@cat-factory/server 0.267.0 → 0.269.0

package/dist/modules/mcpAuthServer/McpAuthorizationController.js

@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+import { McpOAuthProtocolError, McpOAuthRedirectableError, authorizationServerMetadata, mcpOAuthErrorRedirect, mcpResourceIdentifier, protectedResourceMetadata, AUTHORIZATION_SERVER_METADATA_PATH, OAUTH_ENDPOINT_PATHS, PROTECTED_RESOURCE_METADATA_PATH, } from '@cat-factory/integrations';
+import { describeError } from '@cat-factory/kernel';
+import { Hono } from 'hono';
+import { assertCapability, requireCapability } from '../../http/guards.js';
+import { requestLogger } from '../../http/requestLogging.js';
+import { consentUrlFor } from './consentRedirect.js';
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// The unauthenticated half of MCP authorization on the SERVING side: two metadata documents, a
+// dynamic client registration, the authorization redirect, and the token exchange.
+//
+// Everything here is reached WITHOUT a session, by construction rather than by exemption. A host
+// reading metadata has no credential yet (that is what it is here to obtain), a registration is the
+// act of becoming known at all, and the token exchange is a machine-to-machine call carrying the
+// code and the PKCE verifier instead of a session. The one step that needs a signed-in human is the
+// consent screen, and it is deliberately NOT here: `GET /oauth/authorize` validates and then sends
+// the browser to the SPA, whose approval call is ordinary session-gated API. That is the same shape
+// the CONSUMING side settled on for its vendor callback, arrived at from the other direction: a
+// third party's browser navigation cannot carry a bearer token, so any identity check written on a
+// route that receives one is unreachable code that reads like protection.
+//
+// Refusals answer in OAUTH's own vocabulary (RFC 6749 §5.2's `{ error, error_description }`),
+// not the deployment's error envelope. Same split the hosted MCP endpoint already makes between an
+// HTTP-level auth failure (the envelope, with its correlation id) and a protocol-level refusal (the
+// transport's own frame): a client here parses `error` and branches on it, and `invalid_grant`
+// against `invalid_client` is a distinction the envelope's status class cannot carry.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/** What every route here needs, and the message naming what a deployment has not wired. */
+const AUTH_SERVER_UNWIRED = 'This deployment does not serve MCP authorization. It needs ENCRYPTION_KEY (the flow seals ' +
+    'every value it carries) and the public API enabled, since what a host is issued is a ' +
+    'public-API key.';
+/** The authorization server, or the 503 naming what a deployment has not wired. */
+function requireAuthServer(c) {
+    return requireCapability(c.get('container').mcpAuthServer, AUTH_SERVER_UNWIRED);
+}
+/**
+ * The same refusal where the route has no use for the value: the two metadata documents.
+ *
+ * They are gated for the reason a signpost is taken down when the road behind it is closed. Left
+ * ungated they describe a complete authorization server (endpoints, grant types, PKCE method) on a
+ * deployment whose `/oauth/register` and `/oauth/token` can only answer 503, which is strictly
+ * worse than answering nothing: a host that reads discovery believes the flow is available, walks
+ * it, and reports a broken server. A host that cannot discover falls back to asking for a key,
+ * which is exactly the behaviour that existed before any of this, and is the honest answer for a
+ * deployment that has not wired what the documents promise.
+ */
+function assertAuthServer(c) {
+    assertCapability(c.get('container').mcpAuthServer, AUTH_SERVER_UNWIRED);
+}
+export function mcpAuthorizationController() {
+    const app = new Hono();
+    // Both well-known paths answer the same document. RFC 9728 INSERTS the resource's path, which is
+    // correct and is what a client built to the current spec asks for; the bare path is what several
+    // shipped clients ask for, and Figma's live MCP server answers there too. This deployment serves
+    // exactly one protected resource, so there is no second document either path could mean, and
+    // answering both costs nothing but takes a whole class of "connects everywhere except here" out.
+    for (const path of [PROTECTED_RESOURCE_METADATA_PATH, '/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource']) {
+        app.get(path, (c) => {
+            assertAuthServer(c);
+            return metadataResponse(c, protectedResourceMetadata(originOf(c)));
+        });
+    }
+    app.get(AUTHORIZATION_SERVER_METADATA_PATH, (c) => {
+        assertAuthServer(c);
+        return metadataResponse(c, authorizationServerMetadata(originOf(c)));
+    });
+    // Dynamic client registration (RFC 7591). Unauthenticated, which is the specified shape for an
+    // OPEN registration endpoint and is what makes a host nobody configured able to connect at all.
+    // What bounds it is that a registration grants NOTHING: no scope, no board, no token, until a
+    // signed-in human with `secrets.manage` approves a specific board on the consent screen.
+    app.post(OAUTH_ENDPOINT_PATHS.register, async (c) => {
+        const server = requireAuthServer(c);
+        const body = await readJsonBody(c);
+        try {
+            const registration = await server.registerClient({
+                clientName: typeof body.client_name === 'string' ? body.client_name : undefined,
+                redirectUris: body.redirect_uris,
+            });
+            return c.json({
+                client_id: registration.clientId,
+                client_name: registration.clientName,
+                redirect_uris: registration.redirectUris,
+                client_id_issued_at: Math.floor(registration.issuedAt / 1000),
+                grant_types: ['authorization_code'],
+                response_types: ['code'],
+                // Stated rather than left to be inferred: these are PUBLIC clients, so a host that
+                // expected a secret learns it here instead of at a token endpoint that ignores one.
+                token_endpoint_auth_method: 'none',
+            }, 201);
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            return oauthErrorResponse(c, error);
+        }
+    });
+    // The authorization endpoint: a top-level browser navigation the host opens. It validates
+    // everything that can be validated without a human, then hands off to the consent screen.
+    app.get(OAUTH_ENDPOINT_PATHS.authorize, async (c) => {
+        const server = requireAuthServer(c);
+        const query = new URL(c.req.url).searchParams;
+        const redirectUri = query.get('redirect_uri') ?? '';
+        try {
+            const { sealedRequest } = await server.beginAuthorization({
+                clientId: query.get('client_id') ?? '',
+                redirectUri,
+                responseType: query.get('response_type') ?? '',
+                codeChallenge: query.get('code_challenge') ?? '',
+                codeChallengeMethod: query.get('code_challenge_method') ?? '',
+                ...(query.get('state') ? { state: query.get('state') } : {}),
+                ...(query.get('scope') ? { scope: query.get('scope') } : {}),
+                ...(query.get('resource') ? { resource: query.get('resource') } : {}),
+                expectedResource: mcpResourceIdentifier(originOf(c)),
+            });
+            return c.redirect(consentUrlFor(c, sealedRequest), 302);
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            // WHERE a refusal goes is the service's judgement, not this route's, and it turns on one
+            // question: has the redirect URI been matched against the registration yet?
+            //
+            // Until it has, the refusal has nowhere safe to go. Bouncing it to the supplied
+            // `redirect_uri` would be the open redirect the registration check exists to prevent: an
+            // attacker would hold a URL on this deployment's origin that forwards a browser anywhere,
+            // with error text of their choosing on the end of it. The human standing in front of the
+            // browser reads that refusal as a page instead.
+            //
+            // Once it has, the opposite holds and RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 requires it: the fault is in the
+            // host's own request and it is the host that must hear about it, at an address it registered
+            // itself. Rendered as a page, a conforming client waits out its timeout and reports that this
+            // deployment never answered.
+            if (error instanceof McpOAuthRedirectableError) {
+                requestLogger(c).warn('mcp authorization refused, reporting to the client', {
+                    oauthError: error.oauthError,
+                    ...describeError(error),
+                });
+                return c.redirect(mcpOAuthErrorRedirect(error), 302);
+            }
+            return oauthErrorResponse(c, error);
+        }
+    });
+    // The token endpoint: the one call a host makes with no browser involved.
+    app.post(OAUTH_ENDPOINT_PATHS.token, async (c) => {
+        const server = requireAuthServer(c);
+        const form = await readFormBody(c);
+        const grantType = form.get('grant_type') ?? '';
+        try {
+            if (grantType !== 'authorization_code') {
+                throw new McpOAuthProtocolError('unsupported_grant_type', `This authorization server serves the authorization_code grant; got '${grantType}'. ` +
+                    'There is no refresh grant: the issued token does not expire, so there is nothing ' +
+                    'to refresh.');
+            }
+            const issued = await server.redeemCode({
+                code: form.get('code') ?? '',
+                clientId: form.get('client_id') ?? '',
+                ...(form.get('redirect_uri') ? { redirectUri: form.get('redirect_uri') } : {}),
+                codeVerifier: form.get('code_verifier') ?? '',
+            });
+            requestLogger(c).info('mcp authorization token issued', { keyId: issued.keyId });
+            // `expires_in` is ABSENT rather than a large number, and the difference is the whole honesty
+            // of the token model: RFC 6749 §5.1 makes it optional precisely so a server that issues a
+            // non-expiring token says so by omission. A generous number here would have every client
+            // schedule a refresh this server does not serve.
+            return c.json({ access_token: issued.accessToken, token_type: 'Bearer', scope: issued.scope }, 200, 
+            // RFC 6749 §5.1 requires both: this body is a bearer credential, and a cache between the
+            // host and this deployment holding it is the one storage nobody can revoke.
+            { 'cache-control': 'no-store', pragma: 'no-cache' });
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            return oauthErrorResponse(c, error);
+        }
+    });
+    return app;
+}
+/** This deployment's own origin, taken from the request being answered. */
+function originOf(c) {
+    return new URL(c.req.url).origin;
+}
+/**
+ * A metadata document, cacheable.
+ *
+ * Readable from any browser origin, but NOT by a header set here: `isPubliclyReadablePath` in the
+ * shared CORS layer covers `/.well-known` and `/oauth` together, because the routes that ACT on
+ * these documents are preflighted and a preflight never reaches a handler. Setting the header here
+ * as well would answer discovery from two places and leave the registration it points at answering
+ * from neither.
+ */
+function metadataResponse(c, document) {
+    return c.json(document, 200, { 'cache-control': 'public, max-age=300' });
+}
+/**
+ * The OAuth error body, at the status the protocol assigns.
+ *
+ * `invalid_client` is a 401 and everything else a 400 (RFC 6749 §5.2). Anything that is NOT a
+ * protocol error is re-thrown to `handleError`, which is the whole point of narrowing here: an
+ * unexpected fault must keep its correlation id and its 500 rather than being flattened into a
+ * protocol code no client can act on.
+ */
+function oauthErrorResponse(c, error) {
+    if (!(error instanceof McpOAuthProtocolError))
+        throw error;
+    requestLogger(c).warn('mcp authorization refused', {
+        oauthError: error.oauthError,
+        ...describeError(error),
+    });
+    return c.json({ error: error.oauthError, error_description: error.message }, error.oauthError === 'invalid_client' ? 401 : 400);
+}
+/** A JSON request body, or an empty object: a malformed one is refused by the validation below it. */
+async function readJsonBody(c) {
+    try {
+        const body = (await c.req.json());
+        return body && typeof body === 'object' ? body : {};
+    }
+    catch {
+        // silent-catch-ok: an unparseable body reaches the same refusal an empty one does, and that
+        // refusal names the missing field, which is more use than "invalid JSON" to whoever sent it.
+        return {};
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * A token-request body, from either encoding.
+ *
+ * OAuth specifies `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` and that is what most clients send, but JSON
+ * is common enough in MCP hosts that refusing it would be refusing working clients over a content
+ * type. Read through one accessor so the handler above states each field once.
+ */
+async function readFormBody(c) {
+    const contentType = c.req.header('content-type') ?? '';
+    const values = contentType.includes('json')
+        ? await readJsonBody(c)
+        : Object.fromEntries(new URLSearchParams(await c.req.text()));
+    return {
+        get: (name) => {
+            const value = values[name];
+            return typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 ? value : undefined;
+        },
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=McpAuthorizationController.js.map

package/dist/modules/mcpAuthServer/McpAuthorizationController.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/modules/mcpAuthServer/consentRedirect.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+import type { Context } from 'hono';
+import type { AppEnv } from '../../http/env.js';
+/**
+ * The page in the SPA that asks a human what an MCP host may have.
+ *
+ * A page in the APP rather than a route on this backend, for the same reason the consuming side's
+ * vendor callback is: the decision needs a SESSION, and this URL is reached by a top-level browser
+ * navigation the host triggers, which carries no bearer token. Rendering the screen server-side
+ * would mean a route that cannot tell who is looking at it, and an approval taken there would be
+ * an approval by nobody. The page instead re-presents the sealed request over the authenticated API
+ * (`describeMcpAuthorizationContract` / `approveMcpAuthorizationContract`), where the session, the
+ * board choice and the `secrets.manage` check all actually run.
+ *
+ * Exported so both halves derive the string from one place. The SPA page at this path
+ * (`pages/mcp-authorize.vue`) is the other half, and nothing pins the two together: renaming the
+ * page must change this constant too, or `GET /oauth/authorize` sends every host to a 404 while
+ * everything on this side stays green.
+ */
+export declare const MCP_AUTHORIZE_PATH = "/mcp-authorize";
+/**
+ * Where to send the browser for consent, with the sealed request on it.
+ *
+ * The base is the deployment's configured app URL when it has one, and the REQUEST's own origin
+ * otherwise. That fallback is right rather than lazy: a deployment serving the SPA and the API from
+ * one origin (which is every default install) needs no configuration for this to work, and one
+ * serving the SPA elsewhere has already had to set `APP_BASE_URL` for its invite and
+ * password-reset links to arrive anywhere. Unlike the consuming side's redirect URL, no third party
+ * holds this string on file, so nothing breaks if it differs between two deployments of the same
+ * app: the host never sees it, the browser simply follows it.
+ *
+ * The sealed request rides the query string, where a browser history keeps it. It carries no
+ * credential and no code (the code is minted only after a human approves), and it is useless to
+ * anyone who cannot both open a session here and hold `secrets.manage` on a board.
+ *
+ * The path is APPENDED to the configured base rather than resolved against it, which is the same
+ * join `notificationDeepLink` makes and for the same reason: `new URL('/mcp-authorize', base)`
+ * resolves an ABSOLUTE path, so it keeps the base's origin and discards any path component of it. A
+ * deployment serving the SPA under a prefix (`APP_BASE_URL=https://example.test/cat-factory`) would
+ * have every host sent to a 404 one segment above the app, with nothing on this side failing.
+ */
+export declare function consentUrlFor<E extends AppEnv>(c: Context<E>, sealedRequest: string): string;
+//# sourceMappingURL=consentRedirect.d.ts.map

package/dist/modules/mcpAuthServer/consentRedirect.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/modules/mcpAuthServer/consentRedirect.js

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/**
+ * The page in the SPA that asks a human what an MCP host may have.
+ *
+ * A page in the APP rather than a route on this backend, for the same reason the consuming side's
+ * vendor callback is: the decision needs a SESSION, and this URL is reached by a top-level browser
+ * navigation the host triggers, which carries no bearer token. Rendering the screen server-side
+ * would mean a route that cannot tell who is looking at it, and an approval taken there would be
+ * an approval by nobody. The page instead re-presents the sealed request over the authenticated API
+ * (`describeMcpAuthorizationContract` / `approveMcpAuthorizationContract`), where the session, the
+ * board choice and the `secrets.manage` check all actually run.
+ *
+ * Exported so both halves derive the string from one place. The SPA page at this path
+ * (`pages/mcp-authorize.vue`) is the other half, and nothing pins the two together: renaming the
+ * page must change this constant too, or `GET /oauth/authorize` sends every host to a 404 while
+ * everything on this side stays green.
+ */
+export const MCP_AUTHORIZE_PATH = '/mcp-authorize';
+/**
+ * Where to send the browser for consent, with the sealed request on it.
+ *
+ * The base is the deployment's configured app URL when it has one, and the REQUEST's own origin
+ * otherwise. That fallback is right rather than lazy: a deployment serving the SPA and the API from
+ * one origin (which is every default install) needs no configuration for this to work, and one
+ * serving the SPA elsewhere has already had to set `APP_BASE_URL` for its invite and
+ * password-reset links to arrive anywhere. Unlike the consuming side's redirect URL, no third party
+ * holds this string on file, so nothing breaks if it differs between two deployments of the same
+ * app: the host never sees it, the browser simply follows it.
+ *
+ * The sealed request rides the query string, where a browser history keeps it. It carries no
+ * credential and no code (the code is minted only after a human approves), and it is useless to
+ * anyone who cannot both open a session here and hold `secrets.manage` on a board.
+ *
+ * The path is APPENDED to the configured base rather than resolved against it, which is the same
+ * join `notificationDeepLink` makes and for the same reason: `new URL('/mcp-authorize', base)`
+ * resolves an ABSOLUTE path, so it keeps the base's origin and discards any path component of it. A
+ * deployment serving the SPA under a prefix (`APP_BASE_URL=https://example.test/cat-factory`) would
+ * have every host sent to a 404 one segment above the app, with nothing on this side failing.
+ */
+export function consentUrlFor(c, sealedRequest) {
+    const configured = c.get('container').appBaseUrl?.trim();
+    const base = configured || new URL(c.req.url).origin;
+    const url = new URL(`${base.replace(/\/+$/, '')}${MCP_AUTHORIZE_PATH}`);
+    url.searchParams.set('request', sealedRequest);
+    return url.toString();
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=consentRedirect.js.map

package/dist/modules/mcpAuthServer/consentRedirect.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/modules/mcpAuthServer/containerFields.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+import { McpAuthorizationServer, type PublicApiKeyService } from '@cat-factory/integrations';
+import type { Clock, Logger } from '@cat-factory/kernel';
+/**
+ * The one field an MCP-authorization-capable facade contributes to its `ServerContainer`.
+ *
+ * Projected through a shared function rather than assembled at each composition root, for the
+ * reason `mcpOAuthContainerFields` beside it exists: the capability has TWO preconditions that a
+ * facade could satisfy by halves, and `requireCapability` narrows on presence, so a facade
+ * spreading the key unconditionally would turn "not wired" into a value that reads as wired.
+ */
+export interface McpAuthServerContainerFields {
+    mcpAuthServer?: McpAuthorizationServer;
+}
+/**
+ * Build the authorization server for a facade that can serve one, or nothing.
+ *
+ * The two preconditions are not arbitrary and neither is optional:
+ *
+ * - an `ENCRYPTION_KEY`, because every value this flow carries between two requests is sealed
+ *   under it. With no key there is nowhere to keep a PKCE challenge or an approved board, and the
+ *   only alternative designs are a table or a signed-but-readable value, both refused for reasons
+ *   recorded on the service itself.
+ * - the public-API key store, because the token a host is issued IS a public-API key. A deployment
+ *   with the public API unwired has nothing to issue, and an authorization server that authorizes
+ *   access to a surface its own deployment does not serve would be a consent screen leading
+ *   nowhere.
+ *
+ * Absent, every route refuses with a 503 naming both, which is the honest answer: this is a
+ * capability a deployment has not enabled rather than a fault.
+ */
+export declare function mcpAuthServerContainerFields(input: {
+    encryptionKey?: string | undefined;
+    publicApiKeys?: PublicApiKeyService | undefined;
+    clock: Clock;
+    logger: Logger;
+}): McpAuthServerContainerFields;
+//# sourceMappingURL=containerFields.d.ts.map

package/dist/modules/mcpAuthServer/containerFields.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/modules/mcpAuthServer/containerFields.js

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+import { McpAuthorizationServer, MCP_AUTH_SERVER_CIPHER_INFO, } from '@cat-factory/integrations';
+import { WebCryptoSecretCipher } from '../../crypto/WebCryptoSecretCipher.js';
+/**
+ * Build the authorization server for a facade that can serve one, or nothing.
+ *
+ * The two preconditions are not arbitrary and neither is optional:
+ *
+ * - an `ENCRYPTION_KEY`, because every value this flow carries between two requests is sealed
+ *   under it. With no key there is nowhere to keep a PKCE challenge or an approved board, and the
+ *   only alternative designs are a table or a signed-but-readable value, both refused for reasons
+ *   recorded on the service itself.
+ * - the public-API key store, because the token a host is issued IS a public-API key. A deployment
+ *   with the public API unwired has nothing to issue, and an authorization server that authorizes
+ *   access to a surface its own deployment does not serve would be a consent screen leading
+ *   nowhere.
+ *
+ * Absent, every route refuses with a 503 naming both, which is the honest answer: this is a
+ * capability a deployment has not enabled rather than a fault.
+ */
+export function mcpAuthServerContainerFields(input) {
+    const key = input.encryptionKey?.trim();
+    if (!key || !input.publicApiKeys)
+        return {};
+    return {
+        mcpAuthServer: new McpAuthorizationServer({
+            secretCipher: new WebCryptoSecretCipher({
+                masterKeyBase64: key,
+                info: MCP_AUTH_SERVER_CIPHER_INFO,
+            }),
+            publicApiKeys: input.publicApiKeys,
+            clock: input.clock,
+            logger: input.logger,
+        }),
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=containerFields.js.map

package/dist/modules/mcpAuthServer/containerFields.js.map

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package/dist/modules/publicApi/PublicMcpController.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"PublicMcpController.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/modules/publicApi/PublicMcpController.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAKA,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,CAAA;AAC3B,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAA;AAC/C,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAA;AA+BzD,wBAAgB,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAiDvF"}

package/dist/modules/publicApi/PublicMcpController.js

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // The `./http` entry point, NOT the package root: the root re-exports the stdio boot, whose
 // transport imports `node:process`, and this package is bundled into the Worker facade.
 import { handleMcpHttpRequest, refuseMcpMethod } from '@cat-factory/mcp-server/http';
+import { bearerChallenge } from '@cat-factory/integrations';
 import { describeError } from '@cat-factory/kernel';
 import { Hono } from 'hono';
 import { requestLogger } from '../../http/requestLogging.js';
@@ -39,6 +40,12 @@ export function publicMcpController(loopback) {
         const refused = refuseMcpMethod(c.req.method);
         if (refused)
             return refused;
+        // The discovery entry point, set BEFORE the gate below can refuse: a host that presented no
+        // credential (or one too narrow) is answered with the challenge naming this deployment's
+        // protected-resource metadata, which is where the MCP authorization spec has a client look for
+        // its authorization server. Without it the whole chain is served and unreachable, and the only
+        // way to connect is a key pasted into a config file.
+        c.set('bearerChallenge', bearerChallenge(new URL(c.req.url).origin));
         // `read` is the FLOOR, not a per-tool requirement: the ladder is inclusive, so this refuses only
         // an absent, unknown or revoked key. What each tool may do stays enforced where it already is, by
         // the `/api/v1` handler the loopback reaches — a scope table restated here would be a second

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