@cat-factory/executor-harness 1.60.0 → 1.64.0

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@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
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+ import { readFile, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'
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+ import { join } from 'node:path'
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+ import { inertInline, inertMarkdown, walkFences } from './host-markdown.js'
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+ import { redactSecrets } from './redact.js'
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+
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+ // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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+ // The agent-authored pull-request description side channel. A coding agent whose
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+ // dispatch opens a PR is asked (via the backend-composed system prompt) to end its
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+ // run by writing a reviewer briefing — the problem, the decisions made, what to
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+ // look out for — to a sentinel file at the root of the checkout the PR belongs to.
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+ // The harness reads it after the agent settles, removes it (so it never lands in a
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+ // commit), and uses it as the PR body in place of the generic dispatch-time text
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+ // the job body carries. Absent or unusable ⇒ the dispatch-time fallback, unchanged.
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+ //
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+ // The briefing is MODEL-AUTHORED text landing verbatim on a host-parsed surface, so
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+ // it crosses `host-markdown.ts` (auto-link triggers defused, open code fences closed)
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+ // on the way out — see that module for why a PR body is not an inert string sink.
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+ //
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+ // The filename is kept in sync with `PR_DESCRIPTION_FILE` in `@cat-factory/agents`
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+ // (the executor-harness has no dependency on that package), exactly like the
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+ // effort-report and follow-ups sentinels.
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+ // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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+
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+ /** The sentinel file the agent writes its PR description to (relative to the checkout root). */
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+ export const PR_DESCRIPTION_FILE = '.cat-pr-description.md'
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Ceiling on the agent-authored body.
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+ *
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+ * The engine appends its verification report to the SAME body later, and that section carries
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+ * its own 50,000-character ceiling (`MAX_SECTION_CHARS` in kernel's `hostMarkdown`). GitHub
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+ * rejects a body over 65,536 with a 422, and the report publisher swallows its own failures —
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+ * so a briefing budget that does not leave the report room would surface as a report that
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+ * silently never publishes. 15,000 + 50,000 stays under the limit with room to join them.
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+ */
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+ const MAX_PR_BODY_CHARS = 15_000
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+
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+ /** Ceiling on an agent-supplied title (GitHub truncates around 256; a title should be short). */
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+ const MAX_PR_TITLE_CHARS = 160
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+
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+ /** Opens the engine-managed region of a PR body (kept in sync with `kernel/domain/pr-report.ts`). */
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+ export const PR_REPORT_MARKER_START = '<!-- cat-factory:verification-report:start -->'
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+ /** Closes the engine-managed region of a PR body. */
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+ export const PR_REPORT_MARKER_END = '<!-- cat-factory:verification-report:end -->'
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+
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+ /**
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+ * A marker inside the agent-authored briefing would make the engine's splice treat part of the
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+ * briefing as its own managed region and rewrite it, so any occurrence is stripped up front.
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+ * Deliberately laxer than the exact constants above (whitespace-tolerant), so a near-miss the
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+ * splice itself would not match cannot survive here either.
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+ */
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+ const MANAGED_SECTION_MARKER = /<!--\s*cat-factory:verification-report:(?:start|end)\s*-->/g
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+
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+ /** An agent-authored PR description: an optional title plus the briefing body. */
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+ export interface AgentPrDescription {
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+ title?: string
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+ body?: string
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+ }
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Read + parse + REMOVE the agent's PR-description sentinel from `dir`. Lenient: returns
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+ * undefined when the file is absent (the agent wrote none) or carries nothing usable. Never
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+ * throws — a bad description must never fail an otherwise-good run; the caller falls back to
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+ * the dispatch-time text.
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+ *
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+ * A SINGLE `# <title>` heading on the first line sets the PR title; everything after it is the
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+ * body (see {@link splitTitle} for why a LONE heading is required). The whole text is
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+ * secret-scrubbed, an over-budget body is truncated WITH a visible note (a silent cut would
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+ * read as the complete briefing), and both halves are made inert for the host.
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+ *
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+ * On scrubbing: `redactSecrets`'s credential-assignment rule is deliberately eager, so a
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+ * briefing sentence like "the token: handling changed" loses its next word. That is the right
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+ * trade for a surface this public — the rule is shared with every other redaction path, and
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+ * narrowing it so prose reads better would weaken all of them.
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+ */
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+ export async function readPrDescription(dir: string): Promise<AgentPrDescription | undefined> {
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+ const path = join(dir, PR_DESCRIPTION_FILE)
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+ let raw: string
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+ try {
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+ raw = await readFile(path, 'utf8')
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+ } catch {
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+ return undefined // no description written — the fallback body applies
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+ }
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+ // Remove it so it never lands in a commit (defence in depth; the checkout also excludes it).
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+ await rm(path, { force: true }).catch(() => {})
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+ const text = redactSecrets(raw).replace(MANAGED_SECTION_MARKER, '').trim()
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+ if (!text) return undefined
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+
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+ const split = splitTitle(text)
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+ // Cap BEFORE the escapes on both halves, so a numeric entity can never be sliced in half.
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+ const title = split.title ? inertInline(capTitle(split.title)) : undefined
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+ const body = split.body ? inertMarkdown(capBody(split.body)) : undefined
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+ if (!title && !body) return undefined
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+ return { ...(title ? { title } : {}), ...(body ? { body } : {}) }
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+ }
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Split a leading `# <title>` heading off the briefing.
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+ *
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+ * The heading becomes the title ONLY when it is the single level-1 heading in the whole file,
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+ * which is exactly what the prompt asks for ("a single `# <title>` heading line"). An agent
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+ * that instead uses `#` for its section headings — `# Problem`, `# Decisions`, entirely
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+ * idiomatic for the briefing the prompt describes — would otherwise have its first section
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+ * silently become the pull request's title, replacing `<block> (<pipeline>)` with the word
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+ * "Problem". Headings inside fenced code are not headings and are skipped, or a briefing
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+ * quoting a shell snippet (`# rebuild the image`) would lose its title to the snippet.
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+ */
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+ function splitTitle(text: string): { title?: string; body: string } {
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+ const lines = text.split('\n')
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+ const headings: number[] = []
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+ let index = 0
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+ walkFences(lines, (line, insideFence) => {
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+ if (!insideFence && /^#\s+\S/.test(line)) headings.push(index)
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+ index += 1
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+ })
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+ if (headings.length !== 1 || headings[0] !== 0) return { body: text }
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+ const title = lines[0]!.replace(/^#\s+/, '').trim()
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+ if (!title) return { body: text }
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+ return { title, body: lines.slice(1).join('\n').trim() }
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+ }
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+
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+ /** Cut an over-long title at a word boundary when one is near, marking the cut. */
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+ function capTitle(value: string): string {
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+ const collapsed = value.trim()
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+ if (collapsed.length <= MAX_PR_TITLE_CHARS) return collapsed
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+ const head = collapsed.slice(0, MAX_PR_TITLE_CHARS - 1)
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+ const space = head.lastIndexOf(' ')
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+ const kept = space > MAX_PR_TITLE_CHARS * 0.6 ? head.slice(0, space) : head
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+ return `${kept.trimEnd()}…`
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+ }
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+
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+ /** Cut an over-budget body, marking the cut so it is never read as the whole briefing. */
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+ function capBody(value: string): string {
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+ if (value.length <= MAX_PR_BODY_CHARS) return value
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+ return (
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+ value.slice(0, MAX_PR_BODY_CHARS).trimEnd() +
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+ '\n\n_Truncated by the platform: the description exceeded the size budget._'
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+ )
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+ }
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Fold an agent-authored description over the dispatch-time fallback the job body carries.
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+ * Field-wise: the agent's title/body each win when present, so a body-only briefing keeps the
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+ * backend-composed title and vice versa.
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+ */
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+ export function applyPrDescription(
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+ fallback: { title: string; body: string },
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+ agent: AgentPrDescription | undefined,
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+ ): { title: string; body: string } {
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+ if (!agent) return fallback
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+ return { title: agent.title ?? fallback.title, body: agent.body ?? fallback.body }
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+ }
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+
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+ /**
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+ * The body to PATCH onto an ALREADY-OPEN pull request when a resumed run produced a fresh
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+ * briefing: the new description followed by whatever the engine's managed verification-report
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+ * region currently holds.
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+ *
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+ * Carrying the region across is what makes the refresh safe. The engine re-publishes the report
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+ * on every step settlement, so dropping it here would usually self-heal — but "usually" is not
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+ * a property to rest the one artefact a reviewer reads on, and a run that settles no further
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+ * step (the work is already merged, the run failed after its push) would never restore it.
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+ */
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+ export function preserveManagedSection(currentBody: string | undefined, nextBody: string): string {
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+ const existing = currentBody ?? ''
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+ const start = existing.indexOf(PR_REPORT_MARKER_START)
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+ const end = existing.indexOf(PR_REPORT_MARKER_END)
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+ if (start === -1 || end <= start) return nextBody
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+ const region = existing.slice(start, end + PR_REPORT_MARKER_END.length)
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+ return `${nextBody.trim()}\n\n${region}\n`
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+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
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+ import { SUBAGENT_TOOL_NAMES } from './claude-stream.js'
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+
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+ // The harness's no-progress guard: the live anti-rabbithole bound every agent run is held to,
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+ // plus the tool-name vocabulary it classifies calls with and the limits it reads from the
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+ // environment. Extracted from `pi.ts` when the guard stopped being Pi's: it now also drives the
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+ // claude-code subscription runner (`agent-runner.ts` feeds it via `observeSignal`), so the two
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+ // harnesses share ONE definition of "this run has stopped making progress" — and the tool-name
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+ // sets below deliberately cover both CLIs' vocabularies.
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Tool-call signal read off a streamed Pi event, or undefined if not a tool call. Exported for
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+ * `runPi`'s span emitter, which reads the same event for its per-tool trace spans.
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+ */
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+ export function toolCallSignal(
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+ event: Record<string, unknown>,
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+ ): { name: string; isError: boolean } | undefined {
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+ // `tool_execution_end` is the canonical per-call stream event (statsFromEvents
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+ // counts the same one), so the guard reads it and nothing else — no double count.
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+ if (event.type !== 'tool_execution_end') return undefined
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+ const name = typeof event.toolName === 'string' ? event.toolName : ''
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+ return { name, isError: event.isError === true }
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+ }
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+
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+ /** Tunable bounds for the {@link ProgressGuard}. */
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+ export interface ProgressGuardLimits {
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+ /**
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+ * Abort once the agent has made this many NON-exploration tool calls without ever
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+ * using a file-editing tool (see `FILE_EDIT_TOOLS`). The signature of the credential
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+ * rabbit-hole that motivated this: probing the environment (`bash`/exec) endlessly
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+ * without implementing anything. Read-only exploration (`read`/`grep`/… — see
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+ * `EXPLORATION_TOOLS`) and planning (`todo`) do NOT count, so a large task that
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+ * legitimately reads/searches many files before its first edit is not killed for it.
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+ * Disabled when `expectsEdits` is false (e.g. the assess-only merger / Blueprinter,
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+ * which legitimately edit nothing). Note this bound only guards the run UNTIL its
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+ * first edit: once the agent has edited a file at all, it has demonstrably started
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+ * the work, so only `maxConsecutiveErrors` guards a later stall.
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+ */
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+ maxToolCallsWithoutEdit: number
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+ /**
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+ * Abort after this many consecutive failing tool calls — the agent is stuck
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+ * retrying an operation that keeps failing rather than making progress.
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+ */
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+ maxConsecutiveErrors: number
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+ /**
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+ * Abort after this many consecutive web-search/web-fetch calls with no other tool
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+ * call in between. Web tools are read-only exploration (they don't count toward the
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+ * no-edit bound), so without this a model could rabbit-hole on searches indefinitely
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+ * without ever tripping a guard. Any non-web tool call resets the streak. Optional:
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+ * defaults to {@link DEFAULT_PROGRESS_GUARD_LIMITS} when a caller builds limits
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+ * without it.
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+ */
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+ maxConsecutiveWebCalls?: number
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+ }
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+
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+ // `satisfies` (not a type annotation) so each property keeps its concrete `number`
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+ // type — `maxConsecutiveWebCalls` is optional on the interface (callers may omit it),
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+ // but the defaults always define it, so consumers reading it off here get a `number`.
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+ export const DEFAULT_PROGRESS_GUARD_LIMITS = {
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+ // Counts only non-exploration, non-planning calls (see EXPLORATION_TOOLS), so the
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+ // ceiling can be generous without risking a false kill on a read-heavy large task.
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+ maxToolCallsWithoutEdit: 40,
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+ maxConsecutiveErrors: 12,
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+ // A genuine research burst is a handful of searches; an uninterrupted run of this
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+ // many web calls (with no read/edit/bash between) is a search loop, not progress.
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+ maxConsecutiveWebCalls: 25,
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+ } satisfies ProgressGuardLimits
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+
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+ // Tool names that mutate files, so a call to one clears the no-edit suspicion. Kept
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+ // broad on purpose: different models/extensions name the same capability differently
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+ // (`edit`/`write`, but also `apply_patch`/`patch`/`str_replace`/`multiedit`/`create`),
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+ // and a false "no edits" reading would kill a run that IS making changes. Matched
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+ // case-insensitively. NOTE: a file written purely via `bash` (e.g. a heredoc) is not
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+ // recognised here — broaden or move to a working-tree signal if that becomes common.
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+ const FILE_EDIT_TOOLS = new Set([
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+ 'edit',
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+ 'write',
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+ 'apply_patch',
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+ 'patch',
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+ 'str_replace',
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+ 'multiedit',
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+ 'create',
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+ // Claude Code tool names (the guard now runs on the claude-code stream too): Edit/Write/
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+ // MultiEdit already match above; NotebookEdit is its own tool.
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+ 'notebookedit',
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+ ])
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+
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+ // Planning/bookkeeping tools that are neither file edits nor the environment-probing
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+ // the no-edit bound targets — the todo list the agent maintains as it works. These do
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+ // NOT count toward `maxToolCallsWithoutEdit`: a run that diligently updates a long
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+ // todo list before its first edit (common on a large task) would otherwise be killed
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+ // for "no edits" purely from planning calls. They still reset the consecutive-error
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+ // streak (a successful call means the agent isn't wedged). Matched case-insensitively.
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+ // `todo` is Pi's tool; `TodoWrite` and the incremental `TaskCreate`/`TaskUpdate` pair are
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+ // Claude Code's plan vocabularies — all pure bookkeeping, exempt from the no-edit bound.
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+ const PLANNING_TOOLS = new Set(['todo', 'todowrite', 'taskcreate', 'taskupdate'])
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+
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+ // A subagent dispatch (Claude Code's `Agent`/`Task`) is exempt from the no-edit bound because
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+ // the parent stream CANNOT see the edits it makes: only the dispatch and its terminal
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+ // tool_result appear there, while every Edit/Write the subagent performs happens on a transcript
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+ // the guard never reads (`subagents.ts` watches those separately, for usage/progress only). So a
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+ // coder that fans its implementation out across subagents looks, to this guard, like a run making
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+ // dozens of action calls and zero edits — and would be killed for making excellent progress.
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+ // Counting them as edits instead would be worse (a read-only research subagent would then clear
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+ // the suspicion the bound exists to hold), so they are neutral: they neither count toward the
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+ // bound nor satisfy it. Sourced from the same set the slice tracker matches on, lower-cased for
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+ // this module's case-insensitive comparison.
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+ const SUBAGENT_DISPATCH_TOOLS = new Set([...SUBAGENT_TOOL_NAMES].map((name) => name.toLowerCase()))
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+
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+ // Read-only exploration tools: reading/searching the repo is legitimate work-up to an
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+ // edit, NOT the environment-probing the no-edit bound targets, so they don't count
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+ // toward `maxToolCallsWithoutEdit` (a large task may read/search dozens of files
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+ // before its first edit). The bound thus counts only "action" calls — chiefly `bash`
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+ // (the credential rabbit-hole's vector) — that have yet to produce an edit. Kept broad
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+ // since models/extensions name the same capability differently. Matched case-insensitively.
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+ const EXPLORATION_TOOLS = new Set([
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+ 'read',
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+ 'grep',
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+ 'search',
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+ 'glob',
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+ 'ls',
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+ 'list',
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+ 'find',
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+ 'tree',
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+ 'cat',
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+ 'view',
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+ 'head',
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+ 'tail',
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+ 'stat',
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+ // rpiv-web-tools (Pi) + Claude Code's WebSearch/WebFetch: querying/reading the web is
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+ // read-only research up to an edit, not the environment-probing the no-edit bound targets.
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+ 'web_search',
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+ 'web_fetch',
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+ 'websearch',
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+ 'webfetch',
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+ ])
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+
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+ // The web-tool calls, tracked separately so an unbounded run of them (with no other tool
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+ // call between) can be caught as a search loop — see `maxConsecutiveWebCalls`. Covers both
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+ // Pi's `web_search`/`web_fetch` and Claude Code's `WebSearch`/`WebFetch`.
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+ const WEB_TOOLS = new Set(['web_search', 'web_fetch', 'websearch', 'webfetch'])
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+
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+ /** Read {@link ProgressGuardLimits} from the environment, falling back to the defaults. */
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+ export function progressGuardLimitsFromEnv(
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+ env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,
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+ ): ProgressGuardLimits {
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+ const num = (raw: string | undefined, fallback: number): number => {
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+ const n = Number(raw)
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+ return Number.isFinite(n) && n > 0 ? Math.floor(n) : fallback
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+ }
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+ return {
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+ maxToolCallsWithoutEdit: num(
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+ env.JOB_MAX_TOOLCALLS_WITHOUT_EDIT,
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+ DEFAULT_PROGRESS_GUARD_LIMITS.maxToolCallsWithoutEdit,
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+ ),
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+ maxConsecutiveErrors: num(
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+ env.JOB_MAX_CONSECUTIVE_TOOL_ERRORS,
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+ DEFAULT_PROGRESS_GUARD_LIMITS.maxConsecutiveErrors,
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+ ),
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+ maxConsecutiveWebCalls: num(
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+ env.JOB_MAX_CONSECUTIVE_WEB_CALLS,
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+ DEFAULT_PROGRESS_GUARD_LIMITS.maxConsecutiveWebCalls,
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+ ),
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Apply per-knob overrides onto a base set of guard limits, ENFORCING loosen-only: an
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+ * override can only RAISE a knob (more headroom), never lower it below the base. A
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+ * larger value is more lenient for every knob (more no-edit tool calls / errors / web
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+ * calls tolerated), so each result is `max(base, override)`. This is a hard guarantee,
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+ * not a convention — a tuning entry (built-in or a custom kind's, which reaches this via
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+ * an untrusted job body) that supplies a value TIGHTER than the base is clamped back up
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+ * to the base rather than aborting a legitimately-progressing run. An absent/undefined
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+ * knob keeps the base value untouched.
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+ */
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+ export function mergeGuardLimits(
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+ base: ProgressGuardLimits,
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+ overrides: Partial<ProgressGuardLimits> | undefined,
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+ ): ProgressGuardLimits {
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+ if (!overrides) return base
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+ const loosen = (b: number, o: number | undefined): number =>
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+ typeof o === 'number' ? Math.max(b, o) : b
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+ return {
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+ maxToolCallsWithoutEdit: loosen(
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+ base.maxToolCallsWithoutEdit,
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+ overrides.maxToolCallsWithoutEdit,
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+ ),
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+ maxConsecutiveErrors: loosen(base.maxConsecutiveErrors, overrides.maxConsecutiveErrors),
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+ // `maxConsecutiveWebCalls` is optional on the interface (callers may omit it), so
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+ // fall back to the default before loosening — keeps `loosen`'s base a concrete number.
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+ maxConsecutiveWebCalls: loosen(
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+ base.maxConsecutiveWebCalls ?? DEFAULT_PROGRESS_GUARD_LIMITS.maxConsecutiveWebCalls,
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+ overrides.maxConsecutiveWebCalls,
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+ ),
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Live anti-rabbithole guard: fed each streamed Pi event, it returns a diagnostic
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+ * reason the moment a run has plainly stopped making progress, so the harness can
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+ * kill Pi early instead of letting it burn the whole budget (and then surface a
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+ * useful failure instead of a generic "no file changes"). Pure and incremental so
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+ * it can be unit-tested over a fixed event sequence.
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+ */
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+ export class ProgressGuard {
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+ private toolCalls = 0
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+ private edits = 0
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+ private consecutiveErrors = 0
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+ private consecutiveWebCalls = 0
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+
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+ constructor(
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+ private readonly limits: ProgressGuardLimits,
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+ /** When false (assess-only runs like the merger), the no-edit bound is skipped. */
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+ private readonly expectsEdits: boolean = true,
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+ ) {}
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+
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+ /** Feed one parsed Pi event; returns a diagnostic reason when the run should abort, else null. */
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+ observe(event: Record<string, unknown>): string | null {
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+ const tool = toolCallSignal(event)
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+ if (!tool) return null
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+ return this.observeSignal(tool)
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+ }
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Feed one already-parsed tool-call signal (name + error flag), returning a diagnostic reason
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+ * when the run should abort, else null. Split out of {@link observe} so a caller whose stream
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+ * is NOT Pi's `tool_execution_end` envelope — the claude-code runner, which correlates a
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+ * `tool_use` block's name with its `tool_result`'s `is_error` — can drive the SAME guard logic
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+ * without synthesising a fake Pi event.
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+ */
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+ observeSignal(tool: { name: string; isError: boolean }): string | null {
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+ const name = tool.name.toLowerCase()
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+ // The error streak tracks ANY tool call (a planning call still proves the agent
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+ // isn't wedged in a failing-op loop), so it's updated before the planning skip.
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+ this.consecutiveErrors = tool.isError ? this.consecutiveErrors + 1 : 0
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+ if (this.consecutiveErrors >= this.limits.maxConsecutiveErrors) {
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+ return (
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+ `no progress: ${this.consecutiveErrors} consecutive failing tool calls — the agent is stuck ` +
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+ `retrying a failing operation rather than making progress. Aborting.`
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+ )
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+ }
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+
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+ // Web search/fetch loop: web tools are read-only (they don't count toward the
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+ // no-edit bound), so guard them separately — an uninterrupted streak of them is a
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+ // research rabbit-hole. Any non-web tool call resets the streak.
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+ if (WEB_TOOLS.has(name)) {
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+ this.consecutiveWebCalls++
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+ const webCap =
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+ this.limits.maxConsecutiveWebCalls ?? DEFAULT_PROGRESS_GUARD_LIMITS.maxConsecutiveWebCalls
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+ if (this.consecutiveWebCalls >= webCap) {
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+ return (
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+ `no progress: ${this.consecutiveWebCalls} consecutive web search/fetch calls without ` +
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+ `any other action — the agent is stuck researching instead of doing the work. Aborting.`
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+ )
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+ }
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+ } else {
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+ this.consecutiveWebCalls = 0
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+ }
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+
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+ // Planning, read-only exploration and subagent-dispatch calls don't count toward the
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+ // no-edit bound (see PLANNING_TOOLS / EXPLORATION_TOOLS / SUBAGENT_DISPATCH_TOOLS) —
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+ // only "action" calls without an edit do.
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+ if (
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+ PLANNING_TOOLS.has(name) ||
265
+ EXPLORATION_TOOLS.has(name) ||
266
+ SUBAGENT_DISPATCH_TOOLS.has(name)
267
+ ) {
268
+ return null
269
+ }
270
+ this.toolCalls++
271
+ if (FILE_EDIT_TOOLS.has(name)) this.edits++
272
+
273
+ if (
274
+ this.expectsEdits &&
275
+ this.edits === 0 &&
276
+ this.toolCalls >= this.limits.maxToolCallsWithoutEdit
277
+ ) {
278
+ return (
279
+ `no progress: ${this.toolCalls} tool calls and not one file edit — the agent is exploring or ` +
280
+ `probing the environment without implementing anything. Aborting before it burns the whole run.`
281
+ )
282
+ }
283
+ return null
284
+ }
285
+ }
package/src/subagents.ts CHANGED
@@ -1,7 +1,13 @@
1
1
  import { readdir, stat } from 'node:fs/promises'
2
2
  import { createReadStream, type Dirent } from 'node:fs'
3
3
  import { basename, join } from 'node:path'
4
- import { claudeAssistantContent, claudeCallUsage, isObject, redactBody } from './claude-stream.js'
4
+ import {
5
+ claudeAssistantContent,
6
+ claudeCallUsage,
7
+ isObject,
8
+ redactBody,
9
+ SUBAGENT_TOOL_NAMES,
10
+ } from './claude-stream.js'
5
11
  import type { Logger } from './logger.js'
6
12
  import { publishCallMetric, type HarnessCallMetric, type TodoProgress } from './pi.js'
7
13
 
@@ -42,21 +48,6 @@ import { publishCallMetric, type HarnessCallMetric, type TodoProgress } from './
42
48
  // Slice / progress tracking off the PARENT stream (D2.1)
43
49
  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
44
50
 
45
- /**
46
- * The tool names the Claude Code CLI dispatches a parallel subagent under. `Agent` is what the
47
- * shipped schema declares (`AgentInput` in `sdk-tools.d.ts`, carrying `description` / `prompt` /
48
- * `subagent_type`); `Task` is the older name for the same dispatch. Both are matched because the
49
- * harness runs against whatever CLI the image happens to bundle, and matching only the old name
50
- * is what left a CLI 2.1.x pr-review reporting no slices at all.
51
- *
52
- * Note the asymmetry: keeping the legacy `Task` here is the one place a CLI rename could produce a
53
- * FALSE signal rather than merely no signal — if a future build were to name a plain task-list
54
- * tool `Task`, its writes would be counted as in-flight slices. We accept that because no shipped
55
- * build does (the incremental plan tool is `TaskCreate`/`TaskUpdate`, tracked separately in
56
- * `progress.ts`), and dropping legacy coverage is the more likely regression.
57
- */
58
- const SUBAGENT_TOOL_NAMES = new Set(['Agent', 'Task'])
59
-
60
51
  interface TrackedSlice {
61
52
  /** The dispatch's tool_use id, used to pair the terminal tool_result. */
62
53
  toolUseId: string