@celilo/cli 2.2.1 → 2.3.0

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Files changed (112) hide show
  1. package/CELILO_CORE_MODULES.md +1 -0
  2. package/CELILO_SUBSYSTEMS.md +1 -1
  3. package/README.md +1 -1
  4. package/drizzle/0032_module_jail_policies.sql +28 -0
  5. package/drizzle/0033_build_bus_hook_runs.sql +37 -0
  6. package/drizzle/meta/_journal.json +15 -1
  7. package/package.json +3 -3
  8. package/src/__integration__/container-services-cli.integration.test.ts +1 -1
  9. package/src/api/sessions.test.ts +3 -3
  10. package/src/api-clients/proxmox.ts +10 -7
  11. package/src/cli/backup-rename.test.ts +3 -3
  12. package/src/cli/cli.test.ts +1 -1
  13. package/src/cli/commands/events.test.ts +2 -2
  14. package/src/cli/commands/firewall-interface-list.test.ts +2 -2
  15. package/src/cli/commands/machine-list.test.ts +57 -0
  16. package/src/cli/commands/machine-list.ts +35 -4
  17. package/src/cli/commands/module-health.ts +1 -0
  18. package/src/cli/commands/module-import-registry.test.ts +1 -1
  19. package/src/cli/commands/module-jail.test.ts +242 -0
  20. package/src/cli/commands/module-jail.ts +227 -0
  21. package/src/cli/commands/module-list-jail.test.ts +136 -0
  22. package/src/cli/commands/module-list.ts +30 -3
  23. package/src/cli/commands/module-publish.test.ts +6 -6
  24. package/src/cli/commands/module-update.test.ts +22 -7
  25. package/src/cli/commands/module-update.ts +4 -1
  26. package/src/cli/commands/module-upgrade.test.ts +115 -1
  27. package/src/cli/commands/module-upgrade.ts +23 -1
  28. package/src/cli/commands/module-verify.test.ts +1 -1
  29. package/src/cli/commands/publish/execute.ts +4 -1
  30. package/src/cli/commands/publish/index.ts +11 -1
  31. package/src/cli/commands/publish/module-registry.test.ts +24 -1
  32. package/src/cli/commands/publish/module-registry.ts +23 -4
  33. package/src/cli/commands/publish/plan.ts +1 -1
  34. package/src/cli/commands/publish/types.ts +7 -0
  35. package/src/cli/commands/registry-owner.test.ts +1 -1
  36. package/src/cli/commands/registry-token.test.ts +1 -1
  37. package/src/cli/commands/system-audit.ts +20 -6
  38. package/src/cli/commands/system-doctor-remediation-gate.test.ts +295 -0
  39. package/src/cli/commands/system-doctor.test.ts +76 -10
  40. package/src/cli/commands/system-doctor.ts +34 -3
  41. package/src/cli/commands/system-init-deprecation.test.ts +1 -1
  42. package/src/cli/commands/system-update.ts +5 -0
  43. package/src/cli/completion.ts +8 -2
  44. package/src/cli/flag-surface-gate.test.ts +279 -0
  45. package/src/cli/index.ts +68 -2
  46. package/src/cli/parser.test.ts +37 -1
  47. package/src/cli/restore-command.test.ts +3 -3
  48. package/src/cli/restore-migration-failure.test.ts +2 -2
  49. package/src/cli/tui/audit-state.ts +2 -0
  50. package/src/config/paths.test.ts +19 -19
  51. package/src/db/client.test.ts +46 -1
  52. package/src/db/client.ts +26 -0
  53. package/src/db/schema.ts +63 -0
  54. package/src/hooks/capability-loader-firewall.test.ts +9 -1
  55. package/src/hooks/capability-loader.ts +8 -0
  56. package/src/hooks/executor.test.ts +86 -12
  57. package/src/hooks/executor.ts +31 -1
  58. package/src/hooks/hook-jail-unreachability.test.ts +17 -18
  59. package/src/hooks/hook-trespass.test.ts +9 -2
  60. package/src/hooks/jail.test.ts +105 -17
  61. package/src/hooks/jail.ts +47 -10
  62. package/src/manifest/contracts/v1.ts +13 -0
  63. package/src/policy/module-script-scan.ts +52 -68
  64. package/src/policy/no-hand-built-ssh.test.ts +5 -1
  65. package/src/policy/no-swallowed-refusal.test.ts +14 -14
  66. package/src/registry/client.test.ts +2 -2
  67. package/src/secrets/storage.test.ts +1 -1
  68. package/src/services/alerting/keys.test.ts +4 -0
  69. package/src/services/alerting/keys.ts +12 -2
  70. package/src/services/audit/health.test.ts +97 -2
  71. package/src/services/audit/health.ts +64 -2
  72. package/src/services/audit/index.test.ts +22 -0
  73. package/src/services/audit/index.ts +8 -2
  74. package/src/services/audit/jail-exemptions.test.ts +42 -0
  75. package/src/services/audit/jail-exemptions.ts +44 -0
  76. package/src/services/audit/module-integrity.test.ts +23 -1
  77. package/src/services/audit/module-integrity.ts +7 -2
  78. package/src/services/audit/types.ts +2 -1
  79. package/src/services/backup-create.ts +9 -0
  80. package/src/services/backup-envelope-roundtrip.test.ts +1 -1
  81. package/src/services/backup-in-flight-refusal.test.ts +1 -1
  82. package/src/services/build-bus/hook-dispatch-mgmt.test.ts +48 -0
  83. package/src/services/build-bus/hook-dispatcher.ts +49 -1
  84. package/src/services/bus-ensure-flow.test.ts +1 -1
  85. package/src/services/bus-interview-park.test.ts +2 -2
  86. package/src/services/bus-interview.test.ts +2 -2
  87. package/src/services/bus-secret-flow.test.ts +1 -1
  88. package/src/services/celilo-events.test.ts +1 -1
  89. package/src/services/celilo-mgmt-hooks.test.ts +23 -5
  90. package/src/services/container-service.test.ts +1 -1
  91. package/src/services/cross-module-read.test.ts +2 -2
  92. package/src/services/deploy-preflight.ts +7 -0
  93. package/src/services/deployed-systems.ts +1 -1
  94. package/src/services/fleet-checks.test.ts +123 -4
  95. package/src/services/fleet-checks.ts +176 -3
  96. package/src/services/health-runner.test.ts +87 -2
  97. package/src/services/health-runner.ts +40 -11
  98. package/src/services/infrastructure-selector.test.ts +1 -1
  99. package/src/services/jail-exemptions.test.ts +125 -0
  100. package/src/services/jail-exemptions.ts +81 -0
  101. package/src/services/machine-pool.test.ts +1 -1
  102. package/src/services/module-deploy.ts +12 -4
  103. package/src/services/module-subscriptions.test.ts +2 -2
  104. package/src/services/network-discovery.test.ts +64 -1
  105. package/src/services/network-discovery.ts +30 -5
  106. package/src/services/responder-probe.test.ts +1 -1
  107. package/src/services/restore-from-file.test.ts +4 -4
  108. package/src/services/restore-preflight.test.ts +1 -1
  109. package/src/services/ssh-key-manager.test.ts +2 -2
  110. package/src/services/system-state-stage.test.ts +2 -2
  111. package/src/services/update/orchestrator.test.ts +2 -0
  112. package/src/test-utils/bus-responder.ts +1 -1
@@ -209,9 +209,13 @@ describe('the three policies', () => {
209
209
  });
210
210
 
211
211
  test("'required' turns an unavailable jail into a hard failure (task 4.5)", () => {
212
- expect(() =>
213
- planJailedSpawn(CMD, deriveMountSet(REQUEST), UNAVAILABLE, 'required', allPresent),
214
- ).toThrow(/CELILO_HOOK_JAIL=required/);
212
+ expect(
213
+ () => planJailedSpawn(CMD, deriveMountSet(REQUEST), UNAVAILABLE, 'required', allPresent),
214
+ // Not /CELILO_HOOK_JAIL=required/. Since hook-jail-config-surface the
215
+ // policy can come from the stored `hooks.jail_policy` row or the
216
+ // default, so a message naming the variable names a source that may be
217
+ // unset.
218
+ ).toThrow(/hook jail policy is 'required'/);
215
219
  });
216
220
 
217
221
  test("'required' names the reason, so the operator can act on it", () => {
@@ -291,30 +295,42 @@ describe('jailPolicy reads the operator’s switch', () => {
291
295
 
292
296
  describe('resolveJailPolicy applies D2 precedence (hook-jail-config-surface)', () => {
293
297
  test('an env value set and non-empty wins over stored config', () => {
294
- expect(resolveJailPolicy('required', 'off')).toEqual({ policy: 'required', source: 'env' });
298
+ expect(resolveJailPolicy('required', undefined, 'off')).toEqual({
299
+ policy: 'required',
300
+ source: 'env',
301
+ });
295
302
  });
296
303
 
297
304
  test('an EMPTY STRING env value counts as unset and falls through to config', () => {
298
305
  // jailPolicy() already treats '' as unset, so the resolver agrees rather
299
306
  // than inventing a second rule for what counts as set.
300
- expect(resolveJailPolicy('', 'off')).toEqual({ policy: 'off', source: 'config' });
307
+ expect(resolveJailPolicy('', undefined, 'off')).toEqual({ policy: 'off', source: 'config' });
301
308
  });
302
309
 
303
310
  test('stored config wins when the env var is absent', () => {
304
- expect(resolveJailPolicy(undefined, 'off')).toEqual({ policy: 'off', source: 'config' });
305
- expect(resolveJailPolicy(undefined, 'required')).toEqual({
311
+ expect(resolveJailPolicy(undefined, undefined, 'off')).toEqual({
312
+ policy: 'off',
313
+ source: 'config',
314
+ });
315
+ expect(resolveJailPolicy(undefined, undefined, 'required')).toEqual({
306
316
  policy: 'required',
307
317
  source: 'config',
308
318
  });
309
319
  });
310
320
 
311
- test('both absent resolves to off from the default (peba, ce-rez7)', () => {
312
- expect(resolveJailPolicy(undefined, undefined)).toEqual({ policy: 'off', source: 'default' });
313
- expect(resolveJailPolicy('', undefined)).toEqual({ policy: 'off', source: 'default' });
321
+ test('all absent resolves to off from the default (peba, ce-rez7)', () => {
322
+ expect(resolveJailPolicy(undefined, undefined, undefined)).toEqual({
323
+ policy: 'off',
324
+ source: 'default',
325
+ });
326
+ expect(resolveJailPolicy('', undefined, undefined)).toEqual({
327
+ policy: 'off',
328
+ source: 'default',
329
+ });
314
330
  });
315
331
 
316
332
  test('an explicit env auto still wins (peba, ce-rez7)', () => {
317
- expect(resolveJailPolicy('auto', 'off')).toEqual({ policy: 'auto', source: 'env' });
333
+ expect(resolveJailPolicy('auto', undefined, 'off')).toEqual({ policy: 'auto', source: 'env' });
318
334
  });
319
335
 
320
336
  test('a stored empty jail_policy THROWS, it does not resolve to auto (peba, ce-8832)', () => {
@@ -322,8 +338,8 @@ describe('resolveJailPolicy applies D2 precedence (hook-jail-config-surface)', (
322
338
  // can only arrive via a restore from file or a hand edit to the DB — the
323
339
  // untrusted paths D3 exists to catch. It is outside the enum and fails
324
340
  // closed like any other bad stored value.
325
- expect(() => resolveJailPolicy(undefined, '')).toThrow(/is not a hook jail policy/);
326
- expect(() => resolveJailPolicy(undefined, '')).toThrow(/hooks\.jail_policy=''/);
341
+ expect(() => resolveJailPolicy(undefined, undefined, '')).toThrow(/is not a hook jail policy/);
342
+ expect(() => resolveJailPolicy(undefined, undefined, '')).toThrow(/hooks\.jail_policy=''/);
327
343
  });
328
344
 
329
345
  test('a typo in the STORED row is refused, not silently treated as auto (D3)', () => {
@@ -331,15 +347,87 @@ describe('resolveJailPolicy applies D2 precedence (hook-jail-config-surface)', (
331
347
  // foreign state, and a typo that silently meant `auto` reads as an armed
332
348
  // jail when nothing is armed. The config path is no laxer than the env
333
349
  // path.
334
- expect(() => resolveJailPolicy(undefined, 'alwayssafe')).toThrow(/is not a hook jail policy/);
335
- expect(() => resolveJailPolicy(undefined, 'alwayssafe')).toThrow(
350
+ expect(() => resolveJailPolicy(undefined, undefined, 'alwayssafe')).toThrow(
351
+ /is not a hook jail policy/,
352
+ );
353
+ expect(() => resolveJailPolicy(undefined, undefined, 'alwayssafe')).toThrow(
336
354
  /hooks\.jail_policy='alwayssafe'/,
337
355
  );
338
356
  });
339
357
 
340
358
  test('a typo in the env value is still refused (unchanged jailPolicy behaviour)', () => {
341
- expect(() => resolveJailPolicy('requried', undefined)).toThrow(/is not a hook jail policy/);
342
- expect(() => resolveJailPolicy('requried', 'off')).toThrow(/CELILO_HOOK_JAIL='requried'/);
359
+ expect(() => resolveJailPolicy('requried', undefined, undefined)).toThrow(
360
+ /is not a hook jail policy/,
361
+ );
362
+ expect(() => resolveJailPolicy('requried', undefined, 'off')).toThrow(
363
+ /CELILO_HOOK_JAIL='requried'/,
364
+ );
365
+ });
366
+ });
367
+
368
+ describe('resolveJailPolicy applies the four-step precedence (per-module-jail-policy task 1.3)', () => {
369
+ // Each boundary gets its own assertion, not just the ends: the chain is
370
+ // fixed and rendered, and a test that only pins (env, default) cannot tell
371
+ // a reordering of module and config apart from a correct one.
372
+
373
+ test('env beats the module row', () => {
374
+ expect(resolveJailPolicy('required', 'off', 'auto')).toEqual({
375
+ policy: 'required',
376
+ source: 'env',
377
+ });
378
+ expect(resolveJailPolicy('off', 'auto', 'auto')).toEqual({ policy: 'off', source: 'env' });
379
+ });
380
+
381
+ test('the module row beats system config', () => {
382
+ expect(resolveJailPolicy(undefined, 'off', 'auto')).toEqual({
383
+ policy: 'off',
384
+ source: 'module',
385
+ });
386
+ expect(resolveJailPolicy(undefined, 'required', 'off')).toEqual({
387
+ policy: 'required',
388
+ source: 'module',
389
+ });
390
+ });
391
+
392
+ test('system config beats the default', () => {
393
+ expect(resolveJailPolicy(undefined, undefined, 'auto')).toEqual({
394
+ policy: 'auto',
395
+ source: 'config',
396
+ });
397
+ expect(resolveJailPolicy(undefined, undefined, 'required')).toEqual({
398
+ policy: 'required',
399
+ source: 'config',
400
+ });
401
+ });
402
+
403
+ test('the default is off (peba, ce-rez7)', () => {
404
+ expect(resolveJailPolicy(undefined, undefined, undefined)).toEqual({
405
+ policy: 'off',
406
+ source: 'default',
407
+ });
408
+ });
409
+
410
+ test('an absent module row falls through to system config — absent means follow the system', () => {
411
+ // The everyday case: a fleet with no per-module rows behaves exactly as
412
+ // it does today, which is the spec's own operator guarantee.
413
+ expect(resolveJailPolicy(undefined, undefined, 'auto')).toEqual({
414
+ policy: 'auto',
415
+ source: 'config',
416
+ });
417
+ });
418
+
419
+ test('a bad stored per-module value THROWS rather than coercing (task 1.3)', () => {
420
+ // The same rule as the system key (peba, ce-8832): a restore or a hand
421
+ // edit is a trust boundary, and a typo that silently meant `off` would
422
+ // jail a module the operator exempted — or the reverse. The error names
423
+ // its source so a reader can tell which stored row is junk.
424
+ expect(() => resolveJailPolicy(undefined, 'alwayssafe', 'off')).toThrow(
425
+ /is not a hook jail policy/,
426
+ );
427
+ expect(() => resolveJailPolicy(undefined, 'alwayssafe', 'off')).toThrow(
428
+ /module's jail policy='alwayssafe'/,
429
+ );
430
+ expect(() => resolveJailPolicy(undefined, '', 'off')).toThrow(/is not a hook jail policy/);
343
431
  });
344
432
  });
345
433
 
package/src/hooks/jail.ts CHANGED
@@ -100,7 +100,9 @@ export function autoJailDefers(availability: JailAvailability): boolean {
100
100
  }
101
101
 
102
102
  /**
103
- * What the operator asked for. `CELILO_HOOK_JAIL`, and the default is `auto`.
103
+ * What the operator asked for. `CELILO_HOOK_JAIL`, and the default is `off`
104
+ * (peba's ruling on ce-rez7; `resolveJailPolicy`'s doc comment below has the
105
+ * reversal trigger).
104
106
  *
105
107
  * `required` is D8's end state, reached as an explicit act once stage 2 has
106
108
  * been proven on a host: an unavailable jail becomes a hard failure rather
@@ -433,21 +435,37 @@ export function jailPolicy(): JailPolicy {
433
435
  }
434
436
 
435
437
  /** Where the effective jail policy came from. Rendered by `system doctor` (D4). */
436
- export type JailPolicySource = 'env' | 'config' | 'default';
438
+ export type JailPolicySource = 'env' | 'module' | 'config' | 'default';
439
+
440
+ /** How much jailing a policy does. Lower is weaker (per-module-jail-policy). */
441
+ export const POLICY_STRENGTH: Record<JailPolicy, number> = { off: 0, auto: 1, required: 2 };
442
+
443
+ /**
444
+ * Whether the module's own policy jails LESS than the system's would — the
445
+ * definition of an exemption (per-module-jail-policy task 3.1-3.3).
446
+ *
447
+ * Shared by `module jail`'s weakening interview, `module list`'s marker,
448
+ * `system doctor`'s count and `system audit`'s category, so the four
449
+ * surfaces cannot disagree about what an exemption is.
450
+ */
451
+ export function isWeakerJailPolicy(modulePolicy: JailPolicy, systemPolicy: JailPolicy): boolean {
452
+ return POLICY_STRENGTH[modulePolicy] < POLICY_STRENGTH[systemPolicy];
453
+ }
437
454
 
438
455
  /**
439
- * Apply D2's precedence to the two sources: env wins, then stored config,
440
- * then the default, which is `off` (peba's ruling on ce-rez7; see
441
- * openspec/changes/hook-jail-config-surface/design.md for the reversal
442
- * trigger).
456
+ * Apply the precedence to the four sources (per-module-jail-policy task 1.2):
457
+ * env wins, then the module's own recorded policy, then stored system
458
+ * config, then the default, which is `off` (peba's rulings on ce-rez7 and
459
+ * ce-8832; see openspec/changes/hook-jail-config-surface/design.md and
460
+ * openspec/changes/per-module-jail-policy/ for the fixed chain).
443
461
  *
444
462
  * Pure, so both consumers (executor.ts and system-doctor.ts) can fetch the
445
- * stored row themselves and stay testable without a database.
463
+ * stored rows themselves and stay testable without a database.
446
464
  *
447
465
  * The empty-string env value is treated as unset, matching `jailPolicy()`'s
448
466
  * own handling — one rule for "what counts as set", not a second one here.
449
467
  *
450
- * The config path is deliberately stricter than the env path: a stored
468
+ * The stored paths are deliberately stricter than the env path: a stored
451
469
  * empty string THROWS (peba's ruling on ce-8832). The set-time pattern
452
470
  * `^(auto|off|required)$` rejects `''`, so a stored one can only arrive via
453
471
  * a restore from file or a hand edit to the DB — exactly the untrusted
@@ -456,9 +474,15 @@ export type JailPolicySource = 'env' | 'config' | 'default';
456
474
  * closed is the whole point. An empty CELILO_HOOK_JAIL stays "not set",
457
475
  * because `jailPolicy()` relies on that and slice 1's safety rests on the
458
476
  * two resolvers agreeing.
477
+ *
478
+ * The module row follows the same throw rule as the system key (task 1.3).
479
+ * `undefined` is the everyday case — no row, follow the system — and a row
480
+ * keyed to a module that was removed is impossible by schema: the FK
481
+ * cascades the delete.
459
482
  */
460
483
  export function resolveJailPolicy(
461
484
  envValue: string | undefined,
485
+ moduleValue: string | undefined,
462
486
  configValue: string | undefined,
463
487
  ): { policy: JailPolicy; source: JailPolicySource } {
464
488
  if (envValue !== undefined && envValue !== '') {
@@ -469,6 +493,14 @@ export function resolveJailPolicy(
469
493
  `CELILO_HOOK_JAIL='${envValue}' is not a hook jail policy. Use 'auto' (jail when a backend is available), 'required' (an unavailable jail is a hard failure), or 'off'.`,
470
494
  );
471
495
  }
496
+ if (moduleValue !== undefined) {
497
+ if (moduleValue === 'auto' || moduleValue === 'off' || moduleValue === 'required') {
498
+ return { policy: moduleValue, source: 'module' };
499
+ }
500
+ throw new Error(
501
+ `the module's jail policy='${moduleValue}' is not a hook jail policy. Use 'auto' (jail when a backend is available), 'required' (an unavailable jail is a hard failure), or 'off'.`,
502
+ );
503
+ }
472
504
  if (configValue !== undefined) {
473
505
  if (configValue === 'auto' || configValue === 'off' || configValue === 'required') {
474
506
  return { policy: configValue, source: 'config' };
@@ -620,9 +652,14 @@ function realpathOrSelf(path: string): string {
620
652
  * Why an `off` policy runs unjailed, shared with `celilo system doctor` (task
621
653
  * 4.6) so the sentence the operator reads there is the sentence the record
622
654
  * carries.
655
+ *
656
+ * It names no source. Since hook-jail-config-surface there are three (the
657
+ * environment variable, the stored `hooks.jail_policy` row, and the `off`
658
+ * default), and this sentence is rendered for all of them. The doctor prints
659
+ * the source on its own line above this one; the record carries it as state.
623
660
  */
624
661
  export const JAIL_OFF_REASON =
625
- 'CELILO_HOOK_JAIL=off: the operator switched the hook jail off on this host.';
662
+ "The hook jail policy is 'off', so hooks run unjailed on this host. Set hooks.jail_policy to 'auto' or 'required' to jail them.";
626
663
 
627
664
  export function planJailedSpawn(
628
665
  cmd: readonly string[],
@@ -647,7 +684,7 @@ export function planJailedSpawn(
647
684
  : 'This invocation has no module tree to jail, so there is no mount set to enforce.';
648
685
  if (policy === 'required') {
649
686
  throw new Error(
650
- `CELILO_HOOK_JAIL=required and no hook jail is available. ${reason ?? ''}`.trim(),
687
+ `The hook jail policy is 'required' and no hook jail is available. ${reason ?? ''}`.trim(),
651
688
  );
652
689
  }
653
690
  return { cmd, mode: 'unjailed', backend: availability.backend, reason, skipped: [] };
@@ -173,6 +173,19 @@ export const V1_HOOKS: ContractHooks = {
173
173
  * mount-set derivation walking the declared inputs could not see it.
174
174
  */
175
175
  system_state_root: { required: false, path: { access: 'read' } },
176
+ /**
177
+ * The management-host inventory as a JSON array, staged by
178
+ * `backup-create.ts` from `listMachines()` under the same
179
+ * cross_module_read privilege as `system_state_root`. Not a path: the
180
+ * hook reads the value, not a file, so it carries no mount-set entry.
181
+ *
182
+ * It replaces on_backup's `celilo machine list --json` spawn, which the
183
+ * hook jail kills (no celilo binary, celilo#1225) and which never
184
+ * actually produced JSON before that — the CLI printed its human report,
185
+ * the hook's JSON.parse failed, and the catch wrote [] into every
186
+ * envelope (ce-y0we).
187
+ */
188
+ machine_pool: { required: false },
176
189
  },
177
190
  outputs: {
178
191
  artifact_count: { required: true },
@@ -82,28 +82,36 @@ export const SWALLOWED_REFUSAL_RULE = 'swallowed framework refusal';
82
82
  */
83
83
  const CLI_SPAWN_RE =
84
84
  /\b(?:execSync|execFileSync|execFile|exec|spawnSync|spawn)\s*\(\s*(?:['"`]\s*celilo(?=\s|['"`])|`[^`]*\bcelilo(?=\s|`))/;
85
+
86
+ /**
87
+ * The spawn rule runs against the WHOLE FILE, not one line at a time. The
88
+ * per-line pass above could not see a call whose argv wrapped onto the next
89
+ * line — `execFileSync(\n 'celilo', …` — and that blind spot was live:
90
+ * celilo-registry setup.ts carried a four-line spawn and iptables
91
+ * firewall-functions.ts three more, all scanning clean while the gate was
92
+ * green (found by ce-y0we's reach check on 2026-09-09). The regex itself
93
+ * needs no change — `\s*` already crosses newlines, and `[^\`]*` never
94
+ * matches a backtick so a template cannot swallow the rest of the file — it
95
+ * just has to be applied to text wider than a line. Line numbers come from
96
+ * the match index, so reports still name the line an author fixes.
97
+ */
98
+ const CLI_SPAWN_BLOCK_RE = new RegExp(CLI_SPAWN_RE.source, 'g');
99
+
100
+ /** Same wording the rule carried when it ran per line; moved with the pass. */
101
+ const CLI_SPAWN_HINT =
102
+ 'A jailed hook has no celilo binary and no shell, so this dies with ' +
103
+ '"Executable not found in $PATH" (celilo#1225). Replace the spawn with an ' +
104
+ 'injected capability — context.secrets/context.config for self-config and ' +
105
+ 'self-secrets (openspec/changes/hook-owned-state) — or move the operation ' +
106
+ 'into the framework the way celilo-mgmt on_install did (5e0e624d).';
107
+
85
108
  const FRAMEWORK_CALL_RE = new RegExp(`${CLI_SPAWN_RE.source}|\\brunCelilo\\s*\\(`);
86
109
 
87
110
  const PATTERN_RULES: Array<{ rule: string; re: RegExp; hint: string }> = [
88
- {
89
- rule: JAILED_CLI_SPAWN_RULE,
90
- // Same regex as CLI_SPAWN_RE below — one definition of "reaches the
91
- // framework", used by both rules that key on it. Matches the CLI as
92
- // argv[0] of a spawn-family call ('celilo' / "celilo"), or inside a shell
93
- // string passed to one, where celilo is followed by a word (a subcommand)
94
- // or the closing quote — so `docker exec celilo-mgr …`, a `celilo.db` file
95
- // name, and prose that merely names the CLI do not fire. What it
96
- // deliberately cannot see: a binary path resolved into a variable, or a
97
- // spawn reached through an indirection. Same honesty class as the
98
- // namespace rule — a lint, not a boundary.
99
- re: CLI_SPAWN_RE,
100
- hint:
101
- 'A jailed hook has no celilo binary and no shell, so this dies with ' +
102
- '"Executable not found in $PATH" (celilo#1225). Replace the spawn with an ' +
103
- 'injected capability — context.secrets/context.config for self-config and ' +
104
- 'self-secrets (openspec/changes/hook-owned-state) — or move the operation ' +
105
- 'into the framework the way celilo-mgmt on_install did (5e0e624d).',
106
- },
111
+ // NOTE: the jailed-CLI-spawn rule is NOT in this array — it runs in its own
112
+ // whole-file pass in scanModuleScriptSource (CLI_SPAWN_BLOCK_RE), because a
113
+ // per-line match missed every spawn whose argv wrapped. Everything else
114
+ // stays per-line.
107
115
  {
108
116
  rule: 'raw ssh invocation (StrictHostKeyChecking)',
109
117
  re: /StrictHostKeyChecking/,
@@ -200,6 +208,20 @@ export function scanModuleScriptSource(file: string, source: string): ScanViolat
200
208
  const violations: ScanViolation[] = [];
201
209
  const lines = source.split('\n');
202
210
 
211
+ // The jailed-CLI-spawn pass: whole-file, so a spawn whose argv wraps onto
212
+ // the next line is still seen (see CLI_SPAWN_BLOCK_RE for the blind spot
213
+ // that motivated this). Reported on the line the CALL starts, because that
214
+ // is the site an author fixes.
215
+ CLI_SPAWN_BLOCK_RE.lastIndex = 0;
216
+ for (let m = CLI_SPAWN_BLOCK_RE.exec(source); m !== null; m = CLI_SPAWN_BLOCK_RE.exec(source)) {
217
+ violations.push({
218
+ file,
219
+ line: source.slice(0, m.index).split('\n').length,
220
+ rule: JAILED_CLI_SPAWN_RULE,
221
+ hint: CLI_SPAWN_HINT,
222
+ });
223
+ }
224
+
203
225
  lines.forEach((text, i) => {
204
226
  for (const { rule, re, hint } of PATTERN_RULES) {
205
227
  if (re.test(text)) violations.push({ file, line: i + 1, rule, hint });
@@ -337,51 +359,19 @@ export interface PolicyDebtEntry {
337
359
  * the test goes red, and the entry must be deleted in the same change.
338
360
  */
339
361
  export const JAILED_CLI_SPAWN_DEBT: readonly PolicyDebtEntry[] = [
340
- {
341
- module: 'celilo-mgmt',
342
- file: 'scripts/on_backup.ts',
343
- matches: 1,
344
- reason:
345
- 'hook-owned-state 5.5 / survey class G: machine list becomes a machine-pool read capability',
346
- },
347
362
  {
348
363
  module: 'dnsmasq-dhcp',
349
364
  file: 'scripts/dhcp-server-functions.ts',
350
365
  matches: 1,
351
366
  reason:
352
- 'hook-owned-state 5.5 shape (self-config write); not in its 10-site table — reconcile there',
353
- },
354
- {
355
- module: 'forgejo',
356
- file: 'scripts/on-consumer-removed.ts',
357
- matches: 1,
358
- reason: 'hook-owned-state 5.5 (runner_registrations, Group B3)',
367
+ 'capability provider, no hook entry imports it — ce-mqay (jail does not constrain it; conversion is dedup, not breakage)',
359
368
  },
360
369
  {
361
- module: 'forgejo',
362
- file: 'scripts/setup.ts',
363
- matches: 1,
364
- reason: 'hook-owned-state 5.5 (secret set)',
365
- },
366
- {
367
- module: 'forgejo',
368
- file: 'scripts/source-forge-functions.ts',
369
- matches: 1,
370
- reason:
371
- 'hook-owned-state 5.5 shape (self-config write); not in its 10-site table — reconcile there',
372
- },
373
- {
374
- module: 'generic-cpanel-hosting-provider',
375
- file: 'scripts/on-consumer-removed.ts',
376
- matches: 1,
377
- reason: 'hook-owned-state 5.5 (publications, Group B4)',
378
- },
379
- {
380
- module: 'generic-cpanel-hosting-provider',
381
- file: 'scripts/publish-functions.ts',
382
- matches: 1,
370
+ module: 'iptables',
371
+ file: 'scripts/firewall-functions.ts',
372
+ matches: 3,
383
373
  reason:
384
- 'hook-owned-state 5.5 shape (self-config write); not in its 10-site table — reconcile there',
374
+ 'ce-mqay: capability provider, no hook entry imports it. Two config-set writes and one events emit. INVISIBLE to the scan until ce-y0we taught it continuation lines (2026-09-09) — these three were live spawns the green gate could not see',
385
375
  },
386
376
  ];
387
377
 
@@ -393,19 +383,13 @@ export const JAILED_CLI_SPAWN_DEBT: readonly PolicyDebtEntry[] = [
393
383
  * same guarded rot: when a site converts, the count drops, the debt test goes
394
384
  * red, and the entry must be deleted in the same change.
395
385
  *
396
- * Converted on 2026-09-07 by ce-pvii: knot-unbound-internal/scripts/on-install.ts
397
- * dropped its last swallow (the runCelilo wrapper), so the rule fires on
398
- * exactly these two sites and nothing else in the tree.
386
+ * EMPTY as of ce-y0we (2026-09-09): knot-unbound-internal's on-install dropped
387
+ * its last swallow on 2026-09-07 (ce-pvii), wireguard's health-check converted
388
+ * the same evening (01575380), and celilo-mgmt's on_backup machine-pool read
389
+ * retired the last entry. A NEW swallowed refusal must never land here — it
390
+ * gets fixed, not tracked.
399
391
  */
400
- export const SWALLOWED_REFUSAL_DEBT: readonly PolicyDebtEntry[] = [
401
- {
402
- module: 'celilo-mgmt',
403
- file: 'scripts/on_backup.ts',
404
- matches: 1,
405
- reason:
406
- 'hook-owned-state 5.5 / survey class G: machine list becomes a typed-absent machine-pool read',
407
- },
408
- ];
392
+ export const SWALLOWED_REFUSAL_DEBT: readonly PolicyDebtEntry[] = [];
409
393
 
410
394
  /**
411
395
  * The files inside `@celilo/capabilities` that implement the remote-exec
@@ -85,7 +85,11 @@ describe('recurrence gate: the jailed-CLI-spawn debt list is honest', () => {
85
85
  });
86
86
 
87
87
  test('the debt list is non-trivial (the guard actually reached the entries)', () => {
88
- expect(JAILED_CLI_SPAWN_DEBT.length).toBeGreaterThan(5);
88
+ // Was >5 while the list still carried the hook-owned-state 5.5 batch. The
89
+ // conversions retire entries faster than new debt arrives (ce-y0we), so
90
+ // the floor is now "at least one tracked site" — enough to prove the test
91
+ // reached the list without pinning the retirement schedule.
92
+ expect(JAILED_CLI_SPAWN_DEBT.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
89
93
  });
90
94
  });
91
95
 
@@ -212,9 +212,9 @@ describe('recurrence gate: a hook does not swallow a refused framework call', ()
212
212
  }
213
213
  });
214
214
 
215
- test('today’s tree: the remaining known sites are flagged, and nothing else is', () => {
215
+ test('today’s tree: no swallowed refusals anywhere, and the scan still reaches every module', () => {
216
216
  // Raw scan, deliberately NOT scanModuleDirectory: the debt list below
217
- // exempts these same files so the merged gate stays green while
217
+ // exempts the same files so the merged gate stays green while
218
218
  // hook-owned-state converts them, and this assertion has to outlive that
219
219
  // exemption to prove the rule still reaches them.
220
220
  const violations = moduleDirs().flatMap((d) =>
@@ -225,13 +225,11 @@ describe('recurrence gate: a hook does not swallow a refused framework call', ()
225
225
  ),
226
226
  );
227
227
  const sites = violations.map((v) => v.file.replace(`${repoRoot()}/`, '')).sort();
228
- // Pinned to the exact sites from e2e-suite-recovery task 4.2, as measured
229
- // on 2026-09-07 at on_backup.ts:52 (a third, on-install.ts:69, converted
230
- // by ce-pvii the same day, and wireguard's health-check.ts converted by
231
- // 01575380 the same evening). A converted site drops out and the debt
232
- // entry must go; a NEW site appearing here is the next instance this scan
233
- // exists to stop.
234
- expect(sites).toEqual(['modules/celilo-mgmt/scripts/on_backup.ts']);
228
+ // Empty since ce-y0we (2026-09-09): on_backup.ts:52 was the last site —
229
+ // its machine-pool read is staged input now — and the two before it
230
+ // converted on 2026-09-07 (ce-pvii and 01575380). A NEW site appearing
231
+ // here is the next instance this scan exists to stop.
232
+ expect(sites, `Module script policy violations:\n${formatViolations(violations)}`).toEqual([]);
235
233
  });
236
234
  });
237
235
 
@@ -255,10 +253,12 @@ describe('recurrence gate: the swallow debt list is honest', () => {
255
253
  }
256
254
  });
257
255
 
258
- test('the debt list is non-trivial (the guard actually reached the entries)', () => {
259
- // The list held three entries until ce-pvii converted the on-install.ts
260
- // entry and 01575380 converted wireguard's health-check (both
261
- // 2026-09-07); one remains, so the guard still proves engagement.
262
- expect(SWALLOWED_REFUSAL_DEBT.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
256
+ test('the debt list is retired (empty), and this test pins that fact', () => {
257
+ // The list held three entries when the gate landed; ce-pvii and 01575380
258
+ // converted two on 2026-09-07 and ce-y0we retired the last (on_backup's
259
+ // machine-pool read) on 2026-09-09. Kept as an explicit pin so a future
260
+ // entry has to be justified against this sentence: a swallowed refusal is
261
+ // a defect to fix, never debt to track.
262
+ expect(SWALLOWED_REFUSAL_DEBT).toEqual([]);
263
263
  });
264
264
  });
@@ -48,14 +48,14 @@ describe('RegistryClient constructor', () => {
48
48
 
49
49
  afterEach(() => {
50
50
  if (origEnv === undefined) {
51
- process.env.CELILO_REGISTRY_URL = undefined;
51
+ delete process.env.CELILO_REGISTRY_URL;
52
52
  } else {
53
53
  process.env.CELILO_REGISTRY_URL = origEnv;
54
54
  }
55
55
  });
56
56
 
57
57
  test('uses DEFAULT_REGISTRY when no arg and no env var', () => {
58
- process.env.CELILO_REGISTRY_URL = undefined;
58
+ delete process.env.CELILO_REGISTRY_URL;
59
59
  const client = new RegistryClient();
60
60
  expect(client.baseUrl).toBe(DEFAULT_REGISTRY);
61
61
  });
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ describe('secret storage', () => {
36
36
  afterEach(() => {
37
37
  // Cleanup
38
38
  rmSync(testDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
39
- process.env.CELILO_MASTER_KEY_PATH = undefined;
39
+ delete process.env.CELILO_MASTER_KEY_PATH;
40
40
  });
41
41
 
42
42
  test('stores and retrieves system secret', async () => {
@@ -116,6 +116,10 @@ describe('severityForItemStatus', () => {
116
116
  expect(severityForItemStatus('fail', 'critical')).toBe('critical');
117
117
  expect(severityForItemStatus('fail', 'warning')).toBe('warning');
118
118
  });
119
+
120
+ test('skip produces no alert — a check that could not run is not a failure', () => {
121
+ expect(severityForItemStatus('skip', 'critical')).toBeNull();
122
+ });
119
123
  });
120
124
 
121
125
  describe('failingKeysFromHealthItems', () => {
@@ -134,14 +134,24 @@ export function parentModuleKey(key: string): string | null {
134
134
  * and never pages. That gives module authors somewhere to put "cert expires in
135
135
  * 20 days" without anyone having to decide whether it is a 3am problem.
136
136
  *
137
+ * `skip` produces no alert either: a check that could not perform its probe
138
+ * is not a failure. Note the honest cost — a previously-failing key whose
139
+ * item now reports skip leaves this run's failing set, so the reconciler
140
+ * reads "recovered" off a run that measured nothing. That is the same hazard
141
+ * class design D5 handles at run level (a run that could not execute is the
142
+ * caller's branch); there is no per-item sticky-key mechanism here, so a
143
+ * module whose credential disappeared needs the audit's `unmeasured` finding
144
+ * to be seen (celilo#1326).
145
+ *
137
146
  * See design D6.
138
147
  */
139
148
  export function severityForItemStatus(
140
- itemStatus: 'pass' | 'warn' | 'fail',
149
+ itemStatus: 'pass' | 'warn' | 'fail' | 'skip',
141
150
  monitorSeverity: AlertSeverity,
142
151
  ): AlertSeverity | null {
143
152
  if (itemStatus === 'pass') return null;
144
153
  if (itemStatus === 'warn') return 'warning';
154
+ if (itemStatus === 'skip') return null;
145
155
  return monitorSeverity;
146
156
  }
147
157
 
@@ -155,7 +165,7 @@ export interface FailingKey {
155
165
 
156
166
  export interface HealthCheckItemLike {
157
167
  name: string;
158
- status: 'pass' | 'warn' | 'fail';
168
+ status: 'pass' | 'warn' | 'fail' | 'skip';
159
169
  message: string;
160
170
  details?: string;
161
171
  }