npm - @cardanowall/poe-standard - Versions diffs - 0.1.0 → 0.2.0 - Mend

@cardanowall/poe-standard 0.1.0 → 0.2.0

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The schema enforces per-field types, length\n// bounds (chunk size, digest length, supersedes length, nonce length,\n// passphrase salt length), closed-map invariants (`sigs[i]`, `slot`,\n// `passphrase`, `merkle[i]`), and the `v == 1` literal. Cross-field rules\n// (item.hashes content-hash binding when `enc` present, slots/passphrase\n// exclusivity, `crit[]` shape, registry membership of algorithm\n// identifiers, COSE_Sign1 structural decode, URI per-scheme shape rules)\n// fire in `validator.ts` so the validator can emit the precise structural\n// codes (`UNSUPPORTED__ALG`, `ENC_`, `SIG_`, `INVALID_URI`,\n// `CRIT_SHAPE_INVALID`, …) rather than a generic schema-mismatch.\n//\n// Refinements that DO live in the schema (because the validator's domain\n// pass lifts these as `SCHEMA_` / `_LENGTH_MISMATCH` codes directly):\n// - chunk size `[1, 64]` → `CHUNK_TOO_LARGE`\n// - 32-byte digest / 32-byte root / 32-byte supersedes → `HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH_MISMATCH`\n// / `SUPERSEDES_TX_INVALID_LENGTH`\n// - 24-byte nonce / 32-byte slots_mac →\n// `NONCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH` / `ENC_SLOTS_MAC_INVALID_LENGTH`\n// - passphrase salt 16..64 bytes → `ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_SHORT` /\n// `ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_LONG`\n//\n// Per-slot recipient lengths (`epk`, `kem_ct`, `wrap`) are NOT enforced here:\n// the required slot shape depends on the envelope-level `kem`, which a slot\n// cannot see in isolation. The KEM-driven slot descriptor in `validator.ts`\n// emits the precise `KEM_EPK_LENGTH_MISMATCH` / `KEM_CT_LENGTH_MISMATCH` /\n// `WRAP_LENGTH_MISMATCH` / `ENC_SLOT_INVALID_SHAPE` codes instead.\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Chunked-bytes / chunked-text arrays\n// =============================================================================\n\n// `[1 bstr .size (1..64)]`. A zero-length chunk (0 < 1) is rejected with the\n// SAME `CHUNK_TOO_LARGE` code as oversized chunks (any length outside\n// `[1, 64]`).\nexport const ChunkedBytesArraySchema = z\n .array(\n z.instanceof(Uint8Array).refine((b) => b.length >= 1 && b.length <= 64, {\n params: { code: 'CHUNK_TOO_LARGE' },\n }),\n )\n .min(1);\nexport type ChunkedBytesArray = z.infer<typeof ChunkedBytesArraySchema>;\n\n// `[1* tstr .size (1..64)]` — chunk byte length is the UTF-8-encoded length\n// (each `tstr` is wire-encoded as UTF-8). The `tstr .size (1..64)` pin is a\n// byte-count constraint, not a code-unit constraint.\nconst UTF8_ENCODER = new TextEncoder();\nexport const UriChunkArraySchema = z\n .array(\n z.string().refine(\n (s) => {\n const n = UTF8_ENCODER.encode(s).length;\n return n >= 1 && n <= 64;\n },\n { params: { code: 'CHUNK_TOO_LARGE' } },\n ),\n )\n .min(1);\nexport type UriChunkArray = z.infer<typeof UriChunkArraySchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Hashes map\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// `hashes` is a non-empty CBOR map keyed by content-hash algorithm identifier\n// (a CBOR text string from the content-hash registry) with the 32-byte digest\n// as value. cbor2 surfaces a text-keyed CBOR map as a plain JS object — z.record\n// admits any string key here. Both the registry-membership check\n// (`UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALG`) and the per-algorithm digest-length check\n// (`HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH_MISMATCH`) live in the validator's domain pass so\n// each violation emits its precise code; the schema only enforces the\n// value is a CBOR byte string.\n\nexport const HashDigestSchema = z.instanceof(Uint8Array);\n\nexport const HashesMapSchema = z.record(z.string(), HashDigestSchema);\nexport type HashesMap = z.infer<typeof HashesMapSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Top-level `merkle[]`\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// Each commit is a closed map `{alg, root, leaf_count, ? uris}`. `alg` is open\n// (registry membership is enforced in the validator's domain pass — unknown\n// identifiers emit `UNSUPPORTED_MERKLE_COMMIT_ALG`).\n\nexport const MerkleCommitSchema = z\n .object({\n alg: z.string(),\n root: z.instanceof(Uint8Array),\n leaf_count: z.number().int().min(1),\n uris: z.array(UriChunkArraySchema).min(1).optional(),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type MerkleCommit = z.infer<typeof MerkleCommitSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Encryption envelope\n// =============================================================================\n\n// Per-slot recipient entry. The slot shape is KEM-driven:\n//\n// - x25519: `{ epk: bstr(32), wrap: bstr(48) }` — `epk` is the\n// ephemeral X25519 public key, `wrap` is the 32-byte CEK + 16-byte\n// ChaCha20-Poly1305 tag.\n// - mlkem768x25519: `{ kem_ct: [ bstr .size (1..64) ], wrap: bstr(48) }` —\n// `kem_ct` is the 1120-byte X-Wing `enc` carried as a chunked byte-string\n// array (the same `bytes-chunk-array` shape `sigs[i].cose_sign1` uses);\n// there is NO per-slot `epk` on the hybrid path.\n//\n// The `kem` identifier is hoisted to envelope scope (a per-slot `kem` would\n// be wire-bloat). The schema is deliberately PERMISSIVE:\n// `epk`, `kem_ct`, and `wrap` are all optional and `.strict()` is NOT applied.\n// Both the per-field length checks (`KEM_EPK_LENGTH_MISMATCH`,\n// `KEM_CT_LENGTH_MISMATCH`, `WRAP_LENGTH_MISMATCH`) and the KEM-driven\n// shape gate (which field MUST/MUST NOT be present for the declared `kem`,\n// emitting `ENC_SLOT_INVALID_SHAPE`) live in the validator's domain pass —\n// the structural schema cannot know the envelope `kem` from a slot in\n// isolation, and we want the precise KEM-aware code rather than a generic\n// schema mismatch. Because `.strict()` is dropped, the domain pass MUST\n// explicitly reject cross-KEM contamination (an x25519 slot carrying\n// `kem_ct`, or a hybrid slot carrying `epk`).\nexport const SlotSchema = z.object({\n epk: z.instanceof(Uint8Array).optional(),\n kem_ct: ChunkedBytesArraySchema.optional(),\n wrap: z.instanceof(Uint8Array).optional(),\n});\nexport type Slot = z.infer<typeof SlotSchema>;\n\n// Argon2id params `{m, t, p}` are a closed map. Each value MUST be a CBOR\n// unsigned integer; the FLOOR check (`m ≥ 65536`,\n// `t ≥ 3`, `p ≥ 1`) emits `ENC_PASSPHRASE_ARGON2_PARAMS_TOO_LOW` in the\n// validator's domain pass — keeping it out of the schema lets us emit the\n// distinct salt-length code when salt itself is malformed too.\nexport const Argon2idParamsSchema = z\n .object({\n m: z.number().int(),\n t: z.number().int(),\n p: z.number().int(),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type Argon2idParams = z.infer<typeof Argon2idParamsSchema>;\n\n// Passphrase block. `alg` is open (registry membership checked in the\n// validator's domain pass → `ENC_PASSPHRASE_ALG_UNSUPPORTED`);\n// `params` is open here (validator narrows on the registered `alg` value and\n// emits `SCHEMA_UNKNOWN_FIELD` for extra keys, `ENC_PASSPHRASE_ARGON2_PARAMS_TOO_LOW`\n// for sub-floor values). `salt` length floor/ceiling are schema-layer\n// refinements with the dedicated `ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_SHORT/TOO_LONG`\n// codes — they belong at the schema layer because a slot cannot otherwise\n// see the salt length.\nexport const PassphraseBlockSchema = z\n .object({\n alg: z.string(),\n salt: z.instanceof(Uint8Array).superRefine((bytes, ctx) => {\n if (bytes.length < 16) {\n ctx.addIssue({\n code: 'custom',\n path: [],\n message: `passphrase.salt length ${bytes.length} < 16`,\n params: { code: 'ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_SHORT' },\n });\n } else if (bytes.length > 64) {\n ctx.addIssue({\n code: 'custom',\n path: [],\n message: `passphrase.salt length ${bytes.length} > 64`,\n params: { code: 'ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_LONG' },\n });\n }\n }),\n params: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type PassphraseBlock = z.infer<typeof PassphraseBlockSchema>;\n\n// Sealed-PoE envelope. The wire format admits any combination of\n// `kem` / `slots` / `slots_mac` / `passphrase` keys (permissive superset);\n// cross-field invariants (slots ⊕ passphrase, slots ↔ slots_mac, slots\n// requires kem, content-hash binding, slots non-empty) are enforced in the\n// validator's domain pass so each violation emits its typed code rather\n// than a generic shape mismatch.\nexport const EncryptionEnvelopeSchema = z\n .object({\n scheme: z.unknown(),\n aead: z.string(),\n kem: z.string().optional(),\n nonce: z.instanceof(Uint8Array),\n slots: z.array(SlotSchema).optional(),\n slots_mac: z\n .instanceof(Uint8Array)\n .refine((b) => b.length === 32, {\n params: { code: 'ENC_SLOTS_MAC_INVALID_LENGTH' },\n })\n .optional(),\n passphrase: PassphraseBlockSchema.optional(),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type EncryptionEnvelope = z.infer<typeof EncryptionEnvelopeSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Item entry\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport const ItemEntrySchema = z\n .object({\n hashes: HashesMapSchema,\n uris: z.array(UriChunkArraySchema).min(1).optional(),\n // Captured as `unknown` so the validator can run the\n // `ENC_REQUIRES_CONTENT_HASH` pre-check ahead of any inner-shape errors\n // and surface the most informative code first.\n enc: z.unknown().optional(),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type ItemEntry = z.infer<typeof ItemEntrySchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Sig entry\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// Closed CBOR map `{cose_sign1, ? cose_key}`. Canonical CBOR map-key sort\n// (RFC 8949 §4.2.1, bytewise lex on encoded keys) places `cose_key`\n// (length-8 tstr, `0x68`) BEFORE `cose_sign1` (length-10 tstr, `0x6a`); the\n// schema property-order is irrelevant — the canonical encoder handles it.\nexport const SigEntrySchema = z\n .object({\n cose_key: ChunkedBytesArraySchema.optional(),\n cose_sign1: ChunkedBytesArraySchema,\n })\n .strict();\nexport type SigEntry = z.infer<typeof SigEntrySchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Supersedence\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport const SupersedesSchema = z.instanceof(Uint8Array).refine((b) => b.length === 32, {\n params: { code: 'SUPERSEDES_TX_INVALID_LENGTH' },\n});\nexport type Supersedes = z.infer<typeof SupersedesSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Top-level record\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// `v == 1` is a literal — a future major (`v: 2`) MUST be rejected with\n// `SCHEMA_INVALID_LITERAL`. `z.literal(1)` preserves the narrow `1` type for\n// the inferred `PoeRecord[\"v\"]` (so consumers can dispatch on it) and emits\n// Zod's `invalid_value` code which the validator's mapper lifts to\n// `SCHEMA_INVALID_LITERAL`.\n//\n// `looseObject` admits extension keys (matching `^x-.+` or `^[a-z]+-.+`); the\n// validator's domain pass rejects unknown keys that match neither pattern with\n// `SCHEMA_UNKNOWN_FIELD`.\nexport const VersionLiteralSchema = z.literal(1);\n\nexport const PoeRecordSchema = z.looseObject({\n v: VersionLiteralSchema,\n items: z.array(ItemEntrySchema).optional(),\n merkle: z.array(MerkleCommitSchema).optional(),\n supersedes: SupersedesSchema.optional(),\n sigs: z.array(SigEntrySchema).optional(),\n crit: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n});\nexport type PoeRecord = z.infer<typeof PoeRecordSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Closed top-level base-key registry\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// Used by the validator's domain pass to distinguish unknown-typo keys from\n// well-formed extension keys (`^x-.+` / `^[a-z]+-.+`).\nexport const TOP_LEVEL_BASE_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n 'v',\n 'items',\n 'merkle',\n 'supersedes',\n 'sigs',\n 'crit',\n]);\n\n// Extension-key namespaces. Anchored at both ends so an\n// embedded newline cannot smuggle a multi-segment key past the check: `.`\n// excludes `\\n` in JS, and the `\\n?$` tail tolerates exactly ONE trailing\n// newline (matching the Python validator's `re.fullmatch(r'^(x-.+\|[a-z]+-.+)$')`\n// semantics, where `$` likewise admits a single trailing `\\n`). So `x-note\\n`\n// is an extension key, but `x-a\\nb`, `x-note\\n\\n`, and `x-\\n` are not.\nexport const EXTENSION_KEY_VENDOR_RE = /^x-.+\\n?$/;\nexport const EXTENSION_KEY_COMPANION_RE = /^[a-z]+-.+\\n?$/;\n\nexport function isExtensionKey(k: string): boolean {\n return EXTENSION_KEY_VENDOR_RE.test(k) \|\| EXTENSION_KEY_COMPANION_RE.test(k);\n}\n"]}
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The schema enforces per-field types, length\n// bounds (chunk size, digest length, supersedes length, nonce length,\n// passphrase salt length), closed-map invariants (`sigs[i]`, `slot`,\n// `passphrase`, `merkle[i]`), and the `v == 1` literal. Cross-field rules\n// (item.hashes content-hash binding when `enc` present, slots/passphrase\n// exclusivity, `crit[]` shape, registry membership of algorithm\n// identifiers, COSE_Sign1 structural decode, URI per-scheme shape rules)\n// fire in `validator.ts` so the validator can emit the precise structural\n// codes (`UNSUPPORTED__ALG`, `ENC_`, `SIG_`, `INVALID_URI`,\n// `CRIT_SHAPE_INVALID`, …) rather than a generic schema-mismatch.\n//\n// Refinements that DO live in the schema (because the validator's domain\n// pass lifts these as `SCHEMA_` / `_LENGTH_MISMATCH` codes directly):\n// - chunk size `[1, 64]` → `CHUNK_TOO_LARGE`\n// - 32-byte digest / 32-byte root / 32-byte supersedes → `HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH_MISMATCH`\n// / `SUPERSEDES_TX_INVALID_LENGTH`\n// - 24-byte nonce / 32-byte slots_mac →\n// `NONCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH` / `ENC_SLOTS_MAC_INVALID_LENGTH`\n// - passphrase salt 16..64 bytes → `ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_SHORT` /\n// `ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_LONG`\n//\n// Per-slot recipient lengths (`epk`, `kem_ct`, `wrap`) are NOT enforced here:\n// the required slot shape depends on the envelope-level `kem`, which a slot\n// cannot see in isolation. The KEM-driven slot descriptor in `validator.ts`\n// emits the precise `KEM_EPK_LENGTH_MISMATCH` / `KEM_CT_LENGTH_MISMATCH` /\n// `WRAP_LENGTH_MISMATCH` / `ENC_SLOT_INVALID_SHAPE` codes instead.\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Chunked-bytes / chunked-text arrays\n// =============================================================================\n\n// `[1 bstr .size (1..64)]`. A zero-length chunk (0 < 1) is rejected with the\n// SAME `CHUNK_TOO_LARGE` code as oversized chunks (any length outside\n// `[1, 64]`).\nexport const ChunkedBytesArraySchema = z\n .array(\n z.instanceof(Uint8Array).refine((b) => b.length >= 1 && b.length <= 64, {\n params: { code: 'CHUNK_TOO_LARGE' },\n }),\n )\n .min(1);\nexport type ChunkedBytesArray = z.infer<typeof ChunkedBytesArraySchema>;\n\n// `[1* tstr .size (1..64)]` — chunk byte length is the UTF-8-encoded length\n// (each `tstr` is wire-encoded as UTF-8). The `tstr .size (1..64)` pin is a\n// byte-count constraint, not a code-unit constraint.\nconst UTF8_ENCODER = new TextEncoder();\nexport const UriChunkArraySchema = z\n .array(\n z.string().refine(\n (s) => {\n const n = UTF8_ENCODER.encode(s).length;\n return n >= 1 && n <= 64;\n },\n { params: { code: 'CHUNK_TOO_LARGE' } },\n ),\n )\n .min(1);\nexport type UriChunkArray = z.infer<typeof UriChunkArraySchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Hashes map\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// `hashes` is a non-empty CBOR map keyed by content-hash algorithm identifier\n// (a CBOR text string from the content-hash registry) with the 32-byte digest\n// as value. cbor2 surfaces a text-keyed CBOR map as a plain JS object — z.record\n// admits any string key here. Both the registry-membership check\n// (`UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALG`) and the per-algorithm digest-length check\n// (`HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH_MISMATCH`) live in the validator's domain pass so\n// each violation emits its precise code; the schema only enforces the\n// value is a CBOR byte string.\n\nexport const HashDigestSchema = z.instanceof(Uint8Array);\n\nexport const HashesMapSchema = z.record(z.string(), HashDigestSchema);\nexport type HashesMap = z.infer<typeof HashesMapSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Top-level `merkle[]`\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// Each commit is a closed map `{alg, root, leaf_count, ? uris}`. `alg` is open\n// (registry membership is enforced in the validator's domain pass — unknown\n// identifiers emit `UNSUPPORTED_MERKLE_COMMIT_ALG`).\n\nexport const MerkleCommitSchema = z\n .object({\n alg: z.string(),\n root: z.instanceof(Uint8Array),\n leaf_count: z.number().int().min(1),\n uris: z.array(UriChunkArraySchema).min(1).optional(),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type MerkleCommit = z.infer<typeof MerkleCommitSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Encryption envelope\n// =============================================================================\n\n// Per-slot recipient entry. The slot shape is KEM-driven:\n//\n// - x25519: `{ epk: bstr(32), wrap: bstr(48) }` — `epk` is the\n// ephemeral X25519 public key, `wrap` is the 32-byte CEK + 16-byte\n// ChaCha20-Poly1305 tag.\n// - mlkem768x25519: `{ kem_ct: [ bstr .size (1..64) ], wrap: bstr(48) }` —\n// `kem_ct` is the 1120-byte X-Wing `enc` carried as a chunked byte-string\n// array (the same `bytes-chunk-array` shape `sigs[i].cose_sign1` uses);\n// there is NO per-slot `epk` on the hybrid path.\n//\n// The `kem` identifier is hoisted to envelope scope (a per-slot `kem` would\n// be wire-bloat). The schema is deliberately PERMISSIVE:\n// `epk`, `kem_ct`, and `wrap` are all optional and `.strict()` is NOT applied.\n// Both the per-field length checks (`KEM_EPK_LENGTH_MISMATCH`,\n// `KEM_CT_LENGTH_MISMATCH`, `WRAP_LENGTH_MISMATCH`) and the KEM-driven\n// shape gate (which field MUST/MUST NOT be present for the declared `kem`,\n// emitting `ENC_SLOT_INVALID_SHAPE`) live in the validator's domain pass —\n// the structural schema cannot know the envelope `kem` from a slot in\n// isolation, and we want the precise KEM-aware code rather than a generic\n// schema mismatch. Because `.strict()` is dropped, the domain pass MUST\n// explicitly reject cross-KEM contamination (an x25519 slot carrying\n// `kem_ct`, or a hybrid slot carrying `epk`).\nexport const SlotSchema = z.object({\n epk: z.instanceof(Uint8Array).optional(),\n kem_ct: ChunkedBytesArraySchema.optional(),\n wrap: z.instanceof(Uint8Array).optional(),\n});\nexport type Slot = z.infer<typeof SlotSchema>;\n\n// Argon2id params `{m, t, p}` are a closed map. Each value MUST be a CBOR\n// unsigned integer; the FLOOR check (`m ≥ 65536`,\n// `t ≥ 3`, `p ≥ 1`) emits `ENC_PASSPHRASE_ARGON2_PARAMS_TOO_LOW` in the\n// validator's domain pass — keeping it out of the schema lets us emit the\n// distinct salt-length code when salt itself is malformed too.\nexport const Argon2idParamsSchema = z\n .object({\n m: z.number().int(),\n t: z.number().int(),\n p: z.number().int(),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type Argon2idParams = z.infer<typeof Argon2idParamsSchema>;\n\n// Passphrase block. `alg` is open (registry membership checked in the\n// validator's domain pass → `ENC_PASSPHRASE_ALG_UNSUPPORTED`);\n// `params` is open here (validator narrows on the registered `alg` value and\n// emits `SCHEMA_UNKNOWN_FIELD` for extra keys, `ENC_PASSPHRASE_ARGON2_PARAMS_TOO_LOW`\n// for sub-floor values). `salt` length floor/ceiling are schema-layer\n// refinements with the dedicated `ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_SHORT/TOO_LONG`\n// codes — they belong at the schema layer because a slot cannot otherwise\n// see the salt length.\nexport const PassphraseBlockSchema = z\n .object({\n alg: z.string(),\n salt: z.instanceof(Uint8Array).superRefine((bytes, ctx) => {\n if (bytes.length < 16) {\n ctx.addIssue({\n code: 'custom',\n path: [],\n message: `passphrase.salt length ${bytes.length} < 16`,\n params: { code: 'ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_SHORT' },\n });\n } else if (bytes.length > 64) {\n ctx.addIssue({\n code: 'custom',\n path: [],\n message: `passphrase.salt length ${bytes.length} > 64`,\n params: { code: 'ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_LONG' },\n });\n }\n }),\n params: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type PassphraseBlock = z.infer<typeof PassphraseBlockSchema>;\n\n// Sealed-PoE envelope. The wire format admits any combination of\n// `kem` / `slots` / `slots_mac` / `passphrase` keys (permissive superset);\n// cross-field invariants (slots ⊕ passphrase, slots ↔ slots_mac, slots\n// requires kem, content-hash binding, slots non-empty) are enforced in the\n// validator's domain pass so each violation emits its typed code rather\n// than a generic shape mismatch.\nexport const EncryptionEnvelopeSchema = z\n .object({\n scheme: z.unknown(),\n aead: z.string(),\n kem: z.string().optional(),\n nonce: z.instanceof(Uint8Array),\n slots: z.array(SlotSchema).optional(),\n slots_mac: z\n .instanceof(Uint8Array)\n .refine((b) => b.length === 32, {\n params: { code: 'ENC_SLOTS_MAC_INVALID_LENGTH' },\n })\n .optional(),\n passphrase: PassphraseBlockSchema.optional(),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type EncryptionEnvelope = z.infer<typeof EncryptionEnvelopeSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Item entry\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport const ItemEntrySchema = z\n .object({\n hashes: HashesMapSchema,\n uris: z.array(UriChunkArraySchema).min(1).optional(),\n // Captured as `unknown` so the validator can run the\n // `ENC_REQUIRES_CONTENT_HASH` pre-check ahead of any inner-shape errors\n // and surface the most informative code first.\n enc: z.unknown().optional(),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type ItemEntry = z.infer<typeof ItemEntrySchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Sig entry\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// Closed CBOR map `{cose_sign1, ? cose_key}`. Canonical CBOR map-key sort\n// (RFC 8949 §4.2.1, bytewise lex on encoded keys) places `cose_key`\n// (length-8 tstr, `0x68`) BEFORE `cose_sign1` (length-10 tstr, `0x6a`); the\n// schema property-order is irrelevant — the canonical encoder handles it.\nexport const SigEntrySchema = z\n .object({\n cose_key: ChunkedBytesArraySchema.optional(),\n cose_sign1: ChunkedBytesArraySchema,\n })\n .strict();\nexport type SigEntry = z.infer<typeof SigEntrySchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Supersedence\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport const SupersedesSchema = z.instanceof(Uint8Array).refine((b) => b.length === 32, {\n params: { code: 'SUPERSEDES_TX_INVALID_LENGTH' },\n});\nexport type Supersedes = z.infer<typeof SupersedesSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Top-level record\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// `v == 1` is a literal — a future major (`v: 2`) MUST be rejected with\n// `SCHEMA_INVALID_LITERAL`. `z.literal(1)` preserves the narrow `1` type for\n// the inferred `PoeRecord[\"v\"]` (so consumers can dispatch on it) and emits\n// Zod's `invalid_value` code which the validator's mapper lifts to\n// `SCHEMA_INVALID_LITERAL`.\n//\n// `looseObject` admits extension keys (matching `^x-.+` or `^[a-z]+-.+`); the\n// validator's domain pass rejects unknown keys that match neither pattern with\n// `SCHEMA_UNKNOWN_FIELD`.\nexport const VersionLiteralSchema = z.literal(1);\n\nexport const PoeRecordSchema = z.looseObject({\n v: VersionLiteralSchema,\n items: z.array(ItemEntrySchema).optional(),\n merkle: z.array(MerkleCommitSchema).optional(),\n supersedes: SupersedesSchema.optional(),\n sigs: z.array(SigEntrySchema).optional(),\n crit: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n});\nexport type PoeRecord = z.infer<typeof PoeRecordSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Closed top-level base-key registry\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// Used by the validator's domain pass to distinguish unknown-typo keys from\n// well-formed extension keys (`^x-.+` / `^[a-z]+-.+`).\nexport const TOP_LEVEL_BASE_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n 'v',\n 'items',\n 'merkle',\n 'supersedes',\n 'sigs',\n 'crit',\n]);\n\n// Extension-key namespaces. Anchored at both ends so an\n// embedded newline cannot smuggle a multi-segment key past the check: `.`\n// excludes `\\n` in JS, and the `\\n?$` tail tolerates exactly ONE trailing\n// newline (matching the Python validator's `re.fullmatch(r'^(x-.+\|[a-z]+-.+)$')`\n// semantics, where `$` likewise admits a single trailing `\\n`). So `x-note\\n`\n// is an extension key, but `x-a\\nb`, `x-note\\n\\n`, and `x-\\n` are not.\nexport const EXTENSION_KEY_VENDOR_RE = /^x-.+\\n?$/;\nexport const EXTENSION_KEY_COMPANION_RE = /^[a-z]+-.+\\n?$/;\n\nexport function isExtensionKey(k: string): boolean {\n return EXTENSION_KEY_VENDOR_RE.test(k) \|\| EXTENSION_KEY_COMPANION_RE.test(k);\n}\n"]}

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The schema enforces per-field types, length\n// bounds (chunk size, digest length, supersedes length, nonce length,\n// passphrase salt length), closed-map invariants (`sigs[i]`, `slot`,\n// `passphrase`, `merkle[i]`), and the `v == 1` literal. Cross-field rules\n// (item.hashes content-hash binding when `enc` present, slots/passphrase\n// exclusivity, `crit[]` shape, registry membership of algorithm\n// identifiers, COSE_Sign1 structural decode, URI per-scheme shape rules)\n// fire in `validator.ts` so the validator can emit the precise structural\n// codes (`UNSUPPORTED__ALG`, `ENC_`, `SIG_`, `INVALID_URI`,\n// `CRIT_SHAPE_INVALID`, …) rather than a generic schema-mismatch.\n//\n// Refinements that DO live in the schema (because the validator's domain\n// pass lifts these as `SCHEMA_` / `_LENGTH_MISMATCH` codes directly):\n// - chunk size `[1, 64]` → `CHUNK_TOO_LARGE`\n// - 32-byte digest / 32-byte root / 32-byte supersedes → `HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH_MISMATCH`\n// / `SUPERSEDES_TX_INVALID_LENGTH`\n// - 24-byte nonce / 32-byte slots_mac →\n// `NONCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH` / `ENC_SLOTS_MAC_INVALID_LENGTH`\n// - passphrase salt 16..64 bytes → `ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_SHORT` /\n// `ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_LONG`\n//\n// Per-slot recipient lengths (`epk`, `kem_ct`, `wrap`) are NOT enforced here:\n// the required slot shape depends on the envelope-level `kem`, which a slot\n// cannot see in isolation. The KEM-driven slot descriptor in `validator.ts`\n// emits the precise `KEM_EPK_LENGTH_MISMATCH` / `KEM_CT_LENGTH_MISMATCH` /\n// `WRAP_LENGTH_MISMATCH` / `ENC_SLOT_INVALID_SHAPE` codes instead.\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Chunked-bytes / chunked-text arrays\n// =============================================================================\n\n// `[1 bstr .size (1..64)]`. A zero-length chunk (0 < 1) is rejected with the\n// SAME `CHUNK_TOO_LARGE` code as oversized chunks (any length outside\n// `[1, 64]`).\nexport const ChunkedBytesArraySchema = z\n .array(\n z.instanceof(Uint8Array).refine((b) => b.length >= 1 && b.length <= 64, {\n params: { code: 'CHUNK_TOO_LARGE' },\n }),\n )\n .min(1);\nexport type ChunkedBytesArray = z.infer<typeof ChunkedBytesArraySchema>;\n\n// `[1* tstr .size (1..64)]` — chunk byte length is the UTF-8-encoded length\n// (each `tstr` is wire-encoded as UTF-8). The `tstr .size (1..64)` pin is a\n// byte-count constraint, not a code-unit constraint.\nconst UTF8_ENCODER = new TextEncoder();\nexport const UriChunkArraySchema = z\n .array(\n z.string().refine(\n (s) => {\n const n = UTF8_ENCODER.encode(s).length;\n return n >= 1 && n <= 64;\n },\n { params: { code: 'CHUNK_TOO_LARGE' } },\n ),\n )\n .min(1);\nexport type UriChunkArray = z.infer<typeof UriChunkArraySchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Hashes map\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// `hashes` is a non-empty CBOR map keyed by content-hash algorithm identifier\n// (a CBOR text string from the content-hash registry) with the 32-byte digest\n// as value. cbor2 surfaces a text-keyed CBOR map as a plain JS object — z.record\n// admits any string key here. Both the registry-membership check\n// (`UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALG`) and the per-algorithm digest-length check\n// (`HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH_MISMATCH`) live in the validator's domain pass so\n// each violation emits its precise code; the schema only enforces the\n// value is a CBOR byte string.\n\nexport const HashDigestSchema = z.instanceof(Uint8Array);\n\nexport const HashesMapSchema = z.record(z.string(), HashDigestSchema);\nexport type HashesMap = z.infer<typeof HashesMapSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Top-level `merkle[]`\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// Each commit is a closed map `{alg, root, leaf_count, ? uris}`. `alg` is open\n// (registry membership is enforced in the validator's domain pass — unknown\n// identifiers emit `UNSUPPORTED_MERKLE_COMMIT_ALG`).\n\nexport const MerkleCommitSchema = z\n .object({\n alg: z.string(),\n root: z.instanceof(Uint8Array),\n leaf_count: z.number().int().min(1),\n uris: z.array(UriChunkArraySchema).min(1).optional(),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type MerkleCommit = z.infer<typeof MerkleCommitSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Encryption envelope\n// =============================================================================\n\n// Per-slot recipient entry. The slot shape is KEM-driven:\n//\n// - x25519: `{ epk: bstr(32), wrap: bstr(48) }` — `epk` is the\n// ephemeral X25519 public key, `wrap` is the 32-byte CEK + 16-byte\n// ChaCha20-Poly1305 tag.\n// - mlkem768x25519: `{ kem_ct: [ bstr .size (1..64) ], wrap: bstr(48) }` —\n// `kem_ct` is the 1120-byte X-Wing `enc` carried as a chunked byte-string\n// array (the same `bytes-chunk-array` shape `sigs[i].cose_sign1` uses);\n// there is NO per-slot `epk` on the hybrid path.\n//\n// The `kem` identifier is hoisted to envelope scope (a per-slot `kem` would\n// be wire-bloat). The schema is deliberately PERMISSIVE:\n// `epk`, `kem_ct`, and `wrap` are all optional and `.strict()` is NOT applied.\n// Both the per-field length checks (`KEM_EPK_LENGTH_MISMATCH`,\n// `KEM_CT_LENGTH_MISMATCH`, `WRAP_LENGTH_MISMATCH`) and the KEM-driven\n// shape gate (which field MUST/MUST NOT be present for the declared `kem`,\n// emitting `ENC_SLOT_INVALID_SHAPE`) live in the validator's domain pass —\n// the structural schema cannot know the envelope `kem` from a slot in\n// isolation, and we want the precise KEM-aware code rather than a generic\n// schema mismatch. Because `.strict()` is dropped, the domain pass MUST\n// explicitly reject cross-KEM contamination (an x25519 slot carrying\n// `kem_ct`, or a hybrid slot carrying `epk`).\nexport const SlotSchema = z.object({\n epk: z.instanceof(Uint8Array).optional(),\n kem_ct: ChunkedBytesArraySchema.optional(),\n wrap: z.instanceof(Uint8Array).optional(),\n});\nexport type Slot = z.infer<typeof SlotSchema>;\n\n// Argon2id params `{m, t, p}` are a closed map. Each value MUST be a CBOR\n// unsigned integer; the FLOOR check (`m ≥ 65536`,\n// `t ≥ 3`, `p ≥ 1`) emits `ENC_PASSPHRASE_ARGON2_PARAMS_TOO_LOW` in the\n// validator's domain pass — keeping it out of the schema lets us emit the\n// distinct salt-length code when salt itself is malformed too.\nexport const Argon2idParamsSchema = z\n .object({\n m: z.number().int(),\n t: z.number().int(),\n p: z.number().int(),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type Argon2idParams = z.infer<typeof Argon2idParamsSchema>;\n\n// Passphrase block. `alg` is open (registry membership checked in the\n// validator's domain pass → `ENC_PASSPHRASE_ALG_UNSUPPORTED`);\n// `params` is open here (validator narrows on the registered `alg` value and\n// emits `SCHEMA_UNKNOWN_FIELD` for extra keys, `ENC_PASSPHRASE_ARGON2_PARAMS_TOO_LOW`\n// for sub-floor values). `salt` length floor/ceiling are schema-layer\n// refinements with the dedicated `ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_SHORT/TOO_LONG`\n// codes — they belong at the schema layer because a slot cannot otherwise\n// see the salt length.\nexport const PassphraseBlockSchema = z\n .object({\n alg: z.string(),\n salt: z.instanceof(Uint8Array).superRefine((bytes, ctx) => {\n if (bytes.length < 16) {\n ctx.addIssue({\n code: 'custom',\n path: [],\n message: `passphrase.salt length ${bytes.length} < 16`,\n params: { code: 'ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_SHORT' },\n });\n } else if (bytes.length > 64) {\n ctx.addIssue({\n code: 'custom',\n path: [],\n message: `passphrase.salt length ${bytes.length} > 64`,\n params: { code: 'ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_LONG' },\n });\n }\n }),\n params: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type PassphraseBlock = z.infer<typeof PassphraseBlockSchema>;\n\n// Sealed-PoE envelope. The wire format admits any combination of\n// `kem` / `slots` / `slots_mac` / `passphrase` keys (permissive superset);\n// cross-field invariants (slots ⊕ passphrase, slots ↔ slots_mac, slots\n// requires kem, content-hash binding, slots non-empty) are enforced in the\n// validator's domain pass so each violation emits its typed code rather\n// than a generic shape mismatch.\nexport const EncryptionEnvelopeSchema = z\n .object({\n scheme: z.unknown(),\n aead: z.string(),\n kem: z.string().optional(),\n nonce: z.instanceof(Uint8Array),\n slots: z.array(SlotSchema).optional(),\n slots_mac: z\n .instanceof(Uint8Array)\n .refine((b) => b.length === 32, {\n params: { code: 'ENC_SLOTS_MAC_INVALID_LENGTH' },\n })\n .optional(),\n passphrase: PassphraseBlockSchema.optional(),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type EncryptionEnvelope = z.infer<typeof EncryptionEnvelopeSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Item entry\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport const ItemEntrySchema = z\n .object({\n hashes: HashesMapSchema,\n uris: z.array(UriChunkArraySchema).min(1).optional(),\n // Captured as `unknown` so the validator can run the\n // `ENC_REQUIRES_CONTENT_HASH` pre-check ahead of any inner-shape errors\n // and surface the most informative code first.\n enc: z.unknown().optional(),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type ItemEntry = z.infer<typeof ItemEntrySchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Sig entry\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// Closed CBOR map `{cose_sign1, ? cose_key}`. Canonical CBOR map-key sort\n// (RFC 8949 §4.2.1, bytewise lex on encoded keys) places `cose_key`\n// (length-8 tstr, `0x68`) BEFORE `cose_sign1` (length-10 tstr, `0x6a`); the\n// schema property-order is irrelevant — the canonical encoder handles it.\nexport const SigEntrySchema = z\n .object({\n cose_key: ChunkedBytesArraySchema.optional(),\n cose_sign1: ChunkedBytesArraySchema,\n })\n .strict();\nexport type SigEntry = z.infer<typeof SigEntrySchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Supersedence\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport const SupersedesSchema = z.instanceof(Uint8Array).refine((b) => b.length === 32, {\n params: { code: 'SUPERSEDES_TX_INVALID_LENGTH' },\n});\nexport type Supersedes = z.infer<typeof SupersedesSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Top-level record\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// `v == 1` is a literal — a future major (`v: 2`) MUST be rejected with\n// `SCHEMA_INVALID_LITERAL`. `z.literal(1)` preserves the narrow `1` type for\n// the inferred `PoeRecord[\"v\"]` (so consumers can dispatch on it) and emits\n// Zod's `invalid_value` code which the validator's mapper lifts to\n// `SCHEMA_INVALID_LITERAL`.\n//\n// `looseObject` admits extension keys (matching `^x-.+` or `^[a-z]+-.+`); the\n// validator's domain pass rejects unknown keys that match neither pattern with\n// `SCHEMA_UNKNOWN_FIELD`.\nexport const VersionLiteralSchema = z.literal(1);\n\nexport const PoeRecordSchema = z.looseObject({\n v: VersionLiteralSchema,\n items: z.array(ItemEntrySchema).optional(),\n merkle: z.array(MerkleCommitSchema).optional(),\n supersedes: SupersedesSchema.optional(),\n sigs: z.array(SigEntrySchema).optional(),\n crit: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n});\nexport type PoeRecord = z.infer<typeof PoeRecordSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Closed top-level base-key registry\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// Used by the validator's domain pass to distinguish unknown-typo keys from\n// well-formed extension keys (`^x-.+` / `^[a-z]+-.+`).\nexport const TOP_LEVEL_BASE_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n 'v',\n 'items',\n 'merkle',\n 'supersedes',\n 'sigs',\n 'crit',\n]);\n\n// Extension-key namespaces. Anchored at both ends so an\n// embedded newline cannot smuggle a multi-segment key past the check: `.`\n// excludes `\\n` in JS, and the `\\n?$` tail tolerates exactly ONE trailing\n// newline (matching the Python validator's `re.fullmatch(r'^(x-.+\|[a-z]+-.+)$')`\n// semantics, where `$` likewise admits a single trailing `\\n`). So `x-note\\n`\n// is an extension key, but `x-a\\nb`, `x-note\\n\\n`, and `x-\\n` are not.\nexport const EXTENSION_KEY_VENDOR_RE = /^x-.+\\n?$/;\nexport const EXTENSION_KEY_COMPANION_RE = /^[a-z]+-.+\\n?$/;\n\nexport function isExtensionKey(k: string): boolean {\n return EXTENSION_KEY_VENDOR_RE.test(k) \|\| EXTENSION_KEY_COMPANION_RE.test(k);\n}\n"]}
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The schema enforces per-field types, length\n// bounds (chunk size, digest length, supersedes length, nonce length,\n// passphrase salt length), closed-map invariants (`sigs[i]`, `slot`,\n// `passphrase`, `merkle[i]`), and the `v == 1` literal. Cross-field rules\n// (item.hashes content-hash binding when `enc` present, slots/passphrase\n// exclusivity, `crit[]` shape, registry membership of algorithm\n// identifiers, COSE_Sign1 structural decode, URI per-scheme shape rules)\n// fire in `validator.ts` so the validator can emit the precise structural\n// codes (`UNSUPPORTED__ALG`, `ENC_`, `SIG_`, `INVALID_URI`,\n// `CRIT_SHAPE_INVALID`, …) rather than a generic schema-mismatch.\n//\n// Refinements that DO live in the schema (because the validator's domain\n// pass lifts these as `SCHEMA_` / `_LENGTH_MISMATCH` codes directly):\n// - chunk size `[1, 64]` → `CHUNK_TOO_LARGE`\n// - 32-byte digest / 32-byte root / 32-byte supersedes → `HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH_MISMATCH`\n// / `SUPERSEDES_TX_INVALID_LENGTH`\n// - 24-byte nonce / 32-byte slots_mac →\n// `NONCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH` / `ENC_SLOTS_MAC_INVALID_LENGTH`\n// - passphrase salt 16..64 bytes → `ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_SHORT` /\n// `ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_LONG`\n//\n// Per-slot recipient lengths (`epk`, `kem_ct`, `wrap`) are NOT enforced here:\n// the required slot shape depends on the envelope-level `kem`, which a slot\n// cannot see in isolation. The KEM-driven slot descriptor in `validator.ts`\n// emits the precise `KEM_EPK_LENGTH_MISMATCH` / `KEM_CT_LENGTH_MISMATCH` /\n// `WRAP_LENGTH_MISMATCH` / `ENC_SLOT_INVALID_SHAPE` codes instead.\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Chunked-bytes / chunked-text arrays\n// =============================================================================\n\n// `[1 bstr .size (1..64)]`. A zero-length chunk (0 < 1) is rejected with the\n// SAME `CHUNK_TOO_LARGE` code as oversized chunks (any length outside\n// `[1, 64]`).\nexport const ChunkedBytesArraySchema = z\n .array(\n z.instanceof(Uint8Array).refine((b) => b.length >= 1 && b.length <= 64, {\n params: { code: 'CHUNK_TOO_LARGE' },\n }),\n )\n .min(1);\nexport type ChunkedBytesArray = z.infer<typeof ChunkedBytesArraySchema>;\n\n// `[1* tstr .size (1..64)]` — chunk byte length is the UTF-8-encoded length\n// (each `tstr` is wire-encoded as UTF-8). The `tstr .size (1..64)` pin is a\n// byte-count constraint, not a code-unit constraint.\nconst UTF8_ENCODER = new TextEncoder();\nexport const UriChunkArraySchema = z\n .array(\n z.string().refine(\n (s) => {\n const n = UTF8_ENCODER.encode(s).length;\n return n >= 1 && n <= 64;\n },\n { params: { code: 'CHUNK_TOO_LARGE' } },\n ),\n )\n .min(1);\nexport type UriChunkArray = z.infer<typeof UriChunkArraySchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Hashes map\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// `hashes` is a non-empty CBOR map keyed by content-hash algorithm identifier\n// (a CBOR text string from the content-hash registry) with the 32-byte digest\n// as value. cbor2 surfaces a text-keyed CBOR map as a plain JS object — z.record\n// admits any string key here. Both the registry-membership check\n// (`UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALG`) and the per-algorithm digest-length check\n// (`HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH_MISMATCH`) live in the validator's domain pass so\n// each violation emits its precise code; the schema only enforces the\n// value is a CBOR byte string.\n\nexport const HashDigestSchema = z.instanceof(Uint8Array);\n\nexport const HashesMapSchema = z.record(z.string(), HashDigestSchema);\nexport type HashesMap = z.infer<typeof HashesMapSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Top-level `merkle[]`\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// Each commit is a closed map `{alg, root, leaf_count, ? uris}`. `alg` is open\n// (registry membership is enforced in the validator's domain pass — unknown\n// identifiers emit `UNSUPPORTED_MERKLE_COMMIT_ALG`).\n\nexport const MerkleCommitSchema = z\n .object({\n alg: z.string(),\n root: z.instanceof(Uint8Array),\n leaf_count: z.number().int().min(1),\n uris: z.array(UriChunkArraySchema).min(1).optional(),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type MerkleCommit = z.infer<typeof MerkleCommitSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Encryption envelope\n// =============================================================================\n\n// Per-slot recipient entry. The slot shape is KEM-driven:\n//\n// - x25519: `{ epk: bstr(32), wrap: bstr(48) }` — `epk` is the\n// ephemeral X25519 public key, `wrap` is the 32-byte CEK + 16-byte\n// ChaCha20-Poly1305 tag.\n// - mlkem768x25519: `{ kem_ct: [ bstr .size (1..64) ], wrap: bstr(48) }` —\n// `kem_ct` is the 1120-byte X-Wing `enc` carried as a chunked byte-string\n// array (the same `bytes-chunk-array` shape `sigs[i].cose_sign1` uses);\n// there is NO per-slot `epk` on the hybrid path.\n//\n// The `kem` identifier is hoisted to envelope scope (a per-slot `kem` would\n// be wire-bloat). The schema is deliberately PERMISSIVE:\n// `epk`, `kem_ct`, and `wrap` are all optional and `.strict()` is NOT applied.\n// Both the per-field length checks (`KEM_EPK_LENGTH_MISMATCH`,\n// `KEM_CT_LENGTH_MISMATCH`, `WRAP_LENGTH_MISMATCH`) and the KEM-driven\n// shape gate (which field MUST/MUST NOT be present for the declared `kem`,\n// emitting `ENC_SLOT_INVALID_SHAPE`) live in the validator's domain pass —\n// the structural schema cannot know the envelope `kem` from a slot in\n// isolation, and we want the precise KEM-aware code rather than a generic\n// schema mismatch. Because `.strict()` is dropped, the domain pass MUST\n// explicitly reject cross-KEM contamination (an x25519 slot carrying\n// `kem_ct`, or a hybrid slot carrying `epk`).\nexport const SlotSchema = z.object({\n epk: z.instanceof(Uint8Array).optional(),\n kem_ct: ChunkedBytesArraySchema.optional(),\n wrap: z.instanceof(Uint8Array).optional(),\n});\nexport type Slot = z.infer<typeof SlotSchema>;\n\n// Argon2id params `{m, t, p}` are a closed map. Each value MUST be a CBOR\n// unsigned integer; the FLOOR check (`m ≥ 65536`,\n// `t ≥ 3`, `p ≥ 1`) emits `ENC_PASSPHRASE_ARGON2_PARAMS_TOO_LOW` in the\n// validator's domain pass — keeping it out of the schema lets us emit the\n// distinct salt-length code when salt itself is malformed too.\nexport const Argon2idParamsSchema = z\n .object({\n m: z.number().int(),\n t: z.number().int(),\n p: z.number().int(),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type Argon2idParams = z.infer<typeof Argon2idParamsSchema>;\n\n// Passphrase block. `alg` is open (registry membership checked in the\n// validator's domain pass → `ENC_PASSPHRASE_ALG_UNSUPPORTED`);\n// `params` is open here (validator narrows on the registered `alg` value and\n// emits `SCHEMA_UNKNOWN_FIELD` for extra keys, `ENC_PASSPHRASE_ARGON2_PARAMS_TOO_LOW`\n// for sub-floor values). `salt` length floor/ceiling are schema-layer\n// refinements with the dedicated `ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_SHORT/TOO_LONG`\n// codes — they belong at the schema layer because a slot cannot otherwise\n// see the salt length.\nexport const PassphraseBlockSchema = z\n .object({\n alg: z.string(),\n salt: z.instanceof(Uint8Array).superRefine((bytes, ctx) => {\n if (bytes.length < 16) {\n ctx.addIssue({\n code: 'custom',\n path: [],\n message: `passphrase.salt length ${bytes.length} < 16`,\n params: { code: 'ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_SHORT' },\n });\n } else if (bytes.length > 64) {\n ctx.addIssue({\n code: 'custom',\n path: [],\n message: `passphrase.salt length ${bytes.length} > 64`,\n params: { code: 'ENC_PASSPHRASE_SALT_TOO_LONG' },\n });\n }\n }),\n params: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type PassphraseBlock = z.infer<typeof PassphraseBlockSchema>;\n\n// Sealed-PoE envelope. The wire format admits any combination of\n// `kem` / `slots` / `slots_mac` / `passphrase` keys (permissive superset);\n// cross-field invariants (slots ⊕ passphrase, slots ↔ slots_mac, slots\n// requires kem, content-hash binding, slots non-empty) are enforced in the\n// validator's domain pass so each violation emits its typed code rather\n// than a generic shape mismatch.\nexport const EncryptionEnvelopeSchema = z\n .object({\n scheme: z.unknown(),\n aead: z.string(),\n kem: z.string().optional(),\n nonce: z.instanceof(Uint8Array),\n slots: z.array(SlotSchema).optional(),\n slots_mac: z\n .instanceof(Uint8Array)\n .refine((b) => b.length === 32, {\n params: { code: 'ENC_SLOTS_MAC_INVALID_LENGTH' },\n })\n .optional(),\n passphrase: PassphraseBlockSchema.optional(),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type EncryptionEnvelope = z.infer<typeof EncryptionEnvelopeSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Item entry\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport const ItemEntrySchema = z\n .object({\n hashes: HashesMapSchema,\n uris: z.array(UriChunkArraySchema).min(1).optional(),\n // Captured as `unknown` so the validator can run the\n // `ENC_REQUIRES_CONTENT_HASH` pre-check ahead of any inner-shape errors\n // and surface the most informative code first.\n enc: z.unknown().optional(),\n })\n .strict();\nexport type ItemEntry = z.infer<typeof ItemEntrySchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Sig entry\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// Closed CBOR map `{cose_sign1, ? cose_key}`. Canonical CBOR map-key sort\n// (RFC 8949 §4.2.1, bytewise lex on encoded keys) places `cose_key`\n// (length-8 tstr, `0x68`) BEFORE `cose_sign1` (length-10 tstr, `0x6a`); the\n// schema property-order is irrelevant — the canonical encoder handles it.\nexport const SigEntrySchema = z\n .object({\n cose_key: ChunkedBytesArraySchema.optional(),\n cose_sign1: ChunkedBytesArraySchema,\n })\n .strict();\nexport type SigEntry = z.infer<typeof SigEntrySchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Supersedence\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport const SupersedesSchema = z.instanceof(Uint8Array).refine((b) => b.length === 32, {\n params: { code: 'SUPERSEDES_TX_INVALID_LENGTH' },\n});\nexport type Supersedes = z.infer<typeof SupersedesSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Top-level record\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// `v == 1` is a literal — a future major (`v: 2`) MUST be rejected with\n// `SCHEMA_INVALID_LITERAL`. `z.literal(1)` preserves the narrow `1` type for\n// the inferred `PoeRecord[\"v\"]` (so consumers can dispatch on it) and emits\n// Zod's `invalid_value` code which the validator's mapper lifts to\n// `SCHEMA_INVALID_LITERAL`.\n//\n// `looseObject` admits extension keys (matching `^x-.+` or `^[a-z]+-.+`); the\n// validator's domain pass rejects unknown keys that match neither pattern with\n// `SCHEMA_UNKNOWN_FIELD`.\nexport const VersionLiteralSchema = z.literal(1);\n\nexport const PoeRecordSchema = z.looseObject({\n v: VersionLiteralSchema,\n items: z.array(ItemEntrySchema).optional(),\n merkle: z.array(MerkleCommitSchema).optional(),\n supersedes: SupersedesSchema.optional(),\n sigs: z.array(SigEntrySchema).optional(),\n crit: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n});\nexport type PoeRecord = z.infer<typeof PoeRecordSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Closed top-level base-key registry\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// Used by the validator's domain pass to distinguish unknown-typo keys from\n// well-formed extension keys (`^x-.+` / `^[a-z]+-.+`).\nexport const TOP_LEVEL_BASE_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n 'v',\n 'items',\n 'merkle',\n 'supersedes',\n 'sigs',\n 'crit',\n]);\n\n// Extension-key namespaces. Anchored at both ends so an\n// embedded newline cannot smuggle a multi-segment key past the check: `.`\n// excludes `\\n` in JS, and the `\\n?$` tail tolerates exactly ONE trailing\n// newline (matching the Python validator's `re.fullmatch(r'^(x-.+\|[a-z]+-.+)$')`\n// semantics, where `$` likewise admits a single trailing `\\n`). So `x-note\\n`\n// is an extension key, but `x-a\\nb`, `x-note\\n\\n`, and `x-\\n` are not.\nexport const EXTENSION_KEY_VENDOR_RE = /^x-.+\\n?$/;\nexport const EXTENSION_KEY_COMPANION_RE = /^[a-z]+-.+\\n?$/;\n\nexport function isExtensionKey(k: string): boolean {\n return EXTENSION_KEY_VENDOR_RE.test(k) \|\| EXTENSION_KEY_COMPANION_RE.test(k);\n}\n"]}

package/dist/validator.cjs CHANGED Viewed

@@ -1627,7 +1627,7 @@ function decodeCanonicalCbor(bytes) {
       ...r,
       rejectStreaming: true,
       rejectDuplicateKeys: true,
-      // A CIP-309 record carries integers, byte/text strings, arrays, maps and
+      // A Label 309 record carries integers, byte/text strings, arrays, maps and
       // `null` — and nothing else. Without these rejections the major-type-7
       // surface leaks into the decoder: a float16/32/64 that happens to hold an
       // integral value (e.g. 1.0) silently decodes to the integer 1 and passes
@@ -2078,7 +2078,7 @@ function decodeCanonicalCbor2(bytes) {
       ...r,
       rejectStreaming: true,
       rejectDuplicateKeys: true,
-      // A CIP-309 record carries integers, byte/text strings, arrays, maps and
+      // A Label 309 record carries integers, byte/text strings, arrays, maps and
       // `null` — and nothing else. Without these rejections the major-type-7
       // surface leaks into the decoder: a float16/32/64 that happens to hold an
       // integral value (e.g. 1.0) silently decodes to the integer 1 and passes
@@ -2622,7 +2622,7 @@ function validateOneUri(chunks, path, errors) {
     const cid = slashIdx === -1 ? rest : rest.slice(0, slashIdx);
     if (!validateCidProfile(cid)) {
       errors.push(
-        issue("INVALID_URI", path, "ipfs:// URI is not a valid CID under the CIP-309 profile")
+        issue("INVALID_URI", path, "ipfs:// URI is not a valid CID under the Label 309 profile")
       );
     }
     return;
@@ -2670,7 +2670,7 @@ function checkItemEnc(item, idx, errors) {
       issue(
         "UNAUTHENTICATED_CIPHER_FORBIDDEN",
         [...basePath, "aead"],
-        `'${enc.aead}' is an unauthenticated cipher; CIP-309 mandates an authenticated (AEAD) cipher`
+        `'${enc.aead}' is an unauthenticated cipher; Label 309 mandates an authenticated (AEAD) cipher`
       )
     );
     return;