@chidchanun/bcp 0.2.4 → 0.2.6

package/docs/releases/0.2.5.md

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+# BCP Framework 0.2.5
+
+## Authentication Platform v2
+
+`0.2.5` expands `bcp/auth` from signed JWT-cookie authentication into an optional revocable session platform while preserving the stateless mode used by existing applications.
+
+## Highlights
+
+### Server-side auth session store contract
+
+New public types:
+
+```ts
+import type {
+    AuthSessionStore,
+    AuthSessionStoreRecord,
+} from "bcp/auth";
+```
+
+The contract provides:
+
+```text
+set
+get
+touch
+revoke
+revokeUser
+```
+
+Applications can back this contract with Redis, SQL, or another shared server-side store.
+
+### Built-in memory store
+
+Development and tests can use:
+
+```ts
+import {
+    createMemoryAuthSessionStore,
+} from "bcp/auth";
+```
+
+The memory adapter is process-local and intentionally not presented as a distributed production session database.
+
+### Revocable sessions
+
+When an auth store is configured, a valid signed JWT must also have an active server-side `sid` record.
+
+BCP can therefore invalidate a session before the cookie's JWT expiry.
+
+New APIs include:
+
+```text
+logoutAll()
+revokeSession()
+revokeUserSessions()
+```
+
+Normal `logout()` also revokes the current `sid` when a store is enabled.
+
+### Idle timeout
+
+`AuthOptions` now accepts:
+
+```ts
+idleTimeout: number
+```
+
+The value is measured in seconds and requires a session store.
+
+Successful authentication updates the store's `lastSeenAt`. Sessions that exceed the inactivity window are revoked and rejected.
+
+BCP intentionally rejects `idleTimeout` without a store instead of silently providing a false sense of server-side inactivity enforcement.
+
+### Session rotation
+
+`rotateSession()` continues issuing a fresh `sid`, JWT, expiry, and cookie.
+
+With a session store enabled, the previous `sid` is revoked so old cookies no longer pass the server-side session check.
+
+### Guest route guards
+
+New APIs:
+
+```ts
+requireGuest()
+createGuestGuard()
+```
+
+These support login, registration, and similar pages that should continue for anonymous users but redirect users who are already authenticated.
+
+Default authenticated-user behavior is a `303` redirect. `redirectTo: null` returns `409 Already authenticated`.
+
+## Backward compatibility
+
+The default remains stateless signed JWT-cookie authentication:
+
+```ts
+import {
+    auth,
+    login,
+    logout,
+} from "bcp/auth";
+```
+
+Applications do not need to configure a session store unless they need centralized revocation or idle-timeout behavior.
+
+No existing public application entrypoint is intentionally removed in this release.
+
+## Security guidance
+
+- JWT payloads remain signed rather than encrypted.
+- Do not place passwords, password hashes, tokens, API keys, or credentials in auth payload data.
+- Keep `BCP_SESSION_SECRET` outside source control and at least 32 bytes long.
+- Use a shared durable session-store implementation for production applications that run multiple Node.js processes or containers.
+- The built-in memory store is suitable for local development/tests and process-local prototypes.
+
+## Documentation
+
+Updated guides:
+
+```text
+docs/authentication.md
+docs/auth-session-store.md
+docs/auth-route-guards.md
+docs/api-reference.md
+```
+
+## Validation
+
+`0.2.5` adds unit and package smoke coverage for:
+
+```text
+session-store registration and lookup
+session revocation
+session rotation with revocation
+logout-all
+idle timeout
+guest route guards
+bcp/auth publish surface
+Authentication Platform v2 package contents
+```
+
+Before tagging or publishing, run the complete RC sequence:
+
+```bash
+npm run typecheck
+npm run test:unit
+npm run test:integration
+npm run test:e2e
+npm run test:package
+npm run rc:check
+```

package/docs/releases/0.2.6.md

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+# BCP Framework 0.2.6 — Authorization & Security v2
+
+`0.2.6` expands the server authorization model and adds request-origin/CSRF protection primitives while preserving the existing Authentication Platform v2 and route model.
+
+> Release state: unreleased development target until RC validation, tagging and npm publication complete.
+
+## Authorization primitives
+
+`bcp/auth` now provides flat permission checks:
+
+```ts
+hasPermission()
+assertPermission()
+getUserPermissions()
+```
+
+Permission requirements accept one permission or multiple permissions with `any` / `all` matching.
+
+The default user field is:
+
+```text
+permissions
+```
+
+Applications can select another field, such as `scopes`.
+
+## Permission route guards
+
+Route guards can require permissions directly:
+
+```ts
+requirePermission()
+createPermissionGuard()
+```
+
+Unauthenticated behavior remains consistent with `requireAuth()`. Authenticated users that fail the permission check receive `403 Forbidden` by default or can be redirected explicitly.
+
+## Policy authorization
+
+Resource-aware application policies are now supported through:
+
+```ts
+defineAuthorizationPolicy()
+can()
+cannot()
+authorize()
+AuthorizationError
+```
+
+Policies receive a typed context containing:
+
+```ts
+{
+    user,
+    resource,
+    data,
+}
+```
+
+Policies may be synchronous or asynchronous. `authorize()` throws a `403`-classified `AuthorizationError` when access is denied.
+
+## Same-origin protection
+
+`bcp/server` adds request-origin validation for unsafe methods:
+
+```ts
+isSafeHttpMethod()
+isSameOriginRequest()
+requireSameOriginRequest()
+```
+
+The current request origin is always allowed. Additional origins may be listed explicitly.
+
+For unsafe methods, BCP checks `Origin` first and then `Referer`. Missing origin information is rejected by default unless the application explicitly enables `allowMissingOrigin`.
+
+Malformed, opaque, or unsupported origins are treated as denied instead of surfacing as server errors.
+
+## CSRF protection
+
+Signed CSRF tokens are available through:
+
+```ts
+createCsrfToken()
+destroyCsrfToken()
+verifyCsrfToken()
+verifyCsrfRequest()
+requireCsrfRequest()
+```
+
+The default request header is:
+
+```text
+X-BCP-CSRF
+```
+
+The default cookie is:
+
+```text
+bcp_csrf
+```
+
+CSRF cookies are HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax by default, Secure in production, and use a two-hour default lifetime.
+
+Token signing resolves secrets in this order:
+
+```text
+explicit secret
+BCP_CSRF_SECRET
+BCP_SESSION_SECRET
+```
+
+Secrets must contain at least 32 UTF-8 bytes.
+
+`requireCsrfRequest()` combines same-origin validation and token validation for unsafe methods. GET, HEAD and OPTIONS do not require CSRF tokens.
+
+## Security error classification
+
+`RequestSecurityError` reports status `403` and distinguishes:
+
+```text
+INVALID_ORIGIN
+INVALID_CSRF_TOKEN
+```
+
+This allows API routes/actions to map request-security failures to application-specific error responses while retaining a stable security classification.
+
+## Compatibility
+
+`0.2.6` does not intentionally remove existing public entrypoints or authentication behavior.
+
+Existing APIs remain available:
+
+```text
+auth()
+login()
+logout()
+logoutAll()
+rotateSession()
+requireAuth()
+requireGuest()
+requireRole()
+createAuthGuard()
+createGuestGuard()
+createRoleGuard()
+```
+
+Stateless JWT-cookie authentication remains supported. Revocable stores introduced in `0.2.5` are unchanged.
+
+## Testing and packaging
+
+The release adds unit coverage for:
+
+- permission `any` / `all` matching,
+- resource authorization policies,
+- permission route guards,
+- same-origin mutation validation,
+- signed CSRF tokens,
+- invalid CSRF token rejection,
+- cross-origin request rejection.
+
+Prepared npm package smoke coverage verifies that the `bcp/auth` and `bcp/server` public entrypoints include the Authorization & Security v2 APIs and implementation files.
+
+## Documentation
+
+New guide:
+
+```text
+docs/authorization-security.md
+```
+
+Updated documentation contracts include:
+
+```text
+docs/platform-manifest.json
+docs/docs-web-manifest.json
+docs/api-manifest.json
+docs/api-reference.md
+README.md
+```
+
+## Release validation
+
+Before publishing:
+
+```bash
+npm run typecheck
+npm run test:unit
+npm run test:integration
+npm run test:e2e
+npm run test:package
+npm run rc:check
+```
+
+The final `v0.2.6` Git tag must point to the exact commit that passed the complete RC sequence.

package/docs/security.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Security
 
-BCP Framework applies a security gateway in both development and standalone production modes.
+BCP Framework applies a security gateway in both development and standalone production modes and exposes server-side mutation protection primitives through `bcp/server`.
 
 ## Default response headers
 
@@ -40,6 +40,58 @@ server: {
 
 Requests exceeding the limit are rejected by the outer gateway with HTTP 413 before reaching the API handler.
 
+## Same-origin mutation protection — 0.2.6+
+
+Cookie-authenticated unsafe requests can validate their browser origin:
+
+```ts
+import {
+    requireSameOriginRequest,
+} from "bcp/server";
+
+await requireSameOriginRequest();
+```
+
+BCP validates `Origin` first and falls back to `Referer`. GET, HEAD and OPTIONS are treated as safe methods. Unsafe methods without origin information are rejected by default.
+
+Additional trusted origins can be configured per check with `allowedOrigins`.
+
+Malformed, opaque or unsupported origins are denied instead of surfacing as server errors.
+
+## CSRF protection — 0.2.6+
+
+BCP also exposes signed CSRF tokens:
+
+```ts
+import {
+    createCsrfToken,
+    requireCsrfRequest,
+} from "bcp/server";
+
+const token =
+    await createCsrfToken();
+
+// Render the token through a trusted application response,
+// then submit it with the mutation.
+
+await requireCsrfRequest({
+    token: submittedToken,
+});
+```
+
+Default header/cookie:
+
+```text
+X-BCP-CSRF
+bcp_csrf
+```
+
+Token signing uses `BCP_CSRF_SECRET` when configured and otherwise falls back to `BCP_SESSION_SECRET`. Secrets must contain at least 32 UTF-8 bytes.
+
+`requireCsrfRequest()` combines same-origin validation and CSRF token verification for unsafe methods.
+
+Read more: [Authorization & Security v2](authorization-security.md).
+
 ## Static assets
 
 Public asset resolution decodes the URL, rejects null bytes, resolves the candidate beneath `public/`, resolves filesystem symlinks and verifies the final real path remains inside the public directory. This prevents path and symlink traversal from escaping the public root.
@@ -55,3 +107,5 @@ Security config values reject carriage return, line feed and null bytes to preve
 ## Deployment note
 
 The security gateway is the outer production layer, so security headers and body limits also apply to response-cache hits, middleware responses, static assets and error responses.
+
+Authorization, same-origin checks and CSRF validation remain request-handler/guard responsibilities and should be enforced wherever a mutation or protected operation occurs.

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@chidchanun/bcp",
-  "version": "0.2.4",
+  "version": "0.2.6",
   "description": "BCP Framework - a React full-stack framework with file-based routing, SSR, APIs, middleware, islands, caching and standalone production builds.",
   "type": "module",
   "license": "MIT",

package/packages/client/src/auth.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ export {
     getSession,
     login,
     logout,
+    logoutAll,
+    revokeSession,
+    revokeUserSessions,
     rotateSession,
 
     type AuthApi,
@@ -13,17 +16,50 @@ export {
     type AuthUser,
 } from "../../server/src/auth.js";
 
+export {
+    createMemoryAuthSessionStore,
+
+    type AuthSessionStore,
+    type AuthSessionStoreRecord,
+    type MemoryAuthSessionStore,
+} from "../../server/src/auth-session-store.js";
+
+export {
+    assertPermission,
+    authorize,
+    can,
+    cannot,
+    defineAuthorizationPolicy,
+    getUserPermissions,
+    hasPermission,
+    AuthorizationError,
+
+    type AuthorizationContext,
+    type AuthorizationMatch,
+    type AuthorizationPolicy,
+    type PermissionCheckOptions,
+    type PermissionRequirement,
+} from "../../server/src/authorization.js";
+
 export {
     createAuthGuard,
+    createGuestGuard,
+    createPermissionGuard,
     createRoleGuard,
     getGuardAuth,
     requireAuth,
+    requireGuest,
+    requirePermission,
     requireRole,
 
     type AuthGuardData,
     type AuthGuardFunction,
     type AuthGuardResult,
+    type GuestGuardFunction,
+    type GuestGuardResult,
     type RequireAuthOptions,
+    type RequireGuestOptions,
+    type RequirePermissionOptions,
     type RequireRoleOptions,
     type RequiredRole,
 } from "../../server/src/auth-guard.js";

package/packages/client/src/server.ts

@@ -15,6 +15,22 @@ export {
     type ResponseCookieOptions,
 } from "../../server/src/request-context.js";
 
+export {
+    createCsrfToken,
+    destroyCsrfToken,
+    isSafeHttpMethod,
+    isSameOriginRequest,
+    requireCsrfRequest,
+    requireSameOriginRequest,
+    verifyCsrfRequest,
+    verifyCsrfToken,
+    RequestSecurityError,
+
+    type CsrfTokenOptions,
+    type SameOriginOptions,
+    type VerifyCsrfRequestOptions,
+} from "../../server/src/request-security.js";
+
 export {
     attachRequestId,
     createLogger,