@capybara-hq/device 0.1.0-rc.14 → 0.1.0-rc.16
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +101 -157
- package/dist/api.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/args.d.ts +2 -8
- package/dist/args.js +2 -25
- package/dist/cli.d.ts +2 -11
- package/dist/cli.js +6 -61
- package/dist/client.d.ts +8 -45
- package/dist/client.js +25 -424
- package/dist/command-log.d.ts +14 -4
- package/dist/command-log.js +37 -1
- package/dist/commands/ceiling.d.ts +0 -2
- package/dist/commands/ceiling.js +3 -4
- package/dist/commands/login.d.ts +25 -1
- package/dist/commands/login.js +75 -61
- package/dist/commands/policy.d.ts +6 -8
- package/dist/commands/policy.js +30 -49
- package/dist/commands/start.d.ts +2 -17
- package/dist/commands/start.js +13 -53
- package/dist/exec/docker-operations.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/exec/docker-operations.js +4 -2
- package/dist/exec/docker.d.ts +37 -122
- package/dist/exec/docker.js +72 -717
- package/dist/exec/instance-binding.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/exec/linux-agent.js +30 -0
- package/dist/exec/linux-operation-backend.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/exec/linux-operation-backend.js +3 -1
- package/dist/exec/linux-operation-worker.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/exec/linux-operation-worker.js +11 -2
- package/dist/exec/mac-read-policy.d.ts +58 -0
- package/dist/exec/mac-read-policy.js +104 -0
- package/dist/exec/mac-self-check.d.ts +6 -3
- package/dist/exec/mac-self-check.js +28 -5
- package/dist/exec/operation-worker.d.ts +21 -2
- package/dist/exec/operation-worker.js +164 -43
- package/dist/exec/sandbox-check.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/exec/sandbox-check.js +18 -0
- package/dist/exec/sandbox-messages.d.ts +3 -11
- package/dist/exec/sandbox-messages.js +3 -18
- package/dist/exec/shared.d.ts +24 -47
- package/dist/exec/shared.js +53 -165
- package/dist/exec/types.d.ts +2 -66
- package/dist/exec/types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/node_modules/@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime/CAPYBARA-MODIFICATIONS.patch +71 -12
- package/dist/node_modules/@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime/dist/sandbox/macos-sandbox-utils.js +18 -4
- package/dist/node_modules/@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime/dist/sandbox/sandbox-config.js +6 -0
- package/dist/node_modules/@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime/dist/sandbox/sandbox-manager.js +4 -0
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/agent-docs/concepts.md +9 -4
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/agent-docs/extension-points/channel.md +1 -1
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/agent-docs/extension-points/file-preview.md +2 -0
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/agent-docs/extension-points/sandbox.md +1 -1
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/agent-docs/plugin-format.md +1 -1
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/cards.d.ts +11 -0
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/cards.js +1 -1
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/channel.d.ts +37 -0
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/ctx.d.ts +47 -3
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/device-denied-paths.d.ts +14 -0
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/device-denied-paths.js +41 -0
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/device-protocol.d.ts +140 -20
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/device-protocol.js +419 -14
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/file-preview.d.ts +22 -5
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/hooks.d.ts +77 -13
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/http-access.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/index.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/index.js +2 -3
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/model.d.ts +89 -5
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/model.js +103 -0
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/permissions.d.ts +3 -2
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/permissions.js +2 -2
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/sandbox-operation.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/ui-parts.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/ui-parts.js +11 -0
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/ui.d.ts +25 -6
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/package.json +1 -1
- package/dist/owner-report.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/owner-report.js +2 -2
- package/dist/policy-store.d.ts +6 -10
- package/dist/policy-store.js +9 -23
- package/dist/policy.d.ts +3 -32
- package/dist/policy.js +4 -74
- package/dist/runtime-manifest.json +1 -1
- package/dist/server-ops.d.ts +18 -46
- package/dist/server-ops.js +134 -269
- package/dist/staged-connect.js +44 -7
- package/dist/staged-device.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/staged-device.js +3 -0
- package/dist/staged-session.d.ts +5 -5
- package/dist/staged-session.js +4 -4
- package/dist/state.js +3 -2
- package/package.json +2 -2
- package/dist/commands/mode.d.ts +0 -69
- package/dist/commands/mode.js +0 -133
- package/dist/exec/fs-helper.d.ts +0 -21
- package/dist/exec/fs-helper.js +0 -171
- package/dist/exec/host.d.ts +0 -61
- package/dist/exec/host.js +0 -203
- package/dist/exec/listing.d.ts +0 -35
- package/dist/exec/listing.js +0 -157
- package/dist/exec/os.d.ts +0 -162
- package/dist/exec/os.js +0 -616
- package/dist/exec/procs.d.ts +0 -11
- package/dist/exec/procs.js +0 -67
- package/dist/exec/reap.d.ts +0 -41
- package/dist/exec/reap.js +0 -89
- package/dist/exec/switch.d.ts +0 -107
- package/dist/exec/switch.js +0 -204
- package/dist/network.d.ts +0 -45
- package/dist/network.js +0 -154
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/device-protocol-v3.d.ts +0 -117
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/device-protocol-v3.js +0 -409
package/dist/commands/login.d.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -1,6 +1,30 @@
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1
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import { type FetchFn } from "../api.js";
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import type { Command } from "../args.js";
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-
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+
/**
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* Shown once at login when the owner ceiling allows Full access in an organization that allows
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* it: the trust model of Full access is command review, not the OS sandbox.
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*/
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export declare const FULL_ACCESS_RISK_TEXT: string;
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/** The OS sandbox check `login` uses (default: the runtime's, loaded on demand). */
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export type SandboxCheck = () => {
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ok: true;
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} | {
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ok: false;
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reason: string;
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};
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/** How the owner widens the ceiling, on this machine only (the deployment may only narrow it). */
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export declare const WIDEN_CEILING_HINT: string;
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/**
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* The line `login` prints for a restricted owner ceiling (the default of a new setup, B-14): no
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* Full access, restricted work in the device's workspace only.
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*/
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export declare const RESTRICTED_CEILING_LOGIN_LINE: string;
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/** The line `login` prints when the owner ceiling allows Full access. */
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export declare const FULL_CEILING_LOGIN_LINE: string;
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/** Added when the organization does not allow Full access while the owner ceiling does. */
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export declare const FULL_ACCESS_NOT_ALLOWED_LOGIN_LINE = "This organization does not allow Full access, so agents use the restricted profiles here.";
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/** The line `login` prints when restricted work cannot run here (no OS sandbox). */
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export declare function restrictedUnavailableLoginLine(reason: string): string;
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export interface LoginDeps {
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stateDir: string;
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home: string;
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package/dist/commands/login.js
CHANGED
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@@ -3,11 +3,47 @@ import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
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import { hostname } from "node:os";
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import { isAbsolute, resolve } from "node:path";
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import { ApiError, authorize, programVersion, token } from "../api.js";
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import { SANDBOX_INSTALL_HINT } from "../exec/sandbox-messages.js";
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import { prepareDeviceDir } from "../exec/shared.js";
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import { resetOwnerReport } from "../owner-report.js";
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import { hasLoginService } from "../service/installed.js";
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import { DEFAULT_MAX_FRAME_BYTES, DEFAULT_POLICY, defaultWorkDir,
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import { DEFAULT_MAX_FRAME_BYTES, DEFAULT_POLICY, defaultWorkDir, policyPath, readCredential, readPolicy, withPolicyLock, writeCredential, writePolicy, } from "../state.js";
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/**
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* Shown once at login when the owner ceiling allows Full access in an organization that allows
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* it: the trust model of Full access is command review, not the OS sandbox.
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*/
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export const FULL_ACCESS_RISK_TEXT = "With Full access, agent commands run on this computer as you: they can read and write all " +
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"your files, use your credentials (SSH keys, cloud accounts, keychain), Docker and any network, " +
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"and the deployment reviews every command before it runs. Prompt injection can make an agent " +
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"try to delete files or send your credentials away; the review blocks or asks about the " +
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"dangerous ones. Such commands can also read this program's own credential: if you suspect " +
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"misuse, run capybara-device logout and log in again.";
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async function checkSandbox(check) {
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if (check !== undefined)
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return check();
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const { sandboxAvailability } = await import("../exec/sandbox-check.js");
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return sandboxAvailability();
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}
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/** How the owner widens the ceiling, on this machine only (the deployment may only narrow it). */
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export const WIDEN_CEILING_HINT = "Only you can widen it, on this machine: `capybara-device ceiling set --full-access allow " +
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"--project-reach os-user` (see `capybara-device ceiling show`).";
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/**
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* The line `login` prints for a restricted owner ceiling (the default of a new setup, B-14): no
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* Full access, restricted work in the device's workspace only.
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*/
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export const RESTRICTED_CEILING_LOGIN_LINE = "This machine's owner ceiling allows restricted work only: Full access is off, and restricted " +
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`work reaches the device's workspace. ${WIDEN_CEILING_HINT}`;
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/** The line `login` prints when the owner ceiling allows Full access. */
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export const FULL_CEILING_LOGIN_LINE = "This machine's owner ceiling allows Full access: a conversation set to Full access runs agent " +
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"commands as you. Narrow it with `capybara-device ceiling set --full-access deny " +
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"--project-reach workspace`.";
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/** Added when the organization does not allow Full access while the owner ceiling does. */
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export const FULL_ACCESS_NOT_ALLOWED_LOGIN_LINE = "This organization does not allow Full access, so agents use the restricted profiles here.";
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/** The line `login` prints when restricted work cannot run here (no OS sandbox). */
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export function restrictedUnavailableLoginLine(reason) {
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return (`The OS sandbox is unavailable on this machine (${reason}), so restricted work cannot run ` +
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`here yet: ${SANDBOX_INSTALL_HINT}; or log in again with --mode docker. ${WIDEN_CEILING_HINT}`);
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}
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const SLOW_DOWN_STEP_SECONDS = 5;
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function defaultOpen(platform) {
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return (url) => {
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@@ -23,20 +59,19 @@ function defaultOpen(platform) {
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};
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}
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/**
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-
* A
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*
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*
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*
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* changed here. Returns whether this call created the file.
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* A new setup writes the default policy (B-14): a restricted owner ceiling, no Full access and the
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* workspace as the restricted reach. Written under the policy lock, and only while no policy file
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* exists: an existing policy is the owner's choice and is never changed here (an old format still
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* converts exactly at start). Returns whether this call created the file.
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*/
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function
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function persistDefaultPolicy(stateDir) {
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const file = policyPath(stateDir);
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if (existsSync(file))
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return false;
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return withPolicyLock(stateDir, () => {
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if (existsSync(file))
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return false;
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writePolicy(stateDir, { ...DEFAULT_POLICY, ownerCeiling:
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writePolicy(stateDir, { ...DEFAULT_POLICY, ownerCeiling: { ...DEFAULT_POLICY.ownerCeiling } });
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return true;
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});
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}
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@@ -108,41 +143,27 @@ export async function login(cmd, deps) {
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: resolve(cmd.dir);
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// Recreates a lost directory, marker or root: the device starts afresh.
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prepareDeviceDir(dir);
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//
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//
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-
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// at every command if the organization forbids it and the owner keeps auto.
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let mode = "auto";
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/** Why no sandbox policy was written: the OS sandbox cannot run here (OS mode only). */
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let noSandbox;
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if (granted.autoMode === "off") {
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try {
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// A sandbox policy on a machine without the OS sandbox could not run a command either:
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// it is not written, and the line says what to install (Docker needs no OS sandbox).
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if (cmd.mode !== "docker" && !existsSync(policyPath(deps.stateDir))) {
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const available = await checkSandbox(deps.sandboxAvailable);
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if (!available.ok)
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noSandbox = available.reason;
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}
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if (noSandbox === undefined) {
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mode = persistSandboxPolicy(deps.stateDir)
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? "sandbox"
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: policyMode(readPolicy(deps.stateDir));
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}
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}
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catch (e) {
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err(`Cannot set the local policy in ${deps.stateDir}: ${e.message}`);
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}
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// A new setup gets the restricted default written before the credential makes the login
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// final; the printed lines follow the policy this machine actually has.
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let ceiling = { ...DEFAULT_POLICY.ownerCeiling };
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try {
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persistDefaultPolicy(deps.stateDir);
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}
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-
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catch (e) {
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err(`Cannot set the local policy in ${deps.stateDir}: ${e.message}`);
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}
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try {
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ceiling = readPolicy(deps.stateDir).ownerCeiling;
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}
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catch (e) {
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err(`Cannot read the local policy in ${deps.stateDir}: ${e.message}`);
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}
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/** Why restricted work cannot run here: the OS sandbox is missing (OS mode only). */
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let noSandbox;
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if (cmd.mode !== "docker") {
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const available = await checkSandbox(deps.sandboxAvailable);
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if (!available.ok)
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noSandbox = available.reason;
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}
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// a new credential is a new machine at the deployment: its owner reports start a new
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// sequence (also repairs a lost or corrupt sidecar)
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@@ -169,27 +190,20 @@ export async function login(cmd, deps) {
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maxFrameBytes: granted.maxFrameBytes ?? DEFAULT_MAX_FRAME_BYTES,
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});
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out(`Logged in. Device ${granted.deviceId}, working directory ${dir}`);
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-
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else if (noSandbox !== undefined) {
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out(sandboxUnavailableLoginLine(noSandbox));
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}
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else if (granted.autoMode === "off") {
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out(mode === "sandbox" ? SANDBOX_MODE_LOGIN_LINE : AUTO_POLICY_REFUSED_LOGIN_LINE);
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}
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else if (mode === "sandbox") {
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out(SANDBOX_POLICY_LOGIN_LINE);
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if (ceiling.fullAccess) {
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out(FULL_CEILING_LOGIN_LINE);
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if (granted.fullAccess === "off")
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out(FULL_ACCESS_NOT_ALLOWED_LOGIN_LINE);
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// the risk text is shown once at login, and only when Full access runs as the owner on
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// this machine (outside Docker)
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else if (cmd.mode !== "docker")
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out(FULL_ACCESS_RISK_TEXT);
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201
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}
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else {
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out(
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-
out(AUTO_MODE_RISK_TEXT);
|
|
203
|
+
out(RESTRICTED_CEILING_LOGIN_LINE);
|
|
192
204
|
}
|
|
205
|
+
if (noSandbox !== undefined)
|
|
206
|
+
out(restrictedUnavailableLoginLine(noSandbox));
|
|
193
207
|
// An installed service stays stopped after a deliberate exit (not logged in, logged out):
|
|
194
208
|
// it needs starting again, not a second program.
|
|
195
209
|
out(hasLoginService(deps.home, platform)
|
|
@@ -7,17 +7,15 @@ export interface PolicyDeps {
|
|
|
7
7
|
}
|
|
8
8
|
/** What OS mode does not enforce yet, shown with `show` and with a limits change. */
|
|
9
9
|
export declare const NOT_ENFORCED_NOTE: string;
|
|
10
|
-
/**
|
|
11
|
-
export declare
|
|
12
|
-
/** What `policy show` says the mode gives on this machine (English, one line each). */
|
|
13
|
-
export declare function describeMode(policy: Policy, runMode?: "os" | "docker"): string[];
|
|
10
|
+
/** What `policy show` says the owner ceiling gives on this machine (English, one line each). */
|
|
11
|
+
export declare function describeCeiling(policy: Policy, runMode?: "os" | "docker"): string[];
|
|
14
12
|
/**
|
|
15
13
|
* `policy show` prints the local policy and what its mode gives on this machine;
|
|
16
14
|
* `policy set <key> <value>` replaces one field; `policy add|remove <key> <value>` adds or removes
|
|
17
|
-
* entries of a list field. The
|
|
18
|
-
* this file; the deployment changes it only through the `policy` op
|
|
19
|
-
*
|
|
20
|
-
*
|
|
15
|
+
* entries of a list field. The owner ceiling is set with `capybara-device ceiling set`. The
|
|
16
|
+
* machine's user edits this file; the deployment changes it only through the `policy` op
|
|
17
|
+
* (narrowing only). Writes take policy.json.lock, and a running program applies the change at its
|
|
18
|
+
* next operation.
|
|
21
19
|
*/
|
|
22
20
|
export declare function policyCommand(cmd: Extract<Command, {
|
|
23
21
|
command: "policy";
|
package/dist/commands/policy.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,15 +1,14 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { validateAllowHost } from "@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk";
|
|
2
|
+
import { noteCliPolicyChange } from "../command-log.js";
|
|
2
3
|
import { PolicyStore } from "../policy-store.js";
|
|
3
|
-
import {
|
|
4
|
+
import { policyPath, readCredential } from "../state.js";
|
|
4
5
|
/** The fields `show` prints and `set` may replace. */
|
|
5
|
-
const KEYS = ["allowedDomains", "allowCredentials", "cpu", "memoryMb"
|
|
6
|
+
const KEYS = ["allowedDomains", "allowCredentials", "cpu", "memoryMb"];
|
|
6
7
|
/** What OS mode does not enforce yet, shown with `show` and with a limits change. */
|
|
7
|
-
export const NOT_ENFORCED_NOTE = "Note: in OS mode cpu and memoryMb are not enforced yet; allowCredentials is ignored (
|
|
8
|
-
"
|
|
9
|
-
/**
|
|
10
|
-
|
|
11
|
-
"access (auto: the default bridge; sandbox: no network). Allowed domains apply in OS mode's " +
|
|
12
|
-
"sandbox only.";
|
|
8
|
+
export const NOT_ENFORCED_NOTE = "Note: in OS mode cpu and memoryMb are not enforced yet; allowCredentials is ignored (Full " +
|
|
9
|
+
"access already has the owner's credentials, restricted work gets none).";
|
|
10
|
+
/** Where the owner ceiling is changed (the policy command never changes it). */
|
|
11
|
+
const CEILING_COMMAND = "capybara-device ceiling set --full-access allow|deny --project-reach workspace|os-user";
|
|
13
12
|
function list(value) {
|
|
14
13
|
return value
|
|
15
14
|
.split(",")
|
|
@@ -67,40 +66,27 @@ function edit(current, action, key, values, out) {
|
|
|
67
66
|
out(has(current, v) ? `Removed ${v} from ${key}.` : `${v} is not in ${key}.`);
|
|
68
67
|
return current.filter((x) => !has(values, x));
|
|
69
68
|
}
|
|
70
|
-
/** What `policy show` says the
|
|
71
|
-
export function
|
|
72
|
-
|
|
73
|
-
|
|
74
|
-
return [
|
|
75
|
-
"Mode: auto. Commands run in the device's container on its default bridge, and the " +
|
|
76
|
-
"platform's file tools reach any path in the container; the deployment reviews every " +
|
|
77
|
-
"command and blocks or asks about dangerous ones.",
|
|
78
|
-
];
|
|
79
|
-
}
|
|
80
|
-
return [
|
|
81
|
-
"Mode: auto. Commands run as you on this machine, with their files, credentials and " +
|
|
82
|
-
"network; the deployment reviews every command and blocks or asks about dangerous ones.",
|
|
83
|
-
"Allowed domains apply in sandbox mode only (capybara-device mode sandbox).",
|
|
84
|
-
];
|
|
85
|
-
}
|
|
86
|
-
if (runMode === "docker") {
|
|
87
|
-
return [
|
|
88
|
-
"Mode: sandbox. Commands run in the device's container with no network; only the " +
|
|
89
|
-
"workspace, skills and temporary files are writable.",
|
|
90
|
-
];
|
|
91
|
-
}
|
|
69
|
+
/** What `policy show` says the owner ceiling gives on this machine (English, one line each). */
|
|
70
|
+
export function describeCeiling(policy, runMode = "os") {
|
|
71
|
+
const { fullAccess, restrictedProjectReach } = policy.ownerCeiling;
|
|
72
|
+
const where = runMode === "docker" ? "in the device's container" : "as you on this machine";
|
|
92
73
|
return [
|
|
93
|
-
|
|
94
|
-
|
|
74
|
+
fullAccess
|
|
75
|
+
? `Owner ceiling: Full access allowed: a conversation set to Full access runs commands ${where}.`
|
|
76
|
+
: "Owner ceiling: Full access denied: conversations here use the restricted profiles only.",
|
|
77
|
+
restrictedProjectReach === "os-user"
|
|
78
|
+
? "Restricted work and project browsing may read projects outside the device's workspace."
|
|
79
|
+
: "Restricted work and project browsing stay in the device's workspace.",
|
|
80
|
+
`Change the owner ceiling with: ${CEILING_COMMAND}`,
|
|
95
81
|
];
|
|
96
82
|
}
|
|
97
83
|
/**
|
|
98
84
|
* `policy show` prints the local policy and what its mode gives on this machine;
|
|
99
85
|
* `policy set <key> <value>` replaces one field; `policy add|remove <key> <value>` adds or removes
|
|
100
|
-
* entries of a list field. The
|
|
101
|
-
* this file; the deployment changes it only through the `policy` op
|
|
102
|
-
*
|
|
103
|
-
*
|
|
86
|
+
* entries of a list field. The owner ceiling is set with `capybara-device ceiling set`. The
|
|
87
|
+
* machine's user edits this file; the deployment changes it only through the `policy` op
|
|
88
|
+
* (narrowing only). Writes take policy.json.lock, and a running program applies the change at its
|
|
89
|
+
* next operation.
|
|
104
90
|
*/
|
|
105
91
|
export async function policyCommand(cmd, deps) {
|
|
106
92
|
const { stateDir, out, err } = deps;
|
|
@@ -116,10 +102,8 @@ export async function policyCommand(cmd, deps) {
|
|
|
116
102
|
if (cmd.action === "show") {
|
|
117
103
|
const policy = store.current();
|
|
118
104
|
out(JSON.stringify(policy, null, 2));
|
|
119
|
-
for (const l of
|
|
105
|
+
for (const l of describeCeiling(policy, docker ? "docker" : "os"))
|
|
120
106
|
out(l);
|
|
121
|
-
if (docker)
|
|
122
|
-
out(DOCKER_DOMAIN_NOTE);
|
|
123
107
|
out(NOT_ENFORCED_NOTE);
|
|
124
108
|
return 0;
|
|
125
109
|
}
|
|
@@ -146,13 +130,13 @@ export async function policyCommand(cmd, deps) {
|
|
|
146
130
|
break;
|
|
147
131
|
}
|
|
148
132
|
case "mode":
|
|
149
|
-
throw new Error(
|
|
133
|
+
throw new Error(`the mode is gone: set the owner ceiling with ${CEILING_COMMAND}`);
|
|
150
134
|
case "network":
|
|
151
135
|
case "tier":
|
|
152
136
|
case "isolation":
|
|
153
137
|
case "localhost":
|
|
154
138
|
case "remoteGrants":
|
|
155
|
-
throw new Error(`"${key}" is gone: the
|
|
139
|
+
throw new Error(`"${key}" is gone: set the owner ceiling with ${CEILING_COMMAND}; ` +
|
|
156
140
|
`allowedDomains with capybara-device policy add allowedDomains <host>`);
|
|
157
141
|
default:
|
|
158
142
|
throw new Error(`unknown policy key "${key}"; one of ${KEYS.join(", ")}`);
|
|
@@ -179,23 +163,20 @@ export async function policyCommand(cmd, deps) {
|
|
|
179
163
|
return 2;
|
|
180
164
|
}
|
|
181
165
|
const lines = [];
|
|
182
|
-
let next;
|
|
183
166
|
try {
|
|
184
|
-
|
|
167
|
+
store.update((p) => change(p, (l) => lines.push(l)));
|
|
185
168
|
}
|
|
186
169
|
catch (e) {
|
|
187
170
|
err(`Cannot change ${policyPath(stateDir)}: ${e.message}`);
|
|
188
171
|
return 1;
|
|
189
172
|
}
|
|
173
|
+
// the audit line names the key and the values given, never more (no secret is a policy value)
|
|
174
|
+
noteCliPolicyChange(stateDir, `policy ${action} ${key} ${list(value).join(", ")}`);
|
|
190
175
|
for (const l of lines)
|
|
191
176
|
out(l);
|
|
192
|
-
out(`Saved ${policyPath(stateDir)}. A running capybara-device applies it at the next
|
|
177
|
+
out(`Saved ${policyPath(stateDir)}. A running capybara-device applies it at the next operation.`);
|
|
193
178
|
if (key === "allowedDomains") {
|
|
194
|
-
out(
|
|
195
|
-
? DOCKER_DOMAIN_NOTE
|
|
196
|
-
: policyMode(next) === "auto"
|
|
197
|
-
? "Allowed domains apply in sandbox mode only; switch with: capybara-device mode sandbox"
|
|
198
|
-
: "Sandboxed commands may reach these domains when the organization allows them too.");
|
|
179
|
+
out("Restricted work may reach these domains when the organization allows them too.");
|
|
199
180
|
}
|
|
200
181
|
if (key === "cpu" || key === "memoryMb" || key === "allowCredentials")
|
|
201
182
|
out(NOT_ENFORCED_NOTE);
|
package/dist/commands/start.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { connect } from "../client.js";
|
|
2
|
-
import type { Executor } from "../exec/types.js";
|
|
3
1
|
import { type ProcessLookup } from "../pid.js";
|
|
4
2
|
import { PolicyStore } from "../policy-store.js";
|
|
5
3
|
import { connectStaged } from "../staged-connect.js";
|
|
@@ -7,11 +5,6 @@ import type { StagedDevice } from "../staged-device.js";
|
|
|
7
5
|
import { type Credential } from "../state.js";
|
|
8
6
|
export interface StartDeps {
|
|
9
7
|
stateDir: string;
|
|
10
|
-
/**
|
|
11
|
-
* Builds the executor for the credential's mode (the OS and Docker executors). The store
|
|
12
|
-
* follows policy.json, so executors read the policy at each command.
|
|
13
|
-
*/
|
|
14
|
-
createExecutor?: (cred: Credential, policy: PolicyStore) => Promise<Executor> | Executor;
|
|
15
8
|
out: (line: string) => void;
|
|
16
9
|
err: (line: string) => void;
|
|
17
10
|
/** Where the login service would be installed, and on which platform (default: this machine). */
|
|
@@ -25,20 +18,12 @@ export interface StartDeps {
|
|
|
25
18
|
ps?: ProcessLookup;
|
|
26
19
|
/** The environment (default: process.env): tells whether the service manager started this. */
|
|
27
20
|
env?: Record<string, string | undefined>;
|
|
28
|
-
connect?: typeof connect;
|
|
29
21
|
/**
|
|
30
|
-
* Builds the
|
|
31
|
-
*
|
|
32
|
-
* only when the protocol is the staged one.
|
|
22
|
+
* Builds the program's parts for the credential: the binder, one operation backend per bound
|
|
23
|
+
* generation, the per-credential session states and the owner policy.
|
|
33
24
|
*/
|
|
34
25
|
createStaged?: (cred: Credential, policy: PolicyStore) => Promise<StagedDevice> | StagedDevice;
|
|
35
26
|
connectStaged?: typeof connectStaged;
|
|
36
|
-
/**
|
|
37
|
-
* Test seam: the device protocol this program speaks (default: the SDK's
|
|
38
|
-
* `DEVICE_PROTOCOL_VERSION`). Production never sets it: the staged path is selected only by
|
|
39
|
-
* that constant.
|
|
40
|
-
*/
|
|
41
|
-
protocol?: number;
|
|
42
27
|
}
|
|
43
28
|
/** Printed once when start converted an old-format policy.json to version 2. */
|
|
44
29
|
export declare function legacyPolicyNotice(mode: "auto" | "sandbox"): string;
|
package/dist/commands/start.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,8 +1,4 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { homedir } from "node:os";
|
|
2
|
-
import { DEVICE_PROTOCOL_VERSION, STAGED_DEVICE_PROTOCOL_VERSION } from "@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk";
|
|
3
|
-
import { connect } from "../client.js";
|
|
4
|
-
import { CommandLog } from "../command-log.js";
|
|
5
|
-
import { sandboxUnavailableMessage } from "../exec/sandbox-messages.js";
|
|
6
2
|
import { readRunningPid, removePid, writePid } from "../pid.js";
|
|
7
3
|
import { PolicyStore } from "../policy-store.js";
|
|
8
4
|
import { hasLoginService } from "../service/installed.js";
|
|
@@ -35,9 +31,7 @@ export async function start(deps) {
|
|
|
35
31
|
err("Not logged in. Run capybara-device login --url <url> first.");
|
|
36
32
|
return 0;
|
|
37
33
|
}
|
|
38
|
-
|
|
39
|
-
const staged = (deps.protocol ?? DEVICE_PROTOCOL_VERSION) === STAGED_DEVICE_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
|
40
|
-
if (staged ? deps.createStaged === undefined : deps.createExecutor === undefined) {
|
|
34
|
+
if (deps.createStaged === undefined) {
|
|
41
35
|
err("capybara-device start: no execution backend is available in this build");
|
|
42
36
|
return 1;
|
|
43
37
|
}
|
|
@@ -57,7 +51,7 @@ export async function start(deps) {
|
|
|
57
51
|
err(`capybara-device is already running (pid ${running}). Stop it first: capybara-device stop`);
|
|
58
52
|
return 1;
|
|
59
53
|
}
|
|
60
|
-
// Signals arriving while the
|
|
54
|
+
// Signals arriving while the program is still being prepared are applied once connected.
|
|
61
55
|
let conn;
|
|
62
56
|
let stopRequested = false;
|
|
63
57
|
let drainRequested = false;
|
|
@@ -75,47 +69,13 @@ export async function start(deps) {
|
|
|
75
69
|
proc.on("SIGUSR2", onDrain);
|
|
76
70
|
writePid(stateDir, proc.pid, PROGRAM_VERSION);
|
|
77
71
|
try {
|
|
78
|
-
|
|
79
|
-
|
|
80
|
-
|
|
81
|
-
|
|
82
|
-
|
|
83
|
-
|
|
84
|
-
},
|
|
85
|
-
});
|
|
86
|
-
let executor;
|
|
87
|
-
let policy;
|
|
88
|
-
try {
|
|
89
|
-
// An invalid policy.json stops the start; later, a broken edit keeps the last good policy.
|
|
90
|
-
// The one-time explicit conversion to the version 2 format (locked, atomic, exact).
|
|
91
|
-
const converted = convertPolicyFile(stateDir) === "converted";
|
|
92
|
-
policy = new PolicyStore(stateDir, { err });
|
|
93
|
-
if (converted)
|
|
94
|
-
out(legacyPolicyNotice(policyMode(policy.current())));
|
|
95
|
-
executor = await deps.createExecutor(cred, policy);
|
|
96
|
-
// Without the OS sandbox the device keeps serving: auto mode works, and sandbox mode
|
|
97
|
-
// refuses every command with this reason. A policy set to sandbox says so at start.
|
|
98
|
-
const sandbox = executor;
|
|
99
|
-
if (sandbox.available === false && policyMode(policy.current()) === "sandbox") {
|
|
100
|
-
err(sandboxUnavailableMessage(sandbox.unavailableReason ?? ""));
|
|
101
|
-
}
|
|
102
|
-
}
|
|
103
|
-
catch (e) {
|
|
104
|
-
err(`Cannot start: ${e.message}`);
|
|
105
|
-
return 1;
|
|
106
|
-
}
|
|
107
|
-
if (stopRequested)
|
|
108
|
-
return 0;
|
|
109
|
-
// One store: the executor's commands, the hello summary and the policy op see the same policy.
|
|
110
|
-
conn = (deps.connect ?? connect)(cred, executor, {
|
|
111
|
-
log: new CommandLog(stateDir),
|
|
112
|
-
err,
|
|
113
|
-
policy,
|
|
72
|
+
return await serveStaged(deps, cred, {
|
|
73
|
+
stopRequested: () => stopRequested,
|
|
74
|
+
drainRequested: () => drainRequested,
|
|
75
|
+
connected: (c) => {
|
|
76
|
+
conn = c;
|
|
77
|
+
},
|
|
114
78
|
});
|
|
115
|
-
if (drainRequested)
|
|
116
|
-
conn.drain();
|
|
117
|
-
out(`capybara-device: serving device ${cred.deviceId} (${cred.mode} mode)`);
|
|
118
|
-
return await conn.done;
|
|
119
79
|
}
|
|
120
80
|
finally {
|
|
121
81
|
proc.off("SIGTERM", onStop);
|
|
@@ -125,16 +85,16 @@ export async function start(deps) {
|
|
|
125
85
|
}
|
|
126
86
|
}
|
|
127
87
|
/**
|
|
128
|
-
* The
|
|
129
|
-
*
|
|
130
|
-
*
|
|
88
|
+
* The start proper (device protocol 3): the policy store, the program's parts (binder,
|
|
89
|
+
* per-generation backends, per-credential session state), recovery of a persisted binding, then
|
|
90
|
+
* {@link connectStaged}.
|
|
131
91
|
*/
|
|
132
92
|
async function serveStaged(deps, cred, signals) {
|
|
133
93
|
const { stateDir, out, err } = deps;
|
|
134
94
|
let device;
|
|
135
95
|
try {
|
|
136
96
|
const converted = convertPolicyFile(stateDir) === "converted";
|
|
137
|
-
const policy = new PolicyStore(stateDir
|
|
97
|
+
const policy = new PolicyStore(stateDir);
|
|
138
98
|
if (converted)
|
|
139
99
|
out(legacyPolicyNotice(policyMode(policy.current())));
|
|
140
100
|
device = await deps.createStaged(cred, policy);
|
|
@@ -152,7 +112,7 @@ async function serveStaged(deps, cred, signals) {
|
|
|
152
112
|
err(`The instance binding was not recovered: ${e.message}`);
|
|
153
113
|
}
|
|
154
114
|
if (signals.stopRequested()) {
|
|
155
|
-
// stopped before it connected: release what construction acquired
|
|
115
|
+
// stopped before it connected: release what construction acquired
|
|
156
116
|
await device.dispose().catch((e) => err(`Cleanup failed: ${e.message}`));
|
|
157
117
|
return 0;
|
|
158
118
|
}
|
|
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { type LinuxBackendDependencies, type LocalOperationBackend } from "./lin
|
|
|
3
3
|
import { type LinuxAgentTransport } from "./linux-runtime.js";
|
|
4
4
|
import { type MacOperationBackendOptions } from "./mac-operation-backend.js";
|
|
5
5
|
import { type DeviceOwnerCeiling } from "./operation-types.js";
|
|
6
|
-
/** What the
|
|
6
|
+
/** What the device container lends one operation: its running container, held until release. */
|
|
7
7
|
export interface OperationContainerHost {
|
|
8
8
|
operationContainer(signal: AbortSignal): Promise<{
|
|
9
9
|
name: string;
|
|
@@ -41,4 +41,4 @@ export interface DockerOperationBackendOptions extends Omit<MacOperationBackendO
|
|
|
41
41
|
* the container's paths. Background artifacts are written by the trusted supervisor to the host
|
|
42
42
|
* directories behind the bind mounts; skill preparation writes the host skills directory.
|
|
43
43
|
*/
|
|
44
|
-
export declare function createDockerOperationBackend(options: DockerOperationBackendOptions, dependencies?: Omit<LinuxBackendDependencies, "transport" | "baseEnv">): Promise<LocalOperationBackend>;
|
|
44
|
+
export declare function createDockerOperationBackend(options: DockerOperationBackendOptions, dependencies?: Omit<LinuxBackendDependencies, "transport" | "baseEnv" | "toolHome">): Promise<LocalOperationBackend>;
|
|
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ export function containerBaseEnv(full) {
|
|
|
31
31
|
* (PID plus start time, checked again before each signal) gets SIGTERM, then SIGKILL, and this
|
|
32
32
|
* returns once it is gone.
|
|
33
33
|
*/
|
|
34
|
-
const END_AGENT =
|
|
34
|
+
const END_AGENT = `
|
|
35
35
|
import os, sys, time
|
|
36
36
|
pid, start = int(sys.argv[1]), int(sys.argv[2])
|
|
37
37
|
def same():
|
|
@@ -222,7 +222,9 @@ function hostSkillsPreparation(request, hostRoots, pythonPath, stateDir, acquire
|
|
|
222
222
|
* the container's paths. Background artifacts are written by the trusted supervisor to the host
|
|
223
223
|
* directories behind the bind mounts; skill preparation writes the host skills directory.
|
|
224
224
|
*/
|
|
225
|
-
export async function createDockerOperationBackend(options,
|
|
225
|
+
export async function createDockerOperationBackend(options,
|
|
226
|
+
// no toolHome: a command in the container has the image's home, not the host user's
|
|
227
|
+
dependencies = {}) {
|
|
226
228
|
const transport = dockerLinuxTransport(options.container);
|
|
227
229
|
let probe = await (dependencies.probe ?? (() => probeLinuxRuntime(transport)))();
|
|
228
230
|
if (probe.restricted !== null && !dependencies.probe) {
|