@carrierllc/mcp 0.13.35 → 0.13.37

package/dist/index.js

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ import {
   verifyStorefront,
   withOcsListSummary,
   withTemplateResellerId
-} from "./chunk-EH3ZRLVZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-4MQE47L6.js";
 import "./chunk-SHKKVIIA.js";
 
 // src/index.ts
@@ -6925,6 +6925,9 @@ async function stripeGet(stripeKey, path, connectedAccountId) {
   const data = await res.json();
   return { ok: res.ok, status: res.status, data };
 }
+function declineNotSupported(reviewId) {
+  return `Not declined: Stripe has no endpoint to decline a Radar review, so nothing was sent for ${reviewId}. To turn the payment away, refund the charge (POST /v1/refunds) on the account the review belongs to (a platform review needs a platform-scoped refund; stripe_connect_refund acts as the operator's connected account) or, if it was authorized but not captured, cancel its PaymentIntent (POST /v1/payment_intents/:id/cancel). Either one closes the review. See https://docs.stripe.com/radar/reviews.`;
+}
 async function stripePost(stripeKey, path, params, connectedAccountId, idempotencyKey) {
   const headers = buildStripeHeaders(stripeKey, {
     connectedAccountId,
@@ -7174,7 +7177,7 @@ function registerStripeConnectTools(server2, ctx) {
     "stripe_connect_refund",
     {
       title: "Refund a Charge (moves real money)",
-      description: "Refund money to a customer on one charge in the operator's connected Stripe account. This returns real funds and Stripe cannot reverse a refund once issued. Two-step by design: call without `confirm_token` to get a token and a summary of what would be refunded, then call again with that token to execute. The token expires in 5 minutes. Params: `charge_id` (Stripe charge id, `ch_...`), `amount_cents` (optional integer in the charge's smallest currency unit \u2014 omit for a full refund), `reason` ('duplicate' | 'fraudulent' | 'requested_by_customer', optional), `confirm_token`. Returns: the refund id and status. Requires `write` scope. Do NOT use this to stop a charge that has not settled yet \u2014 decline it with `radar_review_decline`. Do NOT use this to contest a chargeback \u2014 read the case with `stripe_connect_dispute_list` first, since refunding a disputed charge can cost the operator twice.",
+      description: "Refund money to a customer on one charge in the operator's connected Stripe account. This returns real funds and Stripe cannot reverse a refund once issued. Two-step by design: call without `confirm_token` to get a token and a summary of what would be refunded, then call again with that token to execute. The token expires in 5 minutes. Params: `charge_id` (Stripe charge id, `ch_...`), `amount_cents` (optional integer in the charge's smallest currency unit \u2014 omit for a full refund), `reason` ('duplicate' | 'fraudulent' | 'requested_by_customer', optional), `confirm_token`. Returns: the refund id and status. Requires `write` scope. Do NOT use this on a payment that was authorized but not captured \u2014 cancel its PaymentIntent instead (Stripe POST /v1/payment_intents/:id/cancel). Do NOT use this to contest a chargeback \u2014 read the case with `stripe_connect_dispute_list` first, since refunding a disputed charge can cost the operator twice.",
       inputSchema: {
         charge_id: z8.string().min(1).describe("Stripe charge ID (ch_...)."),
         amount_cents: z8.number().int().min(1).optional().describe("Partial refund amount in cents. Omit for full refund."),
@@ -7276,9 +7279,9 @@ Call again with confirm_token="${token2}" to execute. Token expires in 5 minutes
     "radar_review_list",
     {
       title: "List Radar Fraud Reviews",
-      description: "List the Stripe Radar fraud reviews waiting on a manual approve/decline decision, newest first. Reads only \u2014 deciding a review is a separate call. Params: `open_only` (boolean, default true \u2014 false also returns already-decided reviews), `limit` (1-50, default 10). Returns: { reviews: [{ id (`prv_...`), charge, reason, opened_reason, closed_reason, created, closed }], has_more }. Call this first to get the `review_id` that `radar_review_approve` and `radar_review_decline` require. Do NOT use this for chargebacks the customer has already raised with their bank \u2014 use `stripe_connect_dispute_list`.",
+      description: "List the Stripe Radar fraud reviews waiting on a manual approve/decline decision, newest first. Reads only \u2014 deciding a review is a separate call. Params: `open_only` (boolean, default true; Stripe lists open reviews only, so false returns the same set), `limit` (1-50, default 10). Returns: { reviews: [{ id (`prv_...`), charge, reason, opened_reason, closed_reason, created, closed }], has_more }. Call this first to get the `review_id` that `radar_review_approve` and `radar_review_decline` require. Do NOT use this for chargebacks the customer has already raised with their bank \u2014 use `stripe_connect_dispute_list`.",
       inputSchema: {
-        open_only: z8.boolean().default(true).describe("If true, only returns open (undecided) reviews."),
+        open_only: z8.boolean().default(true).describe("Stripe lists only open (undecided) reviews; kept for compatibility."),
         limit: z8.number().int().min(1).max(50).default(10)
       },
       annotations: annotationsFor("radar_review_list", "read")
@@ -7296,9 +7299,9 @@ Call again with confirm_token="${token2}" to execute. Token expires in 5 minutes
         const stripeKey = env.STRIPE_ORG_SECRET_KEY ?? env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY;
         if (!stripeKey) return err2("Stripe not configured");
         const params = new URLSearchParams({ limit: String(limit) });
-        if (open_only) params.set("open", "true");
-        const result2 = await stripeGet(stripeKey, `/v1/radar/reviews?${params.toString()}`);
+        const result2 = await stripeGet(stripeKey, `/v1/reviews?${params.toString()}`);
         if (!result2.ok) return err2(`Stripe error: ${JSON.stringify(result2.data)}`);
+        const reviews = open_only ? result2.data.data.filter((r) => r.open !== false) : result2.data.data;
         writeAudit(env, {
           tool_name: "radar_review_list",
           ocs_method: "stripe.radar.reviews.list",
@@ -7308,7 +7311,7 @@ Call again with confirm_token="${token2}" to execute. Token expires in 5 minutes
           sub: props2.sub,
           reseller_id: props2.reseller_id
         });
-        return ok(JSON.stringify({ reviews: result2.data.data, has_more: result2.data.has_more }));
+        return ok(JSON.stringify({ reviews, has_more: result2.data.has_more }));
       } catch (e) {
         Sentry3.captureException(e);
         return err2(`Error: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : "unknown"}`);
@@ -7319,7 +7322,7 @@ Call again with confirm_token="${token2}" to execute. Token expires in 5 minutes
     "radar_review_approve",
     {
       title: "Approve Radar Review (captures charge)",
-      description: "Clear a Stripe Radar fraud review so the held charge is captured and the money is taken. Approving overrides Radar's fraud signal, so a genuinely fraudulent charge approved here usually returns later as a chargeback plus a fee. Two-step by design: call without `confirm_token` to get a token, then call again with it to execute. Params: `review_id` (`prv_...`, from `radar_review_list`), `confirm_token`. Requires `admin` scope. Do NOT call this to block a suspicious charge \u2014 that is `radar_review_decline`, the opposite outcome. Do NOT call this to return money on a charge that already went through \u2014 that is `stripe_connect_refund`.",
+      description: "Clear a Stripe Radar fraud review so the held charge is captured and the money is taken. Approving overrides Radar's fraud signal, so a genuinely fraudulent charge approved here usually returns later as a chargeback plus a fee. Two-step by design: call without `confirm_token` to get a token, then call again with it to execute. Params: `review_id` (`prv_...`, from `radar_review_list`), `confirm_token`. Requires `admin` scope. Do NOT call this to turn a suspicious charge away \u2014 Stripe has no review decline; refund the charge (`stripe_connect_refund`) or cancel an uncaptured PaymentIntent. Do NOT call this to return money on a charge that already went through \u2014 that is `stripe_connect_refund`.",
       inputSchema: {
         review_id: z8.string().min(1).describe("Stripe Radar review ID (prv_...)."),
         confirm_token: z8.string().optional()
@@ -7351,7 +7354,8 @@ Call again with confirm_token="${token2}" to execute. Expires in 5 minutes.`
         if (!stripeKey) return err2("Stripe not configured");
         const result2 = await stripePost(
           stripeKey,
-          `/v1/radar/reviews/${review_id}/approve`,
+          // POST /v1/reviews/:id/approve (docs.stripe.com/api/radar/reviews/approve).
+          `/v1/reviews/${encodeURIComponent(review_id)}/approve`,
           {}
         );
         if (!result2.ok) return err2(`Stripe error: ${JSON.stringify(result2.data)}`);
@@ -7374,15 +7378,15 @@ Call again with confirm_token="${token2}" to execute. Expires in 5 minutes.`
   server2.registerTool(
     "radar_review_decline",
     {
-      title: "Decline Radar Review (blocks charge)",
-      description: "Close a Stripe Radar fraud review as fraudulent, so the held charge is blocked and the customer is never billed. The customer sees a failed payment; if they were legitimate, they have to pay again. Two-step by design: call without `confirm_token` to get a token, then call again with it to execute. Params: `review_id` (`prv_...`, from `radar_review_list`), `confirm_token`. Requires `admin` scope. Do NOT call this to let a charge through \u2014 that is `radar_review_approve`, the opposite outcome. Do NOT call this on a charge that already succeeded; a review only exists while the charge is held, and returning settled money is `stripe_connect_refund`.",
+      title: "Decline Radar Review (not supported by Stripe)",
+      description: "Always refuses and calls nothing: Stripe has no endpoint to decline a Radar review (its Reviews API only lists, retrieves and approves). Payments in review have usually already been processed. To turn one away, refund the charge on Carrier's platform account in Stripe itself (Dashboard, or platform-scoped POST /v1/refunds with no Stripe-Account header): `stripe_connect_refund` always acts as the operator's connected account, so it will NOT find a platform charge from this review list. or, for a payment authorized but not captured, cancel its PaymentIntent (Stripe POST /v1/payment_intents/:id/cancel); either closes the review. Params: `review_id` (`prv_...`), `confirm_token` (ignored). Requires `admin` scope. Do NOT call this expecting a charge to be blocked; nothing happens.",
       inputSchema: {
         review_id: z8.string().min(1),
         confirm_token: z8.string().optional()
       },
       annotations: annotationsFor("radar_review_decline", "admin")
     },
-    async ({ review_id, confirm_token }) => {
+    async ({ review_id }) => {
       const denied = denyUnlessScoped(props2, "radar_review_decline", STRIPE_CONNECT_TOOL_SCOPES);
       if (denied) return denied;
       if (!isPlatformOperator(env, props2.org_id)) {
@@ -7390,41 +7394,7 @@ Call again with confirm_token="${token2}" to execute. Expires in 5 minutes.`
           "This tool acts on Carrier's platform Stripe account and is restricted to Carrier's own organization."
         );
       }
-      const toolName = "radar_review_decline";
-      const start = Date.now();
-      if (!confirm_token) {
-        const token2 = await issueConfirmToken(env, props2.sub, toolName);
-        return ok(
-          `HARD_BLOCK: Declining review ${review_id} will close/block the charge.
-confirm_token: ${token2}
-Expires in 5 minutes.`
-        );
-      }
-      const valid = await verifyConfirmToken(env, props2.sub, toolName, confirm_token);
-      if (!valid) return err2("Invalid or expired confirm_token.");
-      try {
-        const stripeKey = env.STRIPE_ORG_SECRET_KEY ?? env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY;
-        if (!stripeKey) return err2("Stripe not configured");
-        const result2 = await stripePost(
-          stripeKey,
-          `/v1/radar/reviews/${review_id}/approve`,
-          { reason: "fraudulent" }
-        );
-        if (!result2.ok) return err2(`Stripe error: ${JSON.stringify(result2.data)}`);
-        writeAudit(env, {
-          tool_name: toolName,
-          ocs_method: "stripe.radar.review.decline",
-          status: "ok",
-          dry_run: false,
-          duration_ms: Date.now() - start,
-          sub: props2.sub,
-          reseller_id: props2.reseller_id
-        });
-        return ok(`Review ${review_id} declined.`);
-      } catch (e) {
-        Sentry3.captureException(e);
-        return err2(`Error: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : "unknown"}`);
-      }
+      return err2(declineNotSupported(review_id));
     }
   );
   server2.registerTool(