@chrischall/gemini-mcp 1.5.1 → 1.6.1

package/dist/client.js

@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
 import { basename } from 'node:path';
 import { readEnvVar, McpToolError, ApiError, createApiClient, formatApiError, fileBlob } from '@chrischall/mcp-utils';
 import { resolveModel, filterImageModels, DEFAULT_VIDEO_MODEL, DEFAULT_MUSIC_MODEL } from './models.js';
-import { createDiskSink } from './storage/media.js';
+import { createDiskSink, createR2Sink, tenantIdFor } from './storage/media.js';
+import { createR2Library } from './library.js';
+import { createUploadUrlMinter } from './upload-url.js';
+import { blobStoreFromEnv } from './blob-store.js';
 import { SessionState } from './session.js';
 import { fetchRemoteImage } from './fetch-image.js';
 // NOTE: this module must stay SIDE-EFFECT-FREE at module scope — no I/O, no
@@ -746,5 +749,74 @@ export class GeminiClient {
         return { images, videos, audios, text: textParts.join('\n') || undefined, grounding };
     }
 }
+/**
+ * Everything that needs somewhere to put bytes, when the host offers a blob
+ * store (`MCP_BLOB_BASE_URL` / `MCP_BLOB_SIGNING_KEY`, injected by mcp-host).
+ *
+ * This is the hosted shape of what the retired Cloudflare Worker did with its
+ * own R2 bucket: generated media becomes signed URLs instead of local paths,
+ * `gemini_get_upload_url` can mint a signed PUT so a shell can push a reference
+ * photo without base64-ing it through the conversation, and the character/style
+ * library has somewhere permanent to live.
+ *
+ * Absent (every local stdio install), this returns `{}` and the client falls
+ * back to the disk sink with no library and no upload URLs — the tools gate on
+ * presence, so they simply do not register rather than half-working.
+ *
+ * Side-effect-free at module scope: reading two env vars and closing over them.
+ */
+function hostedStorage() {
+    const blob = blobStoreFromEnv();
+    if (!blob)
+        return {};
+    // Namespaced by API key like the connector was. One registration is one
+    // user here, so this is belt-and-braces rather than the tenancy boundary —
+    // that is the blob store's per-registration key. Lazy because the key is
+    // read at request time, not at construction (deferred-config-error).
+    const tenant = () => tenantIdFor(readEnvVar('GEMINI_API_KEY') ?? 'local');
+    return {
+        mediaSink: createR2Sink(blob.bucket, {
+            signedBaseUrl: blob.baseUrl,
+            sign: blob.signRead,
+            urlTtlMs: BLOB_URL_TTL_MS,
+            // Hard ceiling on any PER-PERSIST override. `gemini_image_set` asks for
+            // a 7-day link (SET_URL_TTL_MS) — reasonable against a bucket we own,
+            // but the blob store refuses any signature over 24h, so without this
+            // clamp every set URL and bundle_url would be minted already-invalid and
+            // 403 on first click. The sink clamps with Math.min, so this only ever
+            // shortens.
+            maxUrlTtlMs: BLOB_MAX_TTL_MS,
+            // Signed uploads (`up/`) and the library (`lib/`) are readable by the
+            // session that owns them; writes still go only under `gen/`.
+            readPrefixes: ['up', 'lib'],
+            tenant,
+        }),
+        library: createR2Library(blob.bucket, { tenant }),
+        uploadUrls: createUploadUrlMinter({ baseUrl: blob.baseUrl, sign: blob.signWrite, tenant }),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * How long a freshly-minted media link lives.
+ *
+ * Named for the blob store, NOT `MEDIA_URL_TTL_MS` — `media-url.ts` already
+ * exports a constant by that name with a different value (48h, the retired
+ * connector's window), and having two of them in one repo is how a reader ends
+ * up reasoning about the wrong number.
+ *
+ * Set to the ceiling rather than something shorter, because the ceiling is not
+ * ours to raise: the store refuses any signature over 24h, so this is simply
+ * the longest a link can legally live. The re-host therefore shortens links
+ * — 48h defaults and the 7-day `gemini_image_set` window are both impossible
+ * now — and `gemini_sign_media` is the answer to an expired one, which is what
+ * it was built for.
+ */
+const BLOB_URL_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+/**
+ * The blob store's own limit on how far ahead a signature may expire
+ * (mcp-host docs/BLOB-STORE.md). Keep in step with it: signing past this is
+ * refused at the door, so a longer link is not a longer link — it is a broken
+ * one. Clamps any PER-PERSIST override, notably `gemini_image_set`'s 7 days.
+ */
+const BLOB_MAX_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
 /** Module-level singleton shared by every tool module (deferred-config-error). */
-export const client = new GeminiClient();
+export const client = new GeminiClient(hostedStorage());

package/dist/index.js

@@ -10,10 +10,12 @@ import { registerVideoTools } from './tools/video.js';
 import { registerMusicTools } from './tools/music.js';
 import { registerJobTools } from './tools/jobs.js';
 import { registerFileTools } from './tools/files.js';
+import { registerUploadUrlTools } from './tools/uploads.js';
+import { registerLibraryTools } from './tools/library.js';
 import { client } from './client.js';
-// Load `.env` here rather than in client.ts, which the Cloudflare Worker
-// imports: `import.meta.url` + async I/O at module scope crashes the isolate at
-// startup (see src/dotenv.ts, guarded by tests/connector-boot.test.ts).
+// Load `.env` here rather than in client.ts: `import.meta.url` + async I/O at
+// module scope is not safe in every runtime this module graph reaches (see
+// src/dotenv.ts).
 //
 // Ordering is deliberately NOT load-bearing: GeminiClient reads
 // $GEMINI_API_KEY at request time, so it does not matter that the `client`
@@ -31,6 +33,20 @@ await runMcp({
     name: 'gemini-mcp',
     version: VERSION,
     banner: '[gemini-mcp] This project was developed and is maintained by AI (Claude). Use at your own discretion.',
-    tools: [registerModelTools, registerGenerateTools, registerSetTools, registerInteractTools, registerVideoTools, registerMusicTools, registerJobTools, registerFileTools],
+    tools: [
+        registerModelTools,
+        registerGenerateTools,
+        registerSetTools,
+        registerInteractTools,
+        registerVideoTools,
+        registerMusicTools,
+        registerJobTools,
+        registerFileTools,
+        // Both gate on the client having somewhere to put bytes: hosted with a
+        // blob store they register, and on a local install they no-op rather than
+        // advertising a tool that cannot work.
+        registerUploadUrlTools,
+        registerLibraryTools,
+    ],
     deps: client,
 });

package/dist/jobs.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { randomUUID, createHash } from 'node:crypto';
 import { textResult, McpToolError } from '@chrischall/mcp-utils';
-import { downloadFilename } from './media-endpoint.js';
+import { downloadFilename } from './media-name.js';
 /** Recently-completed jobs are reusable by key for this long, then evicted. */
 const JOB_TTL_MS = 600_000; // 10 min
 /** Hard cap on retained entries (oldest-settled evicted first). */

package/dist/media-name.js

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/**
+ * The human filename behind a stored media key.
+ *
+ * Keys look like `gen/<tenant>/2026-07-29/ab12cd34-a-cat.png`; the random
+ * component is there to make the key unique, not to be read. Stripping it turns
+ * a saved file into `a-cat.png`, which matters because the reliable way to show
+ * a user an image in a chat client is for the agent to download it and attach
+ * it — and an attachment called `ab12cd34-a-cat.png` looks like a machine
+ * artefact.
+ *
+ * Lives on its own because it is pure string work that both the tools and the
+ * job registry need. It used to sit in `media-endpoint.ts` alongside the
+ * Worker's `/media` route handler; that route is the host's job now
+ * (mcp-host's blob store serves signed GETs), but the naming rule is ours.
+ */
+export function downloadFilename(key) {
+    const last = key.split('/').pop() || 'media';
+    const stripped = last.replace(/^[0-9a-f]{6,12}-/i, '');
+    return stripped || last;
+}

package/dist/tools/files.js

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { McpToolError, textResult } from '@chrischall/mcp-utils';
 import { withProgressHeartbeat } from './shared.js';
 import { base64ToBytes, wholeMb } from '../bytes.js';
 import { fileNameFromUrl } from '../fetch-image.js';
-import { downloadFilename } from '../media-endpoint.js';
+import { downloadFilename } from '../media-name.js';
 import { previewUnlessConfirmed, previewLocalInputsUnlessConfirmed, schemaConfirm } from './_confirm.js';
 /**
  * First-class Gemini Files API access.

package/dist/tools/shared.js

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { resolveVideoPath, videoMimeType } from '../images.js';
 import { IMAGE_URL_MAX_BYTES, IMAGE_INLINE_MAX_BYTES } from '../fetch-image.js';
 import { bytesToBase64, base64ToBytes, wholeMb } from '../bytes.js';
 import { createDiskSink } from '../storage/media.js';
-import { downloadFilename } from '../media-endpoint.js';
+import { downloadFilename } from '../media-name.js';
 import { buildZip } from '../zip.js';
 /**
  * Fallback sink for call sites that pass no explicit one (every pre-existing

package/dist/version.js

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 /** Single source of the server version. release-please bumps the literal below. */
-export const VERSION = '1.5.1'; // x-release-please-version
+export const VERSION = '1.6.1'; // x-release-please-version

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@chrischall/gemini-mcp",
-  "version": "1.5.1",
+  "version": "1.6.1",
   "mcpName": "io.github.chrischall/gemini-mcp",
   "description": "Gemini image-generation MCP server for Claude — developed and maintained by AI (Claude Code)",
   "author": "Claude Code (AI) <https://www.anthropic.com/claude>",
@@ -39,32 +39,22 @@
     "build": "tsc && npm run bundle",
     "bundle": "esbuild src/index.ts --bundle --platform=node --format=esm --external:dotenv --outfile=dist/bundle.js",
     "dev": "node dist/index.js",
-    "test": "npm run typecheck && vitest run && npm run worker:test",
+    "test": "npm run typecheck && vitest run",
     "test:watch": "vitest",
     "test:coverage": "vitest run --coverage",
-    "typecheck": "tsc -p tsconfig.test.json",
-    "worker:dev": "wrangler dev",
-    "worker:deploy": "wrangler deploy",
-    "worker:test": "npm run worker:typecheck && vitest run -c vitest.workers.config.ts",
-    "worker:typecheck": "tsc -p tsconfig.worker.json"
+    "typecheck": "tsc -p tsconfig.test.json"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@chrischall/mcp-utils": "^0.13.0",
+    "@chrischall/mcp-utils": "^0.14.0",
     "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.29.0",
     "dotenv": "^17.4.0",
     "zod": "^4.4.2"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
-    "@chrischall/mcp-connector": "^1.1.1",
-    "@cloudflare/vitest-pool-workers": "^0.18.6",
-    "@cloudflare/workers-oauth-provider": "^0.8.2",
-    "@cloudflare/workers-types": "^5.20260719.1",
     "@types/node": "^26.0.0",
     "@vitest/coverage-v8": "^4.1.2",
-    "agents": "^0.19.0",
     "esbuild": "^0.28.0",
     "typescript": "^7.0.2",
-    "vitest": "^4.1.2",
-    "wrangler": "^4.112.0"
+    "vitest": "^4.1.2"
   }
 }

package/server.json

@@ -6,12 +6,12 @@
     "url": "https://github.com/chrischall/gemini-mcp",
     "source": "github"
   },
-  "version": "1.5.1",
+  "version": "1.6.1",
   "packages": [
     {
       "registryType": "npm",
       "identifier": "@chrischall/gemini-mcp",
-      "version": "1.5.1",
+      "version": "1.6.1",
       "transport": {
         "type": "stdio"
       },

package/skills/gemini-mcp/SKILL.md

@@ -126,11 +126,11 @@ not an error.
 | `gemini_list_files(page_size?)` | List current uploads with MIME types and expiry |
 | `gemini_delete_file(file_uri, confirm)` | Delete an upload before its ~48h expiry |
 
-On the **hosted connector** there is also `POST /upload`, behind the same OAuth token as
+On the **hosted hosted deployment** there is also `POST /upload`, behind the same OAuth token as
 `/mcp` — the zero-base64 path for an agent with a shell:
 
 ```bash
-curl -X POST https://<connector>/upload \
+curl -X POST https://<hosted deployment>/upload \
   -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
   -H "Content-Type: image/jpeg" \
   --data-binary @photo.jpg
@@ -179,9 +179,9 @@ gemini_image_edit(prompt: "make the background blue", images_url: ["https://exam
 → the server fetches the URL itself; returns path to edited PNG
 ```
 
-**Reuse one photo across many generations (hosted connector, agent with a shell):**
+**Reuse one photo across many generations (hosted hosted deployment, agent with a shell):**
 ```
-$ curl -X POST https://<connector>/upload -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+$ curl -X POST https://<hosted deployment>/upload -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
     -H "Content-Type: image/jpeg" --data-binary @photo.jpg
   → {"file_uri": "files/abc123"}
 

package/dist/connector-origin.js

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Tell an MCP session which hostname it was reached on.
- *
- * This is the single load-bearing link in the zero-config media-URL path: the
- * origin captured here becomes `https://<host>/media/…` for every generated
- * image. If it goes missing, generations silently stop coming back with
- * openable links — the exact failure the media work exists to end — so it lives
- * in its own module, free of any Cloudflare import, purely so it can be tested.
- * (`src/worker.ts` pulls in `agents` and cannot load under Node at all.)
- *
- * Deriving the origin per request rather than configuring it is what makes a
- * fork, a `*.workers.dev` preview and the custom domain all mint correct links
- * with nothing to set. It rides on `ctx.props` — the object the OAuth provider
- * has already populated with the decrypted grant — rather than a module-level
- * variable, because one isolate serves many authenticated sessions (session.ts).
- */
-/** Property name the session reads back off its props. */
-export const CONNECTOR_ORIGIN_PROP = 'connectorOrigin';
-/**
- * Wrap a handler so `ctx.props.connectorOrigin` is set before it runs.
- *
- * Existing props are preserved — they carry the user's API key, and dropping
- * them would break authentication rather than merely lose a URL.
- */
-export function withConnectorOrigin(inner) {
-    return {
-        fetch(request, env, ctx) {
-            const carrier = (ctx ?? {});
-            const existing = (typeof carrier.props === 'object' && carrier.props !== null ? carrier.props : {});
-            carrier.props = { ...existing, [CONNECTOR_ORIGIN_PROP]: new URL(request.url).origin };
-            return inner.fetch(request, env, ctx);
-        },
-    };
-}

package/dist/media-cleanup.js

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Retention for generated media.
- *
- * Every hosted generation writes an object to R2 and nothing ever removed it,
- * so the bucket grew without bound — and the signed links pointing into it are
- * only useful for a couple of days anyway. A scheduled sweep keeps the two in
- * step: objects live `MEDIA_TTL_DAYS` (default 7), and a signed URL's lifetime
- * is clamped to that, so a link never outlives the object behind it.
- *
- * R2 lifecycle rules would be the cheaper mechanism, but they are configured on
- * the bucket rather than in `wrangler.jsonc`, so a fresh deploy of this repo
- * would silently have no retention at all. A cron in the Worker ships with the
- * code.
- */
-const DEFAULT_MAX_OBJECTS = 5_000;
-/**
- * `gen/` is where media is written now; `media/` is where it was written before
- * the rename that made URLs read `/media/gen/…` instead of `/media/media/…`.
- * Both are swept — retention that ignores the existing backlog is not retention.
- * `up/` (signed uploads) is swept on the same schedule: a reference photo worth
- * keeping gets copied into the character library (`lib/`), which is the ONE
- * prefix deliberately absent here — saved characters and styles have no expiry.
- */
-const LEGACY_AND_CURRENT_PREFIXES = ['gen/', 'media/', 'up/'];
-/** R2 accepts bulk deletes in batches; 1000 is the documented ceiling. */
-const DELETE_BATCH = 1_000;
-/** Days → ms, defaulting to 7 for anything missing or nonsensical. */
-export function retentionMsFromDays(days) {
-    const n = Number(days);
-    return (Number.isFinite(n) && n > 0 ? n : 7) * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
-}
-/**
- * Delete generated media older than `retentionMs`. Returns counts rather than
- * logging them, so the caller decides what to do with the numbers and the sweep
- * itself stays testable.
- */
-export async function cleanupExpiredMedia(bucket, retentionMs, opts = {}) {
-    const now = opts.now?.() ?? Date.now();
-    const cutoff = now - retentionMs;
-    const maxObjects = opts.maxObjects ?? DEFAULT_MAX_OBJECTS;
-    const prefixes = opts.prefixes ?? LEGACY_AND_CURRENT_PREFIXES;
-    let scanned = 0;
-    let deleted = 0;
-    let truncated = false;
-    const doomed = [];
-    const flush = async (all) => {
-        while (doomed.length >= (all ? 1 : DELETE_BATCH)) {
-            const batch = doomed.splice(0, DELETE_BATCH);
-            await bucket.delete(batch);
-            deleted += batch.length;
-        }
-    };
-    for (const prefix of prefixes) {
-        let cursor;
-        for (;;) {
-            if (scanned >= maxObjects) {
-                truncated = true;
-                break;
-            }
-            const page = await bucket.list({ prefix, cursor, limit: Math.min(1000, maxObjects - scanned) });
-            for (const object of page.objects) {
-                scanned++;
-                if (object.uploaded.getTime() < cutoff)
-                    doomed.push(object.key);
-            }
-            await flush(false);
-            if (!page.truncated)
-                break;
-            if (scanned >= maxObjects) {
-                truncated = true;
-                break;
-            }
-            cursor = page.cursor;
-        }
-    }
-    await flush(true);
-    return { scanned, deleted, truncated };
-}

package/dist/media-endpoint.js

@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
-import { loadSigningKey, verifyMediaSignature } from './media-url.js';
-/**
- * Human-friendly download name from an object key.
- *
- * Keys look like `gen/<tenant>/2026-07-29/ab12cd34-a-cat.png`; the random component is
- * there to make the key unique, not to be read. Stripping it turns a saved file
- * into `a-cat.png`, which matters because the reliable way to show a user an
- * image in a chat client is for the agent to download it and attach it — and an
- * attachment called `ab12cd34-a-cat.png` looks like a machine artefact.
- */
-export function downloadFilename(key) {
-    const last = key.split('/').pop() || 'media';
-    const stripped = last.replace(/^[0-9a-f]{6,12}-/i, '');
-    return stripped || last;
-}
-/**
- * Parse a single-range `Range: bytes=a-b` header. Multi-range is unsupported,
- * and an unknown object size means no range handling at all (Range is advisory
- * — `undefined` degrades to a full 200, never an error).
- */
-function parseRange(header, size) {
-    if (!header || size === undefined)
-        return undefined;
-    const match = /^bytes=(\d*)-(\d*)$/.exec(header.trim());
-    if (!match)
-        return undefined;
-    const [, startText, endText] = match;
-    if (startText === '' && endText === '')
-        return undefined;
-    if (startText === '') {
-        // Suffix range: the last N bytes.
-        const suffix = Number(endText);
-        if (!suffix)
-            return undefined;
-        const offset = Math.max(0, size - suffix);
-        return { offset, length: size - offset };
-    }
-    const offset = Number(startText);
-    if (offset >= size)
-        return 'unsatisfiable';
-    const end = endText === '' ? size - 1 : Number(endText);
-    if (end < offset)
-        return 'unsatisfiable';
-    return { offset, length: end - offset + 1 };
-}
-const MISSING = 'That media object no longer exists — it may have been cleaned up. Re-run the generation to get a fresh one.';
-/**
- * Response headers shared by GET, HEAD and 206. `Content-Disposition` carries a
- * readable filename because the reliable way to show a user an image in a chat
- * client is for the agent to download it and attach it.
- */
-function baseHeaders(key, object, size) {
-    const headers = new Headers({
-        'content-type': object.httpMetadata?.contentType ?? 'application/octet-stream',
-        // The URL is signed and expiring, so it is safe to cache for its lifetime;
-        // `private` keeps shared caches from serving it to anyone else.
-        'cache-control': 'private, max-age=3600',
-        'content-disposition': `inline; filename="${downloadFilename(key)}"`,
-        // The bytes are model output being handed to a browser — never let a
-        // sniffed content type turn an image response into something executable.
-        'x-content-type-options': 'nosniff',
-        // Defense in depth against stored XSS: this route serves user-influenced
-        // bytes from the SAME ORIGIN as the connector's OAuth pages, so if a
-        // scriptable document type (SVG, HTML) ever slipped past the raster-only
-        // upload gates, this neutralizes it — no script, no fetch, and a unique
-        // opaque origin via sandbox. Pixels don't need any of what this disables.
-        'content-security-policy': "default-src 'none'; sandbox",
-        // Range support is cheap on R2 and is what makes a resumable `curl -C -`
-        // work against a large video.
-        'accept-ranges': 'bytes',
-    });
-    const etag = object.httpEtag ?? object.etag;
-    if (etag)
-        headers.set('etag', etag);
-    if (size !== undefined)
-        headers.set('content-length', String(size));
-    return headers;
-}
-function problem(status, message) {
-    return new Response(`${message}\n`, {
-        status,
-        headers: { 'content-type': 'text/plain; charset=utf-8', 'cache-control': 'no-store' },
-    });
-}
-/**
- * Build the `/media` handler. `basePath` is stripped from the pathname to get
- * the R2 key, so the key keeps its own prefix and the two never drift.
- */
-export function createMediaHandler(env, basePath = '/media/') {
-    return async function handleMedia(request) {
-        if (request.method !== 'GET' && request.method !== 'HEAD') {
-            return problem(405, `Method ${request.method} not allowed; media links are GET-only.`);
-        }
-        const url = new URL(request.url);
-        if (!url.pathname.startsWith(basePath))
-            return problem(404, 'Not found');
-        // decodeURIComponent per segment, mirroring how the URL was built. A key
-        // cannot contain `..` (the sink sanitises every segment), and R2 has no
-        // path traversal to exploit anyway — a key is an opaque string, not a path.
-        const key = url.pathname
-            .slice(basePath.length)
-            .split('/')
-            .map((segment) => {
-            try {
-                return decodeURIComponent(segment);
-            }
-            catch {
-                return segment;
-            }
-        })
-            .join('/');
-        if (!key)
-            return problem(404, 'Not found');
-        const now = env.now?.() ?? Date.now();
-        // Read-only: verification must never CREATE a signing secret. A stale KV
-        // read here would otherwise clobber the secret every outstanding link was
-        // signed with (see loadSigningKey). No secret ⇒ nothing was legitimately
-        // signed ⇒ refuse, without touching storage or the bucket.
-        const signingKey = await loadSigningKey(env.secret, env.store);
-        const check = signingKey
-            ? await verifyMediaSignature(signingKey, key, url.searchParams.get('exp'), url.searchParams.get('sig'), now)
-            : { ok: false, reason: 'invalid' };
-        if (!check.ok) {
-            if (check.reason === 'expired') {
-                return problem(410, 'This media link has expired. Generated media is retained for a limited time — re-run the generation to get a fresh link.');
-            }
-            return problem(403, 'Invalid or missing media signature. Media links must be used exactly as returned by the tool, including the exp and sig parameters.');
-        }
-        const rangeHeader = request.headers.get('range');
-        // HEAD is what a link-preview fetcher and `curl -I` send first; serve it
-        // from a metadata read where the bucket offers one, rather than opening a
-        // body we are about to throw away.
-        if (request.method === 'HEAD' && env.bucket.head) {
-            const meta = await env.bucket.head(key);
-            if (!meta)
-                return problem(404, MISSING);
-            return new Response(null, { status: 200, headers: baseHeaders(key, meta, meta.size) });
-        }
-        // Fetch whole and slice on the way out rather than pushing the range into
-        // R2: the objects here are single images and short clips, and a typed
-        // range option is not expressible against both the real binding and a test
-        // fake without casting away the very types that make this safe.
-        const object = await env.bucket.get(key);
-        if (!object)
-            return problem(404, MISSING);
-        const totalSize = object.size;
-        const range = parseRange(rangeHeader, totalSize);
-        if (range === 'unsatisfiable') {
-            return new Response('Requested range not satisfiable\n', {
-                status: 416,
-                headers: { 'content-range': `bytes */${totalSize ?? 0}`, 'content-type': 'text/plain; charset=utf-8' },
-            });
-        }
-        const headers = baseHeaders(key, object, totalSize);
-        if (request.method === 'HEAD')
-            return new Response(null, { status: 200, headers });
-        if (range && totalSize !== undefined && object.arrayBuffer) {
-            const length = Math.min(range.length, totalSize - range.offset);
-            const slice = (await object.arrayBuffer()).slice(range.offset, range.offset + length);
-            headers.set('content-length', String(slice.byteLength));
-            headers.set('content-range', `bytes ${range.offset}-${range.offset + slice.byteLength - 1}/${totalSize}`);
-            return new Response(slice, { status: 206, headers });
-        }
-        return new Response(object.body ?? null, { status: 200, headers });
-    };
-}