@cclabsnz/sf-audit 1.1.0 → 1.3.0

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Files changed (133) hide show
  1. package/LICENSE +201 -0
  2. package/README.md +168 -38
  3. package/lib/chains/namedChains.js +4 -4
  4. package/lib/checks/CheckEngine.js +1 -1
  5. package/lib/checks/impl/AnonymousApexAuditCheck.js +5 -5
  6. package/lib/checks/impl/ApexCrudFLSCheck.d.ts +1 -1
  7. package/lib/checks/impl/ApexCrudFLSCheck.js +4 -4
  8. package/lib/checks/impl/ApexLoggingCheck.js +10 -10
  9. package/lib/checks/impl/ApexRestEndpointCheck.js +5 -5
  10. package/lib/checks/impl/ApexSharingCheck.js +3 -3
  11. package/lib/checks/impl/ApiClientPermissionCheck.js +2 -2
  12. package/lib/checks/impl/CertificateExpiryCheck.js +1 -1
  13. package/lib/checks/impl/ConnectedAppInactivityCheck.d.ts +1 -1
  14. package/lib/checks/impl/ConnectedAppInactivityCheck.js +5 -5
  15. package/lib/checks/impl/ConnectedAppScopeCheck.d.ts +1 -1
  16. package/lib/checks/impl/ConnectedAppScopeCheck.js +4 -4
  17. package/lib/checks/impl/ConnectedAppsCheck.js +2 -2
  18. package/lib/checks/impl/ContentLinksCheck.js +6 -6
  19. package/lib/checks/impl/CorsAllowlistCheck.js +3 -3
  20. package/lib/checks/impl/CustomLabelsCredentialCheck.d.ts +1 -1
  21. package/lib/checks/impl/CustomLabelsCredentialCheck.js +7 -7
  22. package/lib/checks/impl/DataClassificationCheck.js +6 -6
  23. package/lib/checks/impl/DebugLogAccessCheck.js +6 -6
  24. package/lib/checks/impl/DeploymentIdentityCheck.js +8 -8
  25. package/lib/checks/impl/EmailSecurityCheck.d.ts +10 -0
  26. package/lib/checks/impl/EmailSecurityCheck.js +117 -0
  27. package/lib/checks/impl/EnhancedDomainsCheck.d.ts +1 -1
  28. package/lib/checks/impl/EnhancedDomainsCheck.js +6 -6
  29. package/lib/checks/impl/EscalationPermsCheck.js +2 -2
  30. package/lib/checks/impl/EventMonitoringCheck.js +6 -6
  31. package/lib/checks/impl/ExperienceCloudSiteCheck.js +3 -3
  32. package/lib/checks/impl/FailedLoginCheck.js +5 -5
  33. package/lib/checks/impl/FieldHistoryTrackingCheck.js +3 -3
  34. package/lib/checks/impl/FieldLevelSecurityCheck.js +2 -2
  35. package/lib/checks/impl/GuestExecutableApexCheck.d.ts +1 -1
  36. package/lib/checks/impl/GuestExecutableApexCheck.js +5 -5
  37. package/lib/checks/impl/GuestUserAccessCheck.js +5 -5
  38. package/lib/checks/impl/HealthCheckCheck.js +2 -2
  39. package/lib/checks/impl/HighAssuranceSessionCheck.js +4 -4
  40. package/lib/checks/impl/InstalledPackagesCheck.js +5 -5
  41. package/lib/checks/impl/IntegrationUsersCheck.js +5 -5
  42. package/lib/checks/impl/InternalUserMfaCheck.js +2 -2
  43. package/lib/checks/impl/IpRestrictionsCheck.js +3 -3
  44. package/lib/checks/impl/LegacyApiVersionCheck.js +1 -1
  45. package/lib/checks/impl/MfaEnforcementCheck.js +3 -3
  46. package/lib/checks/impl/MfaMethodStrengthCheck.js +3 -3
  47. package/lib/checks/impl/MfaRegistrationCheck.js +2 -2
  48. package/lib/checks/impl/MyDomainLoginPolicyCheck.d.ts +1 -1
  49. package/lib/checks/impl/MyDomainLoginPolicyCheck.js +9 -9
  50. package/lib/checks/impl/NamedCredentialsCheck.js +3 -3
  51. package/lib/checks/impl/OutboundMessagesCheck.d.ts +10 -0
  52. package/lib/checks/impl/OutboundMessagesCheck.js +88 -0
  53. package/lib/checks/impl/PasswordSessionPolicyCheck.js +3 -3
  54. package/lib/checks/impl/PermissionsCheck.js +3 -3
  55. package/lib/checks/impl/PrivilegedAccessCheck.d.ts +11 -0
  56. package/lib/checks/impl/PrivilegedAccessCheck.js +111 -0
  57. package/lib/checks/impl/PublicContentExposureCheck.d.ts +10 -0
  58. package/lib/checks/impl/PublicContentExposureCheck.js +98 -0
  59. package/lib/checks/impl/PublicGroupSharingCheck.js +1 -1
  60. package/lib/checks/impl/ReleaseUpdatesCheck.js +2 -2
  61. package/lib/checks/impl/RemoteSitesCheck.js +1 -1
  62. package/lib/checks/impl/ReportFolderAccessCheck.d.ts +1 -1
  63. package/lib/checks/impl/ReportFolderAccessCheck.js +4 -4
  64. package/lib/checks/impl/ScheduledApexCheck.js +1 -1
  65. package/lib/checks/impl/SeparationOfDutiesCheck.d.ts +11 -0
  66. package/lib/checks/impl/SeparationOfDutiesCheck.js +114 -0
  67. package/lib/checks/impl/SharingModelCheck.d.ts +1 -1
  68. package/lib/checks/impl/SharingModelCheck.js +8 -8
  69. package/lib/checks/impl/SiemIntegrationCheck.js +4 -4
  70. package/lib/checks/impl/SsoEnforcementCheck.js +5 -5
  71. package/lib/checks/impl/StandardProfilesCheck.js +2 -2
  72. package/lib/checks/impl/TransactionSecurityPolicyCheck.js +2 -2
  73. package/lib/checks/impl/TrustedIPRangesCheck.js +5 -5
  74. package/lib/checks/impl/VisualforceXssCheck.js +6 -6
  75. package/lib/checks/permCatalog.d.ts +15 -0
  76. package/lib/checks/permCatalog.js +42 -0
  77. package/lib/checks/registry.js +12 -0
  78. package/lib/commands/audit/diff.js +1 -1
  79. package/lib/commands/audit/security.d.ts +5 -0
  80. package/lib/commands/audit/security.js +33 -4
  81. package/lib/compliance/catalogs/hiso10029.d.ts +3 -0
  82. package/lib/compliance/catalogs/hiso10029.js +35 -0
  83. package/lib/compliance/catalogs/index.d.ts +4 -0
  84. package/lib/compliance/catalogs/index.js +21 -0
  85. package/lib/compliance/catalogs/iso27001.d.ts +3 -0
  86. package/lib/compliance/catalogs/iso27001.js +39 -0
  87. package/lib/compliance/catalogs/nzism.d.ts +3 -0
  88. package/lib/compliance/catalogs/nzism.js +31 -0
  89. package/lib/compliance/catalogs/owasp.d.ts +3 -0
  90. package/lib/compliance/catalogs/owasp.js +37 -0
  91. package/lib/compliance/catalogs/privacyAct.d.ts +3 -0
  92. package/lib/compliance/catalogs/privacyAct.js +17 -0
  93. package/lib/compliance/catalogs/sbs.d.ts +3 -0
  94. package/lib/compliance/catalogs/sbs.js +61 -0
  95. package/lib/compliance/catalogs/soc2.d.ts +3 -0
  96. package/lib/compliance/catalogs/soc2.js +42 -0
  97. package/lib/compliance/mapping.d.ts +2 -0
  98. package/lib/compliance/mapping.js +118 -0
  99. package/lib/compliance/resolve.d.ts +12 -0
  100. package/lib/compliance/resolve.js +49 -0
  101. package/lib/compliance/types.d.ts +13 -0
  102. package/lib/compliance/types.js +2 -0
  103. package/lib/context/AuditCache.d.ts +9 -0
  104. package/lib/findings/CheckMeta.d.ts +9 -0
  105. package/lib/findings/CheckMeta.js +72 -0
  106. package/lib/renderers/AuditRenderer.d.ts +2 -0
  107. package/lib/renderers/ClientReportRenderer.d.ts +29 -0
  108. package/lib/renderers/ClientReportRenderer.js +205 -0
  109. package/lib/renderers/DiffHtmlRenderer.js +1 -1
  110. package/lib/renderers/HistoryRenderer.js +1 -1
  111. package/lib/renderers/HtmlRenderer.js +4 -10
  112. package/lib/renderers/MarkdownRenderer.js +2 -2
  113. package/lib/renderers/html-utils.d.ts +2 -0
  114. package/lib/renderers/html-utils.js +8 -0
  115. package/lib/report/ComplianceMatrix.d.ts +19 -0
  116. package/lib/report/ComplianceMatrix.js +47 -0
  117. package/lib/report/ExecutivePriorities.d.ts +8 -0
  118. package/lib/report/ExecutivePriorities.js +22 -0
  119. package/lib/report/RemediationRoadmap.d.ts +9 -0
  120. package/lib/report/RemediationRoadmap.js +18 -0
  121. package/lib/report/branding.d.ts +18 -0
  122. package/lib/report/branding.js +19 -0
  123. package/lib/report/fonts.d.ts +2 -0
  124. package/lib/report/fonts.js +22 -0
  125. package/messages/audit.security.md +30 -2
  126. package/package.json +3 -1
  127. package/src/assets/fonts/dm-sans-italic-latin.woff2 +0 -0
  128. package/src/assets/fonts/dm-sans-normal-latin.woff2 +0 -0
  129. package/src/assets/fonts/dm-serif-display-italic-latin.woff2 +0 -0
  130. package/src/assets/fonts/dm-serif-display-normal-latin.woff2 +0 -0
  131. package/config/queries/soql.json +0 -24
  132. package/config/queries/tooling.json +0 -28
  133. package/config/scoring.json +0 -17
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ export declare class ReportFolderAccessCheck implements SecurityCheck {
4
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  readonly id = "report-folder-access";
5
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  readonly name = "Report Folder Public Access";
6
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  readonly category = "Data Access Control";
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- readonly description = "Checks for Report folders with Public access \u2014 any authenticated user can view all reports and their data";
7
+ readonly description = "Checks for Report folders with Public access: any authenticated user can view all reports and their data";
8
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  run(ctx: AuditContext): Promise<CheckResult>;
9
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  }
10
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  //# sourceMappingURL=ReportFolderAccessCheck.d.ts.map
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ export class ReportFolderAccessCheck {
2
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  id = 'report-folder-access';
3
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  name = 'Report Folder Public Access';
4
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  category = 'Data Access Control';
5
- description = 'Checks for Report folders with Public access — any authenticated user can view all reports and their data';
5
+ description = 'Checks for Report folders with Public access: any authenticated user can view all reports and their data';
6
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  async run(ctx) {
7
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  const findings = [];
8
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  const baseUrl = ctx.orgInfo.instanceUrl;
@@ -40,12 +40,12 @@ export class ReportFolderAccessCheck {
40
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  category: this.category,
41
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  riskLevel: 'HIGH',
42
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  title: `${publicFolders.length} Report folder(s) are publicly accessible to all users`,
43
- detail: `Public Report folders are accessible to every authenticated Salesforce user — including over-permissioned integration accounts, recently activated users, and attackers who have compromised any credential. Reports frequently contain cross-object joins, aggregate data, and sensitive field values that bypass field-level security (FLS does not apply to report results in all configurations). An attacker with basic login access who can open a public report folder can exfiltrate bulk data from Account, Contact, Opportunity, and other sensitive objects by running or exporting the reports inside. This is a common path for mass data exfiltration that bypasses record-level security controls.`,
44
- remediation: 'Change Public Report folders to Private or Shared. For Shared folders, explicitly list the users, roles, or groups that need access. Audit the content of public folders to understand the data exposure — any report in a public folder may have been accessed by any user. Consider enabling Report Snapshot auditing and restricting the "Export Reports" permission for broad user groups.',
43
+ detail: `Public Report folders are accessible to every authenticated Salesforce user, including over-permissioned integration accounts, recently activated users, and attackers who have compromised any credential. Reports frequently contain cross-object joins, aggregate data, and sensitive field values that bypass field-level security (FLS does not apply to report results in all configurations). An attacker with basic login access who can open a public report folder can exfiltrate bulk data from Account, Contact, Opportunity, and other sensitive objects by running or exporting the reports inside. This is a common path for mass data exfiltration that bypasses record-level security controls.`,
44
+ remediation: 'Change Public Report folders to Private or Shared. For Shared folders, explicitly list the users, roles, or groups that need access. Audit the content of public folders to understand the data exposure. Any report in a public folder may have been accessed by any user. Consider enabling Report Snapshot auditing and restricting the "Export Reports" permission for broad user groups.',
45
45
  affectedItems: publicFolders.map((f) => ({
46
46
  label: f.Name ?? f.DeveloperName ?? f.Id,
47
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  url: setupUrl,
48
- note: `AccessType: Public — ${publicFolders.length} folder(s) expose reports to all users`,
48
+ note: `AccessType: Public. ${publicFolders.length} folder(s) expose reports to all users`,
49
49
  })),
50
50
  });
51
51
  return { findings };
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ export class ScheduledApexCheck {
51
51
  affectedItems: privilegedJobs.map((job) => ({
52
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  label: `${job.ApexClass.Name} (${job.JobType})`,
53
53
  url: apexJobsUrl,
54
- note: `Owner: ${creatorMap[job.CreatedById].Username} [${creatorMap[job.CreatedById].Profile.Name}] — reassign to a dedicated integration user`,
54
+ note: `Owner: ${creatorMap[job.CreatedById].Username} [${creatorMap[job.CreatedById].Profile.Name}]: reassign to a dedicated integration user`,
55
55
  })),
56
56
  });
57
57
  }
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
1
+ import type { AuditContext } from '../../context/AuditContext.js';
2
+ import type { SecurityCheck, CheckResult } from '../SecurityCheck.js';
3
+ export declare class SeparationOfDutiesCheck implements SecurityCheck {
4
+ readonly id = "separation-of-duties";
5
+ readonly name = "Separation of Duties";
6
+ readonly category = "Permissions";
7
+ readonly description = "Flags users whose effective permissions combine into self-escalation, fraud, or undetectable-abuse pairings that violate separation of duties";
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+ readonly dependsOnCache: readonly ["effectivePermissions"];
9
+ run(ctx: AuditContext): Promise<CheckResult>;
10
+ }
11
+ //# sourceMappingURL=SeparationOfDutiesCheck.d.ts.map
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
1
+ // Combinations that, held by a single user, enable self-escalation, fraud, or
2
+ // undetectable abuse — even when each permission on its own looks acceptable.
3
+ const COMBOS = [
4
+ {
5
+ id: 'self-escalation',
6
+ label: 'Manage Users + Assign Permission Sets',
7
+ perms: ['ManageUsers', 'AssignPermissionSets'],
8
+ risk: 'CRITICAL',
9
+ why: 'The user can create/modify accounts and grant permission sets, so they can grant themselves (or a confederate) any access in the org: a self-service path to full admin.',
10
+ fix: 'Split these duties across different roles. A user who assigns permission sets should not also administer users.',
11
+ },
12
+ {
13
+ id: 'code-and-data',
14
+ label: 'Author Apex + Modify All Data',
15
+ perms: ['AuthorApex', 'ModifyAllData'],
16
+ risk: 'CRITICAL',
17
+ why: 'The user can deploy Apex that runs without sharing AND already has unrestricted data access: enabling code-driven mass exfiltration or tampering that bypasses every control.',
18
+ fix: 'Remove Modify All Data from developers, or Author Apex from data-privileged users. Use separate sandbox/deploy identities for code.',
19
+ },
20
+ {
21
+ id: 'grant-self-data',
22
+ label: 'Assign Permission Sets + View All Data',
23
+ perms: ['AssignPermissionSets', 'ViewAllData'],
24
+ risk: 'HIGH',
25
+ why: 'The user can read all data and grant access. They can escalate their own or others\' visibility silently.',
26
+ fix: 'Separate permission-set administration from broad data-visibility roles.',
27
+ },
28
+ {
29
+ id: 'identity-takeover',
30
+ label: 'Manage Auth. Providers + Manage Users',
31
+ perms: ['ManageAuthProviders', 'ManageUsers'],
32
+ risk: 'HIGH',
33
+ why: 'The user can reconfigure SSO/identity providers and administer accounts: enabling them to reroute authentication and impersonate or lock out other users.',
34
+ fix: 'Restrict auth-provider management to a dedicated identity team, separate from user administration.',
35
+ },
36
+ {
37
+ id: 'external-exfil-channel',
38
+ label: 'Manage Connected Apps + Use Any API Client',
39
+ perms: ['ManageConnectedApps', 'UseAnyApiClient'],
40
+ risk: 'HIGH',
41
+ why: 'The user can stand up OAuth connected apps and reach the org from any API client, bypassing API Access Control: a self-provisioned, persistent exfiltration channel.',
42
+ fix: 'Keep connected-app administration away from users who can bypass API access control.',
43
+ },
44
+ {
45
+ id: 'tamper-and-cover',
46
+ label: 'Modify All Data + Manage Event Log Files',
47
+ perms: ['ModifyAllData', 'ManageEventLogFiles'],
48
+ risk: 'MEDIUM',
49
+ why: 'The user can both alter data and access/aggregate the monitoring trail, weakening the ability to detect and reconstruct their actions.',
50
+ fix: 'Keep monitoring/event-log access separate from broad data-modification rights.',
51
+ },
52
+ ];
53
+ export class SeparationOfDutiesCheck {
54
+ id = 'separation-of-duties';
55
+ name = 'Separation of Duties';
56
+ category = 'Permissions';
57
+ description = 'Flags users whose effective permissions combine into self-escalation, fraud, or undetectable-abuse pairings that violate separation of duties';
58
+ dependsOnCache = ['effectivePermissions'];
59
+ async run(ctx) {
60
+ const findings = [];
61
+ const setupUrl = `${ctx.orgInfo.instanceUrl}/lightning/setup/ManageUsers/home`;
62
+ const grants = ctx.cache.effectivePermissions;
63
+ if (!grants) {
64
+ findings.push({
65
+ id: 'separation-of-duties-inconclusive',
66
+ category: this.category,
67
+ riskLevel: 'INFO',
68
+ inconclusive: true,
69
+ title: 'Separation-of-duties analysis could not run',
70
+ detail: 'Effective-permission data was not available (the privileged-access resolution did not complete).',
71
+ remediation: 'Grant the audit user "View Setup and Configuration" and "View All Users", then re-run the audit.',
72
+ });
73
+ return { findings };
74
+ }
75
+ let anyViolation = false;
76
+ for (const combo of COMBOS) {
77
+ const holders = grants.filter((g) => {
78
+ const s = new Set(g.perms);
79
+ return combo.perms.every((p) => s.has(p));
80
+ });
81
+ if (holders.length === 0)
82
+ continue;
83
+ anyViolation = true;
84
+ findings.push({
85
+ id: `separation-of-duties-${combo.id}`,
86
+ category: this.category,
87
+ riskLevel: combo.risk,
88
+ title: `${holders.length} user(s) hold a toxic permission combination: ${combo.label}`,
89
+ detail: `${combo.why} Each permission may look acceptable in isolation, which is why combination review matters.`,
90
+ remediation: combo.fix,
91
+ affectedItems: holders.map((g) => ({
92
+ label: g.username,
93
+ url: setupUrl,
94
+ note: `Profile: ${g.profileName}, holds ${combo.label}`,
95
+ })),
96
+ });
97
+ }
98
+ if (!anyViolation) {
99
+ findings.push({
100
+ id: 'separation-of-duties-ok',
101
+ category: this.category,
102
+ riskLevel: 'LOW',
103
+ passed: true,
104
+ title: 'No toxic permission combinations detected',
105
+ detail: grants.length === 0
106
+ ? 'No active users hold catalogued high-risk permissions, so no separation-of-duties conflicts arise.'
107
+ : 'No active user holds a flagged combination of permissions that would violate separation of duties.',
108
+ remediation: 'Continue to separate user administration, code authorship, identity, and data-access duties across roles.',
109
+ });
110
+ }
111
+ return { findings };
112
+ }
113
+ }
114
+ //# sourceMappingURL=SeparationOfDutiesCheck.js.map
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ export declare class SharingModelCheck implements SecurityCheck {
4
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  readonly id = "sharing-model";
5
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  readonly name = "Org-Wide Defaults (OWD) Sharing Model";
6
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  readonly category = "Data Access Control";
7
- readonly description = "Checks OWD sharing settings for Account, Contact, Opportunity, Case, and Lead \u2014 both internal and external (portal) sharing models";
7
+ readonly description = "Checks OWD sharing settings for Account, Contact, Opportunity, Case, and Lead, covering both internal and external (portal) sharing models";
8
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  run(ctx: AuditContext): Promise<CheckResult>;
9
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  }
10
10
  //# sourceMappingURL=SharingModelCheck.d.ts.map
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ export class SharingModelCheck {
5
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  id = 'sharing-model';
6
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  name = 'Org-Wide Defaults (OWD) Sharing Model';
7
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  category = 'Data Access Control';
8
- description = 'Checks OWD sharing settings for Account, Contact, Opportunity, Case, and Lead — both internal and external (portal) sharing models';
8
+ description = 'Checks OWD sharing settings for Account, Contact, Opportunity, Case, and Lead, covering both internal and external (portal) sharing models';
9
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  async run(ctx) {
10
10
  const findings = [];
11
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  const baseUrl = ctx.orgInfo.instanceUrl;
@@ -58,12 +58,12 @@ export class SharingModelCheck {
58
58
  category: this.category,
59
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  riskLevel: 'CRITICAL',
60
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  title: `${externalWriteObjects.length} object(s) have Public Read/Write OWD for external/portal users`,
61
- detail: 'An external OWD of Public Read/Write exposes all records to Experience Cloud portal users and guest users. Any low-trust or unauthenticated portal user can read and modify every record. This is a critical data exposure vector frequently overlooked when configuring portal sites — attackers who create or compromise a portal account gain unrestricted write access to the entire dataset.',
62
- remediation: 'Set external OWD to Private for all sensitive objects immediately. Grant portal access via sharing sets, sharing rules, or Apex managed sharing — never via open OWD.',
61
+ detail: 'An external OWD of Public Read/Write exposes all records to Experience Cloud portal users and guest users. Any low-trust or unauthenticated portal user can read and modify every record. This is a critical data exposure vector frequently overlooked when configuring portal sites. Attackers who create or compromise a portal account gain unrestricted write access to the entire dataset.',
62
+ remediation: 'Set external OWD to Private for all sensitive objects immediately. Grant portal access via sharing sets, sharing rules, or Apex managed sharing, never via open OWD.',
63
63
  affectedItems: externalWriteObjects.map((o) => ({
64
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  label: o.name,
65
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  url: owdUrl,
66
- note: `External OWD: ${o.model} — immediate action required`,
66
+ note: `External OWD: ${o.model}, immediate action required`,
67
67
  })),
68
68
  });
69
69
  }
@@ -74,12 +74,12 @@ export class SharingModelCheck {
74
74
  category: this.category,
75
75
  riskLevel: 'HIGH',
76
76
  title: `${externalReadObjects.length} object(s) have Public Read OWD for external/portal users`,
77
- detail: 'An external OWD of Public Read exposes all records to any Experience Cloud portal user. Attackers who create or compromise a portal account can enumerate the entire dataset for reconnaissance and data theft — even without write access, bulk record exposure violates data minimisation principles and enables targeted attacks.',
77
+ detail: 'An external OWD of Public Read exposes all records to any Experience Cloud portal user. Attackers who create or compromise a portal account can enumerate the entire dataset for reconnaissance and data theft. Even without write access, bulk record exposure violates data minimisation principles and enables targeted attacks.',
78
78
  remediation: 'Set external OWD to Private and use sharing sets or sharing rules to grant portal users access only to their own records.',
79
79
  affectedItems: externalReadObjects.map((o) => ({
80
80
  label: o.name,
81
81
  url: owdUrl,
82
- note: `External OWD: ${o.model} — portal users can read all records`,
82
+ note: `External OWD: ${o.model}, portal users can read all records`,
83
83
  })),
84
84
  });
85
85
  }
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ export class SharingModelCheck {
96
96
  affectedItems: internalWriteObjects.map((o) => ({
97
97
  label: o.name,
98
98
  url: owdUrl,
99
- note: `Internal OWD: ${o.model} — change to Private or Public Read Only`,
99
+ note: `Internal OWD: ${o.model}, change to Private or Public Read Only`,
100
100
  })),
101
101
  });
102
102
  }
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ export class SharingModelCheck {
112
112
  affectedItems: internalReadObjects.map((o) => ({
113
113
  label: o.name,
114
114
  url: owdUrl,
115
- note: `Internal OWD: ${o.model} — all internal users can read all records`,
115
+ note: `Internal OWD: ${o.model}, all internal users can read all records`,
116
116
  })),
117
117
  });
118
118
  }
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ export class SiemIntegrationCheck {
62
62
  category: this.category,
63
63
  riskLevel: 'LOW',
64
64
  passed: true,
65
- title: `${totalSignals} SIEM/monitoring integration signal(s) detected — SBS-MON-003/004`,
65
+ title: `${totalSignals} SIEM/monitoring integration signal(s) detected: SBS-MON-003/004`,
66
66
  detail: `SBS-MON-003 requires suspicious login activity to be monitored and alerted on. SBS-MON-004 requires API activity anomalies to be detected. Both controls require integration with an external monitoring system. ${totalSignals} signal(s) suggest external monitoring is in place. Sources: ${signalSummary}.`,
67
67
  remediation: 'Verify the integration is actively receiving and alerting on Login, API, and DataExport events. Confirm alert thresholds cover: multiple failed logins, off-hours access, bulk data export, and unusual geographic login patterns (SBS-MON-003). Confirm API anomaly detection is configured (SBS-MON-004).',
68
68
  affectedItems: signalSources.map((s) => ({
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ export class SiemIntegrationCheck {
77
77
  id: 'siem-integration-not-detected',
78
78
  category: this.category,
79
79
  riskLevel: 'HIGH',
80
- title: 'No SIEM or external monitoring integration detected — SBS-MON-003/004',
80
+ title: 'No SIEM or external monitoring integration detected: SBS-MON-003/004',
81
81
  detail: 'SBS-MON-003 requires suspicious login activity to be monitored and alerted on. SBS-MON-004 requires API activity anomalies to be detected. No signals of an external monitoring or SIEM integration were found across Named Credentials, Remote Sites, Connected Apps, or Scheduled Apex jobs. Without external log forwarding, Event Monitoring data remains unanalysed and no automated alerts can be generated.',
82
82
  remediation: 'Integrate Salesforce Event Monitoring with a SIEM platform (Splunk, Datadog, Sumo Logic, Microsoft Sentinel, etc.) using the EventLogFile API or Salesforce Shield Event Streaming. Configure alerts for: repeated failed logins, off-hours API access, bulk data export events, and unusual login geolocations (SBS-MON-003). Enable API usage anomaly detection (SBS-MON-004).',
83
83
  });
@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ export class SiemIntegrationCheck {
90
90
  id: 'siem-retention-gap',
91
91
  category: this.category,
92
92
  riskLevel: 'MEDIUM',
93
- title: `Event logs cover only ${daysCovered} day(s) in Salesforce — SIEM ingestion needed for SBS-INT-004 compliance`,
94
- detail: 'SBS-INT-004 requires 30 days of API event log retention. Without a SIEM or log archival process ingesting logs daily, native Salesforce retention may be insufficient — logs older than the native retention window will be permanently lost.',
93
+ title: `Event logs cover only ${daysCovered} day(s) in Salesforce: SIEM ingestion needed for SBS-INT-004 compliance`,
94
+ detail: 'SBS-INT-004 requires 30 days of API event log retention. Without a SIEM or log archival process ingesting logs daily, native Salesforce retention may be insufficient. Logs older than the native retention window will be permanently lost.',
95
95
  remediation: `Configure a SIEM or log archival process to ingest EventLogFile records at least daily. This ensures the 30-day retention requirement is met independent of Salesforce's native retention window.`,
96
96
  });
97
97
  }
@@ -46,13 +46,13 @@ export class SsoEnforcementCheck {
46
46
  id: 'sso-password-logins-detected',
47
47
  category: this.category,
48
48
  riskLevel: 'HIGH',
49
- title: `${uniqueUsers.length} user(s) logged in with username-password credentials in the last 30 days — SBS-AUTH-001/002`,
49
+ title: `${uniqueUsers.length} user(s) logged in with username-password credentials in the last 30 days: SBS-AUTH-001/002`,
50
50
  detail: `SBS-AUTH-001 requires production orgs to enable the org-level setting that disables Salesforce credential logins for all users. SBS-AUTH-002 requires that any users permitted to bypass SSO be explicitly authorised and documented. Found ${records.length} password-based login(s) across ${uniqueUsers.length} unique user(s) in the past 30 days, indicating SSO is either not enforced org-wide or users have undocumented SSO bypass.`,
51
51
  remediation: 'Enable "Prevent Login with Salesforce Credentials" in Setup → Single Sign-On Settings (SBS-AUTH-001). For any users who legitimately need credential login (break-glass accounts), document their authorisation in the system of record (SBS-AUTH-002) and restrict their profile IP ranges.',
52
52
  affectedItems: uniqueUsers.map(([userId, info]) => ({
53
53
  label: info.username,
54
54
  url: `${baseUrl}/${userId}`,
55
- note: `${info.count} credential login(s) — last: ${new Date(info.latest).toISOString().split('T')[0]}`,
55
+ note: `${info.count} credential login(s), last: ${new Date(info.latest).toISOString().split('T')[0]}`,
56
56
  })),
57
57
  });
58
58
  // Advisory: flag users who appear to be SSO-exempt service accounts
@@ -62,13 +62,13 @@ export class SsoEnforcementCheck {
62
62
  id: 'sso-frequent-bypass-users',
63
63
  category: this.category,
64
64
  riskLevel: 'MEDIUM',
65
- title: `${highFrequency.length} user(s) logged in with credentials >10 times — likely undocumented SSO exemptions (SBS-AUTH-002)`,
65
+ title: `${highFrequency.length} user(s) logged in with credentials >10 times, likely undocumented SSO exemptions (SBS-AUTH-002)`,
66
66
  detail: 'SBS-AUTH-002 requires all users permitted to bypass SSO to be explicitly documented. High-frequency credential logins suggest these are regular exemptions rather than emergency break-glass access.',
67
67
  remediation: 'Document each user in the system of record with a justified reason for SSO bypass. Consider converting service accounts to Connected App OAuth flows instead.',
68
68
  affectedItems: highFrequency.map(([userId, info]) => ({
69
69
  label: info.username,
70
70
  url: `${baseUrl}/${userId}`,
71
- note: `${info.count} credential logins in 30 days — document or remove exemption`,
71
+ note: `${info.count} credential logins in 30 days, document or remove exemption`,
72
72
  })),
73
73
  });
74
74
  }
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ export class SsoEnforcementCheck {
79
79
  category: this.category,
80
80
  riskLevel: 'INFO',
81
81
  inconclusive: true,
82
- title: 'SSO enforcement status could not be determined — LoginHistory not accessible',
82
+ title: 'SSO enforcement status could not be determined: LoginHistory not accessible',
83
83
  detail: 'SBS-AUTH-001/002 require SSO enforcement configuration to be verified. LoginHistory was not accessible with current permissions.',
84
84
  remediation: 'Manually verify in Setup → Single Sign-On Settings that "Prevent Login with Salesforce Credentials" is enabled.',
85
85
  });
@@ -54,12 +54,12 @@ export class StandardProfilesCheck {
54
54
  category: this.category,
55
55
  riskLevel: 'HIGH',
56
56
  title: `${totalAffected} active user(s) assigned to standard out-of-the-box Salesforce profiles`,
57
- detail: `SBS-ACS-005 requires all active users be assigned custom profiles — standard profiles must not be used in production. Standard profiles grant broad, poorly-audited permissions and cannot be tailored to least-privilege requirements. Affected profile(s): ${profileSummary}.`,
57
+ detail: `SBS-ACS-005 requires all active users be assigned custom profiles: standard profiles must not be used in production. Standard profiles grant broad, poorly-audited permissions and cannot be tailored to least-privilege requirements. Affected profile(s): ${profileSummary}.`,
58
58
  remediation: 'Create custom profiles based on minimum required permissions and migrate all active users. Remove access to standard profiles in production. Standard profiles cannot be edited so they often grant more than needed.',
59
59
  affectedItems: users.slice(0, 50).map((u) => ({
60
60
  label: u.Username,
61
61
  url: `${baseUrl}/${u.Id}`,
62
- note: `Profile: ${u.Profile.Name} — migrate to a custom profile`,
62
+ note: `Profile: ${u.Profile.Name}, migrate to a custom profile`,
63
63
  })),
64
64
  });
65
65
  return { findings };
@@ -30,12 +30,12 @@ export class TransactionSecurityPolicyCheck {
30
30
  riskLevel: 'HIGH',
31
31
  title: 'No Transaction Security Policies are enabled',
32
32
  detail: 'Transaction Security Policies provide automated, real-time threat detection and response within Salesforce. With no policies enabled, the org has no automated defence against: credential stuffing and brute-force attacks, impossible-travel logins (e.g. login from two countries within minutes), bulk data downloads and mass API queries, concurrent session anomalies, and privilege escalation attempts. An attacker who compromises any credential can operate without triggering any automated response.',
33
- remediation: 'Enable Transaction Security (Setup → Transaction Security Policies) and create policies for at minimum: (1) Login anomalies — impossible travel, concurrent sessions from different IPs; (2) Data export — block or notify on bulk Report/List View exports; (3) API anomalies — high-volume REST/SOAP queries. Recommended actions: Block + Notify for critical events; Notify for informational events.',
33
+ remediation: 'Enable Transaction Security (Setup → Transaction Security Policies) and create policies for at minimum: (1) Login anomalies: impossible travel, concurrent sessions from different IPs; (2) Data export: block or notify on bulk Report/List View exports; (3) API anomalies: high-volume REST/SOAP queries. Recommended actions: Block + Notify for critical events; Notify for informational events.',
34
34
  affectedItems: [
35
35
  {
36
36
  label: 'Transaction Security Policies',
37
37
  url: setupUrl,
38
- note: 'No policies enabled — real-time threat response is completely absent',
38
+ note: 'No policies enabled: real-time threat response is completely absent',
39
39
  },
40
40
  ],
41
41
  });
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ export class TrustedIPRangesCheck {
40
40
  category: this.category,
41
41
  riskLevel: 'LOW',
42
42
  passed: true,
43
- title: 'No trusted IP ranges configured — MFA applies to all login locations',
43
+ title: 'No trusted IP ranges configured: MFA applies to all login locations',
44
44
  detail: 'No NetworkAccess (trusted IP range) records are configured. All users are subject to MFA and login challenge enforcement regardless of their network location.',
45
45
  remediation: 'Continue to avoid configuring trusted IP ranges unless there is a documented, justified business requirement with compensating controls.',
46
46
  });
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ export class TrustedIPRangesCheck {
60
60
  category: this.category,
61
61
  riskLevel: 'HIGH',
62
62
  title: `${broadRanges.length} trusted IP range(s) cover more than 65,536 hosts (broader than /16)`,
63
- detail: 'Trusted IP ranges completely bypass Salesforce MFA — any user logging in from a trusted IP is not challenged for a second factor. Ranges broader than /16 cover entire enterprise network blocks or ISP ranges, creating an extremely large MFA bypass surface. If an attacker or insider gains access to any host within that range, they can log in without MFA.',
63
+ detail: 'Trusted IP ranges completely bypass Salesforce MFA. Any user logging in from a trusted IP is not challenged for a second factor. Ranges broader than /16 cover entire enterprise network blocks or ISP ranges, creating an extremely large MFA bypass surface. If an attacker or insider gains access to any host within that range, they can log in without MFA.',
64
64
  remediation: 'Narrow each trusted IP range to the minimum required set of specific host addresses or subnets. Remove overly broad ranges immediately. If broad ranges are required, document the business justification and ensure compensating controls (network-level MFA, VPN enforcement, EDR) are in place.',
65
65
  affectedItems: broadRanges.map((r) => {
66
66
  let size;
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ export class TrustedIPRangesCheck {
73
73
  return {
74
74
  label: `${r.StartAddress}–${r.EndAddress}`,
75
75
  url: setupUrl,
76
- note: `${r.Description ?? 'no description'} — ${size} hosts`,
76
+ note: `${r.Description ?? 'no description'}, ${size} hosts`,
77
77
  };
78
78
  }),
79
79
  });
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ export class TrustedIPRangesCheck {
82
82
  id: 'trusted-ip-exists',
83
83
  category: this.category,
84
84
  riskLevel: 'MEDIUM',
85
- title: `${ranges.length} trusted IP range(s) configured — MFA is bypassed for logins from these addresses`,
85
+ title: `${ranges.length} trusted IP range(s) configured: MFA is bypassed for logins from these addresses`,
86
86
  detail: 'Trusted IP ranges in Salesforce completely bypass MFA enforcement. Any user authenticating from a listed IP address is not required to provide a second factor. Each range must have documented justification and be reviewed regularly. Without this review, ranges can accumulate and silently expand the MFA bypass surface over time.',
87
87
  remediation: 'Review each trusted IP range and confirm it has a documented business justification. Remove any ranges that are no longer required or cannot be justified. Ensure compensating network controls (VPN with MFA, NAC, EDR) protect the trusted network segments.',
88
88
  affectedItems: ranges.map((r) => {
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ export class TrustedIPRangesCheck {
96
96
  return {
97
97
  label: `${r.StartAddress}–${r.EndAddress}`,
98
98
  url: setupUrl,
99
- note: `${r.Description ?? 'no description'} — ${size} hosts`,
99
+ note: `${r.Description ?? 'no description'}, ${size} hosts`,
100
100
  };
101
101
  }),
102
102
  });
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ export class VisualforceXssCheck {
37
37
  category: this.category,
38
38
  riskLevel: 'INFO',
39
39
  inconclusive: true,
40
- title: 'Visualforce page markup could not be accessed — XSS check skipped',
40
+ title: 'Visualforce page markup could not be accessed: XSS check skipped',
41
41
  detail: 'The Tooling API ApexPage query was not accessible. This may indicate the audit user lacks Tooling API access.',
42
42
  remediation: 'Grant Tooling API access to the audit user and re-run.',
43
43
  });
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ export class VisualforceXssCheck {
50
50
  category: this.category,
51
51
  riskLevel: 'INFO',
52
52
  inconclusive: true,
53
- title: `Visualforce XSS scan incomplete — only ${pages.length} of ${effectiveTotal} pages scanned (API LIMIT 500)`,
53
+ title: `Visualforce XSS scan incomplete: only ${pages.length} of ${effectiveTotal} pages scanned (API LIMIT 500)`,
54
54
  detail: `This org has ${effectiveTotal} Visualforce pages, but the Tooling API imposes a hard LIMIT of 500 rows per query. The remaining ${effectiveTotal - pages.length} pages were not analysed for XSS patterns. Findings below reflect only the scanned subset and may understate the true exposure.`,
55
55
  remediation: 'Use the Salesforce CLI (sf apex list page) or a dedicated SAST tool (PMD, CodeScan) to perform a complete scan of all Visualforce pages outside the 500-row API limit.',
56
56
  });
@@ -91,13 +91,13 @@ export class VisualforceXssCheck {
91
91
  id: 'visualforce-xss-escape-false',
92
92
  category: this.category,
93
93
  riskLevel: 'HIGH',
94
- title: `${escapeFalsePages.length} Visualforce page(s) use escape="false" — XSS risk`,
94
+ title: `${escapeFalsePages.length} Visualforce page(s) use escape="false": XSS risk`,
95
95
  detail: `\`escape="false"\` on \`<apex:outputText>\` or similar components disables Salesforce's automatic HTML encoding. If the rendered value contains user-controlled content, an attacker can inject arbitrary JavaScript into the page, leading to stored or reflected XSS. Salesforce defaults to \`escape="true"\` specifically to prevent this.`,
96
96
  remediation: 'Remove `escape="false"` unless the value being rendered is fully trusted (e.g., hardcoded HTML from a developer). For user-controlled content, ensure it is sanitised before storage and rely on the default escaping. Replace with HTMLENCODE() if explicit encoding is needed.',
97
97
  affectedItems: escapeFalsePages.map((name) => ({
98
98
  label: name,
99
99
  url: setupUrl,
100
- note: 'escape="false" found — review all output components for user-controlled content',
100
+ note: 'escape="false" found: review all output components for user-controlled content',
101
101
  })),
102
102
  });
103
103
  }
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ export class VisualforceXssCheck {
113
113
  affectedItems: jsUncodedPages.map((name) => ({
114
114
  label: name,
115
115
  url: setupUrl,
116
- note: '{!var} in <script> block without JSENCODE — wrap with {!JSENCODE(var)}',
116
+ note: '{!var} in <script> block without JSENCODE: wrap with {!JSENCODE(var)}',
117
117
  })),
118
118
  });
119
119
  }
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ export class VisualforceXssCheck {
129
129
  affectedItems: attrUncodedPages.map((name) => ({
130
130
  label: name,
131
131
  url: setupUrl,
132
- note: '{!var} in href/src/action without URLENCODE — encode or validate',
132
+ note: '{!var} in href/src/action without URLENCODE: encode or validate',
133
133
  })),
134
134
  });
135
135
  }
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
1
+ export type PermTier = 'CRITICAL' | 'HIGH' | 'MEDIUM';
2
+ export interface DangerousPerm {
3
+ /** Stable short key used in the effective-permission cache and combo rules. */
4
+ key: string;
5
+ /** PermissionSet.Permissions* API field name. */
6
+ field: string;
7
+ /** Human-readable label. */
8
+ label: string;
9
+ tier: PermTier;
10
+ /** One-line abuse rationale. */
11
+ why: string;
12
+ }
13
+ export declare const DANGEROUS_PERMS: DangerousPerm[];
14
+ export declare const PERM_BY_KEY: Record<string, DangerousPerm>;
15
+ //# sourceMappingURL=permCatalog.d.ts.map
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
1
+ // Shared vocabulary of high-risk Salesforce user permissions, used by the
2
+ // access-control checks (PrivilegedAccessCheck builds the effective-permission
3
+ // cache from these; SeparationOfDutiesCheck reasons over combinations of them).
4
+ //
5
+ // IMPORTANT: every `field` below is a PermissionSet.Permissions* API name that is
6
+ // already queried elsewhere in this codebase (EscalationPermsCheck, UsersAndAdmins,
7
+ // ApiClientPermission), so it is known-valid. A single invalid field name would
8
+ // make the whole PermissionSetAssignment query fail with INVALID_FIELD.
9
+ export const DANGEROUS_PERMS = [
10
+ { key: 'ModifyAllData', field: 'PermissionsModifyAllData', label: 'Modify All Data', tier: 'CRITICAL',
11
+ why: 'Read, edit, and delete every record in the org, bypassing sharing.' },
12
+ { key: 'ManageUsers', field: 'PermissionsManageUsers', label: 'Manage Users', tier: 'CRITICAL',
13
+ why: 'Create users and reset passwords: a direct account-takeover lever.' },
14
+ { key: 'ViewAllData', field: 'PermissionsViewAllData', label: 'View All Data', tier: 'HIGH',
15
+ why: 'Read every record in the org, bypassing sharing: mass data exposure.' },
16
+ { key: 'AuthorApex', field: 'PermissionsAuthorApex', label: 'Author Apex', tier: 'HIGH',
17
+ why: 'Deploy and run arbitrary Apex, which executes without sharing by default.' },
18
+ { key: 'CustomizeApplication', field: 'PermissionsCustomizeApplication', label: 'Customize Application', tier: 'HIGH',
19
+ why: 'Change org metadata and configuration, including security settings.' },
20
+ { key: 'ModifyMetadata', field: 'PermissionsModifyMetadata', label: 'Modify Metadata', tier: 'HIGH',
21
+ why: 'Change metadata via the API, enabling stealthy configuration tampering.' },
22
+ { key: 'ManageInternalUsers', field: 'PermissionsManageInternalUsers', label: 'Manage Internal Users', tier: 'HIGH',
23
+ why: 'Administer internal user accounts, including password resets.' },
24
+ { key: 'AssignPermissionSets', field: 'PermissionsAssignPermissionSets', label: 'Assign Permission Sets', tier: 'HIGH',
25
+ why: 'Grant permission sets: can be used to self-escalate to any access.' },
26
+ { key: 'ManageAuthProviders', field: 'PermissionsManageAuthProviders', label: 'Manage Auth. Providers', tier: 'HIGH',
27
+ why: 'Control SSO / auth providers, enabling identity-provider takeover.' },
28
+ { key: 'ManageConnectedApps', field: 'PermissionsManageConnectedApps', label: 'Manage Connected Apps', tier: 'HIGH',
29
+ why: 'Control OAuth connected apps, a persistent external-access channel.' },
30
+ { key: 'UseAnyApiClient', field: 'PermissionsUseAnyApiClient', label: 'Use Any API Client', tier: 'HIGH',
31
+ why: 'Bypass API Access Control to reach the org from any tool.' },
32
+ { key: 'ManageEventLogFiles', field: 'PermissionsManageEventLogFiles', label: 'Manage Event Log Files', tier: 'MEDIUM',
33
+ why: 'Access detailed monitoring/event data across the org.' },
34
+ { key: 'ManageSession', field: 'PermissionsManageSession', label: 'Manage Session Permission Set Activations', tier: 'MEDIUM',
35
+ why: 'Activate session-based permission sets, elevating access on demand.' },
36
+ { key: 'ViewAllUsers', field: 'PermissionsViewAllUsers', label: 'View All Users', tier: 'MEDIUM',
37
+ why: 'Enumerate every user in the org: reconnaissance for targeting.' },
38
+ { key: 'PasswordNeverExpires', field: 'PermissionsPasswordNeverExpires', label: 'Password Never Expires', tier: 'MEDIUM',
39
+ why: 'Exempt the account from password rotation, weakening credential hygiene.' },
40
+ ];
41
+ export const PERM_BY_KEY = Object.fromEntries(DANGEROUS_PERMS.map((p) => [p.key, p]));
42
+ //# sourceMappingURL=permCatalog.js.map
@@ -62,6 +62,13 @@ import { ReportFolderAccessCheck } from './impl/ReportFolderAccessCheck.js';
62
62
  import { EscalationPermsCheck } from './impl/EscalationPermsCheck.js';
63
63
  import { CorsAllowlistCheck } from './impl/CorsAllowlistCheck.js';
64
64
  import { GuestExecutableApexCheck } from './impl/GuestExecutableApexCheck.js';
65
+ // External-surface checks (no cache deps)
66
+ import { EmailSecurityCheck } from './impl/EmailSecurityCheck.js';
67
+ import { OutboundMessagesCheck } from './impl/OutboundMessagesCheck.js';
68
+ import { PublicContentExposureCheck } from './impl/PublicContentExposureCheck.js';
69
+ // Access-control depth: effective-permission resolution + combination analysis
70
+ import { PrivilegedAccessCheck } from './impl/PrivilegedAccessCheck.js';
71
+ import { SeparationOfDutiesCheck } from './impl/SeparationOfDutiesCheck.js';
65
72
  // Order matters: a check's dependsOnCache must be satisfied by a preceding check's populatesCache.
66
73
  // CheckEngine.validateCacheOrdering() enforces this at startup.
67
74
  export const CHECKS = [
@@ -117,6 +124,10 @@ export const CHECKS = [
117
124
  new ReportFolderAccessCheck(), // public report folders — mass data exfiltration risk
118
125
  new EscalationPermsCheck(), // priv-esc permission cluster (chain ingredient)
119
126
  new CorsAllowlistCheck(), // wildcard/broad CORS origins (chain ingredient)
127
+ new EmailSecurityCheck(), // inbound email services + send-as spoofing
128
+ new OutboundMessagesCheck(), // outbound message session-id leak + cleartext endpoints
129
+ new PublicContentExposureCheck(), // externally available Documents + public static resources
130
+ new PrivilegedAccessCheck(), // writes: effectivePermissions; shadow-admin detection
120
131
  // Cache-dependent checks — must come after their producers
121
132
  new DeploymentIdentityCheck(), // reads connectedAppNames
122
133
  new ApexLoggingCheck(), // reads apexBodies + scheduledApexClassNames
@@ -130,5 +141,6 @@ export const CHECKS = [
130
141
  new SiemIntegrationCheck(), // reads namedCredentialEndpoints, remoteSiteUrls,
131
142
  // connectedAppNames, scheduledApexClassNames, eventLogSummary
132
143
  new MfaMethodStrengthCheck(), // reads mfaRegistrations
144
+ new SeparationOfDutiesCheck(), // reads effectivePermissions — toxic permission combinations
133
145
  ];
134
146
  //# sourceMappingURL=registry.js.map
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ export default class AuditDiffCommand extends SfCommand {
50
50
  for (const format of formats) {
51
51
  const renderer = DIFF_RENDERERS[format];
52
52
  if (!renderer) {
53
- this.warn(`Unknown format '${format}' — skipping. Valid formats: html, json`);
53
+ this.warn(`Unknown format '${format}'. Skipping. Valid formats: html, json`);
54
54
  continue;
55
55
  }
56
56
  const filename = `sf-audit-diff-${baseline.orgId}-${baseTs}-vs-${curTs}${renderer.fileExtension}`;
@@ -11,8 +11,13 @@ export default class SecurityAuditCommand extends SfCommand<AuditResult> {
11
11
  'fail-on': import("@oclif/core/interfaces").OptionFlag<string | undefined, import("@oclif/core/interfaces").CustomOptions>;
12
12
  checks: import("@oclif/core/interfaces").OptionFlag<string | undefined, import("@oclif/core/interfaces").CustomOptions>;
13
13
  'scoring-config': import("@oclif/core/interfaces").OptionFlag<string | undefined, import("@oclif/core/interfaces").CustomOptions>;
14
+ 'prepared-for': import("@oclif/core/interfaces").OptionFlag<string | undefined, import("@oclif/core/interfaces").CustomOptions>;
15
+ branding: import("@oclif/core/interfaces").OptionFlag<string | undefined, import("@oclif/core/interfaces").CustomOptions>;
16
+ top: import("@oclif/core/interfaces").OptionFlag<number, import("@oclif/core/interfaces").CustomOptions>;
17
+ frameworks: import("@oclif/core/interfaces").OptionFlag<string, import("@oclif/core/interfaces").CustomOptions>;
14
18
  };
15
19
  run(): Promise<AuditResult>;
20
+ private rendererFor;
16
21
  private printSummary;
17
22
  private handleFailOn;
18
23
  }