@camstack/system 1.2.57 → 1.2.59

package/dist/{dist-BupxnZOi.js → dist-CV6XTApk.js}

@@ -2299,9 +2299,38 @@ var CAP_NODE_PIN_CONTEXT_KEY = "__camstackNodePin";
 /**
 * Build the tRPC request options that pin a single capability call to `nodeId`.
 * Pass as the second argument to `.query(input, …)` / `.mutate(input, …)`.
+*
+* ## The id is normalised here, and it has to be
+*
+* A forked addon reads its own node from `ctx.kernel.localNodeId`, and inside a
+* worker that value is a RUNNER id — `hub/export-hap`, not `hub`. Routing
+* compares a pin against real node ids, so such a pin matches nothing and the
+* call fails with `no provider registered for cap "…"`. The local-first
+* resolver already guarded against this (`localNodeId.split('/')[0]`), which
+* made the hazard invisible: unpinned calls worked, and only an explicit pin —
+* the thing you reach for when you specifically need THIS node — silently
+* addressed a node that does not exist.
+*
+* Cost of it being missing: `addon-export-hap` pinned `decoder.getInfo` to its
+* own node to read the host's hardware-decode backend. It never once answered,
+* so every HomeKit egress transcode decoded in SOFTWARE — including 4K H.265 —
+* while D67's whole premise was that the decoder addon is the authority on
+* hardware. The warn said `decoding in SOFTWARE` and read as "this node has no
+* hardware", which was false.
+*
+* Normalising in the ONE constructor fixes every caller at once, which is why
+* it is here and not at the call sites.
 */
 function nodePin(nodeId) {
-	return { context: { [CAP_NODE_PIN_CONTEXT_KEY]: nodeId } };
+	return { context: { [CAP_NODE_PIN_CONTEXT_KEY]: toNodeId(nodeId) } };
+}
+/**
+* A runner id is `<nodeId>/<addonId>`; a node id has no slash. Taking the head
+* is idempotent, so passing an already-clean id costs nothing.
+*/
+function toNodeId(idOrRunnerId) {
+	const head = idOrRunnerId.split("/")[0];
+	return head === void 0 || head.length === 0 ? idOrRunnerId : head;
 }
 /**
 * Generic types for capability definitions.
@@ -3028,6 +3057,14 @@ var VideoEncodeSchema = zod.z.object({
 		"main",
 		"high"
 	]).optional(),
+	/**
+	* `-level`, e.g. `'3.1'`. A consumer that ADVERTISES a level in its SDP
+	* (`profile-level-id=42e01f` is Baseline 3.1) must constrain the encoder to
+	* it, or it ships a stream that does not match its own advertisement — the
+	* defect class that kept HomeKit black for a year and that Alexa carried
+	* silently. Optional because a browser negotiates the level itself.
+	*/
+	level: zod.z.string().optional(),
 	width: zod.z.number().int().positive().optional(),
 	height: zod.z.number().int().positive().optional(),
 	fps: zod.z.number().positive().optional(),
@@ -3078,6 +3115,29 @@ var EncodeProfileSchema = zod.z.object({
 	outputArgs: zod.z.array(zod.z.string()).optional()
 });
 /**
+* The shape every live egress starts from: H.264 Baseline 3.1 at 720p25.
+* Baseline because it is the one profile every consumer in this repo decodes
+* (Echo, iOS, an old browser); 3.1 because that is what the SDPs advertise.
+*/
+var BASE_LIVE_EGRESS_PROFILE = {
+	video: {
+		codec: "h264",
+		profile: "baseline",
+		level: "3.1",
+		width: 1280,
+		height: 720,
+		fps: 25,
+		bitrateKbps: 2500,
+		gopFrames: 25,
+		bf: 0,
+		preset: "veryfast",
+		tune: "zerolatency"
+	},
+	audio: "passthrough"
+};
+({ ...BASE_LIVE_EGRESS_PROFILE }), { ...BASE_LIVE_EGRESS_PROFILE.video };
+({ ...BASE_LIVE_EGRESS_PROFILE });
+/**
 * Deep wiring healthcheck — snapshot of active reachability probes across
 * every declared capability + widget of every installed plugin, on every
 * node. Produced by the backend `WiringHealthService` and surfaced via
@@ -3126,6 +3186,154 @@ zod.z.object({
 		unreachable: zod.z.number()
 	})
 });
+/**
+* Per-camera FUNCTION SWITCHES — the one coherent on/off surface over the
+* pipeline functions an operator thinks in terms of.
+*
+* ## This file adds no state
+*
+* Every switch here is a VIEW onto an authority that already existed
+* ([D62](../../../../docs/decisions/adr-0062.md)). The whole point of the
+* group is that there is exactly one place each function is turned off, and
+* the group routes to it:
+*
+* | Switch | Authority | Proven "off stops the work" gate |
+* | --- | --- | --- |
+* | `stream-broker` | `deviceManager.setDisabled` | `StreamBrokerManager.reconcileAllCatalogs` releases the brokers; `ensureBroker` refuses re-creation |
+* | `object-detection` | `deviceManager.setWrapperActive('detection-pipeline')` | `PipelineSettingsStore.resolvePipelineForDevice` returns `{ steps: [], audio: null }` |
+* | `audio-analysis` | `deviceManager.setWrapperActive('audio-analysis')` | `AudioSubscriptionController.subscribeAudioStream` returns `null` before opening the stream |
+* | `recording` | `recording.setDeviceConfig` → `RecordingConfig.enabled` | `band-decision.shouldRecord` returns false; the controller detaches the device |
+* | `notifications` | `notificationRules.setDeviceMuted` | `NotificationCenter.evaluateAndEnqueue` returns before any rule is evaluated |
+* | `privacy-mask` | `privacyMask.setMask({ enabled })` → the CAMERA | the camera blanks the masked regions itself; every stream and recording carries the black boxes |
+* | `device-audio` | `privacyMask.setAudioEnabled` → the CAMERA | the camera stops encoding an audio track at all; every consumer sees silent video |
+*
+* ## The two switches whose authority is not on this server
+*
+* `privacy-mask` and `device-audio` write the CAMERA. That is not a loophole
+* in "the group stores nothing" — it is the purest form of it: the camera
+* holds the fact, every read is a read-through, and there is no server-side
+* copy that could drift. Their availability therefore cannot come from
+* `listBindableCapsForDeviceType` (a device-NATIVE cap carries no wrappers and
+* is filtered out there); it comes from the cap's own camera-probed
+* `privacyMask.getOptions()`, which is strictly more honest — it answers for
+* THIS camera rather than for the device type
+* ([D74](../../../../docs/decisions/adr-0074.md)).
+*
+* ## `privacy-mask` is the one row whose ON is not "the function is working"
+*
+* Every other switch means *this camera's function is doing its job*, so
+* `enabled: false` is a thing an operator took away. `privacy-mask` means **the
+* MASK is active** — `enabled: true` is video deliberately obscured. The
+* polarity is not a choice made here: `addon-export-hap`'s privacy `Switch`
+* (`builders/privacy-switch.ts`) already mirrors `patch.enabled` verbatim, and
+* a HomeKit toggle that disagreed with the app's toggle for the same camera is
+* worse than either surface not having one.
+*
+* Two consequences follow and both are load-bearing:
+*
+* - **It never counts as `switchedOff`.** `countsAsSwitchedOff` is `false` for
+*   exactly this row. With the polarity above, every camera that has NOT drawn
+*   a privacy mask would otherwise report `switchedOff: ['privacy-mask']` — the
+*   normal, healthy state of most cameras rendered as an operator disablement.
+* - **Its cost line names BOTH directions.** `costWhenOff` is rendered
+*   unconditionally by both clients, so for this row it has to read correctly
+*   whichever way the switch is sitting.
+*
+* The wrapper-binding pair is not a new idea: `legacy-migrations.ts` already
+* migrated the legacy `audioEnabled` / `pipelineEnabled` /
+* `motionDetectionEnabled` booleans ONTO `setWrapperActive`. The group is the
+* surface that decision never got.
+*
+* ## Two rules that are load-bearing
+*
+* - **Recording's switch is `enabled`, never the bands.** `bands` is the only
+*   authored intent and `mode` is derived from it (`deriveRecordingMode`).
+*   Expressing "off" by clearing bands destroys the operator's schedule and
+*   turning the camera back on would then silently record nothing.
+* - **A switch that is off must be reported as off**, not merely produce
+*   nothing. {@link CameraSwitch.enabled} is what a status surface renders as
+*   "disabled by an operator" instead of "broken" — see
+*   `CameraStatus.switchedOff`.
+*/
+/**
+* The functions the operator named — five on 2026-08-05, plus the camera's own
+* microphone on 2026-08-07. Deliberately NOT one id per pipeline step: face
+* recognition and plate/LPR are per-step toggles on
+* `pipelineOrchestrator.setCameraStepToggle` and belong in the pipeline
+* editor, not in a safety group.
+*/
+var CameraSwitchIdSchema = zod.z.enum([
+	"stream-broker",
+	"object-detection",
+	"privacy-mask",
+	"device-audio",
+	"audio-analysis",
+	"recording",
+	"notifications"
+]);
+/**
+* WHERE the switch's state actually lives. A discriminated union rather than a
+* string so both the writer (the orchestrator's `setCameraSwitch`) and any
+* reader can exhaustively narrow — and so "the group added a parallel map" is
+* a compile error rather than a review comment.
+*/
+var CameraSwitchAuthoritySchema = zod.z.discriminatedUnion("kind", [
+	zod.z.object({ kind: zod.z.literal("device-disabled") }),
+	zod.z.object({
+		kind: zod.z.literal("wrapper-binding"),
+		capName: zod.z.string()
+	}),
+	zod.z.object({ kind: zod.z.literal("recording-config") }),
+	zod.z.object({ kind: zod.z.literal("notification-mute") }),
+	zod.z.object({
+		kind: zod.z.literal("camera-audio"),
+		capName: zod.z.string()
+	}),
+	zod.z.object({
+		kind: zod.z.literal("camera-mask"),
+		capName: zod.z.string()
+	})
+]);
+/**
+* Why a switch is not offered for this camera. Rendered instead of the
+* control, never as a dead control — an absent function and a broken one must
+* not look the same.
+*/
+var CameraSwitchUnavailableReasonSchema = zod.z.enum([
+	"no-provider",
+	"source-unreachable",
+	"not-configured"
+]);
+/**
+* One switch, resolved for one camera.
+*
+* `label` and `costWhenOff` travel ON THE WIRE rather than being looked up
+* client-side: the viewer is a separate repository that does not import
+* `@camstack/types`, and a cost line duplicated in two clients is a cost line
+* that will disagree with itself. Five rows per camera is nothing.
+*/
+var CameraSwitchSchema = zod.z.object({
+	id: CameraSwitchIdSchema,
+	label: zod.z.string(),
+	/**
+	* What the operator LOSES while this is off, in one sentence. Required, not
+	* optional: a switch that cannot say what it costs should not ship.
+	*/
+	costWhenOff: zod.z.string(),
+	/** False = do not render a control. `unavailableReason` says why. */
+	available: zod.z.boolean(),
+	unavailableReason: CameraSwitchUnavailableReasonSchema.optional(),
+	/** Current state. Meaningless when `available` is false — read it as `true`. */
+	enabled: zod.z.boolean(),
+	authority: CameraSwitchAuthoritySchema
+});
+/** The whole group for one camera. */
+var CameraSwitchGroupSchema = zod.z.object({
+	deviceId: zod.z.number().int(),
+	switches: zod.z.array(CameraSwitchSchema).readonly(),
+	/** Unix ms when the group was composed server-side. */
+	fetchedAt: zod.z.number()
+});
 /** Friendly display labels for stream quality IDs. */
 var STREAM_QUALITY_LABELS = {
 	high: "High",
@@ -3175,14 +3383,16 @@ var OpsLogOpSchema = zod.z.enum([
 	"manual-delete",
 	"rescan",
 	"retention-run",
-	"relocate"
+	"relocate",
+	"orphan-audit"
 ]);
 /** Why the operation ran. */
 var OpsLogReasonSchema = zod.z.enum([
 	"retention",
 	"quota",
 	"manual",
-	"operator"
+	"operator",
+	"maintenance"
 ]);
 /** One audit row, shared verbatim by both domains. */
 var OpsLogEntrySchema = zod.z.object({
@@ -5409,6 +5619,126 @@ var RtpSourceSchema = zod.z.object({
 	encoder: zod.z.string(),
 	pipelineKey: zod.z.string()
 });
+/**
+* The encode request — **structured and serialisable, with NO raw-flag escape
+* hatch.** This is deliberate and it is the one lesson taken from
+* `getStreamWithCodec`: that method's `outputArgs: string[]` is simultaneously
+* its extensibility mechanism AND part of `pipelineKeyFor`'s sharing key, so
+* adding a flag silently forks the shared child, and two consumers that mean
+* the same thing but spell it differently never share. Here every knob is a
+* NAMED field: a new requirement becomes a schema field (and a codegen run),
+* never an opaque array.
+*
+* `inputArgs` / `outputArgs` are omitted from the profile for the same reason.
+* The operator-facing derived-stream transform editor still has them — that is
+* a different surface (`publishCameraStream({ kind: 'derived' })`) with a
+* different purpose (reshaping a badly-behaved SOURCE), and it is unchanged.
+*/
+var EgressEncodeSchema = EncodeProfileSchema.omit({
+	inputArgs: true,
+	outputArgs: true
+});
+/**
+* How the encoder is bounded. `'tight'` is a one-second VBV window for a
+* consumer whose budget is enforced per second (HomeKit); `'relaxed'` is two
+* seconds, letting a keyframe spike borrow from the next second (a browser,
+* an Echo). Named rather than numeric so the INTENT survives.
+*/
+var EgressRateControlSchema = zod.z.enum(["tight", "relaxed"]);
+var EgressTranscodeRequestSchema = zod.z.object({
+	deviceId: zod.z.number().int().nonnegative(),
+	/** Which published stream to read. */
+	source: zod.z.discriminatedUnion("kind", [zod.z.object({
+		kind: zod.z.literal("profile"),
+		profile: CamProfileSchema
+	}), zod.z.object({
+		kind: zod.z.literal("cam-stream"),
+		camStreamId: zod.z.string().min(1)
+	})]),
+	encode: EgressEncodeSchema,
+	rateControl: EgressRateControlSchema.optional(),
+	/**
+	* `-bsf:v`. A consumer that negotiates its OWN SDP (HomeKit) cannot carry
+	* out-of-band extradata and needs `dump_extra` on both the copy and encode
+	* branches. Enumerated, not free text.
+	*/
+	bitstreamFilter: zod.z.enum([
+		"dump_extra",
+		"h264_mp4toannexb",
+		"hevc_mp4toannexb"
+	]).optional(),
+	/**
+	* Publish the transcode as a LOCAL push cam stream, instead of leaving the
+	* consumer to dial the returned url. The broker picks the id and returns it
+	* as `camStreamId` — a caller-supplied one would be circular, since the
+	* sharing key is computed FROM this request.
+	*
+	* The url is still returned and still the contract for a transcode pinned to
+	* another node. But dialling it locally costs an RTSP round trip that changes
+	* the transport underneath the consumer: a dialled stream is an RTP source,
+	* so `isRtpSource()` is true and the session takes the RTP-passthrough +
+	* repacketizer branch. The push branch — the one the derived mechanism has
+	* live hours on — is never reached. Measured on Alexa: broker registered, RTP
+	* arriving, key frame arriving, black screen, on a chain healthy at every
+	* other point.
+	*
+	* Same idea the transport already applies to CALLS, where `classifyCapRoute`
+	* gives priority to `hub-in-process` so a local call never leaves the node.
+	* This is that rule for media.
+	*/
+	publishLocally: zod.z.boolean().optional(),
+	pixelFormat: zod.z.enum(["yuv420p", "nv12"]).optional(),
+	/**
+	* Operator/consumer override for decode hardware. ABSENT is the normal case
+	* and the one that matters: the broker then resolves the backend from the
+	* DECODER ADDON's per-node `probedBestHwaccel` (see
+	* `@camstack/types` `ffmpeg/hwaccel.ts`), which is the ranking known to work
+	* on this hardware — never the raw kernel resolver's qsv-first order.
+	*/
+	decodeHwAccel: zod.z.enum([
+		"auto",
+		"none",
+		"videotoolbox",
+		"vaapi",
+		"qsv",
+		"cuda"
+	]).optional(),
+	/**
+	* Host to embed in the returned restream `url`. The broker mints hub-local
+	* `127.0.0.1` URLs; a consumer on another node passes a cluster-resolvable
+	* host (`NodeTopologyService.reachableHostByNode`) so the returned URL is
+	* dialable from there. Same contract as `getStreamWithCodec.hostname` —
+	* `substituteRtspHost` rewrites only the dial address, never the restreamer.
+	*/
+	hostname: zod.z.string().optional(),
+	/** Attribution for the broker panel. Never part of the sharing key. */
+	tag: zod.z.string().optional()
+});
+var EgressTranscodeSchema = zod.z.object({
+	/** Dial-able RTSP url (host-substituted when `hostname` was supplied). */
+	url: zod.z.string(),
+	/** Release handle. Refcounted — the child dies when the last holder releases. */
+	pipelineKey: zod.z.string(),
+	videoCodec: zod.z.enum(["H264", "H265"]),
+	resolution: zod.z.object({
+		width: zod.z.number().int().positive(),
+		height: zod.z.number().int().positive()
+	}),
+	transcoded: zod.z.boolean(),
+	encoder: zod.z.string(),
+	/**
+	* The decode backend the child ACTUALLY ran with — `null` for software.
+	* Returned rather than assumed: a consumer that asked for hardware and got
+	* software needs to be able to see that without reading the broker's logs.
+	*/
+	decodeHwAccel: zod.z.string().nullable(),
+	/**
+	* Set when `publishLocally` was honoured: attach to THIS instead of dialling
+	* `url`, and the session takes the push/deframe transport rather than the
+	* RTP-passthrough one. `null` means the consumer must dial.
+	*/
+	camStreamId: zod.z.string().nullable()
+});
 var streamBrokerCapability = {
 	name: "stream-broker",
 	scope: "system",
@@ -5580,6 +5910,40 @@ var streamBrokerCapability = {
 			auth: "admin"
 		}),
 		/**
+		* THE ffmpeg primitive. Acquire an encoded stream matching a structured
+		* encode plan; the broker builds the argv through the ONE builder
+		* (`@camstack/types` `ffmpeg/invocation.ts`), resolves decode hardware from
+		* the DECODER ADDON's per-node ranking, and returns a dialable RTSP url.
+		*
+		* **Refcounted and deduplicated on EXACT match.** Two requesters whose
+		* requests produce the same `egressTranscodeSharingKey` receive the SAME
+		* `pipelineKey` and the same child process. Nearly-identical requests are
+		* NOT merged.
+		*
+		* **The handle is immutable.** There is deliberately no `reconfigure`
+		* method and this one never accepts a `pipelineKey` alongside encode
+		* parameters: a consumer whose requirements change releases and
+		* re-acquires. A mutable shared handle is exactly what made Alexa's old
+		* `derived:alexa-<id>` stream a co-tenant hazard — one consumer's
+		* downgrade dragged every other consumer down with it.
+		*
+		* Placement: unpinned, `classifyCapRoute` serves this hub-in-process
+		* (Priority 1). A caller that wants the transcode elsewhere passes
+		* `nodePin(nodeId)` and a `hostname` it can dial.
+		*/
+		acquireEgressTranscode: method(EgressTranscodeRequestSchema, EgressTranscodeSchema, {
+			kind: "mutation",
+			auth: "admin"
+		}),
+		/** Drop one reference. The child dies when the last holder releases. */
+		releaseEgressTranscode: method(zod.z.object({ pipelineKey: zod.z.string() }), zod.z.object({
+			released: zod.z.boolean(),
+			refcount: zod.z.number().int().nonnegative()
+		}), {
+			kind: "mutation",
+			auth: "admin"
+		}),
+		/**
 		* ── Decoded audio-chunk plane (Phase 5 / D9) ──────────────────────
 		*
 		* The serialisable replacement for the live-object `IStreamBroker.
@@ -11467,12 +11831,13 @@ var NcConditionsSchema = zod.z.object({
 	* source; otherwise the subject's source must equal it. Legacy records
 	* with no stamped source are treated as `pipeline`. The union spans both
 	* record kinds — object events carry `pipeline` | `onboard`, synthetic
-	* tracks carry `sensor`.
+	* tracks carry `sensor` (a linked device) or `audio` (a D62 audio marker).
 	*/
 	source: zod.z.enum([
 		"pipeline",
 		"onboard",
 		"sensor",
+		"audio",
 		"any"
 	]).optional(),
 	/**
@@ -12060,6 +12425,35 @@ var notificationRulesCapability = {
 			auth: "admin"
 		}),
 		/**
+		* PERMANENT per-camera mute — the notifications half of the per-camera
+		* function switch group ([D61](../../../../docs/decisions/adr-0067.md)).
+		*
+		* Deliberately NOT a snooze. A snooze is bounded at
+		* {@link NC_SNOOZE_MAX_MINUTES} on purpose — "a snooze that could not
+		* expire would be an outage the operator asked for once and forgot" — and
+		* widening it to express "this camera never notifies" would destroy that
+		* property for every snooze. A mute is the other thing: an explicit,
+		* indefinite, admin-only decision, visible in the switch group next to the
+		* other four, and reported on `CameraStatus.switchedOff` so a silent
+		* camera never reads as a working one.
+		*
+		* Returned as ONE list rather than a per-camera query: the group's reader
+		* needs every camera's state, and a per-camera fan-out over the viewer's
+		* single WebSocket is N frames serialised on one socket.
+		*/
+		listDeviceMutes: method(zod.z.object({}), zod.z.object({ mutedDeviceIds: zod.z.array(zod.z.number().int()).readonly() }), { auth: "admin" }),
+		/**
+		* Mute or unmute one camera. Idempotent; an unmute of a camera that was
+		* never muted succeeds.
+		*/
+		setDeviceMuted: method(zod.z.object({
+			deviceId: zod.z.number().int(),
+			muted: zod.z.boolean()
+		}), zod.z.object({ success: zod.z.literal(true) }), {
+			kind: "mutation",
+			auth: "admin"
+		}),
+		/**
 		* Dry-run a rule against recently persisted records (object events for
 		* `immediate`, closed tracks for `track-end`). Mutation kind only to
 		* carry the full rule object safely; no side effects.
@@ -12471,12 +12865,60 @@ var TrackAudioLabelSchema = zod.z.object({
 });
 /**
 * How a track was produced. `pipeline` (default / absent) = the spatial
-* detection+tracking pipeline. `sensor` = a SYNTHETIC track projected from a
-* linked sensor/control state change (no positions; carries a snapshot). The
-* spatial subsystems (tracker association, occupancy count, re-id/embedding,
-* resurrection) MUST skip `sensor` tracks — they have no bbox trajectory.
+* detection+tracking pipeline. Every OTHER value is a SYNTHETIC projection —
+* no positions, a single snapshot, and no bbox trajectory at all:
+*
+*  - `sensor` — a linked sensor/control device state change.
+*  - `audio` — an audio event on the camera itself that was anomalous for
+*    THAT camera, loud, and heard while nothing visual was happening (D62).
+*
+* The spatial subsystems (tracker association, occupancy count, re-id /
+* embedding, resurrection) MUST skip every synthetic source. Test for that
+* with `isSpatialTrack`, which allow-lists `pipeline` — a `!== 'sensor'`
+* check silently readmits every source added after it was written.
 */
-var TrackSourceSchema = zod.z.enum(["pipeline", "sensor"]);
+var TrackSourceSchema = zod.z.enum([
+	"pipeline",
+	"sensor",
+	"audio"
+]);
+/**
+* Per-track OPERATOR flags — set by hand from the admin UI or the viewer, never
+* by the pipeline. Spread into `TrackSchema` and `KeyEventSchema` from one place
+* so the two surfaces cannot drift.
+*
+* **Absent ≠ false.** A track that has never been touched omits the field; an
+* explicitly un-flagged track carries `false`. Legacy rows written before the
+* columns existed read as absent, and a consumer that needs a boolean should say
+* `flag === true`, not `flag !== false`.
+*
+* What the flags DO is deliberately UNDEFINED at the time of writing: they are
+* operator curation, and the behaviour they drive will be specified separately.
+* In particular a `markForTrain` track is NOT pinned against retention — see
+* `docs/decisions/adr-0059.md` for why that is a store-level change, not a flag.
+*/
+var TrackFlagFields = {
+	/** Operator marked this track as training material. */
+	markForTrain: zod.z.boolean().optional(),
+	/** Operator marked this track for diagnostic attention. */
+	debug: zod.z.boolean().optional()
+};
+/**
+* The write half: a PARTIAL patch. An omitted key is left untouched, so setting
+* one flag can never clear the other — the toggles are independent and are
+* driven from three surfaces that do not know about each other.
+*/
+var TrackFlagsPatchSchema = zod.z.object(TrackFlagFields);
+/**
+* The resolved flag state after a write. Both fields are REQUIRED here (absent
+* collapses to `false`) so a caller can drive a toggle's checked state off the
+* mutation result without a re-fetch.
+*/
+var TrackFlagsSchema = zod.z.object({
+	trackId: zod.z.string(),
+	markForTrain: zod.z.boolean(),
+	debug: zod.z.boolean()
+});
 var TrackSchema = zod.z.object({
 	trackId: zod.z.string(),
 	deviceId: zod.z.number(),
@@ -12519,7 +12961,8 @@ var TrackSchema = zod.z.object({
 	/** Normalized 0..1 trajectory envelope (see {@link TrackEnvelopeSchema}).
 	*  Populated from the persisted envelope columns on historical reads;
 	*  absent on legacy rows, dims-less tracks and active (in-RAM) tracks. */
-	envelope: TrackEnvelopeSchema.optional()
+	envelope: TrackEnvelopeSchema.optional(),
+	...TrackFlagFields
 });
 var BaseEventFields = {
 	id: zod.z.string(),
@@ -12740,7 +13183,8 @@ var KeyEventSchema = zod.z.object({
 	/** Highest-confidence ObjectEvent id for the track (empty when none). */
 	bestEventId: zod.z.string(),
 	/** Track lifetime in ms (lastSeen - firstSeen). */
-	windowMs: zod.z.number().optional()
+	windowMs: zod.z.number().optional(),
+	...TrackFlagFields
 });
 zod.z.object({
 	trackId: zod.z.string(),
@@ -12826,7 +13270,31 @@ var RebuildObjectEmbeddingsInput = zod.z.object({
 	since: zod.z.number().optional(),
 	until: zod.z.number().optional(),
 	/** Stop after this many tracks; the result reports whether more remain. */
-	maxTracks: zod.z.number().int().positive().optional()
+	maxTracks: zod.z.number().int().positive().optional(),
+	/**
+	* Run every embedding on THIS node instead of round-robining the fleet.
+	*
+	* Named `executeOnNodeId` and not `nodeId` on purpose: an inline `nodeId`
+	* field in cap args is read by `parent-unowned-call.ts` as a ROUTING PIN, so
+	* calling it that would pin the rebuild REQUEST itself to that node — the
+	* rebuild orchestration lives on the hub, and only the per-track step runs
+	* remotely. This field is data; the per-track pin is applied inside.
+	*
+	* Absent ⇒ round-robin over every online node whose runner can serve the
+	* pinned model.
+	*/
+	executeOnNodeId: zod.z.string().optional(),
+	/**
+	* Milliseconds to wait between tracks; omit for the built-in default, `0` to
+	* run flat out.
+	*
+	* A rebuild is bulk maintenance on hub-main's single thread. Measured
+	* 2026-08-06, an unpaced pass held that thread busy 82.2 s out of 120 and
+	* pushed `nodes.topology` from 0.25 s to 26 s for 43 minutes. The value in
+	* force is logged at start and finish so a deliberately slow pass reads
+	* differently from a stalled one.
+	*/
+	pacingMs: zod.z.number().int().nonnegative().optional()
 });
 /**
 * Result of emptying the CLIP index.
@@ -12860,13 +13328,23 @@ var RebuildStatusSchema = zod.z.object({
 	/** Tracks with no usable detection box. */
 	missingBbox: zod.z.number(),
 	/**
-	* Tracks the pipeline REFUSED rather than broke on: the camera is not
-	* attached, or `clip-embedding` is not enabled in its step tree. Separate
-	* from `failed` because the remedy is a configuration change, not an engine
-	* investigation — and because a pass over decommissioned cameras would
-	* otherwise read as a total engine outage.
+	* Tracks an executing node REFUSED rather than broke on — an unreadable key
+	* frame, a step that threw. Separate from `failed` because the remedy is
+	* different, and because a whole camera silently contributing zero vectors
+	* is the shape of failure a rebuild must never hide.
 	*/
 	notRunnable: zod.z.number(),
+	/**
+	* The pass stopped because NO node could serve the pinned model.
+	*
+	* Distinct from `notRunnable` on purpose: that one says "this track was
+	* refused", this one says "the cluster cannot do this work at all" — every
+	* candidate node either lacks the `clip-embedding` step, lacks a build of the
+	* pinned model for its engine format, or dropped out. The remedy is a model /
+	* engine change, not a per-camera one. Non-zero here always comes with
+	* `complete: false`.
+	*/
+	noCapableNode: zod.z.number(),
 	failed: zod.z.number(),
 	/** Set once a pass ends: true only when EVERYTHING was covered. */
 	complete: zod.z.boolean().nullable(),
@@ -13056,6 +13534,31 @@ var pipelineAnalyticsCapability = {
 			auth: "admin"
 		}),
 		/**
+		* Set the per-track operator flags (`markForTrain`, `debug`) on ONE track.
+		* The patch is PARTIAL — an omitted key is left untouched — because the
+		* three surfaces that write it (admin Events grid, viewer track detail,
+		* viewer cluster detail) each own one toggle and must not clobber the other.
+		*
+		* Writes the track ROW: `markForTrain`/`debug` are per-TRACK state, so they
+		* live where `label` and `importance` live, not in any per-device settings
+		* store. Updates the in-RAM active track too, so a flag set on a live track
+		* survives its expiry-time persist.
+		*
+		* `auth: 'protected'` (the default), NOT `admin`: the viewer is an
+		* authenticated non-admin surface and two of the three call sites are
+		* there. Revisit if a flag ever gains an effect that costs storage —
+		* `deleteTracks` next door is admin for exactly that reason.
+		*
+		* Returns the RESOLVED state of both flags (absent → `false`) so a caller
+		* can drive its toggle without a re-fetch. Rejects an unknown track.
+		*/
+		setTrackFlags: method(zod.z.object({
+			/** Log/audit scope only — the trackId is globally unique on its own. */
+			deviceId: zod.z.number(),
+			trackId: zod.z.string(),
+			flags: TrackFlagsPatchSchema
+		}), TrackFlagsSchema, { kind: "mutation" }),
+		/**
 		* Durable event-store footprint for the management UI: event rows
 		* (motion + object + audio) counted per camera + total, plus the
 		* event-owned media bytes on disk per camera + total. Stat/count-based,
@@ -13935,6 +14438,53 @@ var DetailResultSchema = zod.z.object({
 	nativeFaceShortSidePx: zod.z.number().optional()
 });
 /**
+* Why an executing node REFUSED a stateless step run (`runStatelessStep`).
+*
+* A refusal is a first-class answer, not an error, because the caller's next
+* move depends on WHICH one it is — and because "the pass produced nothing"
+* must never be reachable without a named, counted cause. The two tiers:
+*
+* - **node-level** (`unknown-step`, `model-not-servable`) — this node can
+*   never serve this (step, model) pair. The caller drops it from its rotation
+*   and retries the same work elsewhere; nothing about the work changes.
+* - **work-level** (`unreadable-frame`, `execution-failed`) — this node is
+*   fine, this one request is not. Retrying it on another node would only
+*   spread the same failure.
+*/
+var StatelessStepRefusalSchema = zod.z.enum([
+	"unknown-step",
+	"model-not-servable",
+	"unreadable-frame",
+	"execution-failed"
+]);
+/**
+* Answer to `runStatelessStep` — a discriminated union rather than a nullable
+* result, because `null` is exactly what made the camera-bound detail path
+* unable to tell "refused" from "never asked".
+*/
+var RunStatelessStepResultSchema = zod.z.discriminatedUnion("kind", [zod.z.object({
+	kind: zod.z.literal("ran"),
+	/** The node that actually executed it — the pin, echoed back for the log. */
+	nodeId: zod.z.string(),
+	/**
+	* The model the step ran with.
+	*
+	* The node verified this exact id has a build for the format it dispatched
+	* on BEFORE running, so the executor's format resolution returns it
+	* unchanged. A caller that pinned a model must compare this field and
+	* treat a mismatch as a refusal — the whole point of the pin is that a
+	* pass writes one feature space.
+	*/
+	modelId: zod.z.string(),
+	details: zod.z.array(DetailResultSchema)
+}), zod.z.object({
+	kind: zod.z.literal("refused"),
+	nodeId: zod.z.string(),
+	reason: StatelessStepRefusalSchema,
+	/** Human-readable specifics — the format tried, the formats shipped, etc. */
+	detail: zod.z.string()
+})]);
+/**
 * Per-camera tunable ranges + defaults. Single source of truth used
 * by both the Zod data schema (validation + default fallback) and
 * the device settings UI (slider min/max/step). Touch one place and
@@ -14379,7 +14929,77 @@ var pipelineRunnerCapability = {
 			cropJpeg: zod.z.string().optional(),
 			parent: DetailParentSchema,
 			steps: zod.z.array(zod.z.string()).optional()
-		}), zod.z.object({ details: zod.z.array(DetailResultSchema) }).nullable(), { kind: "mutation" })
+		}), zod.z.object({ details: zod.z.array(DetailResultSchema) }).nullable(), { kind: "mutation" }),
+		/**
+		* Run ONE enrichment step against caller-supplied pixels, with NO camera
+		* session — no attach, no frame handle, no device affinity.
+		*
+		* ## Why this exists next to `runDetailSubtree` and not inside it
+		*
+		* `runDetailSubtree` resolves its step tree from the LIVE ATTACH STATE. That
+		* is correct for it: its reason to exist is a frame HANDLE, and a handle is
+		* only resolvable while a decode session is open. But it makes the method
+		* useless to anything walking history — cameras run `detectionMode:
+		* 'on-motion'` and detach ~30 s after motion stops, so a fleet-wide
+		* embedding rebuild found most cameras detached and rebuilt only whatever
+		* happened to be attached at that second (measured 2026-08-06: 1125 tracks
+		* scanned, 121 rebuilt, 601 refused as "camera is not attached").
+		*
+		* A caller that ships its own pixels needs none of that machinery. So this
+		* method takes the three things a step actually needs — an image, a box, a
+		* step id — resolves the step from the CATALOG rather than from an
+		* attachment, and runs it on whichever node the caller pinned.
+		*
+		* ## What it deliberately keeps
+		*
+		* The crop rectangle is derived by the SAME `deriveDetailCropRect` call the
+		* live detail plane uses, from the same cluster-wide convention
+		* ([D52](../../../docs/decisions/adr-0052.md)). `frameJpeg` is a FULL frame,
+		* never a pre-cut tile, for exactly the reason `runDetailSubtree` documents:
+		* a caller that cuts is a second feature space.
+		*
+		* ## What it deliberately drops
+		*
+		* No device jump and no `deviceKey`: the jump roster comes from the attach
+		* config, which does not exist here. The step runs on the node's default
+		* engine. This is a maintenance path, not a latency-sensitive one.
+		*
+		* ## Routing
+		*
+		* NOT device-bound. `sourceDeviceId` is DIAGNOSTIC — the camera whose track
+		* these pixels came from, so every log line on the executing node can carry
+		* `tags: { deviceId }`. It is deliberately not named `deviceId`: that field
+		* is a routing hint that would send the call to the camera's owning node,
+		* which is the placement constraint this method exists to remove. Callers
+		* choose the node with `nodePin(nodeId)`; unpinned, an unowned call is
+		* served hub-in-process like any other singleton.
+		*/
+		runStatelessStep: method(zod.z.object({
+			/** Catalog step id, e.g. `clip-embedding`. */
+			stepId: zod.z.string(),
+			/**
+			* REQUIRED model pin. The node runs this exact model or refuses with
+			* `model-not-servable` — it never substitutes a format default, because
+			* a fleet pass that round-robins across nodes would then fill one index
+			* from several encoders.
+			*/
+			modelId: zod.z.string(),
+			/** FULL FRAME, base64 JPEG. The runner cuts — do NOT pre-crop. */
+			frameJpeg: zod.z.string(),
+			/**
+			* The subject box, NORMALISED [0,1] against `frameJpeg`. Normalised on
+			* purpose: the caller stores boxes against a downscaled analysis frame
+			* while the stored key frame is native-resolution, and the only side
+			* that reliably knows the image's pixel dimensions is the side that
+			* decodes it. Denormalising here removes a second reader of the
+			* dimensions and the class of mismatch that comes with it.
+			*/
+			bbox: NativeCropBboxSchema,
+			/** Parent class of the subject (`person`, `vehicle`, …) — carried into the result. */
+			className: zod.z.string(),
+			/** Camera the pixels came from. Diagnostics + log tags ONLY — never routing. */
+			sourceDeviceId: zod.z.number()
+		}), RunStatelessStepResultSchema, { kind: "mutation" })
 	}
 };
 var CameraPipelineConfigSchema = zod.z.object({
@@ -14687,6 +15307,20 @@ var CameraStatusSchema = zod.z.object({
 	detection: CameraDetectionStatusSchema.nullable(),
 	audio: CameraAudioStatusSchema.nullable(),
 	recording: CameraRecordingStatusSchema.nullable(),
+	/**
+	* Per-camera function switches an OPERATOR has turned off
+	* ([D61](../../../../docs/decisions/adr-0067.md)).
+	*
+	* This is the difference between DISABLED and BROKEN. A camera whose
+	* `detection` block reports zero fps and whose `switchedOff` contains
+	* `'object-detection'` was switched off by a person; the same camera with an
+	* empty list is failing. Every status surface must render the two
+	* differently — a quiet camera that looks identical to a dead one is the
+	* silence-reads-as-never-happened trap this repo keeps paying for.
+	*
+	* Empty when nothing is off. Never contains a switch no provider offers.
+	*/
+	switchedOff: zod.z.array(CameraSwitchIdSchema).readonly(),
 	/** Unix timestamp (ms) when this snapshot was composed server-side. */
 	fetchedAt: zod.z.number()
 });
@@ -15086,6 +15720,43 @@ var pipelineOrchestratorCapability = {
 			agentNodeId: zod.z.string().optional()
 		}), CameraPipelineConfigSchema),
 		/**
+		* The whole per-camera function switch group, DERIVED — never a stored
+		* list ([D61](../../../../docs/decisions/adr-0067.md)).
+		*
+		* The group adds no state. Each switch is a view onto the authority that
+		* already owned it (`deviceManager.setDisabled`,
+		* `deviceManager.setWrapperActive`, `RecordingConfig.enabled`,
+		* `notificationRules.setDeviceMuted`), and `switch.authority` says which.
+		* Availability comes from `deviceManager.listBindableCapsForDeviceType`,
+		* so a deployment with no audio analyzer renders no audio switch.
+		*
+		* `auth: 'view'` deliberately — a NON-admin must be able to see that a
+		* camera is quiet because somebody switched it off. Only the mutation is
+		* admin-gated.
+		*/
+		getCameraSwitches: method(zod.z.object({ deviceId: zod.z.number() }), CameraSwitchGroupSchema),
+		/**
+		* Flip ONE switch, routed to its existing authority.
+		*
+		* Never writes a parallel map: `recording` patches `RecordingConfig.enabled`
+		* and leaves `bands` byte-identical (clearing bands to express "off"
+		* destroys the operator's authored schedule and turning the camera back on
+		* would silently record nothing), and the two pipeline switches write the
+		* SAME wrapper binding the legacy `pipelineEnabled` / `audioEnabled`
+		* booleans were migrated onto.
+		*
+		* Rejects a switch this camera does not offer rather than persisting a
+		* write nothing reads.
+		*/
+		setCameraSwitch: method(zod.z.object({
+			deviceId: zod.z.number(),
+			switchId: CameraSwitchIdSchema,
+			enabled: zod.z.boolean()
+		}), CameraSwitchGroupSchema, {
+			kind: "mutation",
+			auth: "admin"
+		}),
+		/**
 		* Server-composed aggregated status for a single camera.
 		*
 		* Fans out in parallel (bounded, per-stage graceful degradation) to
@@ -15533,9 +16204,15 @@ var snapshotCapability = {
 			* Bypass the cache freshness check and fetch directly from the
 			* native (or stream-broker fallback). Triggered by the UI's
 			* "refresh" button so an operator can force a fresh frame
-			* even when the cache is well within `snapshotMaxAgeMs`.
-			* On battery cams this WILL wake the camera — accept the
-			* cost only when the user explicitly asks for it.
+			* even when the cache is well within the device's
+			* `snapshotMaxAgeS` window.
+			*
+			* **`force` is an OPERATOR signal, not a freshness preference.** On a
+			* battery camera it is the one thing that walks past the wrapper's
+			* sleep gate and wakes the camera, so a background caller — a poller,
+			* an event handler, a thumbnail — must NEVER set it. Every such caller
+			* gets the cached frame, which on a sleeping battery camera is the
+			* correct answer: stale but honest beats woken.
 			*/
 			force: zod.z.boolean().optional()
 		}), SnapshotImageSchema.nullable()),
@@ -21990,12 +22667,30 @@ var pressureSensorCapability = {
 	runtimeState: PressureSensorStatusSchema
 };
 /**
-* Privacy mask = up to `maxRegions` SHAPES the camera blanks out (NOT a
-* cell grid). Reolink `<shelterList>` zones are rectangles; Hikvision
-* ISAPI `<RegionCoordinatesList>` zones are free polygons (this camera:
-* exactly 4 vertices, not necessarily axis-aligned). The cap composes the
-* shared rect|polygon subset of the MaskShape vocabulary. All coords are
-* normalized 0..1 (top-left origin).
+* PRIVACY — what the camera deliberately does not capture. Two planes:
+*
+*  - **video**: up to `maxRegions` SHAPES the camera blanks out (NOT a cell
+*    grid). Reolink `<shelterList>` zones are rectangles; Hikvision ISAPI
+*    `<RegionCoordinatesList>` zones are free polygons (this camera: exactly
+*    4 vertices, not necessarily axis-aligned). The cap composes the shared
+*    rect|polygon subset of the MaskShape vocabulary. All coords are
+*    normalized 0..1 (top-left origin).
+*  - **audio**: the camera's microphone. `setAudioEnabled(false)` stops the
+*    camera encoding an audio track at all, so EVERY consumer — live view,
+*    recording, the audio analyzer, an export — sees silent video. There is
+*    no server-side copy of this fact; the camera is the store and every read
+*    is a read-through, which is why a switch over it cannot drift
+*    ([D62](../../../../docs/decisions/adr-0062.md)).
+*
+* Both belong here for one reason: they are the two things an operator turns
+* off when the answer to "what is this camera allowed to record" changes, and
+* both are applied ON the device, before anything leaves it.
+*
+* **The audio flag has exactly one writer.** `stream-params` used to carry a
+* per-profile `audio` in its patch schema — reachable from no UI and honoured
+* by one provider — and it was removed when this landed. A second writer onto
+* one device register is the shape of every knob this repo has shipped that
+* disagreed with the one the reader read.
 */
 /** A privacy-mask region's geometry — rectangle or free polygon. */
 var PrivacyMaskShapeSchema = zod.z.discriminatedUnion("kind", [MaskRectShapeSchema, MaskPolygonShapeSchema]);
@@ -22007,21 +22702,45 @@ var PrivacyMaskRegionSchema = zod.z.object({
 	enabled: zod.z.boolean(),
 	shape: PrivacyMaskShapeSchema
 });
-/** Current on-camera privacy-mask state — master enable + zones. */
+/** Current on-camera privacy state — mask master enable + zones + microphone. */
 var PrivacyMaskStatusSchema = zod.z.object({
 	enabled: zod.z.boolean(),
 	/** Active zones (normalized 0..1). Length ≤ maxRegions. */
 	regions: zod.z.array(PrivacyMaskRegionSchema),
+	/**
+	* Is the camera capturing sound right now? Read from the camera, never from
+	* a server-side mirror.
+	*
+	* `null` means "no answer" — either this camera exposes no controllable
+	* microphone (`getOptions().supportsAudioMute === false`) or the read
+	* failed. A consumer must render `null` as UNKNOWN and never as `false`:
+	* "the microphone is off" and "we could not ask" look identical to an
+	* operator only until one of them is wrong.
+	*
+	* On a camera whose profiles carry the flag independently (Reolink writes
+	* it per stream), `true` means AT LEAST ONE profile still carries audio —
+	* privacy is only satisfied when every one of them is silent.
+	*/
+	audioEnabled: zod.z.boolean().nullable(),
 	lastFetchedAt: zod.z.number()
 });
-/** Per-camera availability. */
+/** Per-camera availability. Probed, never assumed from the model name. */
 var PrivacyMaskOptionsSchema = zod.z.object({
 	/** Maximum number of supported zones. */
 	maxRegions: zod.z.number(),
 	/** Shape kinds this camera accepts — Reolink: ['rect']; Hikvision: ['rect','polygon']. */
 	supportedShapes: zod.z.array(MaskShapeKindSchema),
 	/** Polygon vertex bounds when 'polygon' is supported (Hikvision: {min:4,max:4}). */
-	polygonVertices: MaskPolygonVerticesSchema.optional()
+	polygonVertices: MaskPolygonVerticesSchema.optional(),
+	/**
+	* Does this camera expose a microphone switch we can actually write?
+	*
+	* Camera-probed: `true` only when the firmware answered with an audio flag
+	* we know how to patch. A camera that never answered is `false` — a control
+	* the operator can press that changes nothing is worse than no control, and
+	* the switch group renders "not available" instead.
+	*/
+	supportsAudioMute: zod.z.boolean()
 });
 /** Partial change — every field optional. */
 var PrivacyMaskPatchSchema = zod.z.object({
@@ -22048,6 +22767,27 @@ var privacyMaskCapability = {
 		}), zod.z.void(), {
 			kind: "mutation",
 			auth: "admin"
+		}),
+		/**
+		* Turn the camera's microphone on or off, at the camera.
+		*
+		* Deliberately its OWN mutation rather than a field on
+		* {@link PrivacyMaskPatchSchema}: `patch.enabled` already means "the video
+		* mask master switch", and overloading it would make one boolean mean two
+		* unrelated things on the same call. It is also the only method here whose
+		* write leaves the device in a state a later `getStatus` reads back
+		* verbatim, which is what makes it safe as a switch authority.
+		*
+		* A camera whose `getOptions().supportsAudioMute` is false must REJECT
+		* this rather than silently accept it — a write nothing applies is exactly
+		* what the switch group exists to remove.
+		*/
+		setAudioEnabled: method(zod.z.object({
+			deviceId: zod.z.number(),
+			enabled: zod.z.boolean()
+		}), zod.z.void(), {
+			kind: "mutation",
+			auth: "admin"
 		})
 	},
 	status: {
@@ -22432,6 +23172,21 @@ var LocateSegmentResultSchema = zod.z.discriminatedUnion("kind", [zod.z.object({
 })]);
 /** Raw bytes of one finalized footage segment (read off disk on the recording node). */
 var ReadSegmentBytesResultSchema = zod.z.object({ data: zod.z.instanceof(Uint8Array) });
+/**
+* One GOP of a finalized segment, cut by byte range through the segment's own
+* `mfra` (D31 on the D42 feeder path). `data` is the `ftyp`+`moov` head plus
+* the single `moof`+`mdat` covering the requested instant — standalone-
+* demuxable, never the whole file. When the segment's index cannot be parsed
+* the provider degrades INSIDE the mechanism to the whole segment (still one
+* `data`, `gopStartMs` = the segment start) — a worse read, not another path.
+*/
+var ReadGopBytesResultSchema = zod.z.object({
+	data: zod.z.instanceof(Uint8Array),
+	/** Absolute epoch ms of the returned fragment's first sample. */
+	gopStartMs: zod.z.number(),
+	/** Media ms the returned fragment covers. */
+	gopDurMs: zod.z.number()
+});
 var recordingCapability = {
 	name: "recording",
 	scope: "system",
@@ -22499,6 +23254,18 @@ var recordingCapability = {
 			kind: "query",
 			auth: "admin"
 		}),
+		/** Read the single GOP of segment `startMs` covering `epochMs`, by mfra
+		*  byte range — the scrub-granular read (D31 letter on the feeder path).
+		*  See {@link ReadGopBytesResultSchema} for the degradation contract. */
+		readGopBytes: method(zod.z.object({
+			deviceId: zod.z.number(),
+			profile: zod.z.string(),
+			startMs: zod.z.number(),
+			epochMs: zod.z.number()
+		}), ReadGopBytesResultSchema, {
+			kind: "query",
+			auth: "admin"
+		}),
 		setDeviceConfig: method(zod.z.object({
 			deviceId: zod.z.number(),
 			config: RecordingConfigSchema
@@ -23142,6 +23909,16 @@ var StreamProfileConfigSchema = zod.z.object({
 		"baseline"
 	]).optional(),
 	gop: zod.z.number().optional(),
+	/**
+	* Whether THIS profile currently carries an audio track. READ-ONLY here.
+	*
+	* There is no matching field on {@link StreamProfilePatchSchema}: the
+	* camera's microphone is owned by `privacy-mask` (`setAudioEnabled`), which
+	* writes every profile at once so "audio off" means silent everywhere. A
+	* per-profile writer beside it would let a camera be half-muted and would be
+	* a second knob onto one device register — the failure D62 exists to
+	* prevent. Absent when the firmware does not report the flag.
+	*/
 	audio: zod.z.boolean().optional()
 });
 var StreamParamsStatusSchema = zod.z.object({
@@ -23182,7 +23959,13 @@ var StreamParamsOptionsSchema = zod.z.object({
 	ext: StreamProfileOptionsSchema.optional()
 });
 /** A partial change to one profile — every field optional; a provider
-*  ignores fields it doesn't support. */
+*  ignores fields it doesn't support.
+*
+*  There is deliberately NO `audio` here. It existed until 2026-08-07,
+*  reachable from no form and honoured by exactly one provider, while the
+*  camera's microphone is a whole-device fact. It now has one writer,
+*  `privacyMask.setAudioEnabled`, which writes every profile — see
+*  `privacy-mask.cap.ts`. */
 var StreamProfilePatchSchema = zod.z.object({
 	width: zod.z.number().optional(),
 	height: zod.z.number().optional(),
@@ -23195,8 +23978,7 @@ var StreamProfilePatchSchema = zod.z.object({
 		"main",
 		"baseline"
 	]).optional(),
-	gop: zod.z.number().optional(),
-	audio: zod.z.boolean().optional()
+	gop: zod.z.number().optional()
 });
 var streamParamsCapability = {
 	name: "stream-params",
@@ -27811,6 +28593,12 @@ var METHOD_ACCESS_MAP = Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "view"
 	},
+	"notificationRules.listDeviceMutes": {
+		capName: "notification-rules",
+		capScope: "system",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "view"
+	},
 	"notificationRules.listRules": {
 		capName: "notification-rules",
 		capScope: "system",
@@ -27829,6 +28617,12 @@ var METHOD_ACCESS_MAP = Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "create"
 	},
+	"notificationRules.setDeviceMuted": {
+		capName: "notification-rules",
+		capScope: "system",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "create"
+	},
 	"notificationRules.setRuleEnabled": {
 		capName: "notification-rules",
 		capScope: "system",
@@ -28105,6 +28899,12 @@ var METHOD_ACCESS_MAP = Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "view"
 	},
+	"pipelineAnalytics.setTrackFlags": {
+		capName: "pipeline-analytics",
+		capScope: "device",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "create"
+	},
 	"pipelineAnalytics.wipeAllAnalytics": {
 		capName: "pipeline-analytics",
 		capScope: "device",
@@ -28411,6 +29211,12 @@ var METHOD_ACCESS_MAP = Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "view"
 	},
+	"pipelineOrchestrator.getCameraSwitches": {
+		capName: "pipeline-orchestrator",
+		capScope: "system",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "view"
+	},
 	"pipelineOrchestrator.getCapabilityBindings": {
 		capName: "pipeline-orchestrator",
 		capScope: "system",
@@ -28543,6 +29349,12 @@ var METHOD_ACCESS_MAP = Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "create"
 	},
+	"pipelineOrchestrator.setCameraSwitch": {
+		capName: "pipeline-orchestrator",
+		capScope: "system",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "create"
+	},
 	"pipelineOrchestrator.setCapabilityBinding": {
 		capName: "pipeline-orchestrator",
 		capScope: "system",
@@ -28633,6 +29445,12 @@ var METHOD_ACCESS_MAP = Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "create"
 	},
+	"pipelineRunner.runStatelessStep": {
+		capName: "pipeline-runner",
+		capScope: "system",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "create"
+	},
 	"plateGallery.assignPlate": {
 		capName: "plate-gallery",
 		capScope: "system",
@@ -28765,6 +29583,12 @@ var METHOD_ACCESS_MAP = Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "view"
 	},
+	"privacyMask.setAudioEnabled": {
+		capName: "privacy-mask",
+		capScope: "device",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "create"
+	},
 	"privacyMask.setMask": {
 		capName: "privacy-mask",
 		capScope: "device",
@@ -28933,6 +29757,12 @@ var METHOD_ACCESS_MAP = Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "create"
 	},
+	"recording.readGopBytes": {
+		capName: "recording",
+		capScope: "system",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "view"
+	},
 	"recording.readSegmentBytes": {
 		capName: "recording",
 		capScope: "system",
@@ -29449,6 +30279,12 @@ var METHOD_ACCESS_MAP = Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "create"
 	},
+	"streamBroker.acquireEgressTranscode": {
+		capName: "stream-broker",
+		capScope: "system",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "create"
+	},
 	"streamBroker.assignProfile": {
 		capName: "stream-broker",
 		capScope: "system",
@@ -29557,6 +30393,12 @@ var METHOD_ACCESS_MAP = Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "create"
 	},
+	"streamBroker.releaseEgressTranscode": {
+		capName: "stream-broker",
+		capScope: "system",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "create"
+	},
 	"streamBroker.releaseStreamWithCodec": {
 		capName: "stream-broker",
 		capScope: "system",
@@ -30318,6 +31160,42 @@ TimelapseRuleInputSchema.extend({
 	updatedAt: zod.z.number()
 });
 /**
+* The addon id as the REGISTRY, the wire and the durable stores spell it.
+*
+* `AddonContext.id` does not agree with itself across the two context
+* factories:
+*
+*   - a FORKED addon gets the bare manifest id
+*     (`kernel/moleculer/addon-context-factory.ts` → `id: addonId`);
+*   - an addon co-located in hub-main gets it PREFIXED
+*     (`server/backend/src/core/addon/addon-registry.service.ts` →
+*      ``id: `addon:${addonId}` ``).
+*
+* Everything an addon might compare `ctx.id` AGAINST carries the bare form:
+* `DeviceBindingEntry.providerAddonId`, the `device-manager` bindings store's
+* `wrapperAddonId`, `CapabilityRegistry` provider keys, manifest ids.
+*
+* So `entry.providerAddonId === this.ctx.id` is silently, permanently false
+* for a builtin — and only for a builtin, which is why it survives a green
+* suite whose fake supplies the bare id. That is exactly how camera 615's
+* virtual doorbell latched `unbound` for twelve hours on 2026-08-07 while its
+* binding was intact ([D72](../../../../docs/decisions/adr-0072.md)).
+*
+* Route every comparison between `ctx.id` and a registry/store addon id
+* through {@link isSameAddonId}. `scripts/check-addon-id-comparison.ts`
+* enforces it in the processes where the prefix exists.
+*/
+/** The prefix the hub-main context factory prepends to the manifest id. */
+var ADDON_ID_PREFIX = "addon:";
+/** The manifest id, whichever spelling of `ctx.id` you were handed. */
+function bareAddonId(id) {
+	return id.startsWith(ADDON_ID_PREFIX) ? id.slice(6) : id;
+}
+/** True when both ids name the same addon, prefixed or not. */
+function isSameAddonId(a, b) {
+	return bareAddonId(a) === bareAddonId(b);
+}
+/**
 * Decode base64 little-endian Float32 back into a vector.
 *
 * Throws on a byte length that is not a multiple of 4 — a truncated vector
@@ -30360,6 +31238,88 @@ zod.z.object({
 	square: false
 }).paddingRatio;
 /**
+* WHICH delivered frames the decode worker retains a native copy of.
+*
+* - `all` — every frame the worker delivered to the runner. The shipped
+*   behaviour, and the only correct one if something can ask for a crop of a
+*   frame the runner never sent to inference.
+* - `inferred` — only the frames the runner ADMITTED to its detection queue.
+*   A native-crop request always names a `frameId` that rode an inference
+*   result, so that is the only set a request can name. How much it drops is
+*   the two-plane governor's admit ratio and nothing else: measured at ~50% on
+*   this cluster, not the ~80% the design sketch assumed, because the governor
+*   was not throttling as hard as the sketch supposed. Read
+*   `leaseAdmitted`/`leaseOffered` off the metrics line for the camera in front
+*   of you rather than quoting a number from here. The newest delivered frame is
+*   croppable regardless — it is still the worker's reserved slot, not a lease —
+*   which covers the one-frame race between a mark and the supersede that
+*   consumes it.
+*/
+var NativeLeaseAdmissionSchema = zod.z.enum(["all", "inferred"]);
+zod.z.object({
+	/**
+	* How long a retained native frame is served before it counts as a miss.
+	*
+	* Must cover the FULL late-crop horizon: detection inference + the
+	* cross-process inference-result hop to hub post-analysis + tracking + the
+	* tRPC crop round-trip back. Below ~500 ms the busiest cameras' subject crops
+	* outrun it and fall back to the ≤640 detection frame; above ~3 s the resident
+	* RAM per busy camera grows linearly with no measured hit-rate gain.
+	*/
+	ttlMs: zod.z.number().int().min(250).max(1e4),
+	/**
+	* Hard per-decode-worker RAM ceiling for retained native frames, in MB.
+	*
+	* Intended as a SAFETY ceiling with the TTL as the effective cap — but check
+	* which one is actually binding before reasoning from that. At the shipped
+	* 1024 MB and a 2 800 ms TTL, a 4K camera hits the CEILING first (~43 frames
+	* at ~24 MB each) and the TTL never gets to expire anything; `leaseMb` /
+	* `leaseFrames` on the metrics line say which. When the ceiling binds, a
+	* change that admits fewer frames buys retention WINDOW at constant RAM
+	* rather than giving RAM back — lower this knob if RAM is what you wanted.
+	* `0` DISABLES the lease entirely and falls the worker back to the tiny
+	* leak-prone GPU surface ring (~85% crop miss; that is what the lease exists
+	* to replace).
+	*/
+	budgetMb: zod.z.number().int().min(0).max(4096),
+	/**
+	* Demand window: eager per-frame native retention runs only within this many
+	* ms of the last native-crop request (or of the dial starting).
+	*
+	* `0` means ALWAYS ON — it disables the gate, it does not disable retention.
+	* That is the legacy behaviour that saturated an N100 (24 native-4K downloads
+	* per second on a camera with zero crop demand), so leave it non-zero unless
+	* you are reproducing that.
+	*/
+	activityMs: zod.z.number().int().min(0).max(12e4),
+	/**
+	* Which delivered frames are retained at all — see
+	* {@link NativeLeaseAdmissionSchema}. This is the only knob of the four that
+	* changes WHAT is kept rather than for how long, so it is also the only one
+	* that can turn a crop that used to hit into a miss. The worker counts every
+	* crop request naming a frame it did NOT see marked
+	* (`leaseUnmarkedCrops` on the session-decode metrics line): a non-zero value
+	* there is the signal that some caller names frames outside the inference set
+	* and that this must go back to `all`.
+	*/
+	admission: NativeLeaseAdmissionSchema
+});
+/**
+* The values in force when the operator has set nothing — byte-for-byte the
+* constants the decode worker shipped with as env-var defaults, so making these
+* settings changed no behaviour on the day it landed.
+*/
+var DEFAULT_NATIVE_LEASE_SETTINGS = {
+	ttlMs: 1200,
+	budgetMb: 1024,
+	activityMs: 15e3,
+	admission: "inferred"
+};
+DEFAULT_NATIVE_LEASE_SETTINGS.ttlMs;
+DEFAULT_NATIVE_LEASE_SETTINGS.budgetMb;
+DEFAULT_NATIVE_LEASE_SETTINGS.activityMs;
+DEFAULT_NATIVE_LEASE_SETTINGS.admission;
+/**
 * Scores all applicable inference backends for the given hardware.
 *
 * Rules (hardware-driven only — no Python import probes):
@@ -30677,6 +31637,12 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, "backupCapability", {
 		return backupCapability;
 	}
 });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "bareAddonId", {
+	enumerable: true,
+	get: function() {
+		return bareAddonId;
+	}
+});
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "buildStreamParamsConfigSchema", {
 	enumerable: true,
 	get: function() {
@@ -30827,6 +31793,12 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, "isObjectInput", {
 		return isObjectInput;
 	}
 });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "isSameAddonId", {
+	enumerable: true,
+	get: function() {
+		return isSameAddonId;
+	}
+});
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "isVoidInput", {
 	enumerable: true,
 	get: function() {