@caupulican/pi-adaptative 0.90.12 → 0.91.2

package/dist/core/resource-loader.js

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { existsSync, readFileSync, statSync } from "node:fs";
-import { join, resolve, sep } from "node:path";
+import { dirname, join, resolve, sep } from "node:path";
 import chalk from "chalk";
 import { CONFIG_DIR_NAME, getBundledExtensionsDir, getBundledPromptsDir, getBundledSkillsDir } from "../config.js";
 import { loadThemeFromPath } from "../modes/interactive/theme/theme.js";
@@ -62,6 +62,13 @@ function sanitizeContextFileContent(filePath, content) {
  * so a profile-DENIED file's content is never processed into the session — only its embedded
  * `<resource-profile>` blocks are read for discovery (see {@link loadRawProjectContextFiles}).
  */
+export function isGlobalAgentsFile(filePath, agentDir, platform = process.platform) {
+    const fileDir = canonicalizePath(dirname(filePath));
+    const resolvedAgentDir = canonicalizePath(agentDir);
+    return platform === "win32"
+        ? fileDir.toLowerCase() === resolvedAgentDir.toLowerCase()
+        : fileDir === resolvedAgentDir;
+}
 function loadRawContextFilesFromDir(dir) {
     const candidates = ["AGENTS.md", "AGENTS.MD", "CLAUDE.md", "CLAUDE.MD", "GEMINI.md", "GEMINI.MD"];
     const files = [];
@@ -103,7 +110,7 @@ export function loadRawProjectContextFiles(options) {
         seenPathIdentities.add(identity);
         contextFiles.push(globalContext);
     }
-    if (options.projectTrusted !== false) {
+    if (options.includeProject === true && options.projectTrusted !== false) {
         const ancestorContextFiles = [];
         let currentDir = resolvedCwd;
         const root = resolve("/");
@@ -137,10 +144,15 @@ export function loadRawProjectContextFiles(options) {
  * only the allowed subset instead, so denied content is never processed.
  */
 export function loadProjectContextFiles(options) {
-    return loadRawProjectContextFiles(options).map((file) => ({
-        path: file.path,
-        content: sanitizeContextFileContent(file.path, file.rawContent),
-    }));
+    return loadRawProjectContextFiles({
+        cwd: options.cwd,
+        agentDir: options.agentDir,
+        projectTrusted: options.projectTrusted,
+        includeProject: options.includeProject === true,
+        platform: options.platform,
+    }).map((file) => isGlobalAgentsFile(file.path, options.agentDir, options.platform)
+        ? { path: file.path, content: sanitizeContextFileContent(file.path, file.rawContent) }
+        : { path: file.path });
 }
 export class DefaultResourceLoader {
     constructor(options) {
@@ -216,6 +228,20 @@ export class DefaultResourceLoader {
             return allowed && !blocked;
         });
     }
+    /**
+     * Re-scan the user skills directory plus already-discovered skill paths so a newly written or
+     * archived skill is visible to `skill` search/load without a full extension reload.
+     */
+    refreshSkills() {
+        if (this.noSkills)
+            return;
+        const userSkillsDir = resourceDir("skills", this.agentDir);
+        const nextPaths = existsSync(userSkillsDir)
+            ? this.mergePaths(this.lastSkillPaths, [userSkillsDir])
+            : this.lastSkillPaths;
+        this.lastSkillPaths = nextPaths;
+        this.updateSkillsFromPaths(nextPaths);
+    }
     getPrompts() {
         return { prompts: this.prompts, diagnostics: this.promptDiagnostics };
     }
@@ -744,15 +770,14 @@ export class DefaultResourceLoader {
                     this.themeDiagnostics.push({ type: "error", message: "Theme path does not exist", path: resolved });
                 }
             }
-            // Read RAW content once. Sanitization/threat-scanning/exposure is deferred until AFTER the
-            // agents filter, so a profile-denied context file's content is never processed into the session.
-            const rawAgentsFiles = this.noContextFiles
-                ? []
-                : loadRawProjectContextFiles({
-                    cwd: this.cwd,
-                    agentDir: this.agentDir,
-                    projectTrusted: this.settingsManager.isProjectTrusted(),
-                });
+            // Global agent-dir files always load. Project/ancestor files are discovered only when
+            // this directory/project opts in (`projectContextFiles: "on-demand"`) and `-nc` is not set.
+            const rawAgentsFiles = loadRawProjectContextFiles({
+                cwd: this.cwd,
+                agentDir: this.agentDir,
+                projectTrusted: this.settingsManager.isProjectTrusted(),
+                includeProject: !this.noContextFiles && this.settingsManager.getProjectContextFiles() === "on-demand",
+            });
             const agentEmbeddedProfiles = {};
             const activeProfileNames = this.settingsManager.getActiveResourceProfileNames();
             // DISCOVERY read (metadata only, never loading): an embedded <resource-profile> block can live
@@ -781,9 +806,11 @@ export class DefaultResourceLoader {
                     const blocked = matchesResourceProfilePattern(file.path, agentProfileFilter.block, this.cwd);
                     return allowed && !blocked;
                 })
-                    // Sanitize (strip profile blocks + scan threats) ONLY for allowed files — the denied
-                    // files' raw content was used solely for profile-block discovery above.
-                    .map((file) => ({ path: file.path, content: sanitizeContextFileContent(file.path, file.rawContent) })),
+                    // Global files are sanitized and injected. Project files stay path-only so the
+                    // model can read them on demand; denied files are dropped before this map.
+                    .map((file) => isGlobalAgentsFile(file.path, this.agentDir)
+                    ? { path: file.path, content: sanitizeContextFileContent(file.path, file.rawContent) }
+                    : { path: file.path }),
             };
             // Strict UAC silently denying AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md context is a sharp footgun for lean
             // profiles — surface it loudly instead of letting instructions vanish without a trace.