@chrono-meta/fh-gate 1.4.78 → 1.4.80

package/.claude-plugin/marketplace.json

@@ -11,13 +11,13 @@
   "plugins": [
     {
       "name": "fh-meta",
-      "version": "1.4.78",
+      "version": "1.4.80",
       "description": "Hub meta-operations toolkit — 35 skills + 7 agents. New in 1.4.53: `fh-codex-doctor` (npm bin) — Codex adapter drift scanner; reads the documented M1/M2/M3 skill tier map + skill/agent source and reports codex-native/adapter-required/claude-native/unclassified per unit, wired into `npm test`/`prepublishOnly` (fail-closed on unclassified Claude-native primitives). New in 1.4.49: steel-quench gains Step 0.6 Verdict-Invariance Probe (groundedness axis — a load-bearing judged gate's verdict must track behavior, not rubric phrasing; measured flip-count over cross-family paraphrases; arXiv:2605.06161 Policy Invariance anchor); multi_model_sidecar_strategy §Vendor-native harness (a model is strongest in its own vendor CLI — Claude/CC, GPT/codex, Gemini/Antigravity; a universal router degrades all of them, so it stays an autocomplete/QA sidecar, never orchestration); predelete_check.sh fail-closed rewrite; memory-hygiene A-TMA anchor. New in 1.4.48: phantom-quench + steel-quench gain external frontier anchors (arXiv:2607.02052 package-hallucination; arXiv:2607.02057 prompt-coverage-adequacy); README model-flat claim reframed from a per-release point-curve to structural invariants (operation flattens across tiers; depth tier-order fixed within a generation). New in 1.4.47: onboarding step ① surfaces the Mode D companion-store session-start load in the auto-read salience anchor (previously only in the local binding + rules, so a greeting could skip the load). New in 1.4.46: context-doctor command-output axis (route to rtk/proxy for verbose CLI stdout, complementing .claudeignore; risk-gated to token-scarce envs). New in 1.4.41: context-doctor 2026 trigger vocab (context engineering/rot/collapse) + phantom-citation hardening; hub measurement-integrity-checklist (cross-model measurement pre-flight: display-name pin/reps≥3/discriminating probe). New in 1.4.40: install-wizard queryable-wiki scaffold (INDEX + session-start read + R/W/C ingest). New in 1.4.39: auto-decorrelation (cross-family verifier sidecar recruitment) + video-ingest (capability-routed video ingestion). New in 1.4.x: verify-axis check-class taxonomy (mandatory-pass/measured/judged), no-reinvention Tier-0 inventory, 7-class failure taxonomy, Destructive-Op Gate, Wave-T (Temper), tier-floor governance, Mode D Model Notice, FC consent lane, default-Sonnet guidance. New in 1.3.0: public-surface-audit, field-harvest Mode B auto-trigger, 4-axis gate scope ext. Validated cross-CLI: Claude Code, Codex, Gemini.",
       "source": "./plugins/fh-meta"
     },
     {
       "name": "fh-commons",
-      "version": "1.4.78",
+      "version": "1.4.80",
       "description": "Project-agnostic utility skills — 4 skills (convergence-loop · deliberation · mcp-circuit-breaker · token-budget-gate) + 1 agent (quench-challenger). Domain-independent utilities transplantable into any project.",
       "source": "./plugins/fh-commons"
     }

package/CLAUDE.md

@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ Proposal format: `"I see [X]. Want me to run /[skill] to [one-line description]?
 | **"진단해줘", "개선해줘", "diagnose this", "improve this harness", "check this project", "audit this project"** — said while working **in a mapped project** (not a single-file ask) | **Field-Harness Diagnostic** (see §Field-Harness Diagnostic above → compose existing checks into one ranked M/S/R list → HITL approval per item, nothing auto-fixed) |
 | **"새 프로젝트", "하네스 작성해줘", "이 프로젝트 가속화", "harness-ify this", "accelerate this project"** — an onboarding/acceleration door (returning-menu ①②③) | **Onboarding / Acceleration Autopilot** (see §Onboarding / Acceleration Autopilot above → Phase 0 auto-discover + branch → innovator-centered recommend → ranked install plan → HITL per item, non-overwriting; "끝까지 자율로" → full-autonomy under /goal-quench gate) |
 
-**Guard**: Do not propose a skill that is already running. One signal = one-line proposal (no pressure). Before proposing, consult the UAP (§Operational Adaptation Loop): a skill the user has rejected 3+ times is **suppressed**, not re-proposed.
+**Guard**: Do not propose a skill that is already running. One signal = one-line proposal (no pressure). Before proposing, consult the UAP (§Operational Adaptation Loop): a skill the user has rejected 3+ times is **suppressed**, not re-proposed — and, symmetrically, a class **accepted 3× consecutively** earns a one-time "stop asking?" offer (§Consent promotion; never on irreversible surfaces).
 For per-skill utterance patterns, see the relevant `SKILL.md §Trigger Phrases` section.
 
 ### Cadence Rules — Check at Session Start
@@ -564,7 +564,8 @@ Some proposals are not *time*-overdue — they fire **once when a specific work
 Self-healing is not only FH-self-dev (Mode D 4-axis) and reactive (`verify-bidirectional`). A **standing, per-user operational loop** tunes FH behavior to the individual during normal field use, and escalates **only generalizable** learnings to the `field-harvest` → FH-origin PR funnel — idiosyncratic taste stays local (drift guard).
 
 - **User Adaptation Profile (UAP)** — `tracks/_meta/user_adaptation_profile.md` (local/gitignored; **behavioral prefs only, never domain content**). Records skill-proposal outcomes (`accepted`/`rejected`/`sustained` — same vocabulary as `operations.md`), preferred tier/language/cadence, recurring friction, muted nags.
-- **Pass** — rides `field-harvest` Mode B at field-session close (no new trigger, one per session): READ to apply (suppress a 3×-rejected proposal, default to preferred tier, mute declined cadence nags), WRITE to update outcomes.
+- **Pass** — rides `field-harvest` Mode B at field-session close (no new trigger, one per session): READ to apply (suppress a 3×-rejected proposal, **offer standing consent on a 3×-accepted class**, default to preferred tier, mute declined cadence nags), WRITE to update outcomes.
+- **Consent promotion (accept-side)** — repeated approval must offer to stop asking, not bill the same prompt forever: 3 consecutive `accepted` on a **registered** class (`tracks/_meta/consent_classes.yaml` — classes are declared, never minted mid-run) → **offer once, quoting the three approvals and the exact scope** → granted = a **time-limited lease**, revocable, and every unprompted run announces itself. **Not symmetric with suppression**: a bad suppression costs a re-ask, a bad grant has side effects. **Floor, decided mechanically from the registry — never by the session's own judgment**: a class never promotes if its sinks are irreversible (publish · delete · history-rewrite), if it *feeds* such a sink (**taint propagates through reversible steps**), or if that is **unknown** — unknown is not reversible. No UAP / no registry entry / expired → keep asking (absent ≠ granted). **Named residual: the ledger is self-attested** — mitigated (append-only, quoted evidence), not closed.
 - **Generalization gate** — idiosyncratic → UAP local; generalizable (any user benefits; `≥40%` reject = redefine candidate / `≥60%` accept = reinforce, per `operations.md` gate) → `field-harvest` Mode A → FH PR (HITL).
 - **Ephemeral guard** — UAP is gitignored, wiped on cloud reclaim; in ephemeral sessions operate from defaults, do not fabricate it.
 
@@ -699,6 +700,10 @@ Closing phrase detected ("wrap up", "done", "good work", "end session", etc.)
        outcomes. ⑤ is ATOMIC and owns BOTH writes: (a) append any close-time finding to
        `fh_completed_{date}.md` FIRST, (b) then write the card. Once ⑤ starts, `fh_completed`
        is CLOSED — a later append re-opens the violation ⑤ exists to prevent.
+       **Late finding (named case)**: a finding that surfaces AFTER (b) — including while writing
+       the final message to the operator — means ⑤ is **not done**. Re-run ⑤ **whole**: append,
+       then **rewrite the card**. Appending alone is the violation; the card must never be older
+       than `fh_completed`.
   → ⑥ Commit card + push
 ```
 

package/knowledge/shared/harness-core/loop_engineering.md

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ instrument: the next slip finds its leg pre-diagnosed.
 | Backlog item | Fires when (measured trigger) |
 |---|---|
 | ~~Close-chain ordered-checklist script~~ | **BUILT 2026-07-10** (`scripts/session_close_check.sh`) — operator strengthen-instruction; the miss class (card staleness) was already measured, only the build trigger was overridden (recorded, not silent) |
-| Weekly-audit scaffold + data-gather script | a weekly audit missed or hand-gathered wrong window data |
+| Weekly-audit scaffold + data-gather script — **TRIGGER FIRED 2026-07-31, half built** | a weekly audit missed or hand-gathered wrong window data. **It fired on both legs**: the audit was **50 days** overdue (cadence is 7), and the window data was then gathered by hand with an ad-hoc bucketing script written on the spot. What was built in response is the **detection** half only — a cadence line in the SessionStart hook, mirroring the frontier-digest one, because the diagnosis was that the two cadences differ in *instrumentation*, not in importance: the mechanized one went 50 days without missing a day while this one went 50 days unnoticed. The **scaffold + data-gather** half stays unbuilt on purpose; a missed audit is now visible, and whether hand-gathering is painful enough to mechanize is a second measurement, not an implication of the first. Re-fires if the next audit is again hand-gathered with friction worth recording. |
 | harvest-loop Step 0-b/0-c evidence check | a harvest run misses completed items despite `fh_completed_*` existing |
 | goal-quench mid-run checkpoint files (70/85/95%) | a /goal run blows through a threshold unnoticed |
 | ~~Substrate-jump detector~~ | **BUILT 2026-07-10** (`scripts/substrate_jump_detector.sh`, SessionStart-wired) — same operator instruction; structure-enforcing class (out-of-context drift), permanent per the durable-mechanization criterion |

package/knowledge/shared/rules/operational_adaptation.md

@@ -28,9 +28,150 @@ This loop fills that gap. It is deliberately thin: it **reuses** existing parts
 
 Runs at field-session close, **riding `field-harvest` Mode B** — no new trigger, never an interception. One pass per session.
 
-- **READ** (session start / proposal time): apply UAP — suppress a skill proposal rejected 3+ times (an `accepted` record carries **no** positive auto-action — the skill simply stays surfaced; do not auto-run on acceptance), default to the preferred tier, mute cadence nags the user always declines, and **apply capability-escalation consent** (`sidecar_consent`/`floorup_consent` `declined` → route to the Sonnet / Tier-3 floor, recommend-only, no re-nag; `unset` → ask-once at first need per the consent protocol). (Tier note: the UAP tier default is a session-depth setting; the Mode D model notice is model-only + advisory and never overrides it.)
+- **READ** (session start / proposal time): apply UAP — suppress a skill proposal rejected 3+ times, apply any **standing consent** granted per §Consent promotion below (an `accepted` record on its own still carries **no** positive auto-action — acceptance alone never auto-runs anything; only a granted standing consent does), default to the preferred tier, mute cadence nags the user always declines, and **apply capability-escalation consent** (`sidecar_consent`/`floorup_consent` `declined` → route to the Sonnet / Tier-3 floor, recommend-only, no re-nag; `unset` → ask-once at first need per the consent protocol). (Tier note: the UAP tier default is a session-depth setting; the Mode D model notice is model-only + advisory and never overrides it.)
 - **WRITE** (session close): update outcome counts + new friction points.
 
+## Consent promotion (accept-side) — repeated approval must offer to stop asking
+
+The suppression rule above is **one-directional**: repeated *rejection* changes FH's behavior, repeated
+*approval* changed nothing, so a user who approves the same class every time keeps paying the same
+prompt forever. That asymmetry is the defect this section closes. It is the general-user form of the
+elastic-granularity principle already granted to the operator (`feedback_hitl_elastic_granularity_cto`):
+**the floor is fixed, the approval grain is not.**
+
+**Promotion is not the mirror image of suppression.** Rejection suppresses a *proposal* — a wrong
+suppression costs one manual re-ask. Acceptance authorizes an *action* with the user absent — a wrong
+grant has side effects. Symmetric machinery over asymmetric stakes is itself the error (cross-family
+review, 2026-07-29). So the accept side carries three things the reject side does not: an **explicitly
+scoped** class, an **expiry**, and a **separate confirmation** that is not the same "yes" that approved
+the action in front of the user.
+
+**Classes are declared, never minted at runtime** (this is what makes the trigger mechanical). A class
+is promotion-eligible only if it exists in the **consent-class registry**, `tracks/_meta/consent_classes.yaml`,
+declaring: `owner` (gate/skill) · `mode` · `target scope` · `capabilities` (read / local-write /
+network / dispatch / repo-mutation) · `sinks` (what downstream surface the action can reach). A session
+may **propose** a registry entry (HITL, like any asset) but may **not** invent one mid-run and start
+counting against it. *Origin: without a registry the guard below did not bind — the class could simply
+be recorded over-broad at birth (`sim-conductor` rather than `dispatch read-only sim on a local
+artifact`), and no after-the-fact widening rule can catch a class that was born wide.*
+
+**Registry authorship is itself a capture surface** (cross-family round 2): closing runtime minting
+still leaves the agent drafting a broad entry, framing it as housekeeping, and later enjoying the
+approved breadth. So a proposed entry is promotion-eligible only after it carries (a) an explicit
+`excludes:` list of neighbouring actions the class must **not** cover, (b) 2+ **adversarial examples** —
+concrete actions a reader might assume are inside and that the author asserts are outside — and (c) a
+review by something other than the proposing session (the human, or a cross-family auditor). A class
+definition is reviewed as a **grant of future autonomy**, not as a config row.
+
+**Storage form (operator decision 2026-07-31)**: `standing_consent` — and every other machine-read UAP
+field — lives in the UAP's **YAML frontmatter**, the `---` block at the top of the file, parsed whole by
+the canonical loader. **Prose in the body is never read by a script**, and a grant written there is a
+**fail-closed error**, not an absence: an unread grant is not an absent one. Why the form changed: the
+previous reader line-sliced a `standing_consent:` key out of markdown, and each special case it closed
+opened the next (loader-identity → nested key → explicit-key → comment-vs-heading, three in one day).
+The root was storing a machine field in markdown, where `#` and indentation mean different things to
+the two languages; frontmatter removes the slicing *decision*, because "the first `---` block" has one
+referent. Record the human-readable grounds in the body, the value in the frontmatter.
+
+**Mechanical floor**: `scripts/consent_registry_check.sh` — joins `standing_consent` against the
+registry and enforces schema, eligibility soundness (a class naming an irreversible or unlisted sink
+**cannot** declare itself promotable), registration, expiry, and recorded scope. Missing registry → N/A
++ promotion disabled; unparseable → fail-closed. Run it before trusting any grant; the prose above is
+the salience layer over this check, not the enforcement. Anchor: `scripts/test_consent_registry.sh`
+(64 lanes, incl. the `F*` storage-form lanes). Four mutants were run against it — each false-clean
+net, the fence regex, and the falsy-laundering guard — and each turned its lanes red, so the green is
+measured rather than assumed. Cross-family review found the first draft's green was partly vacuous
+(one lane called `ok` in both branches; three others passed via a path other than the one they named).
+
+**Trigger**: the same registered class recorded `accepted` **3 consecutive times**, counted across
+sessions from the UAP outcome log. Refinements that keep the count honest:
+- *Consecutive* means consecutive **within that class's own entries**; other classes interleaved do not
+  break the streak, a single `rejected` or `modified` does. An approval the user altered before granting
+  is logged `modified`, never `accepted`.
+- **Only a promotion-eligible approval prompt counts** — one user gesture, one entry. **Retries of the
+  same operation count once**, and one "yes, do those three" is **one** approval, not three. Ordinary
+  supervised retry ("응, 다시 해봐" ×3) is not durable consent and must never reach the threshold.
+- The running count is **visible to the user at each approval** (`1/3` · `2/3` · `3/3`), so the offer is
+  never the first time they learn a streak was being tallied.
+
+**Action — offer once, with the evidence in the offer**:
+
+> "`<class>` 을 3번 연속 승인했다 (`<date1>`, `<date2>`, `<date3>` — 각각 `<one-line what was approved>`).
+>  범위: `<mode · target · capabilities · sinks>`. 앞으로 `<N>`일간 안 묻고 진행할까?
+>  (언제든 '다시 물어봐')"
+
+The offer **quotes the three approvals and the exact scope**; a grant the user cannot audit is not
+consent. Then:
+
+- **granted** → write `standing_consent: <class>: {granted: <date>, expires: <date+N>, effects: [...]}`.
+  Later instances run unprompted, each **states in one line what it did**, and each **appends a durable
+  entry to `tracks/_meta/consent_runs.log`**. *Post-action chat notice is not a control* (cross-family
+  round 2): a line the user scrolls past has stopped the prompt without replacing it. The chat line is
+  courtesy; the log is the audit surface, and it is the reason standing consent may cover only actions
+  that are **recoverable and locally reviewable** — an unrecoverable action was already excluded by the
+  floor, and an unreviewable one is excluded here.
+  **Expiry is not optional** — at expiry the consent lapses to `unset` and the class is asked again;
+  standing consent is a renewable lease, not a transfer of the decision.
+- **declined** → write `declined`. **Never ask again for that class version** — the same no-re-nag rule
+  as muted cadence reminders. *Scoped to the version, not forever*: a user may decline because the
+  timing was wrong, and permanent suppression with no renewal path is its own defect. A re-offer is
+  allowed only when the class is **materially narrowed** (a new registry version with strictly smaller
+  scope) or the user asks. Re-offering the same scope is a nag.
+- Revocation is always available and never negotiated: "다시 물어봐" / "revoke" → `unset`.
+
+**Floor — what never promotes (규약; this is the whole constraint)**: promotion is available only where
+the *protocol still passes*. Applicability is decided **mechanically, from the registry entry — never by
+the running session's judgment**, because the session that wants to stop being asked is the worst
+possible arbiter of whether it may. A class never promotes, at any count, when:
+
+1. its `sinks` include an **irreversible surface** — publish / go-public, delete, history-rewrite, or any
+   surface guarded by a fail-closed Irreversibility gate (`CLAUDE.md §Irreversibility Gates`); **or**
+2. it **feeds, queues, or enables** such a sink even though it does not itself cross one — **sink
+   tainting**. Reversible steps compose into irreversible outcomes: "edit workflow config" + "write
+   release notes" + "create local commit" are each locally reversible, and a CI workflow publishes the
+   result. Taint propagates along that chain; the floor is inherited, not re-derived per step; **or**
+3. its irreversibility is **unknown or not yet classified** → **no promotion, ask**. Unknown is not
+   reversible. (An unregistered class is by definition unknown, which is why 1–3 collapse to a single
+   mechanical test against the registry.)
+
+Their cost is not the prompt, it is that the thing cannot be undone — grain-independent by construction.
+**The promotion offer itself is HITL**: this section grants no path to auto-approval the user did not
+answer "yes" to once, knowingly and in scope, which is why it does not contradict the "acceptance alone
+never auto-runs" rule above.
+
+**Degrade direction (fail-closed), three ways**: no UAP (ephemeral/cloud session, wiped profile) → **no
+promotion, keep asking**. No registry entry → **no promotion, keep asking**. Expired or unparseable
+record → **`unset`, keep asking**. A missing consent record is never `granted` — an absent measurement is
+not a yes.
+
+**Named residual — the ledger is self-attested (cross-family, 2026-07-29, HIGH, NOT closed).** The UAP
+outcome log is written by the same agent that benefits from fewer prompts, and it is gitignored, so there
+is no ordinary review trail. Nothing in this section fixes that; the honest mitigations only *narrow* it:
+consent events are **append-only** (an entry is superseded, never edited or deleted), the offer must
+**quote the three approvals verbatim** so a user can catch a fabricated streak at the one moment it
+matters, and every unprompted run **announces itself**. A real fix requires the consent record to be
+produced by the approval channel rather than by the consuming agent — outside this rule's reach. **Until
+then, treat every standing consent as auditable-by-the-user-only, and never widen the mechanism's scope
+on the assumption the ledger is trustworthy.**
+
+**Consent binds to the action's SHAPE, not its label** (found by blind target-tier sim, 2026-07-29):
+a class name is a string, and the action behind it can change after consent is granted. A sim that
+merely returned a report when you said "stop asking" may, ten sessions later, write into shared memory
+and trigger a downstream commit — same label, different blast radius, HITL skipped. So a grant records
+**what it was granted for**: the owning gate/skill, and the set of **effect classes** the action had at
+grant time (reads · local writes · network · dispatch · repo-mutation) **plus the `target` scope and
+the `sinks` fingerprint**. On any later run whose fingerprint is **not a subset** of the granted one,
+standing consent **reverts to `unset` and asks again**, naming what widened. Effect classes alone are
+too coarse to be the whole test (cross-family round 2): "local write" stays "local write" whether the
+target is a scratch report or a policy file — the *target* is where that drift shows, which is why it
+is part of the fingerprint and not merely descriptive. Widening is the trigger; narrowing is not. This is the same discipline as the
+byte-identity anchors used elsewhere: consent is pinned to a fingerprint, not to a name, because
+**the name is exactly what does not change when the danger does.**
+
+**Guard against class inflation**: the class recorded is the *narrow* one that was actually approved
+3×, never a widened parent. Three approvals of "dispatch a Sonnet sim" do not grant "dispatch any
+agent" (`feedback_scope_widening_needs_grounding` — widening judgments get no free pass).
+
 ## Generalization gate → reverse-PR funnel
 
 This is the operator's **"원본 반영 가치"** criterion made mechanical. Split each UAP learning:
@@ -46,6 +187,8 @@ This is the operator's **"원본 반영 가치"** criterion made mechanical. Spl
 
 - **UAP WRITE ran** at field-session close (or was correctly skipped — absent profile / ephemeral session). *Check class: mandatory-pass (binary — did Step 5-B.1 execute or log a skip reason).*
 - **UAP READ applied** at session start / proposal time when a profile exists (preferred tier defaulted, 3×-rejected proposals suppressed, declined cadence nags muted). *Check class: judged, pair: the target-tier blind sim below.*
+- **A class at 3 consecutive `accepted`** was either offered promotion once, or correctly not offered with the reason recorded (irreversible surface · already `declined` · no UAP). *Check class: measured — the consecutive count is read off the UAP outcome log, not recalled.*
+- **Every `standing_consent` key resolves to a registry entry whose `sinks` are irreversible-free, and is unexpired.** *Check class: mandatory-pass (binary — join `standing_consent` keys against `consent_classes.yaml`, reject any key that is unregistered, taint-reachable to an irreversible sink, or past `expires`; any hit is a defect, not a judgment call).*
 - **No domain content** entered the UAP this session. *Check class: judged, pair: phantom/content scan of the UAP diff.*
 
 ## Guards

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@chrono-meta/fh-gate",
-  "version": "1.4.78",
+  "version": "1.4.80",
   "description": "FH runtime adapters — run FH governance, skills, and agents via Claude or Codex with machine-parseable gates.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "keywords": [
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
     "scripts/count_check.sh",
     "scripts/selfcheck.sh",
     "scripts/package_coverage_check.sh",
+    "scripts/test_package_coverage_lanes.sh",
     "scripts/test_fh_gate_regressions.sh",
     "templates/local_fh_context.md",
     "docs/ETHOS.md",
@@ -107,6 +108,9 @@
     "scripts/memory_nearcheck.py",
     "scripts/sidecar_wait.sh",
     "scripts/test_sidecar_wait_stdin.sh",
+    "scripts/consent_registry_check.sh",
+    "scripts/test_consent_registry.sh",
+    "templates/consent_classes.yaml.example",
     "scripts/test_session_close_lanes.sh",
     "scripts/test_card_drift_probe.sh",
     "scripts/universal_guard_check.sh",
@@ -130,6 +134,12 @@
     "templates/settings.SessionStart.snippet.json",
     "scripts/test_node_check_lanes.sh",
     "scripts/sidecar_calibrate.sh",
-    "scripts/test_sidecar_calibrate_lanes.sh"
+    "scripts/test_sidecar_calibrate_lanes.sh",
+    "scripts/pipe_verdict_guard.sh",
+    "scripts/test_pipe_verdict_guard_lanes.sh",
+    "templates/settings.PreToolUse.snippet.json",
+    "scripts/halffix_propagation_scan.sh",
+    "scripts/test_halffix_lanes.sh",
+    "scripts/test_ollama_panel_lanes.sh"
   ]
 }

package/plugins/fh-commons/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "fh-commons",
-  "version": "1.4.78",
+  "version": "1.4.80",
   "engines": {
     "claudeCode": ">=1.0.0"
   },

package/plugins/fh-meta/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "fh-meta",
-  "version": "1.4.78",
+  "version": "1.4.80",
   "engines": {
     "claudeCode": ">=1.0.0"
   },