@chain305/x-security 0.2.1 → 0.2.3

package/README.md

@@ -1,6 +1,24 @@
-# Writ CLI
+# x-security CLI
 
-Compile, validate, test, and report on `x-security` policies in OpenAPI specs — deterministic, no LLM calls, no API keys.
+Your API gateway and WAF already ship most of the security you need — auth, rate
+limits, request validation, ownership/BOLA rules. Most teams run them on
+defaults. `x-security` lets you write that policy **once**, as an extension of
+the OpenAPI spec you already have, and compile it to whichever gateway you run.
+
+- **No new DSL** — policy lives in your OpenAPI file, next to the route it protects.
+- **No vendor lock-in** — one spec compiles to Kong, Coraza, BunkerWeb, OpenAppSec, Envoy, or a firewall bundle. Switch gateways without rewriting a line of policy.
+- **No config drift** — the spec is the source of truth; it versions and diffs like code, and `validate` catches drift against a running gateway.
+
+Deterministic. No LLM calls, no API keys.
+
+## Install
+
+```
+npm i -g @chain305/x-security     # installs the `xsecurity` command
+xsecurity --help
+```
+
+Or run it without installing:
 
 ```
 npx @chain305/x-security --help

package/bin/xsecurity.mjs

@@ -25252,7 +25252,7 @@ var init_x_security_schema = __esm({
       $schema: "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
       $id: "https://usewaf.com/schemas/x-security/v0.8.json",
       title: "x-security",
-      description: "Vendor-neutral OpenAPI extension declaring per-endpoint API security policy. Writ compiles this into Kong, Coraza, BunkerWeb, OpenAppSec, Cloudflare, AWS API Gateway, and host-firewall configurations. v0.8 (deferred-residuals) adds: graphql.operations[] per-operation authz + cost (capKey graphql.operations.authz, API1/API5, OVERRIDE-ONLY everywhere \u2014 requires an operator-supplied GraphQL-aware processor; the coarse block limits get the distinct capKey graphql.staticLimits, API4); request.serializeBy + request.concurrencyLimit live-concurrency serialization (API6, PARTIAL at best \u2014 edge serialization only, NOT in-handler transaction atomicity); and request.dataAtRest ADVISORY-ONLY at-rest posture declaration (Writ-native SSEC-STORAGE, NOT gateway-enforced \u2014 compiles to nothing, drives an out-of-band scan finding). The unreachable residuals token-entropy and session-rotation get ZERO new fields (detect-and-flag / documented gateway non-goal). v0.7 (edge-enforceable-residuals) adds: injectionGuard sinks 'deserialization' (SSEC-INJECTION) and 'ai-prompt' (Writ-native SSEC-PROMPT); top-level audit logging policy (logging, Writ-native SSEC-AUDIT); response.forbidArrayRoot JSON-hijacking defense (API3); request.idempotencyKey replay/double-submit defense (API6); and capability wiring for the already-declared authentication.passwordPolicy / authentication.accountLockout enforcement (API2). v0.6 added: per-arg injection hardening (W19 request.schema.<f>.injectionGuard, attributed to the Writ-native SSEC-INJECTION category). v0.5 added: identity-flexibility (S-10 RuleRef namespaces: principal/session/header), outbound trust (S-11 outboundCalls), auth depth (S-12 mfa/lockout/passwordPolicy/tokenSources), error scrubbing (S-13), composite-ID semantics (S-14 identifier combinator), open-redirect (S-15 redirectAllowedDomains), session fixation (S-16 sessionRotateOnAuth), nonce replay (S-17 nonceCacheTtl), TLS floor (S-18 tls).",
+      description: "Vendor-neutral OpenAPI extension declaring per-endpoint API security policy. x-security compiles this into Kong, Coraza, BunkerWeb, OpenAppSec, Cloudflare, AWS API Gateway, and host-firewall configurations. v0.8 (deferred-residuals) adds: graphql.operations[] per-operation authz + cost (capKey graphql.operations.authz, API1/API5, OVERRIDE-ONLY everywhere \u2014 requires an operator-supplied GraphQL-aware processor; the coarse block limits get the distinct capKey graphql.staticLimits, API4); request.serializeBy + request.concurrencyLimit live-concurrency serialization (API6, PARTIAL at best \u2014 edge serialization only, NOT in-handler transaction atomicity); and request.dataAtRest ADVISORY-ONLY at-rest posture declaration (x-security-native SSEC-STORAGE, NOT gateway-enforced \u2014 compiles to nothing, drives an out-of-band scan finding). The unreachable residuals token-entropy and session-rotation get ZERO new fields (detect-and-flag / documented gateway non-goal). v0.7 (edge-enforceable-residuals) adds: injectionGuard sinks 'deserialization' (SSEC-INJECTION) and 'ai-prompt' (x-security-native SSEC-PROMPT); top-level audit logging policy (logging, x-security-native SSEC-AUDIT); response.forbidArrayRoot JSON-hijacking defense (API3); request.idempotencyKey replay/double-submit defense (API6); and capability wiring for the already-declared authentication.passwordPolicy / authentication.accountLockout enforcement (API2). v0.6 added: per-arg injection hardening (W19 request.schema.<f>.injectionGuard, attributed to the x-security-native SSEC-INJECTION category). v0.5 added: identity-flexibility (S-10 RuleRef namespaces: principal/session/header), outbound trust (S-11 outboundCalls), auth depth (S-12 mfa/lockout/passwordPolicy/tokenSources), error scrubbing (S-13), composite-ID semantics (S-14 identifier combinator), open-redirect (S-15 redirectAllowedDomains), session fixation (S-16 sessionRotateOnAuth), nonce replay (S-17 nonceCacheTtl), TLS floor (S-18 tls).",
       type: "object",
       additionalProperties: false,
       properties: {
@@ -25334,7 +25334,7 @@ var init_x_security_schema = __esm({
           pattern: "^API([1-9]|10):2023$"
         },
         SsecId: {
-          description: "Writ-native security category id for classes OWASP-API-2023 does not enumerate (Injection, LLM prompt-injection, audit logging, at-rest storage posture). Kept as a parallel pattern so the pure OWASP cells (^API([1-9]|10):2023$) cannot be overloaded or corrupted. v0.7 adds PROMPT (LLM prompt-injection) and AUDIT (audit logging) alongside INJECTION. v0.8 (deferred-residuals) adds STORAGE \u2014 an ADVISORY-ONLY at-rest posture class (encrypted/hashed/tokenized declaration). STORAGE is structurally unreachable by the gateway (it never sees the DB write); it NEVER compiles to enforcement and its capability is hard-pinned override-only/unsupported on every target. It exists only to document declared posture and drive an out-of-band scan finding.",
+          description: "x-security-native security category id for classes OWASP-API-2023 does not enumerate (Injection, LLM prompt-injection, audit logging, at-rest storage posture). Kept as a parallel pattern so the pure OWASP cells (^API([1-9]|10):2023$) cannot be overloaded or corrupted. v0.7 adds PROMPT (LLM prompt-injection) and AUDIT (audit logging) alongside INJECTION. v0.8 (deferred-residuals) adds STORAGE \u2014 an ADVISORY-ONLY at-rest posture class (encrypted/hashed/tokenized declaration). STORAGE is structurally unreachable by the gateway (it never sees the DB write); it NEVER compiles to enforcement and its capability is hard-pinned override-only/unsupported on every target. It exists only to document declared posture and drive an out-of-band scan finding.",
           type: "string",
           pattern: "^SSEC-(INJECTION|PROMPT|AUDIT|STORAGE)$"
         },
@@ -25797,7 +25797,7 @@ var init_x_security_schema = __esm({
               type: "boolean"
             },
             injectionGuard: {
-              description: "v0.6 W19 (v0.7 adds 'deserialization' + 'ai-prompt'): opt-in per-arg injection hardening. Declares which injection sink(s) this body/query field flows into so the ModSecurity-family targets (coraza, bunkerweb) emit a native operator on ARGS:<field>|ARGS:json.<field> (covers both query/form args and the JSON body): 'sql' \u2192 @detectSQLi, 'nosql' \u2192 $where/$ne/$gt/$regex operator-token denylist, 'os-command' \u2192 shell-metacharacter @rx denylist ([;&|`$(){}<>] / newline), 'xpath' \u2192 XPath-metacharacter denylist, 'ldap' \u2192 LDAP-special-char denylist, 'code-eval' \u2192 eval/exec-marker denylist, 'xss' \u2192 @detectXSS (native cross-site-scripting operator), 'deserialization' \u2192 unsafe-deserialization preamble denylist (node-serialize _$$ND_FUNC$$_, Java rO0 base64, PHP O:<n>:, python pickle \\x80 opcode framing), 'ai-prompt' \u2192 LLM prompt-injection heuristic denylist (jailbreak / system-prompt-leak / role-override markers). Per-arg and explicit \u2014 replaces the implicit string-type heuristic. 'sql'/'nosql'/'os-command'/'xpath'/'ldap'/'code-eval'/'xss'/'deserialization' are attributed to SSEC-INJECTION; 'ai-prompt' is attributed to the distinct Writ-native SSEC-PROMPT class (one synthetic id per threat class). Never an OWASP-API cell. Edge-enforceable on coraza/bunkerweb only; kong/envoy resolve unsupported.",
+              description: "v0.6 W19 (v0.7 adds 'deserialization' + 'ai-prompt'): opt-in per-arg injection hardening. Declares which injection sink(s) this body/query field flows into so the ModSecurity-family targets (coraza, bunkerweb) emit a native operator on ARGS:<field>|ARGS:json.<field> (covers both query/form args and the JSON body): 'sql' \u2192 @detectSQLi, 'nosql' \u2192 $where/$ne/$gt/$regex operator-token denylist, 'os-command' \u2192 shell-metacharacter @rx denylist ([;&|`$(){}<>] / newline), 'xpath' \u2192 XPath-metacharacter denylist, 'ldap' \u2192 LDAP-special-char denylist, 'code-eval' \u2192 eval/exec-marker denylist, 'xss' \u2192 @detectXSS (native cross-site-scripting operator), 'deserialization' \u2192 unsafe-deserialization preamble denylist (node-serialize _$$ND_FUNC$$_, Java rO0 base64, PHP O:<n>:, python pickle \\x80 opcode framing), 'ai-prompt' \u2192 LLM prompt-injection heuristic denylist (jailbreak / system-prompt-leak / role-override markers). Per-arg and explicit \u2014 replaces the implicit string-type heuristic. 'sql'/'nosql'/'os-command'/'xpath'/'ldap'/'code-eval'/'xss'/'deserialization' are attributed to SSEC-INJECTION; 'ai-prompt' is attributed to the distinct x-security-native SSEC-PROMPT class (one synthetic id per threat class). Never an OWASP-API cell. Edge-enforceable on coraza/bunkerweb only; kong/envoy resolve unsupported.",
               type: "array",
               minItems: 1,
               uniqueItems: true,
@@ -25878,7 +25878,7 @@ var init_x_security_schema = __esm({
           }
         },
         DataAtRest: {
-          description: "v0.8 (deferred-residuals, SSEC-STORAGE): ADVISORY-DECLARATION ONLY. Names body fields (e.g. password, pan, cvv, apiKey) and the asserted at-rest protection posture the app is SUPPOSED to apply. This field is NOT gateway-enforced and compiles to NOTHING enforcing \u2014 the gateway structurally never sees the DB write, so it cannot encrypt/hash/tokenize at rest. Its capability is HARD-PINNED to override-only/unsupported on EVERY target (never full, never partial). It exists ONLY to (1) document declared posture as a comment/annotation in the compiled output, and (2) drive an out-of-band Writ SCAN/agent finding under SSEC-STORAGE when the declared posture is absent or contradicted by detected plaintext storage. A finding, not a control.",
+          description: "v0.8 (deferred-residuals, SSEC-STORAGE): ADVISORY-DECLARATION ONLY. Names body fields (e.g. password, pan, cvv, apiKey) and the asserted at-rest protection posture the app is SUPPOSED to apply. This field is NOT gateway-enforced and compiles to NOTHING enforcing \u2014 the gateway structurally never sees the DB write, so it cannot encrypt/hash/tokenize at rest. Its capability is HARD-PINNED to override-only/unsupported on EVERY target (never full, never partial). It exists ONLY to (1) document declared posture as a comment/annotation in the compiled output, and (2) drive an out-of-band x-security SCAN/agent finding under SSEC-STORAGE when the declared posture is absent or contradicted by detected plaintext storage. A finding, not a control.",
           type: "object",
           required: ["fields", "protection"],
           additionalProperties: false,
@@ -25898,7 +25898,7 @@ var init_x_security_schema = __esm({
           }
         },
         Logging: {
-          description: "v0.7 (SSEC-AUDIT): declarative audit/access logging policy. The gateway IS the log point, so this compiles natively per target: coraza SecAuditLog/SecAuditLogParts + per-event tagged log actions, bunkerweb modsec audit config, kong http-log/file-log/tcp-log plugins, envoy access_log with a JSON format string. Writ-native (OWASP-API-2023 retired the dedicated logging class, so this is attributed to SSEC-AUDIT, never an API cell).",
+          description: "v0.7 (SSEC-AUDIT): declarative audit/access logging policy. The gateway IS the log point, so this compiles natively per target: coraza SecAuditLog/SecAuditLogParts + per-event tagged log actions, bunkerweb modsec audit config, kong http-log/file-log/tcp-log plugins, envoy access_log with a JSON format string. x-security-native (OWASP-API-2023 retired the dedicated logging class, so this is attributed to SSEC-AUDIT, never an API cell).",
           type: "object",
           required: ["events"],
           additionalProperties: false,
@@ -26129,7 +26129,7 @@ var init_x_security_schema = __esm({
           }
         },
         GraphqlOperation: {
-          description: "v0.8 (deferred-residuals): per-OPERATION GraphQL policy bound to a single named field/operation (e.g. systemDiagnostics, pastes, importPaste) that the one POST /graphql route funnels. authz reuses the Authorization rule grammar (rule-based jwt.sub==resource.owner for per-resolver BOLA \u2192 API1:2023; rbac for per-resolver BFLA \u2192 API5:2023). Per-operation maxDepth/maxComplexity/maxAliases override the block-level coarse limits (API4:2023). OVERRIDE-ONLY on every target: a gateway physically cannot evaluate per-resolver authz or per-operation cost without parsing the GraphQL query+variables out of the POST body and resolving the selection set \u2014 the SAME GraphQL-aware-processor gap as the response-schema ext_proc. Writ ships SCAFFOLDING (an ext_proc filter + a graphql-operations.json data file and/or a graphql-armor/Apollo-router config artifact); ENFORCEMENT DEPENDS ON the operator supplying the GraphQL-aware processor. Until they do, NOTHING here is enforced \u2014 therefore override-only, NOT full, NOT partial. The compiled artifact's enforcement status reads 'override-only' verbatim.",
+          description: "v0.8 (deferred-residuals): per-OPERATION GraphQL policy bound to a single named field/operation (e.g. systemDiagnostics, pastes, importPaste) that the one POST /graphql route funnels. authz reuses the Authorization rule grammar (rule-based jwt.sub==resource.owner for per-resolver BOLA \u2192 API1:2023; rbac for per-resolver BFLA \u2192 API5:2023). Per-operation maxDepth/maxComplexity/maxAliases override the block-level coarse limits (API4:2023). OVERRIDE-ONLY on every target: a gateway physically cannot evaluate per-resolver authz or per-operation cost without parsing the GraphQL query+variables out of the POST body and resolving the selection set \u2014 the SAME GraphQL-aware-processor gap as the response-schema ext_proc. x-security ships SCAFFOLDING (an ext_proc filter + a graphql-operations.json data file and/or a graphql-armor/Apollo-router config artifact); ENFORCEMENT DEPENDS ON the operator supplying the GraphQL-aware processor. Until they do, NOTHING here is enforced \u2014 therefore override-only, NOT full, NOT partial. The compiled artifact's enforcement status reads 'override-only' verbatim.",
           type: "object",
           required: ["name"],
           additionalProperties: false,
@@ -26145,7 +26145,7 @@ var init_x_security_schema = __esm({
               enum: ["query", "mutation", "subscription"]
             },
             authz: {
-              description: "Per-resolver authorization. Mirrors the top-level Authorization $def grammar (rbac / rule-based / abac). Presence attributes to API1:2023 (per-resolver BOLA) and API5:2023 (per-resolver BFLA). OVERRIDE-ONLY \u2014 requires an operator-supplied GraphQL-aware processor; Writ emits only the rule data + scaffolding, never an enforcing filter.",
+              description: "Per-resolver authorization. Mirrors the top-level Authorization $def grammar (rbac / rule-based / abac). Presence attributes to API1:2023 (per-resolver BOLA) and API5:2023 (per-resolver BFLA). OVERRIDE-ONLY \u2014 requires an operator-supplied GraphQL-aware processor; x-security emits only the rule data + scaffolding, never an enforcing filter.",
               $ref: "#/$defs/Authorization"
             },
             maxDepth: { type: "integer", minimum: 1, maximum: 50 },
@@ -26326,19 +26326,19 @@ var init_owasp_mapping = __esm({
         mitigatedBy: ["mtls", "request.schema.domainAllowlist", "request.signature", "request.allowedHosts"]
       },
       "SSEC-INJECTION": {
-        name: "Injection (Writ-native)",
+        name: "Injection (x-security-native)",
         mitigatedBy: ["request.schema.injectionGuard"]
       },
       "SSEC-PROMPT": {
-        name: "LLM Prompt Injection (Writ-native)",
+        name: "LLM Prompt Injection (x-security-native)",
         mitigatedBy: ["request.schema.injectionGuard"]
       },
       "SSEC-AUDIT": {
-        name: "Audit Logging (Writ-native)",
+        name: "Audit Logging (x-security-native)",
         mitigatedBy: ["logging"]
       },
       "SSEC-STORAGE": {
-        name: "At-Rest Storage Posture (Writ-native, advisory-only)",
+        name: "At-Rest Storage Posture (x-security-native, advisory-only)",
         mitigatedBy: ["request.dataAtRest"]
       }
     };
@@ -62903,7 +62903,7 @@ ${plan.yaml}`,
         endpoint: "(gateway)",
         rule: "load-coverage",
         verdict: "FAIL",
-        message: "Writ-emitted artifacts are not loaded by the gateway (lazy verify reported <90%). Aborting traffic phase \u2014 the results would be unattributable.",
+        message: "x-security-emitted artifacts are not loaded by the gateway (xsecurity verify reported <90%). Aborting traffic phase \u2014 the results would be unattributable.",
         durationMs: 0
       });
     } else {
@@ -63296,7 +63296,7 @@ var init_feasibility = __esm({
       ]
     };
     CAPKEY_DISCLAIMERS = {
-      "graphql.operations.authz": "override-only: per-operation GraphQL authz enforcement depends on an operator-supplied GraphQL-aware processor; Writ emits scaffolding only",
+      "graphql.operations.authz": "override-only: per-operation GraphQL authz enforcement depends on an operator-supplied GraphQL-aware processor; x-security emits scaffolding only",
       "graphql.staticLimits": "override-only: coarse GraphQL cost limits depend on an operator-supplied GraphQL-aware processor; a non-parsing crude limit is partial at best",
       "request.serializeBy": "edge serialization only \u2014 does NOT provide in-handler transaction atomicity",
       "request.dataAtRest": "advisory posture declaration \u2014 NOT gateway-enforced; drives an out-of-band SSEC-STORAGE scan finding"
@@ -64034,7 +64034,7 @@ async function checkEndpoint(input, fetcher = defaultFetcher) {
     const res = await fetcher(url, {
       headers: {
         Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}`,
-        "User-Agent": "@writ/cursor-mcp/0.1.0",
+        "User-Agent": "@x-security/cursor-mcp/0.1.0",
         Accept: "application/json"
       }
     });
@@ -64276,7 +64276,7 @@ async function runMcp() {
   const mod = await Promise.resolve().then(() => (init_dist5(), dist_exports));
   const main2 = mod.main ?? mod.default;
   if (typeof main2 !== "function") {
-    throw new Error("@writ/cursor-mcp did not export a main()/default function");
+    throw new Error("@x-security/cursor-mcp did not export a main()/default function");
   }
   await main2();
   return { exitCode: 0 };
@@ -67839,7 +67839,7 @@ function flaskMethods(tail) {
   return verbs.length > 0 ? verbs : ["GET"];
 }
 function stripPyComments(text) {
-  return text.split("\n").filter((line) => !line.trimStart().startsWith("#")).join("\n");
+  return text.split("\n").map((line) => line.trimStart().startsWith("#") ? "" : line).join("\n");
 }
 function lineAt(text, index) {
   let line = 1;
@@ -68970,7 +68970,7 @@ function lineAt8(text, index) {
   return line;
 }
 function stripPyComments4(text) {
-  return text.split("\n").filter((line) => !line.trimStart().startsWith("#")).join("\n");
+  return text.split("\n").map((line) => line.trimStart().startsWith("#") ? "" : line).join("\n");
 }
 async function parseGraphene(repoDir) {
   const routes = [];
@@ -69038,8 +69038,8 @@ function opBlockRe(type) {
   return new RegExp(`type\\s+${type}\\s*\\{([^}]*)\\}`, "g");
 }
 function stripJsComments(text) {
-  const noBlocks = text.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, "");
-  return noBlocks.split("\n").filter((line) => !line.trimStart().startsWith("//")).join("\n");
+  const noBlocks = text.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, (m3) => m3.replace(/[^\n]/g, " "));
+  return noBlocks.split("\n").map((line) => line.trimStart().startsWith("//") ? "" : line).join("\n");
 }
 function lineAt9(text, index) {
   let line = 1;
@@ -69150,15 +69150,19 @@ function lineAt10(text, index) {
 function stripComments2(text, lang) {
   let t = text;
   if (lang === "js") {
-    t = t.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, "");
+    t = t.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, (m3) => m3.replace(/[^\n]/g, " "));
   }
   const out = [];
   for (let line of t.split("\n")) {
     const s = line.trimStart();
-    if (lang === "js" && s.startsWith("//"))
+    if (lang === "js" && s.startsWith("//")) {
+      out.push("");
       continue;
-    if (lang === "py" && s.startsWith("#"))
+    }
+    if (lang === "py" && s.startsWith("#")) {
+      out.push("");
       continue;
+    }
     if (lang === "js") {
       line = line.replace(/(^|[^:'"])\/\/.*$/, "$1");
     }
@@ -73141,7 +73145,7 @@ var init_push = __esm({
     DEFAULT_API_URL2 = "https://usewaf.com";
     HOST_ALLOWLIST_SUFFIXES = [".chain305.com", ".lazy.chain305.com"];
     LOCAL_HOSTS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1"]);
-    USER_AGENT = "@writ/cli push";
+    USER_AGENT = "@x-security/cli push";
     REPO_URL_RE = /^https:\/\/github\.com\/[^/\s]+\/[^/\s]+(\.git)?$/i;
     PushError = class extends Error {
     };
@@ -73436,7 +73440,7 @@ var init_ci_gate = __esm({
       "#!/usr/bin/env bash",
       "# Fail CI if any emitted control lost its byte-matching citation (Rule D-3).",
       "set -euo pipefail",
-      'OUT="$(npx --yes @writ/cli audit .)"',
+      'OUT="$(npx --yes @x-security/cli audit .)"',
       'echo "$OUT"',
       `CITE_BACKED="$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | node -e 'let s="";process.stdin.on("data",d=>s+=d).on("end",()=>process.stdout.write(String(JSON.parse(s).citeBacked)))')"`,
       'if [ "$CITE_BACKED" != "true" ]; then',
@@ -75247,7 +75251,7 @@ Examples:
         process.exit(1);
       }
     });
-    program.command("mcp").description("Run the Writ Cursor MCP server (stdio JSON-RPC). For use in .cursor/mcp.json.").action(async () => {
+    program.command("mcp").description("Run the x-security Cursor MCP server (stdio JSON-RPC). For use in .cursor/mcp.json.").action(async () => {
       try {
         const r5 = await runMcp();
         process.exit(r5.exitCode);
@@ -75257,7 +75261,7 @@ Examples:
         process.exit(1);
       }
     });
-    program.command("verify-bundle <tarball>").description("Verify a signed Writ release bundle (sha256 file hashes + Ed25519 manifest signature).").option("--public-key <path>", "Path to an Ed25519 SPKI PEM public key. Defaults to the embedded release key.").action(async (tarball, opts) => {
+    program.command("verify-bundle <tarball>").description("Verify a signed x-security release bundle (sha256 file hashes + Ed25519 manifest signature).").option("--public-key <path>", "Path to an Ed25519 SPKI PEM public key. Defaults to the embedded release key.").action(async (tarball, opts) => {
       try {
         const verifyOpts = {};
         if (opts.publicKey !== void 0) verifyOpts.publicKeyPath = opts.publicKey;
@@ -75314,7 +75318,7 @@ Examples:
     });
     registerExtras(program);
     program.command("push <repoDir>").description(
-      "Upload the verified .writ/ policies to the Writ SaaS. Aborts if the local audit is not 100% cite-backed. Token from WRIT_API_TOKEN env only."
+      "Upload the verified .writ/ policies to the x-security SaaS. Aborts if the local audit is not 100% cite-backed. Token from WRIT_API_TOKEN env only."
     ).option("--dry-run", "Assemble + validate the payload and print a summary WITHOUT sending.").action(async (repoDir, opts) => {
       try {
         const pushOpts = {};

package/package.json

@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
 {
   "name": "@chain305/x-security",
-  "version": "0.2.1",
-  "description": "Writ CLI — generate/validate/test/report/diff/init against multiple gateway targets",
+  "version": "0.2.3",
+  "description": "x-security CLI — generate/validate/test/report/diff/init against multiple gateway targets",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "homepage": "https://usewaf.com",
   "repository": {
     "type": "git",
-    "url": "git+https://github.com/ZeeshanDarasa/specshield.git",
-    "directory": "packages/cli"
+    "url": "git+https://github.com/ZeeshanSultan/x-security.git"
   },
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {