@cclabsnz/sf-audit 1.11.0 → 1.12.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +38 -0
- package/README.md +4 -4
- package/lib/checks/registry.js +2 -0
- package/lib/compliance/mapping.js +2 -1
- package/lib/findings/CheckMeta.js +1 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
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@@ -11,6 +11,44 @@ published note and carries the signed provenance attestation and CycloneDX SBOM
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Merged to `main`, not yet released.
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## [v1.12.0](https://github.com/cclabsnz/sf-audit-plugin/releases/tag/v1.12.0) — 2026-09-07
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A check that shipped in the source but never ran, now registered, plus tests for three more.
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### Added
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- **`soap-login-api-auth`** — flags accounts that authenticate with SOAP API `login()` but do not
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hold the "Use Any API Auth" permission that Winter '27 requires, and separately flags holders
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that no longer need it.
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The check class has been present and compiling since Winter '27 planning and **had never run**:
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its registry, compliance, `CheckMeta` and test wiring were deferred behind another unfinished
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check and then forgotten. An unregistered check is invisible to the whole suite, so nothing
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failed. It runs now.
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Worth stating because published coverage of this change routinely gets it wrong: "Use Any API
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Auth" is **not** the same permission as "Use Any API Client", which the separate
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`api-client-permission` check covers. Granting the wrong one leaves the breakage in place while
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feeling remediated. The compliance mapping deliberately does not reuse the Use Any API Client
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control, for the same reason.
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Both halves matter. The missing-permission half is an availability finding: the failure lands at
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authentication, server to server, with no error anywhere in the Salesforce UI. The
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already-granted half is a security finding, because granting broadly at profile level is the
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common response to this change and converts a breakage problem into a standing-privilege one.
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### Changed
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- Check count is now **92**.
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### Internal
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- Unit tests added for `connected-apps`, `connected-app-inactivity` and `api-client-permission`.
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Untested checks drop from 36 to 33 of 92. The `connected-apps` tests pin the
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`connectedAppNames` cache write that two other checks read, and the `api-client-permission`
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tests assert on the query text so a copy-paste between the two easily-confused API permissions
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fails a test.
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## [v1.11.0](https://github.com/cclabsnz/sf-audit-plugin/releases/tag/v1.11.0) — 2026-09-07
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One new check, closing a blind spot that the SaaS token-theft campaigns of the last year
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package/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
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A Salesforce CLI (`sf`) plugin that runs a complete, **read-only** security audit against any Salesforce org, risk-scores it with an A–F grade, and turns the result into a report your security team (or your client's) can act on.
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- **
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- **92 read-only checks** across identity, access, data, code, integrations, monitoring, and Agentforce / GenAI
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- **Attack-chain correlation:** links individual findings into named, multi-step attack scenarios — eleven modelled chains, plus an emergent pass for combinations nobody has named yet (see [Attack chains](#attack-chains))
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- **Compliance mapping:** every finding mapped to **source-verified** controls across 10 frameworks (OWASP, OWASP LLM Top 10, SOC 2, ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Security Benchmark for Salesforce, NZ Privacy Act, HISO 10029, NZISM, HIPAA Security Rule, GDPR)
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- **Outputs:** a technical `html` / `md` / `json` report, or a branded, client-ready **executive report** (print-to-PDF) with priorities, remediation roadmap, and a compliance coverage matrix
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@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ guarantees here are checkable rather than asserted — see [Trust & verification
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sf audit security --target-org <orgAlias>
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```
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Runs all
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Runs all 92 checks and writes an HTML report to the current directory. `sf audit list` prints every
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check id.
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| Flag | Default | |
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@@ -94,13 +94,13 @@ All twelve flags, more examples, and what the executive report contains:
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## What It Checks
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**
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**92 read-only checks** across ten domains. Every finding is risk-rated CRITICAL → INFO, mapped to
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compliance controls, and correlated into [attack chains](#attack-chains).
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| Domain | Checks |
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|--------|-------:|
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| Identity & Authentication | 13 |
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| Users, Permissions & Privilege |
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| Users, Permissions & Privilege | 13 |
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| Data Access & Sharing | 11 |
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| Guest & External-Facing Access | 12 |
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| Integrations, Connected Apps & Deployments | 11 |
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package/lib/checks/registry.js
CHANGED
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@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import { StandardProfilesCheck } from './impl/StandardProfilesCheck.js';
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import { SsoEnforcementCheck } from './impl/SsoEnforcementCheck.js';
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import { MfaEnforcementCheck } from './impl/MfaEnforcementCheck.js';
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import { ApiClientPermissionCheck } from './impl/ApiClientPermissionCheck.js';
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import { SoapLoginApiAuthCheck } from './impl/SoapLoginApiAuthCheck.js';
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import { IntegrationUsersCheck } from './impl/IntegrationUsersCheck.js';
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import { IntegrationLeastPrivilegeCheck } from './impl/IntegrationLeastPrivilegeCheck.js';
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import { ContentLinksCheck } from './impl/ContentLinksCheck.js';
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@@ -128,6 +129,7 @@ export const CHECKS = [
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new SsoEnforcementCheck(), // SBS-AUTH-001/002
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new MfaEnforcementCheck(), // SBS-AUTH-004 (portal users)
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new ApiClientPermissionCheck(), // SBS-ACS-006
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new SoapLoginApiAuthCheck(), // Winter '27 SOAP login() readiness; distinct from Use Any API Client above
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new IntegrationUsersCheck(), // SBS-ACS-007/008/009
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new IntegrationLeastPrivilegeCheck(), // permissions integration accounts hold and do not use
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new ContentLinksCheck(), // SBS-FILE-001/002/003
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@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ const BASE_CHECK_CONTROL_MAP = {
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'sso-enforcement': ['OWASP-A07', 'SOC2-CC6.1', 'ISO-A.8.3', 'SBS-AUTH-001', 'SBS-AUTH-002'],
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'mfa-enforcement': ['OWASP-A07', 'SOC2-CC6.1', 'ISO-A.8.3', 'SBS-AUTH-004'],
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'api-client-permission': ['OWASP-A01', 'SOC2-CC6.3', 'ISO-A.8.3', 'SBS-ACS-006'],
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'soap-login-api-auth': ['OWASP-A01', 'SOC2-CC6.1', 'ISO-A.5.18'],
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'integration-users': ['OWASP-A01', 'SOC2-CC6.1', 'ISO-A.5.18', 'SBS-ACS-007', 'SBS-ACS-008', 'SBS-ACS-009'],
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'integration-least-privilege': ['OWASP-A01', 'SOC2-CC6.3', 'ISO-A.5.18', 'SBS-ACS-008', 'SBS-ACS-009'],
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'content-links': ['OWASP-A01', 'SOC2-CC6.1', 'ISO-A.5.14', 'SBS-FILE-001', 'SBS-FILE-002', 'SBS-FILE-003'],
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// so the two cannot drift apart in which checks they consider part of a domain.
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const DOMAIN = {
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accessControl: ['users-and-admins', 'permissions', 'sharing-model', 'public-group-sharing', 'guest-user-access',
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'field-level-security', 'standard-profiles', 'api-client-permission', 'integration-users',
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'field-level-security', 'standard-profiles', 'api-client-permission', 'soap-login-api-auth', 'integration-users',
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'integration-least-privilege',
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'escalation-perms', 'report-folder-access', 'apex-crud-fls', 'apex-rest-endpoint',
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'guest-executable-apex', 'experience-cloud-site', 'content-links', 'apex-sharing', 'flows-without-sharing',
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'sso-enforcement': { effort: 'project', impact: 'Without enforced SSO, username/password logins bypass your identity provider’s MFA and conditional access.' },
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'mfa-enforcement': { effort: 'quick', impact: 'Portal/external users without MFA let a stolen password reach customer or partner data directly.' },
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'api-client-permission': { effort: 'quick', impact: '“Use Any API Client” bypasses API Access Control, letting a user reach the org from any tool.' },
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'soap-login-api-auth': { effort: 'quick', impact: 'SOAP login() callers without Use Any API Auth stop authenticating in Winter \'27, server to server, with no UI error.' },
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'integration-users': { effort: 'moderate', impact: 'Over-privileged service accounts are prime targets: one stolen key grants broad, unattended access.' },
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'integration-least-privilege': { effort: 'moderate', impact: 'An integration account keeps whatever it was granted at go-live: long-lived credentials, no interactive user to notice misuse, and frequently outside MFA and IP restrictions. Every permission it is not using is standing privilege waiting on a leaked key.' },
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'content-links': { effort: 'quick', impact: 'Public file links without expiry or password leak documents to anyone who finds the URL.' },
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package/package.json
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{
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"name": "@cclabsnz/sf-audit",
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"version": "1.
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"version": "1.12.0",
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"description": "Read-only Salesforce security audit for the sf CLI: 88 checks, attack-chain correlation, A-F risk grading, and compliance mapping to OWASP, SOC 2, ISO 27001, NZISM and more.",
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"keywords": [
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"salesforce",
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