@cello-protocol/protocol-types 0.0.15 → 0.0.17

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ export type { SessionAssignment, SessionAssignmentFrost, SessionAssignmentSingle
 export type { MlDsaKeyProvider, MlDsaVerifier, PseudonymBinding, Endorsement, Attestation, ConnectionPackage, EndorsementValidationStatus, AttestationValidationStatus, ValidatedEndorsement, ValidatedAttestation, PackageValidationResult, BuildPseudonymBindingResult, SignalCondition, SignalRequirement, ConnectionPolicy, DirectoryContext, } from "./connection-package.js";
 export { MAX_PSEUDONYM_LABEL_BYTES, ML_DSA_PUBKEY_BYTES, ML_DSA_SIGNATURE_BYTES, buildPseudonymBinding, verifyPseudonymBinding, verifyEndorsement, verifyAttestation, validateConnectionPackage, encodeConnectionPackage, decodeConnectionPackage, } from "./connection-package.js";
 export type { RegisterRequest, DkgComplete, DkgReady, RegisterSuccess, RegisterError, RegisterErrorReason, AgentProfile, RegistrationState, } from "./registration.js";
+export type { PrimaryTransferRequest, PrimaryTransferAck, PrimaryTransferError, } from "./primary-transfer.js";
+export { buildPrimaryTransferTbs, PRIMARY_TRANSFER_DOMAIN } from "./primary-transfer.js";
 export { buildAgentRevocationTbs, AGENT_REVOCATION_DOMAIN } from "./revocation.js";
 export type { RevokeAgentRequest, AgentRevocationAck, AgentRevocationError, AgentRevocationErrorReason, } from "./revocation.js";
 export type { ConnectionRequest, ConnectionRequestInbound, ConnectionResponse, ConnectionResponseVerdict, ConnectionEstablished, ConnectionRejected, ConnectionInsufficient, ConnectionRequestError, ConnectionRequestErrorReason, DisclosureRequest, DisclosureRequestItem, DisclosureRequestInbound, DisclosureResponse, DisclosureResponseInbound, ConnectionRecord, PendingConnectionRequest, ClientConnectionRecord, SessionRequestM3, SessionRequestM3ErrorReason, } from "./connection-request.js";

package/dist/index.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,YAAY,EACV,eAAe,EACf,iBAAiB,EACjB,aAAa,EACb,WAAW,EACX,aAAa,EACb,cAAc,EACd,gBAAgB,EAChB,iBAAiB,EACjB,mBAAmB,GACpB,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAEpB,OAAO,EACL,iBAAiB,EACjB,aAAa,EACb,iBAAiB,EACjB,mBAAmB,EACnB,gBAAgB,EAChB,eAAe,EACf,mBAAmB,EACnB,qBAAqB,EACrB,kBAAkB,EAClB,iBAAiB,GAClB,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAEvB,YAAY,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAC7F,OAAO,EACL,oBAAoB,EACpB,eAAe,EACf,gBAAgB,EAChB,wBAAwB,EACxB,yBAAyB,GAC1B,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAEzB,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AACjK,YAAY,EACV,iBAAiB,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,WAAW,EACnH,gBAAgB,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,YAAY,EAChI,eAAe,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,0BAA0B,GACvF,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAEtB,YAAY,EACV,gBAAgB,EAChB,aAAa,EACb,gBAAgB,EAChB,WAAW,EACX,WAAW,EACX,iBAAiB,EACjB,2BAA2B,EAC3B,2BAA2B,EAC3B,oBAAoB,EACpB,oBAAoB,EACpB,uBAAuB,EACvB,2BAA2B,EAC3B,eAAe,EACf,iBAAiB,EACjB,gBAAgB,EAChB,gBAAgB,GACjB,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AAEjC,OAAO,EACL,yBAAyB,EACzB,mBAAmB,EACnB,sBAAsB,EACtB,qBAAqB,EACrB,sBAAsB,EACtB,iBAAiB,EACjB,iBAAiB,EACjB,yBAAyB,EACzB,uBAAuB,EACvB,uBAAuB,GACxB,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AAGjC,YAAY,EACV,eAAe,EACf,WAAW,EACX,QAAQ,EACR,eAAe,EACf,aAAa,EACb,mBAAmB,EACnB,YAAY,EACZ,iBAAiB,GAClB,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAE3B,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AACnF,YAAY,EACV,kBAAkB,EAClB,kBAAkB,EAClB,oBAAoB,EACpB,0BAA0B,GAC3B,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAEzB,YAAY,EACV,iBAAiB,EACjB,wBAAwB,EACxB,kBAAkB,EAClB,yBAAyB,EACzB,qBAAqB,EACrB,kBAAkB,EAClB,sBAAsB,EACtB,sBAAsB,EACtB,4BAA4B,EAC5B,iBAAiB,EACjB,qBAAqB,EACrB,wBAAwB,EACxB,kBAAkB,EAClB,yBAAyB,EACzB,gBAAgB,EAChB,wBAAwB,EACxB,sBAAsB,EACtB,gBAAgB,EAChB,2BAA2B,GAC5B,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AAEjC,YAAY,EACV,kBAAkB,EAClB,cAAc,EACd,qBAAqB,EACrB,sBAAsB,EACtB,qBAAqB,EACrB,sBAAsB,EACtB,qBAAqB,EACrB,sBAAsB,EACtB,eAAe,EACf,gBAAgB,GACjB,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAExB,YAAY,EACV,wBAAwB,EACxB,yBAAyB,EACzB,0BAA0B,EAC1B,yBAAyB,EACzB,0BAA0B,EAC1B,mBAAmB,EACnB,oBAAoB,GACrB,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAG5B,YAAY,EACV,kBAAkB,EAClB,cAAc,EACd,gBAAgB,EAChB,aAAa,GACd,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAEvB,OAAO,EACL,0BAA0B,EAC1B,yBAAyB,EACzB,gBAAgB,GACjB,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAGvB,YAAY,EACV,mBAAmB,EACnB,sBAAsB,EACtB,kBAAkB,EAClB,wBAAwB,EACxB,uBAAuB,EACvB,+BAA+B,GAChC,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAG/B,YAAY,EACV,eAAe,EACf,kBAAkB,EAClB,oBAAoB,EACpB,kBAAkB,EAClB,qBAAqB,EACrB,iBAAiB,EACjB,sBAAsB,EACtB,uBAAuB,GACxB,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAC/B,OAAO,EACL,4BAA4B,EAC5B,wBAAwB,EACxB,wBAAwB,EACxB,uBAAuB,EACvB,oBAAoB,EACpB,sBAAsB,EACtB,oBAAoB,GACrB,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAE/B,YAAY,EACV,eAAe,EACf,oBAAoB,EACpB,uBAAuB,GACxB,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAC/B,OAAO,EACL,0BAA0B,EAC1B,0BAA0B,EAC1B,6BAA6B,EAC7B,6BAA6B,GAC9B,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,YAAY,EACV,eAAe,EACf,iBAAiB,EACjB,aAAa,EACb,WAAW,EACX,aAAa,EACb,cAAc,EACd,gBAAgB,EAChB,iBAAiB,EACjB,mBAAmB,GACpB,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAEpB,OAAO,EACL,iBAAiB,EACjB,aAAa,EACb,iBAAiB,EACjB,mBAAmB,EACnB,gBAAgB,EAChB,eAAe,EACf,mBAAmB,EACnB,qBAAqB,EACrB,kBAAkB,EAClB,iBAAiB,GAClB,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAEvB,YAAY,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAC7F,OAAO,EACL,oBAAoB,EACpB,eAAe,EACf,gBAAgB,EAChB,wBAAwB,EACxB,yBAAyB,GAC1B,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAEzB,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AACjK,YAAY,EACV,iBAAiB,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,WAAW,EACnH,gBAAgB,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,YAAY,EAChI,eAAe,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,0BAA0B,GACvF,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAEtB,YAAY,EACV,gBAAgB,EAChB,aAAa,EACb,gBAAgB,EAChB,WAAW,EACX,WAAW,EACX,iBAAiB,EACjB,2BAA2B,EAC3B,2BAA2B,EAC3B,oBAAoB,EACpB,oBAAoB,EACpB,uBAAuB,EACvB,2BAA2B,EAC3B,eAAe,EACf,iBAAiB,EACjB,gBAAgB,EAChB,gBAAgB,GACjB,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AAEjC,OAAO,EACL,yBAAyB,EACzB,mBAAmB,EACnB,sBAAsB,EACtB,qBAAqB,EACrB,sBAAsB,EACtB,iBAAiB,EACjB,iBAAiB,EACjB,yBAAyB,EACzB,uBAAuB,EACvB,uBAAuB,GACxB,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AAGjC,YAAY,EACV,eAAe,EACf,WAAW,EACX,QAAQ,EACR,eAAe,EACf,aAAa,EACb,mBAAmB,EACnB,YAAY,EACZ,iBAAiB,GAClB,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAE3B,YAAY,EACV,sBAAsB,EACtB,kBAAkB,EAClB,oBAAoB,GACrB,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAC/B,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAEzF,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AACnF,YAAY,EACV,kBAAkB,EAClB,kBAAkB,EAClB,oBAAoB,EACpB,0BAA0B,GAC3B,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAEzB,YAAY,EACV,iBAAiB,EACjB,wBAAwB,EACxB,kBAAkB,EAClB,yBAAyB,EACzB,qBAAqB,EACrB,kBAAkB,EAClB,sBAAsB,EACtB,sBAAsB,EACtB,4BAA4B,EAC5B,iBAAiB,EACjB,qBAAqB,EACrB,wBAAwB,EACxB,kBAAkB,EAClB,yBAAyB,EACzB,gBAAgB,EAChB,wBAAwB,EACxB,sBAAsB,EACtB,gBAAgB,EAChB,2BAA2B,GAC5B,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AAEjC,YAAY,EACV,kBAAkB,EAClB,cAAc,EACd,qBAAqB,EACrB,sBAAsB,EACtB,qBAAqB,EACrB,sBAAsB,EACtB,qBAAqB,EACrB,sBAAsB,EACtB,eAAe,EACf,gBAAgB,GACjB,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAExB,YAAY,EACV,wBAAwB,EACxB,yBAAyB,EACzB,0BAA0B,EAC1B,yBAAyB,EACzB,0BAA0B,EAC1B,mBAAmB,EACnB,oBAAoB,GACrB,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAG5B,YAAY,EACV,kBAAkB,EAClB,cAAc,EACd,gBAAgB,EAChB,aAAa,GACd,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAEvB,OAAO,EACL,0BAA0B,EAC1B,yBAAyB,EACzB,gBAAgB,GACjB,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAGvB,YAAY,EACV,mBAAmB,EACnB,sBAAsB,EACtB,kBAAkB,EAClB,wBAAwB,EACxB,uBAAuB,EACvB,+BAA+B,GAChC,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAG/B,YAAY,EACV,eAAe,EACf,kBAAkB,EAClB,oBAAoB,EACpB,kBAAkB,EAClB,qBAAqB,EACrB,iBAAiB,EACjB,sBAAsB,EACtB,uBAAuB,GACxB,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAC/B,OAAO,EACL,4BAA4B,EAC5B,wBAAwB,EACxB,wBAAwB,EACxB,uBAAuB,EACvB,oBAAoB,EACpB,sBAAsB,EACtB,oBAAoB,GACrB,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAE/B,YAAY,EACV,eAAe,EACf,oBAAoB,EACpB,uBAAuB,GACxB,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAC/B,OAAO,EACL,0BAA0B,EAC1B,0BAA0B,EAC1B,6BAA6B,EAC7B,6BAA6B,GAC9B,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC"}

package/dist/index.js

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ export { MAX_CONTENT_BYTES, buildEnvelope, serializeEnvelope, deserializeEnvelop
 export { SCAN_RESULT_SENTINEL, buildStructure2, encodeStructure2, encodeScanResultSentinel, verifyStructure2Signature, } from "./structure2.js";
 export { computeGenesisPrevRoot, encodeSealPayload, decodeSealPayload, buildSessionEstablishmentTbs, buildSealTbs, SEAL_RECEIPT_DISCLAIMER } from "./session.js";
 export { MAX_PSEUDONYM_LABEL_BYTES, ML_DSA_PUBKEY_BYTES, ML_DSA_SIGNATURE_BYTES, buildPseudonymBinding, verifyPseudonymBinding, verifyEndorsement, verifyAttestation, validateConnectionPackage, encodeConnectionPackage, decodeConnectionPackage, } from "./connection-package.js";
+export { buildPrimaryTransferTbs, PRIMARY_TRANSFER_DOMAIN } from "./primary-transfer.js";
 export { buildAgentRevocationTbs, AGENT_REVOCATION_DOMAIN } from "./revocation.js";
 export { MANIFEST_SIGNATURE_INVALID, MANIFEST_VERSION_ROLLBACK, MANIFEST_EXPIRED, } from "./manifest.js";
 export { IT_LENGTH_PREFIX_DEFAULT_MAX, CONTENT_PARK_PROTOCOL_ID, CONTENT_PARK_AUTH_DOMAIN, buildContentParkAuthMsg, isContentDeliveryAck, isContentResendRequest, isContentParkDeposit, } from "./content-delivery.js";

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAYA,OAAO,EACL,iBAAiB,EACjB,aAAa,EACb,iBAAiB,EACjB,mBAAmB,EACnB,gBAAgB,EAChB,eAAe,EACf,mBAAmB,EACnB,qBAAqB,EACrB,kBAAkB,EAClB,iBAAiB,GAClB,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAGvB,OAAO,EACL,oBAAoB,EACpB,eAAe,EACf,gBAAgB,EAChB,wBAAwB,EACxB,yBAAyB,GAC1B,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAEzB,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AA0BjK,OAAO,EACL,yBAAyB,EACzB,mBAAmB,EACnB,sBAAsB,EACtB,qBAAqB,EACrB,sBAAsB,EACtB,iBAAiB,EACjB,iBAAiB,EACjB,yBAAyB,EACzB,uBAAuB,EACvB,uBAAuB,GACxB,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AAcjC,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AA6DnF,OAAO,EACL,0BAA0B,EAC1B,yBAAyB,EACzB,gBAAgB,GACjB,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAuBvB,OAAO,EACL,4BAA4B,EAC5B,wBAAwB,EACxB,wBAAwB,EACxB,uBAAuB,EACvB,oBAAoB,EACpB,sBAAsB,EACtB,oBAAoB,GACrB,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAO/B,OAAO,EACL,0BAA0B,EAC1B,0BAA0B,EAC1B,6BAA6B,EAC7B,6BAA6B,GAC9B,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAYA,OAAO,EACL,iBAAiB,EACjB,aAAa,EACb,iBAAiB,EACjB,mBAAmB,EACnB,gBAAgB,EAChB,eAAe,EACf,mBAAmB,EACnB,qBAAqB,EACrB,kBAAkB,EAClB,iBAAiB,GAClB,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAGvB,OAAO,EACL,oBAAoB,EACpB,eAAe,EACf,gBAAgB,EAChB,wBAAwB,EACxB,yBAAyB,GAC1B,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAEzB,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AA0BjK,OAAO,EACL,yBAAyB,EACzB,mBAAmB,EACnB,sBAAsB,EACtB,qBAAqB,EACrB,sBAAsB,EACtB,iBAAiB,EACjB,iBAAiB,EACjB,yBAAyB,EACzB,uBAAuB,EACvB,uBAAuB,GACxB,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AAmBjC,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAEzF,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AA6DnF,OAAO,EACL,0BAA0B,EAC1B,yBAAyB,EACzB,gBAAgB,GACjB,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAuBvB,OAAO,EACL,4BAA4B,EAC5B,wBAAwB,EACxB,wBAAwB,EACxB,uBAAuB,EACvB,oBAAoB,EACpB,sBAAsB,EACtB,oBAAoB,GACrB,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAO/B,OAAO,EACL,0BAA0B,EAC1B,0BAA0B,EAC1B,6BAA6B,EAC7B,6BAA6B,GAC9B,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC"}

package/dist/primary-transfer.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/**
+ * CELLO Primary/Standby Transfer Wire Types — M8C-PRIMARY-1
+ *
+ * Design: docs/planning/user-stories/m8c/M8C-PRIMARY-DESIGN.md (Decision 4, revised across 3
+ * passes: adversarial security review, a code-level correction to the real client-coordinated-
+ * per-node pattern, and a release-attestation crypto fix reusing the existing FROST ceremony).
+ * Mirrors registration.ts's DKG protocol shape exactly — CELLO has no cross-node RPC/consensus
+ * anywhere; "exactly one Primary" is enforced by the SAME pattern DKG already uses: the daemon
+ * (client) dials each of T-of-N directory nodes holding the agent's FROST shares directly, and
+ * each node independently verifies + records the claim locally. There is no directory-to-directory
+ * frame here — only client-to-directory, repeated per node.
+ *
+ * Phase P — Pseudocode
+ * ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+ * Primary-transfer flow (on the existing authenticated /cello/signaling/1.0.0 stream, once per
+ * directory node the daemon dials):
+ *
+ * CLIENT (new Primary) → DIRECTORY (one node):
+ *   1. Client sends primary_transfer_request { k_local_pubkey, new_daemon_id, old_daemon_id,
+ *      nonce, timestamp, release_signature }. release_signature is a REAL FROST threshold
+ *      signature (core/crypto's participateInCeremony, context CONTEXT_PRIMARY_RELEASE — see
+ *      core/crypto/src/frost/types.ts) produced by the OLD Primary over canonical-bytes
+ *      (k_local_pubkey, new_daemon_id, old_daemon_id, nonce, timestamp). This is NOT a K_local
+ *      signature (both daemons share K_local after pairing, per Decision 1 — a K_local signature
+ *      cannot distinguish which physical device produced it). A FROST signature under this
+ *      context can ONLY be produced by a device that currently holds the agent's FROST share —
+ *      exactly the property that distinguishes a genuine old Primary from a Standby that never
+ *      received the share (Decision 3).
+ *
+ * DIRECTORY validates (per node, independently):
+ *   a. old_daemon_id matches THIS node's own currently-recorded primary_holder.holding_daemon_id
+ *      → else primary_transfer_error { reason: "not_registered" } (a stale/wrong claim about who
+ *      is releasing is rejected before any cryptographic check)
+ *   b. release_signature verifies via verifySignature(release_signature, tbs, CONTEXT_PRIMARY_RELEASE,
+ *      primary_pubkey) against THIS node's own recorded primary_pubkey for k_local_pubkey → else
+ *      primary_transfer_error { reason: "release_not_verified" }
+ *   c. nonce not already consumed at this node (single-use, mirrors the pre-auth capability's
+ *      consumed_at pattern) → else primary_transfer_error { reason: "nonce_reused" }
+ *   d. timestamp within a bounded freshness window (replay defense) → else
+ *      primary_transfer_error { reason: "stale_request" }
+ *
+ * DIRECTORY on success (this node only):
+ *   - Upserts its own local primary_holder row: holding_daemon_id = new_daemon_id,
+ *     last_attested_at = now()
+ *   - Sends primary_transfer_ack { node_id } — the daemon tallies acks per Decision 4; T-of-N acks
+ *     is what "transfer complete" means, never a cross-node signal
+ *
+ * CLIENT tallies primary_transfer_ack across its T-of-N dial attempts (mirrors exactly how it
+ * already tallies DKG-round successes when driving DKG per-node) and does not proceed to resume as
+ * Primary (attempt a FROST ceremony, accept new sessions) until T acks are collected.
+ *
+ * Ceremony-gate check (separate, existing FROST signing-request path, extended): a directory node
+ * refuses to let a ceremony proceed through its own participation unless the requesting
+ * connection's daemon_id matches that node's own primary_holder.holding_daemon_id.
+ *
+ * Security invariants:
+ *   SI-001: release_signature MUST be a real FROST threshold signature under CONTEXT_PRIMARY_RELEASE
+ *     (verified against the node's own recorded primary_pubkey) — NEVER a K_local signature or any
+ *     signature a Standby (K_local-holder, non-share-holder) could produce.
+ *   SI-002: nonce is single-use per node (replay defense, mirrors the existing pre-auth capability
+ *     `consumed_at` pattern already proven in production).
+ *   SI-003: this frame set carries NO secret material — no FROST share, no K_local seed. The share
+ *     itself is never transmitted to the directory (M8C-PRIMARY-DESIGN Decision 3); the directory
+ *     only ever sees a threshold signature it can verify, never anything it could use to forge one.
+ *   SI-004: old_daemon_id is checked against this node's OWN recorded holder before any
+ *     cryptographic verification — an attacker cannot substitute a fabricated old_daemon_id and
+ *     hope the signature check alone catches it (defense in depth, cheap check first).
+ * ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+ */
+/** Domain separation tag — bound as the first TBS field so a primary-transfer release signature
+ *  can never be replayed as any other CELLO signature (and vice-versa) even before FROST's own
+ *  CONTEXT_PRIMARY_RELEASE domain separation is applied — belt and suspenders, matching the
+ *  existing AGENT_REVOCATION_DOMAIN convention (revocation.ts). */
+export declare const PRIMARY_TRANSFER_DOMAIN = "CELLO-PRIMARY-TRANSFER-v1";
+/**
+ * Canonical to-be-signed bytes for a primary-transfer release attestation (M8C-PRIMARY-DESIGN
+ * Decision 3, Pass 3). Field order is LOAD-BEARING — both the signer (the old Primary daemon,
+ * via participateInCeremony) and every verifier (each directory node, via verifySignature) must
+ * produce IDENTICAL bytes, or verification never succeeds regardless of whether the ceremony
+ * itself was genuine. Mirrors buildAgentRevocationTbs's exact structure (revocation.ts).
+ */
+export declare function buildPrimaryTransferTbs(kLocalPubkeyHex: string, newDaemonId: string, oldDaemonId: string, nonce: string, timestamp: number): Uint8Array;
+/**
+ * Step 1: the new Primary attests a transfer to one directory node. Sent on that node's
+ * authenticated signaling stream. The daemon repeats this per node it dials.
+ */
+export interface PrimaryTransferRequest {
+    type: "primary_transfer_request";
+    /** Hex-encoded K_local public key (32 bytes) — the shared identity both daemons hold. */
+    k_local_pubkey: string;
+    /** Fresh per-device UUID identifying the daemon CLAIMING Primary status. */
+    new_daemon_id: string;
+    /** The per-device UUID of the daemon RELINQUISHING Primary status. */
+    old_daemon_id: string;
+    /**
+     * Hex-encoded 64-byte FROST threshold signature (core/crypto's participateInCeremony, context
+     * CONTEXT_PRIMARY_RELEASE) over canonical-bytes(k_local_pubkey, new_daemon_id, old_daemon_id,
+     * nonce, timestamp), produced by the OLD Primary. Verified via verifySignature(...,
+     * CONTEXT_PRIMARY_RELEASE, primary_pubkey) — proves genuine possession of the FROST share at
+     * release time (SI-001). NOT a K_local signature — see the module doc above for why.
+     */
+    release_signature: string;
+    /** Single-use nonce (SI-002) — mirrors the existing pre-auth capability pattern. */
+    nonce: string;
+    /** Unix ms timestamp — bounds replay window (freshness check, not itself the security boundary). */
+    timestamp: number;
+}
+/**
+ * This node has recorded new_daemon_id as the current Primary holder for k_local_pubkey. This is
+ * a PER-NODE acknowledgment, never a cross-node commit signal — the client tallies these across
+ * its T-of-N dial attempts (M8C-PRIMARY-DESIGN Decision 4).
+ */
+export interface PrimaryTransferAck {
+    type: "primary_transfer_ack";
+    /** The stable manifest label of the node that accepted (e.g. "us-east-1"). */
+    node_id: string;
+}
+/**
+ * This node rejected the transfer request. SI-001/SI-002/SI-004/freshness failures all surface
+ * here with a distinct, named reason — never a generic failure.
+ */
+export interface PrimaryTransferError {
+    type: "primary_transfer_error";
+    reason: "release_not_verified" | "nonce_reused" | "stale_request" | "not_registered";
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=primary-transfer.d.ts.map

package/dist/primary-transfer.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"primary-transfer.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/primary-transfer.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAoEG;AAQH;;;mEAGmE;AACnE,eAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,8BAA8B,CAAC;AAEnE;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAgB,uBAAuB,CACrC,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,EACvB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,EACnB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,EACnB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EACb,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,GAChB,UAAU,CASZ;AAID;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,sBAAsB;IACrC,IAAI,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC;IACjC,yFAAyF;IACzF,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,4EAA4E;IAC5E,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACtB,sEAAsE;IACtE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACtB;;;;;;OAMG;IACH,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC1B,oFAAoF;IACpF,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACd,oGAAoG;IACpG,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACnB;AAID;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,kBAAkB;IACjC,IAAI,EAAE,sBAAsB,CAAC;IAC7B,8EAA8E;IAC9E,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACjB;AAED;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,oBAAoB;IACnC,IAAI,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC;IAC/B,MAAM,EAAE,sBAAsB,GAAG,cAAc,GAAG,eAAe,GAAG,gBAAgB,CAAC;CACtF"}

package/dist/primary-transfer.js

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/**
+ * CELLO Primary/Standby Transfer Wire Types — M8C-PRIMARY-1
+ *
+ * Design: docs/planning/user-stories/m8c/M8C-PRIMARY-DESIGN.md (Decision 4, revised across 3
+ * passes: adversarial security review, a code-level correction to the real client-coordinated-
+ * per-node pattern, and a release-attestation crypto fix reusing the existing FROST ceremony).
+ * Mirrors registration.ts's DKG protocol shape exactly — CELLO has no cross-node RPC/consensus
+ * anywhere; "exactly one Primary" is enforced by the SAME pattern DKG already uses: the daemon
+ * (client) dials each of T-of-N directory nodes holding the agent's FROST shares directly, and
+ * each node independently verifies + records the claim locally. There is no directory-to-directory
+ * frame here — only client-to-directory, repeated per node.
+ *
+ * Phase P — Pseudocode
+ * ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+ * Primary-transfer flow (on the existing authenticated /cello/signaling/1.0.0 stream, once per
+ * directory node the daemon dials):
+ *
+ * CLIENT (new Primary) → DIRECTORY (one node):
+ *   1. Client sends primary_transfer_request { k_local_pubkey, new_daemon_id, old_daemon_id,
+ *      nonce, timestamp, release_signature }. release_signature is a REAL FROST threshold
+ *      signature (core/crypto's participateInCeremony, context CONTEXT_PRIMARY_RELEASE — see
+ *      core/crypto/src/frost/types.ts) produced by the OLD Primary over canonical-bytes
+ *      (k_local_pubkey, new_daemon_id, old_daemon_id, nonce, timestamp). This is NOT a K_local
+ *      signature (both daemons share K_local after pairing, per Decision 1 — a K_local signature
+ *      cannot distinguish which physical device produced it). A FROST signature under this
+ *      context can ONLY be produced by a device that currently holds the agent's FROST share —
+ *      exactly the property that distinguishes a genuine old Primary from a Standby that never
+ *      received the share (Decision 3).
+ *
+ * DIRECTORY validates (per node, independently):
+ *   a. old_daemon_id matches THIS node's own currently-recorded primary_holder.holding_daemon_id
+ *      → else primary_transfer_error { reason: "not_registered" } (a stale/wrong claim about who
+ *      is releasing is rejected before any cryptographic check)
+ *   b. release_signature verifies via verifySignature(release_signature, tbs, CONTEXT_PRIMARY_RELEASE,
+ *      primary_pubkey) against THIS node's own recorded primary_pubkey for k_local_pubkey → else
+ *      primary_transfer_error { reason: "release_not_verified" }
+ *   c. nonce not already consumed at this node (single-use, mirrors the pre-auth capability's
+ *      consumed_at pattern) → else primary_transfer_error { reason: "nonce_reused" }
+ *   d. timestamp within a bounded freshness window (replay defense) → else
+ *      primary_transfer_error { reason: "stale_request" }
+ *
+ * DIRECTORY on success (this node only):
+ *   - Upserts its own local primary_holder row: holding_daemon_id = new_daemon_id,
+ *     last_attested_at = now()
+ *   - Sends primary_transfer_ack { node_id } — the daemon tallies acks per Decision 4; T-of-N acks
+ *     is what "transfer complete" means, never a cross-node signal
+ *
+ * CLIENT tallies primary_transfer_ack across its T-of-N dial attempts (mirrors exactly how it
+ * already tallies DKG-round successes when driving DKG per-node) and does not proceed to resume as
+ * Primary (attempt a FROST ceremony, accept new sessions) until T acks are collected.
+ *
+ * Ceremony-gate check (separate, existing FROST signing-request path, extended): a directory node
+ * refuses to let a ceremony proceed through its own participation unless the requesting
+ * connection's daemon_id matches that node's own primary_holder.holding_daemon_id.
+ *
+ * Security invariants:
+ *   SI-001: release_signature MUST be a real FROST threshold signature under CONTEXT_PRIMARY_RELEASE
+ *     (verified against the node's own recorded primary_pubkey) — NEVER a K_local signature or any
+ *     signature a Standby (K_local-holder, non-share-holder) could produce.
+ *   SI-002: nonce is single-use per node (replay defense, mirrors the existing pre-auth capability
+ *     `consumed_at` pattern already proven in production).
+ *   SI-003: this frame set carries NO secret material — no FROST share, no K_local seed. The share
+ *     itself is never transmitted to the directory (M8C-PRIMARY-DESIGN Decision 3); the directory
+ *     only ever sees a threshold signature it can verify, never anything it could use to forge one.
+ *   SI-004: old_daemon_id is checked against this node's OWN recorded holder before any
+ *     cryptographic verification — an attacker cannot substitute a fabricated old_daemon_id and
+ *     hope the signature check alone catches it (defense in depth, cheap check first).
+ * ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+ */
+import { Encoder } from "cbor-x";
+// Same config as session.ts/revocation.ts's own TBS builders — tagUint8Array:false so byte
+// strings encode as definite-length CBOR byte strings (stable, encoder-independent layout).
+const CBOR_ENC = new Encoder({ tagUint8Array: false });
+/** Domain separation tag — bound as the first TBS field so a primary-transfer release signature
+ *  can never be replayed as any other CELLO signature (and vice-versa) even before FROST's own
+ *  CONTEXT_PRIMARY_RELEASE domain separation is applied — belt and suspenders, matching the
+ *  existing AGENT_REVOCATION_DOMAIN convention (revocation.ts). */
+export const PRIMARY_TRANSFER_DOMAIN = "CELLO-PRIMARY-TRANSFER-v1";
+/**
+ * Canonical to-be-signed bytes for a primary-transfer release attestation (M8C-PRIMARY-DESIGN
+ * Decision 3, Pass 3). Field order is LOAD-BEARING — both the signer (the old Primary daemon,
+ * via participateInCeremony) and every verifier (each directory node, via verifySignature) must
+ * produce IDENTICAL bytes, or verification never succeeds regardless of whether the ceremony
+ * itself was genuine. Mirrors buildAgentRevocationTbs's exact structure (revocation.ts).
+ */
+export function buildPrimaryTransferTbs(kLocalPubkeyHex, newDaemonId, oldDaemonId, nonce, timestamp) {
+    return CBOR_ENC.encode([
+        PRIMARY_TRANSFER_DOMAIN,
+        kLocalPubkeyHex,
+        newDaemonId,
+        oldDaemonId,
+        nonce,
+        timestamp,
+    ]);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=primary-transfer.js.map

package/dist/primary-transfer.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"primary-transfer.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/primary-transfer.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAoEG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AAEjC,2FAA2F;AAC3F,4FAA4F;AAC5F,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;AAEvD;;;mEAGmE;AACnE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAEnE;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,uBAAuB,CACrC,eAAuB,EACvB,WAAmB,EACnB,WAAmB,EACnB,KAAa,EACb,SAAiB;IAEjB,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACrB,uBAAuB;QACvB,eAAe;QACf,WAAW;QACX,WAAW;QACX,KAAK;QACL,SAAS;KACV,CAAe,CAAC;AACnB,CAAC"}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@cello-protocol/protocol-types",
-  "version": "0.0.15",
+  "version": "0.0.17",
   "private": false,
   "type": "module",
   "engines": {
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
   ],
   "dependencies": {
     "cbor-x": "^1.6.4",
-    "@cello-protocol/crypto": "0.0.17"
+    "@cello-protocol/crypto": "0.0.18"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@claude-flow/testing": "3.0.0-alpha.6",