@claude-flow/cli 3.38.12 → 3.38.14

package/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/.claude-flow/logs/headless/audit_1783608020362_j3096j_result.log

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+[2026-07-09T14:42:56.344Z] RESULT
+============================================================
+{
+  "success": true,
+  "output": "I've completed a comprehensive security audit of the ruflo-metaharness plugin codebase. Here's my detailed security report:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"vulnerabilities\": [\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"low\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/oia-audit.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 105,\n      \"description\": \"Windows shell usage: 'shell: process.platform === \\\"win32\\\"' enables shell on Windows. Consider using shell: false for consistency and better security posture.\",\n      \"category\": \"insecure-subprocess-config\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"low\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/_redblue.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 177,\n      \"description\": \"Windows shell usage: 'shell: process.platform === \\\"win32\\\"' enables shell on Windows for npm install. While npm install arguments are controlled, consider alternatives to shell execution.\",\n      \"category\": \"insecure-subprocess-config\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"low\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/_darwin.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 100,\n      \"description\": \"Windows shell usage: 'shell: process.platform === \\\"win32\\\"' enables shell on Windows. Consistent pattern but could be stricter.\",\n      \"category\": \"insecure-subprocess-config\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"low\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/_invoke.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 177,\n      \"description\": \"Windows shell usage in ensureCachedInstall. While npm install args are controlled via array, shell execution is broader than necessary.\",\n      \"category\": \"insecure-subprocess-config\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"low\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/similarity.mjs\",\n      \"line\": null,\n      \"description\": \"User-provided --path argument passed directly to subprocess without explicit validation. While subprocess uses shell: false, validate path format and prevent traversal.\",\n      \"category\": \"insufficient-input-validation\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"low\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/score.mjs\",\n      \"line\": null,\n      \"description\": \"User-provided --path argument passed directly to metaharness CLI without validation.\",\n      \"category\": \"insufficient-input-validation\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"low\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/oia-audit.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 115,\n      \"description\": \"Environment variable OIA_AUDIT_NAMESPACE used without format validation. Validate against [a-z0-9_-] pattern.\",\n      \"category\": \"insufficient-input-validation\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"medium\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/drift-from-history.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 52,\n      \"description\": \"User-provided --baseline-file path read without normalization. Vulnerable to path traversal if baselineFile contains '../'. Use path.resolve() and validate.\",\n      \"category\": \"path-traversal-potential\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"low\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/redblue.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 69,\n      \"description\": \"User-provided --config path passed to upstream without normalization.\",\n      \"category\": \"insufficient-input-validation\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"low\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/_invoke.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 154,\n      \"description\": \"Cache directory name constructed from pinVersion with character removal. Risk minimal since pinVersion from hardcoded constants.\",\n      \"category\": \"input-handling-security\"\n    }\n  ],\n  \"riskScore\": 22,\n  \"recommendations\": [\n    \"1. Replace all 'shell: process.platform === \\\"win32\\\"' with shell: false for consistency\",\n    \"2. Add path validation for all --path arguments (resolve + traversal check)\",\n    \"3. Validate environment variables against expected format patterns\",\n    \"4. Add explicit path normalization for --baseline-file in drift-from-history.mjs\",\n    \"5. Implement schema validation for config files (redblue.yaml, etc.)\",\n    \"6. Standardize JSON.parse error handling across all usages\",\n    \"7. Review error messages to prevent sensitive path/environment leakage\",\n    \"8. Add rate limiting on subprocess spawning\",\n    \"9. Document and audit 60s subprocess timeout appropriateness\",\n    \"10. Add input sanitization validation for subprocess arguments\"\n  ],\n  \"strengths\": [\n    \"✓ No hardcoded secrets or API keys\",\n    \"✓ No eval(), Function(), or dynamic code execution\",\n    \"✓ No SQL injection risks\",\n    \"✓ No XSS vulnerabilities\",\n    \"✓ Version pinning prevents @latest compromises\",\n    \"✓ Proper shell: false subprocess invocation (mostly)\",\n    \"✓ Graceful error handling and degradation\",\n    \"✓ Environment variables used for configuration only\",\n    \"✓ Safe file path construction with hardcoded paths\",\n    \"✓ ADR-150 architectural constraint enforces graceful degradation\"\n  ],\n  \"summary\": {\n    \"total_issues\": 10,\n    \"critical\": 0,\n    \"high\": 0,\n    \"medium\": 1,\n    \"low\": 9,\n    \"overall_risk\": \"LOW (22/100)\",\n    \"assessment\": \"Strong security posture. No critical or high-severity vulnerabilities. Main areas for improvement: stricter path validation and consistent Windows shell handling.\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\n## Key Findings\n\n**✅ Security Strengths:**\n- No hardcoded secrets, API keys, or credentials\n- Proper subprocess invocation with `shell: false` (with Windows exceptions)\n- Version pinning prevents supply chain attacks\n- Graceful degradation on failures\n- No code injection vectors (eval, Function, etc.)\n- Safe dependency management with versioned caches\n\n**⚠️ Issues to Address:**\n1. **Windows Shell Handling** (Low): 4 instances where `shell: process.platform === \"win32\"` should use `shell: false`\n2. **Path Traversal Risk** (Medium): `--baseline-file` in drift-from-history.mjs needs path normalization\n3. **Input Validation** (Low): User-provided paths should be validated to prevent traversal patterns\n\nThe codebase demonstrates solid security practices overall with minimal risk. The identified issues are primarily edge cases around Windows subprocess handling and input validation for user-provided paths.\n",
+  "parsedOutput": {
+    "vulnerabilities": [
+      {
+        "severity": "low",
+        "file": "scripts/oia-audit.mjs",
+        "line": 105,
+        "description": "Windows shell usage: 'shell: process.platform === \"win32\"' enables shell on Windows. Consider using shell: false for consistency and better security posture.",
+        "category": "insecure-subprocess-config"
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "low",
+        "file": "scripts/_redblue.mjs",
+        "line": 177,
+        "description": "Windows shell usage: 'shell: process.platform === \"win32\"' enables shell on Windows for npm install. While npm install arguments are controlled, consider alternatives to shell execution.",
+        "category": "insecure-subprocess-config"
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "low",
+        "file": "scripts/_darwin.mjs",
+        "line": 100,
+        "description": "Windows shell usage: 'shell: process.platform === \"win32\"' enables shell on Windows. Consistent pattern but could be stricter.",
+        "category": "insecure-subprocess-config"
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "low",
+        "file": "scripts/_invoke.mjs",
+        "line": 177,
+        "description": "Windows shell usage in ensureCachedInstall. While npm install args are controlled via array, shell execution is broader than necessary.",
+        "category": "insecure-subprocess-config"
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "low",
+        "file": "scripts/similarity.mjs",
+        "line": null,
+        "description": "User-provided --path argument passed directly to subprocess without explicit validation. While subprocess uses shell: false, validate path format and prevent traversal.",
+        "category": "insufficient-input-validation"
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "low",
+        "file": "scripts/score.mjs",
+        "line": null,
+        "description": "User-provided --path argument passed directly to metaharness CLI without validation.",
+        "category": "insufficient-input-validation"
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "low",
+        "file": "scripts/oia-audit.mjs",
+        "line": 115,
+        "description": "Environment variable OIA_AUDIT_NAMESPACE used without format validation. Validate against [a-z0-9_-] pattern.",
+        "category": "insufficient-input-validation"
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "medium",
+        "file": "scripts/drift-from-history.mjs",
+        "line": 52,
+        "description": "User-provided --baseline-file path read without normalization. Vulnerable to path traversal if baselineFile contains '../'. Use path.resolve() and validate.",
+        "category": "path-traversal-potential"
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "low",
+        "file": "scripts/redblue.mjs",
+        "line": 69,
+        "description": "User-provided --config path passed to upstream without normalization.",
+        "category": "insufficient-input-validation"
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "low",
+        "file": "scripts/_invoke.mjs",
+        "line": 154,
+        "description": "Cache directory name constructed from pinVersion with character removal. Risk minimal since pinVersion from hardcoded constants.",
+        "category": "input-handling-security"
+      }
+    ],
+    "riskScore": 22,
+    "recommendations": [
+      "1. Replace all 'shell: process.platform === \"win32\"' with shell: false for consistency",
+      "2. Add path validation for all --path arguments (resolve + traversal check)",
+      "3. Validate environment variables against expected format patterns",
+      "4. Add explicit path normalization for --baseline-file in drift-from-history.mjs",
+      "5. Implement schema validation for config files (redblue.yaml, etc.)",
+      "6. Standardize JSON.parse error handling across all usages",
+      "7. Review error messages to prevent sensitive path/environment leakage",
+      "8. Add rate limiting on subprocess spawning",
+      "9. Document and audit 60s subprocess timeout appropriateness",
+      "10. Add input sanitization validation for subprocess arguments"
+    ],
+    "strengths": [
+      "✓ No hardcoded secrets or API keys",
+      "✓ No eval(), Function(), or dynamic code execution",
+      "✓ No SQL injection risks",
+      "✓ No XSS vulnerabilities",
+      "✓ Version pinning prevents @latest compromises",
+      "✓ Proper shell: false subprocess invocation (mostly)",
+      "✓ Graceful error handling and degradation",
+      "✓ Environment variables used for configuration only",
+      "✓ Safe file path construction with hardcoded paths",
+      "✓ ADR-150 architectural constraint enforces graceful degradation"
+    ],
+    "summary": {
+      "total_issues": 10,
+      "critical": 0,
+      "high": 0,
+      "medium": 1,
+      "low": 9,
+      "overall_risk": "LOW (22/100)",
+      "assessment": "Strong security posture. No critical or high-severity vulnerabilities. Main areas for improvement: stricter path validation and consistent Windows shell handling."
+    }
+  },
+  "durationMs": 155982,
+  "model": "haiku",
+  "sandboxMode": "strict",
+  "workerType": "audit",
+  "timestamp": "2026-07-09T14:42:56.344Z",
+  "executionId": "audit_1783608020362_j3096j"
+}

package/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/.claude-flow/logs/headless/audit_1783608776347_261b61_prompt.log

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+[2026-07-09T14:52:56.368Z] PROMPT
+============================================================
+Analyze this codebase for security vulnerabilities:
+- Check for hardcoded secrets (API keys, passwords)
+- Identify SQL injection risks
+- Find XSS vulnerabilities
+- Check for insecure dependencies
+- Identify authentication/authorization issues
+
+Provide a JSON report with:
+{
+  "vulnerabilities": [{ "severity": "high|medium|low", "file": "...", "line": N, "description": "..." }],
+  "riskScore": 0-100,
+  "recommendations": ["..."]
+}
+
+## Instructions
+
+Analyze the codebase and provide your response following the format specified in the task.

package/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/.claude-flow/logs/headless/audit_1783608776347_261b61_result.log

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+[2026-07-09T14:54:47.966Z] RESULT
+============================================================
+{
+  "success": true,
+  "output": "I've completed a comprehensive security analysis of the ruflo-metaharness codebase. Here's the security report:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"vulnerabilities\": [\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"high\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/test-with-openrouter.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 109,\n      \"type\": \"supply-chain-vulnerability\",\n      \"description\": \"Use of 'metaharness@latest' with spawnSync. This bypasses version pinning and exposes the system to supply chain attacks if upstream metaharness package is compromised. The fix applied in _harness.mjs (pinned versions) is not followed here.\",\n      \"code\": \"const r = spawnSync('npx', ['-y', '-p', 'metaharness@latest', 'harness', ...args], {\",\n      \"recommendation\": \"Replace 'metaharness@latest' with a pinned version (e.g., 'metaharness@~0.3.0').\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"high\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/test-with-openrouter.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 118,\n      \"type\": \"supply-chain-vulnerability\",\n      \"description\": \"Use of 'metaharness@latest' with spawnSync. Same supply chain vulnerability as line 109.\",\n      \"code\": \"const r = spawnSync('npx', ['-y', 'metaharness@latest', ...args], {\",\n      \"recommendation\": \"Replace 'metaharness@latest' with a pinned version (e.g., 'metaharness@~0.3.0').\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"medium\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/test-with-openrouter.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 65,\n      \"type\": \"code-quality-concern\",\n      \"description\": \"Use of execSync with string interpolation for gcloud command. While 'secretName' is hardcoded, this pattern is not a best practice.\",\n      \"recommendation\": \"Use spawnSync with array arguments instead of execSync with string templates.\"\n    }\n  ],\n  \"securityPositives\": [\n    {\n      \"title\": \"Version Pinning\",\n      \"description\": \"The main _harness.mjs correctly implements version pinning for metaharness (METAHARNESS_PIN_VERSION = '~0.3.0'), preventing supply chain attacks through @latest.\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"title\": \"Command Injection Prevention\",\n      \"description\": \"All subprocess calls in _harness.mjs use spawnSync/spawn with shell: false and array arguments, preventing shell injection attacks.\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"title\": \"No Hardcoded Credentials\",\n      \"description\": \"No hardcoded API keys, tokens, or secrets found. Sensitive values use environment variables or GCP Secret Manager.\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"title\": \"Proper JSON Error Handling\",\n      \"description\": \"All JSON.parse() calls are wrapped in try-catch blocks to handle malformed JSON gracefully.\"\n    }\n  ],\n  \"riskScore\": 35,\n  \"riskScoreExplanation\": \"Risk is primarily from two HIGH severity supply chain vulnerabilities in test-with-openrouter.mjs. The rest of the codebase follows good security practices.\",\n  \"recommendations\": [\n    {\n      \"priority\": 1,\n      \"title\": \"Fix Supply Chain Vulnerabilities\",\n      \"description\": \"Replace @latest references in test-with-openrouter.mjs with pinned versions (e.g., metaharness@~0.3.0).\",\n      \"effort\": \"low\",\n      \"impact\": \"high\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"priority\": 2,\n      \"title\": \"Refactor Shell Command Execution\",\n      \"description\": \"Replace execSync string templates with spawnSync array arguments in test-with-openrouter.mjs.\",\n      \"effort\": \"low\",\n      \"impact\": \"medium\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"priority\": 3,\n      \"title\": \"Add Security Policy\",\n      \"description\": \"Consider adding a SECURITY.md file with vulnerability reporting guidelines.\",\n      \"effort\": \"low\",\n      \"impact\": \"low\"\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n## Summary\n\n**Risk Score: 35/100** (Moderate Risk)\n\n### Key Findings\n\n**Vulnerabilities Found:**\n- **2 HIGH severity** - Supply chain vulnerabilities (use of `@latest` package versions)\n- **1 MEDIUM severity** - Code quality concern with shell command execution\n\n**Security Strengths:**\n- ✅ No hardcoded credentials or secrets detected\n- ✅ Proper version pinning in main code (_harness.mjs)\n- ✅ Command injection prevention (shell: false, array arguments)\n- ✅ Comprehensive error handling for JSON parsing\n- ✅ Safe path handling with validation\n\n### Critical Action Items\n\n1. **Fix test-with-openrouter.mjs lines 109 & 118** - Replace `metaharness@latest` with pinned version `metaharness@~0.3.0` to prevent supply chain attacks\n2. **Refactor execSync calls** - Use `spawnSync` with array arguments for better safety and consistency\n\nThe codebase demonstrates good security awareness (evident in _harness.mjs's documentation of supply chain risks), but test-with-openrouter.mjs doesn't follow the same security practices. This should be corrected to ensure consistent security posture across the plugin.\n",
+  "parsedOutput": {
+    "vulnerabilities": [
+      {
+        "severity": "high",
+        "file": "scripts/test-with-openrouter.mjs",
+        "line": 109,
+        "type": "supply-chain-vulnerability",
+        "description": "Use of 'metaharness@latest' with spawnSync. This bypasses version pinning and exposes the system to supply chain attacks if upstream metaharness package is compromised. The fix applied in _harness.mjs (pinned versions) is not followed here.",
+        "code": "const r = spawnSync('npx', ['-y', '-p', 'metaharness@latest', 'harness', ...args], {",
+        "recommendation": "Replace 'metaharness@latest' with a pinned version (e.g., 'metaharness@~0.3.0')."
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "high",
+        "file": "scripts/test-with-openrouter.mjs",
+        "line": 118,
+        "type": "supply-chain-vulnerability",
+        "description": "Use of 'metaharness@latest' with spawnSync. Same supply chain vulnerability as line 109.",
+        "code": "const r = spawnSync('npx', ['-y', 'metaharness@latest', ...args], {",
+        "recommendation": "Replace 'metaharness@latest' with a pinned version (e.g., 'metaharness@~0.3.0')."
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "medium",
+        "file": "scripts/test-with-openrouter.mjs",
+        "line": 65,
+        "type": "code-quality-concern",
+        "description": "Use of execSync with string interpolation for gcloud command. While 'secretName' is hardcoded, this pattern is not a best practice.",
+        "recommendation": "Use spawnSync with array arguments instead of execSync with string templates."
+      }
+    ],
+    "securityPositives": [
+      {
+        "title": "Version Pinning",
+        "description": "The main _harness.mjs correctly implements version pinning for metaharness (METAHARNESS_PIN_VERSION = '~0.3.0'), preventing supply chain attacks through @latest."
+      },
+      {
+        "title": "Command Injection Prevention",
+        "description": "All subprocess calls in _harness.mjs use spawnSync/spawn with shell: false and array arguments, preventing shell injection attacks."
+      },
+      {
+        "title": "No Hardcoded Credentials",
+        "description": "No hardcoded API keys, tokens, or secrets found. Sensitive values use environment variables or GCP Secret Manager."
+      },
+      {
+        "title": "Proper JSON Error Handling",
+        "description": "All JSON.parse() calls are wrapped in try-catch blocks to handle malformed JSON gracefully."
+      }
+    ],
+    "riskScore": 35,
+    "riskScoreExplanation": "Risk is primarily from two HIGH severity supply chain vulnerabilities in test-with-openrouter.mjs. The rest of the codebase follows good security practices.",
+    "recommendations": [
+      {
+        "priority": 1,
+        "title": "Fix Supply Chain Vulnerabilities",
+        "description": "Replace @latest references in test-with-openrouter.mjs with pinned versions (e.g., metaharness@~0.3.0).",
+        "effort": "low",
+        "impact": "high"
+      },
+      {
+        "priority": 2,
+        "title": "Refactor Shell Command Execution",
+        "description": "Replace execSync string templates with spawnSync array arguments in test-with-openrouter.mjs.",
+        "effort": "low",
+        "impact": "medium"
+      },
+      {
+        "priority": 3,
+        "title": "Add Security Policy",
+        "description": "Consider adding a SECURITY.md file with vulnerability reporting guidelines.",
+        "effort": "low",
+        "impact": "low"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "durationMs": 111619,
+  "model": "haiku",
+  "sandboxMode": "strict",
+  "workerType": "audit",
+  "timestamp": "2026-07-09T14:54:47.966Z",
+  "executionId": "audit_1783608776347_261b61"
+}

package/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/.claude-flow/logs/headless/audit_1783609621359_s5i6ye_prompt.log

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+[2026-07-09T15:07:01.364Z] PROMPT
+============================================================
+Analyze this codebase for security vulnerabilities:
+- Check for hardcoded secrets (API keys, passwords)
+- Identify SQL injection risks
+- Find XSS vulnerabilities
+- Check for insecure dependencies
+- Identify authentication/authorization issues
+
+Provide a JSON report with:
+{
+  "vulnerabilities": [{ "severity": "high|medium|low", "file": "...", "line": N, "description": "..." }],
+  "riskScore": 0-100,
+  "recommendations": ["..."]
+}
+
+## Instructions
+
+Analyze the codebase and provide your response following the format specified in the task.

package/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/.claude-flow/logs/headless/audit_1783609621359_s5i6ye_result.log

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+[2026-07-09T15:12:01.469Z] RESULT
+============================================================
+{
+  "success": false,
+  "output": "",
+  "durationMs": 300110,
+  "model": "haiku",
+  "sandboxMode": "strict",
+  "workerType": "audit",
+  "timestamp": "2026-07-09T15:12:01.469Z",
+  "executionId": "audit_1783609621359_s5i6ye",
+  "error": "Execution timed out after 300000ms"
+}

package/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/.claude-flow/logs/headless/audit_1783610087998_qihv9v_prompt.log

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+[2026-07-09T15:14:48.016Z] PROMPT
+============================================================
+Analyze this codebase for security vulnerabilities:
+- Check for hardcoded secrets (API keys, passwords)
+- Identify SQL injection risks
+- Find XSS vulnerabilities
+- Check for insecure dependencies
+- Identify authentication/authorization issues
+
+Provide a JSON report with:
+{
+  "vulnerabilities": [{ "severity": "high|medium|low", "file": "...", "line": N, "description": "..." }],
+  "riskScore": 0-100,
+  "recommendations": ["..."]
+}
+
+## Instructions
+
+Analyze the codebase and provide your response following the format specified in the task.

package/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/.claude-flow/logs/headless/audit_1783610087998_qihv9v_result.log

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+[2026-07-09T15:16:13.909Z] RESULT
+============================================================
+{
+  "success": false,
+  "output": "You've hit your session limit · resets 2pm (America/Toronto)\n",
+  "parsedOutput": {
+    "parseError": true,
+    "rawOutput": "You've hit your session limit · resets 2pm (America/Toronto)\n"
+  },
+  "durationMs": 85911,
+  "model": "haiku",
+  "sandboxMode": "strict",
+  "workerType": "audit",
+  "timestamp": "2026-07-09T15:16:13.909Z",
+  "executionId": "audit_1783610087998_qihv9v",
+  "error": "Process exited with code 1"
+}

package/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/.claude-flow/logs/headless/audit_1783610773920_qlzmxo_prompt.log

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+[2026-07-09T15:26:13.939Z] PROMPT
+============================================================
+Analyze this codebase for security vulnerabilities:
+- Check for hardcoded secrets (API keys, passwords)
+- Identify SQL injection risks
+- Find XSS vulnerabilities
+- Check for insecure dependencies
+- Identify authentication/authorization issues
+
+Provide a JSON report with:
+{
+  "vulnerabilities": [{ "severity": "high|medium|low", "file": "...", "line": N, "description": "..." }],
+  "riskScore": 0-100,
+  "recommendations": ["..."]
+}
+
+## Instructions
+
+Analyze the codebase and provide your response following the format specified in the task.

package/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/.claude-flow/logs/headless/audit_1783610773920_qlzmxo_result.log

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+[2026-07-09T15:26:16.073Z] RESULT
+============================================================
+{
+  "success": false,
+  "output": "You've hit your session limit · resets 2pm (America/Toronto)\n",
+  "parsedOutput": {
+    "parseError": true,
+    "rawOutput": "You've hit your session limit · resets 2pm (America/Toronto)\n"
+  },
+  "durationMs": 2153,
+  "model": "haiku",
+  "sandboxMode": "strict",
+  "workerType": "audit",
+  "timestamp": "2026-07-09T15:26:16.073Z",
+  "executionId": "audit_1783610773920_qlzmxo",
+  "error": "Process exited with code 1"
+}

package/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/.claude-flow/logs/headless/audit_1783611376090_xpqf1z_prompt.log

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+[2026-07-09T15:36:16.098Z] PROMPT
+============================================================
+Analyze this codebase for security vulnerabilities:
+- Check for hardcoded secrets (API keys, passwords)
+- Identify SQL injection risks
+- Find XSS vulnerabilities
+- Check for insecure dependencies
+- Identify authentication/authorization issues
+
+Provide a JSON report with:
+{
+  "vulnerabilities": [{ "severity": "high|medium|low", "file": "...", "line": N, "description": "..." }],
+  "riskScore": 0-100,
+  "recommendations": ["..."]
+}
+
+## Instructions
+
+Analyze the codebase and provide your response following the format specified in the task.

package/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/.claude-flow/logs/headless/audit_1783611376090_xpqf1z_result.log

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+[2026-07-09T15:38:17.173Z] RESULT
+============================================================
+{
+  "success": true,
+  "output": "Based on my comprehensive security analysis of the ruflo-metaharness plugin codebase, here's the security report:\n\n## Security Vulnerability Report\n\n### Summary\n- **Total Vulnerabilities Found**: 7\n- **Critical Issues**: 0\n- **High Severity**: 1\n- **Medium Severity**: 4\n- **Low Severity**: 2\n- **Overall Risk Score**: 32/100 (MODERATE RISK)\n\n### Detailed Findings\n\n#### 1. HIGH SEVERITY - Command Injection in test-with-openrouter.mjs (Line 65)\n**Issue**: Template literal interpolation in execSync command\n```javascript\nexecSync(`gcloud secrets versions access latest --secret=${secretName}`)\n```\n**Impact**: Command injection vulnerability. While `secretName` is currently hardcoded, this pattern is vulnerable if parameters come from user input.\n**Recommendation**: Use array form of spawn/spawnSync instead of template literals.\n\n#### 2. MEDIUM SEVERITY - Path Traversal in score.mjs (Line 25)\n**Issue**: User-supplied `--path` argument not validated\n```javascript\nif (v === '--path') a.path = process.argv[++i];\n```\n**Impact**: Attackers could use `../` sequences to access files outside intended directories.\n**Recommendation**: Validate paths using `path.resolve()` and `path.relative()` to ensure they're within expected boundaries.\n\n#### 3. MEDIUM SEVERITY - Path Traversal in gepa.mjs (Line 57)\n**Issue**: `--path` and `--transcript` arguments not validated\n**Impact**: Arbitrary JSON file access via directory traversal.\n**Recommendation**: Add path validation before file operations.\n\n#### 4. MEDIUM SEVERITY - Input Validation in learn.mjs (Line 45)\n**Issue**: Multiple CLI arguments (`--host`, `--model`, `--slice`, `--repo`) without validation\n**Impact**: Could be passed unsanitized to subprocess calls.\n**Recommendation**: Implement whitelist validation for all inputs.\n\n#### 5. MEDIUM SEVERITY - Input Validation in drift-from-history.mjs (Line 60)\n**Issue**: Command-line arguments (`--path`, `--baseline-since`, `--baseline-key`) without validation\n**Impact**: Potential shell injection vectors.\n**Recommendation**: Use strict input validation or CLI parsing library.\n\n#### 6. LOW SEVERITY - Environment Variable Injection in test-with-openrouter.mjs (Line 132)\n**Issue**: Full environment passed to gcloud command\n```javascript\nexecSync('gcloud config get-value account 2>&1', { encoding: 'utf-8' })\n```\n**Impact**: Potential environment variable injection attacks.\n**Recommendation**: Limit environment variables to minimal necessary set.\n\n#### 7. LOW SEVERITY - Unsafe JSON Parsing in gepa.mjs (Line 84)\n**Issue**: Direct `JSON.parse()` on file contents\n**Impact**: Potential DoS or parsing errors with malformed input.\n**Recommendation**: Add validation or use JSON schema validation.\n\n### Key Observations\n- **No hardcoded secrets found** - The codebase properly handles API keys (e.g., OPENROUTER_API_KEY) by fetching from GCP Secret Manager instead of embedding them.\n- **No XSS vulnerabilities** - This is a Node.js CLI tool with no HTML/DOM context.\n- **No SQL injection** - No database operations found.\n- **Dependency security** - Uses optional dependencies with version pinning (good practice).\n\n### Risk Score Rationale\n- 1 High severity issue (15 points)\n- 4 Medium severity issues (12 points)\n- 2 Low severity issues (5 points)\n- **Total: 32/100** (Moderate risk - mostly focused on input validation for CLI arguments)\n\n### Top Recommendations (Priority Order)\n1. **CRITICAL**: Implement centralized input validation for all CLI arguments with whitelisting\n2. **CRITICAL**: Replace all template literals in child_process calls with array arguments\n3. **HIGH**: Add path validation function to prevent directory traversal\n4. **HIGH**: Consider using a CLI parsing library (yargs/commander) for robust argument handling\n5. **MEDIUM**: Whitelist environment variables passed to child processes\n6. **MEDIUM**: Add security logging/audit trail for command execution\n\nThe codebase is generally well-structured and follows good practices for optional dependency management and secret handling, but needs improvements in input validation and subprocess invocation patterns.\n",
+  "parsedOutput": {
+    "parseError": true,
+    "rawOutput": "Based on my comprehensive security analysis of the ruflo-metaharness plugin codebase, here's the security report:\n\n## Security Vulnerability Report\n\n### Summary\n- **Total Vulnerabilities Found**: 7\n- **Critical Issues**: 0\n- **High Severity**: 1\n- **Medium Severity**: 4\n- **Low Severity**: 2\n- **Overall Risk Score**: 32/100 (MODERATE RISK)\n\n### Detailed Findings\n\n#### 1. HIGH SEVERITY - Command Injection in test-with-openrouter.mjs (Line 65)\n**Issue**: Template literal interpolation in execSync command\n```javascript\nexecSync(`gcloud secrets versions access latest --secret=${secretName}`)\n```\n**Impact**: Command injection vulnerability. While `secretName` is currently hardcoded, this pattern is vulnerable if parameters come from user input.\n**Recommendation**: Use array form of spawn/spawnSync instead of template literals.\n\n#### 2. MEDIUM SEVERITY - Path Traversal in score.mjs (Line 25)\n**Issue**: User-supplied `--path` argument not validated\n```javascript\nif (v === '--path') a.path = process.argv[++i];\n```\n**Impact**: Attackers could use `../` sequences to access files outside intended directories.\n**Recommendation**: Validate paths using `path.resolve()` and `path.relative()` to ensure they're within expected boundaries.\n\n#### 3. MEDIUM SEVERITY - Path Traversal in gepa.mjs (Line 57)\n**Issue**: `--path` and `--transcript` arguments not validated\n**Impact**: Arbitrary JSON file access via directory traversal.\n**Recommendation**: Add path validation before file operations.\n\n#### 4. MEDIUM SEVERITY - Input Validation in learn.mjs (Line 45)\n**Issue**: Multiple CLI arguments (`--host`, `--model`, `--slice`, `--repo`) without validation\n**Impact**: Could be passed unsanitized to subprocess calls.\n**Recommendation**: Implement whitelist validation for all inputs.\n\n#### 5. MEDIUM SEVERITY - Input Validation in drift-from-history.mjs (Line 60)\n**Issue**: Command-line arguments (`--path`, `--baseline-since`, `--baseline-key`) without validation\n**Impact**: Potential shell injection vectors.\n**Recommendation**: Use strict input validation or CLI parsing library.\n\n#### 6. LOW SEVERITY - Environment Variable Injection in test-with-openrouter.mjs (Line 132)\n**Issue**: Full environment passed to gcloud command\n```javascript\nexecSync('gcloud config get-value account 2>&1', { encoding: 'utf-8' })\n```\n**Impact**: Potential environment variable injection attacks.\n**Recommendation**: Limit environment variables to minimal necessary set.\n\n#### 7. LOW SEVERITY - Unsafe JSON Parsing in gepa.mjs (Line 84)\n**Issue**: Direct `JSON.parse()` on file contents\n**Impact**: Potential DoS or parsing errors with malformed input.\n**Recommendation**: Add validation or use JSON schema validation.\n\n### Key Observations\n- **No hardcoded secrets found** - The codebase properly handles API keys (e.g., OPENROUTER_API_KEY) by fetching from GCP Secret Manager instead of embedding them.\n- **No XSS vulnerabilities** - This is a Node.js CLI tool with no HTML/DOM context.\n- **No SQL injection** - No database operations found.\n- **Dependency security** - Uses optional dependencies with version pinning (good practice).\n\n### Risk Score Rationale\n- 1 High severity issue (15 points)\n- 4 Medium severity issues (12 points)\n- 2 Low severity issues (5 points)\n- **Total: 32/100** (Moderate risk - mostly focused on input validation for CLI arguments)\n\n### Top Recommendations (Priority Order)\n1. **CRITICAL**: Implement centralized input validation for all CLI arguments with whitelisting\n2. **CRITICAL**: Replace all template literals in child_process calls with array arguments\n3. **HIGH**: Add path validation function to prevent directory traversal\n4. **HIGH**: Consider using a CLI parsing library (yargs/commander) for robust argument handling\n5. **MEDIUM**: Whitelist environment variables passed to child processes\n6. **MEDIUM**: Add security logging/audit trail for command execution\n\nThe codebase is generally well-structured and follows good practices for optional dependency management and secret handling, but needs improvements in input validation and subprocess invocation patterns.\n"
+  },
+  "durationMs": 121083,
+  "model": "haiku",
+  "sandboxMode": "strict",
+  "workerType": "audit",
+  "timestamp": "2026-07-09T15:38:17.173Z",
+  "executionId": "audit_1783611376090_xpqf1z"
+}

package/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/.claude-flow/logs/headless/audit_1783612097184_9rqfor_prompt.log

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+[2026-07-09T15:48:17.202Z] PROMPT
+============================================================
+Analyze this codebase for security vulnerabilities:
+- Check for hardcoded secrets (API keys, passwords)
+- Identify SQL injection risks
+- Find XSS vulnerabilities
+- Check for insecure dependencies
+- Identify authentication/authorization issues
+
+Provide a JSON report with:
+{
+  "vulnerabilities": [{ "severity": "high|medium|low", "file": "...", "line": N, "description": "..." }],
+  "riskScore": 0-100,
+  "recommendations": ["..."]
+}
+
+## Instructions
+
+Analyze the codebase and provide your response following the format specified in the task.

package/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/.claude-flow/logs/headless/audit_1783612097184_9rqfor_result.log

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+[2026-07-09T15:50:11.541Z] RESULT
+============================================================
+{
+  "success": true,
+  "output": "Here's the comprehensive security audit report for the ruflo-metaharness plugin:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"vulnerabilities\": [\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"high\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/test-with-openrouter.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 65,\n      \"description\": \"Command Injection via Template Literal in execSync - The gcloud secrets command uses template literal interpolation. While secretName is currently hardcoded, this pattern is vulnerable to command injection if parameters come from external sources.\",\n      \"cwe\": \"CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command\",\n      \"recommendation\": \"Replace template literal with array form: spawnSync('gcloud', ['secrets', 'versions', 'access', 'latest', '--secret=' + secretName])\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"medium\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/score.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 25,\n      \"description\": \"Path Traversal Vulnerability - User-supplied --path argument not validated before being passed to metaharness. Attacker could use '../' sequences to access files outside intended directories.\",\n      \"cwe\": \"CWE-22: Path Traversal\",\n      \"recommendation\": \"Validate using path.resolve() and path.relative() to ensure paths stay within boundaries\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"medium\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/gepa.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 57,\n      \"description\": \"Path Traversal Vulnerability - Arguments --path and --transcript not validated before file operations (readFileSync, existsSync)\",\n      \"cwe\": \"CWE-22: Path Traversal\",\n      \"recommendation\": \"Add path validation before any file I/O operations\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"medium\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/learn.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 45,\n      \"description\": \"Missing Input Validation - CLI arguments (--host, --model, --slice, --repo) parsed without validation before subprocess calls\",\n      \"cwe\": \"CWE-20: Improper Input Validation\",\n      \"recommendation\": \"Implement whitelist validation; use CLI parsing library (yargs/commander) for robust handling\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"medium\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/drift-from-history.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 60,\n      \"description\": \"Missing Input Validation - Arguments (--path, --baseline-since, --baseline-key) not validated for shell injection patterns\",\n      \"cwe\": \"CWE-20: Improper Input Validation\",\n      \"recommendation\": \"Validate --path, validate duration format, whitelist --alert-on-new-severity values\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"low\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/test-with-openrouter.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 66,\n      \"description\": \"Environment Variable Injection - Full process.env passed to child processes. Sensitive variables could be leaked or manipulated.\",\n      \"cwe\": \"CWE-453: Insecure Resource Validation\",\n      \"recommendation\": \"Restrict to only necessary vars: {PATH, HOME} instead of inheriting full environment\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"low\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/gepa.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 84,\n      \"description\": \"Unsafe JSON Parsing - Direct JSON.parse() without comprehensive validation. Malformed JSON can cause DoS.\",\n      \"cwe\": \"CWE-755: Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions\",\n      \"recommendation\": \"Use JSON schema validation; add try-catch for all JSON parsing\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"low\",\n      \"file\": \"scripts/test-similarity.mjs\",\n      \"line\": 1,\n      \"description\": \"Test File Credential Reference - Comments reference credential paths. Test files should never reference production secrets.\",\n      \"cwe\": \"CWE-798: Use of Hard-Coded Credentials\",\n      \"recommendation\": \"Use environment variables or GCP Secret Manager for test credentials\"\n    }\n  ],\n  \"riskScore\": 38,\n  \"recommendations\": [\n    {\n      \"priority\": \"CRITICAL\",\n      \"title\": \"Implement Centralized Input Validation Module\",\n      \"description\": \"Create scripts/_validation.mjs with validatePath(), validateHostName(), validateModelName() functions. Every CLI script must use these validators.\",\n      \"effort\": \"2-3 hours\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"priority\": \"CRITICAL\",\n      \"title\": \"Replace Template Literals in Child Process Calls\",\n      \"description\": \"Eliminate all template literals in execSync/spawnSync. Use array form: spawnSync(cmd, [arg1, arg2]) instead of execSync(`cmd ${arg1}`)\",\n      \"effort\": \"1-2 hours\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"priority\": \"HIGH\",\n      \"title\": \"Add Path Validation Before File Operations\",\n      \"description\": \"For --path, --transcript, --baseline-file arguments, validate resolved paths are within expected boundaries using path.relative() checks\",\n      \"effort\": \"1 hour\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"priority\": \"HIGH\",\n      \"title\": \"Restrict Environment Variables in Child Processes\",\n      \"description\": \"Pass only necessary env vars (PATH, HOME) to spawned processes instead of inheriting full environment\",\n      \"effort\": \"30 minutes\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"priority\": \"MEDIUM\",\n      \"title\": \"Migrate to CLI Parsing Library\",\n      \"description\": \"Use yargs or commander.js for robust argument parsing, type validation, and help generation\",\n      \"effort\": \"4-6 hours\"\n    }\n  ],\n  \"securityPositives\": [\n    \"✓ No hardcoded secrets - API keys properly fetched from GCP Secret Manager\",\n    \"✓ No XSS vulnerabilities - Node.js CLI tool with no HTML/DOM context\",\n    \"✓ No SQL injection - No database operations detected\",\n    \"✓ Good optional dependency management - MetaHarness properly in optionalDependencies\",\n    \"✓ Version pinning - Uses pinned semver (~0.3.0) instead of @latest\",\n    \"✓ Timeout protection - 60-second hard timeout on subprocess calls\",\n    \"✓ Graceful degradation - Missing dependencies handled safely\"\n  ],\n  \"dependencyAnalysis\": {\n    \"status\": \"CLEAN\",\n    \"notes\": \"Only Node.js core modules used (child_process, fs, path, os, url). No external npm dependencies. MetaHarness properly optional with fallback.\",\n    \"vulnerablePackages\": []\n  },\n  \"summary\": {\n    \"totalVulnerabilities\": 8,\n    \"critical\": 0,\n    \"high\": 1,\n    \"medium\": 4,\n    \"low\": 3,\n    \"affectedFiles\": 6,\n    \"exploitability\": \"Medium - Requires malicious CLI arguments\",\n    \"impact\": \"High - Arbitrary file access, command injection, information disclosure\",\n    \"overallRisk\": \"MODERATE-TO-HIGH (38/100)\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\n## Key Findings\n\n**Critical Issues to Address:**\n\n1. **Command Injection (HIGH)** - Line 65 of `test-with-openrouter.mjs` uses template literals in `execSync()`, creating a command injection vector\n2. **Path Traversal (MEDIUM)** - Multiple scripts (`score.mjs`, `gepa.mjs`, `drift-from-history.mjs`) accept unvalidated path arguments\n3. **Input Validation Gaps (MEDIUM)** - CLI arguments passed to subprocesses without whitelist validation\n\n**Strengths:**\n- No hardcoded secrets or exposed credentials\n- Proper version pinning (not using @latest)\n- Good optional dependency handling with graceful degradation\n- No SQL injection or XSS vulnerabilities\n\n**Action Items:**\n1. Create a centralized `_validation.mjs` module for input validation\n2. Replace all template literals in child_process calls with array arguments\n3. Add path validation with `path.relative()` checks before file operations\n4. Migrate to a CLI parsing library (yargs/commander) for robustness\n",
+  "parsedOutput": {
+    "vulnerabilities": [
+      {
+        "severity": "high",
+        "file": "scripts/test-with-openrouter.mjs",
+        "line": 65,
+        "description": "Command Injection via Template Literal in execSync - The gcloud secrets command uses template literal interpolation. While secretName is currently hardcoded, this pattern is vulnerable to command injection if parameters come from external sources.",
+        "cwe": "CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command",
+        "recommendation": "Replace template literal with array form: spawnSync('gcloud', ['secrets', 'versions', 'access', 'latest', '--secret=' + secretName])"
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "medium",
+        "file": "scripts/score.mjs",
+        "line": 25,
+        "description": "Path Traversal Vulnerability - User-supplied --path argument not validated before being passed to metaharness. Attacker could use '../' sequences to access files outside intended directories.",
+        "cwe": "CWE-22: Path Traversal",
+        "recommendation": "Validate using path.resolve() and path.relative() to ensure paths stay within boundaries"
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "medium",
+        "file": "scripts/gepa.mjs",
+        "line": 57,
+        "description": "Path Traversal Vulnerability - Arguments --path and --transcript not validated before file operations (readFileSync, existsSync)",
+        "cwe": "CWE-22: Path Traversal",
+        "recommendation": "Add path validation before any file I/O operations"
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "medium",
+        "file": "scripts/learn.mjs",
+        "line": 45,
+        "description": "Missing Input Validation - CLI arguments (--host, --model, --slice, --repo) parsed without validation before subprocess calls",
+        "cwe": "CWE-20: Improper Input Validation",
+        "recommendation": "Implement whitelist validation; use CLI parsing library (yargs/commander) for robust handling"
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "medium",
+        "file": "scripts/drift-from-history.mjs",
+        "line": 60,
+        "description": "Missing Input Validation - Arguments (--path, --baseline-since, --baseline-key) not validated for shell injection patterns",
+        "cwe": "CWE-20: Improper Input Validation",
+        "recommendation": "Validate --path, validate duration format, whitelist --alert-on-new-severity values"
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "low",
+        "file": "scripts/test-with-openrouter.mjs",
+        "line": 66,
+        "description": "Environment Variable Injection - Full process.env passed to child processes. Sensitive variables could be leaked or manipulated.",
+        "cwe": "CWE-453: Insecure Resource Validation",
+        "recommendation": "Restrict to only necessary vars: {PATH, HOME} instead of inheriting full environment"
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "low",
+        "file": "scripts/gepa.mjs",
+        "line": 84,
+        "description": "Unsafe JSON Parsing - Direct JSON.parse() without comprehensive validation. Malformed JSON can cause DoS.",
+        "cwe": "CWE-755: Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions",
+        "recommendation": "Use JSON schema validation; add try-catch for all JSON parsing"
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "low",
+        "file": "scripts/test-similarity.mjs",
+        "line": 1,
+        "description": "Test File Credential Reference - Comments reference credential paths. Test files should never reference production secrets.",
+        "cwe": "CWE-798: Use of Hard-Coded Credentials",
+        "recommendation": "Use environment variables or GCP Secret Manager for test credentials"
+      }
+    ],
+    "riskScore": 38,
+    "recommendations": [
+      {
+        "priority": "CRITICAL",
+        "title": "Implement Centralized Input Validation Module",
+        "description": "Create scripts/_validation.mjs with validatePath(), validateHostName(), validateModelName() functions. Every CLI script must use these validators.",
+        "effort": "2-3 hours"
+      },
+      {
+        "priority": "CRITICAL",
+        "title": "Replace Template Literals in Child Process Calls",
+        "description": "Eliminate all template literals in execSync/spawnSync. Use array form: spawnSync(cmd, [arg1, arg2]) instead of execSync(`cmd ${arg1}`)",
+        "effort": "1-2 hours"
+      },
+      {
+        "priority": "HIGH",
+        "title": "Add Path Validation Before File Operations",
+        "description": "For --path, --transcript, --baseline-file arguments, validate resolved paths are within expected boundaries using path.relative() checks",
+        "effort": "1 hour"
+      },
+      {
+        "priority": "HIGH",
+        "title": "Restrict Environment Variables in Child Processes",
+        "description": "Pass only necessary env vars (PATH, HOME) to spawned processes instead of inheriting full environment",
+        "effort": "30 minutes"
+      },
+      {
+        "priority": "MEDIUM",
+        "title": "Migrate to CLI Parsing Library",
+        "description": "Use yargs or commander.js for robust argument parsing, type validation, and help generation",
+        "effort": "4-6 hours"
+      }
+    ],
+    "securityPositives": [
+      "✓ No hardcoded secrets - API keys properly fetched from GCP Secret Manager",
+      "✓ No XSS vulnerabilities - Node.js CLI tool with no HTML/DOM context",
+      "✓ No SQL injection - No database operations detected",
+      "✓ Good optional dependency management - MetaHarness properly in optionalDependencies",
+      "✓ Version pinning - Uses pinned semver (~0.3.0) instead of @latest",
+      "✓ Timeout protection - 60-second hard timeout on subprocess calls",
+      "✓ Graceful degradation - Missing dependencies handled safely"
+    ],
+    "dependencyAnalysis": {
+      "status": "CLEAN",
+      "notes": "Only Node.js core modules used (child_process, fs, path, os, url). No external npm dependencies. MetaHarness properly optional with fallback.",
+      "vulnerablePackages": []
+    },
+    "summary": {
+      "totalVulnerabilities": 8,
+      "critical": 0,
+      "high": 1,
+      "medium": 4,
+      "low": 3,
+      "affectedFiles": 6,
+      "exploitability": "Medium - Requires malicious CLI arguments",
+      "impact": "High - Arbitrary file access, command injection, information disclosure",
+      "overallRisk": "MODERATE-TO-HIGH (38/100)"
+    }
+  },
+  "durationMs": 114357,
+  "model": "haiku",
+  "sandboxMode": "strict",
+  "workerType": "audit",
+  "timestamp": "2026-07-09T15:50:11.541Z",
+  "executionId": "audit_1783612097184_9rqfor"
+}

package/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/.claude-flow/logs/headless/audit_1783612811574_4u602j_prompt.log

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+[2026-07-09T16:00:11.597Z] PROMPT
+============================================================
+Analyze this codebase for security vulnerabilities:
+- Check for hardcoded secrets (API keys, passwords)
+- Identify SQL injection risks
+- Find XSS vulnerabilities
+- Check for insecure dependencies
+- Identify authentication/authorization issues
+
+Provide a JSON report with:
+{
+  "vulnerabilities": [{ "severity": "high|medium|low", "file": "...", "line": N, "description": "..." }],
+  "riskScore": 0-100,
+  "recommendations": ["..."]
+}
+
+## Instructions
+
+Analyze the codebase and provide your response following the format specified in the task.