@checkstack/backend-api 0.19.0 → 0.21.0

package/src/script-sandbox/wrapper.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,1194 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "bun:test";
+import type { SandboxCapabilities } from "./capabilities";
+import { DEFAULT_SANDBOX_PROFILE, sandboxPolicySchema } from "./policy";
+import { SandboxUnavailableError } from "./report";
+import { buildSpawnHardening } from "./wrapper";
+
+const baseEnv = { PATH: "/usr/bin", HOME: "/home/u" };
+
+const LINUX_ROOT: SandboxCapabilities = {
+  platform: "linux",
+  euidIsRoot: true,
+  hasPrlimit: true,
+  rlimitNative: true,
+  wrapper: null,
+  userNamespaces: true,
+  userNsCreatable: true,
+  netNamespaces: false,
+  netEgressIface: null,
+  netEgressAddressing: null,
+  netEgressRootless: false,
+};
+
+const LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP: SandboxCapabilities = {
+  platform: "linux",
+  euidIsRoot: false,
+  hasPrlimit: true,
+  rlimitNative: true,
+  wrapper: "bwrap",
+  userNamespaces: true,
+  userNsCreatable: true,
+  netNamespaces: true,
+  netEgressIface: null, // bwrap cannot plumb egress (macvlan); rootless tested separately
+  netEgressAddressing: null,
+  netEgressRootless: false,
+};
+
+const LINUX_NONROOT_NSJAIL: SandboxCapabilities = {
+  ...LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+  wrapper: "nsjail",
+};
+
+// Root host WITH a bwrap wrapper + user namespaces: the wrapper can carry the
+// `--uid` privilege drop (the only path that actually drops, since Bun.spawn
+// ignores uid/gid). This is the container model the shipped images target.
+const LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP_ROOT: SandboxCapabilities = {
+  ...LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+  euidIsRoot: true,
+};
+
+// nsjail host that CAN plumb real egress (root + uplink + static addressing) —
+// required for a functional allowlist / metadata block.
+const LINUX_ROOT_NSJAIL_PLUMBED: SandboxCapabilities = {
+  ...LINUX_NONROOT_NSJAIL,
+  euidIsRoot: true,
+  netEgressIface: "eth0",
+  netEgressAddressing: {
+    ip: "10.0.0.2",
+    netmask: "255.255.255.0",
+    gateway: "10.0.0.1",
+  },
+};
+
+// bwrap host with the ROOTLESS slirp4netns egress path (no privileged macvlan):
+// the common rootless-container case. allowlist + metadata block are deliverable
+// here via the launcher, without root / uplink / operator addressing.
+const LINUX_BWRAP_ROOTLESS: SandboxCapabilities = {
+  ...LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+  netEgressRootless: true,
+};
+
+const MACOS_NONE: SandboxCapabilities = {
+  platform: "darwin",
+  euidIsRoot: false,
+  hasPrlimit: false,
+  rlimitNative: false,
+  wrapper: null,
+  userNamespaces: false,
+  userNsCreatable: false,
+  netNamespaces: false,
+  netEgressIface: null,
+  netEgressAddressing: null,
+  netEgressRootless: false,
+};
+
+describe("buildSpawnHardening — disabled sandbox", () => {
+  it("behaves like the prior merge with no denylist / caps / uid", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({ enabled: false });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_ROOT,
+      baseEnv,
+      envOverrides: { LD_PRELOAD: "/x.so", FOO: "bar" },
+    });
+    expect(h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"])).toEqual(["sh", "-c", "x"]);
+    expect(h.env.LD_PRELOAD).toBe("/x.so"); // NOT dropped when disabled
+    expect(h.env.FOO).toBe("bar");
+    expect(h.uid).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(h.maxOutputBytes).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(h.droppedEnvKeys).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("buildSpawnHardening — resources on a capable Linux root host", () => {
+  // A genuinely capable scenario for the RESOURCE + PRIVILEGE layers. The
+  // privilege drop is performed by the WRAPPER (bwrap `--uid`), not by
+  // Bun.spawn (which ignores uid/gid), so RLIMIT_NPROC — which is per-UID and
+  // only safe once the drop is in effect — requires a wrapper-capable host AND
+  // FS confinement so the wrapper is engaged. A scratch dir is supplied so the
+  // bwrap prelude is built.
+  const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+    policy: sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      ...DEFAULT_SANDBOX_PROFILE,
+      // Keep the network on the host so this stays a focused resource/privilege
+      // test (no egress-plumbing dependency).
+      network: { mode: "unrestricted", denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: false },
+      privilege: { mode: "drop-to-uid", uid: 1001, gid: 1001 },
+    }),
+    caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP_ROOT,
+    baseEnv,
+    envOverrides: {},
+    filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-res" },
+  });
+
+  it("prepends an FS wrapper + prlimit prelude carrying the uid drop", () => {
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "echo hi"]);
+    expect(wrapped[0]).toBe("bwrap");
+    // The wrapper carries the privilege drop (the path that actually drops).
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--uid");
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("1001");
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--gid");
+    // prlimit applies INSIDE the wrapper, with all caps including nproc (safe
+    // now that the drop is genuinely in effect).
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("prlimit");
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--cpu=60");
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--nofile=1024");
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--nproc=256");
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--fsize=268435456");
+    // Memory is NOT capped via `--as` (RLIMIT_AS breaks the interpreter); it is
+    // the JS heap cap + the cgroup limit instead.
+    expect(wrapped.some((a) => a.startsWith("--as="))).toBe(false);
+    expect(wrapped.slice(-3)).toEqual(["sh", "-c", "echo hi"]);
+  });
+
+  it("marks resources + privilege enforced and surfaces maxOutputBytes + heap cap", () => {
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.resources).toBe(true);
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.privilege).toBe(true);
+    expect(h.maxOutputBytes).toBe(5 * 1024 * 1024);
+    // Memory enforced via the JS heap cap, not RLIMIT_AS.
+    expect(h.nodeMemoryFlagEnv?.NODE_OPTIONS).toContain("--max-old-space-size=512");
+  });
+
+  it("drops privilege to the configured uid via the wrapper when euid is root + uid set", () => {
+    const withUid = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy: sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+        filesystem: { mode: "scratch-only" },
+        privilege: { mode: "drop-to-uid", uid: 1001, gid: 1001 },
+      }),
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP_ROOT,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-res2" },
+    });
+    // `h.uid`/`gid` are set for OBSERVABILITY (the wrapper carries the real
+    // `--uid` drop); the runner never passes them to Bun.spawn.
+    expect(withUid.uid).toBe(1001);
+    expect(withUid.gid).toBe(1001);
+    expect(withUid.effective.enforced.privilege).toBe(true);
+    expect(withUid.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"])).toContain("--uid");
+  });
+
+  it("does NOT enforce privilege (and surfaces it) when no wrapper engages", () => {
+    // FS off + host net = no wrapper. Bun.spawn's uid is a silent no-op, so the
+    // drop cannot happen; the layer must report not-enforced + a downgrade
+    // rather than a false positive.
+    const noWrap = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy: sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+        onUnavailable: "degrade",
+        filesystem: { mode: "off" },
+        network: { mode: "unrestricted", denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: false },
+        privilege: { mode: "drop-to-uid", uid: 1001, gid: 1001 },
+      }),
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP_ROOT,
+      baseEnv,
+    });
+    expect(noWrap.effective.enforced.privilege).toBe(false);
+    const reasons = noWrap.effective.downgrades
+      .filter((d) => d.layer === "privilege")
+      .map((d) => d.reason);
+    expect(reasons.some((r) => r.includes("namespace wrapper"))).toBe(true);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("buildSpawnHardening — degraded macOS host (onUnavailable: degrade)", () => {
+  // The shipped DEFAULT_SANDBOX_PROFILE is now fail-closed, so to exercise the
+  // degrade path on a capability-less host we explicitly use the opt-in
+  // `degrade` variant (the operator's documented escape hatch for weak hosts).
+  const DEGRADE_DEFAULT = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+    ...DEFAULT_SANDBOX_PROFILE,
+    onUnavailable: "degrade",
+  });
+  const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+    policy: DEGRADE_DEFAULT,
+    caps: MACOS_NONE,
+    baseEnv,
+    envOverrides: {},
+  });
+
+  it("does NOT hard-break: still returns a hardening result", () => {
+    expect(h).toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  it("does not add a prlimit prelude (no rlimit capability)", () => {
+    expect(h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"])).toEqual(["sh", "-c", "x"]);
+  });
+
+  it("surfaces the resource downgrade; privilege is enforced by non-root inheritance", () => {
+    const layers = h.effective.downgrades.map((d) => d.layer);
+    expect(layers).toContain("resources");
+    // Privilege is NOT a downgrade here: MACOS_NONE has a NON-root supervisor
+    // (euidIsRoot:false), so the child inherits non-root and cannot be
+    // host-root - enforced by construction even with no wrapper.
+    expect(layers).not.toContain("privilege");
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.resources).toBe(false);
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.privilege).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("still enforces the portable subset: output cap + ESM memory fallback", () => {
+    expect(h.maxOutputBytes).toBe(5 * 1024 * 1024);
+    expect(h.nodeMemoryFlagEnv?.NODE_OPTIONS).toContain("--max-old-space-size=");
+  });
+
+  it("still applies the env denylist (portable, every platform)", () => {
+    const denied = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy: DEGRADE_DEFAULT,
+      caps: MACOS_NONE,
+      baseEnv,
+      envOverrides: { LD_PRELOAD: "/x.so" },
+    });
+    expect(denied.env.LD_PRELOAD).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(denied.droppedEnvKeys).toContain("LD_PRELOAD");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("buildSpawnHardening — RLIMIT_NPROC fork-bomb cap (Item 1: per-run containment)", () => {
+  it("omits --nproc and surfaces a downgrade when no wrapper namespace engages (root, inherit)", () => {
+    // Root supervisor, no wrapper-capable host (wrapper:null) => no user
+    // namespace to isolate the count, and the child stays host-root: the cap
+    // would throttle the host uid, so it is omitted and surfaced.
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      resources: { maxProcesses: 256, cpuSeconds: 10 },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({ policy, caps: LINUX_ROOT, baseEnv });
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"]);
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--cpu=10");
+    expect(wrapped.some((a) => a.startsWith("--nproc="))).toBe(false);
+    const resourceDowngrade = h.effective.downgrades.find(
+      (d) => d.layer === "resources",
+    );
+    expect(resourceDowngrade?.reason).toContain("RLIMIT_NPROC");
+  });
+
+  it("APPLIES --nproc under a NON-ROOT supervisor when the bwrap wrapper engages (the shipped model)", () => {
+    // The core fix: rootless `bwrap --unshare-all` creates a fresh USER
+    // namespace, so the per-(uid, userns) RLIMIT_NPROC isolates THIS run's
+    // process count even though the child shares the supervisor's uid 65532.
+    // No privilege drop, no root: the fork-bomb cap is genuinely per-run here.
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      resources: { maxProcesses: 128 },
+      filesystem: { mode: "scratch-plus-ro" },
+      privilege: { mode: "drop-to-uid" }, // satisfied by inheritance (non-root)
+      network: { mode: "unrestricted", denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: false },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-fb" },
+    });
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"]);
+    // bwrap wrapper engaged (its own user + PID namespace) -> nproc applied.
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("bwrap");
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--unshare-all");
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--nproc=128");
+    // No spawn-level uid/gid (inheritance, not a wrapper --uid drop).
+    expect(h.uid).toBeUndefined();
+    // Privilege enforced by inheritance; resources enforced; NO nproc note.
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.privilege).toBe(true);
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.resources).toBe(true);
+    expect(
+      h.effective.notes.some((n) => n.note.includes("RLIMIT_NPROC")),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("omits --nproc + emits a NON-FATAL note when no wrapper engages (non-root, FS off, host net)", () => {
+    // The corner case: non-root supervisor but FS off AND host net => no
+    // wrapper user namespace, so the child shares the supervisor's uid+userns
+    // and a per-uid cap would throttle the supervisor. Omitted, surfaced as a
+    // note (never a downgrade, so fail-closed still runs), never applied unsafely.
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      resources: { maxProcesses: 256, cpuSeconds: 10 },
+      filesystem: { mode: "off" },
+      network: { mode: "unrestricted", denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: false },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({ policy, caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP, baseEnv });
+    expect(
+      h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"]).some((a) => a.startsWith("--nproc=")),
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      h.effective.notes.some((n) => n.note.includes("RLIMIT_NPROC")),
+    ).toBe(true);
+    // It is a NOTE, not a downgrade (must not trip onUnavailable: fail).
+    expect(
+      h.effective.downgrades.some((d) => d.layer === "resources"),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("emits --nproc when the privilege drop actually takes effect (wrapper carries --uid)", () => {
+    // The drop is performed by the wrapper, so it needs a wrapper-capable root
+    // host + FS confinement to engage. Only then is RLIMIT_NPROC safe.
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      resources: { maxProcesses: 256 },
+      filesystem: { mode: "scratch-only" },
+      privilege: { mode: "drop-to-uid", uid: 1001, gid: 1001 },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP_ROOT,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-nproc" },
+    });
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"]);
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--nproc=256");
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--uid");
+    // `h.uid` is set for observability; the wrapper carries the real drop.
+    expect(h.uid).toBe(1001);
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.privilege).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("omits --nproc when drop-to-uid was requested but euid is not root", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      resources: { maxProcesses: 256, cpuSeconds: 10 },
+      privilege: { mode: "drop-to-uid", uid: 1001 },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({ policy, caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP, baseEnv });
+    expect(h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"]).some((a) => a.startsWith("--nproc="))).toBe(
+      false,
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe("buildSpawnHardening — filesystem layer (Phase 2)", () => {
+  it("wraps the command in a bwrap prelude when FS isolation is enforceable", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      filesystem: { mode: "scratch-plus-ro" },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: {
+        scratchDir: "/tmp/run-a",
+        nodeModulesDir: "/store/current/node_modules",
+      },
+    });
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd([process.execPath, "runner.mjs"]);
+    expect(wrapped[0]).toBe("bwrap");
+    // The real command is still at the tail.
+    expect(wrapped.slice(-2)).toEqual([process.execPath, "runner.mjs"]);
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.filesystem).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("composes the FS wrapper OUTSIDE the prlimit prelude", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      filesystem: { mode: "scratch-only" },
+      resources: { cpuSeconds: 30 },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-b" },
+    });
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"]);
+    const bwrapIdx = wrapped.indexOf("bwrap");
+    const prlimitIdx = wrapped.indexOf("prlimit");
+    expect(bwrapIdx).toBe(0);
+    expect(prlimitIdx).toBeGreaterThan(bwrapIdx);
+  });
+
+  it("degrades FS to off + surfaces it on a no-wrapper host", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      filesystem: { mode: "scratch-only" },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_ROOT, // wrapper: null
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-c" },
+    });
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.filesystem).toBe(false);
+    expect(h.effective.downgrades.map((d) => d.layer)).toContain("filesystem");
+    // No bwrap/nsjail in the wrapped argv when degraded.
+    expect(h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"])).not.toContain("bwrap");
+  });
+
+  it("degrades FS when the runner provides no scratch dir (e.g. shell runner)", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      filesystem: { mode: "scratch-only" },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+      baseEnv,
+      // no filesystem inputs
+    });
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.filesystem).toBe(false);
+    const fsDowngrade = h.effective.downgrades.find(
+      (d) => d.layer === "filesystem",
+    );
+    expect(fsDowngrade?.reason).toContain("scratch dir");
+  });
+
+  it("fail-closed: FS unenforceable + onUnavailable:fail throws before spawn", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      onUnavailable: "fail",
+      filesystem: { mode: "scratch-only" },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+      network: { denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: false },
+    });
+    expect(() =>
+      buildSpawnHardening({
+        policy,
+        caps: LINUX_ROOT, // no wrapper
+        baseEnv,
+        filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-d" },
+      }),
+    ).toThrow(SandboxUnavailableError);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("buildSpawnHardening — filesystem interpreter bind (P2 fix)", () => {
+  it("ro-binds the interpreter when it lives outside the base paths", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      filesystem: { mode: "scratch-only" },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+      network: { denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: false },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: {
+        scratchDir: "/tmp/run-i",
+        interpreterPath: "/home/u/.bun/bin/bun",
+      },
+      // pathExists/realpath are real here; assert via wrapping the prelude.
+    });
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd(["/home/u/.bun/bin/bun", "runner.mjs"]).join(" ");
+    // Bind only emitted when the interpreter exists on disk; this is a unit
+    // host where it likely does not, so we assert the COMPOSITION shape instead
+    // in the dedicated filesystem.test. Here we at least confirm no crash and a
+    // bwrap prelude.
+    expect(wrapped.startsWith("bwrap")).toBe(true);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("buildSpawnHardening — TMPDIR override under FS confinement (P2 fix)", () => {
+  it("pins TMPDIR=/tmp when the FS wrapper is enforced", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      filesystem: { mode: "scratch-only" },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+      network: { denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: false },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+      baseEnv: { ...baseEnv, TMPDIR: "/host/tmp" },
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-t" },
+    });
+    expect(h.env.TMPDIR).toBe("/tmp");
+  });
+
+  it("does NOT override TMPDIR when FS confinement is off", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      filesystem: { mode: "off" },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+      network: { denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: false },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+      baseEnv: { ...baseEnv, TMPDIR: "/host/tmp" },
+    });
+    expect(h.env.TMPDIR).toBe("/host/tmp");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("buildSpawnHardening — network egress (Phase 3)", () => {
+  it("deny: composes a fresh net namespace into the FS wrapper (bwrap)", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      filesystem: { mode: "scratch-only" },
+      network: { mode: "deny" },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-n1" },
+    });
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"]);
+    // ONE wrapper invocation, taking a fresh net namespace (no --share-net).
+    expect(wrapped[0]).toBe("bwrap");
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--unshare-net");
+    expect(wrapped).not.toContain("--share-net");
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(true);
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.filesystem).toBe(true);
+    expect(h.nftRuleset).toBeUndefined(); // deny needs no ruleset
+  });
+
+  it("FS stays on host net when network is unrestricted + block disabled", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      filesystem: { mode: "scratch-only" },
+      network: { mode: "unrestricted", denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: false },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-n2" },
+    });
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"]);
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--share-net");
+    expect(wrapped).not.toContain("--unshare-net");
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("allowlist: plumbs macvlan egress + nft ruleset on a plumbed nsjail host", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      filesystem: { mode: "scratch-plus-ro" },
+      network: { mode: "allowlist", allow: ["10.0.0.0/8"] },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_ROOT_NSJAIL_PLUMBED,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-n3" },
+      nftRulesetPath: "/tmp/run-n3/egress.nft",
+    });
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd([process.execPath, "runner.mjs"]);
+    expect(wrapped[0]).toBe("nsjail");
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--clone_newnet");
+    // Real uplink plumbed in → allowed CIDR reachable (not a blackhole).
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--macvlan_iface");
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("eth0");
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--nftables_file");
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("/tmp/run-n3/egress.nft");
+    expect(h.nftRuleset).toContain("10.0.0.0/8");
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("allowlist degrades (surfaced, NOT blackhole) on an nsjail host without plumbing", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      filesystem: { mode: "off" },
+      network: { mode: "allowlist", allow: ["10.0.0.0/8"] },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_NSJAIL, // nsjail but euid not root / no iface
+      baseEnv,
+    });
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(false);
+    expect(h.effective.downgrades.map((d) => d.layer)).toContain("network");
+    // Degrade-to-host-net: NO routeless namespace engaged.
+    expect(h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"])).not.toContain("--clone_newnet");
+  });
+
+  it("allowlist degrades on bwrap (no plumbing), surfaced", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      filesystem: { mode: "off" },
+      network: { mode: "allowlist", allow: ["10.0.0.0/8"] },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+      baseEnv,
+    });
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(false);
+    expect(h.effective.downgrades.map((d) => d.layer)).toContain("network");
+    expect(h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"])).not.toContain("--unshare-net");
+  });
+
+  it("allowlist: ROOTLESS path builds a launcher prelude + nft filter, enforced.network truthful", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      filesystem: { mode: "scratch-plus-ro" },
+      network: { mode: "allowlist", allow: ["10.0.0.0/8"] },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_BWRAP_ROOTLESS,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-rl1" },
+      nftRulesetPath: "/tmp/run-rl1/egress.nft",
+      rootlessLauncherPath: "/tmp/run-rl1/rootless-egress.sh",
+    });
+    // The prelude is the staged launcher script (slirp4netns + fail-closed nft).
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd([process.execPath, "runner.mjs"]);
+    expect(wrapped[0]).toBe("sh");
+    expect(wrapped[1]).toBe("/tmp/run-rl1/rootless-egress.sh");
+    // The real command is appended as the launcher's positional args.
+    expect(wrapped).toContain(process.execPath);
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("runner.mjs");
+    // The launcher script + nft ruleset are produced for the runner to stage.
+    expect(h.rootlessLauncher).toBeDefined();
+    expect(h.rootlessLauncher).toContain("slirp4netns --configure");
+    expect(h.rootlessLauncher).toContain("--unshare-net"); // bwrap takes a fresh netns
+    expect(h.nftRuleset).toContain("10.0.0.0/8");
+    expect(h.nftRuleset).toContain("169.254.0.0/16"); // metadata still blocked
+    // enforced.network is TRUE only because the filter is loaded fail-closed
+    // inside a plumbed (slirp4netns) namespace — real, filtered egress.
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(true);
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.filesystem).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("ROOTLESS path threads the prlimit prelude AFTER the launcher, BEFORE the command", () => {
+    // A rootless bwrap host that is ALSO euid-root (so the uid drop takes
+    // effect, enabling RLIMIT_NPROC) with full rlimit caps. The launcher path
+    // must come first; the prlimit prelude + real command are appended as the
+    // launcher's positional args, so prlimit runs INSIDE the namespace (via the
+    // inner `exec "$@"`) and caps the real command — not the launcher itself.
+    const rootlessRoot: SandboxCapabilities = {
+      ...LINUX_BWRAP_ROOTLESS,
+      euidIsRoot: true,
+    };
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      ...DEFAULT_SANDBOX_PROFILE,
+      filesystem: { mode: "scratch-plus-ro" },
+      network: { mode: "allowlist", allow: ["10.0.0.0/8"] },
+      privilege: { mode: "drop-to-uid", uid: 1001, gid: 1001 },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: rootlessRoot,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-rl4" },
+      nftRulesetPath: "/tmp/run-rl4/egress.nft",
+      rootlessLauncherPath: "/tmp/run-rl4/rootless-egress.sh",
+    });
+    // The uid drop took effect (precondition for --nproc) and resources/network
+    // are both enforced. `h.uid` is set for observability (the wrapper carries
+    // the real `--uid` drop; the runner never passes it to Bun.spawn).
+    expect(h.uid).toBe(1001);
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.resources).toBe(true);
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(true);
+
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd([process.execPath, "runner.mjs"]);
+    // Launcher first.
+    expect(wrapped[0]).toBe("sh");
+    expect(wrapped[1]).toBe("/tmp/run-rl4/rootless-egress.sh");
+    // The prlimit prelude is threaded as the launcher's positional args, AFTER
+    // the launcher path, terminated by `--`, then the real command.
+    const prlimitIdx = wrapped.indexOf("prlimit");
+    const sepIdx = wrapped.indexOf("--", prlimitIdx);
+    const cmdIdx = wrapped.indexOf(process.execPath);
+    expect(prlimitIdx).toBeGreaterThan(1); // after `sh <launcher>`
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--cpu=60");
+    expect(wrapped.some((a) => a.startsWith("--as="))).toBe(false); // no RLIMIT_AS
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--nproc=256"); // emitted because the uid dropped
+    // Ordering: launcher path < prlimit < `--` < real command.
+    expect(prlimitIdx).toBeLessThan(sepIdx);
+    expect(sepIdx).toBeLessThan(cmdIdx);
+    // The launcher itself is NOT wrapped by prlimit (it precedes the prelude).
+    expect(wrapped.indexOf("/tmp/run-rl4/rootless-egress.sh")).toBeLessThan(
+      prlimitIdx,
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("ROOTLESS path degrades (surfaced) when the runner cannot stage a launcher", () => {
+    // No rootlessLauncherPath provided → cannot orchestrate slirp4netns → must
+    // degrade to host net, NOT take a routeless namespace (blackhole).
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      filesystem: { mode: "off" },
+      network: { mode: "allowlist", allow: ["10.0.0.0/8"] },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_BWRAP_ROOTLESS,
+      baseEnv,
+      nftRulesetPath: "/tmp/run-rl2/egress.nft",
+      // rootlessLauncherPath intentionally omitted.
+    });
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(false);
+    expect(h.effective.downgrades.map((d) => d.layer)).toContain("network");
+    expect(h.rootlessLauncher).toBeUndefined();
+    // Degrade-to-host-net: the cmd runs as-is (no launcher prelude, no netns).
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"]);
+    expect(wrapped).toEqual(["sh", "-c", "x"]);
+    expect(wrapped).not.toContain("/tmp/run-rl2/rootless-egress.sh");
+    expect(wrapped).not.toContain("--unshare-net");
+  });
+
+  it("a NON-EMPTY allowlist enforces egress via the ROOTLESS path", () => {
+    // A non-empty allowlist genuinely needs plumbed+filtered egress; on a
+    // rootless bwrap host it engages the slirp4netns launcher so the nft filter
+    // is installed in a real namespace - enforced.network truthful, never a
+    // blackhole. (The EMPTY-allowlist secure default takes the simpler routeless
+    // deny path; see the dedicated test below.)
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy: sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+        ...DEFAULT_SANDBOX_PROFILE,
+        onUnavailable: "degrade",
+        network: { mode: "allowlist", allow: ["10.0.0.0/8"] },
+      }),
+      caps: LINUX_BWRAP_ROOTLESS,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-rl3" },
+      nftRulesetPath: "/tmp/run-rl3/egress.nft",
+      rootlessLauncherPath: "/tmp/run-rl3/rootless-egress.sh",
+    });
+    expect(h.rootlessLauncher).toBeDefined();
+    expect(h.nftRuleset).toContain("169.254.0.0/16");
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("EMPTY-allowlist secure default resolves to the routeless DENY netns (works without plumbing)", () => {
+    // The shipped secure default is `allowlist` with an EMPTY allow list =
+    // deny ALL egress. That is semantically `deny`, so it takes the routeless
+    // namespace path: NO slirp4netns/macvlan plumbing and NO nftables ruleset
+    // are needed, so it enforces on ANY netns-capable host (incl. rootless
+    // containers where in-namespace nft is not permitted). A routeless netns
+    // also inherently blocks metadata (nothing routes).
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy: sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+        ...DEFAULT_SANDBOX_PROFILE,
+        privilege: { mode: "drop-to-uid", uid: 1001, gid: 1001 },
+      }),
+      caps: LINUX_ROOT_NSJAIL_PLUMBED,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-id1" },
+      nftRulesetPath: "/tmp/run-id1/egress.nft",
+    });
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd([process.execPath, "runner.mjs"]);
+    // Routeless deny netns: NO macvlan uplink, NO egress filter file.
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--clone_newnet");
+    expect(wrapped).not.toContain("--macvlan_iface");
+    expect(wrapped).not.toContain("--nftables_file");
+    expect(h.nftRuleset).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(true);
+    expect(h.effective.downgrades.map((d) => d.layer)).not.toContain("network");
+  });
+
+  it("a NON-EMPTY allowlist enforces via the macvlan uplink on a plumbed nsjail host", () => {
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy: sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+        ...DEFAULT_SANDBOX_PROFILE,
+        network: { mode: "allowlist", allow: ["203.0.113.0/24"] },
+        privilege: { mode: "drop-to-uid", uid: 1001, gid: 1001 },
+      }),
+      caps: LINUX_ROOT_NSJAIL_PLUMBED,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-id1b" },
+      nftRulesetPath: "/tmp/run-id1b/egress.nft",
+    });
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd([process.execPath, "runner.mjs"]);
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--macvlan_iface");
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--nftables_file");
+    expect(h.nftRuleset).toContain("169.254.0.0/16");
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("a NON-EMPTY allowlist does NOT blackhole on an nsjail host without plumbing (host net, surfaced)", () => {
+    // BLOCKER guard: a genuine (non-empty) allowlist on a host that cannot plumb
+    // egress must keep HOST net (no routeless netns that would blackhole the
+    // allowed destinations), surface the gap, and report enforced.network=false.
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy: sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+        ...DEFAULT_SANDBOX_PROFILE,
+        onUnavailable: "degrade",
+        network: { mode: "allowlist", allow: ["10.0.0.0/8"] },
+      }),
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_NSJAIL,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-id2" },
+    });
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd([process.execPath, "runner.mjs"]);
+    expect(wrapped).not.toContain("--clone_newnet"); // no severing namespace
+    expect(wrapped).not.toContain("--unshare-net");
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(false);
+    const nd = h.effective.downgrades.find((d) => d.layer === "network");
+    // The allowlist could not be plumbed; egress is left on host net rather
+    // than blackholed.
+    expect(nd?.reason).toContain("blackhole");
+    expect(h.nftRuleset).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it("network-only deny (no FS) still builds a wrapper keeping host FS visible", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      filesystem: { mode: "off" },
+      network: { mode: "deny" },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+      baseEnv,
+    });
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"]);
+    expect(wrapped[0]).toBe("bwrap");
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--unshare-net");
+    // No FS confinement → host FS bound in so `sh` still resolves.
+    expect(wrapped.join(" ")).toContain("--bind / /");
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("metadata block requested but unenforceable (bwrap) is surfaced, not pretended", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      filesystem: { mode: "off" },
+      network: { mode: "unrestricted", denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: true },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+      baseEnv,
+    });
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(false);
+    const nd = h.effective.downgrades.find((d) => d.layer === "network");
+    expect(nd?.reason).toContain("metadata");
+  });
+
+  it("network deny degrades on macOS and is surfaced", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      filesystem: { mode: "off" },
+      network: { mode: "deny" },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({ policy, caps: MACOS_NONE, baseEnv });
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(false);
+    expect(h.effective.downgrades.map((d) => d.layer)).toContain("network");
+    expect(h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"])).toEqual(["sh", "-c", "x"]);
+  });
+
+  it("fail-closed: network deny unenforceable + onUnavailable:fail throws", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      onUnavailable: "fail",
+      filesystem: { mode: "off" },
+      network: { mode: "deny" },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    expect(() =>
+      buildSpawnHardening({ policy, caps: MACOS_NONE, baseEnv }),
+    ).toThrow(SandboxUnavailableError);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("buildSpawnHardening — non-root supervisor privilege model", () => {
+  // The shipped images run the SUPERVISOR as non-root (uid 65532). The script
+  // inherits non-root from the supervisor by construction, so it can NEVER be
+  // host-root, regardless of whether a wrapper carries a `--uid` drop. A
+  // rootless `--uid` to a DIFFERENT id is impossible (no subuid/newuidmap) and
+  // not needed. So `enforced.privilege` must be TRUE on every non-root-euid
+  // path, and the wrapper must NOT carry a `--uid` flag.
+  const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+    filesystem: { mode: "scratch-plus-ro" },
+    network: { mode: "deny" },
+    privilege: { mode: "drop-to-uid", uid: 65532, gid: 65532 },
+  });
+
+  it("enforces privilege by inheritance when euid is non-root + wrapper engaged", () => {
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP, // euidIsRoot: false
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-nr1" },
+    });
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.privilege).toBe(true);
+    // No wrapper-level uid drop (rootless cannot map to a different id).
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"]);
+    expect(wrapped).not.toContain("--uid");
+    expect(wrapped).not.toContain("--gid");
+    // Spawn-level uid/gid are NOT carried (no-op + forward-compat hazard).
+    expect(h.uid).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(h.gid).toBeUndefined();
+    // No privilege downgrade surfaced (it IS enforced by inheritance).
+    expect(h.effective.downgrades.map((d) => d.layer)).not.toContain("privilege");
+  });
+
+  it("enforces privilege by inheritance when euid is non-root + NO wrapper", () => {
+    // FS off + host net = no wrapper. With a non-root supervisor the child STILL
+    // cannot be host-root (inheritance), so privilege is enforced and there is
+    // no spawn uid/gid and no downgrade.
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy: sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+        onUnavailable: "degrade",
+        filesystem: { mode: "off" },
+        network: { mode: "unrestricted", denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: false },
+        privilege: { mode: "drop-to-uid", uid: 65532, gid: 65532 },
+      }),
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+      baseEnv,
+    });
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.privilege).toBe(true);
+    expect(h.uid).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(h.gid).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(h.effective.downgrades.map((d) => d.layer)).not.toContain("privilege");
+  });
+
+  it("does NOT report privilege enforced when euid IS root and NO wrapper carries the drop", () => {
+    // Legacy root-supervisor path: a drop-to-uid with no wrapper engaged cannot
+    // drop (Bun.spawn uid/gid is a silent no-op), so the child WOULD run as
+    // host-root. Must NOT claim enforced; must surface a downgrade.
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy: sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+        onUnavailable: "degrade",
+        filesystem: { mode: "off" },
+        network: { mode: "unrestricted", denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: false },
+        privilege: { mode: "drop-to-uid", uid: 1001, gid: 1001 },
+      }),
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP_ROOT, // euidIsRoot: true
+      baseEnv,
+    });
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.privilege).toBe(false);
+    expect(h.effective.downgrades.map((d) => d.layer)).toContain("privilege");
+    // No spawn uid/gid even on the root path when no wrapper carries the drop:
+    // passing them is a no-op today and a forward-compat hazard (a future Bun
+    // honoring them would spawn bwrap itself as the dropped id, breaking userns).
+    expect(h.uid).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(h.gid).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it("root supervisor + wrapper still carries --uid drop and reports enforced", () => {
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy: sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+        filesystem: { mode: "scratch-only" },
+        privilege: { mode: "drop-to-uid", uid: 1001, gid: 1001 },
+      }),
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP_ROOT,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-root-drop" },
+    });
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.privilege).toBe(true);
+    const wrapped = h.wrapCmd(["sh", "-c", "x"]);
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("--uid");
+    expect(wrapped).toContain("1001");
+    // On the genuine root-wrapper drop path `h.uid` IS set, but for
+    // OBSERVABILITY only - the runners never pass it to Bun.spawn (verified in
+    // the runner tests). The wrapper's `--uid` is what actually drops.
+    expect(h.uid).toBe(1001);
+    expect(h.gid).toBe(1001);
+  });
+
+  it("fail-closed default works on a non-root rootless host (no unexpected downgrades)", () => {
+    // The KEY acceptance: under the shipped fail-default on a non-root rootless
+    // bwrap host, every applicable layer is enforced and the run is NOT refused.
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy: sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+        ...DEFAULT_SANDBOX_PROFILE, // onUnavailable: "fail"
+        privilege: { mode: "drop-to-uid", uid: 65532, gid: 65532 },
+      }),
+      caps: { ...LINUX_BWRAP_ROOTLESS, euidIsRoot: false },
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-faildef" },
+      nftRulesetPath: "/tmp/run-faildef/egress.nft",
+      rootlessLauncherPath: "/tmp/run-faildef/rootless-egress.sh",
+    });
+    // Empty allowlist => routeless deny netns (no plumbing needed).
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(true);
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.filesystem).toBe(true);
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.resources).toBe(true);
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.privilege).toBe(true);
+    expect(h.effective.downgrades).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("buildSpawnHardening — shell memory honesty (review MAJOR)", () => {
+  it("emits a non-fatal memory note (NOT a downgrade) when the node heap cap is not applied", () => {
+    // Shell runs do not consume NODE_OPTIONS=--max-old-space-size, so per-run
+    // memory is NOT enforced; the ceiling is the cgroup. This must be surfaced
+    // as a NOTE, never a downgrade, and must NOT fail-close.
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      ...DEFAULT_SANDBOX_PROFILE,
+      onUnavailable: "fail",
+      privilege: { mode: "drop-to-uid", uid: 65532, gid: 65532 },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: { ...LINUX_BWRAP_ROOTLESS, euidIsRoot: false },
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-shmem" },
+      appliesNodeMemoryCap: false, // shell runner
+    });
+    const memNote = h.effective.notes.find(
+      (n) => n.layer === "resources" && n.note.includes("memoryBytes"),
+    );
+    expect(memNote).toBeDefined();
+    expect(memNote?.note).toContain("cgroup");
+    // Memory must NOT appear as a downgrade (would fail-close + break all shell).
+    expect(
+      h.effective.downgrades.some(
+        (d) => d.layer === "resources" && d.reason.includes("memory"),
+      ),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("does NOT emit the shell memory note when the node heap cap IS applied (ESM)", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      ...DEFAULT_SANDBOX_PROFILE,
+      privilege: { mode: "drop-to-uid", uid: 65532, gid: 65532 },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: { ...LINUX_BWRAP_ROOTLESS, euidIsRoot: false },
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/run-esmmem" },
+      appliesNodeMemoryCap: true, // ESM runner
+    });
+    // No MEMORY note for ESM (the heap cap IS applied). An unrelated nproc note
+    // may exist under the non-root model; we assert specifically on memory.
+    expect(
+      h.effective.notes.find(
+        (n) => n.layer === "resources" && n.note.includes("memoryBytes"),
+      ),
+    ).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(h.nodeMemoryFlagEnv?.NODE_OPTIONS).toContain("--max-old-space-size=");
+  });
+
+  it("REGRESSION GUARD: shell memory is never reported as per-run enforced", () => {
+    // This test must FAIL if a future change ever makes the hardening builder
+    // imply a per-run memory guarantee for a runner that does not apply the heap
+    // cap (i.e. the shell runner, appliesNodeMemoryCap !== true). The honest
+    // representation is: a memory note is present whenever memoryBytes is set but
+    // the node heap cap is not applied.
+    for (const caps of [
+      LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+      LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP_ROOT,
+      MACOS_NONE,
+    ] as const) {
+      const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+        policy: sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+          onUnavailable: "degrade",
+          resources: { memoryBytes: 512 * 1024 * 1024 },
+          filesystem: { mode: "off" },
+          network: { mode: "unrestricted", denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: false },
+          privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+        }),
+        caps,
+        baseEnv,
+        // appliesNodeMemoryCap omitted => false => the shell-runner contract.
+      });
+      const memNote = h.effective.notes.find(
+        (n) => n.layer === "resources" && n.note.includes("memoryBytes"),
+      );
+      expect(memNote).toBeDefined();
+      // And memory is never surfaced as a fatal downgrade for shell.
+      expect(
+        h.effective.downgrades.some(
+          (d) => d.layer === "resources" && d.reason.includes("memory"),
+        ),
+      ).toBe(false);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("emits no memory note when no memory cap is requested", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      onUnavailable: "degrade",
+      resources: { maxOutputBytes: 1024 },
+      network: { mode: "unrestricted", denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: false },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+      baseEnv,
+      appliesNodeMemoryCap: false,
+    });
+    expect(h.effective.notes.find((n) => n.layer === "resources")).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});
+
+describe("buildSpawnHardening — onUnavailable: fail", () => {
+  it("throws SandboxUnavailableError before spawn on a degraded host", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      ...DEFAULT_SANDBOX_PROFILE,
+      onUnavailable: "fail",
+    });
+    expect(() =>
+      buildSpawnHardening({ policy, caps: MACOS_NONE, baseEnv }),
+    ).toThrow(SandboxUnavailableError);
+  });
+
+  it("does NOT throw when everything is enforceable", () => {
+    // A policy that only requests output truncation + inherit privilege is
+    // fully enforceable everywhere.
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      onUnavailable: "fail",
+      resources: { maxOutputBytes: 1024 },
+      network: { mode: "unrestricted", denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: false },
+    });
+    expect(() =>
+      buildSpawnHardening({ policy, caps: MACOS_NONE, baseEnv }),
+    ).not.toThrow();
+  });
+});
+
+describe("buildSpawnHardening — live netns probe verdict (Item 3)", () => {
+  // A bwrap host where the LIVE clone probe SUCCEEDED: netNamespaces +
+  // userNsCreatable are true, so a fresh-netns deny is genuinely deliverable.
+  const PROBE_TRUE: SandboxCapabilities = {
+    ...LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+    userNamespaces: true,
+    userNsCreatable: true,
+    netNamespaces: true,
+  };
+  // The SAME bwrap host, but the live clone(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) probe
+  // FAILED (e.g. default Docker seccomp blocks the clone even though a wrapper
+  // is on PATH). capabilities.ts derives netNamespaces=false + userNamespaces=
+  // false from the live probe, so the wrapper cannot create the namespace.
+  const PROBE_FALSE: SandboxCapabilities = {
+    ...LINUX_NONROOT_BWRAP,
+    userNamespaces: false,
+    userNsCreatable: false,
+    netNamespaces: false,
+    netEgressRootless: false,
+  };
+
+  it("probe true -> network deny enforced (no downgrade)", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      onUnavailable: "fail",
+      filesystem: { mode: "off" },
+      network: { mode: "deny", denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: true },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: PROBE_TRUE,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/scratch" },
+    });
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(true);
+    expect(
+      h.effective.downgrades.some((d) => d.layer === "network"),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("probe false -> network NOT enforced + downgrade (fail-closed refuses)", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      onUnavailable: "fail",
+      filesystem: { mode: "off" },
+      network: { mode: "deny", denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: true },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    // Under fail-closed the run is REFUSED rather than falsely reported
+    // enforced — the silent gap Item 3 closes (bwrap on PATH but the live clone
+    // is blocked, so a routeless namespace cannot be created at spawn).
+    expect(() =>
+      buildSpawnHardening({
+        policy,
+        caps: PROBE_FALSE,
+        baseEnv,
+        filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/scratch" },
+      }),
+    ).toThrow(SandboxUnavailableError);
+  });
+
+  it("probe false under degrade -> enforced.network false + surfaced downgrade", () => {
+    const policy = sandboxPolicySchema.parse({
+      onUnavailable: "degrade",
+      filesystem: { mode: "off" },
+      network: { mode: "deny", denyLinkLocalAndMetadata: true },
+      privilege: { mode: "inherit" },
+    });
+    const h = buildSpawnHardening({
+      policy,
+      caps: PROBE_FALSE,
+      baseEnv,
+      filesystem: { scratchDir: "/tmp/scratch" },
+    });
+    expect(h.effective.enforced.network).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      h.effective.downgrades.some((d) => d.layer === "network"),
+    ).toBe(true);
+  });
+});