@cello-protocol/daemon 0.0.53 → 0.0.54

package/dist/inbound-sessions.js

@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
+/**
+ * Seam 2: inbound session establishment — the counterparty side.
+ *
+ * When agent A initiates a session, the directory FROST-signs a SessionAssignment and pushes it to
+ * B. This is everything B does with it: verify it, wait for B's standing receiver, accept the
+ * session, and park the event on a per-agent queue that a waiting cello_await_session drains.
+ *
+ * The accept path is SERIALIZED through one chain (inboundAcceptChain) on purpose — two assignments
+ * racing into acceptSession would both try to consume the single standing receiver.
+ *
+ * Everything here is keyed by (agentName, sessionId), NEVER sessionId alone: two of the operator's
+ * agents can hold both ends of the same session on one daemon (DOD-LOOP-1), and keying by session
+ * alone would let one agent's inbound event resolve the other's waiter.
+ */
+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
+import { frameValueToHex } from "./frame-values.js";
+import { computeGenesisPrevRoot } from "@cello-protocol/protocol-types";
+import { hash as cryptoHash } from "@cello-protocol/crypto";
+import { DbIdentityStore } from "./db-identity-store.js";
+import { extractOfferedMoniker } from "./session-assignment-parser.js";
+/** How long an un-accepted inbound session request stays claimable. */
+export const INBOUND_SESSION_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+export function createInboundSessions(deps) {
+    const { logger, sessionNodeManager, agents, getConnState, resolveCurrentAgent, NO_CURRENT_AGENT_RESPONSE, getKeyProvider, sharedSignaling, handleInboundSealInterruptedRequest, reapDeadHalfOpenSessions, sendAwayResponse, dispatchSessionStateChangedWithTelegram, sendTelegramDoorbell, } = deps;
+    // ─── Seam 2: inbound session establishment (counterparty side) ─────────────
+    //
+    // When agent A initiates a session, the directory FROST-signs a SessionAssignment
+    // and PUSHES it to the counterparty B over B's directory signaling stream (an
+    // unsolicited `session_assignment` frame). The daemon turns that frame into a live
+    // inbound session: it resolves which local agent is participant_b, calls
+    // SessionNodeManager.acceptSession (which hands off the standing receiver node bound
+    // to A's session peer id), and enqueues an inbound session event that a blocked
+    // cello_await_session call returns. This is the inbound mirror of cello_initiate_session.
+    // MONIKER-2 AC2b: the initiator's validated offered name. Session-scoped display material ONLY
+    // (spec: promotion to a stored pet name needs an explicit operator action). In-memory by design —
+    // a restart degrades the label to fingerprint, never worse.
+    //
+    // DOD-MONIKER-6 (spec §10): keyed by (agentName, sessionIdHex), NEVER sessionIdHex alone. A box
+    // is written by the RECEIVING side and holds the CALLER's name, so it is meaningful only to the
+    // agent it was written for. Keyed by session id alone, a daemon hosting both participants hands
+    // the initiator the box filled in for her counterparty — she is told she messaged herself — and
+    // either agent's state change or request expiry silently drops the other's name.
+    const offeredMonikers = new Map();
+    const offerKey = (agentName, sessionIdHex) => `${agentName}:${sessionIdHex}`;
+    // Expired requests move HERE (from inboundSessionQueues) rather than vanishing — visible via
+    // cello_check_notifications so the operator can see what they missed, not just silence.
+    const expiredSessionRequests = new Map();
+    // A blocked cello_await_session waiter. connectionId is carried so the disconnect
+    // hook can evict waiters belonging to a dead connection (otherwise enqueue would hand
+    // an inbound event to a closed connection and the event would be lost — review H2).
+    // Per-agent FIFO queue (events accepted while no cello_await_session is blocked) and
+    // the per-agent list of blocked waiters. Inbound sessions are addressed to a specific
+    // local agent (participant_b), so both are keyed by agent name.
+    const inboundSessionQueues = new Map();
+    const inboundSessionWaiters = new Map();
+    // Session ids whose acceptInboundAssignment is in flight (the accept step is async
+    // because it may wait for the standing receiver to rebuild). Guards against two
+    // simultaneous frames for the SAME session both passing the getSessionRecord check
+    // before either has inserted the row (review M1, race half).
+    // DOD-LOOP-1: keyed by (agentName, sessionId), like every other structure here — NOT by session
+    // id alone. Two of the operator's agents can hold both ends of the same session on one daemon, and
+    // a bare session key would let one agent's in-flight accept suppress the other's.
+    const inboundInFlight = new Set();
+    // Inbound accepts are SERIALIZED through this chain. acceptSession synchronously
+    // consumes the single standing receiver and rebuilds a replacement asynchronously;
+    // running two accepts concurrently would let the second pass its readiness check on
+    // the receiver the first is about to consume, then fail on the consumed receiver
+    // (review M2, race). Serializing makes the second accept wait for the first's rebuild.
+    let inboundAcceptChain = Promise.resolve();
+    function enqueueInboundSession(agentName, event) {
+        const waiters = inboundSessionWaiters.get(agentName);
+        if (waiters && waiters.length > 0) {
+            // Hand straight to the oldest blocked waiter (deliver clears its own timeout).
+            const w = waiters.shift();
+            w.deliver(event);
+            return;
+        }
+        const q = inboundSessionQueues.get(agentName) ?? [];
+        q.push({ ...event, enqueuedAt: Date.now() }); // M8C-TTL-1: stamp queue entry time
+        inboundSessionQueues.set(agentName, q);
+    }
+    // M8C-TTL-1 (reviewer HIGH fix, aed2d71f, D19): expiredSessionRequests is a lasting log, not a
+    // consumed queue (unlike inboundSessionQueues, nothing ever drains it) — a whitelisted CONTACT-1
+    // contact is EXEMPT from ABUSE-1's acceptance bounds ("bounded only by disk"), so they can push
+    // unlimited accepted sessions the operator never claims, each becoming a permanent, unremovable
+    // entry every 24h for the life of the daemon process. Capped the same way STATUS_RESUMABLE_CAP
+    // bounds the interrupted-sessions list — keep only the MOST RECENT N per agent.
+    const EXPIRED_SESSION_REQUESTS_CAP = 20;
+    // M8C-TTL-1: move any queue entries past the TTL into expiredSessionRequests (visible via
+    // INBOX), instead of leaving them to sit forever or vanish silently. Called lazily on every
+    // read of the queue (cello_await_session's immediate-check, cello_check_notifications) rather
+    // than on a timer — no background sweep needed, and it's always correct-as-of-the-read.
+    function reapExpiredInboundSessions(agentName) {
+        const q = inboundSessionQueues.get(agentName);
+        if (!q || q.length === 0)
+            return;
+        const now = Date.now();
+        const live = [];
+        let expiredList = expiredSessionRequests.get(agentName);
+        for (const e of q) {
+            if (e.enqueuedAt !== undefined && now - e.enqueuedAt > INBOUND_SESSION_TTL_MS) {
+                if (!expiredList) {
+                    expiredList = [];
+                    expiredSessionRequests.set(agentName, expiredList);
+                }
+                expiredList.push({ sessionIdHex: e.sessionIdHex, counterpartyPubkeyHex: e.counterpartyPubkeyHex, expiredAt: now });
+                if (expiredList.length > EXPIRED_SESSION_REQUESTS_CAP) {
+                    expiredList.splice(0, expiredList.length - EXPIRED_SESSION_REQUESTS_CAP); // keep newest N
+                }
+                logger.info("session.request.expired", { agentName, sessionId: e.sessionIdHex, enqueuedAt: e.enqueuedAt });
+                // MONIKER-2 AC2b (review F1): the offer's display name expires with the offer.
+                if (offeredMonikers.delete(offerKey(agentName, e.sessionIdHex))) {
+                    logger.debug("moniker.offer.dropped", { agentName, sessionId: e.sessionIdHex, state: "expired" });
+                }
+            }
+            else {
+                live.push(e);
+            }
+        }
+        inboundSessionQueues.set(agentName, live);
+    }
+    // Pull the fields out of a pushed session_assignment frame. Returns null when the frame
+    // carries no usable assignment object / is missing the essential ids (the handler then
+    // ignores it rather than throwing). Field-level validity (peer id, signature type) is
+    // checked in the handler so it can emit a distinct, diagnosable event per failure.
+    function extractInboundSessionAssignment(frame) {
+        const raw = frame["assignment"];
+        if (!raw || typeof raw !== "object")
+            return null;
+        const a = raw;
+        const pa = a["participant_a"];
+        const pb = a["participant_b"];
+        const sessionIdHex = frameValueToHex(a["session_id"]);
+        const participantAPubkeyHex = pa ? frameValueToHex(pa["pubkey"]) : null;
+        const participantBPubkeyHex = pb ? frameValueToHex(pb["pubkey"]) : null;
+        if (!sessionIdHex || !participantAPubkeyHex || !participantBPubkeyHex)
+            return null;
+        // M7 DOD-SPINE-6 / MSG-001-3b: relay endpoint so the receiver also connects to the
+        // relay witness (so the relay can deliver the initiator's witnessed leaves to it).
+        const relayEndpoint = a["relay_endpoint"];
+        const relayPeerId = relayEndpoint && typeof relayEndpoint["peer_id"] === "string" ? relayEndpoint["peer_id"] : "";
+        const relayAddrs = relayEndpoint && Array.isArray(relayEndpoint["multiaddrs"])
+            ? relayEndpoint["multiaddrs"].filter((m) => typeof m === "string")
+            : [];
+        // MONIKER-2 AC2: validate the offered name ONCE, at this wire boundary.
+        const monikerResult = extractOfferedMoniker(a);
+        return {
+            sessionIdHex,
+            participantAPubkeyHex,
+            participantBPubkeyHex,
+            initiatorPeerId: typeof a["initiator_session_peer_id"] === "string" ? a["initiator_session_peer_id"] : "",
+            counterpartySessionPeerId: typeof a["counterparty_session_peer_id"] === "string" ? a["counterparty_session_peer_id"] : null,
+            sessionTimestamp: typeof a["session_timestamp"] === "number" ? a["session_timestamp"] : 0,
+            signatureType: typeof a["signature_type"] === "string" ? a["signature_type"] : null,
+            // M7 legibility-TBS-binding (responder verify): the FROST-signed assignment embeds the
+            // initiator's primary (group) pubkey as `signer_pubkey` — the key that signs the seal.
+            // The responder stores it so it can verify the bilateral seal signature locally, not just
+            // accept it (session.ts: "embedded so the counterparty can verify").
+            signerPubkeyHex: a["signer_pubkey"] !== undefined ? frameValueToHex(a["signer_pubkey"]) : null,
+            relayPeerId,
+            relayAddrs,
+            offeredMoniker: monikerResult.offeredMoniker,
+            monikerRejected: monikerResult.rejected,
+            monikerRejectReason: monikerResult.reason ?? null,
+        };
+    }
+    // Wait (bounded) for THIS AGENT's standing receiver to be ready. acceptSession consumes the
+    // agent's standing receiver and rebuilds a replacement asynchronously, so a burst of inbound
+    // assignments for that agent would otherwise drop all but the first (review M2). Polling the
+    // per-agent readiness lets each accept proceed once the prior rebuild completes. Must check the
+    // OWNING agent — `getStandingReceiverReady()` with no arg returns true if ANY agent has one,
+    // which in the loopback case (alice + bob on one daemon) would falsely pass while bob's own SR
+    // is still mid-rebuild and drop bob's session (DOD-LOOP-1).
+    async function waitForStandingReceiver(agentName, maxWaitMs = 3_000, stepMs = 25) {
+        if (sessionNodeManager.getStandingReceiverReady(agentName))
+            return true;
+        const deadline = Date.now() + maxWaitMs;
+        while (Date.now() < deadline) {
+            await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, stepMs));
+            if (sessionNodeManager.getStandingReceiverReady(agentName))
+                return true;
+        }
+        return sessionNodeManager.getStandingReceiverReady(agentName);
+    }
+    async function acceptInboundAssignment(parsed, agentName, correlationId) {
+        try {
+            // M8C-ABUSE-1 + DOD-TIER-2/3: bound acceptance by the sender's TIER — a per-sender cap that is
+            // the sender's tier cap (BLOCKED 0 → refused here, indistinguishably from an over-cap stranger),
+            // plus a global anti-swarm cap that applies only to the UNKNOWN-tier stranger pool. No tier is
+            // unbounded (INV-TIER-BOUND); KNOWN+ are exempt from the GLOBAL pool only, not from their own
+            // cap. Checked FIRST, before any standing-receiver work, so a refusal is cheap.
+            // CC-10: reap provably-dead ghosts for THIS agent before counting — otherwise invisible
+            // interrupted 0-received sessions (post-restart shape) consume the sender's budget forever
+            // and lock the stranger out with no list read ever clearing them. Safe here: abandonSession
+            // flips the DB status synchronously, so the bound query below sees the reaped state.
+            reapDeadHalfOpenSessions(agentName);
+            const bound = sessionNodeManager.checkUnknownSenderAcceptanceBound(agentName, parsed.participantAPubkeyHex);
+            if (!bound.ok) {
+                logger.warn("session.inbound.accept.failed", {
+                    sessionId: parsed.sessionIdHex,
+                    agentName,
+                    reason: bound.reason,
+                    correlationId,
+                });
+                return;
+            }
+            // DOD-RENAME-1 AC1 (review F1 / DEC-AB-4): record the offered name as the rename baseline the
+            // moment the offer passes the acceptance gate — an ALLOWED peer (the bound check let them
+            // through) is tracked even if session formation transiently fails below. Deliberately AFTER the
+            // bound check, not at the raw parse point: a BLOCKED or over-cap peer must NOT be able to drive
+            // the operator's rename baseline or push notices into their inbox. Guarded by offeredMoniker !==
+            // null so a silent offer never clears the baseline (AC5).
+            if (parsed.offeredMoniker !== null) {
+                sessionNodeManager.recordOfferedMoniker(agentName, parsed.participantAPubkeyHex, parsed.offeredMoniker);
+            }
+            // M8B F14 (fix 2): KICK creation before polling — an inbound offer arriving while no
+            // receiver exists and none is being created must trigger the ensure itself (the doc
+            // comment's "retries on demand" made true), instead of polling a creation nobody
+            // started and dropping the offer. Fire-and-forget: the poll below observes readiness.
+            void sessionNodeManager.ensureStandingReceiverForAgent(agentName).catch((err) => {
+                logger.warn("session.standing_receiver.ensure.failed", {
+                    agentName,
+                    reason: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
+                    correlationId,
+                });
+            });
+            // M2: do not drop the session if this agent's standing receiver is mid-rebuild.
+            const ready = await waitForStandingReceiver(agentName);
+            if (!ready) {
+                logger.warn("session.inbound.accept.failed", {
+                    sessionId: parsed.sessionIdHex,
+                    agentName,
+                    reason: "standing_receiver_unavailable",
+                    correlationId,
+                });
+                return;
+            }
+            // M7 DOD-SPINE-6 / MSG-001-3b: relay witness for the receiver. Build from the
+            // inbound assignment's relay endpoint + this agent's K_local + the 16-byte session id.
+            const kp = getKeyProvider(agentName);
+            let relayParams;
+            if (kp && parsed.relayPeerId && parsed.relayAddrs.length > 0) {
+                relayParams = {
+                    relayPeerId: parsed.relayPeerId,
+                    relayAddrs: parsed.relayAddrs,
+                    keyProvider: kp,
+                    senderPubkey: await kp.getPublicKey(),
+                    sessionIdBytes: new Uint8Array(Buffer.from(parsed.sessionIdHex, "hex")),
+                };
+            }
+            const result = await sessionNodeManager.acceptSession(parsed.sessionIdHex, agentName, parsed.participantAPubkeyHex, // the initiator is OUR counterparty
+            parsed.initiatorPeerId, correlationId, relayParams);
+            if (!result.ok) {
+                logger.warn("session.inbound.accept.failed", {
+                    sessionId: parsed.sessionIdHex,
+                    agentName,
+                    reason: result.reason,
+                    correlationId,
+                });
+                return;
+            }
+            // M7 legibility-TBS-binding (responder verify): store the initiator's primary (the seal
+            // signer, carried as signer_pubkey on the FROST-signed assignment) so the bilateral seal
+            // signature can be verified locally rather than accepted on faith.
+            if (parsed.signerPubkeyHex) {
+                sessionNodeManager.recordCounterpartyPrimary(agentName, parsed.sessionIdHex, parsed.signerPubkeyHex);
+            }
+            // H1: genesis_prev_root is the canonical two-party genesis value — the SAME value
+            // baked into the FROST-signed session-establishment TBS and derived by the initiator
+            // and directory — NOT the daemon's (empty) tree root. computeGenesisPrevRoot sorts
+            // the pubkeys internally, so natural (A, B) order is correct.
+            const genesisPrevRootHex = Buffer.from(computeGenesisPrevRoot(Buffer.from(parsed.participantAPubkeyHex, "hex"), Buffer.from(parsed.participantBPubkeyHex, "hex"), Buffer.from(parsed.sessionIdHex, "hex"), parsed.sessionTimestamp)).toString("hex");
+            logger.info("session.inbound.accepted", {
+                sessionId: parsed.sessionIdHex,
+                agentName,
+                sessionPeerId: result.peerId,
+                correlationId,
+            });
+            // MONIKER-2 AC2: a present-but-invalid moniker is a red flag (the sender runs modified
+            // code) — logged with the spec'd fields and NEVER the raw value. Not grounds to refuse
+            // the session (version skew is real; refusing hands strangers a DoS lever).
+            if (parsed.monikerRejected) {
+                logger.info("moniker.rejected", {
+                    agentName,
+                    pubkey: parsed.participantAPubkeyHex,
+                    reason: parsed.monikerRejectReason ?? "invalid",
+                    correlationId,
+                });
+            }
+            // MONIKER-2 AC2b: display material for THIS offer/session only (never persisted, never
+            // auto-written to contacts — AC3). Session-scoped: MONIKER-4's dispatcher resolves
+            // whoLabel from here; entries are dropped when the session's terminal state dispatches.
+            // DOD-MONIKER-6: scoped to `agentName` — the agent this offer was received FOR.
+            if (parsed.offeredMoniker !== null) {
+                offeredMonikers.set(offerKey(agentName, parsed.sessionIdHex), parsed.offeredMoniker);
+                // (DOD-RENAME-1's rename-baseline update runs earlier, right after the acceptance bound — see
+                // the recordOfferedMoniker call there. This map is only the session-scoped display material.)
+            }
+            enqueueInboundSession(agentName, {
+                sessionIdHex: parsed.sessionIdHex,
+                counterpartyPubkeyHex: parsed.participantAPubkeyHex,
+                genesisPrevRootHex,
+                offeredMoniker: parsed.offeredMoniker,
+            });
+            dispatchSessionStateChangedWithTelegram(agentName, parsed.sessionIdHex, "created", parsed.participantAPubkeyHex);
+            // M8C-TGDOOR-1: session requests ALWAYS ring (DoD) — no coalescing, unlike message-waiting.
+            void sendTelegramDoorbell(agentName, parsed.sessionIdHex, "session_request", "New session request");
+            // M8C-AWAY-1: an unattended agent auto-acks a fresh inbound session request. Fire-and-forget
+            // (sendAwayResponse never throws) — best-effort, must not delay/block acceptance completion.
+            void sendAwayResponse(agentName, parsed.sessionIdHex, "request");
+            // CC-1 (2026-07-07): do NOT auto-add the requester here. Accepting the *connection* must not
+            // grant *trust*. The old auto-add promoted any stranger who knocked once to "known" (Level-4
+            // fast-track), which defeated BOTH the screening layer AND the ABUSE-1 acceptance caps
+            // (a higher tier raises the per-sender cap, so auto-promoting a stranger would have let their
+            // sessions 2+ ride a larger bound — DOD-TIER-2). Promotion to "known" now requires operator engagement only:
+            // an outbound cello_initiate_session (below, ~3137), the operator replying INTO the session via
+            // cello_send, or an explicit cello_contact_add. An unattended stranger is never auto-whitelisted.
+            // See docs/planning/.../2026-07-07_1700_four-level-screening-policy.md (D21).
+        }
+        finally {
+            inboundInFlight.delete(offerKey(agentName, parsed.sessionIdHex));
+        }
+    }
+    function handleInboundSessionAssignment(frame) {
+        // M4: one correlationId minted per inbound flow, threaded through EVERY event below.
+        const correlationId = randomUUID();
+        const parsed = extractInboundSessionAssignment(frame);
+        if (!parsed) {
+            logger.warn("session.inbound.assignment.malformed", {
+                reason: "missing_assignment_or_ids",
+                correlationId,
+            });
+            return;
+        }
+        // L1: refuse M1 single-key assignments outright (downgrade guard). Distinct from the
+        // deferred FROST verification below — track it so SESSION-004's re-home keeps it.
+        if (parsed.signatureType === "single") {
+            logger.warn("session.inbound.assignment.refused", {
+                sessionId: parsed.sessionIdHex,
+                reason: "unsupported_signature_type",
+                correlationId,
+            });
+            return;
+        }
+        // M3: the initiator session peer id is the AC-015 hand-off gate (acceptSession passes
+        // it to gater.setAllowedPeer). An empty value would gate the handed-off receiver to "",
+        // defeating "only the initiator may connect". The dead stack treated this as malformed.
+        if (!parsed.initiatorPeerId) {
+            logger.warn("session.inbound.assignment.malformed", {
+                sessionId: parsed.sessionIdHex,
+                reason: "missing_initiator_peer_id",
+                correlationId,
+            });
+            return;
+        }
+        // Resolve which local agent is participant_b. participant pubkeys are the agents'
+        // K_local identity pubkeys (same convention as the seal-interrupted responder's
+        // counterparty match above). If none of our agents is the counterparty, this
+        // assignment is not for this daemon — drop it.
+        const localAgent = agents.find((ag) => ag.pubkey === parsed.participantBPubkeyHex);
+        if (!localAgent) {
+            logger.debug("session.inbound.not_local", {
+                sessionId: parsed.sessionIdHex,
+                counterpartyPubkey: parsed.participantBPubkeyHex,
+                correlationId,
+            });
+            return;
+        }
+        // DOD-INBOUND-GUARD-1 (D3): the receive-side mirror of the initiator's F13 guard (~3189).
+        // An empty counterparty endpoint means the offer-accept never happened (this agent's standing
+        // receiver was not up when the directory's session_offer arrived) and the directory signed the
+        // assignment anyway, with "empty defaults". The initiator refuses that assignment and creates
+        // NO session — accepting it here builds a phantom session whose away-reply lands in the
+        // initiator's transcript with no session row: permanently unread AND unreadable. Refuse it
+        // loudly, before any session state exists. Nothing legitimate is lost — a session whose
+        // initiator has no address to dial is unusable by construction.
+        if (!parsed.counterpartySessionPeerId) {
+            logger.warn("session.inbound.assignment.incomplete", {
+                agentName: localAgent.name,
+                sessionId: parsed.sessionIdHex,
+                correlationId,
+            });
+            return;
+        }
+        // M1: idempotency — a retransmitted assignment for an already-known session (persisted
+        // row OR currently in flight) must not double-accept (orphaned node) or double-enqueue.
+        if (inboundInFlight.has(offerKey(localAgent.name, parsed.sessionIdHex)) || sessionNodeManager.getSessionRecord(localAgent.name, parsed.sessionIdHex)) {
+            logger.info("session.inbound.duplicate.ignored", {
+                sessionId: parsed.sessionIdHex,
+                agentName: localAgent.name,
+                correlationId,
+            });
+            return;
+        }
+        // SECURITY — DEFERRED (SESSION-004 re-home): the directory's FROST threshold signature
+        // on the assignment (directory_signature over the TBS, verified against signer_pubkey)
+        // is NOT yet verified here. The old client's receiveSessionAssignment performed that
+        // check; it must be re-homed natively before this path faces a real (untrusted)
+        // directory. Until then we accept directory-pushed assignments on trust — the in-process
+        // seam tests inject trusted frames.
+        // M8B F15: logged at DEBUG with an "expected" note — it fires on EVERY healthy inbound
+        // session, and at WARN it read as a failure and actively misled live diagnosis. The
+        // deferred-verification state is a known, tracked gap (SESSION-004), not a per-session
+        // anomaly.
+        logger.debug("session.inbound.assignment.unverified", {
+            sessionId: parsed.sessionIdHex,
+            agentName: localAgent.name,
+            note: "FROST assignment signature verification deferred to SESSION-004 re-home (expected on every inbound session until SESSION-004)",
+            correlationId,
+        });
+        inboundInFlight.add(offerKey(localAgent.name, parsed.sessionIdHex));
+        // Serialize: the next accept does not begin until this one (and any standing-receiver
+        // rebuild it triggers) settles. A throw inside one accept must not break the chain.
+        const agentName = localAgent.name;
+        inboundAcceptChain = inboundAcceptChain
+            .then(() => acceptInboundAssignment(parsed, agentName, correlationId))
+            .catch((err) => {
+            inboundInFlight.delete(offerKey(localAgent.name, parsed.sessionIdHex));
+            logger.error("session.inbound.accept.error", {
+                sessionId: parsed.sessionIdHex,
+                agentName,
+                error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
+                correlationId,
+            });
+        });
+    }
+    // CELLO-M7-CONN-001 (DOD-CONN-2): wire the inbound session/seal responders onto a GIVEN
+    // signaling manager. Called for EVERY agent's own per-agent manager (via getAgentSignaling)
+    // so each agent receives inbound session_assignment + seal_interrupted_request on its OWN
+    // authenticated stream — closing the SPINE-5 gap where only the primary (whose stream WAS
+    // the keystone) received them. A frame arrives on exactly one agent's stream, so there is no
+    // double-dispatch; each handler resolves the local agent internally and that resolution
+    // matches the stream the directory routed the frame to.
+    // CELLO-M8-TRUST-001: open + verify + store + ACK a sealed trust signal pushed from the directory
+    // pickup queue. The daemon is the ONLY party that can open the seal (k_local — SI-001); it verifies
+    // the recomputed hash against the directory's anchor before storing, and ACKs only on success so the
+    // directory deletes the ciphertext (AC-001/AC-002). open-fail / hash-mismatch / store-fail → NO ACK
+    // (the directory keeps the pickup for a later retry; the signal is re-mintable).
+    async function handleTrustSignalPickup(frame, keyProvider, mgr, agentName) {
+        const id = typeof frame["id"] === "string" ? frame["id"] : null;
+        const signalKind = typeof frame["signal_kind"] === "string" ? frame["signal_kind"] : null;
+        const signalHash = typeof frame["signal_hash"] === "string" ? frame["signal_hash"] : null;
+        const ciphertext = frame["ciphertext"];
+        if (!id || !signalKind || !signalHash || !(ciphertext instanceof Uint8Array)) {
+            // Neither stores nor ACKs → the directory retains the row and re-delivers. Log it: a PERMANENTLY
+            // malformed frame would otherwise be re-delivered forever with zero daemon-side signal (fallback-finder).
+            logger.warn("daemon.trust_signal.malformed", {
+                agentName,
+                hasId: !!id,
+                hasSignalKind: !!signalKind,
+                hasSignalHash: !!signalHash,
+                ciphertextOk: ciphertext instanceof Uint8Array,
+            });
+            return;
+        }
+        if (!keyProvider.openContentSeal) {
+            // A session-node stub key cannot open content seals. No ACK → the directory re-delivers; log so a
+            // pickup persistently routed to a stub-key agent is visible rather than a silent forever-retry.
+            logger.warn("daemon.trust_signal.no_content_key", { agentName, signalKind, correlationId: id });
+            return;
+        }
+        // The pickup id correlates the directory's deliver/ack with the daemon's receive (TRUST-001 obs).
+        const correlationId = id;
+        let recovered;
+        try {
+            recovered = await keyProvider.openContentSeal(ciphertext);
+        }
+        catch {
+            recovered = null;
+        }
+        if (!recovered) {
+            logger.warn("daemon.trust_signal.open_failed", { agentName, signalKind, correlationId });
+            return;
+        }
+        const recomputed = Buffer.from(cryptoHash(recovered)).toString("hex");
+        if (recomputed !== signalHash) {
+            logger.error("daemon.trust_signal.hash_mismatch", { agentName, signalKind, correlationId });
+            return;
+        }
+        try {
+            const store = new DbIdentityStore(sessionNodeManager.getDb(), logger);
+            store.storeTrustSignal({ signalHash, agentId: null, signalKind, payload: recovered });
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            logger.error("daemon.trust_signal.store_failed", {
+                agentName,
+                signalKind,
+                correlationId,
+                error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
+            });
+            return;
+        }
+        logger.info("daemon.trust_signal.received", { agentName, signalKind, verified: true, correlationId });
+        // DOD-SENDRAW-1: sendRaw never throws — a discarded result hid every failed ack, leaving the
+        // sender to retransmit against a daemon that believed it had answered.
+        const ackRes = await mgr.sendRaw({ type: "trust_signal_ack", id });
+        if (!ackRes.ok) {
+            logger.warn("daemon.trust_signal.ack_send_failed", {
+                agentName,
+                signalKind,
+                correlationId,
+                detail: ackRes.reason ?? "send_not_ok",
+                ...(ackRes.guidance ? { guidance: ackRes.guidance } : {}),
+            });
+        }
+    }
+    function wirePerAgentSessionInbound(mgr) {
+        mgr.registerInboundHandler((frame) => {
+            if (frame["type"] !== "seal_interrupted_request")
+                return;
+            void handleInboundSealInterruptedRequest(frame);
+        });
+        mgr.registerInboundHandler((frame) => {
+            if (frame["type"] !== "session_assignment")
+                return;
+            handleInboundSessionAssignment(frame);
+        });
+    }
+    // CONN-001: test path only — the shared manager's inbound session/seal responders. Production
+    // wires them per-agent in getAgentSignaling (each agent receives on its own stream).
+    if (sharedSignaling)
+        wirePerAgentSessionInbound(sharedSignaling);
+    // M7 DOD-SPINE-7 / CELLO-M7-CONN-001: the seal-completion listeners (session_sealed /
+    // seal_unilateral_confirmed / seal_unilateral_notification) are registered PER-AGENT inside
+    // getAgentSignaling (the directory routes each over the session-owning agent's authenticated
+    // stream), and on the shared manager for the test path via wireSharedHandlers. No keystone, no
+    // runtime election — a fresh-install agent gets them when it comes online (create/start).
+    /**
+     * Phase 2: register the IPC handler, once the handler map exists.
+     *
+     * Split from construction because this module is constructed EARLY — the per-agent signaling
+     * wiring calls into it at boot, before the handler map is built. Fusing the two would force
+     * construction after the map, which pushes the eager per-agent connect below
+     * `await flushAwaitingContent()` and serializes every agent's directory handshake behind a
+     * relay drain. Same pattern as content-park.ts.
+     */
+    function registerHandlers(handlers) {
+        // cello_await_session — the counterparty's blocking pull for the next inbound session.
+        // Returns immediately if one is already queued for the current agent (FIFO), otherwise
+        // blocks until one arrives or timeout_ms elapses.
+        handlers.set("cello_await_session", async (params, connectionId) => {
+            const connState = getConnState(connectionId);
+            // CC-3 / M8C-AUTOSTART-1 F18: resolve the target agent — explicit { agent } wins, else this
+            // connection's current agent, else the sole online agent (removes the no_current_agent papercut
+            // after a /mcp reconnect when exactly one agent is online). 2+ online with none selected → null.
+            const agentName = resolveCurrentAgent(connState, params?.agent);
+            if (!agentName) {
+                return NO_CURRENT_AGENT_RESPONSE;
+            }
+            const timeoutMs = typeof params?.["timeout_ms"] === "number" ? params["timeout_ms"] : 30_000;
+            const toResponse = (e) => ({
+                type: "new_session",
+                session_id: e.sessionIdHex,
+                counterparty_pubkey: e.counterpartyPubkeyHex,
+                genesis_prev_root: e.genesisPrevRootHex,
+                // MONIKER-2: validated-at-boundary display hint; null = absent or rejected.
+                offered_moniker: e.offeredMoniker ?? null,
+            });
+            reapExpiredInboundSessions(agentName); // M8C-TTL-1: don't hand back a stale expired entry
+            const queued = inboundSessionQueues.get(agentName);
+            if (queued && queued.length > 0) {
+                return toResponse(queued.shift());
+            }
+            const event = await new Promise((resolve) => {
+                const waiters = inboundSessionWaiters.get(agentName) ?? [];
+                const waiter = {
+                    connectionId,
+                    deliver: (e) => {
+                        clearTimeout(timer);
+                        resolve(e);
+                    },
+                };
+                waiters.push(waiter);
+                inboundSessionWaiters.set(agentName, waiters);
+                const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+                    const list = inboundSessionWaiters.get(agentName);
+                    if (list) {
+                        const idx = list.indexOf(waiter);
+                        if (idx !== -1)
+                            list.splice(idx, 1);
+                    }
+                    resolve(null);
+                }, timeoutMs);
+            });
+            if (event === null)
+                return { type: "timeout" };
+            return toResponse(event);
+        });
+    }
+    return {
+        registerHandlers,
+        wirePerAgentSessionInbound,
+        handleTrustSignalPickup,
+        enqueueInboundSession,
+        reapExpiredInboundSessions,
+        inboundSessionQueues,
+        inboundSessionWaiters,
+        expiredSessionRequests,
+        offeredMonikers,
+        offerKey,
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=inbound-sessions.js.map

package/dist/inbound-sessions.js.map

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