@camunda/ccma-shared-types 7.4.0 → 7.6.0

package/dist/_tests/constants/custom-generation.const.spec.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+export {};

package/dist/_tests/utils/jvmOptions.spec.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+export {};

package/dist/approvals/policy.js

@@ -63,7 +63,8 @@ function canCreate(actor, useCase, request = {}) {
     );
   }
   const toRun = request.requiredPermissions ?? [useCase.requiredPermission];
-  if (resolveRequiredAcks(useCase, request.requiredAcks) === 0 && !useCase.openToEveryone && !hasEveryPermission(actor, toRun)) {
+  const openedBySystem = useCase.openedBySystem && !!useCase.createPermission;
+  if (resolveRequiredAcks(useCase, request.requiredAcks) === 0 && !useCase.openToEveryone && !openedBySystem && !hasEveryPermission(actor, toRun)) {
     return deny(
       "forbidden",
       `This request needs no approval, so opening it runs it. That needs ${toRun.join(" and ")}, and you do not hold it.`

package/dist/approvals/policy.js.map

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "version": 3,
   "sources": ["../../src/approvals/policy.ts"],
-  "sourcesContent": ["/*\n * Copyright Camunda Services GmbH and/or licensed to Camunda Services GmbH\n * under one or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under a commercial license.\n * You may not use this file except in compliance with the commercial license.\n */\n\nimport { UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL } from '../constants/misc.const.js'\nimport type {\n  ApprovalJobDto,\n  ApprovalUseCaseDto,\n} from '../dtos/ApprovalJob.dto.js'\nimport { ConsolePermissions } from '../permissions/console.permissions.js'\n\n/**\n * The rules of the approval mechanism, as pure functions.\n *\n * Three consumers run this file: control-backend decides whether to reject a\n * request, control-frontend decides whether to disable a button, and cloudbot\n * decides whether to answer. One copy means the button and the endpoint can\n * never disagree.\n *\n * Two choices in the signatures carry the design:\n *\n * - The actor is an interface with a `has` method. The backend holds an array\n *   of Auth0 claims, and `useSession()` in the frontend gives a flat record of\n *   booleans. Neither side has to convert to the shape of the other.\n * - `now` is a parameter. The expiry is lazy, so a stored `pending` request can\n *   be expired already. A parameter makes a difference between the two clocks\n *   an input that a test can set, and not a silent disagreement.\n *\n * No function here does I/O or returns a promise. The browser call site is what\n * enforces that, and it also stops a later use case from turning a list of 50\n * rows into 200 network calls.\n */\n\n/** Who is asking. See the note above on why this is an interface. */\nexport interface ApprovalActorView {\n  userId: string\n  /**\n   * The email of the actor. It is the SECOND identity of the four-eyes rule.\n   *\n   * `userId` alone is not enough. One person can hold more than one identity in\n   * Auth0 \u2014 a connection through SSO and a connection through a database, or an\n   * account that was made again \u2014 and each one carries a different `sub`. The\n   * same human then opens a request with one identity and approves it with the\n   * other, which is the rule defeated.\n   *\n   * It is optional because a token can carry no email. See\n   * `isSameActorEmail` for what that means for the comparison.\n   */\n  email?: string\n  has(permission: string): boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds the `has` of an actor from the permissions that the actor holds.\n *\n * `ConsolePermissions.APPROVALS_ALL_USE_CASES` stands in for every permission\n * that a use case asks for. Both actor builders call this function, the one of\n * control-backend and the one of the browser, so the button and the route\n * agree on it. A rule that reads `actor.has` needs no change for it, and nor\n * does a use case that a later change adds.\n */\nexport function approvalPermissionCheck(\n  held: ReadonlySet<string>,\n): (permission: string) => boolean {\n  const all = held.has(ConsolePermissions.APPROVALS_ALL_USE_CASES)\n  return (permission) => all || held.has(permission)\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether two email addresses name one person.\n *\n * Two values that are absent, empty, or `UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL` are NOT one\n * person. A token with no email would otherwise make every actor equal to\n * every other actor, and the rule would refuse everybody.\n *\n * The comparison removes the spaces and the case. Auth0 gives the address as\n * the identity provider wrote it, so `A.B@camunda.com` and `a.b@camunda.com`\n * are one mailbox and must not pass as two people.\n */\nexport function isSameActorEmail(one?: string, other?: string): boolean {\n  const left = comparableActorEmail(one)\n  return left.length > 0 && left === comparableActorEmail(other)\n}\n\n/**\n * The address in the one form that a comparison may use.\n *\n * An absent address, an empty one and `UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL` all become an\n * empty string, because none of the three names a person. The spaces and the\n * case go as well: Auth0 gives the address as the identity provider wrote it.\n */\nfunction comparableActorEmail(value?: string): string {\n  const trimmed = value?.trim().toLowerCase() ?? ''\n  return trimmed === UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL ? '' : trimmed\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether one identity of a request names the actor.\n *\n * The `sub` of the token OR the email, because one person can hold more than\n * one Auth0 identity. Every rule that asks \"is this the same human?\" reads both\n * through this function, so a rule cannot forget the second half: `canWithdraw`\n * did, and it refused a creator whose browser and whose service resolved the\n * id from two different tokens.\n */\nexport function isSameActor(\n  identity: { userId: string; email?: string },\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n): boolean {\n  return (\n    identity.userId === actor.userId ||\n    isSameActorEmail(identity.email, actor.email)\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether this actor carries an address that names a person.\n *\n * A machine-to-machine token carries none: accounts-backend builds the\n * permissions of such a token from its `permissions` claim alone, and there is\n * no person behind it. See `creatorEmailRequired` of the use case.\n */\nexport function hasActorEmail(actor: ApprovalActorView): boolean {\n  return comparableActorEmail(actor.email).length > 0\n}\n\n/**\n * Why an action is not allowed.\n *\n * The code is for a program: control-backend maps it to a status, and the\n * frontend can branch on it. The message is for a person, and it is shown as\n * written.\n */\nexport type ApprovalDenialCode =\n  | 'forbidden'\n  | 'not-pending'\n  | 'self-approval'\n  | 'self-rejection'\n  | 'already-acknowledged'\n  | 'expired'\n  | 'not-creator'\n  | 'not-executable'\n  | 'no-reason'\n  | 'too-few-acks'\n  | 'no-creator-email'\n\nexport type ApprovalDecision =\n  | { allowed: true }\n  | { allowed: false; code: ApprovalDenialCode; message: string }\n\nconst ALLOWED: ApprovalDecision = { allowed: true }\n\nfunction deny(code: ApprovalDenialCode, message: string): ApprovalDecision {\n  return { allowed: false, code, message }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether the time to answer a request has passed.\n *\n * Only a `pending` request expires. A request that already reached an end state\n * keeps that state, because \"expired\" would lose the answer that was given.\n */\nexport function isExpired(job: ApprovalJobDto, now: Date): boolean {\n  return (\n    job.status === 'pending' &&\n    new Date(job.expiresAt).getTime() <= now.getTime()\n  )\n}\n\n/** Reports the status to show, which is `expired` once the time has passed. */\nexport function effectiveStatus(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  now: Date,\n): ApprovalJobDto['status'] {\n  return isExpired(job, now) ? 'expired' : job.status\n}\n\n/** Reports how many more acknowledgements the request needs. */\nexport function remainingAcks(job: ApprovalJobDto): number {\n  return Math.max(0, job.requiredAcks - job.acks.length)\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether the actor holds EVERY permission of the set.\n *\n * Every, and not one of them. A payload that raises the guard adds a\n * permission, so \"one of them\" would let the base permission alone carry a\n * request that the extra permission exists to stop.\n *\n * An EMPTY set is held by nobody. That is the opposite of what `Array.every`\n * answers, and it is deliberate: this function guards a privileged action, so\n * the empty case must fail closed. A row with no permissions is not a row that\n * everybody may run \u2014 it is a row that lost its guard, through a migration\n * that did not backfill it or a write that went around the service. Every use\n * case builds a set of at least one, so no real request meets this branch.\n */\nexport function hasEveryPermission(\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  permissions: string[],\n): boolean {\n  if (permissions.length === 0) {\n    return false\n  }\n  return permissions.every((permission) => actor.has(permission))\n}\n\n/**\n * What a person must hold to act on a request.\n *\n * A request carries its own set, because a payload can raise the guard. A use\n * case that never does has a set of one, and it is the base permission.\n */\nexport function requiredPermissionsOf(job: ApprovalJobDto): string[] {\n  return job.requiredPermissions\n}\n\n/**\n * Who can READ a request.\n *\n * Two people: one who can act on it, and the one who opened it. A Camundi who\n * holds neither has no reason to read which customer somebody proposed to\n * expire, so the list and the detail both hide it.\n *\n * The rule reads the BASE permission of the use case and not the effective set\n * of the request. A payload that raises the guard raises who can APPROVE, and\n * not who can look: a generation update with the yolo flag is visible to\n * everybody who can approve a plain one, and only the yolo permission runs it.\n * The list filters by use case in SQL, which is what makes one page of rows\n * the same page that a person is allowed to read.\n */\nexport function canView(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  useCase: ApprovalUseCaseDto,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (\n    actor.has(useCase.requiredPermission) ||\n    isSameActor(job.createdBy, actor)\n  ) {\n    return ALLOWED\n  }\n  return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot see this request.')\n}\n\n/**\n * Who can OPEN a request, and with what.\n *\n * `createPermission` is what keeps the pool that asks as small as the pool that\n * approves. A use case that leaves it absent says the opposite on purpose: the\n * approvals are the guard, and anybody signed in can propose the action.\n *\n * The two checks after it are about the request and not about the person. A\n * count below the floor of the use case, and a missing reason, are both a 400\n * and not a 403, so the words say which one the caller must repair.\n */\nexport function canCreate(\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  useCase: ApprovalUseCaseDto,\n  request: {\n    reason?: string\n    requiredAcks?: number\n    /**\n     * The effective permissions of the payload, from `permissionsFor`.\n     *\n     * Absent means \"the base permission alone\", which is what most use cases\n     * build. Only the permissions ABOVE the base one gate opening a request:\n     * see the note in the body.\n     */\n    requiredPermissions?: string[]\n  } = {},\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  // The message NAMES the permission. \"You cannot open this request\" is true\n  // and useless: a Camundi who reads it cannot tell a missing permission from\n  // a rule they never heard of, and the detail page already names a permission\n  // the same way (\"Approving needs aacp\").\n  if (useCase.createPermission && !actor.has(useCase.createPermission)) {\n    return deny(\n      'forbidden',\n      `Opening this request needs ${useCase.createPermission}, and you do not hold it.`,\n    )\n  }\n  // What the PAYLOAD raised, on top of the base permission of the use case.\n  // A bulk generation update with the yolo flag needs the yolo permission, and\n  // without this check a person who holds the base permission alone could open\n  // one. They could not approve it and could not run it, so it is not an\n  // escalation \u2014 it is a request that its own author is not allowed to make,\n  // waiting in the queue of the people who are.\n  //\n  // The BASE permission is deliberately not checked here. `createPermission`\n  // above is the only gate on the person, and a use case that leaves it absent\n  // means that anybody signed in can propose the action. Checking the base\n  // permission too would take that choice away from every use case.\n  const raised = (request.requiredPermissions ?? []).filter(\n    (permission) => permission !== useCase.requiredPermission,\n  )\n  if (raised.length > 0 && !hasEveryPermission(actor, raised)) {\n    return deny(\n      'forbidden',\n      `This payload needs ${raised.join(' and ')}, and you do not hold it.`,\n    )\n  }\n  // A request that needs no approval RUNS when it is opened, so the person who\n  // opens it must hold what running it needs. Every other use case leaves this\n  // to the approvals, which is why the base permission is not checked above.\n  // With a floor of zero there is no approval to leave it to.\n  const toRun = request.requiredPermissions ?? [useCase.requiredPermission]\n  if (\n    resolveRequiredAcks(useCase, request.requiredAcks) === 0 &&\n    !useCase.openToEveryone &&\n    !hasEveryPermission(actor, toRun)\n  ) {\n    // The message NAMES the permission, and it says why opening needs it. A\n    // Camundi who reads \"you cannot open this request\" for an action that\n    // needs no approval cannot tell which of the two rules refused them.\n    return deny(\n      'forbidden',\n      `This request needs no approval, so opening it runs it. That needs ` +\n        `${toRun.join(' and ')}, and you do not hold it.`,\n    )\n  }\n  // The action of this use case carries the address of the person who asked,\n  // so a caller with no address must be refused HERE. The alternative is a\n  // request that looks ordinary, collects its approvals over days, and then\n  // fails because the other service cannot find a user called \"unknown\".\n  if (useCase.creatorEmailRequired && !hasActorEmail(actor)) {\n    return deny(\n      'no-creator-email',\n      'This action needs the email address of the person who asks for it, ' +\n        'and your session carries none. Sign in as a person to open this ' +\n        'request.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (useCase.reasonRequired && (request.reason ?? '').trim().length === 0) {\n    return deny('no-reason', 'Give a reason to open this request.')\n  }\n  if (\n    request.requiredAcks !== undefined &&\n    request.requiredAcks < useCase.minAcks\n  ) {\n    return deny(\n      'too-few-acks',\n      `This action needs at least ${useCase.minAcks} approvals.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n\n/**\n * The approvals that a new request asks for.\n *\n * The caller names a number or names none. A number below the floor is refused\n * by `canCreate`, and this function holds the answer inside the range anyway:\n * the two run in the same call, and a floor that only one of them knows is a\n * floor that a later caller can step over.\n */\nexport function resolveRequiredAcks(\n  useCase: ApprovalUseCaseDto,\n  requested?: number,\n): number {\n  if (requested === undefined) {\n    return Math.max(useCase.defaultAcks, useCase.minAcks)\n  }\n  return Math.max(Math.trunc(requested), useCase.minAcks)\n}\n\n/**\n * The four-eyes rule.\n *\n * The bans are in the order a person meets them, and each one has its own\n * message: \"you already approved this\" and \"you cannot approve your own\n * request\" are different mistakes, and one message for both helps nobody.\n *\n * Each of the two bans on a person reads BOTH identities: the `sub` of the\n * token, and the email. See `ApprovalActorView.email` for why one of them is\n * not enough.\n */\nexport function canAcknowledge(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  now: Date,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (!hasEveryPermission(actor, job.requiredPermissions)) {\n    return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot approve this request.')\n  }\n  if (isExpired(job, now)) {\n    return deny(\n      'expired',\n      'This request expired and can no longer be approved.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (job.status !== 'pending') {\n    return deny(\n      'not-pending',\n      `This request is ${job.status} and can no longer be approved.`,\n    )\n  }\n  if (isSameActor(job.createdBy, actor)) {\n    return deny(\n      'self-approval',\n      'You opened this request, so you cannot approve it.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (job.acks.some((ack) => isSameActor(ack, actor))) {\n    return deny('already-acknowledged', 'You already approved this request.')\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n\n/**\n * A rejection needs the same permission as an acknowledgement, and a reason.\n *\n * Two people answer a request, and each one has ONE verb. Somebody else\n * approves or rejects it; the person who opened it withdraws it. The creator is\n * refused here for the same reason `canAcknowledge` refuses them: one person\n * must not be both sides of a four-eyes decision. The message names the button\n * that they do have, and the trail loses nothing, because a withdrawal writes\n * its reason into the same field.\n *\n * The ORDER of the checks is the order that a person meets them, and the state\n * of the request comes before the reason. A closed request must answer\n * \"already closed\" whatever the caller typed: with the reason first, a page\n * that had no reason yet read `no-reason` from a rejected request, and the\n * Reject button of control-frontend stayed enabled on a request that nothing\n * could reject any more.\n */\nexport function canReject(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  now: Date,\n  reason: string,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (!hasEveryPermission(actor, job.requiredPermissions)) {\n    return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot reject this request.')\n  }\n  if (isExpired(job, now)) {\n    return deny(\n      'expired',\n      'This request expired and can no longer be rejected.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (job.status !== 'pending') {\n    return deny(\n      'not-pending',\n      `This request is ${job.status} and can no longer be rejected.`,\n    )\n  }\n  if (isSameActor(job.createdBy, actor)) {\n    return deny(\n      'self-rejection',\n      'You opened this request, so withdraw it instead of rejecting it.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (reason.trim().length === 0) {\n    return deny('no-reason', 'Give a reason to reject this request.')\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n\n/**\n * Only the person who opened a request can take it back.\n *\n * BOTH identities, as every other rule of this file reads them. One person can\n * hold two Auth0 identities with two different `sub` values, and a rule that\n * read the id alone refused the creator their own withdrawal as soon as the\n * browser and the service resolved that id from two different tokens.\n */\nexport function canWithdraw(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  now: Date,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (!isSameActor(job.createdBy, actor)) {\n    return deny(\n      'not-creator',\n      'Only the person who opened a request can withdraw it.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (isExpired(job, now)) {\n    return deny(\n      'expired',\n      'This request expired and can no longer be withdrawn.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (job.status !== 'pending') {\n    return deny(\n      'not-pending',\n      `This request is ${job.status} and can no longer be withdrawn.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n\n/**\n * Runs a request that has its approvals.\n *\n * This is the button of the explicit mode. `failed` is executable again,\n * because a failure is often a problem of the system that is now repaired, and\n * asking for the approvals a second time helps nobody.\n *\n * ANY holder of the permission may press it, and not only the person who\n * opened the request. The decision was made when the request reached\n * `approved`: `canAcknowledge` refuses the creator, so the approvals on the\n * row came from other people, and the button only carries out what they\n * already agreed to. Holding the button to the creator would let one Camundi\n * on holiday freeze an approved action, and a use case that must not run\n * without its author has `executionMode: 'auto'` instead.\n *\n * Who PRESSED it and who ASKED for it are two different facts, and both are\n * kept: the audit trail of control-backend records the actor of the run, and\n * an action that names a person to another service names the creator. See\n * `onBehalfOf` of `extend-trial`.\n */\nexport function canExecute(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (!hasEveryPermission(actor, job.requiredPermissions)) {\n    return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot run this request.')\n  }\n  if (job.status !== 'approved' && job.status !== 'failed') {\n    return deny(\n      'not-executable',\n      `This request is ${job.status} and cannot be run.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n"],
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+  "sourcesContent": ["/*\n * Copyright Camunda Services GmbH and/or licensed to Camunda Services GmbH\n * under one or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under a commercial license.\n * You may not use this file except in compliance with the commercial license.\n */\n\nimport { UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL } from '../constants/misc.const.js'\nimport type {\n  ApprovalJobDto,\n  ApprovalUseCaseDto,\n} from '../dtos/ApprovalJob.dto.js'\nimport { ConsolePermissions } from '../permissions/console.permissions.js'\n\n/**\n * The rules of the approval mechanism, as pure functions.\n *\n * Three consumers run this file: control-backend decides whether to reject a\n * request, control-frontend decides whether to disable a button, and cloudbot\n * decides whether to answer. One copy means the button and the endpoint can\n * never disagree.\n *\n * Two choices in the signatures carry the design:\n *\n * - The actor is an interface with a `has` method. The backend holds an array\n *   of Auth0 claims, and `useSession()` in the frontend gives a flat record of\n *   booleans. Neither side has to convert to the shape of the other.\n * - `now` is a parameter. The expiry is lazy, so a stored `pending` request can\n *   be expired already. A parameter makes a difference between the two clocks\n *   an input that a test can set, and not a silent disagreement.\n *\n * No function here does I/O or returns a promise. The browser call site is what\n * enforces that, and it also stops a later use case from turning a list of 50\n * rows into 200 network calls.\n */\n\n/** Who is asking. See the note above on why this is an interface. */\nexport interface ApprovalActorView {\n  userId: string\n  /**\n   * The email of the actor. It is the SECOND identity of the four-eyes rule.\n   *\n   * `userId` alone is not enough. One person can hold more than one identity in\n   * Auth0 \u2014 a connection through SSO and a connection through a database, or an\n   * account that was made again \u2014 and each one carries a different `sub`. The\n   * same human then opens a request with one identity and approves it with the\n   * other, which is the rule defeated.\n   *\n   * It is optional because a token can carry no email. See\n   * `isSameActorEmail` for what that means for the comparison.\n   */\n  email?: string\n  has(permission: string): boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds the `has` of an actor from the permissions that the actor holds.\n *\n * `ConsolePermissions.APPROVALS_ALL_USE_CASES` stands in for every permission\n * that a use case asks for. Both actor builders call this function, the one of\n * control-backend and the one of the browser, so the button and the route\n * agree on it. A rule that reads `actor.has` needs no change for it, and nor\n * does a use case that a later change adds.\n */\nexport function approvalPermissionCheck(\n  held: ReadonlySet<string>,\n): (permission: string) => boolean {\n  const all = held.has(ConsolePermissions.APPROVALS_ALL_USE_CASES)\n  return (permission) => all || held.has(permission)\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether two email addresses name one person.\n *\n * Two values that are absent, empty, or `UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL` are NOT one\n * person. A token with no email would otherwise make every actor equal to\n * every other actor, and the rule would refuse everybody.\n *\n * The comparison removes the spaces and the case. Auth0 gives the address as\n * the identity provider wrote it, so `A.B@camunda.com` and `a.b@camunda.com`\n * are one mailbox and must not pass as two people.\n */\nexport function isSameActorEmail(one?: string, other?: string): boolean {\n  const left = comparableActorEmail(one)\n  return left.length > 0 && left === comparableActorEmail(other)\n}\n\n/**\n * The address in the one form that a comparison may use.\n *\n * An absent address, an empty one and `UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL` all become an\n * empty string, because none of the three names a person. The spaces and the\n * case go as well: Auth0 gives the address as the identity provider wrote it.\n */\nfunction comparableActorEmail(value?: string): string {\n  const trimmed = value?.trim().toLowerCase() ?? ''\n  return trimmed === UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL ? '' : trimmed\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether one identity of a request names the actor.\n *\n * The `sub` of the token OR the email, because one person can hold more than\n * one Auth0 identity. Every rule that asks \"is this the same human?\" reads both\n * through this function, so a rule cannot forget the second half: `canWithdraw`\n * did, and it refused a creator whose browser and whose service resolved the\n * id from two different tokens.\n */\nexport function isSameActor(\n  identity: { userId: string; email?: string },\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n): boolean {\n  return (\n    identity.userId === actor.userId ||\n    isSameActorEmail(identity.email, actor.email)\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether this actor carries an address that names a person.\n *\n * A machine-to-machine token carries none: accounts-backend builds the\n * permissions of such a token from its `permissions` claim alone, and there is\n * no person behind it. See `creatorEmailRequired` of the use case.\n */\nexport function hasActorEmail(actor: ApprovalActorView): boolean {\n  return comparableActorEmail(actor.email).length > 0\n}\n\n/**\n * Why an action is not allowed.\n *\n * The code is for a program: control-backend maps it to a status, and the\n * frontend can branch on it. The message is for a person, and it is shown as\n * written.\n */\nexport type ApprovalDenialCode =\n  | 'forbidden'\n  | 'not-pending'\n  | 'self-approval'\n  | 'self-rejection'\n  | 'already-acknowledged'\n  | 'expired'\n  | 'not-creator'\n  | 'not-executable'\n  | 'no-reason'\n  | 'too-few-acks'\n  | 'no-creator-email'\n\nexport type ApprovalDecision =\n  | { allowed: true }\n  | { allowed: false; code: ApprovalDenialCode; message: string }\n\nconst ALLOWED: ApprovalDecision = { allowed: true }\n\nfunction deny(code: ApprovalDenialCode, message: string): ApprovalDecision {\n  return { allowed: false, code, message }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether the time to answer a request has passed.\n *\n * Only a `pending` request expires. A request that already reached an end state\n * keeps that state, because \"expired\" would lose the answer that was given.\n */\nexport function isExpired(job: ApprovalJobDto, now: Date): boolean {\n  return (\n    job.status === 'pending' &&\n    new Date(job.expiresAt).getTime() <= now.getTime()\n  )\n}\n\n/** Reports the status to show, which is `expired` once the time has passed. */\nexport function effectiveStatus(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  now: Date,\n): ApprovalJobDto['status'] {\n  return isExpired(job, now) ? 'expired' : job.status\n}\n\n/** Reports how many more acknowledgements the request needs. */\nexport function remainingAcks(job: ApprovalJobDto): number {\n  return Math.max(0, job.requiredAcks - job.acks.length)\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether the actor holds EVERY permission of the set.\n *\n * Every, and not one of them. A payload that raises the guard adds a\n * permission, so \"one of them\" would let the base permission alone carry a\n * request that the extra permission exists to stop.\n *\n * An EMPTY set is held by nobody. That is the opposite of what `Array.every`\n * answers, and it is deliberate: this function guards a privileged action, so\n * the empty case must fail closed. A row with no permissions is not a row that\n * everybody may run \u2014 it is a row that lost its guard, through a migration\n * that did not backfill it or a write that went around the service. Every use\n * case builds a set of at least one, so no real request meets this branch.\n */\nexport function hasEveryPermission(\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  permissions: string[],\n): boolean {\n  if (permissions.length === 0) {\n    return false\n  }\n  return permissions.every((permission) => actor.has(permission))\n}\n\n/**\n * What a person must hold to act on a request.\n *\n * A request carries its own set, because a payload can raise the guard. A use\n * case that never does has a set of one, and it is the base permission.\n */\nexport function requiredPermissionsOf(job: ApprovalJobDto): string[] {\n  return job.requiredPermissions\n}\n\n/**\n * Who can READ a request.\n *\n * Two people: one who can act on it, and the one who opened it. A Camundi who\n * holds neither has no reason to read which customer somebody proposed to\n * expire, so the list and the detail both hide it.\n *\n * The rule reads the BASE permission of the use case and not the effective set\n * of the request. A payload that raises the guard raises who can APPROVE, and\n * not who can look: a generation update with the yolo flag is visible to\n * everybody who can approve a plain one, and only the yolo permission runs it.\n * The list filters by use case in SQL, which is what makes one page of rows\n * the same page that a person is allowed to read.\n */\nexport function canView(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  useCase: ApprovalUseCaseDto,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (\n    actor.has(useCase.requiredPermission) ||\n    isSameActor(job.createdBy, actor)\n  ) {\n    return ALLOWED\n  }\n  return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot see this request.')\n}\n\n/**\n * Who can OPEN a request, and with what.\n *\n * `createPermission` is what keeps the pool that asks as small as the pool that\n * approves. A use case that leaves it absent says the opposite on purpose: the\n * approvals are the guard, and anybody signed in can propose the action.\n *\n * The two checks after it are about the request and not about the person. A\n * count below the floor of the use case, and a missing reason, are both a 400\n * and not a 403, so the words say which one the caller must repair.\n */\nexport function canCreate(\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  useCase: ApprovalUseCaseDto,\n  request: {\n    reason?: string\n    requiredAcks?: number\n    /**\n     * The effective permissions of the payload, from `permissionsFor`.\n     *\n     * Absent means \"the base permission alone\", which is what most use cases\n     * build. Only the permissions ABOVE the base one gate opening a request:\n     * see the note in the body.\n     */\n    requiredPermissions?: string[]\n  } = {},\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  // The message NAMES the permission. \"You cannot open this request\" is true\n  // and useless: a Camundi who reads it cannot tell a missing permission from\n  // a rule they never heard of, and the detail page already names a permission\n  // the same way (\"Approving needs aacp\").\n  if (useCase.createPermission && !actor.has(useCase.createPermission)) {\n    return deny(\n      'forbidden',\n      `Opening this request needs ${useCase.createPermission}, and you do not hold it.`,\n    )\n  }\n  // What the PAYLOAD raised, on top of the base permission of the use case.\n  // A bulk generation update with the yolo flag needs the yolo permission, and\n  // without this check a person who holds the base permission alone could open\n  // one. They could not approve it and could not run it, so it is not an\n  // escalation \u2014 it is a request that its own author is not allowed to make,\n  // waiting in the queue of the people who are.\n  //\n  // The BASE permission is deliberately not checked here. `createPermission`\n  // above is the only gate on the person, and a use case that leaves it absent\n  // means that anybody signed in can propose the action. Checking the base\n  // permission too would take that choice away from every use case.\n  const raised = (request.requiredPermissions ?? []).filter(\n    (permission) => permission !== useCase.requiredPermission,\n  )\n  if (raised.length > 0 && !hasEveryPermission(actor, raised)) {\n    return deny(\n      'forbidden',\n      `This payload needs ${raised.join(' and ')}, and you do not hold it.`,\n    )\n  }\n  // A request that needs no approval RUNS when it is opened, so the person who\n  // opens it must hold what running it needs. Every other use case leaves this\n  // to the approvals, which is why the base permission is not checked above.\n  // With a floor of zero there is no approval to leave it to.\n  const toRun = request.requiredPermissions ?? [useCase.requiredPermission]\n  // A service that opens a request of its own use case holds the\n  // `createPermission` checked above, and that is the guard of the run. Without\n  // a `createPermission` there is no such guard, so the flag lifts nothing.\n  const openedBySystem = useCase.openedBySystem && !!useCase.createPermission\n  if (\n    resolveRequiredAcks(useCase, request.requiredAcks) === 0 &&\n    !useCase.openToEveryone &&\n    !openedBySystem &&\n    !hasEveryPermission(actor, toRun)\n  ) {\n    // The message NAMES the permission, and it says why opening needs it. A\n    // Camundi who reads \"you cannot open this request\" for an action that\n    // needs no approval cannot tell which of the two rules refused them.\n    return deny(\n      'forbidden',\n      `This request needs no approval, so opening it runs it. That needs ` +\n        `${toRun.join(' and ')}, and you do not hold it.`,\n    )\n  }\n  // The action of this use case carries the address of the person who asked,\n  // so a caller with no address must be refused HERE. The alternative is a\n  // request that looks ordinary, collects its approvals over days, and then\n  // fails because the other service cannot find a user called \"unknown\".\n  if (useCase.creatorEmailRequired && !hasActorEmail(actor)) {\n    return deny(\n      'no-creator-email',\n      'This action needs the email address of the person who asks for it, ' +\n        'and your session carries none. Sign in as a person to open this ' +\n        'request.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (useCase.reasonRequired && (request.reason ?? '').trim().length === 0) {\n    return deny('no-reason', 'Give a reason to open this request.')\n  }\n  if (\n    request.requiredAcks !== undefined &&\n    request.requiredAcks < useCase.minAcks\n  ) {\n    return deny(\n      'too-few-acks',\n      `This action needs at least ${useCase.minAcks} approvals.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n\n/**\n * The approvals that a new request asks for.\n *\n * The caller names a number or names none. A number below the floor is refused\n * by `canCreate`, and this function holds the answer inside the range anyway:\n * the two run in the same call, and a floor that only one of them knows is a\n * floor that a later caller can step over.\n */\nexport function resolveRequiredAcks(\n  useCase: ApprovalUseCaseDto,\n  requested?: number,\n): number {\n  if (requested === undefined) {\n    return Math.max(useCase.defaultAcks, useCase.minAcks)\n  }\n  return Math.max(Math.trunc(requested), useCase.minAcks)\n}\n\n/**\n * The four-eyes rule.\n *\n * The bans are in the order a person meets them, and each one has its own\n * message: \"you already approved this\" and \"you cannot approve your own\n * request\" are different mistakes, and one message for both helps nobody.\n *\n * Each of the two bans on a person reads BOTH identities: the `sub` of the\n * token, and the email. See `ApprovalActorView.email` for why one of them is\n * not enough.\n */\nexport function canAcknowledge(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  now: Date,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (!hasEveryPermission(actor, job.requiredPermissions)) {\n    return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot approve this request.')\n  }\n  if (isExpired(job, now)) {\n    return deny(\n      'expired',\n      'This request expired and can no longer be approved.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (job.status !== 'pending') {\n    return deny(\n      'not-pending',\n      `This request is ${job.status} and can no longer be approved.`,\n    )\n  }\n  if (isSameActor(job.createdBy, actor)) {\n    return deny(\n      'self-approval',\n      'You opened this request, so you cannot approve it.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (job.acks.some((ack) => isSameActor(ack, actor))) {\n    return deny('already-acknowledged', 'You already approved this request.')\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n\n/**\n * A rejection needs the same permission as an acknowledgement, and a reason.\n *\n * Two people answer a request, and each one has ONE verb. Somebody else\n * approves or rejects it; the person who opened it withdraws it. The creator is\n * refused here for the same reason `canAcknowledge` refuses them: one person\n * must not be both sides of a four-eyes decision. The message names the button\n * that they do have, and the trail loses nothing, because a withdrawal writes\n * its reason into the same field.\n *\n * The ORDER of the checks is the order that a person meets them, and the state\n * of the request comes before the reason. A closed request must answer\n * \"already closed\" whatever the caller typed: with the reason first, a page\n * that had no reason yet read `no-reason` from a rejected request, and the\n * Reject button of control-frontend stayed enabled on a request that nothing\n * could reject any more.\n */\nexport function canReject(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  now: Date,\n  reason: string,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (!hasEveryPermission(actor, job.requiredPermissions)) {\n    return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot reject this request.')\n  }\n  if (isExpired(job, now)) {\n    return deny(\n      'expired',\n      'This request expired and can no longer be rejected.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (job.status !== 'pending') {\n    return deny(\n      'not-pending',\n      `This request is ${job.status} and can no longer be rejected.`,\n    )\n  }\n  if (isSameActor(job.createdBy, actor)) {\n    return deny(\n      'self-rejection',\n      'You opened this request, so withdraw it instead of rejecting it.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (reason.trim().length === 0) {\n    return deny('no-reason', 'Give a reason to reject this request.')\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n\n/**\n * Only the person who opened a request can take it back.\n *\n * BOTH identities, as every other rule of this file reads them. One person can\n * hold two Auth0 identities with two different `sub` values, and a rule that\n * read the id alone refused the creator their own withdrawal as soon as the\n * browser and the service resolved that id from two different tokens.\n */\nexport function canWithdraw(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  now: Date,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (!isSameActor(job.createdBy, actor)) {\n    return deny(\n      'not-creator',\n      'Only the person who opened a request can withdraw it.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (isExpired(job, now)) {\n    return deny(\n      'expired',\n      'This request expired and can no longer be withdrawn.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (job.status !== 'pending') {\n    return deny(\n      'not-pending',\n      `This request is ${job.status} and can no longer be withdrawn.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n\n/**\n * Runs a request that has its approvals.\n *\n * This is the button of the explicit mode. `failed` is executable again,\n * because a failure is often a problem of the system that is now repaired, and\n * asking for the approvals a second time helps nobody.\n *\n * ANY holder of the permission may press it, and not only the person who\n * opened the request. The decision was made when the request reached\n * `approved`: `canAcknowledge` refuses the creator, so the approvals on the\n * row came from other people, and the button only carries out what they\n * already agreed to. Holding the button to the creator would let one Camundi\n * on holiday freeze an approved action, and a use case that must not run\n * without its author has `executionMode: 'auto'` instead.\n *\n * Who PRESSED it and who ASKED for it are two different facts, and both are\n * kept: the audit trail of control-backend records the actor of the run, and\n * an action that names a person to another service names the creator. See\n * `onBehalfOf` of `extend-trial`.\n */\nexport function canExecute(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (!hasEveryPermission(actor, job.requiredPermissions)) {\n    return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot run this request.')\n  }\n  if (job.status !== 'approved' && job.status !== 'failed') {\n    return deny(\n      'not-executable',\n      `This request is ${job.status} and cannot be run.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n"],
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package/dist/approvals/use-cases.const.d.ts

@@ -37,8 +37,11 @@ export declare const APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES: {
     readonly createPersonalOrganisation: "create-personal-organisation";
     readonly createCustomHardwareSizing: "create-custom-hardware-sizing";
     readonly removeCustomHardwareSizing: "remove-custom-hardware-sizing";
+    readonly createCustomGeneration: "create-custom-generation";
+    readonly removeCustomGeneration: "remove-custom-generation";
     readonly onboardToEnterprise: "onboard-to-enterprise";
     readonly changeClusterPlanType: "change-cluster-plan-type";
+    readonly clusterTtlDeletion: "cluster-ttl-deletion";
 };
 /**
  * The approvals that a change of the feature flag table needs on prod.

package/dist/approvals/use-cases.const.js

@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ const APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES = {
   // use cases of custom hardware sizing.
   createCustomHardwareSizing: "create-custom-hardware-sizing",
   removeCustomHardwareSizing: "remove-custom-hardware-sizing",
+  // Open to every Camundi, runs on dev only, and needs no approval. The two
+  // use cases of custom generations.
+  createCustomGeneration: "create-custom-generation",
+  removeCustomGeneration: "remove-custom-generation",
   // The enterprise onboarding of one organization, behind
   // `control.onboardToEnterpriseApproval`: the contract, the plan type of
   // each cluster, and the reservations, in one request.
@@ -41,7 +45,11 @@ const APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES = {
   // `control.changeClusterPlanType`. The bulk plan type update beside it
   // checks no reservation and moves no cluster plan, so this one is not a
   // duplicate of it. See `change-cluster-plan-type.ts` in control-backend.
-  changeClusterPlanType: "change-cluster-plan-type"
+  changeClusterPlanType: "change-cluster-plan-type",
+  // The deletion of one cluster whose TTL ran out. Only the delete cron of
+  // console-backend opens it, and it needs no approval. It is a record of the
+  // deletion. See `cluster-ttl-deletion.ts` in control-backend.
+  clusterTtlDeletion: "cluster-ttl-deletion"
 };
 const FEATURE_FLAG_MIN_ACKS_PROD = 2;
 const PERSONAL_ORGANIZATION_MAX_PER_REQUESTER = 10;

package/dist/approvals/use-cases.const.js.map

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "version": 3,
   "sources": ["../../src/approvals/use-cases.const.ts"],
-  "sourcesContent": ["/*\n * Copyright Camunda Services GmbH and/or licensed to Camunda Services GmbH\n * under one or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under a commercial license.\n * You may not use this file except in compliance with the commercial license.\n */\n\nimport { AccountsPermissions } from '../permissions/accounts.permissions.js'\n\n/**\n * The names and the value ranges of the registered use cases.\n *\n * control-backend owns the registry, and a frontend reads it at run time\n * (`GET /api/approvals/use-cases`). Two things cannot wait for that answer:\n *\n * - **The identifier**, because a caller must NAME a use case to find it in the\n *   registry, and to open a request of it.\n * - **The range of a payload field**, because a form holds the value before any\n *   call goes out.\n *\n * Both live here, so the schema of the service and the form of the browser can\n * never hold different numbers.\n */\n\n/** The identifier of each use case, on the wire and in the table. */\nexport const APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES = {\n  sendToExpiredTrial: 'send-to-expired-trial',\n  extendTrial: 'extend-trial',\n  moveClusterOrg: 'move-cluster-org',\n  // One use case for each type of a cluster bulk operation. The types need\n  // different permissions and different approval counts, and a use case holds\n  // one of each. See `cluster-bulk-operation.ts` beside this file.\n  clusterBulkGenerationUpdate: 'cluster-bulk-generation-update',\n  clusterBulkPlanUpdate: 'cluster-bulk-plan-update',\n  clusterBulkPlanTypeUpdate: 'cluster-bulk-plan-type-update',\n  clusterBulkSleepWakeup: 'cluster-bulk-sleep-wakeup',\n  clusterBulkDeletion: 'cluster-bulk-deletion',\n  clusterBulkSpecUpdate: 'cluster-bulk-spec-update',\n  // The second group, behind `control.approvalAdminActions`.\n  changePlatformRoles: 'change-platform-roles',\n  deleteInternalBackup: 'delete-internal-backup',\n  changeOrgLimits: 'change-org-limits',\n  deleteSsoConnection: 'delete-sso-connection',\n  changeSalesPlan: 'change-sales-plan',\n  // The third group, behind `control.approvalAccountActions`.\n  deleteOrganization: 'delete-organization',\n  deleteUser: 'delete-user',\n  changeUserEmail: 'change-user-email',\n  purgeUsers: 'purge-users',\n  updateUserMetadata: 'update-user-metadata',\n  // A change of the feature flag table, on a stage where\n  // `isFeatureFlagApprovalRequired` is true.\n  changeFeatureFlag: 'change-feature-flag',\n  // Open to every Camundi, and it needs no approval on any stage.\n  createPersonalOrganisation: 'create-personal-organisation',\n  // Open to every Camundi, runs on dev only, and needs no approval. 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Two other Camundis stand in every change,\n * the same floor as a cluster bulk operation on prod\n * (`CLUSTER_BULK_OPERATION_MIN_ACKS`). Int needs one.\n */\nexport const FEATURE_FLAG_MIN_ACKS_PROD = 2\n\n/**\n * The most personal organizations that one Camundi can request.\n *\n * The request runs with no approval, so this cap is the only guard against a\n * loop that creates organizations without end. It counts the requests that a\n * Camundi opened, and a person who needs more asks a Camundi who holds\n * `AccountsPermissions.CREATE_ORG`.\n */\nexport const PERSONAL_ORGANIZATION_MAX_PER_REQUESTER = 10\n\n/** The shortest and longest name of a personal organization. */\nexport const PERSONAL_ORGANIZATION_NAME_MIN_LENGTH = 3\nexport const PERSONAL_ORGANIZATION_NAME_MAX_LENGTH = 100\n\nexport type ApprovalUseCaseType =\n  (typeof APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES)[keyof typeof APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES]\n\n/**\n * The shortest extension that accounts-backend accepts.\n *\n * `POST /:orgId/extendtrial` refuses a date that is less than 14 days away\n * when the body carries `onBehalfOf`, and it measures those 14 days when the\n * CALL arrives. The floor here is 15 and not 14, for two reasons:\n *\n * - The two clocks are not the same instant. Accounts builds its own \"14 days\n *   from now\" a few milliseconds after control-backend builds the date, so a\n *   date of exactly 14 days is already in the past for the comparison.\n * - Accounts counts with `setDate`, which is calendar arithmetic. A change of\n *   the daylight saving time moves its limit by an hour.\n */\nexport const EXTEND_TRIAL_MIN_DAYS = 15\n\n/**\n * The longest extension that accounts-backend accepts.\n *\n * The same route refuses a date more than 62 days away. 61 keeps the same\n * margin as the floor above.\n */\nexport const EXTEND_TRIAL_MAX_DAYS = 61\n\n/**\n * The most roles that one change-platform-roles request adds, or removes.\n *\n * The form of control-frontend offers every platform role, and a person who\n * gives a Camundi a new position rarely changes more than a few. A request with\n * more roles than this is a request that nobody reads before they approve it.\n */\nexport const PLATFORM_ROLE_CHANGE_MAX_ROLES = 10\n\n/**\n * The longest text value that one change-org-limits request writes.\n *\n * A text limit holds a short value, such as a list of regions. The bound keeps\n * a request readable for the person who approves it.\n */\nexport const ORG_LIMIT_TEXT_MAX_LENGTH = 2000\n\n/**\n * The most users that one purge-users request deletes.\n *\n * The God Mode purge deletes one user after the other, and Auth0 limits how\n * fast that goes. A list longer than this is also a list that no approver\n * reads before they agree.\n */\nexport const PURGE_USERS_MAX_USERS = 1000\n\n/**\n * What a person must hold to open or to approve a purge-users request.\n *\n * The purge of God Mode is behind `GOD_PURGE_USERS`, and each deletion calls a\n * route behind `DELETE_USER`. The use case of control-backend returns this\n * list from `permissionsFor`, and the form passes it to `canCreate`, so the\n * button and the server never disagree.\n */\nexport const PURGE_USERS_REQUIRED_PERMISSIONS: readonly string[] = [\n  AccountsPermissions.GOD_PURGE_USERS,\n  AccountsPermissions.DELETE_USER,\n]\n\n/**\n * The largest metadata object that one update-user-metadata request writes,\n * in characters of its JSON text.\n *\n * This is a bound of the product, and not the limit of Auth0, which is far\n * larger. The approvers read the whole object before they agree, and an\n * object that is longer than this is an object that nobody reads.\n */\nexport const USER_METADATA_MAX_LENGTH = 16_000\n\n/**\n * The largest metadata object that a request carries as the object that the\n * person who asked READ.\n *\n * It is larger than `USER_METADATA_MAX_LENGTH`, so a user whose metadata grew\n * past that bound can still get an edit that makes it smaller. It still has a\n * bound, because the request keeps the copy in its row.\n */\nexport const USER_METADATA_EXPECTED_MAX_LENGTH = 500_000\n\n/** The longest email address that a change-user-email request carries. */\nexport const APPROVAL_EMAIL_MAX_LENGTH = 320\n\n/**\n * The email addresses that a change-user-email request accepts.\n *\n * It is the email pattern of zod 4.6. The pattern is here, so the schema of\n * control-backend and the form of control-frontend accept the same addresses,\n * and a form never sends an address that the service refuses.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_EMAIL_PATTERN =\n  // biome-ignore lint/complexity/noUselessEscapeInRegex: the same source as zod, character for character\n  /^(?:[A-Za-z0-9_'+\\-]+\\.)*[A-Za-z0-9_'+\\-]*[A-Za-z0-9_+-]@(?:[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9\\-]*\\.)+[A-Za-z]{2,}$/\n"],
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+  "sourcesContent": ["/*\n * Copyright Camunda Services GmbH and/or licensed to Camunda Services GmbH\n * under one or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under a commercial license.\n * You may not use this file except in compliance with the commercial license.\n */\n\nimport { AccountsPermissions } from '../permissions/accounts.permissions.js'\n\n/**\n * The names and the value ranges of the registered use cases.\n *\n * control-backend owns the registry, and a frontend reads it at run time\n * (`GET /api/approvals/use-cases`). Two things cannot wait for that answer:\n *\n * - **The identifier**, because a caller must NAME a use case to find it in the\n *   registry, and to open a request of it.\n * - **The range of a payload field**, because a form holds the value before any\n *   call goes out.\n *\n * Both live here, so the schema of the service and the form of the browser can\n * never hold different numbers.\n */\n\n/** The identifier of each use case, on the wire and in the table. */\nexport const APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES = {\n  sendToExpiredTrial: 'send-to-expired-trial',\n  extendTrial: 'extend-trial',\n  moveClusterOrg: 'move-cluster-org',\n  // One use case for each type of a cluster bulk operation. The types need\n  // different permissions and different approval counts, and a use case holds\n  // one of each. See `cluster-bulk-operation.ts` beside this file.\n  clusterBulkGenerationUpdate: 'cluster-bulk-generation-update',\n  clusterBulkPlanUpdate: 'cluster-bulk-plan-update',\n  clusterBulkPlanTypeUpdate: 'cluster-bulk-plan-type-update',\n  clusterBulkSleepWakeup: 'cluster-bulk-sleep-wakeup',\n  clusterBulkDeletion: 'cluster-bulk-deletion',\n  clusterBulkSpecUpdate: 'cluster-bulk-spec-update',\n  // The second group, behind `control.approvalAdminActions`.\n  changePlatformRoles: 'change-platform-roles',\n  deleteInternalBackup: 'delete-internal-backup',\n  changeOrgLimits: 'change-org-limits',\n  deleteSsoConnection: 'delete-sso-connection',\n  changeSalesPlan: 'change-sales-plan',\n  // The third group, behind `control.approvalAccountActions`.\n  deleteOrganization: 'delete-organization',\n  deleteUser: 'delete-user',\n  changeUserEmail: 'change-user-email',\n  purgeUsers: 'purge-users',\n  updateUserMetadata: 'update-user-metadata',\n  // A change of the feature flag table, on a stage where\n  // `isFeatureFlagApprovalRequired` is true.\n  changeFeatureFlag: 'change-feature-flag',\n  // Open to every Camundi, and it needs no approval on any stage.\n  createPersonalOrganisation: 'create-personal-organisation',\n  // Open to every Camundi, runs on dev only, and needs no approval. The two\n  // use cases of custom hardware sizing.\n  createCustomHardwareSizing: 'create-custom-hardware-sizing',\n  removeCustomHardwareSizing: 'remove-custom-hardware-sizing',\n  // Open to every Camundi, runs on dev only, and needs no approval. The two\n  // use cases of custom generations.\n  createCustomGeneration: 'create-custom-generation',\n  removeCustomGeneration: 'remove-custom-generation',\n  // The enterprise onboarding of one organization, behind\n  // `control.onboardToEnterpriseApproval`: the contract, the plan type of\n  // each cluster, and the reservations, in one request.\n  onboardToEnterprise: 'onboard-to-enterprise',\n  // The plan type and the hardware packages of ONE cluster, behind\n  // `control.changeClusterPlanType`. The bulk plan type update beside it\n  // checks no reservation and moves no cluster plan, so this one is not a\n  // duplicate of it. See `change-cluster-plan-type.ts` in control-backend.\n  changeClusterPlanType: 'change-cluster-plan-type',\n  // The deletion of one cluster whose TTL ran out. Only the delete cron of\n  // console-backend opens it, and it needs no approval. It is a record of the\n  // deletion. See `cluster-ttl-deletion.ts` in control-backend.\n  clusterTtlDeletion: 'cluster-ttl-deletion',\n} as const\n\n/**\n * The approvals that a change of the feature flag table needs on prod.\n *\n * A flag there turns a feature on or off for every customer, and a person who\n * holds `aafw` could do it alone. Two other Camundis stand in every change,\n * the same floor as a cluster bulk operation on prod\n * (`CLUSTER_BULK_OPERATION_MIN_ACKS`). Int needs one.\n */\nexport const FEATURE_FLAG_MIN_ACKS_PROD = 2\n\n/**\n * The most personal organizations that one Camundi can request.\n *\n * The request runs with no approval, so this cap is the only guard against a\n * loop that creates organizations without end. It counts the requests that a\n * Camundi opened, and a person who needs more asks a Camundi who holds\n * `AccountsPermissions.CREATE_ORG`.\n */\nexport const PERSONAL_ORGANIZATION_MAX_PER_REQUESTER = 10\n\n/** The shortest and longest name of a personal organization. */\nexport const PERSONAL_ORGANIZATION_NAME_MIN_LENGTH = 3\nexport const PERSONAL_ORGANIZATION_NAME_MAX_LENGTH = 100\n\nexport type ApprovalUseCaseType =\n  (typeof APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES)[keyof typeof APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES]\n\n/**\n * The shortest extension that accounts-backend accepts.\n *\n * `POST /:orgId/extendtrial` refuses a date that is less than 14 days away\n * when the body carries `onBehalfOf`, and it measures those 14 days when the\n * CALL arrives. The floor here is 15 and not 14, for two reasons:\n *\n * - The two clocks are not the same instant. Accounts builds its own \"14 days\n *   from now\" a few milliseconds after control-backend builds the date, so a\n *   date of exactly 14 days is already in the past for the comparison.\n * - Accounts counts with `setDate`, which is calendar arithmetic. A change of\n *   the daylight saving time moves its limit by an hour.\n */\nexport const EXTEND_TRIAL_MIN_DAYS = 15\n\n/**\n * The longest extension that accounts-backend accepts.\n *\n * The same route refuses a date more than 62 days away. 61 keeps the same\n * margin as the floor above.\n */\nexport const EXTEND_TRIAL_MAX_DAYS = 61\n\n/**\n * The most roles that one change-platform-roles request adds, or removes.\n *\n * The form of control-frontend offers every platform role, and a person who\n * gives a Camundi a new position rarely changes more than a few. A request with\n * more roles than this is a request that nobody reads before they approve it.\n */\nexport const PLATFORM_ROLE_CHANGE_MAX_ROLES = 10\n\n/**\n * The longest text value that one change-org-limits request writes.\n *\n * A text limit holds a short value, such as a list of regions. The bound keeps\n * a request readable for the person who approves it.\n */\nexport const ORG_LIMIT_TEXT_MAX_LENGTH = 2000\n\n/**\n * The most users that one purge-users request deletes.\n *\n * The God Mode purge deletes one user after the other, and Auth0 limits how\n * fast that goes. A list longer than this is also a list that no approver\n * reads before they agree.\n */\nexport const PURGE_USERS_MAX_USERS = 1000\n\n/**\n * What a person must hold to open or to approve a purge-users request.\n *\n * The purge of God Mode is behind `GOD_PURGE_USERS`, and each deletion calls a\n * route behind `DELETE_USER`. The use case of control-backend returns this\n * list from `permissionsFor`, and the form passes it to `canCreate`, so the\n * button and the server never disagree.\n */\nexport const PURGE_USERS_REQUIRED_PERMISSIONS: readonly string[] = [\n  AccountsPermissions.GOD_PURGE_USERS,\n  AccountsPermissions.DELETE_USER,\n]\n\n/**\n * The largest metadata object that one update-user-metadata request writes,\n * in characters of its JSON text.\n *\n * This is a bound of the product, and not the limit of Auth0, which is far\n * larger. The approvers read the whole object before they agree, and an\n * object that is longer than this is an object that nobody reads.\n */\nexport const USER_METADATA_MAX_LENGTH = 16_000\n\n/**\n * The largest metadata object that a request carries as the object that the\n * person who asked READ.\n *\n * It is larger than `USER_METADATA_MAX_LENGTH`, so a user whose metadata grew\n * past that bound can still get an edit that makes it smaller. It still has a\n * bound, because the request keeps the copy in its row.\n */\nexport const USER_METADATA_EXPECTED_MAX_LENGTH = 500_000\n\n/** The longest email address that a change-user-email request carries. */\nexport const APPROVAL_EMAIL_MAX_LENGTH = 320\n\n/**\n * The email addresses that a change-user-email request accepts.\n *\n * It is the email pattern of zod 4.6. The pattern is here, so the schema of\n * control-backend and the form of control-frontend accept the same addresses,\n * and a form never sends an address that the service refuses.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_EMAIL_PATTERN =\n  // biome-ignore lint/complexity/noUselessEscapeInRegex: the same source as zod, character for character\n  /^(?:[A-Za-z0-9_'+\\-]+\\.)*[A-Za-z0-9_'+\\-]*[A-Za-z0-9_+-]@(?:[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9\\-]*\\.)+[A-Za-z]{2,}$/\n"],
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   "names": []
 }

package/dist/constants/custom-generation.const.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/**
+ * Custom generation: a bespoke generation that a Camundi creates for an
+ * organization of their own, with no admin permission. The approval use cases
+ * `create-custom-generation` and `remove-custom-generation` run on dev only.
+ */
+/** The stage where custom generations run. */
+export declare const isCustomGenerationStage: (stage: string) => boolean;
+/**
+ * The most custom generations that one Camundi can own. The count is the
+ * bespoke generations that the Camundi created and did not delete. A bespoke
+ * generation that the Camundi created in the admin tool counts too.
+ */
+export declare const CUSTOM_GENERATION_MAX_PER_REQUESTER = 50;
+/** The most generations that a custom generation can list in `upgradeableFrom`. */
+export declare const CUSTOM_GENERATION_MAX_UPGRADEABLE_FROM = 50;
+export declare const CUSTOM_GENERATION_NAME_MIN_LENGTH = 3;
+export declare const CUSTOM_GENERATION_NAME_MAX_LENGTH = 100;
+/**
+ * Returns what is wrong with the versions of a new generation, or an empty
+ * list. It is the check of the admin route and of the custom generation
+ * request, thus both give the same messages. The admin route throws the first
+ * message.
+ *
+ * It does not change `versions`. A caller that saves the versions must still
+ * set the blank optional fields to `undefined`. Here a blank text in one of
+ * those fields counts as no value.
+ */
+export declare function checkNewGenerationVersions(versions: Record<string, unknown>): string[];

package/dist/constants/custom-generation.const.js

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+import {
+  ImmutableThings,
+  MutableThings
+} from "../types/C8ClusterComponentVersions.type.js";
+import {
+  generationImageErrorMessage,
+  isValidGenerationImage
+} from "../utils/versionCheck.utils.js";
+const isCustomGenerationStage = (stage) => stage === "dev";
+const CUSTOM_GENERATION_MAX_PER_REQUESTER = 50;
+const CUSTOM_GENERATION_MAX_UPGRADEABLE_FROM = 50;
+const CUSTOM_GENERATION_NAME_MIN_LENGTH = 3;
+const CUSTOM_GENERATION_NAME_MAX_LENGTH = 100;
+const REQUIRED_IMAGES = ["zeebe", "elasticSearchCurator", "elasticSearchOss"];
+const OPTIONAL_IMAGES = [
+  "operate",
+  "tasklist",
+  "optimize",
+  "connectorBridge",
+  "zeebeAnalytics"
+];
+const BLANK_IS_ABSENT = [
+  "operate",
+  "tasklist",
+  "connectorBridge",
+  "zeebeAnalytics",
+  "elasticSearchCurator"
+];
+const imageProblem = (field, value) => typeof value === "string" && isValidGenerationImage(value) ? void 0 : generationImageErrorMessage(field, value);
+function checkNewGenerationVersions(versions) {
+  const valueOf = (field) => {
+    const value = versions[field];
+    return BLANK_IS_ABSENT.includes(field) && typeof value === "string" && value.trim() === "" ? void 0 : value;
+  };
+  const problems = [];
+  for (const field of REQUIRED_IMAGES) {
+    const problem = imageProblem(field, valueOf(field));
+    if (problem) {
+      problems.push(problem);
+    }
+  }
+  for (const field of OPTIONAL_IMAGES) {
+    const value = valueOf(field);
+    if (value === void 0 || value === "") {
+      continue;
+    }
+    const problem = imageProblem(field, value);
+    if (problem) {
+      problems.push(problem);
+    }
+  }
+  for (const key of Object.keys(versions)) {
+    if (!MutableThings.includes(key) && !ImmutableThings.includes(key)) {
+      problems.push(`${key} is not a valid thing`);
+    }
+  }
+  return problems;
+}
+export {
+  CUSTOM_GENERATION_MAX_PER_REQUESTER,
+  CUSTOM_GENERATION_MAX_UPGRADEABLE_FROM,
+  CUSTOM_GENERATION_NAME_MAX_LENGTH,
+  CUSTOM_GENERATION_NAME_MIN_LENGTH,
+  checkNewGenerationVersions,
+  isCustomGenerationStage
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=custom-generation.const.js.map

package/dist/constants/custom-generation.const.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{
+  "version": 3,
+  "sources": ["../../src/constants/custom-generation.const.ts"],
+  "sourcesContent": ["/*\n * Copyright Camunda Services GmbH and/or licensed to Camunda Services GmbH\n * under one or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under a commercial license.\n * You may not use this file except in compliance with the commercial license.\n */\n\nimport {\n  ImmutableThings,\n  MutableThings,\n} from '../types/C8ClusterComponentVersions.type.js'\nimport {\n  generationImageErrorMessage,\n  isValidGenerationImage,\n} from '../utils/versionCheck.utils.js'\n\n/**\n * Custom generation: a bespoke generation that a Camundi creates for an\n * organization of their own, with no admin permission. The approval use cases\n * `create-custom-generation` and `remove-custom-generation` run on dev only.\n */\n\n/** The stage where custom generations run. */\nexport const isCustomGenerationStage = (stage: string): boolean =>\n  stage === 'dev'\n\n/**\n * The most custom generations that one Camundi can own. The count is the\n * bespoke generations that the Camundi created and did not delete. A bespoke\n * generation that the Camundi created in the admin tool counts too.\n */\nexport const CUSTOM_GENERATION_MAX_PER_REQUESTER = 50\n\n/** The most generations that a custom generation can list in `upgradeableFrom`. */\nexport const CUSTOM_GENERATION_MAX_UPGRADEABLE_FROM = 50\n\nexport const CUSTOM_GENERATION_NAME_MIN_LENGTH = 3\nexport const CUSTOM_GENERATION_NAME_MAX_LENGTH = 100\n\n/** Images that every generation must have. */\nconst REQUIRED_IMAGES = ['zeebe', 'elasticSearchCurator', 'elasticSearchOss']\n\n/**\n * Images that a generation can have. `undefined` and an empty text mean no\n * image. Any other value, `null` too, must be a valid image, because\n * `ZeebeClusterVersionsDto` types these fields as text.\n */\nconst OPTIONAL_IMAGES = [\n  'operate',\n  'tasklist',\n  'optimize',\n  'connectorBridge',\n  'zeebeAnalytics',\n]\n\n/** Fields where a blank text means no value. */\nconst BLANK_IS_ABSENT = [\n  'operate',\n  'tasklist',\n  'connectorBridge',\n  'zeebeAnalytics',\n  'elasticSearchCurator',\n]\n\nconst imageProblem = (field: string, value: unknown): string | undefined =>\n  typeof value === 'string' && isValidGenerationImage(value)\n    ? undefined\n    : generationImageErrorMessage(field, value)\n\n/**\n * Returns what is wrong with the versions of a new generation, or an empty\n * list. It is the check of the admin route and of the custom generation\n * request, thus both give the same messages. The admin route throws the first\n * message.\n *\n * It does not change `versions`. A caller that saves the versions must still\n * set the blank optional fields to `undefined`. Here a blank text in one of\n * those fields counts as no value.\n */\nexport function checkNewGenerationVersions(\n  versions: Record<string, unknown>,\n): string[] {\n  const valueOf = (field: string): unknown => {\n    const value = versions[field]\n    return BLANK_IS_ABSENT.includes(field) &&\n      typeof value === 'string' &&\n      value.trim() === ''\n      ? undefined\n      : value\n  }\n\n  const problems: string[] = []\n  for (const field of REQUIRED_IMAGES) {\n    const problem = imageProblem(field, valueOf(field))\n    if (problem) {\n      problems.push(problem)\n    }\n  }\n  for (const field of OPTIONAL_IMAGES) {\n    const value = valueOf(field)\n    if (value === undefined || value === '') {\n      continue\n    }\n    const problem = imageProblem(field, value)\n    if (problem) {\n      problems.push(problem)\n    }\n  }\n  for (const key of Object.keys(versions)) {\n    if (!MutableThings.includes(key) && !ImmutableThings.includes(key)) {\n      problems.push(`${key} is not a valid thing`)\n    }\n  }\n  return problems\n}\n"],
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+  "names": []
+}

package/dist/dtos/ApprovalJob.dto.d.ts

@@ -527,4 +527,17 @@ export interface ApprovalUseCaseDto {
      *   of, in any role, and removes the plan from their lists.
      */
     openToEveryone?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * A use case with no approval that only a service of the fleet opens.
+     *
+     * The service holds `createPermission`, an m2m permission, and not
+     * `requiredPermission`. This flag lets that holder open and thus run a
+     * request with a floor of zero. `requiredPermission` then decides only who
+     * sees the requests and who can run a failed one again. Without a
+     * `createPermission` the flag lifts nothing.
+     *
+     * `cluster-ttl-deletion` sets it. The request exists for the record: the
+     * list, the entity pages and the audit trail show each deletion.
+     */
+    openedBySystem?: boolean;
 }

package/dist/dtos/ApprovalJob.dto.js.map

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "version": 3,
   "sources": ["../../src/dtos/ApprovalJob.dto.ts"],
-  "sourcesContent": ["/*\n * Copyright Camunda Services GmbH and/or licensed to Camunda Services GmbH\n * under one or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under a commercial license.\n * You may not use this file except in compliance with the commercial license.\n */\n\n/**\n * The wire types of the generic approval mechanism.\n *\n * This file holds no logic and no dependency, because three consumers read it:\n * control-backend, control-frontend and cloudbot. The rules that read these\n * types are in `../approvals/policy.js`, and they are pure for the same reason.\n */\n\n/**\n * Every state that an approval request can hold.\n *\n * A `const` tuple, not an enum, so it is both the union type and the list that\n * validates a status filter at run time.\n *\n * The path of a request: `pending` until it reaches the threshold. Then\n * `executing` (automatic mode) or `approved` (explicit mode, which waits for a\n * person to press the button). `executed` or `failed` after the action ran. A\n * request that never reaches the threshold ends `rejected`, `withdrawn` or\n * `expired`.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_JOB_STATUSES = [\n  'pending',\n  'approved',\n  'executing',\n  'executed',\n  'failed',\n  'rejected',\n  'withdrawn',\n  'expired',\n] as const\n\nexport type ApprovalJobStatus = (typeof APPROVAL_JOB_STATUSES)[number]\n\n/**\n * The states in which the action of a request is still COMING.\n *\n * `pending` waits for approvals, `approved` waits for a person to press the\n * button, and `executing` is running now. Each of them can still change the\n * world, so two requests for one target must not be in these states together.\n * `dedupeKey` reads this set for that reason.\n *\n * `failed` is NOT here, although a person can run a failed request again. A\n * failed request runs only when a person presses the button, and that person\n * sees the row. Blocking a new request on a failed one would also trap the\n * key: `canWithdraw` accepts `pending` alone, so nobody could close it.\n *\n * `executed`, `rejected`, `withdrawn` and `expired` are the end of a request.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_LIVE_STATUSES = [\n  'pending',\n  'approved',\n  'executing',\n] as const satisfies readonly ApprovalJobStatus[]\n\n/**\n * How many requests one page of the list holds when the caller asks for no\n * number.\n *\n * The list is a work queue that a Camundi reads, so the page is large: a\n * person wants the whole queue and not ten rows at a time. What the number is\n * for is the ceiling below.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_PAGE_SIZE_DEFAULT = 500\n\n/**\n * The largest page that the service builds, and the largest that a caller may\n * ask for. The API answers 400 above it.\n *\n * The list had no limit at all. One authenticated caller could then make the\n * service read the whole table into memory, serialize it, and do it again, so\n * the cost of a request grew with the age of the service and with nothing that\n * the caller had to pay for. A ceiling turns that into a fixed cost.\n *\n * It is HERE and not only in the service, because the view must know it: a\n * page that asked for more would get a 400 instead of rows.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_PAGE_SIZE_MAX = 2000\n\n/**\n * The columns that the queue can be ordered by.\n *\n * A NAME and not an SQL expression: the repository maps each one, so a caller\n * can never name a column that this list does not hold. `status` orders by the\n * EFFECTIVE status, because a `pending` row whose time ran out reads as\n * `expired` everywhere else.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_SORT_FIELDS = [\n  'createdAt',\n  'expiresAt',\n  'status',\n  'type',\n  'createdBy',\n] as const\n\nexport type ApprovalSortField = (typeof APPROVAL_SORT_FIELDS)[number]\n\nexport type ApprovalSortOrder = 'asc' | 'desc'\n\n/** The default order of the queue: the newest request first. */\nexport const APPROVAL_SORT_DEFAULT: {\n  sort: ApprovalSortField\n  order: ApprovalSortOrder\n} = { sort: 'createdAt', order: 'desc' }\n\n/**\n * The longest reason that a request, a rejection or a withdrawal accepts.\n *\n * ONE number, because three routes of control-backend hold it and three fields\n * of control-frontend must stop there. A field that let a person write more\n * than the schema accepts turns their sentence into a 400 after they wrote it.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_REASON_MAX_LENGTH = 2000\n\n/**\n * The largest number of approvals that a caller can ask for.\n *\n * A request that asks for 400 approvals can never reach them, so it is a\n * request that only fills the table and expires. The ceiling turns that into a\n * 400 at the moment a person types it. It is HERE because the form of the\n * bulk operation must stop at the same number as the route.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_ACKS_MAX = 10\n\n/**\n * The longest search text that the list accepts.\n *\n * A search runs `ILIKE` over the payload of every visible row, so the cost of\n * one call follows the length of the text. Nothing a person types to find a\n * request is near this.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_SEARCH_MAX_LENGTH = 200\n\n/**\n * The payload field that names the organization a request acts on.\n *\n * It is a CONVENTION, and this constant is what makes the convention readable\n * from both sides. A use case whose action hits one organization puts the id of\n * that organization in this field, and `GET /api/approvals?orgId=\u2026` then finds\n * the request with no knowledge of the use case. The filter reads this one\n * field of the payload, so it matches the whole id and nothing else. The free\n * text search reads the payload as TEXT, which also matches an id that only\n * appears inside another field, and it cannot answer \"the requests of this\n * organization\".\n *\n * The organization page of control-frontend does NOT read this field. It asks\n * the entity-link filter (`entityType=org`), which reads a row that\n * `relatedEntities` of a use case writes \u2014 see `ApprovalEntityRef`. The summary\n * is separate again: the `org` field of a `summarize` result is what a READER\n * follows.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_PAYLOAD_ORG_FIELD = 'orgId'\n\n/**\n * How many requests each status holds, for the filters of the queue.\n *\n * Every number answers the SAME question as the list beside it: the counts are\n * built with the visibility rule, the action filter and the search text of the\n * caller, and with the lazy expiry. A count that ignored one of those would\n * send a person to a filter that then shows nothing.\n */\nexport interface ApprovalStatusCountsDto {\n  /** Every request that matches, whatever its status. */\n  all: number\n  /** One number for each status. A status with no request is 0, never absent. */\n  byStatus: Record<ApprovalJobStatus, number>\n}\n\n/**\n * What happens when a request reaches its threshold.\n *\n * `auto` runs the action immediately. `explicit` holds the request at\n * `approved` and waits for a person to run it.\n */\nexport type ApprovalExecutionMode = 'auto' | 'explicit'\n\n/**\n * WHERE the action runs. It is a separate question from who starts it.\n *\n * - `inline` runs the action inside the call that started it, and the answer\n *   already carries the outcome. Right for one call to another service.\n * - `background` answers as soon as the request is claimed, and the action\n *   runs on. It reports into `ApprovalJobDto.progress`, and the row is the\n *   only place that holds the progress, so a reload and a second person read\n *   the same numbers. A pod that stops loses the run, and the reconciler of\n *   control-backend recovers the row.\n *\n * An action over thousands of targets MUST be `background`. `inline` would\n * hold one HTTP request for the whole run, and the ingress, the load balancer\n * and the browser each have their own deadline before it finishes.\n *\n * An `inline` action must not read `context.signal`. The runner trusts the\n * result of an `inline` action that returns after a drain, and it would count\n * a partial run as `executed`. An action that stops between targets is\n * `background`.\n */\nexport type ApprovalActionMode = 'inline' | 'background'\n\n/**\n * A person, as an approval request records them.\n *\n * Both keys are kept. The machine then never has to choose one identity key,\n * which is what split the earlier acknowledgement flows: some held an email and\n * some held a user id, and the two could not be compared.\n */\nexport interface ApprovalActor {\n  userId: string\n  email: string\n}\n\nexport interface ApprovalAck extends ApprovalActor {\n  /** An ISO timestamp. It is in a json column, so it is a string, not a Date. */\n  date: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Who asked for an action, and who agreed to it.\n *\n * Every route of `api/admin/approvals` takes this envelope, and control-backend\n * builds it from the request that it runs. The envelope exists because the\n * token cannot carry it: the call is machine to machine, so `sub` holds the id\n * of the Auth0 application and not a person. A service that reads the token\n * alone therefore writes \"control-backend\" into its audit record, which hides\n * the two Camundis that the whole mechanism exists to record.\n *\n * `approvedBy` is a list, because a use case can need more than one approval,\n * and the record must name all of them. It can also be EMPTY: how many\n * approvals an action needs is a number of the use case, and `move-cluster-org`\n * holds zero on purpose. The person in `requestedBy` is never in the list: the\n * four-eyes rule is that the person who asks is not the person who agrees, and\n * control-backend holds that rule.\n *\n * Each person carries both keys of `ApprovalActor`. The email is what a route\n * uses to ask Auth0 about the person, and the user id is what an audit record\n * holds, because every other record of the fleet holds an Auth0 `sub`.\n *\n * CAUTION: The envelope is a CLAIM of the caller, and not proof. A route that\n * acts on it must ask Auth0 again whether `requestedBy` may do the action.\n * That means the permission of the action. For a use case with\n * `openToEveryone`, it means that the person is a Camundi, because no\n * permission runs that action. `api/admin/approvals` in accounts-backend does\n * that. See the note on `M2M_CONTROL_APPROVALS`.\n */\nexport interface ApprovalM2mActor {\n  /** The id of the approval request, to join the records of both services. */\n  requestId: string\n  /** The Camundi who opened the request. */\n  requestedBy: ApprovalActor\n  /** The Camundis who approved it. Empty when the use case needs none. */\n  approvedBy: ApprovalActor[]\n}\n\n/**\n * What one value of a summary field is.\n *\n * `text` is what a person reads. `id` is what a link points at, and it is\n * absent when the kind names no entity. The two are separate because the text\n * is a COPY that the request keeps: an organization that gets a new name after\n * the request was opened must still read as the organization that the person\n * chose.\n */\nexport interface ApprovalSummaryValue {\n  text: string\n  id?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * How a reader must render one field of a summary.\n *\n * `org`, `cluster` and `user` name an entity, so a reader can link to it and\n * can resolve a fresh name. The others are plain: `date` is an ISO timestamp,\n * and `code` is a value that must keep its characters, such as a json fragment.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_SUMMARY_FIELD_KINDS = [\n  'text',\n  'number',\n  'boolean',\n  'date',\n  'org',\n  'cluster',\n  'user',\n  'code',\n] as const\n\nexport type ApprovalSummaryFieldKind =\n  (typeof APPROVAL_SUMMARY_FIELD_KINDS)[number]\n\n/**\n * One labelled field of the payload of a request.\n *\n * This is what makes ONE view able to show EVERY use case. The payload of a\n * request is an object of anything, so a generic view can only print it as\n * json. The use case turns it into labelled fields here, and the view renders\n * a field by its kind: it links an `org`, it formats a `date`, and it lists\n * 300 clusters as 300 links.\n *\n * `values` is always an array. A field that holds one value holds an array of\n * one, so a reader needs no branch for \"one or many\".\n */\nexport interface ApprovalSummaryField {\n  label: string\n  kind: ApprovalSummaryFieldKind\n  values: ApprovalSummaryValue[]\n  /**\n   * The values that this request replaces, for a field that changes. A view\n   * shows them as removed beside `values` as added. A field with no\n   * `previous` is not a change.\n   */\n  previous?: ApprovalSummaryValue[]\n  /** The count of `previous`, when the list cut it. Like `total`, for `previous`. */\n  previousTotal?: number\n  /**\n   * How many values the field holds, when `values` holds only the first of\n   * them. The list route cuts every field to `APPROVAL_LIST_SUMMARY_VALUES_MAX`\n   * values. The detail route sends every value and no `total`.\n   */\n  total?: number\n}\n\n/**\n * How many values of one summary field a row of the list carries.\n *\n * A bulk operation names up to 3000 clusters in one field. A page of 100 such\n * rows would carry 300,000 values that no row shows. The view shows at most\n * 12 values of a field, so the list stops there, and `total` holds the count.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_LIST_SUMMARY_VALUES_MAX = 12\n\n/**\n * The kinds of entity that an approval request can concern.\n *\n * These are the entities that a request is findable by: the org and cluster\n * detail pages ask \"which requests touch me\", and the answer reads a row for\n * each entity. It is a subset of `APPROVAL_SUMMARY_FIELD_KINDS` \u2014 the kinds that\n * name an entity \u2014 because only those carry an id that a page can match.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_ENTITY_TYPES = ['cluster', 'org', 'user'] as const\n\nexport type ApprovalEntityType = (typeof APPROVAL_ENTITY_TYPES)[number]\n\n/**\n * One entity that an approval request concerns.\n *\n * A use case reports these from its payload, and the service writes one row for\n * each into `approval_job_entity`. That row is what makes a request findable by\n * an entity it touches, without a text search over the payload: a cluster-move\n * request names its cluster, its target organization AND its source\n * organization, so it shows on all three detail pages. The `summary` still\n * carries the words a reader sees; this carries only the ids a page matches.\n */\nexport interface ApprovalEntityRef {\n  type: ApprovalEntityType\n  id: string\n}\n\n/**\n * How long a run may go quiet before a reader calls it stalled.\n *\n * The pod that runs an action writes its progress and renews its lease on one\n * timer, so a healthy run touches the row well inside this window. A row that\n * is `executing` and older than this held a pod that stopped, and the\n * reconciler of control-backend is on its way to it.\n *\n * It lives here, and not in the config of the service, because a READER needs\n * it: the browser must decide what to show without a second call, and a number\n * that only the backend knew would make the two disagree. `ACTION_LEASE_MS` in\n * `config/index.ts` is held below this on purpose.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_RUN_STALE_MS = 120_000\n\n/**\n * What an action reports while it runs.\n *\n * This is what makes a long action watchable. Every field is in the DATABASE\n * and not in the answer to the call that started the run, so three readers see\n * the same thing: the person who pressed the button, the same person after a\n * reload, and a second person who opens the request.\n *\n * `total` can be 0 while an action counts its targets, and it stays 0 for an\n * action that cannot count them. A reader must then show that it runs, and no\n * percentage.\n */\nexport interface ApprovalProgress {\n  /** Targets in total. 0 means the action did not say. */\n  total: number\n  /** Targets finished, whatever the outcome of each one. */\n  done: number\n  /** Targets that finished with an error. Part of `done`. */\n  failed: number\n  /** One short line for a person, such as the step that runs now. */\n  note?: string\n  /** An ISO timestamp: when the run started. */\n  startedAt: string\n  /** An ISO timestamp: when the run last wrote anything. */\n  updatedAt: string\n}\n\n/** The share of the work that is finished, or `undefined` with no total. */\nexport function progressFraction(\n  progress: ApprovalProgress | undefined,\n): number | undefined {\n  if (!progress || progress.total <= 0) {\n    return undefined\n  }\n  return Math.min(1, progress.done / progress.total)\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether a running request went quiet.\n *\n * True means that the pod which held the run stopped, or lost the row. It does\n * NOT mean that the action failed: the reconciler either runs it again, or it\n * writes `failed` so that a person can. See `APPROVAL_RUN_STALE_MS`.\n */\nexport function isRunStalled(job: ApprovalJobDto, now: Date): boolean {\n  if (job.status !== 'executing') {\n    return false\n  }\n  const lastSign = job.progress?.updatedAt ?? job.executingSince\n  if (!lastSign) {\n    return false\n  }\n  return now.getTime() - new Date(lastSign).getTime() > APPROVAL_RUN_STALE_MS\n}\n\n/** One approval request, as the API returns it. */\nexport interface ApprovalJobDto {\n  id: string\n  type: string\n  dedupeKey?: string\n  payload: Record<string, unknown>\n  /**\n   * The payload as labelled fields. See `ApprovalSummaryField`.\n   *\n   * The use case builds it when the request is opened AND every time the\n   * request is read, so a field that a later version of the use case adds\n   * appears on a request that is already open.\n   */\n  summary: ApprovalSummaryField[]\n  /** Why the person opened the request. Some use cases demand one. */\n  reason?: string\n  createdBy: ApprovalActor\n  acks: ApprovalAck[]\n  /**\n   * How many approvals THIS request needs.\n   *\n   * It is on the request and not only on the use case, because the person who\n   * opens one can ask for more than the floor of the use case. A bulk\n   * operation over 3000 clusters is the same action as one over 3, and it can\n   * still deserve a third pair of eyes. `ApprovalUseCaseDto.minAcks` is the\n   * floor that a caller cannot go below.\n   */\n  requiredAcks: number\n  /**\n   * What a person must hold to approve, reject or run THIS request.\n   *\n   * It is on the request and not only on the use case, because a payload can\n   * raise the guard: a generation update with `yoloForceUpdate` needs the yolo\n   * permission on top of the base one, and the same use case without the flag\n   * does not. The set is computed ONE time, when the request is opened, so it\n   * is also the record of what the request was guarded by.\n   *\n   * A person needs EVERY permission in the set, not one of them.\n   */\n  requiredPermissions: string[]\n  executionMode: ApprovalExecutionMode\n  actionMode: ApprovalActionMode\n  status: ApprovalJobStatus\n  closedBy?: ApprovalActor\n  closedReason?: string\n  /** An ISO timestamp. */\n  expiresAt: string\n  /**\n   * An ISO timestamp: when the current run took the request.\n   *\n   * It is set every time a run starts, so a run that the reconciler starts\n   * again moves it. `attempts` says how many runs there were.\n   */\n  executingSince?: string\n  /** How many times a run started. A recovery raises it. */\n  attempts: number\n  /**\n   * What the action reports while it runs. See `ApprovalProgress`.\n   *\n   * It stays on the row after the run, so the record of a finished run says\n   * how many targets it touched and how many refused.\n   */\n  progress?: ApprovalProgress\n  executedAt?: string\n  executionError?: string\n  /**\n   * What the action reported when it ran.\n   *\n   * The shape belongs to the use case. An action over many targets puts the\n   * result of each target here, which is the difference between \"it failed\"\n   * and \"it did 2998 of 3000, and these two refused\".\n   */\n  executionResult?: Record<string, unknown>\n  createdAt: string\n  updatedAt: string\n}\n\n/**\n * What a use case is, as the API reports it.\n *\n * The frontend needs `requiredPermission` to run the same rule as the backend.\n * PR #9301 kept this registry a second time, by hand, in the frontend. A\n * registry that the server owns means a new use case needs no frontend deploy.\n */\nexport interface ApprovalUseCaseDto {\n  type: string\n  /** A short name for a person to read. */\n  label: string\n  /** One sentence: what the action does, and what it cannot undo. */\n  description: string\n  /** The approvals a new request asks for when the caller names no number. */\n  defaultAcks: number\n  /**\n   * The floor. A caller can ask for more approvals, never for fewer.\n   *\n   * It is a separate number from `defaultAcks` because the two answer\n   * different questions: the default is what the form offers, and the floor is\n   * what the service refuses to go below.\n   */\n  minAcks: number\n  ttlDays: number\n  executionMode: ApprovalExecutionMode\n  /** See `ApprovalActionMode`. An action over many targets is `background`. */\n  actionMode: ApprovalActionMode\n  /**\n   * True when a run that was interrupted can start again by itself.\n   *\n   * It is a promise about the ACTION, and the reconciler reads it. Set it only\n   * when the action can run a second time over the same payload and do no harm\n   * twice: it must read what the first run already finished, out of\n   * `ApprovalJobDto.executionResult`, and skip it.\n   *\n   * False, the default, is the safe answer. An interrupted run then lands in\n   * `failed`, which a person can run again from the detail page, and a person\n   * decides whether running it twice is safe.\n   */\n  resumable: boolean\n  /**\n   * The permission that every request of this use case needs to approve,\n   * reject or run. A payload can add more. See\n   * `ApprovalJobDto.requiredPermissions`, which is the effective set.\n   *\n   * It is also the permission to SEE a request of this use case, because a\n   * person who cannot act on one has no reason to read it. The person who\n   * opened a request always sees that request.\n   *\n   * The one exception to \"or run\" is a use case with `openToEveryone`. It has\n   * no approval, so this permission only decides who sees the requests of\n   * other people. Any signed-in person can open and run such a request.\n   */\n  requiredPermission: string\n  /**\n   * The permission to open a request. Absent means any signed-in Camundi.\n   *\n   * Set it when the pool that can ASK must be as small as the pool that can\n   * approve. Leave it absent when the approvals alone are the guard, and the\n   * proposal is not.\n   */\n  createPermission?: string\n  /** True when a request cannot be opened without a reason. */\n  reasonRequired: boolean\n  /**\n   * True when the ACTION needs the email address of the person who asked.\n   *\n   * A token can carry no address, and the row then stores\n   * `UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL`. An action that sends that placeholder to another\n   * service asks it to find a user that does not exist, so the request can\n   * only fail \u2014 and it fails at the END, after other people spent their\n   * approvals on it. A use case that carries the creator into its call sets\n   * this, and `canCreate` then refuses such a caller at the start.\n   *\n   * `extend-trial` and `send-to-expired-trial` are two: both send the creator\n   * to accounts in an `ApprovalM2mActor`, and accounts reads the permissions\n   * of that person again before it acts.\n   *\n   * `move-cluster-org` does NOT set this. Its envelope reaches console, which\n   * reads the user id alone and needs no address.\n   */\n  creatorEmailRequired?: boolean\n  /**\n   * A use case with no approval that any signed-in person can open AND run.\n   *\n   * A request with a floor of zero runs when it is opened, so `canCreate`\n   * asks the person to hold `requiredPermission`. This flag lifts that one\n   * rule, for an action whose run needs no permission of the person. Set it\n   * only when two things hold:\n   *\n   * - Something else bounds how often a person can ask.\n   * - The service that runs the action authorizes the person again at its\n   *   source, so that nobody can change what is not theirs. The action can\n   *   touch an organization only when that check lets the person change it.\n   *\n   * `create-personal-organisation` and the two use cases of custom hardware\n   * sizing set it. The two use cases of custom hardware sizing do the second\n   * check in two ways:\n   *\n   * - Creating a plan, and unlinking a plan from one organization, read the\n   *   role of the person in that organization. Only an OWNER passes.\n   * - Deleting a plan reads no role. Console checks that the person created\n   *   the plan. Accounts reads the organizations that the person is a member\n   *   of, in any role, and removes the plan from their lists.\n   */\n  openToEveryone?: boolean\n}\n"],
+  "sourcesContent": ["/*\n * Copyright Camunda Services GmbH and/or licensed to Camunda Services GmbH\n * under one or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under a commercial license.\n * You may not use this file except in compliance with the commercial license.\n */\n\n/**\n * The wire types of the generic approval mechanism.\n *\n * This file holds no logic and no dependency, because three consumers read it:\n * control-backend, control-frontend and cloudbot. The rules that read these\n * types are in `../approvals/policy.js`, and they are pure for the same reason.\n */\n\n/**\n * Every state that an approval request can hold.\n *\n * A `const` tuple, not an enum, so it is both the union type and the list that\n * validates a status filter at run time.\n *\n * The path of a request: `pending` until it reaches the threshold. Then\n * `executing` (automatic mode) or `approved` (explicit mode, which waits for a\n * person to press the button). `executed` or `failed` after the action ran. A\n * request that never reaches the threshold ends `rejected`, `withdrawn` or\n * `expired`.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_JOB_STATUSES = [\n  'pending',\n  'approved',\n  'executing',\n  'executed',\n  'failed',\n  'rejected',\n  'withdrawn',\n  'expired',\n] as const\n\nexport type ApprovalJobStatus = (typeof APPROVAL_JOB_STATUSES)[number]\n\n/**\n * The states in which the action of a request is still COMING.\n *\n * `pending` waits for approvals, `approved` waits for a person to press the\n * button, and `executing` is running now. Each of them can still change the\n * world, so two requests for one target must not be in these states together.\n * `dedupeKey` reads this set for that reason.\n *\n * `failed` is NOT here, although a person can run a failed request again. A\n * failed request runs only when a person presses the button, and that person\n * sees the row. Blocking a new request on a failed one would also trap the\n * key: `canWithdraw` accepts `pending` alone, so nobody could close it.\n *\n * `executed`, `rejected`, `withdrawn` and `expired` are the end of a request.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_LIVE_STATUSES = [\n  'pending',\n  'approved',\n  'executing',\n] as const satisfies readonly ApprovalJobStatus[]\n\n/**\n * How many requests one page of the list holds when the caller asks for no\n * number.\n *\n * The list is a work queue that a Camundi reads, so the page is large: a\n * person wants the whole queue and not ten rows at a time. What the number is\n * for is the ceiling below.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_PAGE_SIZE_DEFAULT = 500\n\n/**\n * The largest page that the service builds, and the largest that a caller may\n * ask for. The API answers 400 above it.\n *\n * The list had no limit at all. One authenticated caller could then make the\n * service read the whole table into memory, serialize it, and do it again, so\n * the cost of a request grew with the age of the service and with nothing that\n * the caller had to pay for. A ceiling turns that into a fixed cost.\n *\n * It is HERE and not only in the service, because the view must know it: a\n * page that asked for more would get a 400 instead of rows.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_PAGE_SIZE_MAX = 2000\n\n/**\n * The columns that the queue can be ordered by.\n *\n * A NAME and not an SQL expression: the repository maps each one, so a caller\n * can never name a column that this list does not hold. `status` orders by the\n * EFFECTIVE status, because a `pending` row whose time ran out reads as\n * `expired` everywhere else.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_SORT_FIELDS = [\n  'createdAt',\n  'expiresAt',\n  'status',\n  'type',\n  'createdBy',\n] as const\n\nexport type ApprovalSortField = (typeof APPROVAL_SORT_FIELDS)[number]\n\nexport type ApprovalSortOrder = 'asc' | 'desc'\n\n/** The default order of the queue: the newest request first. */\nexport const APPROVAL_SORT_DEFAULT: {\n  sort: ApprovalSortField\n  order: ApprovalSortOrder\n} = { sort: 'createdAt', order: 'desc' }\n\n/**\n * The longest reason that a request, a rejection or a withdrawal accepts.\n *\n * ONE number, because three routes of control-backend hold it and three fields\n * of control-frontend must stop there. A field that let a person write more\n * than the schema accepts turns their sentence into a 400 after they wrote it.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_REASON_MAX_LENGTH = 2000\n\n/**\n * The largest number of approvals that a caller can ask for.\n *\n * A request that asks for 400 approvals can never reach them, so it is a\n * request that only fills the table and expires. The ceiling turns that into a\n * 400 at the moment a person types it. It is HERE because the form of the\n * bulk operation must stop at the same number as the route.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_ACKS_MAX = 10\n\n/**\n * The longest search text that the list accepts.\n *\n * A search runs `ILIKE` over the payload of every visible row, so the cost of\n * one call follows the length of the text. Nothing a person types to find a\n * request is near this.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_SEARCH_MAX_LENGTH = 200\n\n/**\n * The payload field that names the organization a request acts on.\n *\n * It is a CONVENTION, and this constant is what makes the convention readable\n * from both sides. A use case whose action hits one organization puts the id of\n * that organization in this field, and `GET /api/approvals?orgId=\u2026` then finds\n * the request with no knowledge of the use case. The filter reads this one\n * field of the payload, so it matches the whole id and nothing else. The free\n * text search reads the payload as TEXT, which also matches an id that only\n * appears inside another field, and it cannot answer \"the requests of this\n * organization\".\n *\n * The organization page of control-frontend does NOT read this field. It asks\n * the entity-link filter (`entityType=org`), which reads a row that\n * `relatedEntities` of a use case writes \u2014 see `ApprovalEntityRef`. The summary\n * is separate again: the `org` field of a `summarize` result is what a READER\n * follows.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_PAYLOAD_ORG_FIELD = 'orgId'\n\n/**\n * How many requests each status holds, for the filters of the queue.\n *\n * Every number answers the SAME question as the list beside it: the counts are\n * built with the visibility rule, the action filter and the search text of the\n * caller, and with the lazy expiry. A count that ignored one of those would\n * send a person to a filter that then shows nothing.\n */\nexport interface ApprovalStatusCountsDto {\n  /** Every request that matches, whatever its status. */\n  all: number\n  /** One number for each status. A status with no request is 0, never absent. */\n  byStatus: Record<ApprovalJobStatus, number>\n}\n\n/**\n * What happens when a request reaches its threshold.\n *\n * `auto` runs the action immediately. `explicit` holds the request at\n * `approved` and waits for a person to run it.\n */\nexport type ApprovalExecutionMode = 'auto' | 'explicit'\n\n/**\n * WHERE the action runs. It is a separate question from who starts it.\n *\n * - `inline` runs the action inside the call that started it, and the answer\n *   already carries the outcome. Right for one call to another service.\n * - `background` answers as soon as the request is claimed, and the action\n *   runs on. It reports into `ApprovalJobDto.progress`, and the row is the\n *   only place that holds the progress, so a reload and a second person read\n *   the same numbers. A pod that stops loses the run, and the reconciler of\n *   control-backend recovers the row.\n *\n * An action over thousands of targets MUST be `background`. `inline` would\n * hold one HTTP request for the whole run, and the ingress, the load balancer\n * and the browser each have their own deadline before it finishes.\n *\n * An `inline` action must not read `context.signal`. The runner trusts the\n * result of an `inline` action that returns after a drain, and it would count\n * a partial run as `executed`. An action that stops between targets is\n * `background`.\n */\nexport type ApprovalActionMode = 'inline' | 'background'\n\n/**\n * A person, as an approval request records them.\n *\n * Both keys are kept. The machine then never has to choose one identity key,\n * which is what split the earlier acknowledgement flows: some held an email and\n * some held a user id, and the two could not be compared.\n */\nexport interface ApprovalActor {\n  userId: string\n  email: string\n}\n\nexport interface ApprovalAck extends ApprovalActor {\n  /** An ISO timestamp. It is in a json column, so it is a string, not a Date. */\n  date: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Who asked for an action, and who agreed to it.\n *\n * Every route of `api/admin/approvals` takes this envelope, and control-backend\n * builds it from the request that it runs. The envelope exists because the\n * token cannot carry it: the call is machine to machine, so `sub` holds the id\n * of the Auth0 application and not a person. A service that reads the token\n * alone therefore writes \"control-backend\" into its audit record, which hides\n * the two Camundis that the whole mechanism exists to record.\n *\n * `approvedBy` is a list, because a use case can need more than one approval,\n * and the record must name all of them. It can also be EMPTY: how many\n * approvals an action needs is a number of the use case, and `move-cluster-org`\n * holds zero on purpose. The person in `requestedBy` is never in the list: the\n * four-eyes rule is that the person who asks is not the person who agrees, and\n * control-backend holds that rule.\n *\n * Each person carries both keys of `ApprovalActor`. The email is what a route\n * uses to ask Auth0 about the person, and the user id is what an audit record\n * holds, because every other record of the fleet holds an Auth0 `sub`.\n *\n * CAUTION: The envelope is a CLAIM of the caller, and not proof. A route that\n * acts on it must ask Auth0 again whether `requestedBy` may do the action.\n * That means the permission of the action. For a use case with\n * `openToEveryone`, it means that the person is a Camundi, because no\n * permission runs that action. `api/admin/approvals` in accounts-backend does\n * that. See the note on `M2M_CONTROL_APPROVALS`.\n */\nexport interface ApprovalM2mActor {\n  /** The id of the approval request, to join the records of both services. */\n  requestId: string\n  /** The Camundi who opened the request. */\n  requestedBy: ApprovalActor\n  /** The Camundis who approved it. Empty when the use case needs none. */\n  approvedBy: ApprovalActor[]\n}\n\n/**\n * What one value of a summary field is.\n *\n * `text` is what a person reads. `id` is what a link points at, and it is\n * absent when the kind names no entity. The two are separate because the text\n * is a COPY that the request keeps: an organization that gets a new name after\n * the request was opened must still read as the organization that the person\n * chose.\n */\nexport interface ApprovalSummaryValue {\n  text: string\n  id?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * How a reader must render one field of a summary.\n *\n * `org`, `cluster` and `user` name an entity, so a reader can link to it and\n * can resolve a fresh name. The others are plain: `date` is an ISO timestamp,\n * and `code` is a value that must keep its characters, such as a json fragment.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_SUMMARY_FIELD_KINDS = [\n  'text',\n  'number',\n  'boolean',\n  'date',\n  'org',\n  'cluster',\n  'user',\n  'code',\n] as const\n\nexport type ApprovalSummaryFieldKind =\n  (typeof APPROVAL_SUMMARY_FIELD_KINDS)[number]\n\n/**\n * One labelled field of the payload of a request.\n *\n * This is what makes ONE view able to show EVERY use case. The payload of a\n * request is an object of anything, so a generic view can only print it as\n * json. The use case turns it into labelled fields here, and the view renders\n * a field by its kind: it links an `org`, it formats a `date`, and it lists\n * 300 clusters as 300 links.\n *\n * `values` is always an array. A field that holds one value holds an array of\n * one, so a reader needs no branch for \"one or many\".\n */\nexport interface ApprovalSummaryField {\n  label: string\n  kind: ApprovalSummaryFieldKind\n  values: ApprovalSummaryValue[]\n  /**\n   * The values that this request replaces, for a field that changes. A view\n   * shows them as removed beside `values` as added. A field with no\n   * `previous` is not a change.\n   */\n  previous?: ApprovalSummaryValue[]\n  /** The count of `previous`, when the list cut it. Like `total`, for `previous`. */\n  previousTotal?: number\n  /**\n   * How many values the field holds, when `values` holds only the first of\n   * them. The list route cuts every field to `APPROVAL_LIST_SUMMARY_VALUES_MAX`\n   * values. The detail route sends every value and no `total`.\n   */\n  total?: number\n}\n\n/**\n * How many values of one summary field a row of the list carries.\n *\n * A bulk operation names up to 3000 clusters in one field. A page of 100 such\n * rows would carry 300,000 values that no row shows. The view shows at most\n * 12 values of a field, so the list stops there, and `total` holds the count.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_LIST_SUMMARY_VALUES_MAX = 12\n\n/**\n * The kinds of entity that an approval request can concern.\n *\n * These are the entities that a request is findable by: the org and cluster\n * detail pages ask \"which requests touch me\", and the answer reads a row for\n * each entity. It is a subset of `APPROVAL_SUMMARY_FIELD_KINDS` \u2014 the kinds that\n * name an entity \u2014 because only those carry an id that a page can match.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_ENTITY_TYPES = ['cluster', 'org', 'user'] as const\n\nexport type ApprovalEntityType = (typeof APPROVAL_ENTITY_TYPES)[number]\n\n/**\n * One entity that an approval request concerns.\n *\n * A use case reports these from its payload, and the service writes one row for\n * each into `approval_job_entity`. That row is what makes a request findable by\n * an entity it touches, without a text search over the payload: a cluster-move\n * request names its cluster, its target organization AND its source\n * organization, so it shows on all three detail pages. The `summary` still\n * carries the words a reader sees; this carries only the ids a page matches.\n */\nexport interface ApprovalEntityRef {\n  type: ApprovalEntityType\n  id: string\n}\n\n/**\n * How long a run may go quiet before a reader calls it stalled.\n *\n * The pod that runs an action writes its progress and renews its lease on one\n * timer, so a healthy run touches the row well inside this window. A row that\n * is `executing` and older than this held a pod that stopped, and the\n * reconciler of control-backend is on its way to it.\n *\n * It lives here, and not in the config of the service, because a READER needs\n * it: the browser must decide what to show without a second call, and a number\n * that only the backend knew would make the two disagree. `ACTION_LEASE_MS` in\n * `config/index.ts` is held below this on purpose.\n */\nexport const APPROVAL_RUN_STALE_MS = 120_000\n\n/**\n * What an action reports while it runs.\n *\n * This is what makes a long action watchable. Every field is in the DATABASE\n * and not in the answer to the call that started the run, so three readers see\n * the same thing: the person who pressed the button, the same person after a\n * reload, and a second person who opens the request.\n *\n * `total` can be 0 while an action counts its targets, and it stays 0 for an\n * action that cannot count them. A reader must then show that it runs, and no\n * percentage.\n */\nexport interface ApprovalProgress {\n  /** Targets in total. 0 means the action did not say. */\n  total: number\n  /** Targets finished, whatever the outcome of each one. */\n  done: number\n  /** Targets that finished with an error. Part of `done`. */\n  failed: number\n  /** One short line for a person, such as the step that runs now. */\n  note?: string\n  /** An ISO timestamp: when the run started. */\n  startedAt: string\n  /** An ISO timestamp: when the run last wrote anything. */\n  updatedAt: string\n}\n\n/** The share of the work that is finished, or `undefined` with no total. */\nexport function progressFraction(\n  progress: ApprovalProgress | undefined,\n): number | undefined {\n  if (!progress || progress.total <= 0) {\n    return undefined\n  }\n  return Math.min(1, progress.done / progress.total)\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether a running request went quiet.\n *\n * True means that the pod which held the run stopped, or lost the row. It does\n * NOT mean that the action failed: the reconciler either runs it again, or it\n * writes `failed` so that a person can. See `APPROVAL_RUN_STALE_MS`.\n */\nexport function isRunStalled(job: ApprovalJobDto, now: Date): boolean {\n  if (job.status !== 'executing') {\n    return false\n  }\n  const lastSign = job.progress?.updatedAt ?? job.executingSince\n  if (!lastSign) {\n    return false\n  }\n  return now.getTime() - new Date(lastSign).getTime() > APPROVAL_RUN_STALE_MS\n}\n\n/** One approval request, as the API returns it. */\nexport interface ApprovalJobDto {\n  id: string\n  type: string\n  dedupeKey?: string\n  payload: Record<string, unknown>\n  /**\n   * The payload as labelled fields. See `ApprovalSummaryField`.\n   *\n   * The use case builds it when the request is opened AND every time the\n   * request is read, so a field that a later version of the use case adds\n   * appears on a request that is already open.\n   */\n  summary: ApprovalSummaryField[]\n  /** Why the person opened the request. Some use cases demand one. */\n  reason?: string\n  createdBy: ApprovalActor\n  acks: ApprovalAck[]\n  /**\n   * How many approvals THIS request needs.\n   *\n   * It is on the request and not only on the use case, because the person who\n   * opens one can ask for more than the floor of the use case. A bulk\n   * operation over 3000 clusters is the same action as one over 3, and it can\n   * still deserve a third pair of eyes. `ApprovalUseCaseDto.minAcks` is the\n   * floor that a caller cannot go below.\n   */\n  requiredAcks: number\n  /**\n   * What a person must hold to approve, reject or run THIS request.\n   *\n   * It is on the request and not only on the use case, because a payload can\n   * raise the guard: a generation update with `yoloForceUpdate` needs the yolo\n   * permission on top of the base one, and the same use case without the flag\n   * does not. The set is computed ONE time, when the request is opened, so it\n   * is also the record of what the request was guarded by.\n   *\n   * A person needs EVERY permission in the set, not one of them.\n   */\n  requiredPermissions: string[]\n  executionMode: ApprovalExecutionMode\n  actionMode: ApprovalActionMode\n  status: ApprovalJobStatus\n  closedBy?: ApprovalActor\n  closedReason?: string\n  /** An ISO timestamp. */\n  expiresAt: string\n  /**\n   * An ISO timestamp: when the current run took the request.\n   *\n   * It is set every time a run starts, so a run that the reconciler starts\n   * again moves it. `attempts` says how many runs there were.\n   */\n  executingSince?: string\n  /** How many times a run started. A recovery raises it. */\n  attempts: number\n  /**\n   * What the action reports while it runs. See `ApprovalProgress`.\n   *\n   * It stays on the row after the run, so the record of a finished run says\n   * how many targets it touched and how many refused.\n   */\n  progress?: ApprovalProgress\n  executedAt?: string\n  executionError?: string\n  /**\n   * What the action reported when it ran.\n   *\n   * The shape belongs to the use case. An action over many targets puts the\n   * result of each target here, which is the difference between \"it failed\"\n   * and \"it did 2998 of 3000, and these two refused\".\n   */\n  executionResult?: Record<string, unknown>\n  createdAt: string\n  updatedAt: string\n}\n\n/**\n * What a use case is, as the API reports it.\n *\n * The frontend needs `requiredPermission` to run the same rule as the backend.\n * PR #9301 kept this registry a second time, by hand, in the frontend. A\n * registry that the server owns means a new use case needs no frontend deploy.\n */\nexport interface ApprovalUseCaseDto {\n  type: string\n  /** A short name for a person to read. */\n  label: string\n  /** One sentence: what the action does, and what it cannot undo. */\n  description: string\n  /** The approvals a new request asks for when the caller names no number. */\n  defaultAcks: number\n  /**\n   * The floor. A caller can ask for more approvals, never for fewer.\n   *\n   * It is a separate number from `defaultAcks` because the two answer\n   * different questions: the default is what the form offers, and the floor is\n   * what the service refuses to go below.\n   */\n  minAcks: number\n  ttlDays: number\n  executionMode: ApprovalExecutionMode\n  /** See `ApprovalActionMode`. An action over many targets is `background`. */\n  actionMode: ApprovalActionMode\n  /**\n   * True when a run that was interrupted can start again by itself.\n   *\n   * It is a promise about the ACTION, and the reconciler reads it. Set it only\n   * when the action can run a second time over the same payload and do no harm\n   * twice: it must read what the first run already finished, out of\n   * `ApprovalJobDto.executionResult`, and skip it.\n   *\n   * False, the default, is the safe answer. An interrupted run then lands in\n   * `failed`, which a person can run again from the detail page, and a person\n   * decides whether running it twice is safe.\n   */\n  resumable: boolean\n  /**\n   * The permission that every request of this use case needs to approve,\n   * reject or run. A payload can add more. See\n   * `ApprovalJobDto.requiredPermissions`, which is the effective set.\n   *\n   * It is also the permission to SEE a request of this use case, because a\n   * person who cannot act on one has no reason to read it. The person who\n   * opened a request always sees that request.\n   *\n   * The one exception to \"or run\" is a use case with `openToEveryone`. It has\n   * no approval, so this permission only decides who sees the requests of\n   * other people. Any signed-in person can open and run such a request.\n   */\n  requiredPermission: string\n  /**\n   * The permission to open a request. Absent means any signed-in Camundi.\n   *\n   * Set it when the pool that can ASK must be as small as the pool that can\n   * approve. Leave it absent when the approvals alone are the guard, and the\n   * proposal is not.\n   */\n  createPermission?: string\n  /** True when a request cannot be opened without a reason. */\n  reasonRequired: boolean\n  /**\n   * True when the ACTION needs the email address of the person who asked.\n   *\n   * A token can carry no address, and the row then stores\n   * `UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL`. An action that sends that placeholder to another\n   * service asks it to find a user that does not exist, so the request can\n   * only fail \u2014 and it fails at the END, after other people spent their\n   * approvals on it. A use case that carries the creator into its call sets\n   * this, and `canCreate` then refuses such a caller at the start.\n   *\n   * `extend-trial` and `send-to-expired-trial` are two: both send the creator\n   * to accounts in an `ApprovalM2mActor`, and accounts reads the permissions\n   * of that person again before it acts.\n   *\n   * `move-cluster-org` does NOT set this. Its envelope reaches console, which\n   * reads the user id alone and needs no address.\n   */\n  creatorEmailRequired?: boolean\n  /**\n   * A use case with no approval that any signed-in person can open AND run.\n   *\n   * A request with a floor of zero runs when it is opened, so `canCreate`\n   * asks the person to hold `requiredPermission`. This flag lifts that one\n   * rule, for an action whose run needs no permission of the person. Set it\n   * only when two things hold:\n   *\n   * - Something else bounds how often a person can ask.\n   * - The service that runs the action authorizes the person again at its\n   *   source, so that nobody can change what is not theirs. The action can\n   *   touch an organization only when that check lets the person change it.\n   *\n   * `create-personal-organisation` and the two use cases of custom hardware\n   * sizing set it. The two use cases of custom hardware sizing do the second\n   * check in two ways:\n   *\n   * - Creating a plan, and unlinking a plan from one organization, read the\n   *   role of the person in that organization. Only an OWNER passes.\n   * - Deleting a plan reads no role. Console checks that the person created\n   *   the plan. Accounts reads the organizations that the person is a member\n   *   of, in any role, and removes the plan from their lists.\n   */\n  openToEveryone?: boolean\n  /**\n   * A use case with no approval that only a service of the fleet opens.\n   *\n   * The service holds `createPermission`, an m2m permission, and not\n   * `requiredPermission`. This flag lets that holder open and thus run a\n   * request with a floor of zero. `requiredPermission` then decides only who\n   * sees the requests and who can run a failed one again. Without a\n   * `createPermission` the flag lifts nothing.\n   *\n   * `cluster-ttl-deletion` sets it. The request exists for the record: the\n   * list, the entity pages and the audit trail show each deletion.\n   */\n  openedBySystem?: boolean\n}\n"],
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package/dist/dtos/ControlV2.dto.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import type { CamundaClusterStage } from '../types/CamundaClusterLabels.type.js';
+import type { ClusterPlanTypesToReserved } from '../types/ClusterPlanTypesToReserved.type.js';
 import type { ClusterTtlDto } from '../types/ClusterTtl.type.js';
 import type { SalesPlanType } from '../types/SalesPlanType.type.js';
 import type { LicensingModelType } from './Organization.dto.js';
@@ -58,6 +59,13 @@ export interface OrgListItemV2Dto {
     enterpriseDevOnly?: boolean;
     /** Org metadata: which licensing model prices the org. */
     licensingModel?: LicensingModelType;
+    /**
+     * The cluster plan types the org reserved, by plan type uuid, with the
+     * count. Absent when the org has no sales plan, and also when it has one
+     * that holds no reserved map (the column is nullable). The export of
+     * reservations and clusters of the Organizations page reads it.
+     */
+    clusterPlanTypesToReserved?: ClusterPlanTypesToReserved;
 }
 export interface ListOrganizationsV2Params extends CursorParams {
     q?: string;

package/dist/dtos/SalesPlan.dto.d.ts

@@ -155,6 +155,11 @@ export declare function unusedSalesPlanLimits(limits: Limits, stage?: string): {
  * the type.
  */
 export declare function clusterPlanWhiteListIds(limits: Limits | undefined): string[];
+/**
+ * Returns the generation uuids of the `generationWhiteList` limit. A value
+ * that is not a string gives no ids.
+ */
+export declare function generationWhiteListIds(limits: Limits | undefined): string[];
 /**
  * Says if unlocked cluster plans work on a stage. They work on local, dev and
  * int. They never work on prod, and an unknown stage reads as off. This is a

package/dist/dtos/SalesPlan.dto.js

@@ -190,6 +190,13 @@ function clusterPlanWhiteListIds(limits) {
   }
   return value.split(",").map((id) => id.trim()).filter((id) => id.length > 0);
 }
+function generationWhiteListIds(limits) {
+  const value = limits?.generationWhiteList;
+  if (typeof value !== "string") {
+    return [];
+  }
+  return value.split(",").map((id) => id.trim()).filter((id) => id.length > 0);
+}
 function isUnlockedClusterPlansStage(stage) {
   return stage === "local" || stage === "dev" || stage === "int";
 }
@@ -206,6 +213,7 @@ export {
   allSalesPlanLimits,
   clusterPlanWhiteListIds,
   deprecatedLimit,
+  generationWhiteListIds,
   isLimitKeyEnabled,
   isLimitOfferedOnStage,
   isUnlockedClusterPlansStage,