@clagentic/console 1.10.0 → 1.11.0-beta.2
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +14 -1
- package/bin/cli.js +38 -16
- package/lib/agents.js +1 -55
- package/lib/bash-auto-approve.js +133 -0
- package/lib/build-identity.js +23 -5
- package/lib/build-sha.json +2 -2
- package/lib/build-update-check.js +0 -62
- package/lib/build-update-offer.js +23 -13
- package/lib/build-update-restart.js +59 -43
- package/lib/cli/arg-validation.js +50 -0
- package/lib/cli/daemon-launch.js +5 -4
- package/lib/cli/menus.js +2 -2
- package/lib/cli/schedule-input-subcommands.js +327 -0
- package/lib/cli/session-subcommands.js +101 -17
- package/lib/client-build-id.js +56 -0
- package/lib/daemon.js +38 -6
- package/lib/identity/index.js +9 -4
- package/lib/injected-sender.js +225 -0
- package/lib/message-sender-record.js +133 -0
- package/lib/pending-prompts.js +55 -0
- package/lib/permission-mode-policy.js +63 -0
- package/lib/permission-settings.js +96 -0
- package/lib/permission-summary.js +67 -0
- package/lib/project-connection.js +10 -11
- package/lib/project-external-trigger.js +9 -1
- package/lib/project-loop.js +50 -23
- package/lib/project-permission-settings.js +59 -0
- package/lib/project-prompt-responses.js +25 -15
- package/lib/project-sessions.js +164 -60
- package/lib/project-user-message.js +18 -47
- package/lib/project.js +46 -74
- package/lib/public/app.js +4 -7
- package/lib/public/css/channel-layout.css +20 -0
- package/lib/public/css/diagnostics.css +7 -0
- package/lib/public/css/input.css +78 -0
- package/lib/public/css/menus.css +17 -0
- package/lib/public/css/overlays.css +0 -3
- package/lib/public/css/scheduler-modal.css +5 -0
- package/lib/public/index.html +44 -8
- package/lib/public/modules/app-connection.js +18 -1
- package/lib/public/modules/app-loop-ui.js +11 -1
- package/lib/public/modules/app-messages.js +23 -30
- package/lib/public/modules/app-panels.js +10 -3
- package/lib/public/modules/app-rate-limit.js +64 -88
- package/lib/public/modules/app-rendering.js +37 -6
- package/lib/public/modules/approve-tools-toggle.js +33 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/at-agents.js +8 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/build-guard.js +61 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/build-update-detail.js +1 -4
- package/lib/public/modules/diagnostics.js +98 -9
- package/lib/public/modules/injected-identity.js +78 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/injected-label.js +62 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/input.js +64 -114
- package/lib/public/modules/loop-hooks-warning.js +20 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/mode-options.js +35 -16
- package/lib/public/modules/permission-settings.js +56 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/project-settings.js +3 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/rate-limit-state.js +47 -22
- package/lib/public/modules/schedule-panel.js +234 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/schedule-time.js +193 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/scheduled-input-actions.js +19 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/scheduler-config.js +12 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/scheduler.js +8 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/server-settings.js +5 -9
- package/lib/public/modules/settings-defaults.js +18 -4
- package/lib/runtime-env.js +4 -0
- package/lib/scheduled-input/ipc.js +92 -0
- package/lib/scheduled-input/rate-limit-resume.js +53 -0
- package/lib/scheduled-input/records.js +350 -0
- package/lib/scheduled-input/service.js +743 -0
- package/lib/scheduled-input/store.js +132 -0
- package/lib/scheduled-input/ws.js +194 -0
- package/lib/scheduler.js +4 -0
- package/lib/sdk-bridge.js +194 -175
- package/lib/sdk-message-processor.js +13 -5
- package/lib/sdk-skill-discovery.js +17 -0
- package/lib/sender-ref.js +109 -0
- package/lib/server.js +37 -11
- package/lib/session-directory.js +224 -0
- package/lib/session-file-scan.js +55 -0
- package/lib/session-input-ipc.js +21 -0
- package/lib/session-input.js +396 -23
- package/lib/session-name-holder.js +82 -0
- package/lib/session-resume.js +3 -0
- package/lib/sessions.js +111 -2
- package/lib/turn-initiator.js +6 -2
- package/lib/updater.js +8 -2
- package/lib/ws-schema.js +20 -9
- package/lib/yoke/adapters/claude-worker.js +3 -1
- package/lib/yoke/adapters/claude.js +13 -17
- package/lib/yoke/adapters/codex.js +18 -5
- package/lib/yoke/adapters/permission-relay.js +9 -0
- package/lib/yoke/interface.js +7 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/scripts/check-test-count.js +1 -1
- package/scripts/install-local-test.js +45 -1
- package/scripts/postinstall.js +1 -0
package/lib/sdk-bridge.js
CHANGED
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@@ -4,10 +4,11 @@ var execSync = require("child_process").execSync;
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4
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var execFileSync = require("child_process").execFileSync;
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var usersModule = require("./users");
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var { getCodexConfig } = require("./codex-defaults");
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-
var {
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var { isAutoApprovableSegment } = require("./bash-auto-approve");
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var { splitShellSegments, hasUnapprovableShellSyntax, attachSkillDiscovery, discoverSkillsWithMeta, mergeSkillsWithMeta } = require("./sdk-skill-discovery");
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var { createMessageQueue } = require("./sdk-message-queue");
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var { attachMessageProcessor } = require("./sdk-message-processor");
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var {
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var { parseFrontmatter, slugifyAgentName, AGENTS_SOURCE_DIR } = require("./agents");
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var { discoverWorkflows } = require("./sdk-workflow-discovery");
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var { buildEnrichedSlashCommands } = require("./sdk-slash-enrichment");
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var { runPreflight } = require("./settings-preflight");
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@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@ var sessionActivity = require("./session-activity");
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var sessionReclaim = require("./session-reclaim");
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var { withPromptLabel } = require("./prompt-label");
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var { isAgentDispatchTool } = require("./agent-dispatch-tool");
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var permissionSummary = require("./permission-summary");
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var { getNewWorkRefusal } = require("./new-work-gate");
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var runtimeEnv = require("./runtime-env");
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var mcpToolSchema = require("./mcp-tool-schema");
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@@ -26,6 +28,8 @@ var { buildVendorRegistryMessage, recordInstallState } = require("./vendor-regis
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var { authRequiredFacts } = require("./vendor-auth");
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var { bumpLastActivity } = require("./activity-clock");
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var { logField } = require("./log-field");
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var { checkPermissionMode } = require("./permission-mode-policy");
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var { reserveNameOnRevival } = require("./session-name-holder");
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var { createAiTitleRefresher } = require("./session-ai-title");
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// --- lr-29f9: Global concurrent-session ceiling ---
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@@ -388,7 +392,6 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
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var getNotificationsModule = opts.getNotificationsModule || function () { return null; };
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var adapter = opts.adapter;
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var adapters = opts.adapters || {};
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var dangerouslySkipPermissions = opts.dangerouslySkipPermissions || false;
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// Whether the daemon isolates users at the OS level. An agent that does not
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// support that (Codex) is disabled then: never created, never started.
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var osUsersMode = !!opts.osUsers;
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@@ -401,6 +404,19 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
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return _mcpServersSrc;
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}
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var getRemoteMcpServers = opts.getRemoteMcpServers || null;
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// The server's permission settings, read at each decision so a change needs
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// no restart. Absent means the defaults (nothing turned off).
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function autoApproveReadOnlyOn() {
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var settings = typeof opts.getPermissionSettings === "function" ? opts.getPermissionSettings() : null;
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return !settings || settings.autoApproveReadOnly !== false;
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}
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// The mode a client is shown for a session: its own, else the project default
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// (sessions.js effectiveSessionMode). A session manager without the helper
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// (a test double) gets the same fallback inline.
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function shownMode(session) {
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if (typeof sm.effectiveSessionMode === "function") return sm.effectiveSessionMode(session);
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return (session && session.permissionMode) || sm.currentPermissionMode || "default";
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}
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var clayPort = opts.clayPort || 2633;
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var clayTls = opts.clayTls || false;
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var clayAuthToken = opts.clayAuthToken || null;
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@@ -918,7 +934,12 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
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// Check if a tool should be auto-approved based on whitelist rules.
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// Returns { behavior: "allow", updatedInput } if whitelisted, or null if not.
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// Shared by handleCanUseTool and mate mention canUseTool handlers.
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function checkToolWhitelist(toolName, input) {
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function checkToolWhitelist(toolName, input, toolOpts) {
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938
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// The "Auto-approve read-only tools" setting. Off sends every item below
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939
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// (read-only built-ins, the safe Bash list, browser watch/unwatch, the MCP
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940
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// servers the person enabled) to the normal prompt.
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if (!autoApproveReadOnlyOn()) return null;
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// Auto-approve read-only tools for ALL sessions.
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// These tools only inspect files and fetch data — no side effects.
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var readOnlyTools = { Read: true, Glob: true, Grep: true, WebFetch: true, WebSearch: true };
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@@ -926,34 +947,34 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
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return { behavior: "allow", updatedInput: input };
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}
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//
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950
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// MCP auto-approval keys on the SDK's report of which server serves the
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// tool (toolOpts.mcpServer), never on the tool-name prefix: a configured
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// server can be named anything, so a same-named tool from it would
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953
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// otherwise borrow the approval. Only source "sdk" (an in-process server
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// this host registered) is trusted. No report (Codex approvals, older
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// CLIs) means no auto-approval and the call falls through to the prompt.
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var mcpSource = toolName.indexOf("mcp__") === 0 && toolOpts && toolOpts.mcpServer;
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var trustedMcpName = mcpSource && mcpSource.source === "sdk" && typeof mcpSource.name === "string"
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? mcpSource.name : null;
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// Auto-approve safe browser MCP tools, only from the console's own
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// in-process browser server.
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// Only watch/unwatch: user explicitly chose which tab to share.
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// Everything else (screenshot, read_page, list_tabs, etc.) can expose
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// content from tabs the user didn't intend to share, so require approval.
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var safeBrowserTools = { browser_watch_tab: true, browser_unwatch_tab: true };
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if (
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if (safeBrowserTools[mcpToolName]) {
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if (trustedMcpName === "clay-browser" && toolName.indexOf("mcp__clay-browser__") === 0) {
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if (safeBrowserTools[toolName.substring("mcp__clay-browser__".length)]) {
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return { behavior: "allow", updatedInput: input };
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}
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}
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// Auto-approve Mate datastore tools. These are scoped to the active Mate
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// project and already enforce SQL policy server-side.
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if (toolName.indexOf("mcp__clay-datastore__") === 0) {
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return { behavior: "allow", updatedInput: input };
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}
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// Auto-approve remote MCP tools that the user explicitly enabled in project settings.
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// These are user-owned local MCP servers, so no additional permission prompt needed.
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if (toolName.indexOf("mcp__") === 0 && getRemoteMcpServers) {
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if (trustedMcpName && toolName.indexOf("mcp__" + trustedMcpName + "__") === 0 && getRemoteMcpServers) {
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var _rmcp = getRemoteMcpServers();
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if (_rmcp) {
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var _mcpServerName = _mcpParts.length >= 2 ? _mcpParts[1] : "";
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if (_rmcp[_mcpServerName]) {
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return { behavior: "allow", updatedInput: input };
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}
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if (_rmcp && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(_rmcp, trustedMcpName)) {
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return { behavior: "allow", updatedInput: input };
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}
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}
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// fall through to the normal user permission prompt.
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if (toolName === "Bash" && input && input.command) {
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var cmd = input.command.trim();
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which: true, type: true, whereis: true, hash: true,
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// Environment/system info
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// lr-74c8 (BOBBIE follow-up): `env` and `command` are execution
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// primitives, not read-only inspection — `env rm -rf /` and
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// `command rm -rf /` launder an arbitrary tail command past a
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993
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// first-word-only check with no argument validator. Removed
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// outright rather than gated: neither has a read-only-only form
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// worth trusting to a first-word check (contrast `printenv`,
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// which genuinely can only print).
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echo: true, printf: true, printenv: true, pwd: true,
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whoami: true, id: true, groups: true,
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date: true, uname: true, hostname: true, uptime: true, arch: true,
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nproc: true, free: true, lsb_release: true, sw_vers: true,
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locale: true, timedatectl: true,
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// Text processing (pure stdin/stdout, no side effects)
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jq: true, yq: true, sort: true, uniq: true, cut: true, tr: true,
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paste: true, column: true, fold: true,
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rev: true, tac: true, nl: true, expand: true, unexpand: true,
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fmt: true, pr: true, csplit: true, comm: true, join: true,
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// Comparison/hashing
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diff: true, cmp: true, md5sum: true, sha256sum: true, sha1sum: true,
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shasum: true, cksum: true, sum: true, b2sum: true, base64: true,
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xxd: true, od: true, hexdump: true,
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// Misc read-only
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test: true, true: true, false: true, seq: true, yes: true,
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sleep: true, time: true,
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man: true, help: true, info: true, apropos: true,
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cal: true, bc: true, expr: true, factor: true,
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1016
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lsof: true, ps: true, top: true, htop: true, pgrep: true,
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netstat: true, ss: true, ifconfig: true, ip: true, dig: true,
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nslookup: true, host: true, ping: true, traceroute: true,
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};
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// Multi-purpose tools retained in the whitelist but restricted to a
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// read-only subcommand/flag allowlist (lr-74c8). Each validator
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// receives the segment's argv (excluding the command word itself)
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// and returns true only for forms that cannot mutate state.
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var validatedCommands = {
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// Only the explicitly read-only git subcommands from the lr-74c8
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// spec are allowed. Deliberately narrow: no `remote`, `tag`,
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// `branch`, etc. — those have mutating forms (`branch -D`,
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// `remote add`, `tag <name>`) that a subcommand-only check cannot
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// safely distinguish from their read-only forms.
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git: function (args) {
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if (args.length === 0) return false;
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var readOnlySubcommands = {
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status: true, log: true, diff: true, show: true, "--version": true,
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};
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if (!readOnlySubcommands[args[0]]) return false;
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// lr-74c8 (BOBBIE follow-up): the subcommand allowlist above only
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// checked args[0] and ignored everything after it. `git show
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1038
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// --output=<path>` / `git log --output=<path>` (and the `-o`
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// short form) inherit diff/log's file-write flag, turning a
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// "read-only" subcommand into an unprompted arbitrary file write.
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// `-c <config>` can inject a pager/external-diff/exec config
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// (core.pager, diff.external) that runs an arbitrary command;
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// `--exec`, `--ext-diff`, `--textconv`, `-O`/`--output-indicator-*`
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// extend the same file-write/exec surface. Any of these flags on
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// an otherwise-allowed subcommand falls through to the prompt.
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var dangerousFlagRe = /^(-o|--output(=.*)?|-O|--output-indicator.*|-c|--exec(=.*)?|--ext-diff|--textconv|--upload-pack(=.*)?|--receive-pack(=.*)?)$/;
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for (var gi = 1; gi < args.length; gi++) {
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if (dangerousFlagRe.test(args[gi])) return false;
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}
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return true;
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},
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|
-
};
|
|
999
|
+
// Redirection, newlines, a lone "&" and command substitution turn a
|
|
1000
|
+
// listed command into a write or a second command. Refuse them before
|
|
1001
|
+
// any splitting, quotes included; the call then reaches the prompt.
|
|
1002
|
+
if (hasUnapprovableShellSyntax(cmd)) return null;
|
|
1003
|
+
// Which commands are read-only, and which option tokens each accepts,
|
|
1004
|
+
// is declared in lib/bash-auto-approve.js. Commands that can write,
|
|
1005
|
+
// execute or hang (time, sort, uniq, csplit, xxd, yq, tree, ag/ack,
|
|
1006
|
+
// yes, ping, man, info, top, htop, timedatectl, tail, ss, file, sleep) are not
|
|
1007
|
+
// listed: a dropped entry only costs a prompt. `env` and `command` are
|
|
1008
|
+
// execution primitives and stay out for the same reason.
|
|
1053
1009
|
// Split compound commands on operators (&&, ||, ;, |) while respecting
|
|
1054
1010
|
// quoted strings and subshells so that e.g. grep -E "(a|b)" is not split
|
|
1055
1011
|
var segments = splitShellSegments(cmd);
|
|
@@ -1074,13 +1030,12 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
1074
1030
|
allSafe = false;
|
|
1075
1031
|
break;
|
|
1076
1032
|
}
|
|
1077
|
-
//
|
|
1078
|
-
// is
|
|
1079
|
-
// through to the
|
|
1080
|
-
var segTokens = seg.
|
|
1033
|
+
// Nothing is stripped before the first-word check: a leading env
|
|
1034
|
+
// assignment is refused up front ("=" in hasUnapprovableShellSyntax)
|
|
1035
|
+
// and a leading sudo always falls through to the prompt (lr-74c8).
|
|
1036
|
+
var segTokens = seg.split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean);
|
|
1081
1037
|
var firstWord = segTokens[0];
|
|
1082
|
-
if (
|
|
1083
|
-
if (validatedCommands[firstWord] && validatedCommands[firstWord](segTokens.slice(1))) continue;
|
|
1038
|
+
if (isAutoApprovableSegment(segTokens)) continue;
|
|
1084
1039
|
allSafe = false;
|
|
1085
1040
|
break;
|
|
1086
1041
|
}
|
|
@@ -1092,6 +1047,25 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
1092
1047
|
return null; // Not whitelisted
|
|
1093
1048
|
}
|
|
1094
1049
|
|
|
1050
|
+
// Whether a mode may be applied to this session, by the shared policy
|
|
1051
|
+
// (lib/permission-mode-policy.js). checkVendor adds the session's vendor
|
|
1052
|
+
// capability list to the check. A refusal is logged.
|
|
1053
|
+
function checkModeFor(session, mode, checkVendor) {
|
|
1054
|
+
var vendor = sessionCapabilities.effectiveVendorId(sm, session, adapter && adapter.vendor);
|
|
1055
|
+
return checkPermissionMode(mode, {
|
|
1056
|
+
supportedModes: checkVendor ? sessionCapabilities.capabilitiesFor(sm, vendor).permissionModes : null,
|
|
1057
|
+
});
|
|
1058
|
+
}
|
|
1059
|
+
|
|
1060
|
+
// checkModeFor, with a refusal logged under `what`; true when the mode is allowed.
|
|
1061
|
+
function modeAllowed(session, mode, what, checkVendor) {
|
|
1062
|
+
var verdict = checkModeFor(session, mode, checkVendor);
|
|
1063
|
+
if (!verdict.ok) {
|
|
1064
|
+
console.warn("[sdk-bridge] refused " + what + " " + logField(mode) + " in " + slug + ": " + verdict.error);
|
|
1065
|
+
}
|
|
1066
|
+
return verdict.ok;
|
|
1067
|
+
}
|
|
1068
|
+
|
|
1095
1069
|
function handleCanUseTool(session, toolName, input, opts) {
|
|
1096
1070
|
opts = opts || {};
|
|
1097
1071
|
// An ask the user's own ask rule forced is a human prompt by the user's
|
|
@@ -1102,7 +1076,10 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
1102
1076
|
|
|
1103
1077
|
// Full-auto mode: auto-approve everything except AskUserQuestion
|
|
1104
1078
|
// (which still needs to go through the user interaction flow).
|
|
1105
|
-
|
|
1079
|
+
// The mode is this session's own (falling back to the project default only
|
|
1080
|
+
// where the session has none, as at query start), never another session's.
|
|
1081
|
+
var sessionMode = session.permissionMode || sm.currentPermissionMode;
|
|
1082
|
+
if (!ruleForced && sessionMode === "bypassPermissions" && toolName !== "AskUserQuestion") {
|
|
1106
1083
|
return Promise.resolve({ behavior: "allow", updatedInput: input });
|
|
1107
1084
|
}
|
|
1108
1085
|
|
|
@@ -1115,11 +1092,16 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
1115
1092
|
if (toolName === "EnterPlanMode") {
|
|
1116
1093
|
return Promise.resolve({ behavior: "deny", message: "Do not enter plan mode. Execute directly." });
|
|
1117
1094
|
}
|
|
1118
|
-
|
|
1095
|
+
// The loop's "Approve tools automatically" setting. A record that never
|
|
1096
|
+
// carried it approves, as every loop did before it existed. Off sends the
|
|
1097
|
+
// call down the normal path below (read-only list, then a prompt).
|
|
1098
|
+
if (session.loop.approveTools !== false) {
|
|
1099
|
+
return Promise.resolve({ behavior: "allow", updatedInput: input });
|
|
1100
|
+
}
|
|
1119
1101
|
}
|
|
1120
1102
|
|
|
1121
1103
|
// Check shared whitelist (read-only tools, safe browser tools, safe bash commands)
|
|
1122
|
-
var whitelisted = ruleForced ? null : checkToolWhitelist(toolName, input);
|
|
1104
|
+
var whitelisted = ruleForced ? null : checkToolWhitelist(toolName, input, opts);
|
|
1123
1105
|
if (whitelisted) {
|
|
1124
1106
|
return Promise.resolve(whitelisted);
|
|
1125
1107
|
}
|
|
@@ -1306,15 +1288,27 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
1306
1288
|
// reply (project-sessions.js's set_model/switch_session).
|
|
1307
1289
|
session.model = metaData.model;
|
|
1308
1290
|
sendModelInfoToSession(session, session.vendor || (adapter && adapter.vendor) || "claude", metaData.model);
|
|
1309
|
-
sendToSession(session, { type: "config_state", model: metaData.model, mode:
|
|
1291
|
+
sendToSession(session, { type: "config_state", model: metaData.model, mode: shownMode(session), effort: sm.currentEffort || "medium", betas: sm.currentBetas || [] });
|
|
1310
1292
|
break;
|
|
1311
1293
|
case "effort_changed":
|
|
1312
1294
|
sm.currentEffort = metaData.effort;
|
|
1313
|
-
|
|
1295
|
+
// A broadcast about the effort carries no mode: the project's
|
|
1296
|
+
// default is not any viewer's session mode, and a push without a
|
|
1297
|
+
// mode leaves every chip as it is.
|
|
1298
|
+
send({ type: "config_state", model: sm.currentModel || "", effort: sm.currentEffort, betas: sm.currentBetas || [] });
|
|
1314
1299
|
break;
|
|
1315
1300
|
case "permission_mode_changed":
|
|
1316
|
-
|
|
1317
|
-
|
|
1301
|
+
// One session's worker changed its own mode (plan entered or
|
|
1302
|
+
// left, say). That is this session's mode and no one else's:
|
|
1303
|
+
// writing it to sm.currentPermissionMode made it the
|
|
1304
|
+
// project-wide mode every other session starts from.
|
|
1305
|
+
// The worker is not a trusted source: the mode passes the same
|
|
1306
|
+
// check as any other entry point, and a refused one leaves the
|
|
1307
|
+
// session on its previous mode.
|
|
1308
|
+
if (!modeAllowed(session, metaData.mode, "worker permission mode", true)) break;
|
|
1309
|
+
session.permissionMode = metaData.mode;
|
|
1310
|
+
sm.saveSessionFile(session);
|
|
1311
|
+
sendToSession(session, { type: "config_state", model: session.model || sm.currentModel || "", mode: metaData.mode, effort: sm.currentEffort || "medium", betas: sm.currentBetas || [] });
|
|
1318
1312
|
break;
|
|
1319
1313
|
case "worker_error":
|
|
1320
1314
|
send({ type: "error", text: metaData.error });
|
|
@@ -1541,9 +1535,9 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
1541
1535
|
session.rateLimitResetsAt = null;
|
|
1542
1536
|
session.rateLimitAutoContinuePending = true;
|
|
1543
1537
|
didScheduleAutoContinue = true;
|
|
1544
|
-
console.log("[sdk-bridge] Rate limited, scheduling
|
|
1545
|
-
if (typeof opts.
|
|
1546
|
-
opts.
|
|
1538
|
+
console.log("[sdk-bridge] Rate limited, scheduling the rate-limit resume for session " + session.localId);
|
|
1539
|
+
if (typeof opts.scheduleRateLimitResume === "function") {
|
|
1540
|
+
opts.scheduleRateLimitResume(session, acResetsAt);
|
|
1547
1541
|
}
|
|
1548
1542
|
} else if (acEnabled && !session.destroying) {
|
|
1549
1543
|
// Log why auto-continue was not scheduled (for debugging)
|
|
@@ -1669,8 +1663,32 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
1669
1663
|
|
|
1670
1664
|
// `initiator` (turn-initiator.js INITIATORS) is who started this turn. It is
|
|
1671
1665
|
// per turn: it stamps the first message and says nothing about later turns
|
|
1672
|
-
// of the session or about the process's environment.
|
|
1673
|
-
|
|
1666
|
+
// of the session or about the process's environment. `messageId` is the id
|
|
1667
|
+
// the message's history entry carries (injected-sender.js stampRecord); it is
|
|
1668
|
+
// sent to the vendor with the message so the vendor transcript and the
|
|
1669
|
+
// published sender record name the same message.
|
|
1670
|
+
// `leadMessages` ([{ text, initiator, messageId }]) are further user messages
|
|
1671
|
+
// of their own, sent before the first one: a message the operator typed while
|
|
1672
|
+
// a loop iteration was running reaches the vendor as itself, with its own
|
|
1673
|
+
// initiator and id, never inside the message the loop composed.
|
|
1674
|
+
async function startQuery(session, text, images, linuxUser, initiator, messageId, leadMessages) {
|
|
1675
|
+
// Every path that gives a reaped session a runtime again (send-input, the
|
|
1676
|
+
// browser, a loop or scheduled turn) comes through here, so the name rule
|
|
1677
|
+
// for a session coming back to life is enforced once. The name is reserved
|
|
1678
|
+
// synchronously, before the first await, and released when the start ends.
|
|
1679
|
+
var reservation = sm.sessions ? reserveNameOnRevival(sm.sessions, session) : null;
|
|
1680
|
+
if (reservation && reservation.holder) {
|
|
1681
|
+
if (typeof sm.saveSessionFile === "function") sm.saveSessionFile(session);
|
|
1682
|
+
if (typeof sm.broadcastSessionList === "function") sm.broadcastSessionList();
|
|
1683
|
+
}
|
|
1684
|
+
try {
|
|
1685
|
+
return await startQueryRuntime(session, text, images, linuxUser, initiator, messageId, leadMessages);
|
|
1686
|
+
} finally {
|
|
1687
|
+
if (reservation) reservation.release();
|
|
1688
|
+
}
|
|
1689
|
+
}
|
|
1690
|
+
|
|
1691
|
+
async function startQueryRuntime(session, text, images, linuxUser, initiator, messageId, leadMessages) {
|
|
1674
1692
|
async function ensureVendorReady(vendor) {
|
|
1675
1693
|
if (!vendor) return null;
|
|
1676
1694
|
// What the adapter's live session advertises narrows its declaration; the
|
|
@@ -1689,7 +1707,6 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
1689
1707
|
vendorAdapter = await yoke.lazyCreateAdapter(adapters, vendor, withRuntimeEnv({
|
|
1690
1708
|
cwd: cwd,
|
|
1691
1709
|
osUsers: osUsersMode,
|
|
1692
|
-
dangerouslySkipPermissions: dangerouslySkipPermissions,
|
|
1693
1710
|
linuxUser: linuxUser || undefined,
|
|
1694
1711
|
clayPort: clayPort,
|
|
1695
1712
|
clayTls: clayTls,
|
|
@@ -1699,7 +1716,6 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
1699
1716
|
} else if ((!sm.modelsByVendor || !sm.modelsByVendor[vendor]) && typeof vendorAdapter.init === "function") {
|
|
1700
1717
|
recordInit(await vendorAdapter.init(withRuntimeEnv({
|
|
1701
1718
|
cwd: cwd,
|
|
1702
|
-
dangerouslySkipPermissions: dangerouslySkipPermissions,
|
|
1703
1719
|
linuxUser: linuxUser || undefined,
|
|
1704
1720
|
clayPort: clayPort,
|
|
1705
1721
|
clayTls: clayTls,
|
|
@@ -2023,11 +2039,6 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2023
2039
|
// belt-and-suspenders for sessions that carry agentName from a prior
|
|
2024
2040
|
// vendor switch or a direct ws message.
|
|
2025
2041
|
//
|
|
2026
|
-
// lr-4c90 — belt-and-suspenders tool enforcement: the SDK's `agent` option
|
|
2027
|
-
// should apply tool restrictions, but only does so when the agent file uses
|
|
2028
|
-
// JSON array syntax for the tools field. We read the tools list directly
|
|
2029
|
-
// from disk and set claudeOpts.tools explicitly so restriction is enforced
|
|
2030
|
-
// even if the SDK's parsing path has any quirks.
|
|
2031
2042
|
// lr-5bd7 — declared outside the agent block so the model override can be
|
|
2032
2043
|
// applied when queryModel is computed below (after loop-settings resolution).
|
|
2033
2044
|
var _agentDeclaredModel = null;
|
|
@@ -2043,18 +2054,12 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2043
2054
|
var effectiveHome = resolveEffectiveHome(linuxUser);
|
|
2044
2055
|
var effectiveAgentsDir = effectiveHome ? path.join(effectiveHome, ".claude", "agents") : AGENTS_SOURCE_DIR;
|
|
2045
2056
|
|
|
2046
|
-
var agentTools = readAgentToolsFromFile(session.agentName, effectiveAgentsDir);
|
|
2047
|
-
if (agentTools) {
|
|
2048
|
-
claudeOpts.tools = agentTools;
|
|
2049
|
-
console.log("[sdk-bridge] agent tools enforced for " + session.agentName + ": " + agentTools.join(", "));
|
|
2050
|
-
}
|
|
2051
|
-
|
|
2052
2057
|
// lr-5bd7 — inject AGENT.md body as systemPrompt on the main thread.
|
|
2053
2058
|
// The `agents` map approach (PR #264) only applies to subagent invocations
|
|
2054
2059
|
// via the Agent tool; it does not deliver the body to the main conversation.
|
|
2055
2060
|
// Setting claudeOpts.systemPrompt bypasses settingSources/agents-map resolution
|
|
2056
2061
|
// and ensures the model receives the agent persona directly.
|
|
2057
|
-
// We keep claudeOpts.agent set
|
|
2062
|
+
// We keep claudeOpts.agent set; the console passes no tool list of its own.
|
|
2058
2063
|
var agentSlug = slugifyAgentName(session.agentName);
|
|
2059
2064
|
var agentFilePath = path.join(effectiveAgentsDir, agentSlug + ".md");
|
|
2060
2065
|
var agentRaw;
|
|
@@ -2094,7 +2099,10 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2094
2099
|
if (budgetTokens) claudeOpts.thinking = { type: "enabled", budgetTokens: budgetTokens };
|
|
2095
2100
|
}
|
|
2096
2101
|
|
|
2097
|
-
|
|
2102
|
+
// A loop's mode (LOOP.json is a file, not a trusted client) passes the same
|
|
2103
|
+
// check as a mode a client asks for; a refused one is ignored and the
|
|
2104
|
+
// session's own mode applies.
|
|
2105
|
+
if (ls.permissionMode && modeAllowed(session, ls.permissionMode, "loop permissionMode", true)) {
|
|
2098
2106
|
session._loopPermissionMode = ls.permissionMode;
|
|
2099
2107
|
}
|
|
2100
2108
|
|
|
@@ -2103,22 +2111,32 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2103
2111
|
claudeOpts.settings = Object.assign({}, claudeOpts.settings || {}, { disableAllHooks: ls.disableAllHooks });
|
|
2104
2112
|
}
|
|
2105
2113
|
|
|
2106
|
-
|
|
2107
|
-
|
|
2108
|
-
|
|
2109
|
-
|
|
2110
|
-
|
|
2111
|
-
|
|
2112
|
-
|
|
2113
|
-
|
|
2114
|
-
|
|
2115
|
-
|
|
2116
|
-
if (
|
|
2117
|
-
|
|
2114
|
+
var globalMode = session.permissionMode || sm.currentPermissionMode || "default";
|
|
2115
|
+
// A stored mode (session file, saved default) is checked again here: a
|
|
2116
|
+
// bypassPermissions written by an older build or by hand must not start
|
|
2117
|
+
// a query while the server does not allow it.
|
|
2118
|
+
// The vendor is known here, so a mode the session's vendor lacks (auto
|
|
2119
|
+
// after a switch to a vendor without it) falls back too.
|
|
2120
|
+
if (!modeAllowed(session, globalMode, "stored permission mode", true)) {
|
|
2121
|
+
globalMode = "default";
|
|
2122
|
+
// The session's own mode too, so the bypass branch of canUseTool
|
|
2123
|
+
// (which reads it) agrees with what this query starts with.
|
|
2124
|
+
if (session.permissionMode) {
|
|
2125
|
+
session.permissionMode = "default";
|
|
2126
|
+
// The saved value too, or the next load reads the refused mode back.
|
|
2127
|
+
sm.saveSessionFile(session);
|
|
2118
2128
|
}
|
|
2119
2129
|
}
|
|
2120
|
-
|
|
2121
|
-
|
|
2130
|
+
var effectiveDefault;
|
|
2131
|
+
if (globalMode === "bypassPermissions") effectiveDefault = "bypassPermissions";
|
|
2132
|
+
else if (session.acceptEditsAfterStart) effectiveDefault = "acceptEdits";
|
|
2133
|
+
else effectiveDefault = globalMode;
|
|
2134
|
+
var modeToApply = session._loopPermissionMode || effectiveDefault;
|
|
2135
|
+
if (modeToApply && modeToApply !== "default") {
|
|
2136
|
+
claudeOpts.permissionMode = modeToApply;
|
|
2137
|
+
}
|
|
2138
|
+
// Clear one-shot acceptEditsAfterStart so the flag does not linger into
|
|
2139
|
+
// subsequent turns.
|
|
2122
2140
|
if (session.acceptEditsAfterStart) delete session.acceptEditsAfterStart;
|
|
2123
2141
|
if (session.cliSessionId && session.lastRewindUuid) {
|
|
2124
2142
|
claudeOpts.resumeSessionAt = session.lastRewindUuid;
|
|
@@ -2219,6 +2237,13 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2219
2237
|
// The variables Settings add to this runtime's environment, as of now.
|
|
2220
2238
|
withRuntimeEnv(queryOpts, session);
|
|
2221
2239
|
|
|
2240
|
+
// The console's own reference to this session, in the process environment
|
|
2241
|
+
// whatever identity provider is configured (lib/sender-ref.js). Claude only:
|
|
2242
|
+
// one Codex app-server serves many threads, so it cannot carry a per-thread one.
|
|
2243
|
+
if (sessionAdapter.vendor === "claude" && slug) {
|
|
2244
|
+
queryOpts.sessionRef = { project: slug, sessionId: session.localId };
|
|
2245
|
+
}
|
|
2246
|
+
|
|
2222
2247
|
// The identity of this agent process, when a provider is configured. Its
|
|
2223
2248
|
// directory is delivered in the process's environment and removed when the
|
|
2224
2249
|
// query ends (processQueryStream) or fails to start (below).
|
|
@@ -2280,7 +2305,13 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2280
2305
|
|
|
2281
2306
|
// Push initial user message through the QueryHandle
|
|
2282
2307
|
console.log("[sdk-bridge] pushing initial message via handle.pushMessage...");
|
|
2283
|
-
|
|
2308
|
+
if (Array.isArray(leadMessages)) {
|
|
2309
|
+
for (var li = 0; li < leadMessages.length; li++) {
|
|
2310
|
+
var lead = leadMessages[li];
|
|
2311
|
+
handle.pushMessage(lead.text, undefined, lead.initiator, lead.messageId);
|
|
2312
|
+
}
|
|
2313
|
+
}
|
|
2314
|
+
handle.pushMessage(text, images, initiator, messageId);
|
|
2284
2315
|
|
|
2285
2316
|
// lr-b61b: Flush any messages that arrived between turns (after the previous
|
|
2286
2317
|
// finally block nulled queryInstance and before this startQuery call).
|
|
@@ -2288,7 +2319,7 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2288
2319
|
console.log("[sdk-bridge] startQuery: flushing " + session.pendingMessages.length + " buffered pending message(s) for project " + slug + " session " + session.localId);
|
|
2289
2320
|
for (var pi = 0; pi < session.pendingMessages.length; pi++) {
|
|
2290
2321
|
var pm = session.pendingMessages[pi];
|
|
2291
|
-
handle.pushMessage(pm.text, pm.images, pm.initiator);
|
|
2322
|
+
handle.pushMessage(pm.text, pm.images, pm.initiator, pm.messageId);
|
|
2292
2323
|
}
|
|
2293
2324
|
session.pendingMessages = [];
|
|
2294
2325
|
}
|
|
@@ -2327,11 +2358,11 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2327
2358
|
}
|
|
2328
2359
|
}
|
|
2329
2360
|
|
|
2330
|
-
function pushMessage(session, text, images, initiator) {
|
|
2361
|
+
function pushMessage(session, text, images, initiator, messageId) {
|
|
2331
2362
|
bumpLastActivity(session, "push-message", slug);
|
|
2332
2363
|
// Route through QueryHandle (works for both in-process and worker paths)
|
|
2333
2364
|
if (session.queryInstance && typeof session.queryInstance.pushMessage === "function") {
|
|
2334
|
-
session.queryInstance.pushMessage(text, images, initiator);
|
|
2365
|
+
session.queryInstance.pushMessage(text, images, initiator, messageId);
|
|
2335
2366
|
} else {
|
|
2336
2367
|
// lr-b61b: queryInstance is null between turns (finally block has run but
|
|
2337
2368
|
// startQuery has not been called yet). Buffer the message so it is not
|
|
@@ -2347,7 +2378,7 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2347
2378
|
// so any candidate cause that lands a message here is visible.
|
|
2348
2379
|
var wasFull = session.pendingMessages.length >= MAX_PENDING_MESSAGES;
|
|
2349
2380
|
if (wasFull) session.pendingMessages.shift();
|
|
2350
|
-
session.pendingMessages.push({ text: text, images: images, initiator: initiator });
|
|
2381
|
+
session.pendingMessages.push({ text: text, images: images, initiator: initiator, messageId: messageId });
|
|
2351
2382
|
console.log("[sdk-bridge] pushMessage: queryInstance null, buffered message for session " + session.localId + " (pending=" + session.pendingMessages.length + ")");
|
|
2352
2383
|
sendAndRecord(session, {
|
|
2353
2384
|
type: "diagnostic",
|
|
@@ -2378,29 +2409,7 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2378
2409
|
}
|
|
2379
2410
|
|
|
2380
2411
|
function permissionPushBody(toolName, input) {
|
|
2381
|
-
|
|
2382
|
-
var text = "";
|
|
2383
|
-
if (toolName === "Bash" && input.command) {
|
|
2384
|
-
text = input.command;
|
|
2385
|
-
} else if (toolName === "Edit" && input.file_path) {
|
|
2386
|
-
text = input.file_path.split(/[/\\]/).pop() + ": " + (input.old_string || "").substring(0, 40) + " \u2192 " + (input.new_string || "").substring(0, 40);
|
|
2387
|
-
} else if (toolName === "Write" && input.file_path) {
|
|
2388
|
-
text = input.file_path;
|
|
2389
|
-
} else if (input.file_path) {
|
|
2390
|
-
text = input.file_path;
|
|
2391
|
-
} else if (input.command) {
|
|
2392
|
-
text = input.command;
|
|
2393
|
-
} else if (input.url) {
|
|
2394
|
-
text = input.url;
|
|
2395
|
-
} else if (input.query) {
|
|
2396
|
-
text = input.query;
|
|
2397
|
-
} else if (input.pattern) {
|
|
2398
|
-
text = input.pattern;
|
|
2399
|
-
} else if (input.description) {
|
|
2400
|
-
text = input.description;
|
|
2401
|
-
}
|
|
2402
|
-
if (text.length > 120) text = text.substring(0, 120) + "...";
|
|
2403
|
-
return text;
|
|
2412
|
+
return permissionSummary.pushBody(toolName, input);
|
|
2404
2413
|
}
|
|
2405
2414
|
|
|
2406
2415
|
// Detect which vendor binaries are installed for an OS identity and record
|
|
@@ -2442,7 +2451,6 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2442
2451
|
try {
|
|
2443
2452
|
var result = await adapter.init(withRuntimeEnv({
|
|
2444
2453
|
cwd: cwd,
|
|
2445
|
-
dangerouslySkipPermissions: dangerouslySkipPermissions,
|
|
2446
2454
|
linuxUser: linuxUser || undefined,
|
|
2447
2455
|
clayPort: clayPort,
|
|
2448
2456
|
clayTls: clayTls,
|
|
@@ -2579,7 +2587,7 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2579
2587
|
async function setEffort(session, effort) {
|
|
2580
2588
|
if (!session.queryInstance) {
|
|
2581
2589
|
sm.currentEffort = effort;
|
|
2582
|
-
send({ type: "config_state", model: sm.currentModel || "",
|
|
2590
|
+
send({ type: "config_state", model: sm.currentModel || "", effort: sm.currentEffort, betas: sm.currentBetas || [] });
|
|
2583
2591
|
return { ok: true };
|
|
2584
2592
|
}
|
|
2585
2593
|
try {
|
|
@@ -2591,24 +2599,34 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2591
2599
|
return { ok: false, error: errMsg };
|
|
2592
2600
|
}
|
|
2593
2601
|
sm.currentEffort = effort;
|
|
2594
|
-
send({ type: "config_state", model: sm.currentModel || "",
|
|
2602
|
+
send({ type: "config_state", model: sm.currentModel || "", effort: sm.currentEffort, betas: sm.currentBetas || [] });
|
|
2595
2603
|
return { ok: true };
|
|
2596
2604
|
}
|
|
2597
2605
|
|
|
2606
|
+
// Returns true when the session now has the mode (and it is saved, so a
|
|
2607
|
+
// resume or restart keeps it), false when it was refused or the running query
|
|
2608
|
+
// would not take it.
|
|
2598
2609
|
async function setPermissionMode(session, mode) {
|
|
2610
|
+
// The handlers check first; this keeps any other caller (a prompt answer,
|
|
2611
|
+
// a loop) from handing the session a mode the server does not allow.
|
|
2612
|
+
if (!modeAllowed(session, mode, "setPermissionMode", true)) return false;
|
|
2599
2613
|
if (!session.queryInstance) {
|
|
2600
2614
|
// No active query — store on session only (not sm — that's for project defaults).
|
|
2601
2615
|
// config_state sent targeted by caller (project-sessions.js).
|
|
2602
2616
|
session.permissionMode = mode;
|
|
2603
|
-
|
|
2617
|
+
sm.saveSessionFile(session);
|
|
2618
|
+
return true;
|
|
2604
2619
|
}
|
|
2605
2620
|
try {
|
|
2606
2621
|
// Route through QueryHandle (works for both in-process and worker paths)
|
|
2607
2622
|
await session.queryInstance.setPermissionMode(mode);
|
|
2608
2623
|
session.permissionMode = mode;
|
|
2624
|
+
sm.saveSessionFile(session);
|
|
2609
2625
|
// config_state sent targeted by caller — no broadcast here.
|
|
2626
|
+
return true;
|
|
2610
2627
|
} catch (e) {
|
|
2611
2628
|
send({ type: "error", text: "Failed to set permission mode: " + (e.message || e) });
|
|
2629
|
+
return false;
|
|
2612
2630
|
}
|
|
2613
2631
|
}
|
|
2614
2632
|
|
|
@@ -2666,6 +2684,7 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2666
2684
|
setModel: setModel,
|
|
2667
2685
|
setEffort: setEffort,
|
|
2668
2686
|
setPermissionMode: setPermissionMode,
|
|
2687
|
+
checkModeFor: checkModeFor,
|
|
2669
2688
|
isClaudeProcess: isClaudeProcess,
|
|
2670
2689
|
permissionPushTitle: permissionPushTitle,
|
|
2671
2690
|
permissionPushBody: permissionPushBody,
|