@camunda/ccma-shared-types 3.0.0 → 4.0.0

package/dist/approvals/policy.js

@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
 import { UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL } from "../constants/misc.const.js";
+import { ConsolePermissions } from "../permissions/console.permissions.js";
+function approvalPermissionCheck(held) {
+  const all = held.has(ConsolePermissions.APPROVALS_ALL_USE_CASES);
+  return (permission) => all || held.has(permission);
+}
 function isSameActorEmail(one, other) {
   const left = comparableActorEmail(one);
   return left.length > 0 && left === comparableActorEmail(other);
@@ -7,6 +12,9 @@ function comparableActorEmail(value) {
   const trimmed = value?.trim().toLowerCase() ?? "";
   return trimmed === UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL ? "" : trimmed;
 }
+function isSameActor(identity, actor) {
+  return identity.userId === actor.userId || isSameActorEmail(identity.email, actor.email);
+}
 function hasActorEmail(actor) {
   return comparableActorEmail(actor.email).length > 0;
 }
@@ -33,20 +41,33 @@ function requiredPermissionsOf(job) {
   return job.requiredPermissions;
 }
 function canView(job, actor, useCase) {
-  if (actor.has(useCase.requiredPermission) || job.createdBy.userId === actor.userId || isSameActorEmail(job.createdBy.email, actor.email)) {
+  if (actor.has(useCase.requiredPermission) || isSameActor(job.createdBy, actor)) {
     return ALLOWED;
   }
   return deny("forbidden", "You cannot see this request.");
 }
 function canCreate(actor, useCase, request = {}) {
   if (useCase.createPermission && !actor.has(useCase.createPermission)) {
-    return deny("forbidden", "You cannot open this request.");
+    return deny(
+      "forbidden",
+      `Opening this request needs ${useCase.createPermission}, and you do not hold it.`
+    );
   }
   const raised = (request.requiredPermissions ?? []).filter(
     (permission) => permission !== useCase.requiredPermission
   );
   if (raised.length > 0 && !hasEveryPermission(actor, raised)) {
-    return deny("forbidden", "You cannot open this request.");
+    return deny(
+      "forbidden",
+      `This payload needs ${raised.join(" and ")}, and you do not hold it.`
+    );
+  }
+  const toRun = request.requiredPermissions ?? [useCase.requiredPermission];
+  if (resolveRequiredAcks(useCase, request.requiredAcks) === 0 && !hasEveryPermission(actor, toRun)) {
+    return deny(
+      "forbidden",
+      `This request needs no approval, so opening it runs it. That needs ${toRun.join(" and ")}, and you do not hold it.`
+    );
   }
   if (useCase.creatorEmailRequired && !hasActorEmail(actor)) {
     return deny(
@@ -87,15 +108,13 @@ function canAcknowledge(job, actor, now) {
       `This request is ${job.status} and can no longer be approved.`
     );
   }
-  if (job.createdBy.userId === actor.userId || isSameActorEmail(job.createdBy.email, actor.email)) {
+  if (isSameActor(job.createdBy, actor)) {
     return deny(
       "self-approval",
       "You opened this request, so you cannot approve it."
     );
   }
-  if (job.acks.some(
-    (ack) => ack.userId === actor.userId || isSameActorEmail(ack.email, actor.email)
-  )) {
+  if (job.acks.some((ack) => isSameActor(ack, actor))) {
     return deny("already-acknowledged", "You already approved this request.");
   }
   return ALLOWED;
@@ -104,9 +123,6 @@ function canReject(job, actor, now, reason) {
   if (!hasEveryPermission(actor, job.requiredPermissions)) {
     return deny("forbidden", "You cannot reject this request.");
   }
-  if (reason.trim().length === 0) {
-    return deny("no-reason", "Give a reason to reject this request.");
-  }
   if (isExpired(job, now)) {
     return deny(
       "expired",
@@ -119,10 +135,19 @@ function canReject(job, actor, now, reason) {
       `This request is ${job.status} and can no longer be rejected.`
     );
   }
+  if (isSameActor(job.createdBy, actor)) {
+    return deny(
+      "self-rejection",
+      "You opened this request, so withdraw it instead of rejecting it."
+    );
+  }
+  if (reason.trim().length === 0) {
+    return deny("no-reason", "Give a reason to reject this request.");
+  }
   return ALLOWED;
 }
 function canWithdraw(job, actor, now) {
-  if (job.createdBy.userId !== actor.userId) {
+  if (!isSameActor(job.createdBy, actor)) {
     return deny(
       "not-creator",
       "Only the person who opened a request can withdraw it."
@@ -155,6 +180,7 @@ function canExecute(job, actor) {
   return ALLOWED;
 }
 export {
+  approvalPermissionCheck,
   canAcknowledge,
   canCreate,
   canExecute,
@@ -165,6 +191,7 @@ export {
   hasActorEmail,
   hasEveryPermission,
   isExpired,
+  isSameActor,
   isSameActorEmail,
   remainingAcks,
   requiredPermissionsOf,

package/dist/approvals/policy.js.map

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "version": 3,
   "sources": ["../../src/approvals/policy.ts"],
-  "sourcesContent": ["/*\n * Copyright Camunda Services GmbH and/or licensed to Camunda Services GmbH\n * under one or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under a commercial license.\n * You may not use this file except in compliance with the commercial license.\n */\n\nimport { UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL } from '../constants/misc.const.js'\nimport type {\n  ApprovalJobDto,\n  ApprovalUseCaseDto,\n} from '../dtos/ApprovalJob.dto.js'\n\n/**\n * The rules of the approval mechanism, as pure functions.\n *\n * Three consumers run this file: control-backend decides whether to reject a\n * request, control-frontend decides whether to disable a button, and cloudbot\n * decides whether to answer. One copy means the button and the endpoint can\n * never disagree.\n *\n * Two choices in the signatures carry the design:\n *\n * - The actor is an interface with a `has` method. The backend holds an array\n *   of Auth0 claims, and `useSession()` in the frontend gives a flat record of\n *   booleans. Neither side has to convert to the shape of the other.\n * - `now` is a parameter. The expiry is lazy, so a stored `pending` request can\n *   be expired already. A parameter makes a difference between the two clocks\n *   an input that a test can set, and not a silent disagreement.\n *\n * No function here does I/O or returns a promise. The browser call site is what\n * enforces that, and it also stops a later use case from turning a list of 50\n * rows into 200 network calls.\n */\n\n/** Who is asking. See the note above on why this is an interface. */\nexport interface ApprovalActorView {\n  userId: string\n  /**\n   * The email of the actor. It is the SECOND identity of the four-eyes rule.\n   *\n   * `userId` alone is not enough. One person can hold more than one identity in\n   * Auth0 \u2014 a connection through SSO and a connection through a database, or an\n   * account that was made again \u2014 and each one carries a different `sub`. The\n   * same human then opens a request with one identity and approves it with the\n   * other, which is the rule defeated.\n   *\n   * It is optional because a token can carry no email. See\n   * `isSameActorEmail` for what that means for the comparison.\n   */\n  email?: string\n  has(permission: string): boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether two email addresses name one person.\n *\n * Two values that are absent, empty, or `UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL` are NOT one\n * person. A token with no email would otherwise make every actor equal to\n * every other actor, and the rule would refuse everybody.\n *\n * The comparison removes the spaces and the case. Auth0 gives the address as\n * the identity provider wrote it, so `A.B@camunda.com` and `a.b@camunda.com`\n * are one mailbox and must not pass as two people.\n */\nexport function isSameActorEmail(one?: string, other?: string): boolean {\n  const left = comparableActorEmail(one)\n  return left.length > 0 && left === comparableActorEmail(other)\n}\n\n/**\n * The address in the one form that a comparison may use.\n *\n * An absent address, an empty one and `UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL` all become an\n * empty string, because none of the three names a person. The spaces and the\n * case go as well: Auth0 gives the address as the identity provider wrote it.\n */\nfunction comparableActorEmail(value?: string): string {\n  const trimmed = value?.trim().toLowerCase() ?? ''\n  return trimmed === UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL ? '' : trimmed\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether this actor carries an address that names a person.\n *\n * A machine-to-machine token carries none: accounts-backend builds the\n * permissions of such a token from its `permissions` claim alone, and there is\n * no person behind it. See `creatorEmailRequired` of the use case.\n */\nexport function hasActorEmail(actor: ApprovalActorView): boolean {\n  return comparableActorEmail(actor.email).length > 0\n}\n\n/**\n * Why an action is not allowed.\n *\n * The code is for a program: control-backend maps it to a status, and the\n * frontend can branch on it. The message is for a person, and it is shown as\n * written.\n */\nexport type ApprovalDenialCode =\n  | 'forbidden'\n  | 'not-pending'\n  | 'self-approval'\n  | 'already-acknowledged'\n  | 'expired'\n  | 'not-creator'\n  | 'not-executable'\n  | 'no-reason'\n  | 'too-few-acks'\n  | 'no-creator-email'\n\nexport type ApprovalDecision =\n  | { allowed: true }\n  | { allowed: false; code: ApprovalDenialCode; message: string }\n\nconst ALLOWED: ApprovalDecision = { allowed: true }\n\nfunction deny(code: ApprovalDenialCode, message: string): ApprovalDecision {\n  return { allowed: false, code, message }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether the time to answer a request has passed.\n *\n * Only a `pending` request expires. A request that already reached an end state\n * keeps that state, because \"expired\" would lose the answer that was given.\n */\nexport function isExpired(job: ApprovalJobDto, now: Date): boolean {\n  return (\n    job.status === 'pending' &&\n    new Date(job.expiresAt).getTime() <= now.getTime()\n  )\n}\n\n/** Reports the status to show, which is `expired` once the time has passed. */\nexport function effectiveStatus(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  now: Date,\n): ApprovalJobDto['status'] {\n  return isExpired(job, now) ? 'expired' : job.status\n}\n\n/** Reports how many more acknowledgements the request needs. */\nexport function remainingAcks(job: ApprovalJobDto): number {\n  return Math.max(0, job.requiredAcks - job.acks.length)\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether the actor holds EVERY permission of the set.\n *\n * Every, and not one of them. A payload that raises the guard adds a\n * permission, so \"one of them\" would let the base permission alone carry a\n * request that the extra permission exists to stop.\n *\n * An EMPTY set is held by nobody. That is the opposite of what `Array.every`\n * answers, and it is deliberate: this function guards a privileged action, so\n * the empty case must fail closed. A row with no permissions is not a row that\n * everybody may run \u2014 it is a row that lost its guard, through a migration\n * that did not backfill it or a write that went around the service. Every use\n * case builds a set of at least one, so no real request meets this branch.\n */\nexport function hasEveryPermission(\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  permissions: string[],\n): boolean {\n  if (permissions.length === 0) {\n    return false\n  }\n  return permissions.every((permission) => actor.has(permission))\n}\n\n/**\n * What a person must hold to act on a request.\n *\n * A request carries its own set, because a payload can raise the guard. A use\n * case that never does has a set of one, and it is the base permission.\n */\nexport function requiredPermissionsOf(job: ApprovalJobDto): string[] {\n  return job.requiredPermissions\n}\n\n/**\n * Who can READ a request.\n *\n * Two people: one who can act on it, and the one who opened it. A Camundi who\n * holds neither has no reason to read which customer somebody proposed to\n * expire, so the list and the detail both hide it.\n *\n * The rule reads the BASE permission of the use case and not the effective set\n * of the request. A payload that raises the guard raises who can APPROVE, and\n * not who can look: a generation update with the yolo flag is visible to\n * everybody who can approve a plain one, and only the yolo permission runs it.\n * The list filters by use case in SQL, which is what makes one page of rows\n * the same page that a person is allowed to read.\n */\nexport function canView(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  useCase: ApprovalUseCaseDto,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (\n    actor.has(useCase.requiredPermission) ||\n    job.createdBy.userId === actor.userId ||\n    isSameActorEmail(job.createdBy.email, actor.email)\n  ) {\n    return ALLOWED\n  }\n  return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot see this request.')\n}\n\n/**\n * Who can OPEN a request, and with what.\n *\n * `createPermission` is what keeps the pool that asks as small as the pool that\n * approves. A use case that leaves it absent says the opposite on purpose: the\n * approvals are the guard, and anybody signed in can propose the action.\n *\n * The two checks after it are about the request and not about the person. A\n * count below the floor of the use case, and a missing reason, are both a 400\n * and not a 403, so the words say which one the caller must repair.\n */\nexport function canCreate(\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  useCase: ApprovalUseCaseDto,\n  request: {\n    reason?: string\n    requiredAcks?: number\n    /**\n     * The effective permissions of the payload, from `permissionsFor`.\n     *\n     * Absent means \"the base permission alone\", which is what most use cases\n     * build. Only the permissions ABOVE the base one gate opening a request:\n     * see the note in the body.\n     */\n    requiredPermissions?: string[]\n  } = {},\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (useCase.createPermission && !actor.has(useCase.createPermission)) {\n    return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot open this request.')\n  }\n  // What the PAYLOAD raised, on top of the base permission of the use case.\n  // A bulk generation update with the yolo flag needs the yolo permission, and\n  // without this check a person who holds the base permission alone could open\n  // one. They could not approve it and could not run it, so it is not an\n  // escalation \u2014 it is a request that its own author is not allowed to make,\n  // waiting in the queue of the people who are.\n  //\n  // The BASE permission is deliberately not checked here. `createPermission`\n  // above is the only gate on the person, and a use case that leaves it absent\n  // means that anybody signed in can propose the action. Checking the base\n  // permission too would take that choice away from every use case.\n  const raised = (request.requiredPermissions ?? []).filter(\n    (permission) => permission !== useCase.requiredPermission,\n  )\n  if (raised.length > 0 && !hasEveryPermission(actor, raised)) {\n    return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot open this request.')\n  }\n  // The action of this use case carries the address of the person who asked,\n  // so a caller with no address must be refused HERE. The alternative is a\n  // request that looks ordinary, collects its approvals over days, and then\n  // fails because the other service cannot find a user called \"unknown\".\n  if (useCase.creatorEmailRequired && !hasActorEmail(actor)) {\n    return deny(\n      'no-creator-email',\n      'This action needs the email address of the person who asks for it, ' +\n        'and your session carries none. Sign in as a person to open this ' +\n        'request.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (useCase.reasonRequired && (request.reason ?? '').trim().length === 0) {\n    return deny('no-reason', 'Give a reason to open this request.')\n  }\n  if (\n    request.requiredAcks !== undefined &&\n    request.requiredAcks < useCase.minAcks\n  ) {\n    return deny(\n      'too-few-acks',\n      `This action needs at least ${useCase.minAcks} approvals.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n\n/**\n * The approvals that a new request asks for.\n *\n * The caller names a number or names none. A number below the floor is refused\n * by `canCreate`, and this function holds the answer inside the range anyway:\n * the two run in the same call, and a floor that only one of them knows is a\n * floor that a later caller can step over.\n */\nexport function resolveRequiredAcks(\n  useCase: ApprovalUseCaseDto,\n  requested?: number,\n): number {\n  if (requested === undefined) {\n    return Math.max(useCase.defaultAcks, useCase.minAcks)\n  }\n  return Math.max(Math.trunc(requested), useCase.minAcks)\n}\n\n/**\n * The four-eyes rule.\n *\n * The bans are in the order a person meets them, and each one has its own\n * message: \"you already approved this\" and \"you cannot approve your own\n * request\" are different mistakes, and one message for both helps nobody.\n *\n * Each of the two bans on a person reads BOTH identities: the `sub` of the\n * token, and the email. See `ApprovalActorView.email` for why one of them is\n * not enough.\n */\nexport function canAcknowledge(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  now: Date,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (!hasEveryPermission(actor, job.requiredPermissions)) {\n    return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot approve this request.')\n  }\n  if (isExpired(job, now)) {\n    return deny(\n      'expired',\n      'This request expired and can no longer be approved.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (job.status !== 'pending') {\n    return deny(\n      'not-pending',\n      `This request is ${job.status} and can no longer be approved.`,\n    )\n  }\n  if (\n    job.createdBy.userId === actor.userId ||\n    isSameActorEmail(job.createdBy.email, actor.email)\n  ) {\n    return deny(\n      'self-approval',\n      'You opened this request, so you cannot approve it.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (\n    job.acks.some(\n      (ack) =>\n        ack.userId === actor.userId || isSameActorEmail(ack.email, actor.email),\n    )\n  ) {\n    return deny('already-acknowledged', 'You already approved this request.')\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n\n/**\n * A rejection needs the same permission as an acknowledgement, and a reason.\n *\n * The creator MAY reject their own request. That is a withdrawal with a reason,\n * and stopping it would only push the person to the withdraw button, where the\n * reason is lost.\n */\nexport function canReject(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  now: Date,\n  reason: string,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (!hasEveryPermission(actor, job.requiredPermissions)) {\n    return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot reject this request.')\n  }\n  if (reason.trim().length === 0) {\n    return deny('no-reason', 'Give a reason to reject this request.')\n  }\n  if (isExpired(job, now)) {\n    return deny(\n      'expired',\n      'This request expired and can no longer be rejected.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (job.status !== 'pending') {\n    return deny(\n      'not-pending',\n      `This request is ${job.status} and can no longer be rejected.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n\n/** Only the person who opened a request can take it back. */\nexport function canWithdraw(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  now: Date,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (job.createdBy.userId !== actor.userId) {\n    return deny(\n      'not-creator',\n      'Only the person who opened a request can withdraw it.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (isExpired(job, now)) {\n    return deny(\n      'expired',\n      'This request expired and can no longer be withdrawn.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (job.status !== 'pending') {\n    return deny(\n      'not-pending',\n      `This request is ${job.status} and can no longer be withdrawn.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n\n/**\n * Runs a request that has its approvals.\n *\n * This is the button of the explicit mode. `failed` is executable again,\n * because a failure is often a problem of the system that is now repaired, and\n * asking for the approvals a second time helps nobody.\n *\n * ANY holder of the permission may press it, and not only the person who\n * opened the request. The decision was made when the request reached\n * `approved`: `canAcknowledge` refuses the creator, so the approvals on the\n * row came from other people, and the button only carries out what they\n * already agreed to. Holding the button to the creator would let one Camundi\n * on holiday freeze an approved action, and a use case that must not run\n * without its author has `executionMode: 'auto'` instead.\n *\n * Who PRESSED it and who ASKED for it are two different facts, and both are\n * kept: the audit trail of control-backend records the actor of the run, and\n * an action that names a person to another service names the creator. See\n * `onBehalfOf` of `extend-trial`.\n */\nexport function canExecute(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (!hasEveryPermission(actor, job.requiredPermissions)) {\n    return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot run this request.')\n  }\n  if (job.status !== 'approved' && job.status !== 'failed') {\n    return deny(\n      'not-executable',\n      `This request is ${job.status} and cannot be run.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n"],
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+  "sourcesContent": ["/*\n * Copyright Camunda Services GmbH and/or licensed to Camunda Services GmbH\n * under one or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under a commercial license.\n * You may not use this file except in compliance with the commercial license.\n */\n\nimport { UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL } from '../constants/misc.const.js'\nimport type {\n  ApprovalJobDto,\n  ApprovalUseCaseDto,\n} from '../dtos/ApprovalJob.dto.js'\nimport { ConsolePermissions } from '../permissions/console.permissions.js'\n\n/**\n * The rules of the approval mechanism, as pure functions.\n *\n * Three consumers run this file: control-backend decides whether to reject a\n * request, control-frontend decides whether to disable a button, and cloudbot\n * decides whether to answer. One copy means the button and the endpoint can\n * never disagree.\n *\n * Two choices in the signatures carry the design:\n *\n * - The actor is an interface with a `has` method. The backend holds an array\n *   of Auth0 claims, and `useSession()` in the frontend gives a flat record of\n *   booleans. Neither side has to convert to the shape of the other.\n * - `now` is a parameter. The expiry is lazy, so a stored `pending` request can\n *   be expired already. A parameter makes a difference between the two clocks\n *   an input that a test can set, and not a silent disagreement.\n *\n * No function here does I/O or returns a promise. The browser call site is what\n * enforces that, and it also stops a later use case from turning a list of 50\n * rows into 200 network calls.\n */\n\n/** Who is asking. See the note above on why this is an interface. */\nexport interface ApprovalActorView {\n  userId: string\n  /**\n   * The email of the actor. It is the SECOND identity of the four-eyes rule.\n   *\n   * `userId` alone is not enough. One person can hold more than one identity in\n   * Auth0 \u2014 a connection through SSO and a connection through a database, or an\n   * account that was made again \u2014 and each one carries a different `sub`. The\n   * same human then opens a request with one identity and approves it with the\n   * other, which is the rule defeated.\n   *\n   * It is optional because a token can carry no email. See\n   * `isSameActorEmail` for what that means for the comparison.\n   */\n  email?: string\n  has(permission: string): boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds the `has` of an actor from the permissions that the actor holds.\n *\n * `ConsolePermissions.APPROVALS_ALL_USE_CASES` stands in for every permission\n * that a use case asks for. Both actor builders call this function, the one of\n * control-backend and the one of the browser, so the button and the route\n * agree on it. A rule that reads `actor.has` needs no change for it, and nor\n * does a use case that a later change adds.\n */\nexport function approvalPermissionCheck(\n  held: ReadonlySet<string>,\n): (permission: string) => boolean {\n  const all = held.has(ConsolePermissions.APPROVALS_ALL_USE_CASES)\n  return (permission) => all || held.has(permission)\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether two email addresses name one person.\n *\n * Two values that are absent, empty, or `UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL` are NOT one\n * person. A token with no email would otherwise make every actor equal to\n * every other actor, and the rule would refuse everybody.\n *\n * The comparison removes the spaces and the case. Auth0 gives the address as\n * the identity provider wrote it, so `A.B@camunda.com` and `a.b@camunda.com`\n * are one mailbox and must not pass as two people.\n */\nexport function isSameActorEmail(one?: string, other?: string): boolean {\n  const left = comparableActorEmail(one)\n  return left.length > 0 && left === comparableActorEmail(other)\n}\n\n/**\n * The address in the one form that a comparison may use.\n *\n * An absent address, an empty one and `UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL` all become an\n * empty string, because none of the three names a person. The spaces and the\n * case go as well: Auth0 gives the address as the identity provider wrote it.\n */\nfunction comparableActorEmail(value?: string): string {\n  const trimmed = value?.trim().toLowerCase() ?? ''\n  return trimmed === UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL ? '' : trimmed\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether one identity of a request names the actor.\n *\n * The `sub` of the token OR the email, because one person can hold more than\n * one Auth0 identity. Every rule that asks \"is this the same human?\" reads both\n * through this function, so a rule cannot forget the second half: `canWithdraw`\n * did, and it refused a creator whose browser and whose service resolved the\n * id from two different tokens.\n */\nexport function isSameActor(\n  identity: { userId: string; email?: string },\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n): boolean {\n  return (\n    identity.userId === actor.userId ||\n    isSameActorEmail(identity.email, actor.email)\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether this actor carries an address that names a person.\n *\n * A machine-to-machine token carries none: accounts-backend builds the\n * permissions of such a token from its `permissions` claim alone, and there is\n * no person behind it. See `creatorEmailRequired` of the use case.\n */\nexport function hasActorEmail(actor: ApprovalActorView): boolean {\n  return comparableActorEmail(actor.email).length > 0\n}\n\n/**\n * Why an action is not allowed.\n *\n * The code is for a program: control-backend maps it to a status, and the\n * frontend can branch on it. The message is for a person, and it is shown as\n * written.\n */\nexport type ApprovalDenialCode =\n  | 'forbidden'\n  | 'not-pending'\n  | 'self-approval'\n  | 'self-rejection'\n  | 'already-acknowledged'\n  | 'expired'\n  | 'not-creator'\n  | 'not-executable'\n  | 'no-reason'\n  | 'too-few-acks'\n  | 'no-creator-email'\n\nexport type ApprovalDecision =\n  | { allowed: true }\n  | { allowed: false; code: ApprovalDenialCode; message: string }\n\nconst ALLOWED: ApprovalDecision = { allowed: true }\n\nfunction deny(code: ApprovalDenialCode, message: string): ApprovalDecision {\n  return { allowed: false, code, message }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether the time to answer a request has passed.\n *\n * Only a `pending` request expires. A request that already reached an end state\n * keeps that state, because \"expired\" would lose the answer that was given.\n */\nexport function isExpired(job: ApprovalJobDto, now: Date): boolean {\n  return (\n    job.status === 'pending' &&\n    new Date(job.expiresAt).getTime() <= now.getTime()\n  )\n}\n\n/** Reports the status to show, which is `expired` once the time has passed. */\nexport function effectiveStatus(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  now: Date,\n): ApprovalJobDto['status'] {\n  return isExpired(job, now) ? 'expired' : job.status\n}\n\n/** Reports how many more acknowledgements the request needs. */\nexport function remainingAcks(job: ApprovalJobDto): number {\n  return Math.max(0, job.requiredAcks - job.acks.length)\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports whether the actor holds EVERY permission of the set.\n *\n * Every, and not one of them. A payload that raises the guard adds a\n * permission, so \"one of them\" would let the base permission alone carry a\n * request that the extra permission exists to stop.\n *\n * An EMPTY set is held by nobody. That is the opposite of what `Array.every`\n * answers, and it is deliberate: this function guards a privileged action, so\n * the empty case must fail closed. A row with no permissions is not a row that\n * everybody may run \u2014 it is a row that lost its guard, through a migration\n * that did not backfill it or a write that went around the service. Every use\n * case builds a set of at least one, so no real request meets this branch.\n */\nexport function hasEveryPermission(\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  permissions: string[],\n): boolean {\n  if (permissions.length === 0) {\n    return false\n  }\n  return permissions.every((permission) => actor.has(permission))\n}\n\n/**\n * What a person must hold to act on a request.\n *\n * A request carries its own set, because a payload can raise the guard. A use\n * case that never does has a set of one, and it is the base permission.\n */\nexport function requiredPermissionsOf(job: ApprovalJobDto): string[] {\n  return job.requiredPermissions\n}\n\n/**\n * Who can READ a request.\n *\n * Two people: one who can act on it, and the one who opened it. A Camundi who\n * holds neither has no reason to read which customer somebody proposed to\n * expire, so the list and the detail both hide it.\n *\n * The rule reads the BASE permission of the use case and not the effective set\n * of the request. A payload that raises the guard raises who can APPROVE, and\n * not who can look: a generation update with the yolo flag is visible to\n * everybody who can approve a plain one, and only the yolo permission runs it.\n * The list filters by use case in SQL, which is what makes one page of rows\n * the same page that a person is allowed to read.\n */\nexport function canView(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  useCase: ApprovalUseCaseDto,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (\n    actor.has(useCase.requiredPermission) ||\n    isSameActor(job.createdBy, actor)\n  ) {\n    return ALLOWED\n  }\n  return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot see this request.')\n}\n\n/**\n * Who can OPEN a request, and with what.\n *\n * `createPermission` is what keeps the pool that asks as small as the pool that\n * approves. A use case that leaves it absent says the opposite on purpose: the\n * approvals are the guard, and anybody signed in can propose the action.\n *\n * The two checks after it are about the request and not about the person. A\n * count below the floor of the use case, and a missing reason, are both a 400\n * and not a 403, so the words say which one the caller must repair.\n */\nexport function canCreate(\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  useCase: ApprovalUseCaseDto,\n  request: {\n    reason?: string\n    requiredAcks?: number\n    /**\n     * The effective permissions of the payload, from `permissionsFor`.\n     *\n     * Absent means \"the base permission alone\", which is what most use cases\n     * build. Only the permissions ABOVE the base one gate opening a request:\n     * see the note in the body.\n     */\n    requiredPermissions?: string[]\n  } = {},\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  // The message NAMES the permission. \"You cannot open this request\" is true\n  // and useless: a Camundi who reads it cannot tell a missing permission from\n  // a rule they never heard of, and the detail page already names a permission\n  // the same way (\"Approving needs aacp\").\n  if (useCase.createPermission && !actor.has(useCase.createPermission)) {\n    return deny(\n      'forbidden',\n      `Opening this request needs ${useCase.createPermission}, and you do not hold it.`,\n    )\n  }\n  // What the PAYLOAD raised, on top of the base permission of the use case.\n  // A bulk generation update with the yolo flag needs the yolo permission, and\n  // without this check a person who holds the base permission alone could open\n  // one. They could not approve it and could not run it, so it is not an\n  // escalation \u2014 it is a request that its own author is not allowed to make,\n  // waiting in the queue of the people who are.\n  //\n  // The BASE permission is deliberately not checked here. `createPermission`\n  // above is the only gate on the person, and a use case that leaves it absent\n  // means that anybody signed in can propose the action. Checking the base\n  // permission too would take that choice away from every use case.\n  const raised = (request.requiredPermissions ?? []).filter(\n    (permission) => permission !== useCase.requiredPermission,\n  )\n  if (raised.length > 0 && !hasEveryPermission(actor, raised)) {\n    return deny(\n      'forbidden',\n      `This payload needs ${raised.join(' and ')}, and you do not hold it.`,\n    )\n  }\n  // A request that needs no approval RUNS when it is opened, so the person who\n  // opens it must hold what running it needs. Every other use case leaves this\n  // to the approvals, which is why the base permission is not checked above.\n  // With a floor of zero there is no approval to leave it to.\n  const toRun = request.requiredPermissions ?? [useCase.requiredPermission]\n  if (\n    resolveRequiredAcks(useCase, request.requiredAcks) === 0 &&\n    !hasEveryPermission(actor, toRun)\n  ) {\n    // The message NAMES the permission, and it says why opening needs it. A\n    // Camundi who reads \"you cannot open this request\" for an action that\n    // needs no approval cannot tell which of the two rules refused them.\n    return deny(\n      'forbidden',\n      `This request needs no approval, so opening it runs it. That needs ` +\n        `${toRun.join(' and ')}, and you do not hold it.`,\n    )\n  }\n  // The action of this use case carries the address of the person who asked,\n  // so a caller with no address must be refused HERE. The alternative is a\n  // request that looks ordinary, collects its approvals over days, and then\n  // fails because the other service cannot find a user called \"unknown\".\n  if (useCase.creatorEmailRequired && !hasActorEmail(actor)) {\n    return deny(\n      'no-creator-email',\n      'This action needs the email address of the person who asks for it, ' +\n        'and your session carries none. Sign in as a person to open this ' +\n        'request.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (useCase.reasonRequired && (request.reason ?? '').trim().length === 0) {\n    return deny('no-reason', 'Give a reason to open this request.')\n  }\n  if (\n    request.requiredAcks !== undefined &&\n    request.requiredAcks < useCase.minAcks\n  ) {\n    return deny(\n      'too-few-acks',\n      `This action needs at least ${useCase.minAcks} approvals.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n\n/**\n * The approvals that a new request asks for.\n *\n * The caller names a number or names none. A number below the floor is refused\n * by `canCreate`, and this function holds the answer inside the range anyway:\n * the two run in the same call, and a floor that only one of them knows is a\n * floor that a later caller can step over.\n */\nexport function resolveRequiredAcks(\n  useCase: ApprovalUseCaseDto,\n  requested?: number,\n): number {\n  if (requested === undefined) {\n    return Math.max(useCase.defaultAcks, useCase.minAcks)\n  }\n  return Math.max(Math.trunc(requested), useCase.minAcks)\n}\n\n/**\n * The four-eyes rule.\n *\n * The bans are in the order a person meets them, and each one has its own\n * message: \"you already approved this\" and \"you cannot approve your own\n * request\" are different mistakes, and one message for both helps nobody.\n *\n * Each of the two bans on a person reads BOTH identities: the `sub` of the\n * token, and the email. See `ApprovalActorView.email` for why one of them is\n * not enough.\n */\nexport function canAcknowledge(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  now: Date,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (!hasEveryPermission(actor, job.requiredPermissions)) {\n    return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot approve this request.')\n  }\n  if (isExpired(job, now)) {\n    return deny(\n      'expired',\n      'This request expired and can no longer be approved.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (job.status !== 'pending') {\n    return deny(\n      'not-pending',\n      `This request is ${job.status} and can no longer be approved.`,\n    )\n  }\n  if (isSameActor(job.createdBy, actor)) {\n    return deny(\n      'self-approval',\n      'You opened this request, so you cannot approve it.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (job.acks.some((ack) => isSameActor(ack, actor))) {\n    return deny('already-acknowledged', 'You already approved this request.')\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n\n/**\n * A rejection needs the same permission as an acknowledgement, and a reason.\n *\n * Two people answer a request, and each one has ONE verb. Somebody else\n * approves or rejects it; the person who opened it withdraws it. The creator is\n * refused here for the same reason `canAcknowledge` refuses them: one person\n * must not be both sides of a four-eyes decision. The message names the button\n * that they do have, and the trail loses nothing, because a withdrawal writes\n * its reason into the same field.\n *\n * The ORDER of the checks is the order that a person meets them, and the state\n * of the request comes before the reason. A closed request must answer\n * \"already closed\" whatever the caller typed: with the reason first, a page\n * that had no reason yet read `no-reason` from a rejected request, and the\n * Reject button of control-frontend stayed enabled on a request that nothing\n * could reject any more.\n */\nexport function canReject(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  now: Date,\n  reason: string,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (!hasEveryPermission(actor, job.requiredPermissions)) {\n    return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot reject this request.')\n  }\n  if (isExpired(job, now)) {\n    return deny(\n      'expired',\n      'This request expired and can no longer be rejected.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (job.status !== 'pending') {\n    return deny(\n      'not-pending',\n      `This request is ${job.status} and can no longer be rejected.`,\n    )\n  }\n  if (isSameActor(job.createdBy, actor)) {\n    return deny(\n      'self-rejection',\n      'You opened this request, so withdraw it instead of rejecting it.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (reason.trim().length === 0) {\n    return deny('no-reason', 'Give a reason to reject this request.')\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n\n/**\n * Only the person who opened a request can take it back.\n *\n * BOTH identities, as every other rule of this file reads them. One person can\n * hold two Auth0 identities with two different `sub` values, and a rule that\n * read the id alone refused the creator their own withdrawal as soon as the\n * browser and the service resolved that id from two different tokens.\n */\nexport function canWithdraw(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n  now: Date,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (!isSameActor(job.createdBy, actor)) {\n    return deny(\n      'not-creator',\n      'Only the person who opened a request can withdraw it.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (isExpired(job, now)) {\n    return deny(\n      'expired',\n      'This request expired and can no longer be withdrawn.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (job.status !== 'pending') {\n    return deny(\n      'not-pending',\n      `This request is ${job.status} and can no longer be withdrawn.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n\n/**\n * Runs a request that has its approvals.\n *\n * This is the button of the explicit mode. `failed` is executable again,\n * because a failure is often a problem of the system that is now repaired, and\n * asking for the approvals a second time helps nobody.\n *\n * ANY holder of the permission may press it, and not only the person who\n * opened the request. The decision was made when the request reached\n * `approved`: `canAcknowledge` refuses the creator, so the approvals on the\n * row came from other people, and the button only carries out what they\n * already agreed to. Holding the button to the creator would let one Camundi\n * on holiday freeze an approved action, and a use case that must not run\n * without its author has `executionMode: 'auto'` instead.\n *\n * Who PRESSED it and who ASKED for it are two different facts, and both are\n * kept: the audit trail of control-backend records the actor of the run, and\n * an action that names a person to another service names the creator. See\n * `onBehalfOf` of `extend-trial`.\n */\nexport function canExecute(\n  job: ApprovalJobDto,\n  actor: ApprovalActorView,\n): ApprovalDecision {\n  if (!hasEveryPermission(actor, job.requiredPermissions)) {\n    return deny('forbidden', 'You cannot run this request.')\n  }\n  if (job.status !== 'approved' && job.status !== 'failed') {\n    return deny(\n      'not-executable',\n      `This request is ${job.status} and cannot be run.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return ALLOWED\n}\n"],
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package/dist/approvals/use-cases.const.d.ts

@@ -16,6 +16,14 @@
 export declare const APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES: {
     readonly sendToExpiredTrial: "send-to-expired-trial";
     readonly extendTrial: "extend-trial";
+    readonly moveClusterOrg: "move-cluster-org";
+    readonly clusterBulkGenerationUpdate: "cluster-bulk-generation-update";
+    readonly clusterBulkPlanUpdate: "cluster-bulk-plan-update";
+    readonly clusterBulkPlanTypeUpdate: "cluster-bulk-plan-type-update";
+    readonly clusterBulkSleepWakeup: "cluster-bulk-sleep-wakeup";
+    readonly clusterBulkDeletion: "cluster-bulk-deletion";
+    readonly clusterBulkSpecUpdate: "cluster-bulk-spec-update";
+    readonly featureFlagOverride: "feature-flag-override";
 };
 export type ApprovalUseCaseType = (typeof APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES)[keyof typeof APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES];
 /**
@@ -39,3 +47,68 @@ export declare const EXTEND_TRIAL_MIN_DAYS = 15;
  * margin as the floor above.
  */
 export declare const EXTEND_TRIAL_MAX_DAYS = 61;
+/**
+ * The shortest life of a feature flag override, in days.
+ *
+ * One day. An override that ends sooner than the next working day is a change
+ * that nobody can look at before it goes away again.
+ */
+export declare const FLAG_OVERRIDE_MIN_DAYS = 1;
+/**
+ * The longest life of a feature flag override, in days.
+ *
+ * An override is a temporary thing. Without a ceiling it becomes a second,
+ * invisible layer of configuration, and then nobody can answer "what runs on
+ * prod?" from the source alone. A change that has to hold for longer belongs
+ * in `defaults.ts`, where a reviewer reads it.
+ */
+export declare const FLAG_OVERRIDE_MAX_DAYS = 90;
+/**
+ * The life of an override when the person names no other number.
+ *
+ * Two weeks is long enough for a rollout to prove itself, and short enough
+ * that a forgotten override goes away by itself.
+ */
+export declare const FLAG_OVERRIDE_DEFAULT_DAYS = 14;
+/**
+ * Whether a stored override reaches any reader yet.
+ *
+ * It is `false` today, and the write path is closed at both ends: the page
+ * turns the Override button off, and the create route of control-backend
+ * answers 404. It lives HERE, and not in the page, because both sides read
+ * it. One switch cannot drift; a disabled button beside an open route is not
+ * a closed door, and that is what the review found.
+ *
+ * ## Why it is still `false`, and what is NOT true any more
+ *
+ * This said that control-backend reads exactly ONE flag, `control.approvals`,
+ * which takes no override, so the set of flags that this service reads and
+ * the set that take an override do not meet. **That stopped being true while
+ * this branch was open.** `main` added the annotations component, and
+ * `requireAnnotationsEnabled` reads `request.flags.control.annotations`:
+ *
+ * ```
+ * approvals.routes.ts:368     if (!request.flags.control.approvals) {
+ * annotations.routes.ts:313   if (!request.flags.control.annotations) {
+ * ```
+ *
+ * `control.annotations` is `overridable: true`, and `feature-flags.plugin.ts`
+ * applies the overrides in an application `preHandler`, which runs BEFORE a
+ * route-level one. So a STAGE override of that one flag would reach a real
+ * reader today.
+ *
+ * The intersection is therefore no longer empty: it holds one flag of 28, in
+ * one of the two scopes. That is the reason to keep this `false` rather than
+ * to turn it on. One boolean cannot say "this flag in this scope reaches a
+ * reader, and the other 27 do not": `true` would open a form that writes a
+ * row and moves nothing for every flag but one, which is the failure this
+ * constant exists to prevent, in the other direction.
+ *
+ * ## Phase 2
+ *
+ * Availability belongs per flag AND per scope, derived from which service
+ * reads the flag and whether that reader passes an `orgId` — not from one
+ * global switch. See section 8 of the design. Until then this stays `false`,
+ * which is safe: it is closed, and never wrongly open.
+ */
+export declare const OVERRIDES_REACH_A_READER = false;

package/dist/approvals/use-cases.const.js

@@ -1,12 +1,31 @@
 const APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES = {
   sendToExpiredTrial: "send-to-expired-trial",
-  extendTrial: "extend-trial"
+  extendTrial: "extend-trial",
+  moveClusterOrg: "move-cluster-org",
+  // One use case for each type of a cluster bulk operation. The types need
+  // different permissions and different approval counts, and a use case holds
+  // one of each. See `cluster-bulk-operation.ts` beside this file.
+  clusterBulkGenerationUpdate: "cluster-bulk-generation-update",
+  clusterBulkPlanUpdate: "cluster-bulk-plan-update",
+  clusterBulkPlanTypeUpdate: "cluster-bulk-plan-type-update",
+  clusterBulkSleepWakeup: "cluster-bulk-sleep-wakeup",
+  clusterBulkDeletion: "cluster-bulk-deletion",
+  clusterBulkSpecUpdate: "cluster-bulk-spec-update",
+  featureFlagOverride: "feature-flag-override"
 };
 const EXTEND_TRIAL_MIN_DAYS = 15;
 const EXTEND_TRIAL_MAX_DAYS = 61;
+const FLAG_OVERRIDE_MIN_DAYS = 1;
+const FLAG_OVERRIDE_MAX_DAYS = 90;
+const FLAG_OVERRIDE_DEFAULT_DAYS = 14;
+const OVERRIDES_REACH_A_READER = false;
 export {
   APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES,
   EXTEND_TRIAL_MAX_DAYS,
-  EXTEND_TRIAL_MIN_DAYS
+  EXTEND_TRIAL_MIN_DAYS,
+  FLAG_OVERRIDE_DEFAULT_DAYS,
+  FLAG_OVERRIDE_MAX_DAYS,
+  FLAG_OVERRIDE_MIN_DAYS,
+  OVERRIDES_REACH_A_READER
 };
 //# sourceMappingURL=use-cases.const.js.map

package/dist/approvals/use-cases.const.js.map

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "version": 3,
   "sources": ["../../src/approvals/use-cases.const.ts"],
-  "sourcesContent": ["/*\n * Copyright Camunda Services GmbH and/or licensed to Camunda Services GmbH\n * under one or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under a commercial license.\n * You may not use this file except in compliance with the commercial license.\n */\n\n/**\n * The names and the value ranges of the registered use cases.\n *\n * control-backend owns the registry, and a frontend reads it at run time\n * (`GET /api/approvals/use-cases`). Two things cannot wait for that answer:\n *\n * - **The identifier**, because a caller must NAME a use case to find it in the\n *   registry, and to open a request of it.\n * - **The range of a payload field**, because a form holds the value before any\n *   call goes out.\n *\n * Both live here, so the schema of the service and the form of the browser can\n * never hold different numbers.\n */\n\n/** The identifier of each use case, on the wire and in the table. */\nexport const APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES = {\n  sendToExpiredTrial: 'send-to-expired-trial',\n  extendTrial: 'extend-trial',\n} as const\n\nexport type ApprovalUseCaseType =\n  (typeof APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES)[keyof typeof APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES]\n\n/**\n * The shortest extension that accounts-backend accepts.\n *\n * `POST /:orgId/extendtrial` refuses a date that is less than 14 days away\n * when the body carries `onBehalfOf`, and it measures those 14 days when the\n * CALL arrives. The floor here is 15 and not 14, for two reasons:\n *\n * - The two clocks are not the same instant. Accounts builds its own \"14 days\n *   from now\" a few milliseconds after control-backend builds the date, so a\n *   date of exactly 14 days is already in the past for the comparison.\n * - Accounts counts with `setDate`, which is calendar arithmetic. A change of\n *   the daylight saving time moves its limit by an hour.\n */\nexport const EXTEND_TRIAL_MIN_DAYS = 15\n\n/**\n * The longest extension that accounts-backend accepts.\n *\n * The same route refuses a date more than 62 days away. 61 keeps the same\n * margin as the floor above.\n */\nexport const EXTEND_TRIAL_MAX_DAYS = 61\n"],
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+  "sourcesContent": ["/*\n * Copyright Camunda Services GmbH and/or licensed to Camunda Services GmbH\n * under one or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under a commercial license.\n * You may not use this file except in compliance with the commercial license.\n */\n\n/**\n * The names and the value ranges of the registered use cases.\n *\n * control-backend owns the registry, and a frontend reads it at run time\n * (`GET /api/approvals/use-cases`). Two things cannot wait for that answer:\n *\n * - **The identifier**, because a caller must NAME a use case to find it in the\n *   registry, and to open a request of it.\n * - **The range of a payload field**, because a form holds the value before any\n *   call goes out.\n *\n * Both live here, so the schema of the service and the form of the browser can\n * never hold different numbers.\n */\n\n/** The identifier of each use case, on the wire and in the table. */\nexport const APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES = {\n  sendToExpiredTrial: 'send-to-expired-trial',\n  extendTrial: 'extend-trial',\n  moveClusterOrg: 'move-cluster-org',\n  // One use case for each type of a cluster bulk operation. The types need\n  // different permissions and different approval counts, and a use case holds\n  // one of each. See `cluster-bulk-operation.ts` beside this file.\n  clusterBulkGenerationUpdate: 'cluster-bulk-generation-update',\n  clusterBulkPlanUpdate: 'cluster-bulk-plan-update',\n  clusterBulkPlanTypeUpdate: 'cluster-bulk-plan-type-update',\n  clusterBulkSleepWakeup: 'cluster-bulk-sleep-wakeup',\n  clusterBulkDeletion: 'cluster-bulk-deletion',\n  clusterBulkSpecUpdate: 'cluster-bulk-spec-update',\n  featureFlagOverride: 'feature-flag-override',\n} as const\n\nexport type ApprovalUseCaseType =\n  (typeof APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES)[keyof typeof APPROVAL_USE_CASE_TYPES]\n\n/**\n * The shortest extension that accounts-backend accepts.\n *\n * `POST /:orgId/extendtrial` refuses a date that is less than 14 days away\n * when the body carries `onBehalfOf`, and it measures those 14 days when the\n * CALL arrives. The floor here is 15 and not 14, for two reasons:\n *\n * - The two clocks are not the same instant. Accounts builds its own \"14 days\n *   from now\" a few milliseconds after control-backend builds the date, so a\n *   date of exactly 14 days is already in the past for the comparison.\n * - Accounts counts with `setDate`, which is calendar arithmetic. A change of\n *   the daylight saving time moves its limit by an hour.\n */\nexport const EXTEND_TRIAL_MIN_DAYS = 15\n\n/**\n * The longest extension that accounts-backend accepts.\n *\n * The same route refuses a date more than 62 days away. 61 keeps the same\n * margin as the floor above.\n */\nexport const EXTEND_TRIAL_MAX_DAYS = 61\n\n/**\n * The shortest life of a feature flag override, in days.\n *\n * One day. An override that ends sooner than the next working day is a change\n * that nobody can look at before it goes away again.\n */\nexport const FLAG_OVERRIDE_MIN_DAYS = 1\n\n/**\n * The longest life of a feature flag override, in days.\n *\n * An override is a temporary thing. Without a ceiling it becomes a second,\n * invisible layer of configuration, and then nobody can answer \"what runs on\n * prod?\" from the source alone. A change that has to hold for longer belongs\n * in `defaults.ts`, where a reviewer reads it.\n */\nexport const FLAG_OVERRIDE_MAX_DAYS = 90\n\n/**\n * The life of an override when the person names no other number.\n *\n * Two weeks is long enough for a rollout to prove itself, and short enough\n * that a forgotten override goes away by itself.\n */\nexport const FLAG_OVERRIDE_DEFAULT_DAYS = 14\n\n/**\n * Whether a stored override reaches any reader yet.\n *\n * It is `false` today, and the write path is closed at both ends: the page\n * turns the Override button off, and the create route of control-backend\n * answers 404. It lives HERE, and not in the page, because both sides read\n * it. One switch cannot drift; a disabled button beside an open route is not\n * a closed door, and that is what the review found.\n *\n * ## Why it is still `false`, and what is NOT true any more\n *\n * This said that control-backend reads exactly ONE flag, `control.approvals`,\n * which takes no override, so the set of flags that this service reads and\n * the set that take an override do not meet. **That stopped being true while\n * this branch was open.** `main` added the annotations component, and\n * `requireAnnotationsEnabled` reads `request.flags.control.annotations`:\n *\n * ```\n * approvals.routes.ts:368     if (!request.flags.control.approvals) {\n * annotations.routes.ts:313   if (!request.flags.control.annotations) {\n * ```\n *\n * `control.annotations` is `overridable: true`, and `feature-flags.plugin.ts`\n * applies the overrides in an application `preHandler`, which runs BEFORE a\n * route-level one. So a STAGE override of that one flag would reach a real\n * reader today.\n *\n * The intersection is therefore no longer empty: it holds one flag of 28, in\n * one of the two scopes. That is the reason to keep this `false` rather than\n * to turn it on. One boolean cannot say \"this flag in this scope reaches a\n * reader, and the other 27 do not\": `true` would open a form that writes a\n * row and moves nothing for every flag but one, which is the failure this\n * constant exists to prevent, in the other direction.\n *\n * ## Phase 2\n *\n * Availability belongs per flag AND per scope, derived from which service\n * reads the flag and whether that reader passes an `orgId` \u2014 not from one\n * global switch. See section 8 of the design. Until then this stays `false`,\n * which is safe: it is closed, and never wrongly open.\n */\nexport const OVERRIDES_REACH_A_READER = false\n"],
+  "mappings": "AAsBO,MAAM,0BAA0B;AAAA,EACrC,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACpB,aAAa;AAAA,EACb,gBAAgB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAIhB,6BAA6B;AAAA,EAC7B,uBAAuB;AAAA,EACvB,2BAA2B;AAAA,EAC3B,wBAAwB;AAAA,EACxB,qBAAqB;AAAA,EACrB,uBAAuB;AAAA,EACvB,qBAAqB;AACvB;AAkBO,MAAM,wBAAwB;AAQ9B,MAAM,wBAAwB;AAQ9B,MAAM,yBAAyB;AAU/B,MAAM,yBAAyB;AAQ/B,MAAM,6BAA6B;AA2CnC,MAAM,2BAA2B;",
   "names": []
 }

package/dist/config/camundi-permission-rules.js

@@ -24,11 +24,32 @@ const CONFIG = {
       "support:agent"
     ],
     // Pre-Sales as per https://confluence.camunda.com/spaces/HAN/pages/168660217/Adjust+C8+SaaS+permissions+and+sales+plan#AdjustC8SaaSpermissionsandsalesplan-DetailsperRole
+    // Professional Services holds 36 people, the consultants. Six of them
+    // sit in the Education subdivision. They train customers and do not
+    // work on customer clusters.
+    //
+    // The augmenter can only ADD a role, so no rule here can EXCLUDE
+    // Education from this grant. The other 30 consultants carry no
+    // subdivision at all, so a subdivision rule cannot name them either.
+    //
+    // This grant covers the whole division on purpose. A rule that keys on
+    // the ABSENCE of a subdivision id is more fragile than one that keys on
+    // a present id, and two comments in this file already record a
+    // subdivision id that a HiBob restructure broke without warning.
+    //
+    // If the 30 consultants without a subdivision get one of their own one
+    // day, move this grant down to that subdivision and remove this rule.
+    // Education would then stop inheriting the grant, because the division
+    // no longer carries it and the subdivision rule never named Education.
+    "266189454": ["console:clusterMover"],
+    // Professional Services
     // Enterprise Success holds the CSMs and the TAMs. A customer who has
     // privacy concerns asks them to switch optional telemetry off, thus they
-    // carry the capability. HiBob marks no TAM, thus the division is the
-    // smallest group that holds all of them.
-    "266229124": ["console:optionalTelemetryManager"]
+    // carry that capability. HiBob marks no TAM, thus the division is the
+    // smallest group that holds all of them. The CSMs and TAMs also move a
+    // cluster to another org for a customer, thus they carry
+    // `console:clusterMover` too.
+    "266229124": ["console:optionalTelemetryManager", "console:clusterMover"]
     // Enterprise Success
   },
   subdivisionRules: {

package/dist/config/camundi-permission-rules.js.map

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "version": 3,
   "sources": ["../../src/config/camundi-permission-rules.ts"],
-  "sourcesContent": ["/*\n * Copyright Camunda Services GmbH and/or licensed to Camunda Services GmbH\n * under one or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under a commercial license.\n * You may not use this file except in compliance with the commercial license.\n */\n\nimport type { CamundiPermissionRules } from './camundi-permission-rules.types.js'\n\nconst CONFIG: CamundiPermissionRules = {\n  departmentRules: {\n    '205882305': ['accounts:read', 'accounts:trialExtender'], // CS\n    Marketing: ['accounts:read', 'accounts:trialExtender'],\n    '205882307': ['accounts:read', 'accounts:trialExtender'], // revops\n    Products: ['console:admin:readonly', 'accounts:read'],\n    Executive: ['accounts:read'],\n    '259633605': ['accounts:read', 'accounts:trialExtender'], // Sales\n  },\n  divisionRules: {\n    Engineering: ['console:admin:readonly'],\n    '259633608': [\n      'accounts:connections:create',\n      'accounts:connections:update',\n      'support:agent',\n    ], // Support\n    '259633611': [\n      'accounts:trialExtender',\n      'accounts:limitExtender',\n      'support:agent',\n    ], // Pre-Sales as per https://confluence.camunda.com/spaces/HAN/pages/168660217/Adjust+C8+SaaS+permissions+and+sales+plan#AdjustC8SaaSpermissionsandsalesplan-DetailsperRole\n    // Enterprise Success holds the CSMs and the TAMs. A customer who has\n    // privacy concerns asks them to switch optional telemetry off, thus they\n    // carry the capability. HiBob marks no TAM, thus the division is the\n    // smallest group that holds all of them.\n    '266229124': ['console:optionalTelemetryManager'], // Enterprise Success\n  },\n  subdivisionRules: {\n    // The console team is the \"Control plane\" subdivision. The id was\n    // `256909487` until a HiBob restructure, and the augmenter matches a\n    // subdivision exactly and stays quiet on a miss, thus the rule granted\n    // nothing to anybody and nobody saw it.\n    '267516827': ['accounts:admin', 'console:admin', 'consoleTeam'], // Control plane\n    'Engineering Management': [\n      'accounts:addSafeRoles',\n      'accounts:orgCreator',\n      'console:C8ReleaseManager',\n    ], // Engineering Management\n    // Same story: the id `258049291` is gone. The subdivision carries the name\n    // `Controller` now, and a name is a valid key \u2014 `Engineering Management`\n    // above is one too.\n    Controller: ['console:clusterPlanManager', 'console:operationsEngineer'],\n  },\n}\nexport default CONFIG\n"],
-  "mappings": "AAQA,MAAM,SAAiC;AAAA,EACrC,iBAAiB;AAAA,IACf,aAAa,CAAC,iBAAiB,wBAAwB;AAAA;AAAA,IACvD,WAAW,CAAC,iBAAiB,wBAAwB;AAAA,IACrD,aAAa,CAAC,iBAAiB,wBAAwB;AAAA;AAAA,IACvD,UAAU,CAAC,0BAA0B,eAAe;AAAA,IACpD,WAAW,CAAC,eAAe;AAAA,IAC3B,aAAa,CAAC,iBAAiB,wBAAwB;AAAA;AAAA,EACzD;AAAA,EACA,eAAe;AAAA,IACb,aAAa,CAAC,wBAAwB;AAAA,IACtC,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAKA,aAAa,CAAC,kCAAkC;AAAA;AAAA,EAClD;AAAA,EACA,kBAAkB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAKhB,aAAa,CAAC,kBAAkB,iBAAiB,aAAa;AAAA;AAAA,IAC9D,0BAA0B;AAAA,MACxB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAIA,YAAY,CAAC,8BAA8B,4BAA4B;AAAA,EACzE;AACF;AACA,IAAO,mCAAQ;",
+  "sourcesContent": ["/*\n * Copyright Camunda Services GmbH and/or licensed to Camunda Services GmbH\n * under one or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under a commercial license.\n * You may not use this file except in compliance with the commercial license.\n */\n\nimport type { CamundiPermissionRules } from './camundi-permission-rules.types.js'\n\nconst CONFIG: CamundiPermissionRules = {\n  departmentRules: {\n    '205882305': ['accounts:read', 'accounts:trialExtender'], // CS\n    Marketing: ['accounts:read', 'accounts:trialExtender'],\n    '205882307': ['accounts:read', 'accounts:trialExtender'], // revops\n    Products: ['console:admin:readonly', 'accounts:read'],\n    Executive: ['accounts:read'],\n    '259633605': ['accounts:read', 'accounts:trialExtender'], // Sales\n  },\n  divisionRules: {\n    Engineering: ['console:admin:readonly'],\n    '259633608': [\n      'accounts:connections:create',\n      'accounts:connections:update',\n      'support:agent',\n    ], // Support\n    '259633611': [\n      'accounts:trialExtender',\n      'accounts:limitExtender',\n      'support:agent',\n    ], // Pre-Sales as per https://confluence.camunda.com/spaces/HAN/pages/168660217/Adjust+C8+SaaS+permissions+and+sales+plan#AdjustC8SaaSpermissionsandsalesplan-DetailsperRole\n    // Professional Services holds 36 people, the consultants. Six of them\n    // sit in the Education subdivision. They train customers and do not\n    // work on customer clusters.\n    //\n    // The augmenter can only ADD a role, so no rule here can EXCLUDE\n    // Education from this grant. The other 30 consultants carry no\n    // subdivision at all, so a subdivision rule cannot name them either.\n    //\n    // This grant covers the whole division on purpose. A rule that keys on\n    // the ABSENCE of a subdivision id is more fragile than one that keys on\n    // a present id, and two comments in this file already record a\n    // subdivision id that a HiBob restructure broke without warning.\n    //\n    // If the 30 consultants without a subdivision get one of their own one\n    // day, move this grant down to that subdivision and remove this rule.\n    // Education would then stop inheriting the grant, because the division\n    // no longer carries it and the subdivision rule never named Education.\n    '266189454': ['console:clusterMover'], // Professional Services\n    // Enterprise Success holds the CSMs and the TAMs. A customer who has\n    // privacy concerns asks them to switch optional telemetry off, thus they\n    // carry that capability. HiBob marks no TAM, thus the division is the\n    // smallest group that holds all of them. The CSMs and TAMs also move a\n    // cluster to another org for a customer, thus they carry\n    // `console:clusterMover` too.\n    '266229124': ['console:optionalTelemetryManager', 'console:clusterMover'], // Enterprise Success\n  },\n  subdivisionRules: {\n    // The console team is the \"Control plane\" subdivision. The id was\n    // `256909487` until a HiBob restructure, and the augmenter matches a\n    // subdivision exactly and stays quiet on a miss, thus the rule granted\n    // nothing to anybody and nobody saw it.\n    '267516827': ['accounts:admin', 'console:admin', 'consoleTeam'], // Control plane\n    'Engineering Management': [\n      'accounts:addSafeRoles',\n      'accounts:orgCreator',\n      'console:C8ReleaseManager',\n    ], // Engineering Management\n    // Same story: the id `258049291` is gone. The subdivision carries the name\n    // `Controller` now, and a name is a valid key \u2014 `Engineering Management`\n    // above is one too.\n    Controller: ['console:clusterPlanManager', 'console:operationsEngineer'],\n  },\n}\nexport default CONFIG\n"],
+  "mappings": "AAQA,MAAM,SAAiC;AAAA,EACrC,iBAAiB;AAAA,IACf,aAAa,CAAC,iBAAiB,wBAAwB;AAAA;AAAA,IACvD,WAAW,CAAC,iBAAiB,wBAAwB;AAAA,IACrD,aAAa,CAAC,iBAAiB,wBAAwB;AAAA;AAAA,IACvD,UAAU,CAAC,0BAA0B,eAAe;AAAA,IACpD,WAAW,CAAC,eAAe;AAAA,IAC3B,aAAa,CAAC,iBAAiB,wBAAwB;AAAA;AAAA,EACzD;AAAA,EACA,eAAe;AAAA,IACb,aAAa,CAAC,wBAAwB;AAAA,IACtC,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAkBA,aAAa,CAAC,sBAAsB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAOpC,aAAa,CAAC,oCAAoC,sBAAsB;AAAA;AAAA,EAC1E;AAAA,EACA,kBAAkB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAKhB,aAAa,CAAC,kBAAkB,iBAAiB,aAAa;AAAA;AAAA,IAC9D,0BAA0B;AAAA,MACxB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAIA,YAAY,CAAC,8BAA8B,4BAA4B;AAAA,EACzE;AACF;AACA,IAAO,mCAAQ;",
   "names": []
 }

package/dist/constants/misc.const.d.ts

@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ export declare const MINIMUM_EYEPAIRS: {
     CLUSTER_GENERATION_UPDATE: number;
     CLUSTER_PLAN_UPDATE: number;
     CLUSTER_PLAN_TYPE_UPDATE: number;
+    CLUSTER_SLEEP_WAKEUP: number;
+    CLUSTER_SPEC_UPDATE: number;
     CLUSTER_PLAN_MODIFICATION: number;
     CLUSTER_MODIFICATION: number;
 };

package/dist/constants/misc.const.js

@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ const MINIMUM_EYEPAIRS = {
   CLUSTER_GENERATION_UPDATE: 2,
   CLUSTER_PLAN_UPDATE: 2,
   CLUSTER_PLAN_TYPE_UPDATE: 2,
+  // These two had no name, and each reader fell back to
+  // `CLUSTER_PLAN_UPDATE`. The values are the same as that fallback.
+  CLUSTER_SLEEP_WAKEUP: 2,
+  CLUSTER_SPEC_UPDATE: 2,
   CLUSTER_PLAN_MODIFICATION: 1,
   CLUSTER_MODIFICATION: 1
 };

package/dist/constants/misc.const.js.map

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "version": 3,
   "sources": ["../../src/constants/misc.const.ts"],
-  "sourcesContent": ["/*\n * Copyright Camunda Services GmbH and/or licensed to Camunda Services GmbH\n * under one or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under a commercial license.\n * You may not use this file except in compliance with the commercial license.\n */\n\nexport const CONSOLE_API_USER_ID = 'console-api'\n\n/**\n * The namespace of the custom claims that Auth0 adds to a token of this fleet.\n *\n * An Auth0 API access token carries no `email` claim of its own. The rules of\n * the tenant put the email of the person under this namespace instead, and\n * every reader of the fleet must look there. A service that reads a top-level\n * `email` claim gets nothing, and the failure is silent: the identity is still\n * valid, so the request continues with an empty email.\n */\nexport const CAMUNDA_CLAIMS_NAMESPACE = 'https://camunda.com/meta'\n\n/**\n * The email of an actor whose token carries no email.\n *\n * It is a value and not an empty string, because an empty string reads like a\n * field that nobody wrote. A record that says `unknown` says that the token had\n * no email, which is a different fact.\n *\n * A rule that compares two people MUST NOT treat two of these as one person.\n * `isSameActorEmail` in `approvals/policy.ts` holds that.\n */\nexport const UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL = 'unknown'\nexport const TEMPORARY_CLUSTER_NAME = 'Get Started'\nexport type Stage = 'local' | 'dev' | 'int' | 'prod'\nexport const HOTBACKUP_MIN_CREATE_PERIOD = 1000 * 60 * 60 * 0.25 // 15 minutes\n\nexport const SECRETS_MAX_LENGTH = 4096\nexport const FIRSTNAME_LASTNAME_MAX_LENGTH = 255\n\nexport const STARTING_PRICE_PER_MONTH_IN_EURO = 99\n\nexport const MAX_LENGTH_CLUSTER_NAME = 50\n\nexport const NAMES_OF_ENTERPRISE_SALESPLANS_WITH_SLEEPING_CLUSTERS = [\n  'CELP with sleeping clusters',\n  'Camunda Partner',\n]\n\nexport const MINIMUM_EYEPAIRS = {\n  CLUSTER_DELETION: 3,\n  CLUSTER_GENERATION_UPDATE: 2,\n  CLUSTER_PLAN_UPDATE: 2,\n  CLUSTER_PLAN_TYPE_UPDATE: 2,\n  CLUSTER_PLAN_MODIFICATION: 1,\n  CLUSTER_MODIFICATION: 1,\n}\n\nexport const MAX_HARDWARE_PACKAGE_COUNT = 4\n"],
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+  "sourcesContent": ["/*\n * Copyright Camunda Services GmbH and/or licensed to Camunda Services GmbH\n * under one or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under a commercial license.\n * You may not use this file except in compliance with the commercial license.\n */\n\nexport const CONSOLE_API_USER_ID = 'console-api'\n\n/**\n * The namespace of the custom claims that Auth0 adds to a token of this fleet.\n *\n * An Auth0 API access token carries no `email` claim of its own. The rules of\n * the tenant put the email of the person under this namespace instead, and\n * every reader of the fleet must look there. A service that reads a top-level\n * `email` claim gets nothing, and the failure is silent: the identity is still\n * valid, so the request continues with an empty email.\n */\nexport const CAMUNDA_CLAIMS_NAMESPACE = 'https://camunda.com/meta'\n\n/**\n * The email of an actor whose token carries no email.\n *\n * It is a value and not an empty string, because an empty string reads like a\n * field that nobody wrote. A record that says `unknown` says that the token had\n * no email, which is a different fact.\n *\n * A rule that compares two people MUST NOT treat two of these as one person.\n * `isSameActorEmail` in `approvals/policy.ts` holds that.\n */\nexport const UNKNOWN_ACTOR_EMAIL = 'unknown'\nexport const TEMPORARY_CLUSTER_NAME = 'Get Started'\nexport type Stage = 'local' | 'dev' | 'int' | 'prod'\nexport const HOTBACKUP_MIN_CREATE_PERIOD = 1000 * 60 * 60 * 0.25 // 15 minutes\n\nexport const SECRETS_MAX_LENGTH = 4096\nexport const FIRSTNAME_LASTNAME_MAX_LENGTH = 255\n\nexport const STARTING_PRICE_PER_MONTH_IN_EURO = 99\n\nexport const MAX_LENGTH_CLUSTER_NAME = 50\n\nexport const NAMES_OF_ENTERPRISE_SALESPLANS_WITH_SLEEPING_CLUSTERS = [\n  'CELP with sleeping clusters',\n  'Camunda Partner',\n]\n\nexport const MINIMUM_EYEPAIRS = {\n  CLUSTER_DELETION: 3,\n  CLUSTER_GENERATION_UPDATE: 2,\n  CLUSTER_PLAN_UPDATE: 2,\n  CLUSTER_PLAN_TYPE_UPDATE: 2,\n  // These two had no name, and each reader fell back to\n  // `CLUSTER_PLAN_UPDATE`. The values are the same as that fallback.\n  CLUSTER_SLEEP_WAKEUP: 2,\n  CLUSTER_SPEC_UPDATE: 2,\n  CLUSTER_PLAN_MODIFICATION: 1,\n  CLUSTER_MODIFICATION: 1,\n}\n\nexport const MAX_HARDWARE_PACKAGE_COUNT = 4\n"],
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   "names": []
 }