@ccmsg/cli 0.2.8 → 0.2.11

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ccmsg/cli",
-  "version": "0.2.8",
+  "version": "0.2.11",
   "description": "The ccmsg daemon, CLI and agent plugins for one instance (= one config home)",
   "license": "MIT",
   "author": "kawaz",
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
     "test": "bun test"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@ccmsg/protocol": "1.6.0"
+    "@ccmsg/protocol": "1.8.0"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@types/bun": "^1.3.0",

package/src/auth/auth.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import type {
   AuthChallengeResult,
   AuthRecord,
   AuthRefreshArgs,
+  AuthRefreshReason,
   AuthRefreshResult,
   AuthRegisterArgs,
   AuthResolveArgs,
@@ -145,6 +146,18 @@ export interface MintedSession {
   readonly refresh: { readonly value: Base64Url; readonly expires_at: Timestamp };
 }
 
+/** What is known about the client that asked for a refresh: its own word for
+ * why, and what the carrier observed of it.
+ *
+ * Kept on the family as `last_refresh` and read by nobody but the person whose
+ * sessions they are — a run of `reconnect` at an hour they were asleep is
+ * something to recognise. Nothing here is checked, so nothing may turn on it. */
+export interface RefreshFrom {
+  readonly reason?: AuthRefreshReason;
+  readonly ip?: string;
+  readonly userAgent?: string;
+}
+
 /** What a registration URL is, as the command that made it prints it. */
 export interface IssuedRegistration {
   readonly sub: Subject;
@@ -455,6 +468,11 @@ export class Auth {
       endpoint: claims.endpoint,
       rp_id: claims.rp_id,
       sign_count: verified.signCount,
+      // What the authenticator said about backing this credential up, kept
+      // because it decides what removing the line costs the person and nothing
+      // else: neither flag is ever read to admit or refuse an exchange.
+      backup_eligible: verified.backupEligible,
+      backup_state: verified.backupState,
       ...(claims.issued_label === undefined ? {} : { issued_label: claims.issued_label }),
       ...(args.device_label === undefined ? {} : { device_label: args.device_label }),
       registered_at: at,
@@ -656,7 +674,7 @@ export class Auth {
    * a family minted elsewhere is carried there rather than done here — two
    * instances rotating one family in parallel would merge by last write and
    * read exactly like a stolen token being replayed (§2.4). */
-  async refreshToken(value: Base64Url): Promise<MintedSession> {
+  async refreshToken(value: Base64Url, from: RefreshFrom = {}): Promise<MintedSession> {
     const held = this.deps.records.byRefresh(value);
     if (held === undefined) {
       // Not the standing generation, nor the one before it. Either it never was
@@ -666,12 +684,21 @@ export class Auth {
       throw new OpError("auth_invalid", "この refresh token は使えません");
     }
     if (held.body.iss !== this.deps.self) {
+      // What the carrier observed goes with the value: the person is at the
+      // other end of this instance's connection and not the issuer's, so these
+      // are only knowable here, and a rotation forwarded without them would be
+      // remembered as a time and nothing else. The issuer writes them
+      // unchecked, as it does the ones it observes itself (contract,
+      // `AuthRotateArgs`).
       const answer = (await this.#atIssuer(held.body.iss, "auth_rotate", {
         refresh_token: value,
+        ...(from.reason === undefined ? {} : { reason: from.reason }),
+        ...(from.ip === undefined ? {} : { ip: from.ip }),
+        ...(from.userAgent === undefined ? {} : { user_agent: from.userAgent }),
       } satisfies AuthRotateArgs)) as AuthRotateResult;
       return { session: { sub: answer.sub, access: answer.access }, refresh: answer.refresh };
     }
-    const rotated = this.rotate(value);
+    const rotated = this.rotate(value, from);
     return { session: { sub: rotated.sub, access: rotated.access }, refresh: rotated.refresh };
   }
 
@@ -703,7 +730,7 @@ export class Auth {
 
   /** Rotate a family this instance minted. The one writer's own operation, and
    * what `auth_rotate` runs on its behalf. */
-  rotate(value: Base64Url): AuthRotateResult {
+  rotate(value: Base64Url, from: RefreshFrom = {}): AuthRotateResult {
     const held = this.deps.records.byRefresh(value);
     if (held === undefined) {
       this.#failReused(value);
@@ -732,6 +759,16 @@ export class Auth {
       iss: this.deps.self,
       access,
       refresh: { value: token(), expires_at: at + REFRESH_TTL_MS },
+      // Written by this instance because it is the family's `iss`, and only for
+      // the rotation that just happened — the caller's word about why, and
+      // where it was asked from, are a hint for the person reading their own
+      // sessions back and are never checked (contract, `TokenFamily`).
+      last_refresh: {
+        at,
+        ...(from.reason === undefined ? {} : { reason: from.reason }),
+        ...(from.ip === undefined ? {} : { ip: from.ip }),
+        ...(from.userAgent === undefined ? {} : { user_agent: from.userAgent }),
+      },
       previous_refresh: { value: held.body.refresh.value, expires_at: at + PREVIOUS_GRACE_MS },
       // The value going out of service is remembered as a digest for as long as
       // it would have been accepted, so that presenting it later is recognised
@@ -895,8 +932,17 @@ export function authHandlers(auth: Auth) {
       // the URL and the count of tries against it (§2.2).
       return { kind: "register", claims: auth.resolveRegistration(args.token, args.code) };
     },
-    auth_rotate: (input: HandlerInput): AuthRotateResult =>
-      auth.rotate((input.args as unknown as AuthRotateArgs).refresh_token),
+    auth_rotate: (input: HandlerInput): AuthRotateResult => {
+      const args = input.args as unknown as AuthRotateArgs;
+      // The receiving instance's account of the person, taken as stated: it is
+      // the only one that saw them, and `last_refresh` is a hint nothing is
+      // decided by (contract, `AuthRotateArgs`).
+      return auth.rotate(args.refresh_token, {
+        ...(args.reason === undefined ? {} : { reason: args.reason }),
+        ...(args.ip === undefined ? {} : { ip: args.ip }),
+        ...(args.user_agent === undefined ? {} : { userAgent: args.user_agent }),
+      });
+    },
   };
 }
 

package/src/auth/http.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
 import {
   type AuthAssertArgs,
+  type AuthRefreshTokenArgs,
   type AuthRegisterArgs,
   type ErrorCode,
   type InstanceId,
@@ -196,7 +197,12 @@ export async function handleAuth(
         if (held === undefined) {
           return refusal("auth_invalid", "この要求には refresh token がありません", cors);
         }
-        const minted = await deps.auth.refreshToken(held);
+        const { reason } = args as unknown as AuthRefreshTokenArgs;
+        const minted = await deps.auth.refreshToken(held, {
+          ...(reason === undefined ? {} : { reason }),
+          ...(seen.ip === undefined ? {} : { ip: seen.ip }),
+          ...(seen.userAgent === undefined ? {} : { userAgent: seen.userAgent }),
+        });
         return answer(minted.session, cors, setCookie(deps, url.pathname, minted));
       }
     }

package/src/auth/webauthn.ts

@@ -9,11 +9,15 @@ import { type CborValue, decodeCbor, decodeCborWhole, mapEntry } from "./cbor.ts
  * log; nothing branches on it. */
 export class WebAuthnError extends Error {}
 
-/** The flags of the authenticator data (L2 §6.1). Only two are read: that a
- * person was present, and that they were verified — the registration asks for
- * `userVerification: "required"`, so both have to hold on every exchange. */
+/** The flags of the authenticator data (L2 §6.1). Two of them decide whether an
+ * exchange is admitted: that a person was present, and that they were verified
+ * — the registration asks for `userVerification: "required"`, so both have to
+ * hold on every exchange. The two backup flags decide nothing; they are read at
+ * registration and kept as a hint for the person reading their own list. */
 const FLAG_USER_PRESENT = 0x01;
 const FLAG_USER_VERIFIED = 0x04;
+const FLAG_BACKUP_ELIGIBLE = 0x08;
+const FLAG_BACKUP_STATE = 0x10;
 const FLAG_ATTESTED_CREDENTIAL = 0x40;
 
 export function base64UrlDecode(value: string): Uint8Array {
@@ -131,6 +135,12 @@ export interface VerifiedRegistration {
   readonly credentialId: Base64Url;
   readonly publicKey: Base64Url;
   readonly signCount: number;
+  /** The BE flag: whether the authenticator may back this credential up, which
+   * is what separates a synced passkey from one that lives on a single device. */
+  readonly backupEligible: boolean;
+  /** The BS flag: whether it was backed up at this moment. Eligible and not yet
+   * backed up is an ordinary state on a device that has just made the key. */
+  readonly backupState: boolean;
 }
 
 /** Check a registration (L2 §7.1) and answer what is worth keeping.
@@ -180,6 +190,8 @@ export function verifyRegistration(
     credentialId: base64UrlEncode(data.credentialId),
     publicKey: base64UrlEncode(data.publicKey),
     signCount: data.signCount,
+    backupEligible: (data.flags & FLAG_BACKUP_ELIGIBLE) !== 0,
+    backupState: (data.flags & FLAG_BACKUP_STATE) !== 0,
   };
 }
 

package/src/instance/client.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+/** Where a request came from, when something in front of us is forwarding it
+ * (§3.1).
+ *
+ * The address the listener observed is the one thing here that cannot be
+ * claimed, and behind a reverse proxy it is always the proxy's. `X-Forwarded-*`
+ * carries what the proxy saw, but the header is a header: anyone who can reach
+ * the port can write one. The operator names the proxies as CIDR blocks, which
+ * is the only way this instance can tell a forwarding it asked for from a
+ * forwarding a caller invented.
+ *
+ * What is recovered is a hint and not a credential — an address is what a
+ * person recognises their own session by (DR-0001 §2.2), and nothing is
+ * admitted or refused by it. That is also why a wrong answer here is worse than
+ * no answer: a forged address kept on a record is a hint pointing away from
+ * whoever reads it.
+ */
+
+/** One address block, as the operator wrote it. Held as the address's bytes and
+ * how many of its leading bits the block fixes. */
+interface Cidr {
+  readonly bytes: Uint8Array;
+  readonly bits: number;
+}
+
+/** Parse an address, or answer nothing for a text that is not one.
+ *
+ * IPv4 and IPv6 are both read to bytes here rather than compared as text: a
+ * block is a run of bits, and two spellings of one address (`::ffff:127.0.0.1`
+ * and `127.0.0.1`, `::1` and `0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1`) are the same address. An
+ * IPv4-mapped IPv6 address is answered as its four IPv4 bytes, so an operator
+ * who wrote `127.0.0.0/8` is not asked to also write the mapped spelling of it.
+ */
+export function addressBytes(text: string): Uint8Array | undefined {
+  // A zone id names an interface on the host that holds the address, and says
+  // nothing about which address it is.
+  const bare = text.includes("%") ? text.slice(0, text.indexOf("%")) : text;
+  if (bare === "") return undefined;
+  return bare.includes(":") ? ipv6Bytes(bare) : ipv4Bytes(bare);
+}
+
+function ipv4Bytes(text: string): Uint8Array | undefined {
+  const parts = text.split(".");
+  if (parts.length !== 4) return undefined;
+  const bytes = new Uint8Array(4);
+  for (const [index, part] of parts.entries()) {
+    // Leading zeros are refused rather than read: `0177.0.0.1` is one address
+    // to a library that reads it as octal and another to one that does not, and
+    // an address this instance is unsure of is not one to trust a header by.
+    if (!/^(?:0|[1-9][0-9]{0,2})$/.test(part)) return undefined;
+    const value = Number(part);
+    if (value > 255) return undefined;
+    bytes[index] = value;
+  }
+  return bytes;
+}
+
+function ipv6Bytes(text: string): Uint8Array | undefined {
+  const halves = text.split("::");
+  if (halves.length > 2) return undefined;
+  const head = groupsOf(halves[0] ?? "");
+  const tail = halves.length === 2 ? groupsOf(halves[1] ?? "") : [];
+  if (head === undefined || tail === undefined) return undefined;
+  // The address's last group may be written as a dotted IPv4, which is how a
+  // mapped address is spelled; it stands for the two groups it fills.
+  const last = tail.length > 0 ? tail : head;
+  const trailing = last[last.length - 1];
+  let embedded: Uint8Array | undefined;
+  if (trailing !== undefined && trailing.includes(".")) {
+    embedded = ipv4Bytes(trailing);
+    if (embedded === undefined) return undefined;
+    last.pop();
+  }
+  const front = bytesOfGroups(head);
+  const back = bytesOfGroups(tail);
+  if (front === undefined || back === undefined) return undefined;
+  const stated = front.length + back.length + (embedded === undefined ? 0 : 4);
+  // Without `::` the groups are the whole address; with it they are less than
+  // the whole, since it has to stand for at least one group of zeros.
+  if (halves.length === 1 ? stated !== 16 : stated > 14) return undefined;
+  const bytes = new Uint8Array(16);
+  bytes.set(front, 0);
+  const rest = new Uint8Array([...back, ...(embedded ?? [])]);
+  bytes.set(rest, 16 - rest.length);
+  return mappedV4(bytes) ?? bytes;
+}
+
+function bytesOfGroups(groups: readonly string[]): Uint8Array | undefined {
+  const bytes = new Uint8Array(groups.length * 2);
+  for (const [index, group] of groups.entries()) {
+    if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}$/.test(group)) return undefined;
+    const value = Number.parseInt(group, 16);
+    bytes[index * 2] = value >> 8;
+    bytes[index * 2 + 1] = value & 0xff;
+  }
+  return bytes;
+}
+
+/** The four IPv4 bytes of an IPv4-mapped address (`::ffff:0:0/96`), if it is
+ * one. Held as IPv4 so that one written block covers both spellings. */
+function mappedV4(bytes: Uint8Array): Uint8Array | undefined {
+  for (let index = 0; index < 10; index += 1) if (bytes[index] !== 0) return undefined;
+  if (bytes[10] !== 0xff || bytes[11] !== 0xff) return undefined;
+  return bytes.slice(12);
+}
+
+function groupsOf(half: string): string[] | undefined {
+  if (half === "") return [];
+  const groups = half.split(":");
+  return groups.some((group) => group === "") ? undefined : groups;
+}
+
+/** Parse `<address>/<bits>`, or a bare address as the block holding it alone.
+ * Answers nothing for a text that is not a block, which is what lets config
+ * refuse it at load rather than silently trusting nobody. */
+export function parseCidr(text: string): Cidr | undefined {
+  const slash = text.lastIndexOf("/");
+  const address = slash === -1 ? text : text.slice(0, slash);
+  const bytes = addressBytes(address);
+  if (bytes === undefined) return undefined;
+  const width = bytes.length * 8;
+  if (slash === -1) return { bytes, bits: width };
+  const suffix = text.slice(slash + 1);
+  if (!/^(?:0|[1-9][0-9]?[0-9]?)$/.test(suffix)) return undefined;
+  const bits = Number(suffix);
+  if (bits > width) return undefined;
+  return { bytes, bits };
+}
+
+function within(address: Uint8Array, block: Cidr): boolean {
+  // A block fixes bits of one family, so an address of the other is outside it.
+  if (address.length !== block.bytes.length) return false;
+  const whole = block.bits >> 3;
+  for (let index = 0; index < whole; index += 1) {
+    if (address[index] !== block.bytes[index]) return false;
+  }
+  const rest = block.bits & 7;
+  if (rest === 0) return true;
+  const mask = 0xff << (8 - rest);
+  return ((address[whole] ?? 0) & mask) === ((block.bytes[whole] ?? 0) & mask);
+}
+
+/** Whether an address is one of the named blocks. */
+export function trusted(address: string | undefined, blocks: readonly Cidr[]): boolean {
+  if (address === undefined || blocks.length === 0) return false;
+  const bytes = addressBytes(address);
+  if (bytes === undefined) return false;
+  return blocks.some((block) => within(bytes, block));
+}
+
+/** The address the person is at, as far as this instance can tell.
+ *
+ * The observed address when it is not a proxy the operator named — a header
+ * from anyone else is a claim about somebody else and is dropped. When it is
+ * one, `X-Forwarded-For` is read from the right and the first address that is
+ * not itself a trusted proxy is answered: the entries to the right were written
+ * by the proxies in the chain, and the first one outside that chain is the last
+ * value this instance has any reason to believe. Everything further left was
+ * written by whoever was talking to the outermost proxy and could say anything.
+ *
+ * A chain of nothing but trusted proxies leaves the observed address, which is
+ * the honest answer when every value in the header is one of our own hops.
+ */
+export function clientAddress(
+  request: Request,
+  observed: string | undefined,
+  proxies: readonly Cidr[],
+): string | undefined {
+  if (!trusted(observed, proxies)) return observed;
+  const forwarded = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for");
+  if (forwarded === null) return observed;
+  const hops = forwarded
+    .split(",")
+    .map((hop) => hop.trim())
+    .filter((hop) => hop !== "");
+  for (let index = hops.length - 1; index >= 0; index -= 1) {
+    const hop = hops[index] ?? "";
+    if (addressBytes(hop) === undefined) return observed;
+    if (!trusted(hop, proxies)) return hop;
+  }
+  return observed;
+}
+
+export type { Cidr };

package/src/instance/config.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import { mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
 import { dirname, isAbsolute } from "node:path";
 import type { Endpoint } from "@ccmsg/protocol";
+import { parseCidr } from "./client.ts";
 
 /** Where the instance accepts WebSocket connections, and from whom.
  *
@@ -14,6 +15,15 @@ export interface EntryConfig {
   /** Source addresses allowed to connect. Empty means every address the bind
    * itself already permits, which for the default loopback bind is this host. */
   readonly source_ips: readonly string[];
+  /** Address blocks, in CIDR notation, whose `X-Forwarded-For` this instance
+   * believes.
+   *
+   * Separate from `source_ips` because the two answer different questions: that
+   * one is who may connect at all, this one is whose account of somebody else
+   * to take. A reverse proxy is commonly allowed in without being the only
+   * thing allowed in, and an operator with no proxy leaves this empty and has
+   * every forwarding header ignored. */
+  readonly trusted_proxies: readonly string[];
 }
 
 /** One value a launch recipe's command reads, as the operator declares it. */
@@ -274,10 +284,22 @@ function entryOf(file: string, raw: unknown): EntryConfig {
   if (typeof host !== "string" || host === "") {
     throw new ConfigError(file, "entry.host must be an address to bind");
   }
+  const proxies = stringsOf(file, "entry.trusted_proxies", fields["trusted_proxies"]);
+  // Read here rather than where a request is: a block that parses to nothing
+  // would silently trust nobody, and an operator who wrote one meant to trust
+  // somebody.
+  const unreadable = proxies.filter((block) => parseCidr(block) === undefined);
+  if (unreadable.length > 0) {
+    throw new ConfigError(
+      file,
+      `entry.trusted_proxies must be CIDR blocks, got ${unreadable.join(", ")}`,
+    );
+  }
   return {
     host,
     port,
     source_ips: stringsOf(file, "entry.source_ips", fields["source_ips"]),
+    trusted_proxies: proxies,
   };
 }
 

package/src/instance/instance.ts

@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ import {
   handleAuth,
   recordsDir,
 } from "../auth/index.ts";
+import { type Cidr, clientAddress, parseCidr } from "./client.ts";
 import { type EntryConfig, type InstanceConfig, loadConfig } from "./config.ts";
 import { completeHandlers } from "./handlers.ts";
 import { acquireLock, type Held, isHeldByUs, type Lock } from "./lock.ts";
@@ -264,7 +265,8 @@ async function bindForMesh(config: InstanceConfig, mesh: Mesh): Promise<MeshWiri
         ? Promise.resolve(failure(undefined, "internal_error", "this instance is still starting"))
         : instance.handle(frame, conn),
     entry: entryPolicy(config, true, () => instance?.auth),
-    route: async (request) => (await mesh.route(request)) ?? (await instance?.route(request)),
+    route: async (request, source) =>
+      (await mesh.route(request)) ?? (await instance?.route(request, source)),
     onConn: (conn, info) => {
       mesh.accept(conn, info);
       instance?.accepted(conn, info);
@@ -313,6 +315,10 @@ export class Instance {
   /** The person's authentication: who may open a connection, and the records
    * that say so (DR-0001). */
   readonly #auth: Auth;
+  /** The forwarding proxies the operator named, read once: a block is config,
+   * and parsing one per request would be work done for every caller to answer
+   * a question the config already settled. */
+  readonly #proxies: readonly Cidr[];
   readonly #handlers: Handlers;
   readonly #capabilities: ReadonlySet<Capability>;
   /** Set the moment shutdown starts, which is the re-entry guard of §8.5 step
@@ -343,6 +349,12 @@ export class Instance {
     now?: () => Timestamp,
   ) {
     this.#conns = wiring?.conns ?? new ConnRegistry();
+    // Config refused anything that does not parse, so what is dropped here is
+    // nothing an operator wrote.
+    this.#proxies = (config.entry?.trusted_proxies ?? []).flatMap((block) => {
+      const parsed = parseCidr(block);
+      return parsed === undefined ? [] : [parsed];
+    });
     this.#mesh = wiring?.mesh;
     this.#boundWs = wiring?.ws;
     // Every capability rests on an upstream, so what is configured is what
@@ -644,7 +656,7 @@ export class Instance {
           },
           // The gateway posts to the address this instance already serves,
           // behind the same entry check (§3.1).
-          route: (request) => this.route(request),
+          route: (request, source) => this.route(request, source),
         }),
       );
     }
@@ -665,11 +677,16 @@ export class Instance {
    * gateway's webhook is the one such route this instance answers itself; the
    * mesh's two are answered before this is asked, because they are served
    * before anything is proven and this instance's own routes are not. */
-  async route(request: Request): Promise<Response | undefined> {
+  async route(request: Request, source?: string): Promise<Response | undefined> {
     // The person's authentication comes first: it is the one route reached
     // before anything is proven, and the gateway's webhook carries its own
     // secret and cannot be confused with it (DR-0001 §2.7).
-    const authorized = await handleAuth(request, { auth: this.#auth, self: this.self }, {});
+    const ip = clientAddress(request, source, this.#proxies);
+    const authorized = await handleAuth(
+      request,
+      { auth: this.#auth, self: this.self },
+      ip === undefined ? {} : { ip },
+    );
     if (authorized !== undefined) return authorized;
     return await this.#gateway.route(request);
   }

package/src/service/service.ts

@@ -150,16 +150,43 @@ export function serviceFor(env: Env = process.env, platform = process.platform):
   throw new CommandError("capability_unavailable", `${platform} には登録先がありません`);
 }
 
-class LaunchdService implements Service {
+/** Whether launchd's refusal to bootstrap is it saying the unit is already
+ * there. Errno 37 is `EBUSY`, which is what a bootstrap racing the teardown of
+ * the same label gets. */
+function alreadyLoaded(answer: RunResult): boolean {
+  const said = `${answer.stdout} ${answer.stderr}`;
+  return /already (loaded|bootstrapped)|Operation already in progress|: 37:/.test(said);
+}
+
+/** What the init system said when it refused.
+ *
+ * The command and its stderr, unabridged: launchd's refusals are numbered
+ * rather than worded, and a `Bootstrap failed: 5: Input/output error` handed
+ * straight to the person is worth more than anything this could say instead. */
+function refuse(command: readonly string[], answer: RunResult): never {
+  const said = answer.stderr.trim() || answer.stdout.trim();
+  throw new CommandError(
+    "internal_error",
+    `${command.join(" ")} が失敗しました (exit ${String(answer.code)})${said === "" ? "" : `: ${said}`}`,
+  );
+}
+
+export class LaunchdService implements Service {
   readonly kind = "launchd" as const;
   readonly unitFile: string;
+  readonly #label: string;
   readonly #env: Env;
   readonly #domain: string;
 
-  constructor(env: Env) {
+  /** The label is a parameter for `Run`'s reason: a test that drives this
+   * machine's real launchd has to do it under a name that is not the one the
+   * machine's own supervisor is registered under. Nothing in ccmsg passes it —
+   * `serviceFor` is where the name is settled. */
+  constructor(env: Env, label: string = LAUNCHD_LABEL) {
     this.#env = env;
+    this.#label = label;
     const home = env["HOME"] ?? homedir();
-    this.unitFile = join(home, "Library", "LaunchAgents", `${LAUNCHD_LABEL}.plist`);
+    this.unitFile = join(home, "Library", "LaunchAgents", `${label}.plist`);
     this.#domain = `gui/${String(process.getuid?.() ?? 0)}`;
   }
 
@@ -173,7 +200,7 @@ class LaunchdService implements Service {
       '<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">',
       '<plist version="1.0">',
       "<dict>",
-      `  <key>Label</key><string>${LAUNCHD_LABEL}</string>`,
+      `  <key>Label</key><string>${this.#label}</string>`,
       "  <key>ProgramArguments</key>",
       "  <array>",
       ...supervisorCommand().map((arg) => `    <string>${escapeXml(arg)}</string>`),
@@ -194,26 +221,48 @@ class LaunchdService implements Service {
     ].join("\n");
   }
 
+  /** Registering is writing the unit and starting it: a supervisor nothing is
+   * supervising is not what the person asked for, and `RunAtLoad` means that a
+   * unit put in front of launchd at all is a unit launchd runs. What `start`
+   * adds is the case where the file is already there. */
   async register(run: Run): Promise<ServiceState> {
     write(this.unitFile, this.unitText(), serviceLogFile(this.#env));
-    await run(["launchctl", "bootstrap", this.#domain, this.unitFile]);
-    return await this.state(run);
+    return await this.start(run);
   }
 
   async unregister(run: Run): Promise<{ unregistered: boolean }> {
-    await run(["launchctl", "bootout", `${this.#domain}/${LAUNCHD_LABEL}`]);
+    await run(["launchctl", "bootout", `${this.#domain}/${this.#label}`]);
     const existed = existsSync(this.unitFile);
     rmSync(this.unitFile, { force: true });
     return { unregistered: existed };
   }
 
+  /** Put the unit in front of launchd if it is not already there, then start
+   * the program.
+   *
+   * `kickstart` alone is what a loaded unit needs, and launchd answers a unit
+   * it has never heard of with `No such process` — which is exactly the state
+   * a login leaves behind, and the state `unregister` leaves behind however
+   * quickly a `register` follows it. So what is loaded is read first and the
+   * missing half is done here rather than assumed to have been done by
+   * whoever wrote the file. */
   async start(run: Run): Promise<ServiceState> {
-    await run(["launchctl", "kickstart", `${this.#domain}/${LAUNCHD_LABEL}`]);
+    const before = await this.#report(run);
+    if (before.service?.loaded !== true) {
+      const bootstrap = ["launchctl", "bootstrap", this.#domain, this.unitFile];
+      const answer = await run(bootstrap);
+      // `Operation already in progress` and `Service is already loaded` are
+      // launchd saying the unit is there, which is all this asked for.
+      if (answer.code !== 0 && !alreadyLoaded(answer)) refuse(bootstrap, answer);
+    }
+    const kickstart = ["launchctl", "kickstart", `${this.#domain}/${this.#label}`];
+    const answer = await run(kickstart);
+    if (answer.code !== 0) refuse(kickstart, answer);
     return await this.state(run);
   }
 
   async stop(run: Run): Promise<ServiceState> {
-    await run(["launchctl", "kill", "SIGTERM", `${this.#domain}/${LAUNCHD_LABEL}`]);
+    await run(["launchctl", "kill", "SIGTERM", `${this.#domain}/${this.#label}`]);
     return await this.state(run);
   }
 
@@ -226,7 +275,7 @@ class LaunchdService implements Service {
 
   async #report(run: Run): Promise<Omit<ServiceState, "program">> {
     const registered = existsSync(this.unitFile);
-    const printed = await run(["launchctl", "print", `${this.#domain}/${LAUNCHD_LABEL}`]);
+    const printed = await run(["launchctl", "print", `${this.#domain}/${this.#label}`]);
     // A non-zero exit is launchd saying it has no such service, which is not
     // the same as having nothing to say: the report stays `null` only when the
     // question could not be put, and here it was and the answer was "no".
@@ -294,11 +343,10 @@ class SystemdService implements Service {
     return { kind: "command", show: [...unit, "--no-pager"], follow: [...unit, "-f"] };
   }
 
+  /** `LaunchdService.register`'s reasoning, in systemd's vocabulary. */
   async register(run: Run): Promise<ServiceState> {
     write(this.unitFile, this.unitText(), serviceLogFile(this.#env));
-    await run(["systemctl", "--user", "daemon-reload"]);
-    await run(["systemctl", "--user", "enable", "--now", SYSTEMD_UNIT]);
-    return await this.state(run);
+    return await this.start(run);
   }
 
   async unregister(run: Run): Promise<{ unregistered: boolean }> {
@@ -309,8 +357,20 @@ class SystemdService implements Service {
     return { unregistered: existed };
   }
 
+  /** `LaunchdService.start`'s reasoning: a unit systemd has not read is a unit
+   * `start` answers `not found` for, and a file written since the last reload
+   * is exactly that. `enable --now` starts it and puts it in the target, so a
+   * supervisor registered today is running after the next login. */
   async start(run: Run): Promise<ServiceState> {
-    await run(["systemctl", "--user", "start", SYSTEMD_UNIT]);
+    const before = await this.#report(run);
+    if (before.service?.loaded !== true) {
+      const reload = ["systemctl", "--user", "daemon-reload"];
+      const reloaded = await run(reload);
+      if (reloaded.code !== 0) refuse(reload, reloaded);
+    }
+    const enable = ["systemctl", "--user", "enable", "--now", SYSTEMD_UNIT];
+    const answer = await run(enable);
+    if (answer.code !== 0) refuse(enable, answer);
     return await this.state(run);
   }
 

package/src/transport/ws.ts

@@ -39,8 +39,13 @@ export interface WsOptions {
    * posts to this instance reaches it at the address it already has, and the
    * entry check of §3.1 runs before this is asked, so a route cannot be
    * reached by anyone the WebSocket could not be. Answering `undefined` leaves
-   * the request to the upgrade, which refuses it. */
-  readonly route?: (request: Request) => Promise<Response | undefined>;
+   * the request to the upgrade, which refuses it.
+   *
+   * `source` is the peer address the server observed, passed for the reason
+   * `allowRequest` is given it: what a route can be told about where a request
+   * came from is written by whoever is in front of us, and only the listener
+   * knows who that actually was. */
+  readonly route?: (request: Request, source: string | undefined) => Promise<Response | undefined>;
 }
 
 /** Accept the webui, and later mesh peers, over WebSocket.
@@ -61,10 +66,11 @@ export function serveWs(options: WsOptions): Listener {
     hostname: options.hostname ?? "127.0.0.1",
     port: options.port,
     async fetch(request, srv) {
-      if (entry.allowRequest?.(request, srv.requestIP(request)?.address) === false) {
+      const source = srv.requestIP(request)?.address;
+      if (entry.allowRequest?.(request, source) === false) {
         return new Response("Forbidden", { status: 403 });
       }
-      const routed = await options.route?.(request);
+      const routed = await options.route?.(request, source);
       if (routed !== undefined) return routed;
       if (!entryPath(new URL(request.url).pathname, path)) {
         return new Response("Not Found", { status: 404 });