@cello-protocol/daemon 0.0.225 → 0.0.227

package/dist/park-envelope.js

@@ -1,509 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * SEC-1 — the relay-park content envelope, and its authentication.
- *
- * WHY THIS EXISTS. Relay deposit is unauthenticated by design (the blob is E2E-encrypted, so an open
- * deposit cannot LEAK anything) and `sealToRecipient` is an ANONYMOUS public-key seal. Those two
- * facts together mean anyone holding the recipient's PUBLIC key can mint a well-formed sealed entry
- * for their mailbox. Before SEC-1 the recovery path took the sender identity from the SESSION ROW,
- * never from the envelope — so injected content was attributed to the honest counterparty, appended
- * as a Merkle leaf, and then NOTARIZED by the bilateral seal. The party best placed to exploit that
- * is the RELAY ITSELF: the protocol hands it the session_id in plaintext on every deposit and the
- * recipient pubkey is its mailbox key.
- *
- * Confidentiality was mistaken for the whole job. A relay that cannot READ your messages could still
- * WRITE them for you.
- *
- * THE FIX. Every envelope carries a per-message SENDER SIGNATURE over a domain-separated statement
- * bound to (session_id, recipient_pubkey, content_hash) — see `buildParkContentTbs`. It rides INSIDE
- * the seal, so the relay can neither read, strip, nor forge it. Recovery FAILS CLOSED.
- *
- * Note the signature is bound to the sender's own K_local and NOT to the relay's ordering record
- * (Structure1/2). That is deliberate: the ordering record embeds a RELAY-ASSIGNED sequence, so
- * making authenticity depend on it would make the adversary a precondition for trusting content.
- * It also keeps the CELLO-M7-MSG-001 crash backstop working — that path legitimately parks content
- * with no ordering record (the durable awaiting queue does not persist one), and it can still sign.
- *
- * Crypto: Ed25519 (RFC 8032), SHA-256 (FIPS 180-4).
- */
-import { timingSafeEqual, createHash } from "node:crypto";
-import { decode as cborDecode } from "cbor-x";
-import { encodeCbor } from "@cello-protocol/protocol-types";
-import { verify, sealToRecipient } from "@cello-protocol/crypto";
-import { buildParkContentTbs } from "@cello-protocol/protocol-types";
-import { CONTENT_HASH_ALGS, isKnownContentHashAlg } from "./wire-content-hash.js";
-/**
- * Compare an identity key (raw bytes) against a stored hex pubkey — on BYTES, never on the hex
- * strings.
- *
- * Review M1: `sessions.counterparty_pubkey` is persisted VERBATIM from the IPC `target_pubkey`
- * string with no normalization, so an uppercase or mixed-case pubkey is a perfectly functional
- * session (Buffer.from(hex) is case-insensitive, so dialing, sealing and the direct content path all
- * work) — but a `toString("hex") !== stored` comparison would then refuse EVERY parked recovery for
- * that session as `signer_not_counterparty`, i.e. permanent store-and-forward mail loss reported as
- * an attack. Comparing bytes makes the check independent of how the hex was cased on the way in.
- *
- * Length-guarded because timingSafeEqual throws on a length mismatch, and the input is
- * attacker-controlled (a forged envelope can carry a short/long pubkey).
- */
-export function pubkeyMatchesHex(pubkey, storedHex) {
-    if (!storedHex)
-        return false;
-    let stored;
-    try {
-        stored = Buffer.from(storedHex, "hex");
-    }
-    catch {
-        return false;
-    }
-    // Buffer.from ignores trailing garbage rather than throwing, so a length check is the real guard.
-    if (stored.length === 0 || stored.length !== pubkey.length)
-        return false;
-    return timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(pubkey), stored);
-}
-/**
- * DOD-M15-DELIVERYACK-1 unit 1 — WHAT A PARKED ENTRY IS, SAID WHERE THE RELAY CANNOT READ IT.
- *
- * The relay's mailbox holds opaque ciphertext and has no idea what is inside. An acknowledgement
- * parked there would arrive at the recipient's content-recovery path and be ingested as a MESSAGE —
- * which is why the acknowledgement could not use that path at all, and why an acknowledgement sent
- * while the sender's daemon was down was simply lost.
- *
- * So the discriminator rides INSIDE the seal. Consequences, and all three are the point:
- *  - the relay needs NO change and learns nothing new — it stays a blind custodian (INV-3);
- *  - the relay cannot strip the tag to make an acknowledgement be ingested as content, nor add one
- *    to make a message disappear into the evidence store;
- *  - the envelope's existing SEC-1 gate still runs first, so a parked acknowledgement is
- *    authenticated as coming from this session's counterparty BEFORE anything looks at what it says.
- *
- * ⚠️ THE TAG IS A WIRE VALUE. The string is the contract; renaming the constant is free, changing
- * its value breaks every parked acknowledgement already sitting in a mailbox.
- */
-export const PARKED_DELIVERY_ACK_TAG = "cello/park/delivery-ack/v1";
-/** Domain separator for the mailbox slot an acknowledgement is filed under. */
-const PARKED_DELIVERY_ACK_SLOT_DOMAIN = "CELLO-PARK-DELIVERY-ACK-SLOT-v1";
-/**
- * The relay mailbox slot a parked acknowledgement occupies.
- *
- * ⚠️ NOT the hash it acknowledges, and that is a correctness requirement rather than tidiness. The
- * relay files entries by `(recipient_pubkey, content_hash)`. Filing an acknowledgement under the
- * hash it is about would put it in the same slot a parked copy of that very message occupies, so
- * one could evict or be mistaken for the other. A labelled derivation puts it somewhere no
- * message's content hash can land, by accident or by construction.
- *
- * DETERMINISTIC on purpose: re-parking the same acknowledgement lands on the same slot, so the
- * relay's own `INSERT OR IGNORE`-shaped dedup absorbs a repeat instead of growing the mailbox.
- *
- * SHA-256 — FIPS 180-4.
- */
-export function parkedDeliveryAckMailboxHash(sessionIdHex, contentHash) {
-    return new Uint8Array(createHash("sha256")
-        .update(Buffer.from(PARKED_DELIVERY_ACK_SLOT_DOMAIN, "utf8"))
-        .update(Buffer.from(sessionIdHex, "hex"))
-        .update(Buffer.from(contentHash))
-        .digest());
-}
-/**
- * Encode a parked acknowledgement. This becomes the park envelope's `content`, so the envelope's
- * signature covers it and the seal hides it.
- */
-export function encodeParkedDeliveryAck(ack) {
-    return encodeCbor([
-        PARKED_DELIVERY_ACK_TAG,
-        ack.sessionIdHex,
-        ack.contentHash,
-        ack.ackSig,
-    ]);
-}
-/**
- * Is this park envelope's content a delivery acknowledgement? `null` means no — which is the answer
- * for every ordinary message, and must stay the answer for every ordinary message.
- *
- * 🚨 STRICT ON PURPOSE, AND IT REFUSES RATHER THAN REPAIRS. A malformed acknowledgement answers
- * `null`, which routes it to the content path where the envelope gate has already vouched for the
- * depositor and ingest will judge it on its own terms. There is no half-accepted acknowledgement:
- * the widths are exact, the tag is in the first slot only, and a hex session id that is not hex is
- * refused. A tolerant decode here would let a crafted message be filed as proof of its own delivery.
- */
-export function decodeParkedDeliveryAck(content) {
-    let arr;
-    try {
-        arr = cborDecode(content);
-    }
-    catch {
-        return null;
-    }
-    if (!Array.isArray(arr) || arr.length !== 4)
-        return null;
-    const [tag, sessionIdHex, contentHash, ackSig] = arr;
-    if (tag !== PARKED_DELIVERY_ACK_TAG)
-        return null;
-    if (typeof sessionIdHex !== "string" || !/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(sessionIdHex) || sessionIdHex.length % 2 !== 0)
-        return null;
-    if (!(contentHash instanceof Uint8Array) || contentHash.length !== 32)
-        return null;
-    if (!(ackSig instanceof Uint8Array) || ackSig.length !== 64)
-        return null;
-    return { sessionIdHex, contentHash, ackSig };
-}
-/** Current envelope version. v1 (unsigned) is decodable but NEVER acceptable — see authenticate(). */
-export const PARK_ENVELOPE_VERSION = 2;
-/**
- * v3 — a v2 envelope plus the CONTENT-HASH ALGORITHM (`DOD-M15-SEALWIRE-1` part B2a).
- *
- * ⚠️ EMITTED ONLY WHEN THE ALGORITHM IS NOT THE DEFAULT, and that is the whole compatibility story.
- * Every envelope this build produces today is still v2, because nothing salts — so no current peer
- * sees a version it cannot read.
- *
- * 🚨 AND THE GATE IS A PUBLISHING FACT, NOT A STRUCTURAL ONE — review B2a F6 corrected this. The
- * header used to claim *"a salted envelope can only be addressed to a peer that completed the salt
- * agreement, and a build able to do that necessarily contains this decoder."* **False as stated:**
- * the salt agreement landed several commits before this decoder, so any build cut from that interval
- * has the agreement and not the decoder. On such a peer a v3 envelope matches no decode branch,
- * falls through to the bare-content v1 shape, and `authenticateParkedEntry` refuses it as
- * `unsigned_envelope` — the ATTACKER shape — the entry is never confirm-deleted, and it re-pulls
- * forever. Exactly the failure this unit exists to prevent.
- *
- * What is true, and checkable: **no published build has the salt agreement without this decoder** —
- * nothing in that interval is tagged. Part B2b must therefore gate salting on a real peer-capability
- * signal rather than inferring capability from "they completed the salt agreement".
- *
- * Why the algorithm is NOT in the signed statement: `parkSig` covers `(session_id, recipient_pubkey,
- * content_hash)` — the HASH, not the name of the function that produced it. Adding the name would
- * change `buildParkContentTbs`, a cross-repo type, for no security gain. An attacker who flips the
- * name cannot make altered content verify, because the recomputed hash must still equal the SIGNED
- * one; a flip can only turn an acceptance into a REFUSAL. `dod-m15-park-envelope-alg.test.ts` pins
- * that, because "only a refusal" is a claim rather than a hope.
- */
-export const PARK_ENVELOPE_VERSION_ALG = 3;
-/**
- * v4 — a v3 envelope plus THE SENDER'S SIGNATURE OVER `structure1Cbor` (034-CARRYLEAF review F1).
- *
- * ⚠️ **WITHOUT IT, A WITHHELD MESSAGE THAT ARRIVES BY MAILBOX CANNOT BE WITNESSED, and the
- * withholding attack stays open on that route.**
- *
- * The direct path closed it: a message arriving with no relay ordering record is witnessed by its
- * RECIPIENT, using the author's own signature carried beside the bytes it signs. The mailbox route
- * had no such field — this envelope carried `structure1Cbor` and no signature over it, because
- * `parkSig` covers `(session_id, recipient_pubkey, content_hash)`, a different statement. So the
- * recipient held the author's words and nothing the relay would accept as proof of them, and a
- * counterparty who parked instead of hand-delivering still truncated the record.
- *
- * The algorithm rides at index 6 exactly as on v3 and is ALWAYS present here, so the shape is a
- * clean superset rather than a second optional tail nobody can parse positionally.
- *
- * **This is the emit half only.** A v2 or v3 envelope is still accepted — refusing one would destroy
- * store-and-forward mail already sitting in every relay mailbox, which is the failure
- * `SIGNED_ENVELOPE_VERSIONS` exists to prevent. Requiring v4 is a later step, once nothing in the
- * field emits the older shapes; until then this route is closed against a stock client and open to
- * one that deliberately strips the field.
- */
-export const PARK_ENVELOPE_VERSION_S1SIG = 4;
-/** The message leaf domain — the default a v4 envelope names when its caller does not. */
-const LEAF_KIND_MSG_DOMAIN = 0x00;
-/**
- * The versions that carry a sender signature and may therefore be authenticated.
- *
- * A SET, not a single constant, and the difference is mail loss. `authenticateParkedEntry` refused
- * anything whose version was not the one `PARK_ENVELOPE_VERSION` names — so bumping that constant to
- * 3 would have turned every v2 envelope sitting in every relay mailbox into `unsigned_envelope`:
- * store-and-forward mail destroyed, and reported as an attack.
- */
-const SIGNED_ENVELOPE_VERSIONS = new Set([
-    PARK_ENVELOPE_VERSION,
-    PARK_ENVELOPE_VERSION_ALG,
-    PARK_ENVELOPE_VERSION_S1SIG,
-]);
-/**
- * Why this build refused to SEAL an entry — the producer side, distinct from `ParkAuthFailure`,
- * which is why it refused to ACCEPT one.
- */
-export const PARK_ENVELOPE_REASONS = {
-    /** The entry names a content-hash algorithm this build cannot itself reproduce. */
-    ALG_UNREADABLE: "park_envelope_alg_unreadable",
-};
-/**
- * The relay's park-refusal codes.
- *
- * ⚠️ RE-EXPORTED FROM `@cello-protocol/protocol-types`, NOT declared here. They used to be a private
- * copy that happened to agree with the relay's strings — verified by hand once, which is not a
- * guard. A rename on the relay side would have left this copy silently unmatched, falling through to
- * the generic "the relay link is down" wording: the exact defect this family of work removed,
- * reintroduced by a change nobody would think of as a protocol change.
- */
-import { RELAY_PARK_REFUSALS } from "@cello-protocol/protocol-types";
-export { RELAY_PARK_REFUSALS };
-/**
- * A REFUSAL TO SEAL, carrying a code the caller can branch on — `DOD-M15-SEALWIRE-1` B2b-2
- * constraint 6, inherited from B2a's review.
- *
- * ⚠️ THE PROSE WAS NEVER THE PROBLEM; WHERE IT LANDED WAS. This threw a bare `Error` with a clear
- * paragraph, and `#parkContent`'s catch put `err.message` into `cause` — a field its own callers
- * document as the MACHINE-READABLE half, added (M12-P13) so that nobody would have to substring-match
- * English to decide what to do. A paragraph there is unbranchable, so this fault fell into the
- * generic relay branch and inherited its guidance: *"the relay refused the hand-off, so the message
- * is queued and will be re-sent automatically when the relay link is back."*
- *
- * Both halves of that are false here. The relay was never asked, and every re-park throws in exactly
- * the same place, so the message sits in the queue while its sender waits for a recovery that cannot
- * happen. Splitting the code from the prose is what lets the caller say something true instead.
- */
-export class ParkEnvelopeError extends Error {
-    reason;
-    /** The offending value alone, so a caller can log it without re-parsing the sentence. */
-    detail;
-    constructor(reason, detail, message) {
-        super(message);
-        this.name = "ParkEnvelopeError";
-        this.reason = reason;
-        this.detail = detail;
-    }
-}
-/**
- * SEC-1: encode a SIGNED park envelope. `senderPubkey` and `parkSig` are REQUIRED — the type system
- * is the enforcement point, so no call site can construct an unsigned envelope by omission (the
- * exact drift that made this a downgrade attack: verification existed, but was opt-in).
- */
-export function encodeParkEnvelope(args) {
-    const base = [
-        args.content,
-        args.structure1Cbor ?? null,
-        args.structure2Cbor ?? null,
-        args.senderPubkey,
-        args.parkSig,
-    ];
-    /**
-     * The DEFAULT algorithm stays on v2 even when named explicitly. A caller that starts passing the
-     * algorithm through would otherwise push every envelope to a version older peers cannot read,
-     * without anyone having decided to.
-     *
-     * ABSENT is `undefined`/`null` ONLY, never "falsy" — review B2a F4. `!args.contentHashAlg` also
-     * caught the EMPTY STRING, which is the collapse `resolveContentHashAlg` documents as forbidden
-     * and which this file's own `contentHashAlg` doc cites B1 for. A caller whose variable is `""`
-     * would have emitted a v2 envelope labelled sha256-by-absence, and the recipient would report a
-     * tamper on a message nobody touched.
-     */
-    const alg = args.contentHashAlg;
-    /**
-     * v4 WHEN THE ORDERING CLAIM IS SIGNED — 034-CARRYLEAF. Checked before the algorithm branches,
-     * because v4 always carries the algorithm slot and a v2/v3 decision would drop the signature.
-     * Both fields must be present: a signature with no claim to check it against is not evidence.
-     */
-    if (args.structure1Signature && args.structure1Cbor) {
-        const named = alg === undefined || alg === null ? CONTENT_HASH_ALGS.SHA256 : alg;
-        if (!isKnownContentHashAlg(named)) {
-            throw new ParkEnvelopeError(PARK_ENVELOPE_REASONS.ALG_UNREADABLE, named, `PARK ENVELOPE: refusing to seal an entry naming content-hash algorithm "${named}", which ` +
-                "this build cannot itself reproduce.");
-        }
-        return encodeCbor([
-            PARK_ENVELOPE_VERSION_S1SIG, ...base, named, args.structure1Signature, args.leafKind ?? LEAF_KIND_MSG_DOMAIN,
-        ]);
-    }
-    if (alg === undefined || alg === null || alg === CONTENT_HASH_ALGS.SHA256) {
-        return encodeCbor([PARK_ENVELOPE_VERSION, ...base]);
-    }
-    /**
-     * REFUSE TO EMIT A NAME WE CANNOT READ OURSELVES — the producer-side mirror of what
-     * `contentHashFor` already does, and it costs nothing to have.
-     *
-     * Without it a caller can seal an envelope every peer refuses — including this build — with no
-     * signal at the sender at all: the message parks, is pulled, is refused, is kept, and repeats.
-     * A throw here is a developer error at the moment it is made, rather than a silent mail loop.
-     */
-    if (!isKnownContentHashAlg(alg)) {
-        throw new ParkEnvelopeError(PARK_ENVELOPE_REASONS.ALG_UNREADABLE, alg, `PARK ENVELOPE: refusing to seal an entry naming content-hash algorithm "${alg}", which this ` +
-            "build cannot itself reproduce. The recipient would refuse it and keep re-pulling it forever, " +
-            "and nothing at the sender would say why.");
-    }
-    return encodeCbor([PARK_ENVELOPE_VERSION_ALG, ...base, alg]);
-}
-/**
- * SEC-1 — THE ONLY PRODUCER. Sign the entry as the sending agent, wrap it in a v2 envelope, and seal
- * it to the recipient. Both park sites (the live hook and the crash backstop) call THIS, so the
- * to-be-signed arguments are constructed in exactly one place.
- *
- * Review (hollow-test finding): while the two call sites each built their own signature, a producer
- * that signed the WRONG TBS arguments — e.g. its own pubkey where the recipient's belongs — would
- * emit envelopes no recipient could ever accept, and every consumer-side test would still pass. The
- * bug would only surface as mail that silently never arrives. One producer + a round-trip test
- * against the real consumer removes that whole class: if this function signs the wrong statement,
- * `authenticateParkedEntry` rejects its output and the test goes red.
- */
-export async function sealParkEnvelope(args) {
-    const senderPubkey = await args.signer.getPublicKey();
-    const parkSig = await args.signer.sign(buildParkContentTbs(args.sessionIdHex, args.recipientPubkey, args.contentHash));
-    const envelope = encodeParkEnvelope({
-        content: args.content,
-        structure1Cbor: args.structure1Cbor,
-        structure2Cbor: args.structure2Cbor,
-        structure1Signature: args.structure1Signature,
-        leafKind: args.leafKind,
-        senderPubkey,
-        parkSig,
-        contentHashAlg: args.contentHashAlg,
-    });
-    // The signature rides INSIDE the seal — the relay (the adversary) never sees it, so it can neither
-    // strip nor forge it. INV-3 is untouched: the relay still holds only ciphertext.
-    return sealToRecipient(args.recipientPubkey, envelope);
-}
-/**
- * Decode a park envelope. Legacy shapes (the pre-SEC-1 4-element v1 array, and raw non-CBOR bare
- * content) still DECODE — deliberately, so `authenticate` can reject them with a precise reason
- * rather than the caller seeing an opaque parse failure. Decoding is not accepting.
- */
-export function decodeParkEnvelope(plaintext) {
-    try {
-        const arr = cborDecode(plaintext);
-        // v3 first: a v2 envelope plus the content-hash algorithm as a 7th element.
-        // v4 FIRST — longest shape first, so a v4 array can never be read as a shorter one.
-        if (Array.isArray(arr) && arr.length === 9 && arr[0] === PARK_ENVELOPE_VERSION_S1SIG && arr[1] instanceof Uint8Array) {
-            return {
-                version: PARK_ENVELOPE_VERSION_S1SIG,
-                content: arr[1],
-                structure1Cbor: arr[2] instanceof Uint8Array ? arr[2] : undefined,
-                structure2Cbor: arr[3] instanceof Uint8Array ? arr[3] : undefined,
-                senderPubkey: arr[4] instanceof Uint8Array ? arr[4] : undefined,
-                parkSig: arr[5] instanceof Uint8Array ? arr[5] : undefined,
-                contentHashAlg: typeof arr[6] === "string" ? arr[6] : undefined,
-                structure1Signature: arr[7] instanceof Uint8Array ? arr[7] : undefined,
-                leafKind: typeof arr[8] === "number" ? arr[8] : undefined,
-            };
-        }
-        if (Array.isArray(arr) && arr.length === 7 && arr[0] === PARK_ENVELOPE_VERSION_ALG && arr[1] instanceof Uint8Array) {
-            return {
-                version: PARK_ENVELOPE_VERSION_ALG,
-                content: arr[1],
-                structure1Cbor: arr[2] instanceof Uint8Array ? arr[2] : undefined,
-                structure2Cbor: arr[3] instanceof Uint8Array ? arr[3] : undefined,
-                senderPubkey: arr[4] instanceof Uint8Array ? arr[4] : undefined,
-                parkSig: arr[5] instanceof Uint8Array ? arr[5] : undefined,
-                // A non-string here stays ABSENT rather than being coerced. `resolveContentHashAlg` refuses
-                // a name it cannot read; it must never be handed a `"42"` that looks like one.
-                contentHashAlg: typeof arr[6] === "string" ? arr[6] : undefined,
-            };
-        }
-        if (Array.isArray(arr) && arr.length === 6 && arr[0] === PARK_ENVELOPE_VERSION && arr[1] instanceof Uint8Array) {
-            return {
-                version: PARK_ENVELOPE_VERSION,
-                content: arr[1],
-                structure1Cbor: arr[2] instanceof Uint8Array ? arr[2] : undefined,
-                structure2Cbor: arr[3] instanceof Uint8Array ? arr[3] : undefined,
-                senderPubkey: arr[4] instanceof Uint8Array ? arr[4] : undefined,
-                parkSig: arr[5] instanceof Uint8Array ? arr[5] : undefined,
-            };
-        }
-        // Pre-SEC-1 v1 envelope: [1, content, s1|null, s2|null]. Decoded so it can be REFUSED by name.
-        if (Array.isArray(arr) && arr.length === 4 && arr[0] === 1 && arr[1] instanceof Uint8Array) {
-            return {
-                version: 1,
-                content: arr[1],
-                structure1Cbor: arr[2] instanceof Uint8Array ? arr[2] : undefined,
-                structure2Cbor: arr[3] instanceof Uint8Array ? arr[3] : undefined,
-            };
-        }
-    }
-    catch {
-        /* not an envelope — fall through to raw bare content */
-    }
-    return { version: 1, content: plaintext };
-}
-/**
- * SEC-1: the authentication decision for a recovered parked entry. FAIL CLOSED — every path that is
- * not a proven-good signature from THIS session's counterparty returns a failure.
- *
- * `counterpartyPubkeyHex` is the session's counterparty (the only principal allowed to have parked
- * content into this session). Pass undefined when the session/counterparty is unknown: that is
- * `counterparty_unknown` and is a REFUSAL, never a bypass — we cannot prove the signer, so we do not
- * trust the content. (Same fail-closed stance the ordering-record check already takes.)
- */
-export function authenticateParkedEntry(args) {
-    const { env, sessionIdHex, recipientPubkey, contentHash, counterpartyPubkeyHex } = args;
-    // 1. Unsigned (v1 envelope, or raw bare content) — the shape an attacker sends, and the shape the
-    //    pre-SEC-1 daemon ingested without a single check. Refused outright.
-    if (!SIGNED_ENVELOPE_VERSIONS.has(env.version) || !env.senderPubkey || !env.parkSig) {
-        return { ok: false, reason: "unsigned_envelope" };
-    }
-    // 2. Fail closed when there is no counterparty to bind the signer to.
-    if (!counterpartyPubkeyHex) {
-        return { ok: false, reason: "counterparty_unknown" };
-    }
-    // 3. The signature must cover THESE bytes, for THIS session, into THIS mailbox. Verified BEFORE
-    //    the signer check so a forged signature is never mistaken for a wrong-principal one.
-    const tbs = buildParkContentTbs(sessionIdHex, recipientPubkey, contentHash);
-    if (!verify(env.senderPubkey, tbs, env.parkSig)) {
-        return { ok: false, reason: "bad_signature" };
-    }
-    // 4. The signer MUST be this session's counterparty. A cryptographically valid signature by any
-    //    other key is still a forgery of THIS conversation. Compared on BYTES (review M1) — the stored
-    //    hex is un-normalized, so a string compare would turn a mixed-case pubkey into permanent
-    //    mail loss that looks exactly like an attack in the log.
-    if (!pubkeyMatchesHex(env.senderPubkey, counterpartyPubkeyHex)) {
-        return { ok: false, reason: "signer_not_counterparty" };
-    }
-    return { ok: true };
-}
-/**
- * The operator-facing guidance for a refused park hand-off — **a pure function, deliberately.**
- *
- * ⚠️ It was an inline ternary inside `sendContent`, which meant the only way to assert any branch of
- * it was to stand up a two-connection fixture and drive a real send. That is why the branch that was
- * WRONG for a throttling relay survived: nothing cheap could reach it. A guidance string is a
- * decision about what a person does next, and it deserves to be testable on its own.
- *
- * `durable` distinguishes "queued and will retry" from "not queued — it is lost", which is the one
- * distinction that changes whether the reader must act right now.
- */
-export function parkRefusalGuidance(cause, durable, retryAfterMs) {
-    if (cause === PARK_ENVELOPE_REASONS.ALG_UNREADABLE) {
-        return ("This message names a content-hash algorithm your build cannot produce, so it could not be " +
-            "sealed for hand-off. The relay is NOT involved and this will not clear on its own — the " +
-            "message is safely stored but every retry fails the same way. Upgrade to a build that knows " +
-            "the algorithm, or start a new session with this counterparty. Re-sending on this build " +
-            "changes nothing.");
-    }
-    /**
-     * ⚠️ DIAGNOSIS AND ACTION ARE COMPOSED, NOT WRITTEN TOGETHER — and this shape is the fix for a
-     * defect review found in the first version.
-     *
-     * That version returned a complete paragraph per cause and **never consulted `durable`**, so all
-     * three new branches ended "The message is queued and re-sent automatically. Do not re-send it."
-     * `durable` is OBSERVED, not assumed: it is false when the durable enqueue was refused as a
-     * duplicate, or when the retry hook is unwired. In that case the daemon logs at ERROR that the
-     * content is *not* separately retained while the operator was simultaneously told it was queued
-     * and instructed not to re-send. **Nothing held the message.** That is precisely the lie this
-     * family of work exists to kill, reintroduced one layer up.
-     *
-     * Splitting them makes the mistake unavailable: the action half is produced in exactly one place
-     * and cannot be reached without reading the flag.
-     */
-    const diagnosis = cause === RELAY_PARK_REFUSALS.RATE_LIMITED
-        ? `The relay is healthy and deliberately rate-limiting this agent's hand-offs, so it refused this one. NOTHING IS WRONG with the link or the counterparty, and the limit clears on its own${describeRetryWindow(retryAfterMs)}.`
-        : cause === RELAY_PARK_REFUSALS.RECIPIENT_FULL
-            ? "The relay is holding as much undelivered content for THIS counterparty as it will, so it refused the hand-off. That is about their mailbox, not your connection, and another relay would refuse it too. It clears when they come online and collect it, or when older entries expire."
-            : cause === RELAY_PARK_REFUSALS.STORE_FULL
-                ? "The relay's parked-content store is full, so it refused the hand-off. The link is fine. If this persists the relay operator needs to know — it means the store is under sustained pressure."
-                : null;
-    if (diagnosis !== null) {
-        return durable
-            ? `${diagnosis} The message is queued and re-sent automatically. Do not re-send it: an identical re-send is not separately queued.`
-            : `${diagnosis} ⚠️ BUT THIS MESSAGE WAS NOT QUEUED — it is lost. Send it again.`;
-    }
-    return durable
-        ? "Direct delivery failed and the relay refused the hand-off, so the message is queued and will be re-sent automatically when the relay link is back. Do not re-send it: an identical re-send is not separately queued."
-        : "Direct delivery failed and the message could NOT be queued for retry — it is lost. Send it again.";
-}
-/**
- * Render the relay's own retry delay, or say nothing at all.
- *
- * ⚠️ SAYS NOTHING WHEN THE RELAY DID NOT SAY — review MEDIUM-6. The first version of the guidance
- * asserted the limit clears *"in about a minute"*, which is a hardcoded guess about the relay's
- * CONFIGURABLE window: a relay run at ten minutes makes that a wrong promise, and a wrong number is
- * worse than no number because the reader plans around it. When the relay tells us, we quote it;
- * when it does not, the sentence simply ends.
- */
-function describeRetryWindow(retryAfterMs) {
-    if (retryAfterMs === undefined || !Number.isFinite(retryAfterMs) || retryAfterMs <= 0)
-        return "";
-    const seconds = Math.ceil(retryAfterMs / 1000);
-    return seconds < 90 ? ` in about ${String(seconds)} seconds` : ` in about ${String(Math.ceil(seconds / 60))} minutes`;
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=park-envelope.js.map

package/dist/park-envelope.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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