@claude-flow/cli 3.32.29 → 3.32.30

package/node_modules/@claude-flow/security/dist/application/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+/**
+ * Security Application Layer - Public Exports
+ *
+ * @module v3/security/application
+ */
+export { SecurityApplicationService, } from './services/security-application-service.js';
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/node_modules/@claude-flow/security/dist/application/index.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/node_modules/@claude-flow/security/dist/application/services/security-application-service.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/**
+ * Security Application Service - Application Layer
+ *
+ * Orchestrates security operations and provides simplified interface.
+ *
+ * @module v3/security/application/services
+ */
+import { SecurityContext } from '../../domain/entities/security-context.js';
+import { ValidationResult, ThreatDetectionResult } from '../../domain/services/security-domain-service.js';
+/**
+ * Security audit result
+ */
+export interface SecurityAuditResult {
+    passed: boolean;
+    score: number;
+    checks: Array<{
+        name: string;
+        passed: boolean;
+        severity: 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'critical';
+        message: string;
+    }>;
+    recommendations: string[];
+}
+/**
+ * Security Application Service
+ */
+export declare class SecurityApplicationService {
+    private readonly domainService;
+    private readonly contexts;
+    constructor();
+    /**
+     * Create and register security context for agent
+     */
+    createAgentContext(agentId: string, role: string): SecurityContext;
+    /**
+     * Get security context
+     */
+    getContext(principalId: string): SecurityContext | undefined;
+    /**
+     * Remove security context
+     */
+    removeContext(principalId: string): boolean;
+    /**
+     * Validate path access
+     */
+    validatePath(path: string, principalId: string): ValidationResult;
+    /**
+     * Validate command execution
+     */
+    validateCommand(command: string, principalId: string): ValidationResult;
+    /**
+     * Validate user input
+     */
+    validateInput(input: string): ValidationResult;
+    /**
+     * Detect threats in content
+     */
+    detectThreats(content: string): ThreatDetectionResult;
+    /**
+     * Run security audit on codebase
+     */
+    auditCodebase(files: Array<{
+        path: string;
+        content: string;
+    }>): Promise<SecurityAuditResult>;
+    /**
+     * Check if operation is allowed
+     */
+    isOperationAllowed(principalId: string, operation: 'path' | 'command', target: string): boolean;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=security-application-service.d.ts.map

package/node_modules/@claude-flow/security/dist/application/services/security-application-service.d.ts.map

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package/node_modules/@claude-flow/security/dist/application/services/security-application-service.js

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+/**
+ * Security Application Service - Application Layer
+ *
+ * Orchestrates security operations and provides simplified interface.
+ *
+ * @module v3/security/application/services
+ */
+import { SecurityDomainService } from '../../domain/services/security-domain-service.js';
+/**
+ * Security Application Service
+ */
+export class SecurityApplicationService {
+    domainService;
+    contexts = new Map();
+    constructor() {
+        this.domainService = new SecurityDomainService();
+    }
+    // ============================================================================
+    // Context Management
+    // ============================================================================
+    /**
+     * Create and register security context for agent
+     */
+    createAgentContext(agentId, role) {
+        const context = this.domainService.createAgentContext(agentId, role);
+        this.contexts.set(agentId, context);
+        return context;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Get security context
+     */
+    getContext(principalId) {
+        return this.contexts.get(principalId);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Remove security context
+     */
+    removeContext(principalId) {
+        return this.contexts.delete(principalId);
+    }
+    // ============================================================================
+    // Validation
+    // ============================================================================
+    /**
+     * Validate path access
+     */
+    validatePath(path, principalId) {
+        const context = this.contexts.get(principalId);
+        if (!context) {
+            return {
+                valid: false,
+                errors: ['Security context not found'],
+                warnings: [],
+            };
+        }
+        return this.domainService.validatePath(path, context);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Validate command execution
+     */
+    validateCommand(command, principalId) {
+        const context = this.contexts.get(principalId);
+        if (!context) {
+            return {
+                valid: false,
+                errors: ['Security context not found'],
+                warnings: [],
+            };
+        }
+        return this.domainService.validateCommand(command, context);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Validate user input
+     */
+    validateInput(input) {
+        return this.domainService.validateInput(input);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Detect threats in content
+     */
+    detectThreats(content) {
+        return this.domainService.detectThreats(content);
+    }
+    // ============================================================================
+    // Audit
+    // ============================================================================
+    /**
+     * Run security audit on codebase
+     */
+    async auditCodebase(files) {
+        const checks = [];
+        const recommendations = [];
+        let criticalCount = 0;
+        let highCount = 0;
+        for (const file of files) {
+            const threats = this.domainService.detectThreats(file.content);
+            for (const threat of threats.threats) {
+                checks.push({
+                    name: `${threat.type} in ${file.path}`,
+                    passed: false,
+                    severity: threat.severity,
+                    message: threat.description,
+                });
+                if (threat.severity === 'critical')
+                    criticalCount++;
+                if (threat.severity === 'high')
+                    highCount++;
+            }
+            if (threats.safe) {
+                checks.push({
+                    name: `Security check: ${file.path}`,
+                    passed: true,
+                    severity: 'low',
+                    message: 'No threats detected',
+                });
+            }
+        }
+        // Generate recommendations
+        if (criticalCount > 0) {
+            recommendations.push('Address critical security issues immediately');
+        }
+        if (highCount > 0) {
+            recommendations.push('Review and fix high-severity findings');
+        }
+        recommendations.push('Run regular security scans');
+        recommendations.push('Keep dependencies updated');
+        // Calculate score
+        const totalChecks = checks.length;
+        const passedChecks = checks.filter((c) => c.passed).length;
+        const score = totalChecks > 0 ? Math.round((passedChecks / totalChecks) * 100) : 100;
+        return {
+            passed: criticalCount === 0 && highCount === 0,
+            score,
+            checks,
+            recommendations,
+        };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Check if operation is allowed
+     */
+    isOperationAllowed(principalId, operation, target) {
+        const context = this.contexts.get(principalId);
+        if (!context || context.isExpired())
+            return false;
+        if (operation === 'path') {
+            return context.canAccessPath(target);
+        }
+        else {
+            return context.canExecuteCommand(target);
+        }
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=security-application-service.js.map

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package/node_modules/@claude-flow/security/dist/authorization/propagator.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+/**
+ * AgentAuthorizationPropagator — action-layer security for agent delegation.
+ *
+ * Implements P1 of ADR-144 (ruvnet/ruflo#2248): scope-envelope on SendMessage
+ * + per-action authorization checks. P2-P5 wire this into the comms layer,
+ * MCP dispatcher, MCP auth validator, and provenance log respectively.
+ *
+ * Threat model
+ * ------------
+ * When agent A delegates a task to agent B via SendMessage, B can today
+ * escalate the granted scope by calling tools A was never authorized to
+ * invoke. RBAC/ABAC on agent roles do not solve this — roles don't compose
+ * under dynamic LLM delegation (arXiv:2605.05440, Grade A formal analysis).
+ *
+ * The fix is scope-based propagation: every SendMessage carries an
+ * `AuthScope` that is *monotonically reducing* — each hop can drop tools or
+ * servers from the granted set but never add them. This is the same shape
+ * as OAuth scope reduction; adding back a tool requires talking to the
+ * original principal out-of-band.
+ *
+ * Scope
+ * -----
+ * - P1 (this file): the component, the envelope, the type-level invariants.
+ *   No call sites yet — adding the wrapping/enforcement in P2-P4.
+ * - All operations synchronous, pure, allocation-light. Targets < 1 ms p99
+ *   for `wrapOutbound` + `checkToolCall` so it can sit on every SendMessage.
+ *
+ * Backwards compatibility
+ * -----------------------
+ * `scope` on the envelope is optional in v1. Agents without scope set
+ * operate in legacy permissive mode (all tools allowed, depth unlimited,
+ * server auth unchecked). `CLAUDE_FLOW_STRICT_AUTH=true` enables enforcement.
+ *
+ * Reference: ADR-144, arXiv:2605.05440 (Authorization Propagation),
+ * arXiv:2605.28914 (AIRGuard), arXiv:2605.22333 (MCP auth survey).
+ */
+/** Scope granted to an agent at a delegation hop. Monotonically reducing. */
+export interface AuthScope {
+    /** Stable identifier of the originating principal (agent or user). */
+    readonly principalId: string;
+    /** MCP tool IDs this scope is allowed to call. */
+    readonly grantedTools: ReadonlyArray<string>;
+    /** MCP server IDs whose tool responses this scope will accept. */
+    readonly grantedServers: ReadonlyArray<string>;
+    /** Max remaining delegation hops. Decrements on every `wrapOutbound`. */
+    readonly delegationDepth: number;
+    /** Unix ms after which this scope is no longer valid. */
+    readonly expiresAt: number;
+    /**
+     * Optional opaque ID for cross-referencing with ADR-144 P5 provenance log
+     * and ADR-146 telemetry events. Callers should treat as a correlation
+     * handle, not a security claim.
+     */
+    readonly scopeId?: string;
+}
+/** Envelope shape attached to every SendMessage when strict-auth is on. */
+export interface SendMessageEnvelope<T = unknown> {
+    /** Authorization scope governing what the receiver may do. */
+    readonly scope: AuthScope;
+    /** The original SendMessage payload, untouched. */
+    readonly payload: T;
+}
+/** Decision returned by `checkToolCall`. Never throws. */
+export interface ToolCallDecision {
+    readonly allowed: boolean;
+    /** Human-readable reason; stable enough to match in tests/telemetry. */
+    readonly reason?: 'tool-not-in-scope' | 'server-not-in-scope' | 'scope-expired' | 'delegation-depth-exhausted' | 'principal-mismatch';
+}
+/**
+ * Wrap-failure reasons surfaced to callers as a typed error. We use a
+ * discriminated union rather than throwing so the comms layer (P2) can
+ * decide whether to drop the SendMessage or surface to the user.
+ */
+export declare class AuthorizationPropagationError extends Error {
+    readonly code: 'scope-cannot-grow' | 'depth-underflow' | 'scope-expired' | 'principal-mismatch';
+    constructor(code: 'scope-cannot-grow' | 'depth-underflow' | 'scope-expired' | 'principal-mismatch', message: string);
+}
+/**
+ * Construct a default permissive scope. Used in legacy mode when no scope
+ * was attached upstream. Callers SHOULD migrate to explicit scopes; this is
+ * here so the propagator never has to special-case "no scope".
+ */
+export declare function makeLegacyPermissiveScope(principalId?: string): AuthScope;
+/**
+ * `AgentAuthorizationPropagator` — the load-bearing component for ADR-144.
+ *
+ * Construction is intentionally cheap (no I/O, no async). Callers can build
+ * a fresh instance per task without overhead, or share one — it holds no
+ * mutable state beyond the optional provenance buffer.
+ */
+export declare class AgentAuthorizationPropagator {
+    private readonly opts;
+    /**
+     * In-memory provenance buffer. P5 will flush this to the structured
+     * telemetry sink (ADR-146 GuardrailEvent shape). For P1 we just retain
+     * the last N events for inspection/tests.
+     */
+    private readonly provenance;
+    constructor(opts?: {
+        provenanceBufferMax?: number;
+    });
+    /**
+     * Attach a reduced scope to an outbound SendMessage.
+     *
+     * Invariants enforced (throws `AuthorizationPropagationError` on violation):
+     *   - newly granted tools MUST be a subset of `currentScope.grantedTools`
+     *   - newly granted servers MUST be a subset of `currentScope.grantedServers`
+     *   - delegationDepth MUST decrement by ≥ 1 (must remain ≥ 0)
+     *   - principalId is propagated unchanged
+     *   - expiresAt cannot be extended; copied from the holder
+     */
+    wrapOutbound<T>(payload: T, currentScope: AuthScope, requested?: {
+        tools?: ReadonlyArray<string>;
+        servers?: ReadonlyArray<string>;
+    }): SendMessageEnvelope<T>;
+    /**
+     * Validate a single tool call against a scope. Pure; never throws. Use the
+     * result's `allowed` to make the dispatch decision.
+     */
+    checkToolCall(toolId: string, scope: AuthScope, opts?: {
+        serverId?: string;
+        now?: number;
+    }): ToolCallDecision;
+    /**
+     * Verify an MCP server presented a valid credential before its response is
+     * consumed. P1 ships a permissive default (any non-empty credential is
+     * accepted) so the API is stable; P4 wires this to a real validator.
+     *
+     * Returns `false` on missing/empty credential; callers MUST treat `false`
+     * as a hard reject (same rule as ADR-131 reject findings).
+     */
+    verifyServerAuth(serverId: string, credential: unknown): boolean;
+    /**
+     * Record an action in the provenance buffer. P5 will route to telemetry;
+     * P1 keeps the last N events for test inspection and post-incident audit.
+     */
+    recordAction(agentId: string, toolId: string, scope: AuthScope, outcome: 'allowed' | 'denied', reason?: string): void;
+    /** Read-only view of recorded provenance for tests + audit CLI (P5). */
+    getProvenance(): ReadonlyArray<{
+        agentId: string;
+        toolId: string;
+        scope: AuthScope;
+        outcome: 'allowed' | 'denied';
+        reason?: string;
+        ts: number;
+    }>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=propagator.d.ts.map

package/node_modules/@claude-flow/security/dist/authorization/propagator.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/node_modules/@claude-flow/security/dist/authorization/propagator.js

@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+/**
+ * AgentAuthorizationPropagator — action-layer security for agent delegation.
+ *
+ * Implements P1 of ADR-144 (ruvnet/ruflo#2248): scope-envelope on SendMessage
+ * + per-action authorization checks. P2-P5 wire this into the comms layer,
+ * MCP dispatcher, MCP auth validator, and provenance log respectively.
+ *
+ * Threat model
+ * ------------
+ * When agent A delegates a task to agent B via SendMessage, B can today
+ * escalate the granted scope by calling tools A was never authorized to
+ * invoke. RBAC/ABAC on agent roles do not solve this — roles don't compose
+ * under dynamic LLM delegation (arXiv:2605.05440, Grade A formal analysis).
+ *
+ * The fix is scope-based propagation: every SendMessage carries an
+ * `AuthScope` that is *monotonically reducing* — each hop can drop tools or
+ * servers from the granted set but never add them. This is the same shape
+ * as OAuth scope reduction; adding back a tool requires talking to the
+ * original principal out-of-band.
+ *
+ * Scope
+ * -----
+ * - P1 (this file): the component, the envelope, the type-level invariants.
+ *   No call sites yet — adding the wrapping/enforcement in P2-P4.
+ * - All operations synchronous, pure, allocation-light. Targets < 1 ms p99
+ *   for `wrapOutbound` + `checkToolCall` so it can sit on every SendMessage.
+ *
+ * Backwards compatibility
+ * -----------------------
+ * `scope` on the envelope is optional in v1. Agents without scope set
+ * operate in legacy permissive mode (all tools allowed, depth unlimited,
+ * server auth unchecked). `CLAUDE_FLOW_STRICT_AUTH=true` enables enforcement.
+ *
+ * Reference: ADR-144, arXiv:2605.05440 (Authorization Propagation),
+ * arXiv:2605.28914 (AIRGuard), arXiv:2605.22333 (MCP auth survey).
+ */
+/**
+ * Wrap-failure reasons surfaced to callers as a typed error. We use a
+ * discriminated union rather than throwing so the comms layer (P2) can
+ * decide whether to drop the SendMessage or surface to the user.
+ */
+export class AuthorizationPropagationError extends Error {
+    code;
+    constructor(code, message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.code = code;
+        this.name = 'AuthorizationPropagationError';
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Construct a default permissive scope. Used in legacy mode when no scope
+ * was attached upstream. Callers SHOULD migrate to explicit scopes; this is
+ * here so the propagator never has to special-case "no scope".
+ */
+export function makeLegacyPermissiveScope(principalId = 'legacy') {
+    return {
+        principalId,
+        grantedTools: ['*'], // sentinel — see `checkToolCall`
+        grantedServers: ['*'],
+        delegationDepth: Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER,
+        expiresAt: Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * `AgentAuthorizationPropagator` — the load-bearing component for ADR-144.
+ *
+ * Construction is intentionally cheap (no I/O, no async). Callers can build
+ * a fresh instance per task without overhead, or share one — it holds no
+ * mutable state beyond the optional provenance buffer.
+ */
+export class AgentAuthorizationPropagator {
+    opts;
+    /**
+     * In-memory provenance buffer. P5 will flush this to the structured
+     * telemetry sink (ADR-146 GuardrailEvent shape). For P1 we just retain
+     * the last N events for inspection/tests.
+     */
+    provenance = [];
+    constructor(opts = {}) {
+        this.opts = opts;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Attach a reduced scope to an outbound SendMessage.
+     *
+     * Invariants enforced (throws `AuthorizationPropagationError` on violation):
+     *   - newly granted tools MUST be a subset of `currentScope.grantedTools`
+     *   - newly granted servers MUST be a subset of `currentScope.grantedServers`
+     *   - delegationDepth MUST decrement by ≥ 1 (must remain ≥ 0)
+     *   - principalId is propagated unchanged
+     *   - expiresAt cannot be extended; copied from the holder
+     */
+    wrapOutbound(payload, currentScope, requested = {}) {
+        if (currentScope.delegationDepth <= 0) {
+            throw new AuthorizationPropagationError('depth-underflow', `cannot delegate further — delegationDepth=${currentScope.delegationDepth}`);
+        }
+        const now = Date.now();
+        if (currentScope.expiresAt <= now) {
+            throw new AuthorizationPropagationError('scope-expired', `scope expired at ${new Date(currentScope.expiresAt).toISOString()}`);
+        }
+        const reducedTools = subsetOrThrow(currentScope.grantedTools, requested.tools ?? currentScope.grantedTools, 'tools');
+        const reducedServers = subsetOrThrow(currentScope.grantedServers, requested.servers ?? currentScope.grantedServers, 'servers');
+        const reducedScope = {
+            principalId: currentScope.principalId,
+            grantedTools: reducedTools,
+            grantedServers: reducedServers,
+            delegationDepth: currentScope.delegationDepth - 1,
+            expiresAt: currentScope.expiresAt,
+            scopeId: currentScope.scopeId,
+        };
+        return { scope: reducedScope, payload };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Validate a single tool call against a scope. Pure; never throws. Use the
+     * result's `allowed` to make the dispatch decision.
+     */
+    checkToolCall(toolId, scope, opts = {}) {
+        const now = opts.now ?? Date.now();
+        if (scope.expiresAt <= now)
+            return { allowed: false, reason: 'scope-expired' };
+        if (!matchesScopeList(scope.grantedTools, toolId)) {
+            return { allowed: false, reason: 'tool-not-in-scope' };
+        }
+        if (opts.serverId && !matchesScopeList(scope.grantedServers, opts.serverId)) {
+            return { allowed: false, reason: 'server-not-in-scope' };
+        }
+        return { allowed: true };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Verify an MCP server presented a valid credential before its response is
+     * consumed. P1 ships a permissive default (any non-empty credential is
+     * accepted) so the API is stable; P4 wires this to a real validator.
+     *
+     * Returns `false` on missing/empty credential; callers MUST treat `false`
+     * as a hard reject (same rule as ADR-131 reject findings).
+     */
+    verifyServerAuth(serverId, credential) {
+        if (!serverId || typeof serverId !== 'string')
+            return false;
+        if (credential == null)
+            return false;
+        if (typeof credential === 'string' && credential.trim().length === 0)
+            return false;
+        return true;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Record an action in the provenance buffer. P5 will route to telemetry;
+     * P1 keeps the last N events for test inspection and post-incident audit.
+     */
+    recordAction(agentId, toolId, scope, outcome, reason) {
+        const max = this.opts.provenanceBufferMax ?? 1024;
+        this.provenance.push({ agentId, toolId, scope, outcome, reason, ts: Date.now() });
+        if (this.provenance.length > max)
+            this.provenance.splice(0, this.provenance.length - max);
+    }
+    /** Read-only view of recorded provenance for tests + audit CLI (P5). */
+    getProvenance() {
+        return this.provenance.slice();
+    }
+}
+// ─── helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function subsetOrThrow(parent, requested, kind) {
+    if (parent.includes('*'))
+        return Array.from(new Set(requested));
+    for (const item of requested) {
+        if (!parent.includes(item) && item !== '*') {
+            throw new AuthorizationPropagationError('scope-cannot-grow', `cannot grant ${kind} '${item}' — not in parent scope`);
+        }
+    }
+    // De-duplicate; preserve requested order
+    const seen = new Set();
+    const out = [];
+    for (const r of requested)
+        if (!seen.has(r))
+            (seen.add(r), out.push(r));
+    return out;
+}
+function matchesScopeList(list, item) {
+    if (list.includes('*'))
+        return true;
+    return list.includes(item);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=propagator.js.map

package/node_modules/@claude-flow/security/dist/authorization/propagator.js.map

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