@clagentic/console 1.10.0-beta.4 → 1.11.0-beta.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +14 -0
- package/bin/cli.js +15 -3
- package/lib/agents.js +1 -55
- package/lib/bash-auto-approve.js +133 -0
- package/lib/build-identity.js +23 -5
- package/lib/build-sha.json +2 -2
- package/lib/build-update-check.js +0 -62
- package/lib/build-update-offer.js +23 -13
- package/lib/build-update-restart.js +59 -43
- package/lib/cli/schedule-input-subcommands.js +327 -0
- package/lib/cli/session-subcommands.js +100 -17
- package/lib/client-build-id.js +56 -0
- package/lib/daemon.js +20 -5
- package/lib/injected-sender.js +225 -0
- package/lib/message-sender-record.js +133 -0
- package/lib/pending-prompts.js +55 -0
- package/lib/permission-mode-policy.js +63 -0
- package/lib/permission-summary.js +67 -0
- package/lib/project-connection.js +2 -1
- package/lib/project-external-trigger.js +9 -1
- package/lib/project-loop.js +26 -20
- package/lib/project-prompt-responses.js +20 -14
- package/lib/project-sessions.js +73 -21
- package/lib/project-user-message.js +18 -47
- package/lib/project.js +36 -62
- package/lib/public/app.js +3 -5
- package/lib/public/css/channel-layout.css +20 -0
- package/lib/public/css/diagnostics.css +7 -0
- package/lib/public/css/input.css +78 -0
- package/lib/public/css/menus.css +17 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/app-connection.js +18 -1
- package/lib/public/modules/app-messages.js +19 -17
- package/lib/public/modules/app-panels.js +9 -2
- package/lib/public/modules/app-rate-limit.js +63 -87
- package/lib/public/modules/app-rendering.js +37 -6
- package/lib/public/modules/at-agents.js +8 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/build-guard.js +61 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/build-update-detail.js +1 -4
- package/lib/public/modules/diagnostics.js +98 -9
- package/lib/public/modules/injected-identity.js +78 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/injected-label.js +62 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/input.js +64 -114
- package/lib/public/modules/mode-options.js +19 -16
- package/lib/public/modules/rate-limit-state.js +47 -22
- package/lib/public/modules/schedule-panel.js +234 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/schedule-time.js +193 -0
- package/lib/public/modules/scheduled-input-actions.js +19 -0
- package/lib/runtime-env.js +4 -0
- package/lib/scheduled-input/ipc.js +92 -0
- package/lib/scheduled-input/rate-limit-resume.js +53 -0
- package/lib/scheduled-input/records.js +350 -0
- package/lib/scheduled-input/service.js +743 -0
- package/lib/scheduled-input/store.js +132 -0
- package/lib/scheduled-input/ws.js +194 -0
- package/lib/sdk-bridge.js +137 -152
- package/lib/sdk-message-processor.js +13 -5
- package/lib/sdk-skill-discovery.js +17 -0
- package/lib/sender-ref.js +109 -0
- package/lib/server.js +28 -8
- package/lib/session-directory.js +224 -0
- package/lib/session-file-scan.js +55 -0
- package/lib/session-input-ipc.js +20 -0
- package/lib/session-input.js +355 -19
- package/lib/session-name-holder.js +82 -0
- package/lib/session-resume.js +1 -0
- package/lib/sessions.js +44 -0
- package/lib/turn-initiator.js +6 -2
- package/lib/ws-schema.js +15 -7
- package/lib/yoke/adapters/claude-worker.js +3 -1
- package/lib/yoke/adapters/claude.js +13 -7
- package/lib/yoke/adapters/codex.js +18 -5
- package/lib/yoke/adapters/permission-relay.js +9 -0
- package/lib/yoke/interface.js +7 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/scripts/check-test-count.js +1 -1
- package/scripts/install-local-test.js +45 -1
- package/scripts/postinstall.js +1 -0
package/lib/sdk-bridge.js
CHANGED
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@@ -4,10 +4,11 @@ var execSync = require("child_process").execSync;
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4
4
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var execFileSync = require("child_process").execFileSync;
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var usersModule = require("./users");
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6
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var { getCodexConfig } = require("./codex-defaults");
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7
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-
var {
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7
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var { isAutoApprovableSegment } = require("./bash-auto-approve");
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8
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var { splitShellSegments, hasUnapprovableShellSyntax, attachSkillDiscovery, discoverSkillsWithMeta, mergeSkillsWithMeta } = require("./sdk-skill-discovery");
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var { createMessageQueue } = require("./sdk-message-queue");
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10
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var { attachMessageProcessor } = require("./sdk-message-processor");
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10
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-
var {
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11
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+
var { parseFrontmatter, slugifyAgentName, AGENTS_SOURCE_DIR } = require("./agents");
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var { discoverWorkflows } = require("./sdk-workflow-discovery");
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var { buildEnrichedSlashCommands } = require("./sdk-slash-enrichment");
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var { runPreflight } = require("./settings-preflight");
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@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@ var sessionActivity = require("./session-activity");
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var sessionReclaim = require("./session-reclaim");
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var { withPromptLabel } = require("./prompt-label");
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var { isAgentDispatchTool } = require("./agent-dispatch-tool");
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var permissionSummary = require("./permission-summary");
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var { getNewWorkRefusal } = require("./new-work-gate");
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var runtimeEnv = require("./runtime-env");
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var mcpToolSchema = require("./mcp-tool-schema");
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@@ -26,6 +28,8 @@ var { buildVendorRegistryMessage, recordInstallState } = require("./vendor-regis
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var { authRequiredFacts } = require("./vendor-auth");
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var { bumpLastActivity } = require("./activity-clock");
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var { logField } = require("./log-field");
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var { checkPermissionMode } = require("./permission-mode-policy");
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var { reserveNameOnRevival } = require("./session-name-holder");
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var { createAiTitleRefresher } = require("./session-ai-title");
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// --- lr-29f9: Global concurrent-session ceiling ---
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@@ -918,7 +922,7 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
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918
922
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// Check if a tool should be auto-approved based on whitelist rules.
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919
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// Returns { behavior: "allow", updatedInput } if whitelisted, or null if not.
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// Shared by handleCanUseTool and mate mention canUseTool handlers.
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921
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-
function checkToolWhitelist(toolName, input) {
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925
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function checkToolWhitelist(toolName, input, toolOpts) {
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// Auto-approve read-only tools for ALL sessions.
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// These tools only inspect files and fetch data — no side effects.
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928
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var readOnlyTools = { Read: true, Glob: true, Grep: true, WebFetch: true, WebSearch: true };
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@@ -926,34 +930,34 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
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return { behavior: "allow", updatedInput: input };
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}
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932
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929
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-
//
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// MCP auto-approval keys on the SDK's report of which server serves the
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934
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// tool (toolOpts.mcpServer), never on the tool-name prefix: a configured
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// server can be named anything, so a same-named tool from it would
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936
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// otherwise borrow the approval. Only source "sdk" (an in-process server
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937
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// this host registered) is trusted. No report (Codex approvals, older
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938
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// CLIs) means no auto-approval and the call falls through to the prompt.
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var mcpSource = toolName.indexOf("mcp__") === 0 && toolOpts && toolOpts.mcpServer;
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940
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var trustedMcpName = mcpSource && mcpSource.source === "sdk" && typeof mcpSource.name === "string"
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? mcpSource.name : null;
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942
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+
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943
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// Auto-approve safe browser MCP tools, only from the console's own
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944
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// in-process browser server.
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930
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// Only watch/unwatch: user explicitly chose which tab to share.
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// Everything else (screenshot, read_page, list_tabs, etc.) can expose
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// content from tabs the user didn't intend to share, so require approval.
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var safeBrowserTools = { browser_watch_tab: true, browser_unwatch_tab: true };
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if (
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935
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-
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if (safeBrowserTools[mcpToolName]) {
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if (trustedMcpName === "clay-browser" && toolName.indexOf("mcp__clay-browser__") === 0) {
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if (safeBrowserTools[toolName.substring("mcp__clay-browser__".length)]) {
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return { behavior: "allow", updatedInput: input };
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}
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}
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954
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941
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-
// Auto-approve Mate datastore tools. These are scoped to the active Mate
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942
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-
// project and already enforce SQL policy server-side.
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943
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-
if (toolName.indexOf("mcp__clay-datastore__") === 0) {
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return { behavior: "allow", updatedInput: input };
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945
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-
}
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946
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-
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947
955
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// Auto-approve remote MCP tools that the user explicitly enabled in project settings.
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948
956
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// These are user-owned local MCP servers, so no additional permission prompt needed.
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949
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-
if (toolName.indexOf("mcp__") === 0 && getRemoteMcpServers) {
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957
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+
if (trustedMcpName && toolName.indexOf("mcp__" + trustedMcpName + "__") === 0 && getRemoteMcpServers) {
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950
958
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var _rmcp = getRemoteMcpServers();
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951
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-
if (_rmcp) {
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952
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-
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953
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var _mcpServerName = _mcpParts.length >= 2 ? _mcpParts[1] : "";
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954
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if (_rmcp[_mcpServerName]) {
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955
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return { behavior: "allow", updatedInput: input };
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956
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-
}
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959
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if (_rmcp && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(_rmcp, trustedMcpName)) {
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960
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+
return { behavior: "allow", updatedInput: input };
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957
961
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}
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962
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}
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959
963
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@@ -975,81 +979,16 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
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975
979
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// fall through to the normal user permission prompt.
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976
980
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if (toolName === "Bash" && input && input.command) {
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977
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var cmd = input.command.trim();
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978
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-
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979
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980
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-
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983
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984
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985
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-
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986
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-
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987
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-
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988
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which: true, type: true, whereis: true, hash: true,
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989
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-
// Environment/system info
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990
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-
// lr-74c8 (BOBBIE follow-up): `env` and `command` are execution
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991
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-
// primitives, not read-only inspection — `env rm -rf /` and
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992
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// `command rm -rf /` launder an arbitrary tail command past a
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993
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-
// first-word-only check with no argument validator. Removed
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994
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-
// outright rather than gated: neither has a read-only-only form
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995
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-
// worth trusting to a first-word check (contrast `printenv`,
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996
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-
// which genuinely can only print).
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997
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-
echo: true, printf: true, printenv: true, pwd: true,
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998
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-
whoami: true, id: true, groups: true,
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999
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-
date: true, uname: true, hostname: true, uptime: true, arch: true,
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1000
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-
nproc: true, free: true, lsb_release: true, sw_vers: true,
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1001
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-
locale: true, timedatectl: true,
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1002
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// Text processing (pure stdin/stdout, no side effects)
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1003
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-
jq: true, yq: true, sort: true, uniq: true, cut: true, tr: true,
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1004
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paste: true, column: true, fold: true,
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1005
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-
rev: true, tac: true, nl: true, expand: true, unexpand: true,
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1006
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-
fmt: true, pr: true, csplit: true, comm: true, join: true,
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1007
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// Comparison/hashing
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1008
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-
diff: true, cmp: true, md5sum: true, sha256sum: true, sha1sum: true,
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1009
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-
shasum: true, cksum: true, sum: true, b2sum: true, base64: true,
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1010
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-
xxd: true, od: true, hexdump: true,
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1011
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-
// Misc read-only
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1012
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-
test: true, true: true, false: true, seq: true, yes: true,
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1013
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-
sleep: true, time: true,
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1014
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-
man: true, help: true, info: true, apropos: true,
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1015
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-
cal: true, bc: true, expr: true, factor: true,
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1016
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-
lsof: true, ps: true, top: true, htop: true, pgrep: true,
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1017
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-
netstat: true, ss: true, ifconfig: true, ip: true, dig: true,
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1018
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-
nslookup: true, host: true, ping: true, traceroute: true,
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1019
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-
};
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1020
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-
// Multi-purpose tools retained in the whitelist but restricted to a
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1021
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-
// read-only subcommand/flag allowlist (lr-74c8). Each validator
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1022
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-
// receives the segment's argv (excluding the command word itself)
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1023
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-
// and returns true only for forms that cannot mutate state.
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1024
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-
var validatedCommands = {
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1025
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-
// Only the explicitly read-only git subcommands from the lr-74c8
|
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1026
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-
// spec are allowed. Deliberately narrow: no `remote`, `tag`,
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1027
|
-
// `branch`, etc. — those have mutating forms (`branch -D`,
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1028
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-
// `remote add`, `tag <name>`) that a subcommand-only check cannot
|
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1029
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-
// safely distinguish from their read-only forms.
|
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1030
|
-
git: function (args) {
|
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1031
|
-
if (args.length === 0) return false;
|
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1032
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-
var readOnlySubcommands = {
|
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1033
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-
status: true, log: true, diff: true, show: true, "--version": true,
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1034
|
-
};
|
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1035
|
-
if (!readOnlySubcommands[args[0]]) return false;
|
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1036
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-
// lr-74c8 (BOBBIE follow-up): the subcommand allowlist above only
|
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1037
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-
// checked args[0] and ignored everything after it. `git show
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1038
|
-
// --output=<path>` / `git log --output=<path>` (and the `-o`
|
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1039
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-
// short form) inherit diff/log's file-write flag, turning a
|
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1040
|
-
// "read-only" subcommand into an unprompted arbitrary file write.
|
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1041
|
-
// `-c <config>` can inject a pager/external-diff/exec config
|
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1042
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-
// (core.pager, diff.external) that runs an arbitrary command;
|
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1043
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-
// `--exec`, `--ext-diff`, `--textconv`, `-O`/`--output-indicator-*`
|
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1044
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-
// extend the same file-write/exec surface. Any of these flags on
|
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1045
|
-
// an otherwise-allowed subcommand falls through to the prompt.
|
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1046
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-
var dangerousFlagRe = /^(-o|--output(=.*)?|-O|--output-indicator.*|-c|--exec(=.*)?|--ext-diff|--textconv|--upload-pack(=.*)?|--receive-pack(=.*)?)$/;
|
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1047
|
-
for (var gi = 1; gi < args.length; gi++) {
|
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1048
|
-
if (dangerousFlagRe.test(args[gi])) return false;
|
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1049
|
-
}
|
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1050
|
-
return true;
|
|
1051
|
-
},
|
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1052
|
-
};
|
|
982
|
+
// Redirection, newlines, a lone "&" and command substitution turn a
|
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983
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+
// listed command into a write or a second command. Refuse them before
|
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984
|
+
// any splitting, quotes included; the call then reaches the prompt.
|
|
985
|
+
if (hasUnapprovableShellSyntax(cmd)) return null;
|
|
986
|
+
// Which commands are read-only, and which option tokens each accepts,
|
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987
|
+
// is declared in lib/bash-auto-approve.js. Commands that can write,
|
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988
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+
// execute or hang (time, sort, uniq, csplit, xxd, yq, tree, ag/ack,
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989
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+
// yes, ping, man, info, top, htop, timedatectl, tail, ss, file) are not
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990
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+
// listed: a dropped entry only costs a prompt. `env` and `command` are
|
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991
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+
// execution primitives and stay out for the same reason.
|
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1053
992
|
// Split compound commands on operators (&&, ||, ;, |) while respecting
|
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1054
993
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// quoted strings and subshells so that e.g. grep -E "(a|b)" is not split
|
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1055
994
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var segments = splitShellSegments(cmd);
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@@ -1074,13 +1013,12 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
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|
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1074
1013
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allSafe = false;
|
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1075
1014
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break;
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1076
1015
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}
|
|
1077
|
-
//
|
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1078
|
-
// is
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1079
|
-
// through to the
|
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1080
|
-
var segTokens = seg.
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1016
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+
// Nothing is stripped before the first-word check: a leading env
|
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1017
|
+
// assignment is refused up front ("=" in hasUnapprovableShellSyntax)
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1018
|
+
// and a leading sudo always falls through to the prompt (lr-74c8).
|
|
1019
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+
var segTokens = seg.split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean);
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1081
1020
|
var firstWord = segTokens[0];
|
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1082
|
-
if (
|
|
1083
|
-
if (validatedCommands[firstWord] && validatedCommands[firstWord](segTokens.slice(1))) continue;
|
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1021
|
+
if (isAutoApprovableSegment(segTokens)) continue;
|
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1084
1022
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allSafe = false;
|
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1085
1023
|
break;
|
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1086
1024
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}
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|
@@ -1092,6 +1030,21 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
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1092
1030
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return null; // Not whitelisted
|
|
1093
1031
|
}
|
|
1094
1032
|
|
|
1033
|
+
// Whether a mode may be applied to this session, by the shared policy
|
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1034
|
+
// (lib/permission-mode-policy.js). checkVendor adds the session's vendor
|
|
1035
|
+
// capability list to the check. A refusal is logged.
|
|
1036
|
+
function modeAllowed(session, mode, what, checkVendor) {
|
|
1037
|
+
var vendor = sessionCapabilities.effectiveVendorId(sm, session, adapter && adapter.vendor);
|
|
1038
|
+
var verdict = checkPermissionMode(mode, {
|
|
1039
|
+
skipPermissionsAllowed: dangerouslySkipPermissions === true,
|
|
1040
|
+
supportedModes: checkVendor ? sessionCapabilities.capabilitiesFor(sm, vendor).permissionModes : null,
|
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1041
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+
});
|
|
1042
|
+
if (!verdict.ok) {
|
|
1043
|
+
console.warn("[sdk-bridge] refused " + what + " " + logField(mode) + " in " + slug + ": " + verdict.error);
|
|
1044
|
+
}
|
|
1045
|
+
return verdict.ok;
|
|
1046
|
+
}
|
|
1047
|
+
|
|
1095
1048
|
function handleCanUseTool(session, toolName, input, opts) {
|
|
1096
1049
|
opts = opts || {};
|
|
1097
1050
|
// An ask the user's own ask rule forced is a human prompt by the user's
|
|
@@ -1102,7 +1055,10 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
1102
1055
|
|
|
1103
1056
|
// Full-auto mode: auto-approve everything except AskUserQuestion
|
|
1104
1057
|
// (which still needs to go through the user interaction flow).
|
|
1105
|
-
|
|
1058
|
+
// The mode is this session's own (falling back to the project default only
|
|
1059
|
+
// where the session has none, as at query start), never another session's.
|
|
1060
|
+
var sessionMode = session.permissionMode || sm.currentPermissionMode;
|
|
1061
|
+
if (!ruleForced && sessionMode === "bypassPermissions" && toolName !== "AskUserQuestion") {
|
|
1106
1062
|
return Promise.resolve({ behavior: "allow", updatedInput: input });
|
|
1107
1063
|
}
|
|
1108
1064
|
|
|
@@ -1119,7 +1075,7 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
1119
1075
|
}
|
|
1120
1076
|
|
|
1121
1077
|
// Check shared whitelist (read-only tools, safe browser tools, safe bash commands)
|
|
1122
|
-
var whitelisted = ruleForced ? null : checkToolWhitelist(toolName, input);
|
|
1078
|
+
var whitelisted = ruleForced ? null : checkToolWhitelist(toolName, input, opts);
|
|
1123
1079
|
if (whitelisted) {
|
|
1124
1080
|
return Promise.resolve(whitelisted);
|
|
1125
1081
|
}
|
|
@@ -1306,15 +1262,23 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
1306
1262
|
// reply (project-sessions.js's set_model/switch_session).
|
|
1307
1263
|
session.model = metaData.model;
|
|
1308
1264
|
sendModelInfoToSession(session, session.vendor || (adapter && adapter.vendor) || "claude", metaData.model);
|
|
1309
|
-
sendToSession(session, { type: "config_state", model: metaData.model, mode: sm.currentPermissionMode || "default", effort: sm.currentEffort || "medium", betas: sm.currentBetas || [] });
|
|
1265
|
+
sendToSession(session, { type: "config_state", model: metaData.model, mode: session.permissionMode || sm.currentPermissionMode || "default", effort: sm.currentEffort || "medium", betas: sm.currentBetas || [] });
|
|
1310
1266
|
break;
|
|
1311
1267
|
case "effort_changed":
|
|
1312
1268
|
sm.currentEffort = metaData.effort;
|
|
1313
1269
|
send({ type: "config_state", model: sm.currentModel || "", mode: sm.currentPermissionMode || "default", effort: sm.currentEffort, betas: sm.currentBetas || [] });
|
|
1314
1270
|
break;
|
|
1315
1271
|
case "permission_mode_changed":
|
|
1316
|
-
|
|
1317
|
-
|
|
1272
|
+
// One session's worker changed its own mode (plan entered or
|
|
1273
|
+
// left, say). That is this session's mode and no one else's:
|
|
1274
|
+
// writing it to sm.currentPermissionMode made it the
|
|
1275
|
+
// project-wide mode every other session starts from.
|
|
1276
|
+
// The worker is not a trusted source: the mode passes the same
|
|
1277
|
+
// check as any other entry point, and a refused one leaves the
|
|
1278
|
+
// session on its previous mode.
|
|
1279
|
+
if (!modeAllowed(session, metaData.mode, "worker permission mode", true)) break;
|
|
1280
|
+
session.permissionMode = metaData.mode;
|
|
1281
|
+
sendToSession(session, { type: "config_state", model: session.model || sm.currentModel || "", mode: metaData.mode, effort: sm.currentEffort || "medium", betas: sm.currentBetas || [] });
|
|
1318
1282
|
break;
|
|
1319
1283
|
case "worker_error":
|
|
1320
1284
|
send({ type: "error", text: metaData.error });
|
|
@@ -1541,9 +1505,9 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
1541
1505
|
session.rateLimitResetsAt = null;
|
|
1542
1506
|
session.rateLimitAutoContinuePending = true;
|
|
1543
1507
|
didScheduleAutoContinue = true;
|
|
1544
|
-
console.log("[sdk-bridge] Rate limited, scheduling
|
|
1545
|
-
if (typeof opts.
|
|
1546
|
-
opts.
|
|
1508
|
+
console.log("[sdk-bridge] Rate limited, scheduling the rate-limit resume for session " + session.localId);
|
|
1509
|
+
if (typeof opts.scheduleRateLimitResume === "function") {
|
|
1510
|
+
opts.scheduleRateLimitResume(session, acResetsAt);
|
|
1547
1511
|
}
|
|
1548
1512
|
} else if (acEnabled && !session.destroying) {
|
|
1549
1513
|
// Log why auto-continue was not scheduled (for debugging)
|
|
@@ -1669,8 +1633,32 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
1669
1633
|
|
|
1670
1634
|
// `initiator` (turn-initiator.js INITIATORS) is who started this turn. It is
|
|
1671
1635
|
// per turn: it stamps the first message and says nothing about later turns
|
|
1672
|
-
// of the session or about the process's environment.
|
|
1673
|
-
|
|
1636
|
+
// of the session or about the process's environment. `messageId` is the id
|
|
1637
|
+
// the message's history entry carries (injected-sender.js stampRecord); it is
|
|
1638
|
+
// sent to the vendor with the message so the vendor transcript and the
|
|
1639
|
+
// published sender record name the same message.
|
|
1640
|
+
// `leadMessages` ([{ text, initiator, messageId }]) are further user messages
|
|
1641
|
+
// of their own, sent before the first one: a message the operator typed while
|
|
1642
|
+
// a loop iteration was running reaches the vendor as itself, with its own
|
|
1643
|
+
// initiator and id, never inside the message the loop composed.
|
|
1644
|
+
async function startQuery(session, text, images, linuxUser, initiator, messageId, leadMessages) {
|
|
1645
|
+
// Every path that gives a reaped session a runtime again (send-input, the
|
|
1646
|
+
// browser, a loop or scheduled turn) comes through here, so the name rule
|
|
1647
|
+
// for a session coming back to life is enforced once. The name is reserved
|
|
1648
|
+
// synchronously, before the first await, and released when the start ends.
|
|
1649
|
+
var reservation = sm.sessions ? reserveNameOnRevival(sm.sessions, session) : null;
|
|
1650
|
+
if (reservation && reservation.holder) {
|
|
1651
|
+
if (typeof sm.saveSessionFile === "function") sm.saveSessionFile(session);
|
|
1652
|
+
if (typeof sm.broadcastSessionList === "function") sm.broadcastSessionList();
|
|
1653
|
+
}
|
|
1654
|
+
try {
|
|
1655
|
+
return await startQueryRuntime(session, text, images, linuxUser, initiator, messageId, leadMessages);
|
|
1656
|
+
} finally {
|
|
1657
|
+
if (reservation) reservation.release();
|
|
1658
|
+
}
|
|
1659
|
+
}
|
|
1660
|
+
|
|
1661
|
+
async function startQueryRuntime(session, text, images, linuxUser, initiator, messageId, leadMessages) {
|
|
1674
1662
|
async function ensureVendorReady(vendor) {
|
|
1675
1663
|
if (!vendor) return null;
|
|
1676
1664
|
// What the adapter's live session advertises narrows its declaration; the
|
|
@@ -2023,11 +2011,6 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2023
2011
|
// belt-and-suspenders for sessions that carry agentName from a prior
|
|
2024
2012
|
// vendor switch or a direct ws message.
|
|
2025
2013
|
//
|
|
2026
|
-
// lr-4c90 — belt-and-suspenders tool enforcement: the SDK's `agent` option
|
|
2027
|
-
// should apply tool restrictions, but only does so when the agent file uses
|
|
2028
|
-
// JSON array syntax for the tools field. We read the tools list directly
|
|
2029
|
-
// from disk and set claudeOpts.tools explicitly so restriction is enforced
|
|
2030
|
-
// even if the SDK's parsing path has any quirks.
|
|
2031
2014
|
// lr-5bd7 — declared outside the agent block so the model override can be
|
|
2032
2015
|
// applied when queryModel is computed below (after loop-settings resolution).
|
|
2033
2016
|
var _agentDeclaredModel = null;
|
|
@@ -2043,18 +2026,12 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2043
2026
|
var effectiveHome = resolveEffectiveHome(linuxUser);
|
|
2044
2027
|
var effectiveAgentsDir = effectiveHome ? path.join(effectiveHome, ".claude", "agents") : AGENTS_SOURCE_DIR;
|
|
2045
2028
|
|
|
2046
|
-
var agentTools = readAgentToolsFromFile(session.agentName, effectiveAgentsDir);
|
|
2047
|
-
if (agentTools) {
|
|
2048
|
-
claudeOpts.tools = agentTools;
|
|
2049
|
-
console.log("[sdk-bridge] agent tools enforced for " + session.agentName + ": " + agentTools.join(", "));
|
|
2050
|
-
}
|
|
2051
|
-
|
|
2052
2029
|
// lr-5bd7 — inject AGENT.md body as systemPrompt on the main thread.
|
|
2053
2030
|
// The `agents` map approach (PR #264) only applies to subagent invocations
|
|
2054
2031
|
// via the Agent tool; it does not deliver the body to the main conversation.
|
|
2055
2032
|
// Setting claudeOpts.systemPrompt bypasses settingSources/agents-map resolution
|
|
2056
2033
|
// and ensures the model receives the agent persona directly.
|
|
2057
|
-
// We keep claudeOpts.agent set
|
|
2034
|
+
// We keep claudeOpts.agent set; the console passes no tool list of its own.
|
|
2058
2035
|
var agentSlug = slugifyAgentName(session.agentName);
|
|
2059
2036
|
var agentFilePath = path.join(effectiveAgentsDir, agentSlug + ".md");
|
|
2060
2037
|
var agentRaw;
|
|
@@ -2094,7 +2071,10 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2094
2071
|
if (budgetTokens) claudeOpts.thinking = { type: "enabled", budgetTokens: budgetTokens };
|
|
2095
2072
|
}
|
|
2096
2073
|
|
|
2097
|
-
|
|
2074
|
+
// A loop's mode (LOOP.json is a file, not a trusted client) passes the same
|
|
2075
|
+
// check as a mode a client asks for; a refused one is ignored and the
|
|
2076
|
+
// session's own mode applies.
|
|
2077
|
+
if (ls.permissionMode && modeAllowed(session, ls.permissionMode, "loop permissionMode", true)) {
|
|
2098
2078
|
session._loopPermissionMode = ls.permissionMode;
|
|
2099
2079
|
}
|
|
2100
2080
|
|
|
@@ -2108,6 +2088,17 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2108
2088
|
claudeOpts.permissionMode = "bypassPermissions";
|
|
2109
2089
|
} else {
|
|
2110
2090
|
var globalMode = session.permissionMode || sm.currentPermissionMode || "default";
|
|
2091
|
+
// A stored mode (session file, saved default) is checked again here: a
|
|
2092
|
+
// bypassPermissions written by an older build or by hand must not start
|
|
2093
|
+
// a query while the server does not allow it.
|
|
2094
|
+
// The vendor is known here, so a mode the session's vendor lacks (auto
|
|
2095
|
+
// after a switch to a vendor without it) falls back too.
|
|
2096
|
+
if (!modeAllowed(session, globalMode, "stored permission mode", true)) {
|
|
2097
|
+
globalMode = "default";
|
|
2098
|
+
// The session's own mode too, so the bypass branch of canUseTool
|
|
2099
|
+
// (which reads it) agrees with what this query starts with.
|
|
2100
|
+
if (session.permissionMode) session.permissionMode = "default";
|
|
2101
|
+
}
|
|
2111
2102
|
var effectiveDefault;
|
|
2112
2103
|
if (globalMode === "bypassPermissions") effectiveDefault = "bypassPermissions";
|
|
2113
2104
|
else if (session.acceptEditsAfterStart) effectiveDefault = "acceptEdits";
|
|
@@ -2219,6 +2210,13 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2219
2210
|
// The variables Settings add to this runtime's environment, as of now.
|
|
2220
2211
|
withRuntimeEnv(queryOpts, session);
|
|
2221
2212
|
|
|
2213
|
+
// The console's own reference to this session, in the process environment
|
|
2214
|
+
// whatever identity provider is configured (lib/sender-ref.js). Claude only:
|
|
2215
|
+
// one Codex app-server serves many threads, so it cannot carry a per-thread one.
|
|
2216
|
+
if (sessionAdapter.vendor === "claude" && slug) {
|
|
2217
|
+
queryOpts.sessionRef = { project: slug, sessionId: session.localId };
|
|
2218
|
+
}
|
|
2219
|
+
|
|
2222
2220
|
// The identity of this agent process, when a provider is configured. Its
|
|
2223
2221
|
// directory is delivered in the process's environment and removed when the
|
|
2224
2222
|
// query ends (processQueryStream) or fails to start (below).
|
|
@@ -2280,7 +2278,13 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2280
2278
|
|
|
2281
2279
|
// Push initial user message through the QueryHandle
|
|
2282
2280
|
console.log("[sdk-bridge] pushing initial message via handle.pushMessage...");
|
|
2283
|
-
|
|
2281
|
+
if (Array.isArray(leadMessages)) {
|
|
2282
|
+
for (var li = 0; li < leadMessages.length; li++) {
|
|
2283
|
+
var lead = leadMessages[li];
|
|
2284
|
+
handle.pushMessage(lead.text, undefined, lead.initiator, lead.messageId);
|
|
2285
|
+
}
|
|
2286
|
+
}
|
|
2287
|
+
handle.pushMessage(text, images, initiator, messageId);
|
|
2284
2288
|
|
|
2285
2289
|
// lr-b61b: Flush any messages that arrived between turns (after the previous
|
|
2286
2290
|
// finally block nulled queryInstance and before this startQuery call).
|
|
@@ -2288,7 +2292,7 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2288
2292
|
console.log("[sdk-bridge] startQuery: flushing " + session.pendingMessages.length + " buffered pending message(s) for project " + slug + " session " + session.localId);
|
|
2289
2293
|
for (var pi = 0; pi < session.pendingMessages.length; pi++) {
|
|
2290
2294
|
var pm = session.pendingMessages[pi];
|
|
2291
|
-
handle.pushMessage(pm.text, pm.images, pm.initiator);
|
|
2295
|
+
handle.pushMessage(pm.text, pm.images, pm.initiator, pm.messageId);
|
|
2292
2296
|
}
|
|
2293
2297
|
session.pendingMessages = [];
|
|
2294
2298
|
}
|
|
@@ -2327,11 +2331,11 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2327
2331
|
}
|
|
2328
2332
|
}
|
|
2329
2333
|
|
|
2330
|
-
function pushMessage(session, text, images, initiator) {
|
|
2334
|
+
function pushMessage(session, text, images, initiator, messageId) {
|
|
2331
2335
|
bumpLastActivity(session, "push-message", slug);
|
|
2332
2336
|
// Route through QueryHandle (works for both in-process and worker paths)
|
|
2333
2337
|
if (session.queryInstance && typeof session.queryInstance.pushMessage === "function") {
|
|
2334
|
-
session.queryInstance.pushMessage(text, images, initiator);
|
|
2338
|
+
session.queryInstance.pushMessage(text, images, initiator, messageId);
|
|
2335
2339
|
} else {
|
|
2336
2340
|
// lr-b61b: queryInstance is null between turns (finally block has run but
|
|
2337
2341
|
// startQuery has not been called yet). Buffer the message so it is not
|
|
@@ -2347,7 +2351,7 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2347
2351
|
// so any candidate cause that lands a message here is visible.
|
|
2348
2352
|
var wasFull = session.pendingMessages.length >= MAX_PENDING_MESSAGES;
|
|
2349
2353
|
if (wasFull) session.pendingMessages.shift();
|
|
2350
|
-
session.pendingMessages.push({ text: text, images: images, initiator: initiator });
|
|
2354
|
+
session.pendingMessages.push({ text: text, images: images, initiator: initiator, messageId: messageId });
|
|
2351
2355
|
console.log("[sdk-bridge] pushMessage: queryInstance null, buffered message for session " + session.localId + " (pending=" + session.pendingMessages.length + ")");
|
|
2352
2356
|
sendAndRecord(session, {
|
|
2353
2357
|
type: "diagnostic",
|
|
@@ -2378,29 +2382,7 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2378
2382
|
}
|
|
2379
2383
|
|
|
2380
2384
|
function permissionPushBody(toolName, input) {
|
|
2381
|
-
|
|
2382
|
-
var text = "";
|
|
2383
|
-
if (toolName === "Bash" && input.command) {
|
|
2384
|
-
text = input.command;
|
|
2385
|
-
} else if (toolName === "Edit" && input.file_path) {
|
|
2386
|
-
text = input.file_path.split(/[/\\]/).pop() + ": " + (input.old_string || "").substring(0, 40) + " \u2192 " + (input.new_string || "").substring(0, 40);
|
|
2387
|
-
} else if (toolName === "Write" && input.file_path) {
|
|
2388
|
-
text = input.file_path;
|
|
2389
|
-
} else if (input.file_path) {
|
|
2390
|
-
text = input.file_path;
|
|
2391
|
-
} else if (input.command) {
|
|
2392
|
-
text = input.command;
|
|
2393
|
-
} else if (input.url) {
|
|
2394
|
-
text = input.url;
|
|
2395
|
-
} else if (input.query) {
|
|
2396
|
-
text = input.query;
|
|
2397
|
-
} else if (input.pattern) {
|
|
2398
|
-
text = input.pattern;
|
|
2399
|
-
} else if (input.description) {
|
|
2400
|
-
text = input.description;
|
|
2401
|
-
}
|
|
2402
|
-
if (text.length > 120) text = text.substring(0, 120) + "...";
|
|
2403
|
-
return text;
|
|
2385
|
+
return permissionSummary.pushBody(toolName, input);
|
|
2404
2386
|
}
|
|
2405
2387
|
|
|
2406
2388
|
// Detect which vendor binaries are installed for an OS identity and record
|
|
@@ -2596,6 +2578,9 @@ function createSDKBridge(opts) {
|
|
|
2596
2578
|
}
|
|
2597
2579
|
|
|
2598
2580
|
async function setPermissionMode(session, mode) {
|
|
2581
|
+
// The handlers check first; this keeps any other caller (a prompt answer,
|
|
2582
|
+
// a loop) from handing the session a mode the server does not allow.
|
|
2583
|
+
if (!modeAllowed(session, mode, "setPermissionMode", false)) return;
|
|
2599
2584
|
if (!session.queryInstance) {
|
|
2600
2585
|
// No active query — store on session only (not sm — that's for project defaults).
|
|
2601
2586
|
// config_state sent targeted by caller (project-sessions.js).
|
|
@@ -263,6 +263,8 @@ function attachMessageProcessor(ctx) {
|
|
|
263
263
|
var _isNewSessionId = !session.cliSessionId;
|
|
264
264
|
session.cliSessionId = parsed.sessionId;
|
|
265
265
|
sm.saveSessionFile(session);
|
|
266
|
+
// Messages sent before the vendor named the session were held until now.
|
|
267
|
+
if (typeof sm.flushSenderRecords === "function") sm.flushSenderRecords(session);
|
|
266
268
|
if (_isNewSessionId) {
|
|
267
269
|
sendAndRecord(session, { type: "session_id", cliSessionId: session.cliSessionId });
|
|
268
270
|
}
|
|
@@ -331,6 +333,11 @@ function attachMessageProcessor(ctx) {
|
|
|
331
333
|
if (parsed.inputTokens) {
|
|
332
334
|
session.lastStreamInputTokens = parsed.inputTokens;
|
|
333
335
|
}
|
|
336
|
+
// A vendor that numbers its own turns (Codex) names the turn the message
|
|
337
|
+
// started: published beside the message's sender record.
|
|
338
|
+
if (parsed.messageId && parsed.turnId && typeof sm.bindSenderTurn === "function") {
|
|
339
|
+
sm.bindSenderTurn(session, parsed.messageId, parsed.turnId);
|
|
340
|
+
}
|
|
334
341
|
|
|
335
342
|
} else if (parsed.yokeType === "tool_start" || parsed.yokeType === "thinking_start" || parsed.yokeType === "text_start") {
|
|
336
343
|
var idx = parsed.blockId;
|
|
@@ -938,7 +945,8 @@ function attachMessageProcessor(ctx) {
|
|
|
938
945
|
|
|
939
946
|
// Schedule auto-continue immediately on rejection (don't wait for
|
|
940
947
|
// query completion which has timing issues with worker/non-worker paths).
|
|
941
|
-
|
|
948
|
+
var resumeArmed = typeof opts.hasRateLimitResume === "function" && opts.hasRateLimitResume(session);
|
|
949
|
+
if (!resumeArmed && !session.destroying) {
|
|
942
950
|
var acEnabled = session.onQueryComplete ||
|
|
943
951
|
(typeof opts.getAutoContinueSetting === "function" && opts.getAutoContinueSetting(session));
|
|
944
952
|
console.log("[sdk-bridge] rate_limit rejected: acEnabled=" + acEnabled + " overage=" + !!info.isUsingOverage + " session=" + session.localId);
|
|
@@ -948,16 +956,16 @@ function attachMessageProcessor(ctx) {
|
|
|
948
956
|
// Extra usage available: send continue immediately (5s delay for query to finish)
|
|
949
957
|
console.log("[sdk-bridge] Overage available, sending immediate continue for session " + session.localId);
|
|
950
958
|
session.rateLimitResetsAt = null;
|
|
951
|
-
if (typeof opts.
|
|
952
|
-
opts.
|
|
959
|
+
if (typeof opts.scheduleRateLimitResume === "function") {
|
|
960
|
+
opts.scheduleRateLimitResume(session, Date.now());
|
|
953
961
|
}
|
|
954
962
|
} else {
|
|
955
963
|
// No overage: schedule after rate limit resets
|
|
956
964
|
var acResetsAt = session.rateLimitResetsAt;
|
|
957
965
|
session.rateLimitResetsAt = null;
|
|
958
966
|
console.log("[sdk-bridge] Scheduling auto-continue on rate limit rejection for session " + session.localId);
|
|
959
|
-
if (typeof opts.
|
|
960
|
-
opts.
|
|
967
|
+
if (typeof opts.scheduleRateLimitResume === "function") {
|
|
968
|
+
opts.scheduleRateLimitResume(session, acResetsAt);
|
|
961
969
|
}
|
|
962
970
|
}
|
|
963
971
|
}
|
|
@@ -24,6 +24,22 @@ function resolveContainedSkillDir(base, entryName) {
|
|
|
24
24
|
}
|
|
25
25
|
}
|
|
26
26
|
|
|
27
|
+
// The only characters a command may hold and still be auto-approved: letters,
|
|
28
|
+
// digits, space, tab and . _ / : @ ^ ~ + , % - | ; and "&" (only as "&&").
|
|
29
|
+
// This is an allowlist because every denylist of shell syntax kept missing a
|
|
30
|
+
// shape that builds a word after the check (${X:---output}, {--output,f},
|
|
31
|
+
// -\-output, "--out""put", a glob matching a file named like a flag). With no
|
|
32
|
+
// quote, escape, expansion, brace, glob, redirection, assignment or newline in
|
|
33
|
+
// the text, each token is exactly what the command receives, so the per-command
|
|
34
|
+
// argument checks see the real arguments. Anything else costs a prompt.
|
|
35
|
+
var AUTO_APPROVABLE_SHELL_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9 \t._\/:@^~+,%|;&-]*$/;
|
|
36
|
+
|
|
37
|
+
function hasUnapprovableShellSyntax(cmd) {
|
|
38
|
+
if (typeof cmd !== "string" || !AUTO_APPROVABLE_SHELL_RE.test(cmd)) return true;
|
|
39
|
+
// A "&" that is not half of "&&" is a background job.
|
|
40
|
+
return cmd.replace(/&&/g, "").indexOf("&") !== -1;
|
|
41
|
+
}
|
|
42
|
+
|
|
27
43
|
// Split shell command on operators (&&, ||, ;, |) while respecting quotes
|
|
28
44
|
// and parentheses. Returns array of command segments.
|
|
29
45
|
function splitShellSegments(cmd) {
|
|
@@ -360,6 +376,7 @@ function attachSkillDiscovery(ctx) {
|
|
|
360
376
|
|
|
361
377
|
module.exports = {
|
|
362
378
|
splitShellSegments: splitShellSegments,
|
|
379
|
+
hasUnapprovableShellSyntax: hasUnapprovableShellSyntax,
|
|
363
380
|
attachSkillDiscovery: attachSkillDiscovery,
|
|
364
381
|
extractDescriptionFromContent: extractDescriptionFromContent,
|
|
365
382
|
extractSkillDescription: extractSkillDescription,
|