@chilkat/react-native 11.6.1

package/src/specs/Ntlm.nitro.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,556 @@
+// Generated by ReactNativeNs.RnGenerator -- do not edit.
+import type { HybridObject } from 'react-native-nitro-modules'
+
+/**
+ * Generate, parse, and verify NTLM authentication messages.
+ *
+ * `Ntlm` implements the NTLM challenge/response message
+ * workflow. It can generate Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3 NTLM messages, parse
+ * those messages for inspection, compare Type 3 responses on the server side,
+ * and control key authentication inputs such as username, password, domain,
+ * workstation, target name, client challenge, server challenge, NTLM version,
+ * encoding mode, and negotiate flags.
+ *
+ * **Type 1 negotiate message**
+ *
+ * Generate the client-to-server message that begins the NTLM exchange and
+ * advertises supported options.
+ *
+ * **Type 2 challenge message**
+ *
+ * Generate the server challenge response, including target name, server
+ * challenge, and optional target-info fields.
+ *
+ * **Type 3 authenticate message**
+ *
+ * Generate the final client response using the username and password
+ * without sending the password itself.
+ *
+ * **Server-side verification**
+ *
+ * Load a received Type 3 message, extract embedded fields, recompute the
+ * response, and compare the result with `CompareType3`.
+ *
+ * **Challenges and encoding**
+ *
+ * Set or inspect 8-byte client and server challenges using encodings such
+ * as hex, Base64, Base32, quoted-printable, URL encoding, and others.
+ *
+ * **Version, flags, and diagnostics**
+ *
+ * Select NTLMv1 or NTLMv2, adjust negotiate flags when required, parse
+ * messages for readable diagnostics, and check `LastErrorText`.
+ *
+ * **Common pattern:**
+ * The client calls `GenType1` and sends the Type 1 message to the
+ * server. The server calls `GenType2` and sends the Type 2 challenge
+ * back. The client sets `UserName` and `Password`, calls
+ * `GenType3`, and sends the Type 3 message. The server calls
+ * `LoadType3`, looks up the user's password, recomputes the Type 3
+ * response, and uses `CompareType3` to verify authentication.
+ *
+ * **Flag guidance:**
+ * The default `Flags` value is intended for normal use. Only modify
+ * negotiate flags with `SetFlag` or by setting `Flags`
+ * directly when the application has specific NTLM protocol requirements and
+ * the meaning of the affected flags is understood.
+ *
+ * Each `Ntlm` instance owns a native Chilkat object. It is released when the JavaScript object is
+ * garbage collected, or immediately by `dispose()`; any use after `dispose()` throws.
+ * Create one with `new Ntlm()`.
+ */
+export interface Ntlm extends HybridObject<{ ios: 'c++', android: 'c++' }> {
+  // ---- Properties ----
+
+  /**
+   * Provides HTML-formatted information about the last called method or property. If a method call
+   * fails or behaves unexpectedly, check this property for details. Note that information is
+   * available regardless of the method call's success.
+   *
+   * This property is read-only.
+   */
+  readonly lastErrorHtml: string
+
+  /**
+   * Provides plain text information about the last called method or property. If a method call
+   * fails or behaves unexpectedly, check this property for details. Note that information is
+   * available regardless of the method call's success.
+   *
+   * This property is read-only.
+   */
+  readonly lastErrorText: string
+
+  /**
+   * Provides XML-formatted information about the last called method or property. If a method call
+   * fails or behaves unexpectedly, check this property for details. Note that information is
+   * available regardless of the method call's success.
+   *
+   * This property is read-only.
+   */
+  readonly lastErrorXml: string
+
+  /**
+   * Version of the component/library, such as "10.1.0"
+   *
+   * This property is read-only.
+   */
+  readonly version: string
+
+  /**
+   * If set to a file path, this property logs the LastErrorText of each Chilkat method or property
+   * call to the specified file. This logging helps identify the context and history of Chilkat
+   * calls leading up to any crash or hang, aiding in debugging.
+   *
+   * Enabling the VerboseLogging property provides more detailed information.
+   *
+   * This property is mainly used for debugging rare instances where a Chilkat method call causes a
+   * hang or crash, which should generally not happen.
+   *
+   * Possible causes of hangs include:
+   *
+   * - A timeout property set to 0, indicating an infinite timeout.
+   *
+   * - A hang occurring within an event callback in the application code.
+   *
+   * - An internal bug in the Chilkat code causing the hang.
+   */
+  debugLogFilePath: string
+
+  /**
+   * If set to `true`, then the contents of LastErrorText (or LastErrorXml, or LastErrorHtml) may
+   * contain more verbose information. The default value is `false`. Verbose logging should only be
+   * used for debugging. The potentially large quantity of logged information may adversely affect
+   * peformance.
+   */
+  verboseLogging: boolean
+
+  /**
+   * Indicates the success or failure of the most recent method call: `true` means success, `false`
+   * means failure. This property remains unchanged by property setters or getters. This method is
+   * present to address challenges in checking for null or Nothing returns in certain programming
+   * languages. Note: This property does not apply to methods that return integer values or to
+   * boolean-returning methods where the boolean does not indicate success or failure.
+   */
+  lastMethodSuccess: boolean
+
+  /**
+   * Specifies the 8-byte client challenge used when generating the Type 3 authenticate message.
+   * Because this property is a string, the bytes are represented using `EncodingMode`. For example,
+   * when `EncodingMode` is `hex`, set this property to exactly 16 hexadecimal characters.
+   *
+   * Setting this property is optional. If it is empty when `GenType3` is called, Chilkat generates
+   * eight random bytes automatically.
+   *
+   * **Security note:** A client challenge is a nonce, not a password or encryption key. Use a fresh
+   * unpredictable value for each authentication exchange; do not deliberately reuse a fixed
+   * challenge in production.
+   */
+  clientChallenge: string
+
+  /**
+   * Specifies the server's DNS computer name for inclusion in the `MsvAvDnsComputerName` entry of
+   * the Type 2 message's `TargetInfo` block.
+   *
+   * This property is optional and is used by server-side code when constructing the `TargetInfo`
+   * AV-pair sequence in a Type 2 challenge message.
+   *
+   * If any of the optional target-information name properties are supplied, Chilkat requires both
+   * `NetBiosComputerName` and `NetBiosDomainName` to be set.
+   *
+   * **NTLMv2 background:** Target information is sent by the server and incorporated into the
+   * NTLMv2 response. The values should describe the actual authentication target; they are not
+   * arbitrary client-supplied labels.
+   */
+  dnsComputerName: string
+
+  /**
+   * Specifies the server's DNS domain name for inclusion in the `MsvAvDnsDomainName` entry of the
+   * Type 2 message's `TargetInfo` block.
+   *
+   * This property is optional and is used by server-side code when constructing the `TargetInfo`
+   * AV-pair sequence in a Type 2 challenge message.
+   *
+   * If any of the optional target-information name properties are supplied, Chilkat requires both
+   * `NetBiosComputerName` and `NetBiosDomainName` to be set.
+   *
+   * **NTLMv2 background:** Target information is sent by the server and incorporated into the
+   * NTLMv2 response. The values should describe the actual authentication target; they are not
+   * arbitrary client-supplied labels.
+   */
+  dnsDomainName: string
+
+  /**
+   * Specifies the client's domain or workgroup name. When provided, it can be included in the Type
+   * 1 negotiate message and is used as the domain component of the identity in the Type 3
+   * authenticate message.
+   *
+   * For a domain account, use the account's Windows domain name. For a local account, the expected
+   * value depends on the authenticating server and protocol.
+   *
+   * **Identity note:** `Domain` is separate from `TargetName`. `Domain` identifies the account's
+   * domain in the client identity, whereas `TargetName` is supplied by the server in the Type 2
+   * challenge.
+   */
+  domain: string
+
+  /**
+   * Controls the textual encoding used when Chilkat exposes binary NTLM values as strings or
+   * accepts them from strings. This includes generated and parsed NTLM message tokens and
+   * binary-valued properties such as `ClientChallenge` and `ServerChallenge`.
+   *
+   * The mode name is case-insensitive. Supported values include `base64`, `modBase64`, `base32`,
+   * `UU`, `QP`, `URL`, `hex`, `Q`, `B`, `url_oauth`, `url_rfc1738`, `url_rfc2396`, and
+   * `url_rfc3986`.
+   *
+   * **Interoperability:** NTLM tokens carried in HTTP `Authorization` or `WWW-Authenticate` headers
+   * are conventionally Base64 encoded. Use the same `EncodingMode` for both the producer and
+   * consumer of a token.
+   */
+  encodingMode: string
+
+  /**
+   * Specifies the NTLM negotiate flags as a compact string in which each letter represents one bit.
+   * The flags advertise or select character encoding, target information, session security, and
+   * other protocol capabilities.
+   *
+   * The default is `ABCHMQ`, which enables Unicode, OEM compatibility, target-name request, NTLM
+   * authentication, always-sign behavior, and extended session security.
+   *
+   * LetterBit valueMicrosoft flag name
+   *
+   * | `A` |  | `0x00000001` |  | `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE` |
+   *
+   * | `B` |  | `0x00000002` |  | `NTLM_NEGOTIATE_OEM` |
+   *
+   * | `C` |  | `0x00000004` |  | `NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET` |
+   *
+   * | `D` |  | `0x00000010` |  | `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN` |
+   *
+   * | `E` |  | `0x00000020` |  | `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL` |
+   *
+   * | `F` |  | `0x00000040` |  | `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_DATAGRAM` |
+   *
+   * | `G` |  | `0x00000080` |  | `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY` |
+   *
+   * | `H` |  | `0x00000200` |  | `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM` |
+   *
+   * | `I` |  | `0x00000400` |  | `Reserved / unused` |
+   *
+   * | `J` |  | `0x00000800` |  | `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ANONYMOUS` |
+   *
+   * | `K` |  | `0x00001000` |  | `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_DOMAIN_SUPPLIED` |
+   *
+   * | `L` |  | `0x00002000` |  | `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_WORKSTATION_SUPPLIED` |
+   *
+   * | `M` |  | `0x00008000` |  | `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN` |
+   *
+   * | `N` |  | `0x00010000` |  | `NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_DOMAIN` |
+   *
+   * | `O` |  | `0x00020000` |  | `NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_SERVER` |
+   *
+   * | `P` |  | `0x00040000` |  | `Reserved / unused` |
+   *
+   * | `Q` |  | `0x00080000` |  | `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY` |
+   *
+   * | `R` |  | `0x00100000` |  | `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_IDENTIFY` |
+   *
+   * | `S` |  | `0x00400000` |  | `NTLMSSP_REQUEST_NON_NT_SESSION_KEY` |
+   *
+   * | `T` |  | `0x00800000` |  | `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO` |
+   *
+   * | `U` |  | `0x02000000` |  | `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION` |
+   *
+   * | `V` |  | `0x20000000` |  | `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128` |
+   *
+   * | `W` |  | `0x40000000` |  | `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH` |
+   *
+   * | `X` |  | `0x80000000` |  | `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56` |
+   *
+   * **Compatibility warning:** Leave this property at its default unless a specific protocol peer
+   * requires different flags and the consequences are understood. Some bits are mutually dependent,
+   * some are meaningful only in particular message types, and reserved bits should remain clear.
+   * Prefer `SetFlag` when changing a single option.
+   */
+  flags: string
+
+  /**
+   * Specifies the server's NetBIOS computer name for inclusion in the `MsvAvNbComputerName` entry
+   * of the Type 2 message's `TargetInfo` block.
+   *
+   * This property is optional and is used by server-side code when constructing the `TargetInfo`
+   * AV-pair sequence in a Type 2 challenge message.
+   *
+   * If any of the optional target-information name properties are supplied, Chilkat requires both
+   * `NetBiosComputerName` and `NetBiosDomainName` to be set.
+   *
+   * **NTLMv2 background:** Target information is sent by the server and incorporated into the
+   * NTLMv2 response. The values should describe the actual authentication target; they are not
+   * arbitrary client-supplied labels.
+   */
+  netBiosComputerName: string
+
+  /**
+   * Specifies the server's NetBIOS domain name for inclusion in the `MsvAvNbDomainName` entry of
+   * the Type 2 message's `TargetInfo` block.
+   *
+   * This property is optional and is used by server-side code when constructing the `TargetInfo`
+   * AV-pair sequence in a Type 2 challenge message.
+   *
+   * If any of the optional target-information name properties are supplied, Chilkat requires both
+   * `NetBiosComputerName` and `NetBiosDomainName` to be set.
+   *
+   * **NTLMv2 background:** Target information is sent by the server and incorporated into the
+   * NTLMv2 response. The values should describe the actual authentication target; they are not
+   * arbitrary client-supplied labels.
+   */
+  netBiosDomainName: string
+
+  /**
+   * Selects the challenge-response algorithm used to generate and verify the authentication
+   * response.
+   *
+   * ValueBehavior
+   *
+   * | `1` |  | Use NTLMv1. This is the default for backward compatibility. |
+   *
+   * | `2` |  | Use NTLMv2. |
+   *
+   * The client and server must use compatible response algorithms. This setting is not negotiated
+   * by the three NTLM messages.
+   *
+   * **Security recommendation:** Set this property to `2` for modern deployments. NTLMv1 is
+   * obsolete and has been removed from Windows 11 version 24H2 and Windows Server 2025. Use NTLM
+   * only where compatibility requires it; Kerberos through Negotiate is preferred in Active
+   * Directory environments.
+   */
+  ntlmVersion: number
+
+  /**
+   * Specifies the OEM code page used to encode NTLM text fields when Unicode negotiation is
+   * disabled. The default is the local computer's OEM code page.
+   *
+   * This property applies only when flag `A` (`NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE`) is clear and OEM
+   * encoding is selected. With the default flags, Unicode is used and this setting has no effect.
+   *
+   * **Interoperability:** Both sides must interpret OEM-encoded fields using compatible code pages.
+   * Retaining Unicode negotiation avoids locale-dependent corruption of usernames, domains, and
+   * workstation names.
+   */
+  oemCodePage: number
+
+  /**
+   * Specifies the password for `UserName`. Client-side code must set it before calling `GenType3`.
+   * Server-side verification code sets it after `LoadType3`, typically after looking up the account
+   * identified by the loaded username and domain.
+   *
+   * The password itself is not placed in the Type 3 message. It is used to derive the
+   * challenge-response proof.
+   *
+   * **Sensitive value:** Treat this property as credential material. Do not log it, persist it in
+   * plain text, or retain it longer than necessary. NTLM challenge-response still depends on
+   * password-derived secrets and does not make weak passwords safe.
+   */
+  password: string
+
+  /**
+   * Specifies the 8-byte server challenge carried in the Type 2 challenge message. Because this
+   * property is a string, the bytes are represented using `EncodingMode`. For example, with
+   * `EncodingMode` set to `hex`, provide exactly 16 hexadecimal characters.
+   *
+   * Setting this property is optional. If it is empty when `GenType2` is called, Chilkat generates
+   * eight random bytes automatically. Server-side verification must use the same challenge that was
+   * sent to the client.
+   *
+   * **Security note:** Generate a fresh unpredictable server challenge for each authentication
+   * exchange. Reusing challenges increases exposure to replay and precomputation attacks.
+   */
+  serverChallenge: string
+
+  /**
+   * Specifies the server-provided authentication target placed in the Type 2 challenge message.
+   * Depending on the target-type flags, it commonly identifies a Windows domain or the server
+   * handling local-account authentication.
+   *
+   * This is not the client account's domain; use `Domain` for that purpose.
+   *
+   * **Protocol note:** The target name helps describe the authentication realm advertised by the
+   * server. It does not by itself authenticate the server or prevent NTLM relay attacks.
+   */
+  targetName: string
+
+  /**
+   * Specifies the account name to authenticate. Client-side code must set it before calling
+   * `GenType3`. After server-side code calls `LoadType3`, this property contains the username
+   * extracted from the received Type 3 message.
+   *
+   * Use `Domain` separately when the account belongs to a Windows domain or workgroup.
+   *
+   * **Server-side rule:** Treat the username and domain from a received Type 3 message as untrusted
+   * input until the challenge response has been verified.
+   */
+  userName: string
+
+  /**
+   * Specifies the optional client workstation name. When supplied, Chilkat can include it in the
+   * Type 1 negotiate message and the Type 3 authenticate message. After `LoadType3`, it contains
+   * the workstation value reported by the client.
+   *
+   * **Identity note:** The workstation field is descriptive client-supplied metadata. It is not
+   * proof of the client's computer identity and should not be used as an authorization decision by
+   * itself.
+   */
+  workstation: string
+
+  // ---- Methods ----
+
+  /**
+   * Compares two encoded Type 3 authenticate messages and returns `true` when their LM and NT
+   * challenge-response fields match. A server commonly passes the Type 3 message received from the
+   * client as one argument and the expected Type 3 message recomputed with `GenType3` as the other.
+   *
+   * The messages must use the encoding selected by `EncodingMode`. Other Type 3 metadata, such as
+   * username or workstation text, is not the basis of this comparison.
+   *
+   * **Authentication workflow:** A matching response is meaningful only when the expected message
+   * was generated from the original Type 2 challenge, the correct account password, the same NTLM
+   * version, and the relevant loaded client fields. A `false` result means the response fields do
+   * not match; inspect `LastMethodSuccess` and `LastErrorText` if malformed input or another
+   * processing error is possible.
+   */
+  compareType3(msg1: string, msg2: string): boolean
+
+  /**
+   * Generates the client-to-server Type 1 \*Negotiate\* message that starts an NTLM authentication
+   * exchange. The message advertises the capabilities in `Flags` and can include the optional
+   * `Domain` and `Workstation` values.
+   *
+   * The returned token is encoded according to `EncodingMode`. Check `LastMethodSuccess` before
+   * using the returned string.
+   *
+   * **Message flow:** Type 1 contains negotiation metadata; it does not contain the user's password
+   * or challenge response.
+   *
+   * @throws Error if the call fails (the message names the reason); the full log is in
+   * {@link Ntlm.lastErrorText}.
+   */
+  genType1(): string
+
+  /**
+   * Generates the server-to-client Type 2 \*Challenge\* message from the encoded Type 1 message in
+   * `type1Msg`. Before calling, server-side code normally sets `TargetName` and may set
+   * `ServerChallenge` and the target-information name properties.
+   *
+   * If `ServerChallenge` is empty, Chilkat generates a random 8-byte challenge. The input and
+   * returned token use `EncodingMode`. Check `LastMethodSuccess` before sending the result.
+   *
+   * **State requirement:** Preserve the Type 2 message—or at minimum all state needed to reproduce
+   * it—for the later server-side verification of Type 3. The expected response is bound to the
+   * challenge and target information sent in this message.
+   *
+   * @throws Error if the call fails (the message names the reason); the full log is in
+   * {@link Ntlm.lastErrorText}.
+   */
+  genType2(type1Msg: string): string
+
+  /**
+   * Generates the client-to-server Type 3 \*Authenticate\* message from the encoded Type 2 message
+   * in `type2Msg`. Client-side code must set `UserName` and `Password`; set `Domain` and
+   * `Workstation` when required by the account and peer.
+   *
+   * Chilkat computes the response using `NtlmVersion`, the server challenge and target information
+   * from Type 2, and the client challenge. If `ClientChallenge` is empty, Chilkat generates it
+   * automatically. The password itself is not transmitted.
+   *
+   * The input and returned token use `EncodingMode`. Check `LastMethodSuccess` before using the
+   * returned string.
+   *
+   * **Security limitation:** NTLM proves knowledge of password-derived material but does not by
+   * itself authenticate the server. Deploy it only inside a transport and protocol configuration
+   * that addresses relay, channel protection, and server identity.
+   *
+   * @throws Error if the call fails (the message names the reason); the full log is in
+   * {@link Ntlm.lastErrorText}.
+   */
+  genType3(type2Msg: string): string
+
+  /**
+   * Parses an encoded Type 3 authenticate message received by server-side code and loads its
+   * client-supplied fields into this object. On success, `UserName`, `Domain`, `Workstation`, and
+   * `ClientChallenge` are populated from the message.
+   *
+   * This method parses the message; it does not authenticate the client. After loading, look up the
+   * account's password, set `Password`, recompute the expected Type 3 response with `GenType3`
+   * using the original Type 2 message, and compare the response fields with `CompareType3`.
+   *
+   * **Do not trust parsed identity fields yet:** Values extracted from Type 3 are controlled by the
+   * remote client. Use them only to locate the candidate account until the challenge response has
+   * been verified.
+   *
+   * @throws Error if the call fails (the message names the reason); the full log is in
+   * {@link Ntlm.lastErrorText}.
+   */
+  loadType3(type3Msg: string): void
+
+  /**
+   * Parses an encoded Type 1 negotiate message and returns human-readable XML describing its
+   * fields, including negotiation flags and any supplied domain or workstation information.
+   *
+   * The input token is decoded according to `EncodingMode`. The returned text is diagnostic XML
+   * intended for inspection and troubleshooting; parsing a message does not verify its
+   * authenticity. Check `LastMethodSuccess` before using the returned string.
+   *
+   * @throws Error if the call fails (the message names the reason); the full log is in
+   * {@link Ntlm.lastErrorText}.
+   */
+  parseType1(type1Msg: string): string
+
+  /**
+   * Parses an encoded Type 2 challenge message and returns human-readable XML describing its
+   * fields, including flags, target name, server challenge, and target-information AV pairs when
+   * present.
+   *
+   * The input token is decoded according to `EncodingMode`. The returned text is diagnostic XML
+   * intended for inspection and troubleshooting; parsing a message does not verify its
+   * authenticity. Check `LastMethodSuccess` before using the returned string.
+   *
+   * **Diagnostic sensitivity:** A Type 2 message contains a live server challenge and target
+   * metadata. Avoid exposing diagnostic output unnecessarily while an authentication exchange is
+   * active.
+   *
+   * @throws Error if the call fails (the message names the reason); the full log is in
+   * {@link Ntlm.lastErrorText}.
+   */
+  parseType2(type2Msg: string): string
+
+  /**
+   * Parses an encoded Type 3 authenticate message and returns human-readable XML describing its
+   * fields, including the reported username, domain, workstation, and challenge-response data.
+   *
+   * The input token is decoded according to `EncodingMode`. The returned text is diagnostic XML
+   * intended for inspection and troubleshooting; parsing a message does not verify its
+   * authenticity. Check `LastMethodSuccess` before using the returned string.
+   *
+   * **Sensitive diagnostic data:** The password is not present, but Type 3 contains account
+   * identifiers and password-derived response material that may be useful to an attacker. Do not
+   * place parsed output in public or long-lived logs.
+   *
+   * @throws Error if the call fails (the message names the reason); the full log is in
+   * {@link Ntlm.lastErrorText}.
+   */
+  parseType3(type3Msg: string): string
+
+  /**
+   * Turns one Chilkat flag letter on or off in `Flags`. `flagLetter` is a single letter listed in
+   * the `Flags` table, and `onOrOff` is `true` to set the bit or `false` to clear it.
+   *
+   * Returns `true` when the flag letter is accepted and the value is updated; otherwise returns
+   * `false`.
+   *
+   * **Use with care:** NTLM flags have dependencies and message-specific meanings. Modify them only
+   * for a known interoperability requirement, and avoid enabling reserved letters.
+   *
+   * @throws Error if the call fails (the message names the reason); the full log is in
+   * {@link Ntlm.lastErrorText}.
+   */
+  setFlag(flagLetter: string, onOrOff: boolean): void
+}