@cat-factory/executor-harness 1.145.1 → 1.149.0

package/dist/docker-probe-image.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/** The tag the probe image is loaded under. Removed again once the check has answered. */
+export declare const PROBE_IMAGE_TAG = "cat-factory-docker-probe:1";
+/**
+ * What the container must print for the check to pass.
+ *
+ * A marker on stdout rather than a zero exit status: the point of the check is that a process
+ * inside the container actually ran, and only output it produced proves that. An exit status is
+ * the daemon's word for it.
+ */
+export declare const PROBE_SENTINEL = "cat-factory-docker-probe-ok";
+/** The argv the probe container runs. `busybox` dispatches on its own name, so this is an echo. */
+export declare const PROBE_COMMAND: readonly string[];
+/**
+ * What the egress container prints for each observation: the marker, then the exit STATUS of the
+ * command that made it.
+ *
+ * The status rather than a pass/fail marker, because the two failures need different answers.
+ * A refused connection is evidence about the network; a 127 is busybox saying it has no such
+ * applet, which is evidence about the platform's own probe image and may never be reported as a
+ * network that is not there.
+ */
+export declare const EGRESS_TCP_MARKER = "cat-factory-egress-tcp=";
+export declare const EGRESS_DNS_MARKER = "cat-factory-egress-dns=";
+/** Where the egress check aims: a raw address, plus a name to resolve. */
+export interface EgressTarget {
+    host: string;
+    port: number;
+    dnsName: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Read the configured target, or say why it cannot be used.
+ *
+ * Validated rather than trusted, and strictly, for two reasons that both matter. The host and the
+ * name are interpolated into a `sh -c` script INSIDE the probe container, so anything else there
+ * would be running whatever a deployment's environment happened to hold; and a target that is
+ * quietly wrong produces a confident `blocked` about a daemon that is fine, which is the exact
+ * class of lie this whole module exists to remove. A rejected setting is REPORTED as a check that
+ * could not be carried out, never silently swapped for the default: an operator who pointed this
+ * at an address their network permits is entitled to find out that it was ignored.
+ */
+export declare function parseEgressTarget(target: string, dnsName: string): {
+    target: EgressTarget;
+} | {
+    invalid: string;
+};
+/**
+ * The argv the egress container runs: connect, say what that returned, resolve, say the same.
+ *
+ * Both observations are made and BOTH are reported, because they fail for different reasons and
+ * have different fixes. A connect to a raw address needs only a route; a lookup needs the
+ * daemon's embedded resolver to be reachable and to forward. Reporting only the first would call
+ * a container with a working route and broken DNS "reachable", and nothing an agent fetches by
+ * name would work there.
+ *
+ * Every applet is called by its full path (`/busybox nc`) rather than by name. The image holds
+ * one file and no PATH, and busybox's standalone-shell dispatch is a build-time option nothing
+ * here may assume.
+ *
+ * The connect is the half that is easy to get silently wrong, and `nc -w SEC` alone gets it
+ * wrong. busybox documents that flag as the timeout for connects AND FINAL NET READS: once stdin
+ * hits EOF `nc` half-closes and then waits to be spoken to, so a connect that SUCCEEDED to a peer
+ * which expects the client to speak first (every TLS port, the default `1.1.1.1:443` included)
+ * hits the alarm and exits non-zero. Read off the exit status alone that is indistinguishable
+ * from a refusal, so a working network reports a route that is not there. `-z` means "connect,
+ * then stop", which is the question being asked, so it is used wherever the payload's busybox was
+ * built with it; where it was not, the connect runs with no `-w`, which is the build whose `nc`
+ * exits on its own when stdin closes.
+ *
+ * Both halves are wrapped in `${busybox} timeout` either way, since a blackholed route is silent
+ * rather than refused and the applet's own ceiling is the thing this comment exists because we
+ * cannot assume.
+ */
+export declare function buildEgressCommand(target: EgressTarget): readonly string[];
+/** The docker name for the architecture THIS process's payload is built for, when there is one. */
+export declare function payloadArchitecture(arch?: string): string | undefined;
+interface TarEntry {
+    name: string;
+    content: Buffer;
+    mode: number;
+}
+/** A whole tar stream: the members, then the two zero blocks that terminate one. */
+export declare function tarArchive(entries: readonly TarEntry[]): Buffer;
+/**
+ * Assemble the docker-archive `docker load` reads, from one statically linked binary.
+ *
+ * Classic (v1) docker-archive rather than OCI layout: `docker load` accepts both on every engine
+ * this image can run against, and the v1 shape is three files with no blob directory to get
+ * wrong. The layer digest is the sha256 of the UNCOMPRESSED layer tar, which is what
+ * `rootfs.diff_ids` means; an engine that disagrees with it refuses the load, which the caller
+ * reads as could-not-determine rather than as a broken daemon.
+ *
+ * `architecture` is the DAEMON's own word for its architecture, in docker's vocabulary, so
+ * nothing here decides it (see {@link PAYLOAD_ARCHITECTURES}). The result is byte-stable for one
+ * `(payload, architecture)` pair, which is what lets the caller build it once per container.
+ */
+export declare function buildProbeArchive(payload: Buffer, architecture: string): Buffer;
+export {};

package/dist/docker-probe-image.js

@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+import { scrubbedExcerpt } from './redact.js';
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// The one-container image the platform runs to find out whether this machine's Docker daemon
+// can actually run a container, built here in memory rather than pulled.
+//
+// It exists because `docker info` answers a different question from the one every caller
+// actually asks. A daemon that ANSWERS is not a daemon that WORKS: this container's rootless
+// daemon runs inside whatever sandbox the deployment gave it, and a nested user namespace
+// routinely refuses the overlay mount every image materialisation needs. The daemon serves
+// happily, `docker version` reports a server, and `docker pull` of a multi-layer image,
+// `docker run` of a single-layer one and `docker build` all fail with the same EINVAL. Issue
+// #2120 is three agents in one run each discovering that for themselves, against a system
+// prompt that told them, as stated fact, that Docker worked here.
+//
+// Why the payload is BUILT and not pulled: a probe that needs the network answers a question
+// about the registry as much as about the daemon, cannot run in a sandbox with no egress, and
+// costs the job its first turn. This one is a single layer holding one statically linked
+// binary already in the image, assembled into a docker-archive tar and handed to `docker load`
+// on stdin, so the whole check is local and takes about as long as starting one container.
+//
+// ONE layer, deliberately. The reported failure kills `docker run` of a single-layer image too
+// (the container's own writable layer is already a second overlay lower dir), so one layer is
+// enough to detect it, and it keeps `docker load` (the step this file could plausibly get WRONG)
+// as small as it can be. That matters because the caller reads a load failure as "could
+// not determine" and a RUN failure as "this daemon cannot run containers": a bug in the archive
+// below must never be able to tell an agent that a working daemon is broken.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/** The tag the probe image is loaded under. Removed again once the check has answered. */
+export const PROBE_IMAGE_TAG = 'cat-factory-docker-probe:1';
+/** Where the payload binary lands inside the probe image, and what the container is asked to run. */
+const PROBE_BINARY_PATH = 'busybox';
+/**
+ * What the container must print for the check to pass.
+ *
+ * A marker on stdout rather than a zero exit status: the point of the check is that a process
+ * inside the container actually ran, and only output it produced proves that. An exit status is
+ * the daemon's word for it.
+ */
+export const PROBE_SENTINEL = 'cat-factory-docker-probe-ok';
+/** The argv the probe container runs. `busybox` dispatches on its own name, so this is an echo. */
+export const PROBE_COMMAND = [`/${PROBE_BINARY_PATH}`, 'echo', PROBE_SENTINEL];
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// The second thing the same image is asked, and the one the marker run above structurally cannot
+// answer: whether a container started on this daemon can reach the NETWORK.
+//
+// Loading and running a local image needs no network at all, so a daemon whose nested containers
+// are cut off passes the marker run exactly as a working one does. That is not hypothetical: the
+// published executor image ran its rootless daemon with `--iptables=false`, which drops the
+// MASQUERADE rule for the bridge, and every nested container on it had no egress whatsoever
+// (issue #2173). The harness reported `dockerDaemon: "usable"` throughout, and each agent
+// discovered otherwise about seven minutes into an `npm ci` inside a `docker build` (issue
+// #2174). An agent TOLD it has no egress can plan around it; an agent told docker works cannot.
+//
+// It runs as its own container rather than as one more command in the marker run, because the
+// marker run is deliberately `--network none`. The two need opposite networking, so they cannot
+// be the same `docker run`, and keeping them apart has a second payoff: a failure of anything
+// below can only ever produce an EGRESS verdict, never a verdict about the daemon.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * What the egress container prints for each observation: the marker, then the exit STATUS of the
+ * command that made it.
+ *
+ * The status rather than a pass/fail marker, because the two failures need different answers.
+ * A refused connection is evidence about the network; a 127 is busybox saying it has no such
+ * applet, which is evidence about the platform's own probe image and may never be reported as a
+ * network that is not there.
+ */
+export const EGRESS_TCP_MARKER = 'cat-factory-egress-tcp=';
+export const EGRESS_DNS_MARKER = 'cat-factory-egress-dns=';
+/** How long the in-container connect may take. Short: a blocked route is silent, not slow. */
+const EGRESS_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 3;
+/**
+ * How long busybox is given to print its own `nc` usage, for the capability check below. Bounded
+ * like everything else in that container: an applet that somehow blocks may not take the budget
+ * of the measurement it is only a preamble to.
+ */
+const EGRESS_USAGE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 2;
+/**
+ * How long the in-container lookup may take. Its own ceiling because busybox's `nslookup` retries
+ * on its own schedule, and an unbounded one would spend the whole check's budget on the half that
+ * is the diagnostic rather than the verdict.
+ */
+const EGRESS_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 6;
+/**
+ * How much of a rejected setting is quoted back. Enough to recognise which value was refused,
+ * short of letting a pasted blob be most of an agent's system prompt.
+ */
+const SETTING_CHARS = 60;
+/** An IPv4 literal. Names are refused on purpose: a target that needs DNS cannot TEST DNS. */
+const IPV4 = /^(?:(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|[1-9]?[0-9])\.){3}(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|[1-9]?[0-9])$/;
+/** A hostname, in the narrow shape a DNS lookup can be aimed at. */
+const HOSTNAME = /^(?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?\.)+[a-z]{2,}$/i;
+/**
+ * Read the configured target, or say why it cannot be used.
+ *
+ * Validated rather than trusted, and strictly, for two reasons that both matter. The host and the
+ * name are interpolated into a `sh -c` script INSIDE the probe container, so anything else there
+ * would be running whatever a deployment's environment happened to hold; and a target that is
+ * quietly wrong produces a confident `blocked` about a daemon that is fine, which is the exact
+ * class of lie this whole module exists to remove. A rejected setting is REPORTED as a check that
+ * could not be carried out, never silently swapped for the default: an operator who pointed this
+ * at an address their network permits is entitled to find out that it was ignored.
+ */
+export function parseEgressTarget(target, dnsName) {
+    const [host = '', port = '', ...rest] = target.split(':');
+    if (rest.length > 0 || !IPV4.test(host)) {
+        return {
+            invalid: `the platform's egress check is configured with \`${scrubbedExcerpt(target, SETTING_CHARS)}\`, which is not an \`IPv4:port\` address`,
+        };
+    }
+    const parsed = Number(port);
+    if (!/^[0-9]{1,5}$/.test(port) || parsed < 1 || parsed > 65535) {
+        return {
+            invalid: `the platform's egress check is configured with \`${scrubbedExcerpt(target, SETTING_CHARS)}\`, whose port is not a number between 1 and 65535`,
+        };
+    }
+    if (!HOSTNAME.test(dnsName)) {
+        return {
+            invalid: `the platform's egress check is configured to resolve \`${scrubbedExcerpt(dnsName, SETTING_CHARS)}\`, which is not a hostname`,
+        };
+    }
+    return { target: { host, port: parsed, dnsName } };
+}
+/**
+ * The argv the egress container runs: connect, say what that returned, resolve, say the same.
+ *
+ * Both observations are made and BOTH are reported, because they fail for different reasons and
+ * have different fixes. A connect to a raw address needs only a route; a lookup needs the
+ * daemon's embedded resolver to be reachable and to forward. Reporting only the first would call
+ * a container with a working route and broken DNS "reachable", and nothing an agent fetches by
+ * name would work there.
+ *
+ * Every applet is called by its full path (`/busybox nc`) rather than by name. The image holds
+ * one file and no PATH, and busybox's standalone-shell dispatch is a build-time option nothing
+ * here may assume.
+ *
+ * The connect is the half that is easy to get silently wrong, and `nc -w SEC` alone gets it
+ * wrong. busybox documents that flag as the timeout for connects AND FINAL NET READS: once stdin
+ * hits EOF `nc` half-closes and then waits to be spoken to, so a connect that SUCCEEDED to a peer
+ * which expects the client to speak first (every TLS port, the default `1.1.1.1:443` included)
+ * hits the alarm and exits non-zero. Read off the exit status alone that is indistinguishable
+ * from a refusal, so a working network reports a route that is not there. `-z` means "connect,
+ * then stop", which is the question being asked, so it is used wherever the payload's busybox was
+ * built with it; where it was not, the connect runs with no `-w`, which is the build whose `nc`
+ * exits on its own when stdin closes.
+ *
+ * Both halves are wrapped in `${busybox} timeout` either way, since a blackholed route is silent
+ * rather than refused and the applet's own ceiling is the thing this comment exists because we
+ * cannot assume.
+ */
+export function buildEgressCommand(target) {
+    const busybox = `/${PROBE_BINARY_PATH}`;
+    const bounded = (seconds, command) => `${busybox} timeout ${seconds} ${command}`;
+    const where = `${target.host} ${target.port}`;
+    const connectSeconds = EGRESS_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS + 1;
+    const connect = [
+        'nc_z=no',
+        `case "$(${bounded(EGRESS_USAGE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, `${busybox} nc`)} 2>&1)" in *-z*) nc_z=yes ;; esac`,
+        'if [ "$nc_z" = yes ]; then',
+        `  ${bounded(connectSeconds, `${busybox} nc -w ${EGRESS_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS} -z ${where}`)} >/dev/null 2>&1`,
+        'else',
+        `  ${bounded(connectSeconds, `${busybox} nc ${where}`)} </dev/null >/dev/null 2>&1`,
+        'fi',
+    ].join('\n');
+    const resolve = bounded(EGRESS_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, `${busybox} nslookup ${target.dnsName}`);
+    return [
+        busybox,
+        'sh',
+        '-c',
+        [
+            `${connect}\necho "${EGRESS_TCP_MARKER}$?"`,
+            `${resolve} >/dev/null 2>&1; echo "${EGRESS_DNS_MARKER}$?"`,
+        ].join('\n'),
+    ];
+}
+/**
+ * Node's architecture names mapped onto the docker name for the same machine.
+ *
+ * This names THE PAYLOAD, never the daemon. `process.arch` is the architecture of the harness
+ * process, and the binary it hands over is built for that; the daemon it is measured against
+ * answers for itself (`docker version --format {{.Server.Arch}}`), and the caller compares the
+ * two rather than assuming they agree. An external `DOCKER_HOST` is a first-class path here, and
+ * an arm64 harness talking to an amd64 sidecar shares nothing with it but the socket.
+ *
+ * That comparison is also what makes two of these entries safe. `process.arch` reports `ppc64` on
+ * both endiannesses and `arm` with no variant, so those rows are a HYPOTHESIS about the payload,
+ * not a claim: a machine the guess is wrong about answers with a different name and the check
+ * reports that it could not be carried out. Nothing here may produce a verdict about the daemon.
+ * An architecture nothing maps does the same, which is why `386` was worth adding rather than
+ * leaving to a fallback: the mapping is unambiguous and its absence cost a real check.
+ */
+const PAYLOAD_ARCHITECTURES = {
+    x64: 'amd64',
+    ia32: '386',
+    arm64: 'arm64',
+    arm: 'arm',
+    s390x: 's390x',
+    ppc64: 'ppc64le',
+    riscv64: 'riscv64',
+};
+/** The docker name for the architecture THIS process's payload is built for, when there is one. */
+export function payloadArchitecture(arch = process.arch) {
+    return PAYLOAD_ARCHITECTURES[arch];
+}
+const TAR_BLOCK = 512;
+/** A fixed timestamp everywhere a tar or an image config wants one, so the archive is byte-stable. */
+const EPOCH = '1970-01-01T00:00:00Z';
+/**
+ * One ustar header block.
+ *
+ * The checksum is summed with its own field read as eight SPACES and only then written back
+ * over it, which is the format's own rule and the one detail a hand-rolled writer gets wrong. A
+ * header whose checksum covers its own checksum bytes is rejected by every reader, and
+ * `docker load` reports that as an unreadable archive, which this module's caller would then
+ * have to decide was not the daemon's fault.
+ */
+function tarHeader(name, size, mode) {
+    const header = Buffer.alloc(TAR_BLOCK);
+    header.write(name, 0, 100, 'utf8');
+    header.write(octalField(mode, 8), 100, 8, 'latin1');
+    header.write(octalField(0, 8), 108, 8, 'latin1'); // uid
+    header.write(octalField(0, 8), 116, 8, 'latin1'); // gid
+    header.write(octalField(size, 12), 124, 12, 'latin1');
+    header.write(octalField(0, 12), 136, 12, 'latin1'); // mtime
+    header.write('        ', 148, 8, 'latin1');
+    header.write('0', 156, 1, 'latin1'); // typeflag: a regular file
+    header.write('ustar\0', 257, 6, 'latin1');
+    header.write('00', 263, 2, 'latin1');
+    let sum = 0;
+    for (const byte of header)
+        sum += byte;
+    header.write(`${sum.toString(8).padStart(6, '0')}\0 `, 148, 8, 'latin1');
+    return header;
+}
+/** A numeric tar field: zero-padded octal in `width - 1` characters, then a NUL. */
+function octalField(value, width) {
+    return `${value.toString(8).padStart(width - 1, '0')}\0`;
+}
+/** One tar member: its header, its content, and the padding up to the next 512-byte block. */
+function tarMember(entry) {
+    const padding = (TAR_BLOCK - (entry.content.length % TAR_BLOCK)) % TAR_BLOCK;
+    return Buffer.concat([
+        tarHeader(entry.name, entry.content.length, entry.mode),
+        entry.content,
+        Buffer.alloc(padding),
+    ]);
+}
+/** A whole tar stream: the members, then the two zero blocks that terminate one. */
+export function tarArchive(entries) {
+    return Buffer.concat([...entries.map(tarMember), Buffer.alloc(TAR_BLOCK * 2)]);
+}
+/**
+ * Assemble the docker-archive `docker load` reads, from one statically linked binary.
+ *
+ * Classic (v1) docker-archive rather than OCI layout: `docker load` accepts both on every engine
+ * this image can run against, and the v1 shape is three files with no blob directory to get
+ * wrong. The layer digest is the sha256 of the UNCOMPRESSED layer tar, which is what
+ * `rootfs.diff_ids` means; an engine that disagrees with it refuses the load, which the caller
+ * reads as could-not-determine rather than as a broken daemon.
+ *
+ * `architecture` is the DAEMON's own word for its architecture, in docker's vocabulary, so
+ * nothing here decides it (see {@link PAYLOAD_ARCHITECTURES}). The result is byte-stable for one
+ * `(payload, architecture)` pair, which is what lets the caller build it once per container.
+ */
+export function buildProbeArchive(payload, architecture) {
+    const layer = tarArchive([{ name: PROBE_BINARY_PATH, content: payload, mode: 0o755 }]);
+    const diffId = `sha256:${createHash('sha256').update(layer).digest('hex')}`;
+    const config = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({
+        architecture,
+        os: 'linux',
+        created: EPOCH,
+        config: {},
+        rootfs: { type: 'layers', diff_ids: [diffId] },
+        history: [{ created: EPOCH, created_by: 'cat-factory docker capability probe' }],
+    }));
+    const manifest = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([{ Config: 'config.json', RepoTags: [PROBE_IMAGE_TAG], Layers: ['layer.tar'] }]));
+    return tarArchive([
+        { name: 'config.json', content: config, mode: 0o644 },
+        { name: 'layer.tar', content: layer, mode: 0o644 },
+        { name: 'manifest.json', content: manifest, mode: 0o644 },
+    ]);
+}

package/dist/docker-status.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+import { type DockerWorkload } from './docker-capability.js';
+import { type Logger } from './logger.js';
 /**
  * Where `entrypoint.sh` records its verdict. The two halves of one contract: change this and the
  * `DOCKER_STATUS_FILE` default in `entrypoint.sh` together. `HARNESS_DOCKER_STATUS_FILE`
@@ -29,7 +31,20 @@ export type DockerSource =
 export interface DockerStatus {
     available: boolean | undefined;
     source: DockerSource;
-    /** Why, in the entrypoint's own closed vocabulary (`serving`/`failed`/`missing`/…). */
+    /**
+     * Why, in the entrypoint's own closed vocabulary (`serving`, `serving-without-nat`,
+     * `still-starting`, `failed`, `missing`, `unreachable`, `probing`).
+     *
+     * Reported and never branched on, which is what lets the entrypoint add a word without anything
+     * here having to know it. Two are worth knowing about. `serving-without-nat`: the daemon that
+     * manages its own firewall rules exited without serving, so the one that came up runs with
+     * `--iptables=false` and its NESTED containers have no egress. That is a CAUSE, and the only
+     * place one exists; what MEASURES the consequence is the egress half of the workload check
+     * (docker-capability.ts), from inside a container, with no way to learn why. `still-starting`
+     * is a daemon that had not answered when the boot budget ran out and is STILL RUNNING, which is
+     * the one absence that routinely stops being true: it is exactly what the live re-probe below
+     * exists to catch.
+     */
     reason: string;
     /** A human detail for the failing cases: the dockerd log tail, or what was unreachable. */
     detail?: string;
@@ -58,32 +73,97 @@ export declare function readDockerStatus(path?: string): Promise<DockerStatus>;
  * adding a source without a sentence stops building.
  */
 export declare function describeDockerAbsence(status: DockerStatus): string;
-/** Whether a daemon is answering RIGHT NOW. Injected so the unit suite can state either answer. */
-export type DockerProbe = () => Promise<boolean>;
 /**
- * The default {@link DockerProbe}: `docker version` talks to the SERVER, unlike the client-only
- * `docker --version`, which answers happily with no daemon at all.
+ * What a daemon can do RIGHT NOW. Injected so the unit suite can state every answer.
+ *
+ * It answers with a WORKLOAD rather than with a boolean, and that is the correction this type
+ * carries. It used to be `docker version`, which proves the daemon is serving; a stand-up needs
+ * a daemon that can materialise an image, and a sandboxed rootless daemon routinely serves while
+ * being unable to (issue #2120). Running compose against that one produced a mount error the
+ * agent had to interpret, from the one mechanism whose entire job is to say why infra did not
+ * come up.
+ *
+ * The weaker fact did not go away, though: it rides `daemonAnswered` on the `unknown` arm, since
+ * the workload check establishes it on its way past and {@link resolveDockerVerdict} still needs
+ * it. Takes the job's signal, because this is a live check on the critical path of a run that can
+ * be cancelled under it.
+ */
+export type DockerProbe = (signal?: AbortSignal) => Promise<DockerWorkload>;
+/**
+ * The default {@link DockerProbe}: the process-wide workload probe, which loads a one-layer
+ * image and runs a container from it, memoised per container.
+ *
+ * Named for what it answers. It was `probeDockerServing`, which is the fact this module exists to
+ * say is not enough.
  */
-export declare const probeDockerServing: DockerProbe;
+export declare const probeLiveDockerCapability: DockerProbe;
+/**
+ * The sentence for a daemon that is serving and cannot run anything. It names what was tried,
+ * because "docker is unavailable" against a daemon the agent can see answering reads as a bug in
+ * the platform rather than as the sandbox limit it is.
+ */
+export declare function describeDockerUnusable(workload: {
+    detail: string;
+}): string;
 /** What a stand-up is entitled to conclude about the daemon at the moment it is about to run. */
 export interface DockerVerdict {
-    /** Three-valued exactly as {@link DockerStatus.available}, and read the same way. */
+    /**
+     * Whether a stand-up may PROCEED, three-valued exactly as {@link DockerStatus.available} and
+     * read the same way. It is the decision, not a description of the daemon: a daemon that is
+     * answering and cannot run a container is `false` here and `daemon: true` below, and a record
+     * that reported the first as the second would send an operator to restart a daemon that is
+     * already up.
+     */
     available: boolean | undefined;
-    /** Set only for a CONFIRMED absence: the sentence to refuse with. Absent means proceed. */
+    /**
+     * Set only for a CONFIRMED negative: the sentence to refuse with. Absent means proceed.
+     *
+     * Two causes reach it and they read differently on purpose. Nothing is answering here, and
+     * something is answering here but cannot run a container: an operator sent to restart a daemon
+     * that is already up would find nothing wrong with it.
+     */
     refusal?: string;
+    /**
+     * Whether a daemon ANSWERED the live check. Absent when nothing was checked (an undecided
+     * record probes nothing) or when nothing answered, so it is never read as a decided `false`.
+     */
+    daemon?: boolean;
+    /** What a real container did on it, when one was tried. Absent when nothing was measured. */
+    workload?: DockerWorkload;
 }
 /**
- * Resolve what to do now, from what boot recorded plus what a daemon says today.
+ * Resolve what to do now, from what boot recorded plus what the daemon can do today.
+ *
+ * `entrypoint.sh` probes once, at boot, within a bounded wait, and it probes for a SOCKET. Two
+ * things follow, and the branches below are one each.
+ *
+ * A recorded absence is a HYPOTHESIS. A container outlives its boot: a warm pool serves many jobs
+ * from one, and a sidecar daemon that took longer than the wait allows is serving perfectly well
+ * by the second job. Refusing off the record alone latches that container into refusing local
+ * infra that works, for its whole life, with a stale sentence explaining why. The record is still
+ * what supplies the cause and the daemon's own log tail, which no probe can reconstruct.
+ *
+ * A recorded PRESENCE is a hypothesis too, and that half was missing. `serving` is not `usable`:
+ * a rootless daemon in a sandbox answers while unable to mount any image layer, so compose ran
+ * and died on a mount error the agent then had to interpret. So the probe is consulted in both
+ * directions, and it runs a real container rather than asking the daemon about itself.
  *
- * `entrypoint.sh` probes once, at boot, within a bounded wait. A container outlives that: a warm
- * pool serves many jobs from one, and a sidecar daemon that took longer than the wait allows is
- * serving perfectly well by the second job. Refusing off the recorded verdict alone latches that
- * container into refusing local infra that in fact works, for its whole life, with a stale
- * sentence explaining why. So a recorded absence is a HYPOTHESIS here, and the live probe settles
- * it; the recorded verdict is still what supplies the cause and the daemon's own log tail, which
- * no probe can reconstruct.
+ * A check that could not be CARRIED OUT settles nothing, and the cheap fact is what decides
+ * there. Falling straight back to the boot record would re-latch the very refusal the paragraph
+ * above rules out: the four ways the workload check can come back undeterminable (no payload in
+ * this image variant, an architecture it is not built for, a `docker load` the engine refuses, a
+ * timeout) have nothing to do with whether a daemon is up, so a warm container whose sidecar
+ * arrived late would be denied local infra for the rest of its life over a stale sentence. So a
+ * daemon that ANSWERED contradicts a recorded absence exactly as the old `docker version` probe
+ * did, and only a check that never reached a daemon at all leaves the record to decide.
  *
- * Only a recorded `false` is re-confirmed. "Not decided" keeps attempting exactly as before: the
- * point of the third value is that nothing turns it into a refusal, and a probe here would.
+ * "Not decided" still keeps attempting, untouched. The point of the third value is that NOTHING
+ * turns it into a refusal: the entrypoint's bounded wait may still be running, and a workload
+ * probe against a daemon that has not finished starting fails for a reason that says nothing
+ * about what it will do a second later.
  */
-export declare function resolveDockerVerdict(status: DockerStatus, probe?: DockerProbe): Promise<DockerVerdict>;
+export declare function resolveDockerVerdict(status: DockerStatus, opts?: {
+    probe?: DockerProbe;
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
+    logger?: Logger;
+}): Promise<DockerVerdict>;