@cello-protocol/daemon 0.0.194 → 0.0.195

package/dist/assignment-verify.d.ts

@@ -11,6 +11,13 @@ import type { Logger } from "./types.js";
  */
 export declare function verifyAssignmentSignature(assignment: SessionAssignment, persistence: DbRegistrationPersistence, logger: Logger, agentName: string, correlationId: string): Promise<{
     ok: true;
+    /**
+     * 038-KEYBIND. The COUNTERPARTY's FROST group public key, hex, having been proved theirs by a
+     * signature under their own K_local. Returned rather than left on the frame so the caller
+     * cannot pin a value that was never checked — the only way to hold this string is to have
+     * come through the binding check below.
+     */
+    counterpartyPrimaryHex: string;
 } | {
     ok: false;
     reason: string;
@@ -38,22 +45,43 @@ export declare function verifyAssignmentSignature(assignment: SessionAssignment,
  * that is a real check: a compromised directory can produce a signature, but not one that verifies
  * under a key it does not hold.
  *
- * ─── Two modes, and the weaker one is honest about being weaker ────────────────────────────────
+ * ─── 038-KEYBIND CLOSED THE CIRCLE, AND THIS PARAGRAPH REPLACES THE ONE THAT ADMITTED IT ───────
  *
- * PINNED (`expectedSignerHex` given): the signature must verify under the PINNED key. Non-circular.
- * This is the mode that matters, and it covers every repeat counterparty.
+ * ⚠️ THE OLD TEXT HERE IS KEPT AS EVIDENCE RATHER THAN DELETED, because it is the record of a real
+ * bound that someone reasoned their way to and wrote down. It said: *"UNPINNED (first contact):
+ * there is nothing independent to verify against, so this checks INTERNAL CONSISTENCY only… That
+ * does NOT authenticate the directory, and it is not claimed to."* That was true of the code as it
+ * stood, and the `verifyAgainst` line below really did fall back to `assignment.signer_pubkey` — a
+ * field of the very document under verification. The signature therefore always verified, and the
+ * key it verified under was then PINNED as the counterparty's identity forever.
  *
- * UNPINNED (first contact): there is nothing independent to verify against, so this checks INTERNAL
- * CONSISTENCY only — the signature verifies over the TBS recomputed from the assignment's own
- * contents, under the key the frame names. That does NOT authenticate the directory, and it is not
- * claimed to. What it does catch is a TAMPERED or garbage assignment — one whose fields were altered
- * after signing, or whose signature is noise — which today reaches the seal path unchallenged and
- * gets PINNED, poisoning every later session with that counterparty. Refusing it here is what stops
- * a bad first contact becoming a permanent one.
+ * It is no longer true, and the thing that changed is not a stronger check on the same evidence —
+ * it is NEW evidence on the wire. `participant_a_key_binding` is a signature by the INITIATOR's own
+ * K_local naming their group key. No directory holds that key, so no directory can name a group key
+ * of its choosing. The group key stops being something the frame ASSERTS and becomes something a
+ * signature PROVES.
+ *
+ * ─── The order of the two checks is the fix, not an optimisation ───────────────────────────────
+ *
+ * The binding is verified FIRST, and the threshold signature is then verified under the key the
+ * binding proved. There is no path to the signature check that does not pass through it: `signer`
+ * is not used as a verification key anywhere below, and a missing or bad binding returns before the
+ * TBS is even built.
+ *
+ * ─── Two modes, and neither is circular any more ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+ *
+ * PINNED (`expectedSignerHex` given): the signature must verify under the PINNED key — a value THIS
+ * daemon recorded in an earlier session, which no directory can retroactively change. The binding
+ * still runs; the pin is now a consistency check ACROSS TIME rather than the sole authority.
+ *
+ * FIRST CONTACT: the signature verifies under the group key `participant_a`'s identity key vouched
+ * for. What it still cannot tell you is whether `participant_a` is who you think they are — that is
+ * the operator's out-of-band problem and always was — but a directory can no longer substitute a
+ * group key, which is what this function existed to be unable to say.
  */
 export declare function verifyInboundAssignment(assignment: SessionAssignment, expectedSignerHex: string | null): {
     ok: true;
-    mode: "pinned" | "internal";
+    mode: "pinned" | "bound";
 } | {
     ok: false;
     reason: string;

package/dist/assignment-verify.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"assignment-verify.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/assignment-verify.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAkBA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,gCAAgC,CAAC;AACxE,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AACxE,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAEzC;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,wBAAsB,yBAAyB,CAC7C,UAAU,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAC7B,WAAW,EAAE,yBAAyB,EACtC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EACd,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,EACjB,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,GACpB,OAAO,CACN;IACE,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;IACT;;;;;OAKG;IACH,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAChC,GACD;IAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,CAClD,CAkKA;AAGD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAuDG;AACH,wBAAgB,uBAAuB,CACrC,UAAU,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAC7B,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,GAC/B;IAAE,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;IAAC,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAG,OAAO,CAAA;CAAE,GAAG;IAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,CAsGxF"}

package/dist/assignment-verify.js

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 // removed with the downgrade refusal (review F1). Verifying `directory_signature` against the
 // `directory_pubkey` riding beside it in the same unsigned frame checks a key against itself, and
 // having that call available is how a future edit reintroduces the bypass.
-import { verifyFrostSignature, CONTEXT_SESSION_ESTABLISHMENT } from "@cello-protocol/crypto";
+import { verifyFrostSignature, verifyKeyBinding, CONTEXT_SESSION_ESTABLISHMENT } from "@cello-protocol/crypto";
 import { buildSessionEstablishmentTbs, computeGenesisPrevRoot } from "@cello-protocol/protocol-types";
 /**
  * DOD-M15-ASSIGN-1 — verify a session assignment's signature before anything trusts it.
@@ -109,7 +109,59 @@ export async function verifyAssignmentSignature(assignment, persistence, logger,
                 guidance: "The directory's session assignment did not verify against the key that should have signed it. Nothing was established. Retry the session; if it repeats, the directory you reached is not producing valid assignments and cello status will show which one that is.",
             };
         }
-        return { ok: true };
+        /**
+         * 038-KEYBIND — LEARN THE COUNTERPARTY'S GROUP KEY, AND ONLY IF THEY VOUCHED FOR IT.
+         *
+         * The initiator never used to learn the responder's group key at all. The cost was concrete and
+         * one-directional: when the RESPONDER closed the conversation first, the seal certificate came
+         * back signed by their group key, this daemon held no copy, and it accepted the certificate
+         * with `verified:false` / `signer_key_not_held`. The receipt for a conversation you had was
+         * taken on faith in the channel it arrived on.
+         *
+         * `participant_b_primary_pubkey` alone would not fix that — it would move the same circularity
+         * to the other side, where a directory names a group key and we write it down. The BINDING is
+         * what makes it a fact: a signature under `participant_b`'s K_local. No directory holds that
+         * key, so no directory can put a group key of its choosing here.
+         *
+         * ⚠️ THE ANCHOR IS `participant_b.pubkey`, AND THIS FUNCTION DOES NOT CHECK IT. An earlier draft
+         * of this note said the caller "has already compared" it against the operator's `target_pubkey`;
+         * it has not — `outbound-sessions.ts` runs that comparison ~50 lines AFTER this call, and
+         * getting the order backwards in a comment is how someone later moves the pinning above it.
+         *
+         * What makes the returned key safe to pin is that the caller RETURNS on a target mismatch, so
+         * nothing reaches `recordCounterpartyPrimary` unless `participant_b` is the counterparty the
+         * operator asked for. The ordering is load-bearing and lives at the call site, not here.
+         */
+        const counterpartyBinding = assignment.participant_b_key_binding;
+        const counterpartyPrimary = assignment.participant_b_primary_pubkey;
+        if (!counterpartyBinding || !counterpartyPrimary) {
+            // ABSENT AND MALFORMED TAKE THIS PATH TOGETHER (the parser maps a wrong-length value to
+            // undefined). An attacker who cannot forge a binding evades a mismatch check by supplying
+            // none, so "we could not tell" must cost exactly what "it was wrong" costs.
+            logger.error("session.assignment.counterparty_binding_absent", {
+                agentName, correlationId,
+                hasBinding: !!counterpartyBinding, hasPrimary: !!counterpartyPrimary,
+                impact: "the assignment carried no proof that the counterparty's threshold group key is theirs, so this agent could not learn a key it would later have to trust for their seal; the session was refused before any dial and nothing was sent",
+            });
+            return {
+                ok: false,
+                reason: "assignment_counterparty_binding_absent",
+                guidance: "The directory returned a session assignment without the counterparty's key binding — the signature that proves their threshold key belongs to the identity you asked for. Nothing was opened and nothing you wrote was sent. Retry cello_initiate_session; a different directory node will serve it. If it repeats on every node, the counterparty registered against a directory that predates this proof and they need to re-register before you can reach them.",
+            };
+        }
+        if (!verifyKeyBinding(counterpartyBinding, assignment.participant_b.pubkey, counterpartyPrimary)) {
+            logger.error("session.assignment.counterparty_binding_invalid", {
+                agentName, correlationId,
+                counterpartyPrefix: Buffer.from(assignment.participant_b.pubkey).toString("hex").slice(0, 16),
+                impact: "the assignment named a threshold group key for the counterparty that their own identity key has not vouched for; it was refused before any dial, so no conversation was opened and nothing was sent",
+            });
+            return {
+                ok: false,
+                reason: "assignment_counterparty_binding_invalid",
+                guidance: "The directory named a threshold key for your counterparty that their own identity key has not signed for. This is refused rather than reported because the observation cannot tell a directory fault from an attempt to put a key it controls in their place; cause undetermined. Run cello_status to see which node answered and retry — if it repeats across nodes, confirm the counterparty's pubkey with their operator out of band before trying again.",
+            };
+        }
+        return { ok: true, counterpartyPrimaryHex: Buffer.from(counterpartyPrimary).toString("hex") };
     }
 }
 /**
@@ -134,18 +186,39 @@ export async function verifyAssignmentSignature(assignment, persistence, logger,
  * that is a real check: a compromised directory can produce a signature, but not one that verifies
  * under a key it does not hold.
  *
- * ─── Two modes, and the weaker one is honest about being weaker ────────────────────────────────
+ * ─── 038-KEYBIND CLOSED THE CIRCLE, AND THIS PARAGRAPH REPLACES THE ONE THAT ADMITTED IT ───────
+ *
+ * ⚠️ THE OLD TEXT HERE IS KEPT AS EVIDENCE RATHER THAN DELETED, because it is the record of a real
+ * bound that someone reasoned their way to and wrote down. It said: *"UNPINNED (first contact):
+ * there is nothing independent to verify against, so this checks INTERNAL CONSISTENCY only… That
+ * does NOT authenticate the directory, and it is not claimed to."* That was true of the code as it
+ * stood, and the `verifyAgainst` line below really did fall back to `assignment.signer_pubkey` — a
+ * field of the very document under verification. The signature therefore always verified, and the
+ * key it verified under was then PINNED as the counterparty's identity forever.
+ *
+ * It is no longer true, and the thing that changed is not a stronger check on the same evidence —
+ * it is NEW evidence on the wire. `participant_a_key_binding` is a signature by the INITIATOR's own
+ * K_local naming their group key. No directory holds that key, so no directory can name a group key
+ * of its choosing. The group key stops being something the frame ASSERTS and becomes something a
+ * signature PROVES.
+ *
+ * ─── The order of the two checks is the fix, not an optimisation ───────────────────────────────
  *
- * PINNED (`expectedSignerHex` given): the signature must verify under the PINNED key. Non-circular.
- * This is the mode that matters, and it covers every repeat counterparty.
+ * The binding is verified FIRST, and the threshold signature is then verified under the key the
+ * binding proved. There is no path to the signature check that does not pass through it: `signer`
+ * is not used as a verification key anywhere below, and a missing or bad binding returns before the
+ * TBS is even built.
  *
- * UNPINNED (first contact): there is nothing independent to verify against, so this checks INTERNAL
- * CONSISTENCY only — the signature verifies over the TBS recomputed from the assignment's own
- * contents, under the key the frame names. That does NOT authenticate the directory, and it is not
- * claimed to. What it does catch is a TAMPERED or garbage assignment — one whose fields were altered
- * after signing, or whose signature is noise — which today reaches the seal path unchallenged and
- * gets PINNED, poisoning every later session with that counterparty. Refusing it here is what stops
- * a bad first contact becoming a permanent one.
+ * ─── Two modes, and neither is circular any more ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+ *
+ * PINNED (`expectedSignerHex` given): the signature must verify under the PINNED key — a value THIS
+ * daemon recorded in an earlier session, which no directory can retroactively change. The binding
+ * still runs; the pin is now a consistency check ACROSS TIME rather than the sole authority.
+ *
+ * FIRST CONTACT: the signature verifies under the group key `participant_a`'s identity key vouched
+ * for. What it still cannot tell you is whether `participant_a` is who you think they are — that is
+ * the operator's out-of-band problem and always was — but a directory can no longer substitute a
+ * group key, which is what this function existed to be unable to say.
  */
 export function verifyInboundAssignment(assignment, expectedSignerHex) {
     if (assignment.signature_type !== "frost") {
@@ -159,9 +232,47 @@ export function verifyInboundAssignment(assignment, expectedSignerHex) {
     if (!signer || signer.length !== 32) {
         return { ok: false, reason: "inbound_assignment_no_signer", detail: "signer_pubkey missing or not 32 bytes" };
     }
-    // PINNED beats named. When we hold an independent value, the frame's own claim about who signed is
-    // not consulted at all — using it would reintroduce the circularity the pin exists to break.
-    const verifyAgainst = expectedSignerHex !== null ? Buffer.from(expectedSignerHex, "hex") : signer;
+    /**
+     * 038-KEYBIND — PLACE THE GROUP KEY BEFORE VERIFYING ANYTHING UNDER IT.
+     *
+     * `participant_a.pubkey` is the counterparty's K_local: the 64-hex identity their operator was
+     * given out of band, and the value this daemon keys its contacts and its pin on. The binding is a
+     * signature under THAT key naming `signer_pubkey` as its group key.
+     *
+     * ABSENT IS A REFUSAL. Tolerating a missing binding would reproduce exactly the state this exists
+     * to end — and worse, it would hand the choice to the party the check exists to catch: a
+     * directory that cannot forge a binding simply omits one, and every session goes back to
+     * verifying a key against itself. The parser maps a malformed value to `undefined`, so missing
+     * and malformed take this same path.
+     */
+    const binding = assignment.participant_a_key_binding;
+    if (!binding) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            reason: "inbound_assignment_no_key_binding",
+            detail: "the assignment carried no key binding for the initiator, so the threshold key it names could not be placed against their identity",
+        };
+    }
+    if (!verifyKeyBinding(binding, assignment.participant_a.pubkey, signer)) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            reason: "inbound_assignment_key_binding_invalid",
+            detail: "the initiator's identity key has not signed for the threshold key this assignment names as theirs",
+        };
+    }
+    /**
+     * The key the BINDING proved — not the key the frame supplied.
+     *
+     * Textually these are the same bytes, and that is worth being precise about rather than glossing:
+     * what changed is that this value is now unreachable without a signature by `participant_a`'s
+     * K_local having verified over it three lines above. A directory that names a group key it holds
+     * cannot get here at all.
+     */
+    const boundGroupKey = signer;
+    // PINNED beats bound. When we hold a value from an earlier session, that is the stronger anchor —
+    // it survives the counterparty's own key material changing, which a fresh binding would not
+    // reveal on its own.
+    const verifyAgainst = expectedSignerHex !== null ? Buffer.from(expectedSignerHex, "hex") : boundGroupKey;
     if (expectedSignerHex !== null && Buffer.from(signer).toString("hex").toLowerCase() !== expectedSignerHex.toLowerCase()) {
         return {
             ok: false,
@@ -177,9 +288,14 @@ export function verifyInboundAssignment(assignment, expectedSignerHex) {
             reason: "inbound_assignment_signature_invalid",
             detail: expectedSignerHex !== null
                 ? "the signature did not verify under the key this agent recorded for this counterparty"
-                : "the signature did not verify over the assignment's own recomputed contents — the frame is tampered or malformed",
+                : "the signature did not verify under the threshold key the initiator's identity key vouched for — the frame is tampered or malformed",
         };
     }
-    return { ok: true, mode: expectedSignerHex !== null ? "pinned" : "internal" };
+    // `bound` was `internal`, and the rename is the claim changing rather than the label.
+    // `internal` meant "internally consistent only — this proves nothing about the signer".
+    // A first contact now verifies under a group key the counterparty's own identity key signed
+    // for, so the old word would assert a weaker property than the code holds and send the next
+    // reader looking for a gap that has been closed.
+    return { ok: true, mode: expectedSignerHex !== null ? "pinned" : "bound" };
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=assignment-verify.js.map

package/dist/assignment-verify.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/authorship-verification.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/**
+ * CELLO Daemon — WHO SENT THIS, AND DID THEY SEE WHAT THEY CLAIM
+ *
+ * Split out of `session-node-manager.ts` by 036-GODFILE, Part 1. Two questions about one signed
+ * blob: did this really come from this conversation's counterparty, and is what they say they saw
+ * actually what we sent. Everything is moved verbatim — the comments are the asset and several of
+ * them record a defect that came back once already.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ THE ORDER OF THE CHECKS IS ITSELF A SECURITY PROPERTY — decode → signature → signer → what the
+ * proof is about. Everything after the signer answers `unusable`, which refuses the message and
+ * leaves the session alive; signature and signer answer `refuted`, which FREEZES it. A check that
+ * can answer before the signature is verified hands a peer a switch for choosing the softer
+ * outcome. Do not reorder these, and do not add a cheap early check above the signature.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ THIS CLASS OWNS ITS OWN STATE, which is what made it a seam rather than a split.
+ * `#receivedFromCounterparty` and `#lastFromCounterparty` are read and written nowhere else in the
+ * daemon, so they moved with the code that maintains them. Everything else it needs arrives through
+ * `AuthorshipContext` — a narrow, explicit list. No field of the manager was widened to make this
+ * possible, and the manager is not passed in as a whole.
+ */
+import type { Logger, SessionRecord } from "./types.js";
+import type { SessionTree } from "./session-tree.js";
+import { type AuthorshipVerdict } from "./session-node-types.js";
+/**
+ * Everything the verifier needs from the manager, stated explicitly rather than handed the manager
+ * itself. If this list ever grows long, that is the signal the seam has moved — not a reason to
+ * widen it.
+ */
+export interface AuthorshipContext {
+    readonly logger: Logger;
+    sessionKey(agentName: string, sessionId: string): string;
+    getSessionRecord(agentName: string, sessionId: string): SessionRecord | null;
+    getSessionTree(agentName: string, sessionId: string): SessionTree;
+    isSessionDiverged(agentName: string, sessionId: string): boolean;
+    sessionGenesisPrevRoot(agentName: string, sessionId: string): Uint8Array | undefined;
+    /** The relay's session id for this session, when a live node holds one. */
+    relaySessionIdBytes(agentName: string, sessionId: string): Uint8Array | undefined;
+    /**
+     * Content received and verified but not yet appended, because it sits behind an ordering gap.
+     *
+     * ⚠️ RETURNS THE MAP, not a flattened list, and that is deliberate: the call site's expression
+     * (`[...heldHere.values()].some(...)`) moves across unchanged. Handing back a pre-computed array
+     * of hashes would read as a tidy-up and would be a behaviour change wearing a refactor's clothes.
+     */
+    heldContentFor(agentName: string, sessionId: string): ReadonlyMap<number, {
+        contentHashHex: string;
+    }> | undefined;
+}
+export declare class AuthorshipVerifier {
+    #private;
+    constructor(ctx: AuthorshipContext);
+    /**
+       * `DOD-M15-AUTHORSHIP-ABSENT-1` — DID THIS SENDER PROVE THEY WROTE THIS MESSAGE?
+       *
+       * The one place that answers it, for both callers, so "checked" cannot mean two different things
+       * in two places. It takes the signature as an ARGUMENT rather than digging it out of a structure,
+       * which is the whole of the fix: the signature used to be read only from `structure2_cbor` — the
+       * RELAY's record — so a receiver could not check authorship without a relay record, and refusing
+       * on its absence would have made the relay a precondition for reading mail. The content frame now
+       * carries the signature beside the bytes it signs, exactly as `hash_submit` always has, and this
+       * method does not care which of the two handed it over.
+       *
+       * It VERIFIES and it does not LOG. The severity of each verdict differs by caller — the content
+       * frame refuses an `unusable`, the park path shrugs at one — and a method that logged its own
+       * conclusion would either report a refusal that did not happen or stay silent on one that did.
+       */
+    verifyAuthorshipClaim(agentName: string, sessionId: string, structure1Cbor: Uint8Array, senderSignature: Uint8Array, contentHash: Uint8Array): AuthorshipVerdict;
+    noteReceivedFromCounterparty(agentName: string, sessionId: string, contentHash: Uint8Array): void;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=authorship-verification.d.ts.map

package/dist/authorship-verification.d.ts.map

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