@clagentic/console 1.6.0-beta.2 → 1.6.0-beta.3
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/lib/history-visibility.js +113 -0
- package/lib/project-sessions.js +25 -2
- package/lib/public/css/diagnostics.css +99 -19
- package/lib/public/index.html +4 -1
- package/lib/public/modules/app-header.js +68 -10
- package/lib/public/modules/diagnostic-format.js +18 -2
- package/lib/public/modules/diagnostics.js +149 -8
- package/lib/public/modules/emoji-picker.js +26 -5
- package/lib/public/modules/history-visibility.js +98 -0
- package/lib/sdk-bridge.js +59 -19
- package/lib/sdk-message-processor.js +58 -3
- package/lib/sdk-permission-ownership.js +85 -0
- package/lib/sessions.js +61 -1
- package/lib/settings-preflight.js +52 -16
- package/lib/utils.js +23 -0
- package/lib/yoke/adapters/diagnostic-patterns.js +25 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
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@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
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// lr-9d4b: Shared keep-vs-clear decision for session.pendingPermissions /
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// activeTaskToolIds / taskIdMap at turn-boundary cleanup sites.
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//
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// Two call sites reset this same state at the end of a turn:
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// - sdk-message-processor.js: the 'result' message handler
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// - sdk-bridge.js: processQueryStream's finally block (normal, non-
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// superseded completion)
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// Both used to unconditionally wipe session.pendingPermissions, which
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// destroys a backgrounded sub-agent's still-open permission resolver if the
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// sub-agent's own tool call (e.g. Bash) is still awaiting the operator's
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// approval when the parent turn ends. The permission card stays on the UI,
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// but the resolver is gone, so the sub-agent's canUseTool Promise (no
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// timeout on the in-process path) hangs forever (lr-9d4b root cause).
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//
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// This module computes which entries are owned by a still-active
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// backgrounded sub-agent (via session.subagentToolOwners, recorded in
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// processSubagentMessage) so both cleanup sites can preserve them instead of
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// wiping them, mirroring the existing _keepAskUser preservation pattern for
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// session.pendingAskUser (mcp-mode entries survive the same cleanup sites).
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/**
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* Partition session.pendingPermissions into entries to keep (owned by a
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* still-active backgrounded sub-agent) vs. the rest (top-level, or a
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* sub-agent whose owning Task has already finished) — the latter are
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* cleared exactly as before.
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*
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* @param {object} session - session object with pendingPermissions,
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* subagentToolOwners, activeTaskToolIds.
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* @returns {{keptPermissions: object, preservedTaskIds: object}}
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* keptPermissions: requestId -> pending entry, to become the new
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* session.pendingPermissions.
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* preservedTaskIds: Task tool-use id -> true, for the caller to also keep
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* the corresponding activeTaskToolIds/taskIdMap entries (the sub-agent's
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* bookkeeping must survive alongside its pending permission).
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*/
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function partitionSubagentOwnedPermissions(session) {
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var keptPermissions = {};
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var pendingPermissions = session.pendingPermissions || {};
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var subagentToolOwners = session.subagentToolOwners || {};
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var activeTaskToolIds = session.activeTaskToolIds || {};
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var permissionIds = Object.keys(pendingPermissions);
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for (var i = 0; i < permissionIds.length; i++) {
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var pid = permissionIds[i];
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var pentry = pendingPermissions[pid];
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var owningTaskId = pentry && pentry.toolUseId ? subagentToolOwners[pentry.toolUseId] : null;
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if (owningTaskId && activeTaskToolIds[owningTaskId]) {
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keptPermissions[pid] = pentry;
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}
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}
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var preservedTaskIds = {};
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for (var kpid in keptPermissions) {
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var kpTaskId = subagentToolOwners[keptPermissions[kpid].toolUseId];
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preservedTaskIds[kpTaskId] = true;
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}
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return { keptPermissions: keptPermissions, preservedTaskIds: preservedTaskIds };
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}
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/**
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* Apply the partition result to activeTaskToolIds/taskIdMap, keeping only
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* entries for Task ids whose permission was just preserved.
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*
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* @param {object} session
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* @param {object} preservedTaskIds - from partitionSubagentOwnedPermissions.
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*/
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function retainPreservedTaskBookkeeping(session, preservedTaskIds) {
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var nextActiveTaskToolIds = {};
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for (var atk in (session.activeTaskToolIds || {})) {
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if (preservedTaskIds[atk]) nextActiveTaskToolIds[atk] = session.activeTaskToolIds[atk];
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}
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session.activeTaskToolIds = nextActiveTaskToolIds;
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var nextTaskIdMap = {};
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for (var tik in (session.taskIdMap || {})) {
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if (preservedTaskIds[tik]) nextTaskIdMap[tik] = session.taskIdMap[tik];
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}
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session.taskIdMap = nextTaskIdMap;
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}
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module.exports = {
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partitionSubagentOwnedPermissions: partitionSubagentOwnedPermissions,
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retainPreservedTaskBookkeeping: retainPreservedTaskBookkeeping,
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};
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package/lib/sessions.js
CHANGED
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ var config = require("./config");
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var utils = require("./utils");
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var users = require("./users");
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var { CODEX_DEFAULTS } = require("./codex-defaults");
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var { isVisibleHistoryEvent } = require("./history-visibility");
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function createSessionManager(opts) {
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var cwd = opts.cwd;
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@@ -64,6 +65,13 @@ function createSessionManager(opts) {
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if (session.lastRewindUuid) metaObj.lastRewindUuid = session.lastRewindUuid;
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if (session.agentName) metaObj.agentName = session.agentName;
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if (session.loop) metaObj.loop = session.loop;
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// Persist per-session "allow for session" tool grants (lr-8b2e) so they
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// survive daemon restart / resume-by-cliSessionId rehydration instead of
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// silently re-prompting. Only written when non-empty — grants that were
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// never given must stay absent, not round-trip as {}.
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if (session.allowedTools && Object.keys(session.allowedTools).length > 0) {
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metaObj.allowedTools = session.allowedTools;
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}
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var meta = JSON.stringify(metaObj);
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var lines = [meta];
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for (var i = 0; i < session.history.length; i++) {
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@@ -285,6 +293,12 @@ function createSessionManager(opts) {
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sentToolResults: {},
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pendingPermissions: {},
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pendingAskUser: {},
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// Hydrate previously-granted "allow for session" tool decisions from
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// durable state (lr-8b2e); default to {} only when none was saved so
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// grants that were never given remain empty, not re-prompted.
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// Sanitized (lr-8b2e hardening) so a malformed/injected persisted
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// record cannot silently auto-approve a tool.
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allowedTools: utils.sanitizeAllowedTools(m.allowedTools),
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isProcessing: false,
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title: m.title || "",
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createdAt: m.createdAt || Date.now(),
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@@ -462,6 +476,14 @@ function createSessionManager(opts) {
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// scroll-up via the existing pagination path.
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var HISTORY_PAGE_SIZE = 100;
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// Hard cap on how many additional turn-boundary steps a page window may be
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// extended backward by when searching for visible content (lr-c24b). Each
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// step is itself bounded by HISTORY_PAGE_SIZE (see findTurnBoundary), so the
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// total worst-case scan is MAX_VISIBILITY_EXTENSIONS * HISTORY_PAGE_SIZE —
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// bounded, not unbounded (codex engrams 2026-05-27/29 flagged unbounded
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// backward scans as a structural trap for this exact pagination path).
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var MAX_VISIBILITY_EXTENSIONS = 5;
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// Scan backward from the END of history (hard-capped at HISTORY_PAGE_SIZE) to
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// find the most recent user_message. This ensures the initial replay window
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// always starts at a clean turn boundary rather than mid-stream, regardless of
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return targetIndex;
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}
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// Returns true when history[from..to) contains at least one event that
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// app-messages.js will render as a new visible message (lr-c24b). A page
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// window can otherwise land entirely on invisible-yield events (todo/task
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// bookkeeping, hidden plan tools, state events, thinking deltas) and render
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// zero bubbles even though it advanced historyFrom.
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function sliceHasVisibleEvent(history, from, to) {
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for (var i = from; i < to; i++) {
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if (isVisibleHistoryEvent(history[i])) return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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// Extend a turn-boundary-aligned page window backward, one turn boundary at
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// a time, until the slice [from, to) contains at least one visibly-rendering
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// event or from reaches 0 — capped at MAX_VISIBILITY_EXTENSIONS additional
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// steps so the scan stays bounded even for pathological all-invisible runs.
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// `to` never changes; only `from` moves backward.
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function extendWindowForVisibility(history, from, to) {
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var steps = 0;
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while (from > 0 && !sliceHasVisibleEvent(history, from, to) && steps < MAX_VISIBILITY_EXTENSIONS) {
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var next = findTurnBoundary(history, from - 1);
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if (next >= from) break; // no further progress possible — avoid an infinite loop
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from = next;
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steps++;
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}
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return from;
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}
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function replayHistory(session, fromIndex, targetWs, transform) {
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// Ensure history is in memory before replaying.
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loadSessionHistory(session);
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var hardFloor = Math.max(0, total - HISTORY_PAGE_SIZE);
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var lastTurn = findLastTurnStart(session.history);
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fromIndex = Math.max(hardFloor, lastTurn);
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// Same yield guarantee as load_more_history (lr-c24b): a turn
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// dominated by invisible-yield events (todo/task bookkeeping, hidden
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// plan tools, thinking deltas) can otherwise replay zero visible
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// bubbles on initial resume.
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fromIndex = extendWindowForVisibility(session.history, fromIndex, total);
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}
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}
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sentToolResults: {},
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pendingPermissions: {},
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pendingAskUser: {},
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// Hydrate previously-granted "allow for session" tool decisions from
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// durable state (lr-8b2e); default to {} only when none was saved.
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// Sanitized (lr-8b2e hardening) so a malformed/injected persisted
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// record cannot silently auto-approve a tool.
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allowedTools: utils.sanitizeAllowedTools(opts && opts.allowedTools),
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isProcessing: false,
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title: title,
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createdAt: Date.now(),
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sendToSession: doSendToSession,
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findTurnBoundary: findTurnBoundary,
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findLastTurnStart: findLastTurnStart,
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extendWindowForVisibility: extendWindowForVisibility,
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replayHistory: replayHistory,
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searchSessions: searchSessions,
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searchSessionContent: searchSessionContent,
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// without relying on CLI stderr pattern matching.
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//
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// Public surface:
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// validateSettingsObject(obj, filePath)
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// runPreflight(opts)
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// VALID_HOOK_EVENTS
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// validateSettingsObject(obj, filePath, scope) — pure: settings obj → diagnostic[]
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// runPreflight(opts) — IO: reads files, validates, returns diagnostic[]
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// VALID_HOOK_EVENTS — exported for tests
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//
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// Diagnostic shape (conforms to validateDiagnosticEvent from YOKE interface):
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// { type: 'diagnostic', severity, source: 'preflight', message }
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// { type: 'diagnostic', severity, source: 'preflight', scope?: 'user'|'project', message }
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//
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// scope (lr-7e22) distinguishes which settings file a diagnostic came from —
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// runPreflight checks both ~/.claude/settings.json (scope:'user') and
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// <projectDir>/.claude/settings.json (scope:'project') independently, so a
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// single unknown hook key can legitimately produce one diagnostic per file.
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// The render layer (diagnostic-format.js) uses scope to keep those visually
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// distinct instead of both showing an identical "Preflight" source label.
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"use strict";
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Hook event allowlist
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//
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// SOURCE:
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//
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// SOURCE: Verified live against the Claude Code hooks documentation
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// (https://code.claude.com/docs/en/hooks, hook lifecycle table) as of
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// 2026-07-01, cross-checked via web search. The hooks.AgentTeams case (the
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// motivating screenshot for this stage) is a real example of an unknown key
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// that surfaces as a silent no-op in the CLI but clutters the warnings stream.
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// The 8 events added under lr-7e22 (PreCompact, PostCompact, SessionStart,
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// UserPromptSubmit, PermissionRequest, TaskCreated, TeammateIdle,
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// TaskCompleted) were confirmed present in that same table — they are not an
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// exhaustive list of all documented events (the docs list ~30 total as of
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// this sync), only the ones observed in the field that needed verification.
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//
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// IMPORTANT: This list is the ONLY place the valid hook events are defined in
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// the Console codebase. Do not duplicate it elsewhere — drift between copies
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// is exactly the parity bug we are fixing.
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//
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// TODO(lr-1a26): Sync this list whenever the Claude Code CLI releases new hook
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// event types. The authoritative upstream is the CLI's hook documentation
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// source (search for "hook" +
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//
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//
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// event types. The authoritative upstream is the CLI's hook documentation
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// (https://code.claude.com/docs/en/hooks) or source (search for "hook" +
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// "event" in the @anthropic-ai/claude-code package). Consider scripting a CI
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// check against the installed CLI version's known events if the CLI exposes
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// a machine-readable list in a future release.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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var VALID_HOOK_EVENTS = [
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"PreToolUse",
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@@ -42,6 +56,15 @@ var VALID_HOOK_EVENTS = [
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"Notification",
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"Stop",
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"SubagentStop",
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// lr-7e22: verified 2026-07-01 against code.claude.com/docs/en/hooks
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"PreCompact",
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"PostCompact",
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"SessionStart",
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"UserPromptSubmit",
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"PermissionRequest",
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"TaskCreated",
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"TeammateIdle",
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"TaskCompleted",
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];
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@@ -55,9 +78,13 @@ var VALID_HOOK_EVENTS = [
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55
78
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*
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56
79
|
* @param {object} obj - Parsed settings JSON (any shape; we check what we know)
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57
80
|
* @param {string} filePath - Path string used only in diagnostic messages
|
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58
|
-
* @
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|
81
|
+
* @param {string} [scope] - 'user' | 'project', attached to each diagnostic so the
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82
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+
* render layer can distinguish which settings file a
|
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83
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+
* warning came from (lr-7e22). Omitted when the caller
|
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84
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+
* has no file-scope context (e.g. direct unit tests).
|
|
85
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+
* @returns {Array<{type,severity,source,scope,message}>} Diagnostics (empty = no issues)
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59
86
|
*/
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|
60
|
-
function validateSettingsObject(obj, filePath) {
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|
87
|
+
function validateSettingsObject(obj, filePath, scope) {
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61
88
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var diagnostics = [];
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62
89
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var label = filePath || "settings.json";
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63
90
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@@ -75,6 +102,7 @@ function validateSettingsObject(obj, filePath) {
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75
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type: "diagnostic",
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76
103
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severity: "warning",
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77
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source: "preflight",
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105
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+
scope: scope || undefined,
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78
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message: label + ": 'hooks' field is not an object — expected { EventName: [...] }.",
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79
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});
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80
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} else {
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@@ -86,6 +114,7 @@ function validateSettingsObject(obj, filePath) {
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86
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type: "diagnostic",
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87
115
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severity: "warning",
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88
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source: "preflight",
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117
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+
scope: scope || undefined,
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89
118
|
message: label + ": unknown hook event '" + key + "'. Valid events: " + VALID_HOOK_EVENTS.join(", ") + ". This hook will be silently ignored by the CLI.",
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|
90
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});
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|
91
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|
}
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@@ -112,9 +141,14 @@ function validateSettingsObject(obj, filePath) {
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112
141
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* per the non-blocking preflight contract.
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113
142
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*
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114
143
|
* @param {string} filePath - Absolute path to settings.json
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|
144
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+
* @param {string} [scope] - 'user' | 'project', attached to each diagnostic (lr-7e22)
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145
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+
* so multiple legitimate warnings across files render as
|
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146
|
+
* visibly distinct entries instead of stacking as apparent
|
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147
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+
* duplicates. Optional — omitted when the caller has no
|
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148
|
+
* file-scope context.
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115
149
|
* @returns {Array<object>} diagnostics
|
|
116
150
|
*/
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117
|
-
function validateSettingsFile(filePath) {
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|
151
|
+
function validateSettingsFile(filePath, scope) {
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118
152
|
var diagnostics = [];
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|
119
153
|
|
|
120
154
|
// Missing file → nothing to validate. Not an error.
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@@ -128,6 +162,7 @@ function validateSettingsFile(filePath) {
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128
162
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type: "diagnostic",
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129
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|
severity: "info",
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130
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|
source: "preflight",
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165
|
+
scope: scope || undefined,
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|
131
166
|
message: filePath + ": could not read settings file (" + e.code + " — " + (e.message || String(e)) + ").",
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|
132
167
|
});
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|
133
168
|
return diagnostics;
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@@ -142,13 +177,14 @@ function validateSettingsFile(filePath) {
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142
177
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type: "diagnostic",
|
|
143
178
|
severity: "error",
|
|
144
179
|
source: "preflight",
|
|
180
|
+
scope: scope || undefined,
|
|
145
181
|
message: filePath + ": settings.json is not valid JSON — " + (e.message || String(e)) + ".",
|
|
146
182
|
});
|
|
147
183
|
return diagnostics;
|
|
148
184
|
}
|
|
149
185
|
|
|
150
186
|
// (b) Structural validation
|
|
151
|
-
var structural = validateSettingsObject(obj, filePath);
|
|
187
|
+
var structural = validateSettingsObject(obj, filePath, scope);
|
|
152
188
|
for (var i = 0; i < structural.length; i++) {
|
|
153
189
|
diagnostics.push(structural[i]);
|
|
154
190
|
}
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|
@@ -186,7 +222,7 @@ function runPreflight(opts) {
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|
|
186
222
|
|
|
187
223
|
// User global: ~/.claude/settings.json
|
|
188
224
|
var userSettingsPath = path.join(userHome, ".claude", "settings.json");
|
|
189
|
-
var userDiags = validateSettingsFile(userSettingsPath);
|
|
225
|
+
var userDiags = validateSettingsFile(userSettingsPath, "user");
|
|
190
226
|
for (var i = 0; i < userDiags.length; i++) {
|
|
191
227
|
diagnostics.push(userDiags[i]);
|
|
192
228
|
}
|
|
@@ -195,7 +231,7 @@ function runPreflight(opts) {
|
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|
195
231
|
var projectDir = opts.projectDir;
|
|
196
232
|
if (projectDir && typeof projectDir === "string" && projectDir.length > 0) {
|
|
197
233
|
var projectSettingsPath = path.join(projectDir, ".claude", "settings.json");
|
|
198
|
-
var projectDiags = validateSettingsFile(projectSettingsPath);
|
|
234
|
+
var projectDiags = validateSettingsFile(projectSettingsPath, "project");
|
|
199
235
|
for (var j = 0; j < projectDiags.length; j++) {
|
|
200
236
|
diagnostics.push(projectDiags[j]);
|
|
201
237
|
}
|
package/lib/utils.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -57,8 +57,31 @@ function resolveEncodedFile(baseDir, cwd, ext) {
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|
|
57
57
|
});
|
|
58
58
|
}
|
|
59
59
|
|
|
60
|
+
/**
|
|
61
|
+
* Sanitize a persisted `allowedTools` map before hydrating it into a live
|
|
62
|
+
* session (lr-8b2e). The value originates from a durable .jsonl meta record
|
|
63
|
+
* that shares its trust boundary with other session-file fields, but an
|
|
64
|
+
* un-validated shape would let a crafted record (e.g. {"Bash": "yes"} or a
|
|
65
|
+
* non-object) auto-approve a tool with no operator click at the
|
|
66
|
+
* handleCanUseTool check (lib/sdk-bridge.js:691).
|
|
67
|
+
*
|
|
68
|
+
* Keeps only entries whose key is a string and whose value is strictly
|
|
69
|
+
* boolean `true`; drops everything else. A non-object input (including
|
|
70
|
+
* null/undefined/arrays) yields {} rather than throwing.
|
|
71
|
+
*/
|
|
72
|
+
function sanitizeAllowedTools(value) {
|
|
73
|
+
var out = {};
|
|
74
|
+
if (!value || typeof value !== "object" || Array.isArray(value)) return out;
|
|
75
|
+
for (var key in value) {
|
|
76
|
+
if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(value, key)) continue;
|
|
77
|
+
if (typeof key === "string" && value[key] === true) out[key] = true;
|
|
78
|
+
}
|
|
79
|
+
return out;
|
|
80
|
+
}
|
|
81
|
+
|
|
60
82
|
module.exports = {
|
|
61
83
|
encodeCwd: encodeCwd,
|
|
62
84
|
resolveEncodedDir: resolveEncodedDir,
|
|
63
85
|
resolveEncodedFile: resolveEncodedFile,
|
|
86
|
+
sanitizeAllowedTools: sanitizeAllowedTools,
|
|
64
87
|
};
|
|
@@ -11,6 +11,18 @@
|
|
|
11
11
|
|
|
12
12
|
var validateDiagnosticEvent = require("../interface").validateDiagnosticEvent;
|
|
13
13
|
|
|
14
|
+
// VALID_HOOK_EVENTS (lr-e901): the CLI's own "Unknown hook event: X" stderr
|
|
15
|
+
// line is matched generically below (source:'hook') without knowing whether
|
|
16
|
+
// the Console's allowlist actually considers X unknown. settings-preflight.js
|
|
17
|
+
// is the single source of truth for that allowlist (see its header comment —
|
|
18
|
+
// "the ONLY place the valid hook events are defined"). Reuse it here instead
|
|
19
|
+
// of re-deriving a second copy, so a hook event added to the allowlist stops
|
|
20
|
+
// producing a false "unknown hook" toast from BOTH emission paths at once.
|
|
21
|
+
var VALID_HOOK_EVENTS = require("../../settings-preflight").VALID_HOOK_EVENTS;
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
// Matches the hook event name out of a CLI "Unknown hook event: <Name>" line.
|
|
24
|
+
var UNKNOWN_HOOK_EVENT_RE = /^Unknown hook event:\s*(\S+)/;
|
|
25
|
+
|
|
14
26
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
15
27
|
// Pattern table
|
|
16
28
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
@@ -91,6 +103,19 @@ function parseDiagnosticLine(rawLine) {
|
|
|
91
103
|
for (var i = 0; i < PATTERNS.length; i++) {
|
|
92
104
|
var pattern = PATTERNS[i];
|
|
93
105
|
if (matches(line, pattern)) {
|
|
106
|
+
// lr-e901: reconcile the CLI-stderr "Unknown hook event" path against
|
|
107
|
+
// the Console's own VALID_HOOK_EVENTS allowlist (settings-preflight.js).
|
|
108
|
+
// The CLI's stderr message reflects the *installed CLI version's*
|
|
109
|
+
// knowledge of hook events, which can lag the allowlist verified here
|
|
110
|
+
// (see settings-preflight.js header, lr-7e22). When the named event IS
|
|
111
|
+
// in VALID_HOOK_EVENTS, treat this as a stale/false CLI warning and
|
|
112
|
+
// suppress it rather than surfacing a contradictory toast — do not
|
|
113
|
+
// widen the allowlist to "fix" this, the allowlist is already correct.
|
|
114
|
+
var hookMatch = pattern.source === "hook" && UNKNOWN_HOOK_EVENT_RE.exec(line);
|
|
115
|
+
if (hookMatch && VALID_HOOK_EVENTS.indexOf(hookMatch[1]) !== -1) {
|
|
116
|
+
return null;
|
|
117
|
+
}
|
|
118
|
+
|
|
94
119
|
var event = {
|
|
95
120
|
type: "diagnostic",
|
|
96
121
|
severity: pattern.severity,
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
|
|
3
3
|
"publishConfig": {
|
|
4
4
|
"access": "public"
|
|
5
5
|
},
|
|
6
|
-
"version": "1.6.0-beta.
|
|
6
|
+
"version": "1.6.0-beta.3",
|
|
7
7
|
"description": "Self-hosted console for Claude Code and Codex. Multi-user, browser-based, persistent AI sessions.",
|
|
8
8
|
"bin": {
|
|
9
9
|
"clagentic-console": "./bin/cli.js"
|