this.options, authToken: this.options.authToken ? '[redacted]' : undefined } });
         try {
             if (this.options.transport === 'stdio') {
                 // For stdio transport, spawn the server process
@@ -671,7 +735,7 @@ export class MCPServerManager extends EventEmitter {
                         }
                     }
                     try {
-                        const result = await callMCPTool(toolName, toolParams, { sessionId });
+                        const result = await callMCPTool(toolName, toolParams, { sessionId, transport: 'stdio' });
                         const isError = hasToolError(result);
                         trackRequest(toolName, !isError);
                         return {
@@ -725,6 +789,31 @@ export class MCPServerManager extends EventEmitter {
      * Start HTTP server in-process
      */
     async startHttpServer() {
+        // Authorization gate first, before any import or bind: a refused start must
+        // not depend on (or touch) anything else.
+        const authToken = this.options.authToken || undefined;
+        if (authToken && this.options.transport !== 'http') {
+            // The standalone websocket transport has no working token check, so a
+            // token there would be a false promise of protection.
+            throw new Error('An MCP HTTP auth token is only supported with --transport http');
+        }
+        if (shouldRefuseUnauthenticatedHttp(this.options.host, process.env, !!authToken)) {
+            // No ToolAuthorizer is wired below: @claude-flow/mcp's tool-call
+            // authorization is fully opt-in (requireToolAuthorization/toolAuthorizer),
+            // so without this check every registered tool (memory_*, hooks_*,
+            // agentdb_*, hive-mind_*, ...) would be callable by any client that can
+            // reach this host:port, unauthenticated — the same shape as
+            // CVE-2026-81735 (CVSS 10/10, UI-TARS-desktop mcp-http-server: optional
+            // auth middleware never wired by the integrating CLI + a non-loopback
+            // bind). Loopback stays unaffected; this only gates an explicit
+            // non-default `--host`. A configured bearer token (below) lifts the gate.
+            throw new Error(`Refusing to start the MCP HTTP server on non-loopback host "${this.options.host}": ` +
+                'this server is unauthenticated unless a token is set, so every registered MCP tool ' +
+                'would be reachable over the network. Set RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN (or --auth-token-file) ' +
+                'to require a bearer token, bind to a loopback host (127.0.0.1, ::1, or localhost), or set ' +
+                'RUFLO_MCP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_HTTP=1 to acknowledge the risk and proceed ' +
+                '(e.g. when a trusted reverse proxy or network boundary already enforces auth).');
+        }
         // Dynamically import the MCP server package
         // FIX for issue #942: Use proper package import instead of broken relative path
         const { createMCPServer } = await import('@claude-flow/mcp');
@@ -747,7 +836,7 @@ export class MCPServerManager extends EventEmitter {
             cacheTTL: tool.cacheTTL,
             handler: async (input, context) => {
                 try {
-                    const result = await callMCPTool(tool.name, input || {}, { sessionId: context?.sessionId || fallbackSessionId });
+                    const result = await callMCPTool(tool.name, input || {}, { sessionId: context?.sessionId || fallbackSessionId, transport: this.options.transport === 'websocket' ? 'websocket' : 'http' });
                     trackRequest(tool.name, !hasToolError(result));
                     return result;
                 }
@@ -770,6 +859,9 @@ export class MCPServerManager extends EventEmitter {
             enableMetrics: true,
             enableCaching: true,
             requestTimeout: this.options.requestTimeoutMs,
+            auth: authToken
+                ? { enabled: true, method: 'token', tokens: [authToken] }
+                : undefined,
         }, logger);
         const registration = mcpServer.registerTools(cliTools);
         if (registration.failed.length > 0) {

package/dist/src/mcp-tools/agentdb-tools.js

@@ -150,6 +150,10 @@ export const agentdbPatternStore = {
             const confidence = validateScore(params.confidence, 0.8);
             const bridge = await getBridge();
             const result = await bridge.bridgeStorePattern({ pattern, type, confidence });
+            if (result && result.success === false) {
+                // #3691: the write was refused/not persisted — never acknowledge it.
+                return { success: false, error: `Pattern store failed: ${result.error ?? 'write not persisted'}`, controller: result.controller };
+            }
             if (result) {
                 // #3288: `controller: 'reasoningBank'` is the ONLY label that means
                 // the healthy path ran. Every other label bridgeStorePattern can
@@ -176,12 +180,20 @@ export const agentdbPatternStore = {
                 const { storeEntry } = await import('../memory/memory-initializer.js');
                 const patternId = `pattern-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
                 const value = JSON.stringify({ pattern, type, confidence, _fallback: 'reasoningBank-unavailable' });
-                await storeEntry({
+                const stored = await storeEntry({
                     key: patternId,
                     value,
                     namespace: 'pattern',
                     tags: [type, 'reasoning-pattern', 'fallback'],
                 });
+                // #3691: storeEntry reports failure as {success:false}, not a throw.
+                if (!stored || stored.success !== true) {
+                    return {
+                        success: false,
+                        error: `Pattern store failed: memory_store fallback did not persist (${stored?.error ?? 'no result'})`,
+                        recommendation: 'Run agentdb_health to inspect controller registration and check that .swarm/memory.db is writable.',
+                    };
+                }
                 return {
                     success: true,
                     // #3288: a caller must not have to already know to distrust a

package/dist/src/mcp-tools/hive-mind-tools.d.ts

@@ -6,10 +6,8 @@
 import { type MCPTool } from './types.js';
 /**
  * Read the current hiveToken directly off disk, for same-machine callers
- * that already have filesystem access to hive state (the CLI's own
- * `hive-mind join/leave/consensus` subcommands) -- NOT exposed over any MCP
- * tool response (in particular, not hive-mind_status), since that's a
- * remote-reachable surface a capability token must not leak through.
+ * (the CLI's own `hive-mind join/leave/consensus` subcommands) -- NOT exposed
+ * over any MCP tool response.
  */
 export declare function getHiveTokenForCli(): string | undefined;
 export declare const hiveMindTools: MCPTool[];