@celilo/cli 1.5.0 → 1.7.0

package/CELILO_CORE_MODULES.md

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Each entry: `module id` — what it is — **provides** / **requires** capabilit
 ## Public edge (ingress / identity)
 
 - **caddy** — reverse proxy with automatic HTTPS (HTTP-01 ACME); the standard HTTPS ingress. Emits a 301 redirect block for each served name's `www`/apex companion (kept out of the served-hostname set, so a companion never blocks the ACME wait). Its `health_check`'s DNS item is `internal_dns_resolution` — it digs from the management host behind the split-horizon resolver and is evidence about the in-fleet view only; public reachability is the framework's `public_dns` check. **provides:** `public_web`. **requires:** `dns_registrar`, `firewall`.
-- **caddy-internal** — a SECOND Caddy that serves the fleet and nothing else, and is a sibling of **caddy** rather than a mode of it. It never exposes a port on the firewall's EXTERNAL interface, never publishes a public record, and takes its certificates from Caddy's own local CA (`tls internal`) — those absences ARE the capability, and `public_web` cannot express them because it treats an unreachable route as a deploy failure and publishes a public A record to prevent one (design D10). Lives in the **`dmz`** zone, in front of the things it fronts, mirroring the public `caddy` (celilo#879). LAN devices reach it through an IPAM-allocated `internal`-subnet `ingress_ip` that `on_install` passes to `firewall.exposeService({ ingressIp })` — one DNAT on the firewall's INTERNAL side and nothing external, the same mechanism the dmz-resident `dns_internal` resolver has used for `:53` since ISS-0156. Systems already inside `dmz`/`app`/`secure` use its dmz address instead (carried as `zoneRoutableValue` on the internal record), and VPN clients arrive as a registered trusted source. It previously lived in `internal` on the claim that a dmz ingress could not be reached from a LAN without a public port-forward; that conflated a public forward with an internal-side ingress IP, and cost it the ability to serve a browser inside a segmented zone at all. **`getCaCertificate()` is why the contract has a method `public_web` does not** — an internally-issued cert means clients must trust a CA celilo runs, and here that is nearly free because the people who must trust it are the ones who just downloaded a bundle from the service behind it, so the anchor ships with it. **The route table is this module's OWN config (`routes`), never celilo's `web_routes`** (celilo#846): caddy derives its served hostnames from every row of that table, so a private route stored there would be picked up and served PUBLICLY — storage is the privacy boundary, not policy. Route changes reconcile synchronously in the capability call (there is no `routes_changed` event for private routes, and inventing one would only add delay). **Every proxied route strips a client-supplied `X-Forwarded-User`** (`header_up -X-Forwarded-User`): this ingress routes and does not authenticate, so a backend believing that header would believe whatever the client sent — which `wireguard-manager` shipped doing. That module verifies a signed token now, so the strip protects the NEXT backend written against the same assumption. It is defence in depth, NOT an authenticating proxy: adding `forward_auth` to `private_web` is a capability change and deliberately not bundled with it. A consumer cannot register a route on a hostname the ingress is not already configured for: a capability factory gets no capabilities of its own, so it cannot add the internal DNS record a new name would need, and it refuses rather than serving an unresolvable site block. **provides:** `private_web`. **requires:** `dns_internal` — declared under `optional.capabilities` ONLY to route around celilo#854 (the import-time secret gate refuses a consumer over a secret it never reads); `on_install` throws without it.
+- **caddy-internal** — a SECOND Caddy that serves the fleet and nothing else, and is a sibling of **caddy** rather than a mode of it. It never exposes a port on the firewall's EXTERNAL interface, never publishes a public record, and takes its certificates from Caddy's own local CA (`tls internal`) — those absences ARE the capability, and `public_web` cannot express them because it treats an unreachable route as a deploy failure and publishes a public A record to prevent one (design D10). Lives in the **`dmz`** zone, in front of the things it fronts, mirroring the public `caddy` (celilo#879). LAN devices reach it through an IPAM-allocated `internal`-subnet `ingress_ip` that `on_install` passes to `firewall.exposeService({ ingressIp })` — one DNAT on the firewall's INTERNAL side and nothing external, the same mechanism the dmz-resident `dns_internal` resolver has used for `:53` since ISS-0156. Systems already inside `dmz`/`app`/`secure` use its dmz address instead (carried as `zoneRoutableValue` on the internal record), and VPN clients arrive as a registered trusted source. It previously lived in `internal` on the claim that a dmz ingress could not be reached from a LAN without a public port-forward; that conflated a public forward with an internal-side ingress IP, and cost it the ability to serve a browser inside a segmented zone at all. **`getCaCertificate()` is why the contract has a method `public_web` does not** — an internally-issued cert means clients must trust a CA celilo runs, and here that is nearly free because the people who must trust it are the ones who just downloaded a bundle from the service behind it, so the anchor ships with it. **The route table is this module's OWN config (`routes`), never celilo's `web_routes`** (celilo#846): caddy derives its served hostnames from every row of that table, so a private route stored there would be picked up and served PUBLICLY — storage is the privacy boundary, not policy. Route changes reconcile synchronously in the capability call (there is no `routes_changed` event for private routes, and inventing one would only add delay). **Every proxied route strips a client-supplied `X-Forwarded-User`** (`header_up -X-Forwarded-User`): this ingress routes and does not authenticate, so a backend believing that header would believe whatever the client sent — which `wireguard-manager` shipped doing. That module verifies a signed token now, so the strip protects the NEXT backend written against the same assumption. It is defence in depth, NOT an authenticating proxy: adding `forward_auth` to `private_web` is a capability change and deliberately not bundled with it. A consumer cannot register a route on a hostname the ingress is not already configured for: a capability factory gets no capabilities of its own, so it cannot add the internal DNS record a new name would need, and it refuses rather than serving an unresolvable site block. **provides:** `private_web`. **requires:** `dns_internal` — a hard requirement, since `on_install` throws without it. It sat under `optional.capabilities` until celilo#854 was fixed, because the import-time secret gate refused a consumer over a secret it never reads.
 - **generic-cpanel-hosting-provider** — publishes static sites into a subfolder of a domain on a cPanel/SSH web host celilo does **not** govern (the host owns the domain, DNS, TLS and web server). Systemless like **namecheap** — no `requires.system`, no zone, no IPAM; it holds credentials for an external party. One provider serves many accounts, resolved by hostname; onboarding takes the account password once, `ssh-copy-id`s celilo's key, then discards it. **provides:** `external_web`.
 - **authentik** — Authentik identity provider with OIDC (Docker Compose: server, worker, Postgres, Redis). **provides:** `idp`. **requires:** `public_web`, `dns_registrar`, `firewall`.
 
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ Each entry: `module id` — what it is — **provides** / **requires** capabilit
 - **celilo-apt-repo** — Debian apt repository (reprepro + Bun HTTP server) serving the celilo `.deb` at apt.celilo.computer. **provides:** `apt_publish`. **requires:** `public_web`, `dns_registrar`.
 - **signal** — bidirectional Signal transport for alerts and deploy-interview questions; runs signal-cli in daemon mode with its JSON-RPC socket bound to the host's own address (never public) and **`--receive-mode=manual`**, which is load-bearing: signal-cli's default (`on-start`) leaves the daemon permanently receiving, so it drains every reply into an SSE stream nothing is attached to and REFUSES celilo's `receive` call — replies arrive and are unreadable, while `send` and every health check keep passing. Enrolled as a SECONDARY DEVICE of an existing Signal account rather than registering its own number — Signal blocks most VOIP ranges and bans bot-ish registrations. Recipient addresses live on celilo routes, not in module config, so adding a person never requires a redeploy. Runs on x86_64 and aarch64. `libsignal-client` ships no linux-aarch64 native, so celilo builds one (`modules/signal/build/`) and installs it as a `libsignal-jni` .deb on ARM hosts; x86_64 uses the JAR's bundled native. **provides:** `notification` (`send`, `receive`). **requires:** no capabilities — a transport that depended on the proxy, registrar or firewall could not tell you those were broken — and a system in the **`secure-mgmt`** zone: it holds a linked Signal account (the operator's own messaging identity and keys), and its job is to observe every tier while depending on none, which is what the control-plane zone is for. See `openspec/changes/add-alerting/`.
 - **celilo-website** — public docs site (static Astro) served via Caddy on celilo.computer. **requires:** `public_web`, `dns_registrar`.
+- **celilo-canary** — a deliberately minimal nginx serving one static page in **`dmz`**, permanently deployed, whose health check IS the assertion that the deploy path still works. Nothing about it is interesting except that it is *always there*: modules already deployed keep running when the pipeline breaks, so without a canary a regression in IPAM allocation, Terraform provisioning, Ansible convergence or capability wiring stays invisible until the next real deploy — which is exactly when nobody wants to discover it. One deploy exercises all four, plus a live cross-module capability call. **Fleet-only, and the absence is the design**: it registers one route through `private_web` and requires nothing that reaches the perimeter, so there is no public record, no ACME certificate and no port forward. Its `health_check` probes nginx over systemd and its `/healthz` endpoint with **`probeHttp`, from the management server** rather than by SSHing in and running `curl` — the production `ubuntu-22.04-standard` LXC ships no curl, so the old form could not tell a missing binary from a dead service, and reaching the canary at its own address additionally catches a service bound only to loopback. **requires:** `private_web`.
 
 ## Git forge & CI pipeline
 

package/CELILO_SUBSYSTEMS.md

@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ Module hooks reach a remote box ONLY through these typed primitives
 (exported from `packages/capabilities/src/index.ts`).
 
 - **`remoteExec`** — the ONE ssh seam (`ssh <user>@<target> <cmd>`); everything else builds on it. `user`/`port`/`identityFile` on the target default to `root`/22/the agent key, so a fleet call is unchanged; an OFF-FLEET account (`external_web`) sets them.
-- **`probe`** — read-only health checks: `systemd` / `http` / `command`.
+- **`probe`** — read-only health checks over SSH: `systemd` / `command`. It carried a third `http` kind that SSHed in and ran `curl`; the production `ubuntu-22.04-standard` LXC ships none, and a missing binary was indistinguishable from a dead service. Deleted — `probeHttp` replaces it (`openspec/changes/probe-http-from-management/`).
+- **`probeHttp`** — HTTP health check run FROM the management server over `fetch`; nothing on the target. Takes `port` + `path`, never a URL, and builds the address from the target's `ipv4_address` — so a check cannot name `localhost` and silently probe celilo-mgr's own port. Redirects observed, not followed (caddy's 308 is a healthy answer). Typed failure: `'unreachable'` vs `'status'`.
 - **`serviceCtl`** — systemctl start/stop/restart/reload/enable/disable.
 - **`runAppCommand` / `runAppCommandWithSecret`** — escape-hatch on-box command; the secret variant feeds the secret on **stdin** (`$SECRET`), never argv.
 - **`streamBackup` / `streamRestore` / `fetchFile` / `pushFile`** — binary-safe streaming via local shell redirect/pipe.
@@ -184,6 +185,7 @@ runner seam (`execRunner` real / `createMockRunner` for tests) lives in
 - **Module pause / unpause (control-plane quiescence)** — `apps/celilo/src/services/module-pause.ts` — pure `planPause`/`planUnpause` producing an ordered plan, `executePause`/`executeUnpause` performing it, plus `listPausedModules`/`pausedAmong`/`formatPausedDuration`/`describePausedModule` (the ONE place an age is formatted). CLI: `apps/celilo/src/cli/commands/module-pause.ts` (`celilo module pause|unpause <id> [--cascade] [--stop-infra] [--reason] [--dry-run] [--yes]`). Pausing takes a module out of the CONTROL plane — no dispatched events, no timer hooks, no health checks, alerts suppressed — while leaving the DATA plane running, because capability consumption is deploy-time: every consumer calls `firewall`/`dhcp_server` from `on_install` and nothing calls it while serving. Config, secrets, IPAM/VMID and placement are preserved; `on_uninstall` does NOT run. Quiescence is enforced in two places: pausing drops the module's bus subscriptions (`unregisterModuleSubscriptions`), and `run-named-hook.ts` refuses any non-lifecycle hook for a PAUSED module (`skippedPaused`), which catches the paths that skip the bus — `events resync-subscriptions`, a restore that starts events.db empty, aspect fan-out, public-web republish. `on_install`/`on_uninstall` are exempt by hook NAME (not a caller flag): unpause redeploys through `on_install`, and removing a paused provider needs `on_uninstall`. Unpause always REDEPLOYS (`deployModule`) — that is what rebinds a consumer to a replacement provider and recreates provider-local state from the consumers that own it — and re-registers subscriptions, which a plain deploy does not do. A failed unpause restores `PAUSED` rather than leaving the module live and mis-bound. Cascade order reuses `services/update/dep-graph.ts` unchanged (pause = consumers first, unpause = providers first) and is computed from the GRAPH, never from which modules are currently paused, so a cascade walks THROUGH already-done members and is resumable. See `openspec/specs/module-pause/spec.md`.
 - **Provider-removal guard** — `apps/celilo/src/services/remove-guard.ts` — `findRemovalBlockers`/`describeRemovalRefusal`, called from `apps/celilo/src/cli/commands/module-remove.ts`. A PAUSED module is not a dependent (unpause cannot return it to service without a redeploy, and a redeploy re-resolves capabilities), which is what makes a provider swap possible at all. A dependent is one declaring the capability under `requires` **or** `optional` — the same relation `dep-graph.ts` uses, so the guard and the cascade agree on the set; the guard previously read `requires` alone, which let a removal silently orphan `technitium`'s `optional` `dhcp_server`. Refusals name each blocker AND which declaration makes it one. It deliberately does NOT exempt a dependent because another provider of the same capability exists (celilo#683).
 - **Consumer-removal cleanup (every provider is told)** — `apps/celilo/src/services/consumer-cleanup.ts` — pure `planConsumerCleanup` + `loadConsumerCleanupPlan` + `runConsumerCleanup`, called from `apps/celilo/src/cli/commands/module-remove.ts` after `on_uninstall` and before `terraform destroy`. A capability is two-sided: the consumer asks, the provider mints something in ITS world (a caddy site block, a DNAT rule, an OIDC client at authentik, a registered CI runner), and removal only ever touched one side — the FK cascade dropped celilo's row, so the provider's next converge had no way to learn the thing existed. This dispatches the `on_consumer_removed` hook to every provider of every capability the departing module declared under `requires` OR `optional` (the same relation `remove-guard.ts` counts as a dependency edge), **once per provider** rather than once per capability, sorted by provider id. The hook receives one input, `consumer`, and NOTHING else: a provider that cannot answer "what do I hold for this module" without being told has a different defect — the consumer's id was never recorded at mint time. It replaces `services/web-route-cleanup.ts`, which did the same job for exactly one capability, by name, from core. Semantics that are easy to get backwards: **a failed withdrawal never blocks the removal** — the consumer goes and the failing PROVIDER is marked `ERROR` with the departing consumer named in `error_message` (surfaced as a `blocked` finding by `services/audit/undeployed-modules.ts`), because the hook is a full converge and after a failure the provider's state is unknown rather than "one thing missed". **Dispatch continues past a failure**, so one broken provider cannot leave the others holding state. A PAUSED provider is skipped with a warning naming what it keeps (`run-named-hook.ts` refuses non-lifecycle hooks on a paused module, and `on_consumer_removed` must NOT join `LIFECYCLE_HOOKS`), and a never-deployed one is skipped silently. Providers implementing it: caddy, caddy-internal, iptables, greenwave, axon, authentik, forgejo, generic-cpanel-hosting-provider. See `openspec/changes/consumer-removal-cleanup/`.
+- **Provider-arrival backfill (every consumer is re-run)** — `apps/celilo/src/services/provider-arrival.ts` — pure `planProviderBackfill` + `loadProviderBackfillPlan` + `runProviderBackfill`, called from `module-deploy.ts` at the end of BOTH deploy paths (config-only and full). The mirror of consumer-removal cleanup, and it exists because celilo handled one side of a capability generically and the other by hand: a provider arriving had three hand-written pieces covering two capabilities, and `firewall` — provided by `axon`, `greenwave` AND `iptables` — had none, so its consumers inherited nothing (celilo#1011). When a module deploys, every already-installed module declaring one of its capabilities under `requires` OR `optional` has its `on_install` re-run. **PULL, never push** (design D7): the consumer re-registers through the path that worked the first time, rather than core replaying history into the provider by calling the provider's own hooks on a consumer's behalf — the push shape is a second implementation with its own bug surface, and `backfillWebRouteDns` had already drifted into one. Never fatal to the provider's own deploy: a failed consumer is named with `celilo module deploy <id>` to retry, and a PAUSED or never-deployed consumer is reported as skipped rather than silently passed over. Shares `PRE_DEPLOY_STATES` with `consumer-cleanup.ts` — one definition, also read by `module-remove.ts`. It replaced `services/public-web-republish.ts` (deleted) and deliberately did NOT replace `services/dns-provider-backfill.ts`, whose docblock records the two reasons: one half replays celilo's HOST inventory rather than a capability set, and the other covers FQDNs published through `public_web` by modules that declare `public_web` and never `dns_internal`. See `openspec/changes/capability-owned-tables/` stage 1.
 - **Firewall registry ownership** — `apps/celilo/src/services/port-forwards.ts` + `apps/celilo/src/services/trusted-sources.ts`. Both stores are bound to the CONSUMING module and stamp `registered_by` themselves; a caller cannot supply it, so a registration is never attributed to the wrong module. Both writes are **declarative**: `replace()` states a consumer's COMPLETE set for a target, so a port or subnet it previously registered and now omits is withdrawn (celilo#855 — before this, a module that exposed `:8080` and redeployed exposing `:9090` kept both, forever). The owner is IN both unique indexes, not merely beside them: two consumers wanting the same forward are two ROWS, so one leaving cannot delete a rule the other still needs; `modules/iptables/scripts/ruleset-renderer.ts` dedupes on the rule tuple so the pair renders once. Neither column is a FK, so `runConsumerCleanup` deletes these rows explicitly after every provider has converged without them.
 - **Backup artifact encryption** — `apps/celilo/src/services/backup-cipher.ts` — `encryptFileToFile`/`decryptFileToFile`, file-in/file-out and streamed, used by every backup writer (`backup-create.ts`) and reader (`backup-restore.ts`, `restore-from-file.ts`). Do NOT route artifacts through `secrets/encryption.ts`: that API is string-in/string-out for short DB values, and feeding it a tar cost base64 (1.33x) then hex (2x) then `JSON.stringify` — ~9x the artifact in memory, which OOM-killed forgejo's 774 MB backup, and a hard ~805 MB ceiling from the max string length that no amount of RAM raises. On-disk format is `magic "CELILOBK" (8) | version (1) | iv (16) | ciphertext | GCM tag (16)`; the tag is a trailer because it does not exist until the last byte is encrypted. `decryptFileToFile` still reads the pre-2026-07 JSON-envelope artifacts, discriminating on the magic bytes — the envelope's own `schemaVersion` cannot serve, as it lives inside the encrypted tar.
 
@@ -226,13 +228,26 @@ to look, which is how a forgotten pause actually gets found.
 
 ## Packaging, registry & publish
 
-- **Module packaging** — `apps/celilo/src/module/packaging/` — `build.ts` (`buildModule`), `extract.ts`, `checksum.ts`, `signature.ts` (`signChecksums`/`verifySignature`), `release-metadata.ts`, `audit.ts`.
+- **Module packaging** — `apps/celilo/src/module/packaging/` — `build.ts` (`buildModule`), `extract.ts`, `checksum.ts`, `signature.ts` (`signChecksums`/`verifySignature`), `release-metadata.ts`, `audit.ts`, `package-rules.ts`, `generated-plane.ts`, `host-plane.ts` (see **Module integrity** below).
 - **Publish driver** — `scripts/publish.ts` shims to `apps/celilo/src/cli/commands/publish/` (workspace npm packages via `bun publish` + module registry; preflight stale-version/stale-manifest gates).
 - **Registry publish-token admin (append-safe)** — `apps/celilo/src/cli/commands/registry-token.ts` — `celilo registry token add/rm <token>` read-modify-write the celilo-registry `publish_tokens` secret (newline-separated bootstrap/admin list). Avoids the `module secret set` full-overwrite that clobbered other holders. Runs on-mgr where the master key lives; runtime-minted scoped tokens are handled separately by the registry-server.
 - **Contributor identity tokens (idp-issued, per-user)** — `apps/celilo/src/cli/commands/token.ts` — `celilo token obtain|list|revoke` mints/lists/revokes per-user API tokens via the `idp` capability (`create_token`/`list_tokens`/`revoke_token` on authentik). A module contributor authenticates publishes AS THEMSELVES (SECURE_MODULE_PUBLISH.md §6) — no admin/shared token on their machine; the token feeds `celilo author init`. Shown once at mint; the idp stores it hashed, celilo persists nothing. Runs on-mgr where the idp provider lives. Distinct from `registry token add/rm` (raw bootstrap list, different trust model).
 - **Registry token verification (opaque + idp introspection)** — `packages/registry-server/src/auth.ts` (`TokenAuth` — opaque SHA-256 publish tokens, admin/per-package scope) + `packages/registry-server/src/introspection.ts` (`IntrospectionVerifier` — RFC 7662 verify-bridge, SECURE_MODULE_PUBLISH.md §5[D-A]). `authorizePackage()` in `server.ts` tries the opaque set first (unchanged), then, for a token unknown to it, `identify()`s it via the idp introspection endpoint using the registry's confidential OIDC client creds (`OIDC_INTROSPECTION_ENDPOINT`/`OIDC_CLIENT_ID`/`OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET`, provisioned on install — ce-7aa), reading `{active, sub, groups, exp}`. Fails CLOSED on any introspection error; never logs tokens/secrets. Instant revocation: revoke at the idp → next publish sees `active:false` → 401.
 - **Registry module-owner table (hybrid group + owner authz — ce-1ch, D-C)** — `packages/registry-server/src/module-owner-store.ts` (`ModuleOwnerStore` — JSON-persisted `{moduleName, ownerSub, claimedAt, sourceGroup}`, `REGISTRY_OWNERS_FILE`/`dataDir/module-owners.json`). The verified `groups` claim gates *whether* an identity may publish (`REGISTRY_ADMIN_GROUP`→publish/reassign anything; `REGISTRY_PUBLISHER_GROUP`, default `celilo-authors`, configurable→claim+publish owned); the owner table gates *which names*. First-publish-claims: the first verified publisher of an unclaimed name owns it; a *different* publisher is then DENIED (confused-deputy defense — Author-A cannot publish Author-B's module). Admin HTTP endpoints `GET /api/v1/modules/owners`, `GET|POST /api/v1/modules/owners/{name}` (reassign). Operator front door: `celilo registry owner list|show|set` (`apps/celilo/src/cli/commands/registry-owner.ts`), admin token resolved from the local `publish_tokens` bootstrap list.
 
+## Module integrity (the four places a module exists)
+
+A module exists in four places at once, and celilo verifies the correspondence
+between them. Design: `openspec/changes/module-integrity-rigor/design.md`.
+
+- **The one classifier** — `apps/celilo/src/module/packaging/package-rules.ts` — `classifyModulePath(relPath)` returns `package` / `derived` / `unknown` and is the SINGLE answer to what belongs to a module. `build.ts#shouldExclude`, `extract.ts#scanDirectory`, `import.ts#copyModuleFiles`, `module-update.ts` and `audit.ts` all route through it. Composes with, and does not restate, `includeNodeModulesPath` (ISS-0046).
+- **The versioned baseline** — `moduleIntegrity` in `apps/celilo/src/db/schema.ts` — checksums PLUS the `version` they describe. Upserted by `module import` and written by `module-update.ts#updateOne`, so it tracks the installed version instead of freezing at first import. `version` is nullable: NULL means "written before celilo stamped versions", which verify reports rather than papers over.
+- **Plane 1, installed tree vs baseline** — `apps/celilo/src/module/packaging/audit.ts` — `auditModule(moduleId, db, { deep })`. The entry point for `module verify`.
+- **Plane 2, generated project vs installed tree** — `apps/celilo/src/module/packaging/generated-plane.ts` — `compareVerbatimRoleAssets` (pure), `readVerbatimRoleAssets`, `refuseIfGeneratedIsStale`. Only `ansible/roles/<role>/files/**` has a meaningful expected digest; Ansible templates the rest. Wired into `module verify` and into `module-deploy.ts` as a pre-flight that refuses BEFORE contacting any system (celilo#925).
+- **Plane 3, host vs generated project** — `apps/celilo/src/module/packaging/host-plane.ts` — `verifyModuleOnHosts` runs the generated playbook through `executeAnsible(..., { check: true })` and classifies each `PLAY RECAP` line as `converged` / `drift` / `unmeasured`. One SSH per system, so `--deep` only. A module opts out with `verify: { deep: false, reason: … }`; the reason is required and is printed.
+- **Surfaces** — `celilo module verify <id> [--deep] [--json]` (`apps/celilo/src/cli/commands/module-verify.ts`), the `module_integrity` audit category (`apps/celilo/src/services/audit/module-integrity.ts`), and `system doctor`'s fleet section. Same implementation behind all three.
+- **Dead convergence machinery** — `apps/celilo/src/services/audit/detect-without-converge.ts` — the `detect_without_converge` category reports a module declaring a `reconcile_*` / `refresh_registrations` / `reassert_dhcp_dns` hook that no subscription ever fires (celilo#934).
+
 ## Alerting & notifications
 
 Observation and delivery: monitors run checks on a schedule, alerts hold what
@@ -291,6 +306,7 @@ upgrade controls — as opposed to how the module configures itself.
 ## Persistence
 
 - **DB schema** — `apps/celilo/src/db/schema.ts`. Client: `apps/celilo/src/db/client.ts`. Migration runner: `apps/celilo/src/db/migrate.ts`. Migrations: `apps/celilo/drizzle/`.
+- **Frozen-watermark repair** — `runMigrationsOn` (`db/migrate.ts`) is what `createDbClient` calls on open, not drizzle's migrator directly. drizzle is watermark-only, so a DB from the imperative hand-list era — schema applied, `__drizzle_migrations` never told — makes it re-run migrations and die on `duplicate column name`. That throw is inside the OPEN, so every celilo command on that box fails, `celilo system migrate` included: it reaches its own repair through `getDb()`. The repair engages only after the stock migrator has failed AND only when `findSchemaDrift` reports the declared schema entirely present, and it corrects the LEDGER without running SQL — replaying is not an option, since `drizzle/0021_dns_registration_consumers.sql` rebuilds `dns_registrations` by dropping the original and renaming a copy over it. A PARTIALLY applied schema (celilo-mgr's own pre-remediation state) still fails, naming the hand remediation. Gate: `db/migrate.test.ts`. Both entrypoints run `celilo system migrate` — the `.deb` postinst and the `celilo-mgmt` Ansible role, before the dispatcher starts (celilo#169).
 
 ## Events
 

package/MODULE_PRIMITIVES.md

@@ -64,12 +64,25 @@ that, not a primitive. The primitives are for the module's *own* box.
 ### `probe(target, check, runner?, opts?) → { healthy, detail }`
 Read-only health check. Never mutates. `check` is one of:
 - `{ kind: 'systemd', unit }` — unit is `active`.
-- `{ kind: 'http', url, expectStatus?, headers? }` — curl runs **on the box**, so
-  it doesn't depend on Caddy/public DNS. `expectStatus` defaults to 200; pass a
-  list (e.g. `[200, 308]`) or `headers: { Host: 'app.example.com' }` for a vhost.
 - `{ kind: 'command', command, expectStdoutIncludes? }`.
+
+For HTTP use `probeHttp`, not `probe` — see below.
 ```ts
-probe(sys, { kind: 'http', url: 'http://localhost', headers: { Host: fqdn }, expectStatus: [200, 308] }, run);
+probe(sys, { kind: 'systemd', unit: 'caddy' }, run);
+```
+
+### `probeHttp(target, { port, path?, expectStatus?, headers?, timeoutMs? }) → Promise<{ healthy, detail, failure? }>`
+HTTP health check, run **from the management server** over `fetch`. Nothing runs
+on the target — no SSH, no curl (the production LXC image ships none, and a
+missing binary used to be indistinguishable from a dead service). There is
+deliberately **no `url`**: you give a port and a path, and the primitive builds
+the address from the target's `ipv4_address`, so a check cannot name `localhost`
+and end up probing celilo-mgr itself. `expectStatus` defaults to 200; pass a
+list (e.g. `[200, 308]`) or `headers: { Host: 'app.example.com' }` for a vhost.
+Redirects are **observed, not followed**. On failure, `failure` is
+`'unreachable'` (could not connect) or `'status'` (answered with the wrong code).
+```ts
+await probeHttp(sys, { port: 80, headers: { Host: fqdn }, expectStatus: [200, 308] });
 ```
 
 ### `serviceCtl(target, unit, action, runner?, opts?) → RunResult`
@@ -79,7 +92,7 @@ for liveness use `probe`.
 serviceCtl(sys, 'caddy', 'reload', run);
 ```
 
-### `applyRenderedConfig({ target, path, content, validate, apply, runner?, timeoutMs? }) → RunResult`
+### `applyRenderedConfig({ target, path, content, validate, apply, statePath?, runner?, timeoutMs? }) → RunResult`
 **The converge primitive.** For config whose *content* your hook computes at
 deploy-time from celilo's DB (caddy's Caddyfile from `web_routes`, knot's views
 from the DNS ledger, the firewall ruleset from the port-forward registry) —
@@ -87,6 +100,11 @@ content a static Ansible render can't know. One atomic on-box script, one SSH
 round-trip: back up → write (`content` rides **stdin**, newline-safe) → `validate`
 (rolled back + not activated if it fails) → `apply` (rolled back if it fails).
 `{path}` is substituted into `validate`/`apply`.
+
+By default, rollback and last-render state are retained beside `path` as
+`.celilo-bak` and `.celilo-prev`. Set `statePath` to a prefix outside daemon
+include directories (such as `/etc/dnsmasq.d`) when the daemon parses every
+neighboring file.
 ```ts
 applyRenderedConfig({
   target: sys, path: '/etc/caddy/Caddyfile', content: rendered,
@@ -97,11 +115,11 @@ applyRenderedConfig({
 
 ### `waitFor(predicate, { attempts?, intervalMs?, onAttempt? }) → Promise<boolean>`
 Poll an async predicate until true or exhausted (default 30 × 5s). A combinator —
-it never touches the remote; wrap a `probe`/`runAppCommand` thunk. Use
+it never touches the remote; wrap a `probe`/`probeHttp`/`runAppCommand` thunk. Use
 `onAttempt` to emit a heartbeat so a long wait doesn't trip the hook idle-timeout.
 Never `sleep`.
 ```ts
-await waitFor(() => probe(sys, { kind: 'http', url }, run).healthy,
+await waitFor(async () => (await probeHttp(sys, { port: 3000 })).healthy,
   { onAttempt: (n) => logger.info(`waiting… ${n * 5}s`) });
 ```
 

package/drizzle/0026_module_integrity_version.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-- The integrity baseline records WHICH VERSION its checksums describe
+-- (openspec/changes/module-integrity-rigor, D1).
+--
+-- Without it `module verify` cannot distinguish "the files are old" from "the
+-- checksums are old", and it reported the same violations either way. The row
+-- was written once, by a plain INSERT on a UNIQUE column inside a try/catch
+-- that only warned, and `module update` never touched the table at all — so a
+-- module imported once and updated ten times still carried its first import's
+-- checksums, and every file that had legitimately changed since read as
+-- [MODIFIED]. That was the whole of the manifest.yml / README.md / scripts/*
+-- block in the fleet's 47- and 25-violation outputs.
+--
+-- NULLABLE on purpose, and this is the Rule 3.4 exception rather than a missing
+-- default: NULL means "written before celilo stamped versions", which is a
+-- fact verify must be able to state. A default of '' or of the module's current
+-- version would fabricate a correspondence nobody measured — exactly the
+-- failure this change exists to remove. Existing rows keep NULL until the next
+-- `module import` or `module update` rewrites them.
+
+ALTER TABLE `module_integrity` ADD `version` text;

package/drizzle/meta/_journal.json

@@ -183,6 +183,13 @@
       "when": 1784100000000,
       "tag": "0025_port_forward_owner",
       "breakpoints": true
+    },
+    {
+      "idx": 26,
+      "version": "6",
+      "when": 1784200000000,
+      "tag": "0026_module_integrity_version",
+      "breakpoints": true
     }
   ]
-}
+}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@celilo/cli",
-  "version": "1.5.0",
+  "version": "1.7.0",
   "description": "Celilo — home lab orchestration CLI",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {
@@ -58,9 +58,9 @@
   "dependencies": {
     "@aws-sdk/client-s3": "^3.1109.0",
     "@aws-sdk/lib-storage": "^3.1101.0",
-    "@celilo/capabilities": "^2.2.0",
+    "@celilo/capabilities": "^2.4.0",
     "@celilo/cli-display": "^0.2.0",
-    "@celilo/core": "^0.9.0",
+    "@celilo/core": "^0.9.1",
     "@celilo/event-bus": "^0.6.0",
     "ajv": "^8.18.0",
     "drizzle-orm": "^0.36.4",

package/src/capabilities/lookup.ts

@@ -18,6 +18,43 @@ export interface CapabilityProviderInfo {
   zones: string[] | null;
 }
 
+type CapabilityProviderRow = {
+  id: number;
+  moduleId: string;
+  capabilityName: string;
+  version: string;
+  data: Record<string, unknown>;
+  zones: string[] | null;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Select a provider from an already-loaded candidate set.
+ *
+ * Keeping this policy separate from the database query lets runtime consumers
+ * that already loaded every provider (notably the hook capability loader) use
+ * exactly the same explicit-zone-first semantics as direct lookups.
+ */
+export function selectCapabilityProvider(
+  all: CapabilityProviderRow[],
+  zone?: string,
+): CapabilityProviderInfo | null {
+  if (all.length === 0) return null;
+
+  if (zone) {
+    const zoneMatch = all.find((candidate) => candidate.zones?.includes(zone));
+    if (zoneMatch) return toInfo(zoneMatch);
+
+    const agnostic = all.find(
+      (candidate) => candidate.zones === null || candidate.zones === undefined,
+    );
+    if (agnostic) return toInfo(agnostic);
+
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  return toInfo(all[0]);
+}
+
 /**
  * Find a capability provider, optionally filtered by zone.
  *
@@ -35,27 +72,7 @@ export function findCapabilityProvider(
   zone?: string,
 ): CapabilityProviderInfo | null {
   const all = db.select().from(capabilities).where(eq(capabilities.capabilityName, name)).all();
-
-  if (all.length === 0) return null;
-
-  if (zone) {
-    // First: try to find a provider that explicitly covers this zone
-    const zoneMatch = all.find((c) => {
-      const zones = c.zones as string[] | null;
-      return zones?.includes(zone);
-    });
-    if (zoneMatch) return toInfo(zoneMatch);
-
-    // Second: fall back to zone-agnostic provider (zones is null)
-    const agnostic = all.find((c) => c.zones === null || c.zones === undefined);
-    if (agnostic) return toInfo(agnostic);
-
-    // No match for this zone
-    return null;
-  }
-
-  // No zone specified: return first provider
-  return toInfo(all[0]);
+  return selectCapabilityProvider(all, zone);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -70,14 +87,7 @@ export function findAllCapabilityProviders(name: string, db: DbClient): Capabili
     .map(toInfo);
 }
 
-function toInfo(row: {
-  id: number;
-  moduleId: string;
-  capabilityName: string;
-  version: string;
-  data: Record<string, unknown>;
-  zones: string[] | null;
-}): CapabilityProviderInfo {
+function toInfo(row: CapabilityProviderRow): CapabilityProviderInfo {
   return {
     id: row.id,
     moduleId: row.moduleId,

package/src/capabilities/secret-ref.test.ts

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import { join } from 'node:path';
 import { createDbClient } from '@/db/client';
 import { encryptSecret } from '@/secrets/encryption';
 import { getOrCreateMasterKey } from '@/secrets/master-key';
+import { validateCapabilitySecrets } from './secret-validation';
 import { getCapabilitySecret } from './secrets';
 
 let testDirs: string[] = [];
@@ -108,6 +109,11 @@ describe('Capability secret_ref resolution', () => {
       )
       .run(capabilityId.id, 'tsig', 'TSIG secret for DNS updates');
 
+    // A configured secret_ref satisfies generation validation without
+    // duplicating the secret into capability_secrets.
+    const validation = await validateCapabilitySecrets('dns-external', db.$client);
+    expect(validation).toEqual({ success: true });
+
     // Test: Resolve capability secret via secret_ref
     const result = await getCapabilitySecret('dns_external', 'tsig', db.$client);
 
@@ -172,6 +178,17 @@ describe('Capability secret_ref resolution', () => {
       )
       .run(capabilityId.id, 'tsig');
 
+    const validation = await validateCapabilitySecrets('dns-external', db.$client);
+    expect(validation.success).toBe(false);
+    expect(validation.missingSecrets).toEqual([
+      {
+        capabilityId: capabilityId.id,
+        capabilityName: 'dns_external',
+        secretName: 'tsig',
+        description: null,
+      },
+    ]);
+
     // Test: Should throw error about missing module secret
     await expect(getCapabilitySecret('dns_external', 'tsig', db.$client)).rejects.toThrow(
       "Module secret 'nonexistent_secret' not found",
@@ -241,6 +258,9 @@ describe('Capability secret_ref resolution', () => {
       )
       .run(capabilityId.id, 'api_key', encrypted.encryptedValue, encrypted.iv, encrypted.authTag);
 
+    const validation = await validateCapabilitySecrets('test-module', db.$client);
+    expect(validation).toEqual({ success: true });
+
     // Test: Should read from capability_secrets table
     const result = await getCapabilitySecret('test_capability', 'api_key', db.$client);
 
@@ -305,6 +325,10 @@ describe('Capability secret_ref resolution', () => {
       )
       .run(capabilityId.id, 'api_key');
 
+    const validation = await validateCapabilitySecrets('test-module', db.$client);
+    expect(validation.success).toBe(false);
+    expect(validation.missingSecrets?.map((secret) => secret.secretName)).toEqual(['api_key']);
+
     // Test: Should throw helpful error
     await expect(getCapabilitySecret('test_capability', 'api_key', db.$client)).rejects.toThrow(
       "Secret 'api_key' in capability 'test_capability' has not been set",

package/src/capabilities/secret-validation.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 
 import type { Database } from 'bun:sqlite';
 import { celiloIntro, promptPassword } from '../cli/prompts';
+import type { ModuleManifest } from '../manifest/schema';
 import { encryptSecret } from '../secrets/encryption';
 import { getOrCreateMasterKey } from '../secrets/master-key';
 
@@ -21,6 +22,46 @@ export interface SecretValidationResult {
   missingSecrets?: MissingCapabilitySecret[];
 }
 
+/**
+ * Check whether an unset capability-secret row is backed by a configured
+ * provider module secret through `secret_ref`.
+ *
+ * Capability registration deliberately stores metadata-only rows even when
+ * the manifest delegates storage to `$secret:<name>`. In that case the NULL
+ * capability value is expected and must not trigger a second secret prompt.
+ */
+function hasConfiguredSecretRef(
+  moduleId: string,
+  manifest: ModuleManifest | null,
+  capabilityName: string,
+  secretName: string,
+  db: Database,
+): boolean {
+  const capability = manifest?.provides?.capabilities?.find(
+    (candidate) => candidate.name === capabilityName,
+  );
+  const secret = capability?.secrets?.find((candidate) => candidate.name === secretName);
+  const match = secret?.secret_ref?.match(/^\$secret:(.+)$/);
+
+  if (!match) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const referencedSecret = db
+    .prepare(
+      `SELECT 1
+       FROM secrets
+       WHERE module_id = ? AND name = ?
+         AND encrypted_value IS NOT NULL
+         AND iv IS NOT NULL
+         AND auth_tag IS NOT NULL
+       LIMIT 1`,
+    )
+    .get(moduleId, match[1]);
+
+  return referencedSecret !== null && referencedSecret !== undefined;
+}
+
 /**
  * Check if module has any missing capability secrets
  *
@@ -43,6 +84,11 @@ export async function validateCapabilitySecrets(
     return { success: true }; // No capabilities = no secrets needed
   }
 
+  const moduleResult = db.prepare('SELECT manifest_data FROM modules WHERE id = ?').get(moduleId) as
+    | { manifest_data: string }
+    | undefined;
+  const manifest = moduleResult ? (JSON.parse(moduleResult.manifest_data) as ModuleManifest) : null;
+
   // Check for secrets with NULL encrypted_value
   const missingSecrets: MissingCapabilitySecret[] = [];
 
@@ -56,6 +102,10 @@ export async function validateCapabilitySecrets(
       .all(capability.id) as Array<{ name: string; description: string | null }>;
 
     for (const secret of secrets) {
+      if (hasConfiguredSecretRef(moduleId, manifest, capability.capability_name, secret.name, db)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+
       missingSecrets.push({
         capabilityId: capability.id,
         capabilityName: capability.capability_name,