@cclabsnz/sf-audit 1.19.0 → 1.21.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +52 -0
- package/lib/apps/apiLogSource.js +3 -2
- package/lib/chains/AttackChain.d.ts +14 -0
- package/lib/chains/CapabilityRegistry.d.ts +5 -0
- package/lib/chains/CapabilityRegistry.js +31 -31
- package/lib/chains/ChainEngine.d.ts +2 -0
- package/lib/chains/ChainEngine.js +31 -6
- package/lib/chains/namedChains.d.ts +85 -0
- package/lib/chains/namedChains.js +404 -210
- package/lib/checks/CheckEngine.js +5 -2
- package/lib/checks/impl/AgentActionSurfaceCheck.js +2 -13
- package/lib/checks/impl/AgentInventoryCheck.js +2 -15
- package/lib/checks/impl/ApexLoggingCheck.js +2 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/GuestApiAccessCheck.js +2 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/GuestUserAccessCheck.js +2 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/UsersAndAdminsCheck.js +5 -5
- package/lib/checks/registry.js +1 -1
- package/lib/checks/support/missingObject.js +2 -1
- package/lib/checks/support/schema.js +1 -1
- package/lib/commands/audit/incident/collect.js +2 -1
- package/lib/findings/Finding.d.ts +7 -0
- package/lib/incident/collect/orgErrors.js +3 -1
- package/lib/incident/collect/streamGuestLogs.js +3 -2
- package/lib/lib/apiErrorText.d.ts +8 -0
- package/lib/lib/apiErrorText.js +15 -0
- package/lib/renderers/AttackChainDagRenderer.d.ts +5 -1
- package/lib/renderers/AttackChainDagRenderer.js +16 -31
- package/lib/renderers/ClientReportRenderer.js +4 -1
- package/lib/renderers/HtmlRenderer.js +12 -2
- package/lib/renderers/MarkdownRenderer.js +67 -2
- package/lib/renderers/SarifRenderer.js +16 -2
- package/lib/threats/attack.d.ts +63 -0
- package/lib/threats/attack.js +156 -0
- package/lib/threats/linddun.d.ts +3 -0
- package/lib/threats/linddun.js +40 -0
- package/lib/threats/resolve.d.ts +11 -0
- package/lib/threats/resolve.js +27 -0
- package/lib/threats/stride.d.ts +3 -0
- package/lib/threats/stride.js +120 -0
- package/lib/threats/types.d.ts +20 -0
- package/lib/threats/types.js +22 -0
- package/lib/threats/view.d.ts +27 -0
- package/lib/threats/view.js +51 -0
- package/package.json +3 -3
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@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
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import { buildAuditResult } from '../findings/scoring.js';
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import { getComplianceTags } from '../compliance/resolve.js';
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import { threatsFor, withAttack } from '../threats/resolve.js';
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import { ChainEngine } from '../chains/ChainEngine.js';
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import { applyWaivers } from '../waivers/applyWaivers.js';
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import { permissionLabelsFor } from '../preflight/permissions.js';
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@@ -93,13 +94,15 @@ export class CheckEngine {
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try {
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const result = await check.run(this.ctx);
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const tags = getComplianceTags(check.id);
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-
findings.push(...result.findings.map((f) => ({
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findings.push(...result.findings.map((f) => ({
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...f, checkId: check.id, complianceTags: tags, threats: withAttack(f, threatsFor(check.id, f.threats)),
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})));
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if (result.metrics) {
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metrics = { ...metrics, ...result.metrics };
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}
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}
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catch (err) {
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findings.push(buildErrorFinding(check, err));
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findings.push({ ...buildErrorFinding(check, err), threats: threatsFor(check.id) });
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}
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}
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// Waivers apply before correlation but do not remove findings from it: an accepted weakness
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@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
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-
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// Shared, so MALFORMED_QUERY (a bug in the query) is never read as an absent feature.
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import { isMissingObjectError } from '../support/missingObject.js';
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// An agent carrying more than this many actions has a large, hard-to-review surface. Info
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// only — a big surface is not a vulnerability by itself, but it is worth surfacing.
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const ACTION_COUNT_THRESHOLD = 15;
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@@ -6,18 +7,6 @@ const ACTION_COUNT_THRESHOLD = 15;
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// them as write-capable). Apex and Flow can both mutate data; where the type string is
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// unknown/ambiguous we deliberately err toward flagging and say so in the finding.
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const WRITE_CAPABLE_TYPE_HINTS = ['apex', 'flow'];
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function isMissingObjectError(err) {
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if (isApiError(err)) {
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if (/INVALID_TYPE|NOT_FOUND|MALFORMED_QUERY/i.test(err.errorCode))
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return true;
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if (err.statusCode === 404)
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return true;
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}
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const msg = (err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)).toLowerCase();
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return (msg.includes('not supported') ||
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msg.includes('invalid type') ||
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msg.includes('sobject type'));
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}
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export class AgentActionSurfaceCheck {
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id = 'agent-action-surface';
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name = 'Agent Action Surface';
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import { isApiError } from '@cclabsnz/sf-core';
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// Shared, so MALFORMED_QUERY (a bug in the query) is never read as an absent feature.
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import { isMissingObjectError } from '../support/missingObject.js';
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// BotDefinition.Type values that denote an Agentforce / GenAI agent rather than a
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// classic Einstein Bot. Matched case-insensitively; anything else (typically 'Bot')
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// is treated as a classic bot. LIKE-style matching so exact enum spellings across
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@@ -7,21 +9,6 @@ const AGENT_TYPE_HINTS = ['agent', 'einsteinservice', 'einsteincopilot', 'genai'
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// Permission set license labels that grant Agentforce / Einstein Agent capability.
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// Substring match so exact SKU names are not load-bearing.
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const AGENT_LICENSE_HINTS = ['agentforce', 'einstein agent'];
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// A Tooling error whose cause is "the object does not exist" (feature absent) rather
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// than a transient/permission failure. Mirrors classifyEventLogAccessError's not-enabled arm.
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function isMissingObjectError(err) {
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if (isApiError(err)) {
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if (/INVALID_TYPE|NOT_FOUND|MALFORMED_QUERY/i.test(err.errorCode))
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return true;
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if (err.statusCode === 404)
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return true;
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}
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const msg = (err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)).toLowerCase();
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return (msg.includes('not supported') ||
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msg.includes('invalid type') ||
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msg.includes('is not supported') ||
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msg.includes('sobject type'));
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}
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export class AgentInventoryCheck {
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id = 'agent-inventory';
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name = 'Agentforce Agent Inventory';
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@@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ export class ApexLoggingCheck {
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findings.push({
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id: 'apex-logging-sensitive-data',
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category: this.category,
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// A disclosure, not a repudiation gap: its fix removes logging (RULE-103).
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threats: { stride: ['I'] },
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riskLevel: 'HIGH',
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title: `${sensitiveLogClasses.length} Apex class(es) may log sensitive data: SBS-CODE-004`,
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detail: 'SBS-CODE-004 prohibits logging sensitive data (passwords, tokens, session IDs, PII) in Apex. The flagged classes appear to pass sensitive variable names or credential values directly to System.debug(), which writes them to debug logs accessible to any administrator who can view debug logs.',
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@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ export class GuestApiAccessCheck {
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findings.push({
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id: 'guest-api-hard-delete',
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category: this.category,
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// Irreversible deletion takes the data away; it is not a disclosure.
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threats: { stride: ['D', 'T'] },
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riskLevel: 'CRITICAL',
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title: `${hardDeleteGuests.size} guest user(s) have Bulk API Hard Delete`,
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detail: '"Bulk API Hard Delete" lets the holder permanently delete records, skipping the recycle bin. On a guest user this hands an unauthenticated visitor an irreversible destructive capability.',
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@@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ export class GuestUserAccessCheck {
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findings.push({
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id: 'guest-user-write-access',
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category: this.category,
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// Writing is tampering, not the disclosure the rest of this check reports.
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threats: { stride: ['T', 'I'] },
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riskLevel: 'CRITICAL',
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title: 'Guest user profile(s) have write access to Salesforce objects',
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affectedItems: writeViolations.map((v) => {
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@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ export class UsersAndAdminsCheck {
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OR PermissionSet.PermissionsAuthorApex = true)
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AND Assignee.IsActive = true
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AND AssigneeId NOT IN (SELECT UserId FROM UserLogin WHERE IsFrozen = true)`;
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// queryAll
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//
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// queryAll reads every page (sf-core 0.12+), but assignments can change between the read and the
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// COUNT(). The COUNT() says how many rows there are, so a short read is detected (INT-004).
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const broadPerms = await ctx.soql.queryAll(`SELECT Assignee.Id, Assignee.Username, Assignee.Name, Assignee.Profile.Name,
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PermissionSet.Name, PermissionSet.IsOwnedByProfile,
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PermissionSet.PermissionsModifyAllData, PermissionSet.PermissionsViewAllData,
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const unknownDetail = (perm) => partial
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? `No ${perm} holder was found, but ${readNote}, so holders may be in the rows not read.`
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: `No active user was found holding ${perm}, yet every org with an active System Administrator has at least one. The audit user most likely cannot see PermissionSetAssignment rows, so this is unknown, not clean.`;
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const
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const RE_RUN = 'Re-run the audit: permission set assignments changed while it was reading them, or the count of them could not be read.';
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const SEE_ROWS = 'Re-run as a user with View Setup and Configuration (or View All Users) so permission set assignments are visible.';
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// A
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// A short read needs a fresh read; a failed COUNT may also mean the rows are not visible, so the
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// visibility advice applies too.
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const unknownRemediation = !partial ? SEE_ROWS : psaTotal === undefined ? `${SEE_ROWS} ${
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const unknownRemediation = !partial ? SEE_ROWS : psaTotal === undefined ? `${SEE_ROWS} ${RE_RUN}` : RE_RUN;
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// On a partial read, a count can also fall under its reporting threshold and not appear at all.
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// This finding is the machine-readable signal for every count from the read (INT-004).
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if (partial) {
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package/lib/checks/registry.js
CHANGED
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new CustomLabelsCredentialCheck(), // credentials stored in globally-readable labels
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new ReportFolderAccessCheck(), // public report folders — mass data exfiltration risk
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new EscalationPermsCheck(), // priv-esc permission cluster (chain ingredient)
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new CorsAllowlistCheck(), // wildcard/broad CORS origins
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new CorsAllowlistCheck(), // wildcard/broad CORS origins
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new EmailSecurityCheck(), // inbound email services + send-as spoofing
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new OutboundMessagesCheck(), // outbound message session-id leak + cleartext endpoints
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new PublicContentExposureCheck(), // externally available Documents + public static resources
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// would report an unchecked area as clean.
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if (/INVALID_TYPE|NOT_FOUND/i.test(err.errorCode))
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return true;
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// sf-core 0.12: a Connection-path 404 with no Salesforce code carries no statusCode.
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if (err.statusCode === 404 || err.errorCode === 'ERROR_HTTP_404')
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return true;
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}
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const msg = (err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)).toLowerCase();
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import { isApiError } from '@cclabsnz/sf-core';
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const cache = new WeakMap();
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function isNotFound(err) {
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if (isApiError(err) && (err.statusCode === 404 || /NOT_FOUND|INVALID_TYPE|^ERROR_HTTP_404$/i.test(err.errorCode)))
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return true;
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const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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return /NOT_FOUND|requested resource does not exist|is not supported/i.test(msg);
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import * as path from 'node:path';
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import { SfCommand, Flags } from '@salesforce/sf-plugins-core';
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import { buildAuditContext, resolveOrgInfo } from '../../../lib/wire.js';
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import { apiErrorText } from '../../../lib/apiErrorText.js';
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import { collectBundle, defaultIncidentRoot } from '../../../incident/collect/collectBundle.js';
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export default class AuditIncidentCollectCommand extends SfCommand {
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static summary = 'Collect a guest-filtered evidence bundle for a Guest User Anomaly investigation';
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({ manifest } = await collectBundle({ soql: ctx.soql, rest: ctx.rest, orgId: orgInfo.id, orgName: orgInfo.name }, { sinceDays: flags.since, window: flags.window, event: flags.event, ipRangeFiles: flags['ip-ranges'] ?? [], outputDir: dir, warn: (m) => this.warn(m) }));
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}
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catch (e) {
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const message =
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const message = apiErrorText(e);
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this.error(`${message} (partial bundle kept at ${dir}; re-run with --output "${dir}" to resume)`, { exit: 1 });
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}
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const collected = manifest.logs.filter((l) => l.status === 'collected').length;
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import type { RiskLevel } from '@cclabsnz/sf-core';
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import type { Capability } from '../chains/Capability.js';
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import type { FindingThreats } from '../threats/types.js';
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export interface AffectedItem {
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label: string;
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url?: string;
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* Populated by CheckEngine from ComplianceMapping after each check runs.
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*/
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complianceTags?: string[];
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/**
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* STRIDE and LINDDUN categories. Populated by CheckEngine from the threat maps; a check may set
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* either list inline to override its check-level entry for this finding. Carries no weight in
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* scoring, grading or --fail-on (RULE-105).
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*/
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threats?: FindingThreats;
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/**
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* True when the check could not gather evidence due to insufficient permissions.
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* Scored as INFO (no impact on health score) but displayed distinctly.
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// src/incident/collect/orgErrors.ts
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import { apiErrorText } from '../../lib/apiErrorText.js';
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/** Only 'unavailable' and 'no-permission' may degrade collection; everything else must abort it. */
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export function classifyOrgError(e) {
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const m =
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const m = apiErrorText(e);
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if (/INVALID_TYPE|is not supported|not supported/i.test(m))
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if (/INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS|HTTP 403/i.test(m))
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import { join } from 'node:path';
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import { secureFs } from '@cclabsnz/sf-core';
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import { apiErrorText } from '../../lib/apiErrorText.js';
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import { degrades } from './orgErrors.js';
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import { filterLogFile, MissingColumnsError } from '../csv.js';
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import { logPath } from '../bundleIo.js';
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settled = { type, day, status: 'collected', ...r, file: rel };
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}
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catch (e) {
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if (e?.code === 'ENOSPC' || /HTTP 401/.test(
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if (e?.code === 'ENOSPC' || /HTTP 401/.test(apiErrorText(e))) {
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rmSync(part, { force: true });
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rmSync(raw, { force: true });
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rmSync(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
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warn(`Could not collect ${type} for ${day}: ${e instanceof MissingColumnsError ? e.message : String(e)}`);
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settled = e instanceof MissingColumnsError
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? blank(type, day, 'failed', e.message)
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: blank(type, day, /INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS|HTTP 403/i.test(
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: blank(type, day, /INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS|HTTP 403/i.test(apiErrorText(e)) ? 'no-permission' : 'failed', apiErrorText(e));
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rmSync(part, { force: true });
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}
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finally {
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/**
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* An error's Salesforce code, HTTP status and message as one string, for classifiers that match
|
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* on text. sf-core 0.12 keeps the code out of the message (`INVALID_SESSION_ID` arrives as
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* "Session expired or invalid"), and an error body with no Salesforce code is
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* `ERROR_HTTP_<status>` with no status on the Connection path; both read here as "HTTP <status>".
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*/
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export declare function apiErrorText(e: unknown): string;
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//# sourceMappingURL=apiErrorText.d.ts.map
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@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
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/**
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* An error's Salesforce code, HTTP status and message as one string, for classifiers that match
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* on text. sf-core 0.12 keeps the code out of the message (`INVALID_SESSION_ID` arrives as
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* "Session expired or invalid"), and an error body with no Salesforce code is
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* `ERROR_HTTP_<status>` with no status on the Connection path; both read here as "HTTP <status>".
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*/
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export function apiErrorText(e) {
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if (!(e instanceof Error))
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return String(e);
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const { errorCode, statusCode } = e;
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const code = typeof errorCode === 'string' ? errorCode : '';
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const status = typeof statusCode === 'number' ? statusCode : /^ERROR_HTTP_(\d{3})$/.exec(code)?.[1];
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return [code, status === undefined ? '' : `HTTP ${status}`, e.message].filter(Boolean).join(' ');
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}
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//# sourceMappingURL=apiErrorText.js.map
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@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ import type { AttackChain } from '../chains/AttackChain.js';
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export interface DagRenderOptions {
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theme?: 'dark' | 'light';
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}
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/**
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* Indices of the steps in the chain's break point: removing every one of them stops a named chain.
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* Empty for potential chains, which have no proven break point (MN-060).
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*/
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export declare function breakPointIndices(chain: AttackChain): number[];
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export declare function renderAttackChainDagSvg(chain: AttackChain, opts?: DagRenderOptions): string;
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//# sourceMappingURL=AttackChainDagRenderer.d.ts.map
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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// src/renderers/AttackChainDagRenderer.ts
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//
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// Draws an attack chain as an inline SVG strip of step cards joined by arrows, with the
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//
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// Draws an attack chain as an inline SVG strip of step cards joined by arrows, with the steps that
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// make up a named chain's proven break point marked (RULE-111). Potential chains have none. The executive report runs under a strict CSP (no
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// script, inline style only), so the output is self-contained: no <script>, no event handlers, no
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// <foreignObject>, no external references. Every chain/step string is escaped before it is placed
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// in text or an attribute; colours come only from fixed lookup tables.
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@@ -14,28 +14,12 @@ const SEV_COLORS = {
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};
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/** Cards per row before the strip wraps, so long chains stay readable when scaled to page width. */
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const MAX_PER_ROW = 4;
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if (s.findingId && rem.includes(s.findingId.toLowerCase()))
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return i;
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-
if (s.title && rem.includes(s.title.toLowerCase()))
|
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return i;
|
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-
}
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|
-
const sevRank = { CRITICAL: 4, HIGH: 3, MEDIUM: 2, LOW: 1, INFO: 0 };
|
|
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|
-
let bestIdx = 0;
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-
let bestRank = -1;
|
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-
for (let i = 0; i < chain.steps.length; i++) {
|
|
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|
-
const rank = sevRank[chain.steps[i].severity ?? 'LOW'] ?? 1;
|
|
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|
-
if (rank > bestRank) {
|
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|
-
bestRank = rank;
|
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|
-
bestIdx = i;
|
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|
-
}
|
|
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|
-
}
|
|
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|
-
return bestIdx;
|
|
17
|
+
/**
|
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|
+
* Indices of the steps in the chain's break point: removing every one of them stops a named chain.
|
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19
|
+
* Empty for potential chains, which have no proven break point (MN-060).
|
|
20
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+
*/
|
|
21
|
+
export function breakPointIndices(chain) {
|
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|
+
return (chain.steps ?? []).flatMap((s, i) => (s.breaksChain ? [i] : []));
|
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39
23
|
}
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|
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24
|
/** Truncate by code point (never splitting a surrogate pair); escaping happens after. */
|
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41
25
|
function truncate(str, maxLen) {
|
|
@@ -47,7 +31,7 @@ export function renderAttackChainDagSvg(chain, opts = {}) {
|
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47
31
|
const steps = chain.steps ?? [];
|
|
48
32
|
if (steps.length === 0)
|
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|
return '';
|
|
50
|
-
const
|
|
34
|
+
const cutPoints = new Set(breakPointIndices(chain));
|
|
51
35
|
const cardW = 220;
|
|
52
36
|
const cardH = 96;
|
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53
37
|
const gap = 52;
|
|
@@ -75,23 +59,24 @@ export function renderAttackChainDagSvg(chain, opts = {}) {
|
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75
59
|
const nodesSvg = steps
|
|
76
60
|
.map((step, idx) => {
|
|
77
61
|
const { x, y } = posOf(idx);
|
|
78
|
-
const isCut = idx
|
|
62
|
+
const isCut = cutPoints.has(idx);
|
|
79
63
|
const sevRaw = String(step.severity ?? 'LOW');
|
|
80
64
|
const sevCol = sevColors[sevRaw] ?? sevColors.INFO;
|
|
81
65
|
const sev = esc(truncate(sevRaw, 10));
|
|
82
66
|
const title = esc(truncate(String(step.title || step.findingId || ''), 26));
|
|
83
|
-
|
|
67
|
+
// An inferred capability is a fallback, not something the finding grants (RULE-110).
|
|
68
|
+
const cap = step.capabilityInferred ? '' : esc(truncate(String(step.capability ?? ''), 24));
|
|
84
69
|
const stroke = isCut ? cutAccent : cardBorder;
|
|
85
70
|
const strokeWidth = isCut ? '2.5' : '1';
|
|
86
71
|
const dash = isCut ? ' stroke-dasharray="4 2"' : '';
|
|
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72
|
const cutBadge = isCut
|
|
88
73
|
? `<g transform="translate(${x + cardW - 84}, ${y - 10})">
|
|
89
74
|
<rect width="80" height="18" rx="4" fill="${cutAccent}" />
|
|
90
|
-
<text x="40" y="12" fill="#ffffff" font-size="9" font-weight="700" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif">✂
|
|
75
|
+
<text x="40" y="12" fill="#ffffff" font-size="9" font-weight="700" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif">✂ BREAK POINT</text>
|
|
91
76
|
</g>`
|
|
92
77
|
: '';
|
|
93
78
|
const cutNote = isCut
|
|
94
|
-
? `<text x="${x + 10}" y="${y + cardH - 10}" fill="${cutAccent}" font-size="9" font-weight="600" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif"
|
|
79
|
+
? `<text x="${x + 10}" y="${y + cardH - 10}" fill="${cutAccent}" font-size="9" font-weight="600" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif">${cutPoints.size > 1 ? 'Fix every ✂ step' : 'Fixing this breaks it'}</text>`
|
|
95
80
|
: '';
|
|
96
81
|
return `<g class="dag-node${isCut ? ' dag-cut-point' : ''}">
|
|
97
82
|
<rect x="${x}" y="${y}" width="${cardW}" height="${cardH}" rx="8" fill="${cardBg}" stroke="${stroke}" stroke-width="${strokeWidth}"${dash} />
|
|
@@ -99,8 +84,8 @@ export function renderAttackChainDagSvg(chain, opts = {}) {
|
|
|
99
84
|
<circle cx="${x + 18}" cy="${y + 20}" r="4" fill="${sevCol}" />
|
|
100
85
|
<text x="${x + 28}" y="${y + 24}" fill="${sevCol}" font-size="10" font-weight="700" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif">STEP ${idx + 1} · ${sev}</text>
|
|
101
86
|
<text x="${x + 10}" y="${y + 44}" fill="${textColor}" font-size="12" font-weight="600" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif">${title}</text>
|
|
102
|
-
|
|
103
|
-
<text x="${x + 16}" y="${y + 67}" fill="${mutedColor}" font-size="10" font-family="ui-monospace, monospace">grants: ${cap}</text
|
|
87
|
+
${cap ? `<rect x="${x + 10}" y="${y + 54}" width="${cardW - 20}" height="18" rx="4" fill="${pillBg}" />
|
|
88
|
+
<text x="${x + 16}" y="${y + 67}" fill="${mutedColor}" font-size="10" font-family="ui-monospace, monospace">grants: ${cap}</text>` : ''}
|
|
104
89
|
${cutNote}
|
|
105
90
|
</g>`;
|
|
106
91
|
})
|
|
@@ -183,9 +183,12 @@ ${impact}${chained}<p><strong>Fix:</strong> ${esc(f.remediation)}</p></div>`;
|
|
|
183
183
|
const dagSvg = renderAttackChainDagSvg(c, { theme: 'light' });
|
|
184
184
|
return `<div class="card scenario" style="--c:${SEV_COLOR[c.severity]}">
|
|
185
185
|
<div class="row"><h3>${esc(c.title)}</h3>${this.chip(c.severity, c.severity)}</div>
|
|
186
|
+
${c.abuseCase ? `<p><strong>Abuse case:</strong> ${esc(c.abuseCase.actor)} wants to ${esc(c.abuseCase.goal)}.</p>` : ''}
|
|
186
187
|
<p>${esc(c.narrative)}</p>
|
|
187
188
|
${dagSvg}
|
|
188
|
-
|
|
189
|
+
${c.abuseCase
|
|
190
|
+
? `<p><strong>Breaks the chain:</strong> ${esc(c.abuseCase.breakPoint)}</p><p class="muted"><strong>Full remediation:</strong> ${esc(c.remediation)}</p>`
|
|
191
|
+
: `<p><strong>Recommended fixes:</strong> ${esc(c.remediation)}</p>`}</div>`;
|
|
189
192
|
}).join('');
|
|
190
193
|
return `${this.sectionHead(numStr, 'Attack Scenarios')}<p class="muted">How findings combine into real attack paths.</p>${items}`;
|
|
191
194
|
}
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { esc, firaFontFaceCss, INTERACTIVE_CSP_META } from '@cclabsnz/sf-core';
|
|
2
2
|
import { renderAttackChainDagSvg } from './AttackChainDagRenderer.js';
|
|
3
3
|
import { coverageSummary, coverageAdvice } from '../findings/coverage.js';
|
|
4
|
+
import { techniqueLabel } from '../threats/attack.js';
|
|
4
5
|
import { unknownMetrics } from '../findings/unknownMetrics.js';
|
|
5
6
|
const RISK_COLORS = {
|
|
6
7
|
CRITICAL: '#dc2626',
|
|
@@ -193,14 +194,23 @@ export class HtmlRenderer {
|
|
|
193
194
|
const conf = c.confidence === 'named' ? '' : ' (potential)';
|
|
194
195
|
const dagSvg = renderAttackChainDagSvg(c, { theme: 'dark' });
|
|
195
196
|
const steps = c.steps
|
|
196
|
-
.map((s) =>
|
|
197
|
+
.map((s) => {
|
|
198
|
+
const technique = s.techniques?.length ? ` → ${esc(s.techniques.map(techniqueLabel).join(' · '))}` : '';
|
|
199
|
+
const grants = s.capabilityInferred ? '' : `: grants <code>${esc(s.capability)}</code>${technique}`;
|
|
200
|
+
const cut = s.breaksChain ? ' <strong>✂ break point</strong>' : '';
|
|
201
|
+
return `<li><strong>${esc(s.title ?? s.findingId)}</strong> (${esc(s.severity ?? '—')})${grants}${cut}</li>`;
|
|
202
|
+
})
|
|
197
203
|
.join('');
|
|
198
204
|
return `<div class="attack-chain severity-${c.severity.toLowerCase()}">
|
|
199
205
|
<h3>[${esc(c.severity)}] ${esc(c.title)}${conf}</h3>
|
|
206
|
+
${c.abuseCase ? `<p><strong>Abuse case:</strong> ${esc(c.abuseCase.actor)} wants to ${esc(c.abuseCase.goal)}.</p>` : ''}
|
|
200
207
|
<p>${esc(c.narrative)}</p>
|
|
201
208
|
${dagSvg}
|
|
202
209
|
<ol>${steps}</ol>
|
|
203
|
-
|
|
210
|
+
${c.abuseCase
|
|
211
|
+
? `<p class="remediation"><strong>Breaks the chain:</strong> ${esc(c.abuseCase.breakPoint)}</p>
|
|
212
|
+
<p class="remediation"><strong>Remediation:</strong> ${esc(c.remediation)}</p>`
|
|
213
|
+
: `<p class="remediation"><strong>Recommended fixes:</strong> ${esc(c.remediation)}</p>`}
|
|
204
214
|
</div>`;
|
|
205
215
|
})
|
|
206
216
|
.join('\n');
|
|
@@ -1,7 +1,29 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { coverageSummary, coverageAdvice } from '../findings/coverage.js';
|
|
2
|
+
import { techniqueLabel } from '../threats/attack.js';
|
|
3
|
+
import { buildThreatView, threatRowStatusText, PRIVACY_COST_OF_LOGGING } from '../threats/view.js';
|
|
2
4
|
function escapeMdCell(s) {
|
|
3
5
|
return s.replace(/\\/g, '\\\\').replace(/\|/g, '\\|').replace(/\n/g, ' ');
|
|
4
6
|
}
|
|
7
|
+
function threatTags(f) {
|
|
8
|
+
const parts = [];
|
|
9
|
+
if (f.threats?.stride?.length)
|
|
10
|
+
parts.push(`STRIDE ${f.threats.stride.join(' · ')}`);
|
|
11
|
+
if (f.threats?.linddun?.length)
|
|
12
|
+
parts.push(`LINDDUN ${f.threats.linddun.join(' · ')}`);
|
|
13
|
+
if (f.threats?.attack?.length)
|
|
14
|
+
parts.push(`ATT&CK ${f.threats.attack.join(' · ')}`);
|
|
15
|
+
if (f.threats?.detects?.length)
|
|
16
|
+
parts.push(`leaves unobserved: ${f.threats.detects.map(techniqueLabel).join(' · ')}`);
|
|
17
|
+
return parts.join(' | ');
|
|
18
|
+
}
|
|
19
|
+
function threatTable(lines, rows) {
|
|
20
|
+
lines.push('| Category | Coverage | Findings |');
|
|
21
|
+
lines.push('| --- | --- | --- |');
|
|
22
|
+
for (const r of rows) {
|
|
23
|
+
const titles = r.findings.map((f) => escapeMdCell(f.title)).join('; ') || '—';
|
|
24
|
+
lines.push(`| ${r.category}: ${r.name} | ${threatRowStatusText(r)} | ${titles} |`);
|
|
25
|
+
}
|
|
26
|
+
}
|
|
5
27
|
export class MarkdownRenderer {
|
|
6
28
|
format = 'md';
|
|
7
29
|
fileExtension = '.md';
|
|
@@ -31,15 +53,29 @@ export class MarkdownRenderer {
|
|
|
31
53
|
const conf = c.confidence === 'named' ? '' : ' _(potential)_';
|
|
32
54
|
lines.push(`### [${c.severity}] ${c.title}${conf}`);
|
|
33
55
|
lines.push('');
|
|
56
|
+
if (c.abuseCase) {
|
|
57
|
+
lines.push(`**Abuse case:** ${c.abuseCase.actor} wants to ${c.abuseCase.goal}.`);
|
|
58
|
+
lines.push('');
|
|
59
|
+
}
|
|
34
60
|
lines.push(c.narrative);
|
|
35
61
|
lines.push('');
|
|
36
62
|
lines.push('**Steps:**');
|
|
37
63
|
lines.push('');
|
|
38
64
|
c.steps.forEach((s, i) => {
|
|
39
|
-
|
|
65
|
+
const technique = s.techniques?.length ? ` → ${s.techniques.map(techniqueLabel).join(' · ')}` : '';
|
|
66
|
+
const grants = s.capabilityInferred ? '' : `: grants \`${s.capability}\`${technique}`;
|
|
67
|
+
const cut = s.breaksChain ? ' ✂ _break point_' : '';
|
|
68
|
+
lines.push(`${i + 1}. **${s.title ?? s.findingId}** (${s.severity ?? '—'})${grants}${cut}`);
|
|
40
69
|
});
|
|
41
70
|
lines.push('');
|
|
42
|
-
|
|
71
|
+
if (c.abuseCase) {
|
|
72
|
+
lines.push(`**Breaks the chain:** ${c.abuseCase.breakPoint}`);
|
|
73
|
+
lines.push('');
|
|
74
|
+
lines.push(`**Remediation:** ${c.remediation}`);
|
|
75
|
+
}
|
|
76
|
+
else {
|
|
77
|
+
lines.push(`**Recommended fixes:** ${c.remediation}`);
|
|
78
|
+
}
|
|
43
79
|
lines.push('');
|
|
44
80
|
lines.push('---');
|
|
45
81
|
lines.push('');
|
|
@@ -63,6 +99,11 @@ export class MarkdownRenderer {
|
|
|
63
99
|
lines.push('');
|
|
64
100
|
lines.push(`**Compliance:** ${f.complianceTags.join(' · ')}`);
|
|
65
101
|
}
|
|
102
|
+
const threats = threatTags(f);
|
|
103
|
+
if (threats) {
|
|
104
|
+
lines.push('');
|
|
105
|
+
lines.push(`**Threats:** ${threats}`);
|
|
106
|
+
}
|
|
66
107
|
if (f.affectedItems?.length) {
|
|
67
108
|
const hasUrls = f.affectedItems.some((i) => i.url);
|
|
68
109
|
const hasNotes = f.affectedItems.some((i) => i.note);
|
|
@@ -86,6 +127,30 @@ export class MarkdownRenderer {
|
|
|
86
127
|
lines.push('');
|
|
87
128
|
}
|
|
88
129
|
}
|
|
130
|
+
const view = buildThreatView(result.findings);
|
|
131
|
+
lines.push('');
|
|
132
|
+
lines.push('## Threat View');
|
|
133
|
+
lines.push('');
|
|
134
|
+
lines.push('_Findings grouped by threat category. Coverage shows what this run looked at, not that a threat is absent._');
|
|
135
|
+
lines.push('');
|
|
136
|
+
lines.push('### STRIDE');
|
|
137
|
+
lines.push('');
|
|
138
|
+
threatTable(lines, view.stride);
|
|
139
|
+
if (view.linddun) {
|
|
140
|
+
lines.push('');
|
|
141
|
+
lines.push('### LINDDUN (privacy)');
|
|
142
|
+
lines.push('');
|
|
143
|
+
threatTable(lines, view.linddun);
|
|
144
|
+
}
|
|
145
|
+
if (view.dualReadings.length > 0) {
|
|
146
|
+
lines.push('');
|
|
147
|
+
lines.push('### Logging, read both ways');
|
|
148
|
+
lines.push('');
|
|
149
|
+
lines.push(`Each of these is a repudiation gap (STRIDE R). ${PRIVACY_COST_OF_LOGGING}`);
|
|
150
|
+
lines.push('');
|
|
151
|
+
for (const f of view.dualReadings)
|
|
152
|
+
lines.push(`- ${f.title}`);
|
|
153
|
+
}
|
|
89
154
|
lines.push('');
|
|
90
155
|
lines.push('---');
|
|
91
156
|
lines.push('');
|
|
@@ -101,7 +101,11 @@ export class SarifRenderer {
|
|
|
101
101
|
}
|
|
102
102
|
const acc = this.ruleFor(rules, ruleId, f);
|
|
103
103
|
acc.worst = acc.worst ? maxRisk(acc.worst, f.riskLevel) : f.riskLevel;
|
|
104
|
-
|
|
104
|
+
const threatTags = [
|
|
105
|
+
...(f.threats?.stride ?? []).map((c) => `stride:${c}`),
|
|
106
|
+
...(f.threats?.linddun ?? []).map((c) => `linddun:${c}`),
|
|
107
|
+
];
|
|
108
|
+
for (const tag of [...(f.complianceTags ?? []), ...threatTags]) {
|
|
105
109
|
if (!acc.rule.properties.tags.includes(tag))
|
|
106
110
|
acc.rule.properties.tags.push(tag);
|
|
107
111
|
}
|
|
@@ -221,10 +225,19 @@ export class SarifRenderer {
|
|
|
221
225
|
rules.set(ruleId, acc);
|
|
222
226
|
}
|
|
223
227
|
acc.worst = acc.worst ? maxRisk(acc.worst, chain.severity) : chain.severity;
|
|
228
|
+
for (const id of chain.steps.flatMap((s) => s.techniques ?? [])) {
|
|
229
|
+
const tag = `attack:${id}`;
|
|
230
|
+
if (!acc.rule.properties.tags.includes(tag))
|
|
231
|
+
acc.rule.properties.tags.push(tag);
|
|
232
|
+
}
|
|
224
233
|
const stepLocation = (step, idx) => ({
|
|
225
234
|
message: { text: `Step ${idx + 1}: ${step.title ?? step.findingId} (${step.findingId})` },
|
|
226
235
|
logicalLocations: logicalLocations([step.findingId]),
|
|
227
|
-
properties: {
|
|
236
|
+
properties: {
|
|
237
|
+
...(step.capabilityInferred ? {} : { capability: step.capability }),
|
|
238
|
+
...(step.breaksChain ? { breaksChain: true } : {}),
|
|
239
|
+
...(step.techniques?.length ? { attackTechniques: step.techniques } : {}),
|
|
240
|
+
},
|
|
228
241
|
});
|
|
229
242
|
return {
|
|
230
243
|
ruleId,
|
|
@@ -243,6 +256,7 @@ export class SarifRenderer {
|
|
|
243
256
|
confidence: chain.confidence,
|
|
244
257
|
attackChainId: chain.id,
|
|
245
258
|
remediation: chain.remediation,
|
|
259
|
+
...(chain.abuseCase ? { abuseCase: chain.abuseCase } : {}),
|
|
246
260
|
},
|
|
247
261
|
};
|
|
248
262
|
}
|