@candledottv/cli 0.11.33 → 0.11.35

package/README.md

@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ emergency procedure, rebinding, trusted wallets and API key access levels are al
 | `candle wallets import --chain solana\|evm`, `wallets revoke <wallet-id>` | Link a wallet you own (key from `--key-file` or a hidden prompt, sealed to Privy before it leaves the machine), or unlink one. |
 | `candle wallets trust\|untrust <label\|address\|id\|prefix*>...` | Mark linked wallets as yours so an agent's Withdraw key can move funds into them, or clear the mark. Owner only, over the device token, with a typed confirm; a trailing `*`, as in `'tr-*'`, selects by prefix. |
 | `candle wallets allow-launch\|disallow-launch <label\|address\|id\|prefix*>...` | Let TEE wallets pay for a launch (`candle launch`), or stop them. Owner only, over the device token; the screen shows each wallet's label, address and bound key before a typed confirm. `disallow-launch --yes` skips the confirm. |
-| `candle wallets close-empty [--wallet embedded] [--keep <mint>]... [--yes]` | Closes the embedded wallet's empty token accounts and returns their rent to it, after a preview (`transfer:write`). |
+| `candle wallets close-empty [--wallet embedded\|<tee address\|label>] [--keep <mint>]... [--yes]` | Closes a wallet's empty token accounts and returns their rent to it, after a preview: the embedded wallet (`transfer:write`), or a Solana TEE wallet bound to the key (`swap:write`), whose close transactions Candle builds, this machine checks and the key signer approves. |
 | `candle vault init\|status\|list\|new-key\|rename\|phrase show\|restore\|reconcile-exposure` | The encrypted local vault, `vault.enc` (Tier 1). `init` creates it with a passphrase factor and a 24-word recovery phrase (and no key), `new-key` derives a key inside it (`--count`, `--labels-from <file>` for many under one unlock), `list [filter] [--balances]` shows one line per key, `rename` changes a label only, `phrase show` displays the phrase on a terminal (never in `--json`, a log or a pipe), and `restore --phrase` rebuilds the derived keys on another machine with a new passphrase (`--count`, `--tee-count`, `--external-count`, `--evm-count` and `--evm-tee-count` for EVM keys and Hood TEE wallets, or a Solana gap scan with `--rpc-url`); a restored vault never allocates new keys. `reconcile-exposure` re-reads the account and adds exposure records, clearing nothing. No key ever leaves the vault to reach Candle. See [CLI custody](https://docs.candle.tv/developers/cli-custody). |
 | `candle vault factor list\|add passphrase\|add security-key\|add touch-id\|add passkey\|remove` (or `vault enroll <kind>`), `vault backup --to <path>\|icloud`, `vault verify-backup <path>` | What can open the vault, and proving a copy of it works: `backup` verifies the copy in full before reporting (a copy is sealed, keeping only the passphrase and security-key envelopes, unless it goes to a recognised local disk or removable drive, so a cloud folder and any path the CLI cannot place are both sealed unless `--accept-shared-domain` is passed), and `verify-backup` re-checks an existing one against this vault's key and address set. `add security-key` enrolls a FIDO2 security key (CTAP2 `hmac-secret`, user-verified with the key's PIN or biometric) through the bundled `candle-fido2` helper (`--install-helper` fetches and verifies this release's helper first); one key is not a recoverable factor, two keys are a pair, an enrolled key can authorize adding another, and the passphrase stays the recovery floor. `add touch-id` and `add passkey` are refused with `VAULT_FACTOR_UNSUPPORTED_ON_PLATFORM` until the Apple-signed helper ships. Every vault command then takes `--factor <id\|passphrase\|security-key>` to say which envelope opens it and `--device <id>` to name the key when several are attached. |
 | `candle vault transfer\|promote\|promote-batch\|fund\|demote\|export-key` | Moving value and authority. `transfer` and `fund` sign locally after showing the decoded transaction (`transfer` from a vault key or a promoted TEE wallet, which warns when an agent may be trading it and reports the finalized transfer to Candle's history; `fund` reaches a TEE wallet from its pinned vault key, or an external wallet, with no `--yes`; both verify once, at the unlock, which names the send, then show the destination grouped in fours and take a typed `confirm`); `promote --from <cold label>` derives a fresh TEE wallet pinned to that key (an EVM vault key becomes a Hood TEE wallet), `promote --in-place <label> --sweep-to <cold label>` promotes a key at its own address after a typed warning, `promote-batch --pairs-from <file>` does many in place under one unlock, `--to-key` binds the result to another of your keys, and `demote` (disable then sweep; `--emergency` sweeps even when the stop request fails) sends it back to its pinned vault; `export-key` is the one ceremony that writes a single private key to a file you name. |