@camstack/server 1.2.78 → 1.2.80

package/dist/api/trpc/cap-router-runtime.js

@@ -181,9 +181,43 @@ function createCapRouterServices(deps) {
                 return reg?.getSingleton(capName) ?? null;
         }
     };
+    /**
+     * An explicit `{ addonId }` collection pin that no registered provider owns
+     * must REFUSE — never degrade into another provider's answer.
+     *
+     * The hole this closes: `getProviderByAddonId` returns null for an unknown
+     * id, which the router could not tell apart from "this cap is resident in a
+     * forked hub worker", so it fell through to `remoteProxy(cap, 'hub')` and
+     * answered from the FIRST hub-side provider. Measured live: a fabricated
+     * `addonId` on `deviceExport.getStatus` returned Alexa's `linked / 3`. The
+     * Home Assistant component pins `homeassistant-export` precisely to avoid
+     * the merged aggregate — one missing/renamed/undeployed addon and it would
+     * have silently imported Alexa's devices while looking like success.
+     *
+     * Refuses ONLY when the cap has providers and none matches: with zero local
+     * providers the fallthrough is the legitimate forked-worker route and stays.
+     */
+    const rejectUnresolvedAddonPin = (capName, addonId) => {
+        if (!reg)
+            return;
+        const known = reg.getProviderAddonIds(capName);
+        if (known.length === 0)
+            return;
+        deps.logger?.warn('Refusing cap call: pinned addonId is not a provider of this capability', {
+            tags: { addonId },
+            meta: { capability: capName, validAddonIds: [...known] },
+        });
+        throw new server_1.TRPCError({
+            code: 'BAD_REQUEST',
+            message: `Capability "${capName}" has no provider with addonId "${addonId}". ` +
+                `Valid addonId(s): ${known.join(', ')}. ` +
+                `An unresolvable addonId is refused rather than answered by another provider.`,
+        });
+    };
     return {
         getLocalProvider,
         remoteProxy,
+        rejectUnresolvedAddonPin,
         noProvider: (capName, nodeId) => {
             if (nodeId !== undefined && nodeId !== 'hub') {
                 throw new server_1.TRPCError({

package/dist/api/trpc/device-config-secret-redaction.js

@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Device-config secret redaction for NON-ADMIN principals.
+ *
+ * A device's `config` blob is the driver's connection record — host, port,
+ * username and, for every IP camera in the deployment, the camera's
+ * `password` in plaintext. It rides the wire on every device-manager read:
+ * `getDevice`, `listAll`, `getChildren`, and the three settings surfaces that
+ * project the same values into form fields.
+ *
+ * Those methods are declared `auth: 'protected'` (the default in
+ * `capability-definition.ts`), which is NOT admin — it is "authenticated, and
+ * scope-matched". Measured against the live hub: a `cst_*` scoped token
+ * carrying nothing but `category:system` + `view` — a READ-ONLY grant, the one
+ * the deploy runbook mints for CI — read `deviceManager.getDevice` and received
+ * `config.password` verbatim, and `deviceManager.listAll` answered with a
+ * populated password for every camera at once. Read-only access to a device
+ * list is not consent to hand over the credentials that open those cameras.
+ *
+ * WHY HERE, and not at the provider. `toDeviceInfo()` builds one `config` for
+ * everybody, and its in-process consumers need the real thing: the pipeline
+ * orchestrator's per-camera `getDevice`, dispatch routing, the drivers that
+ * actually connect. Those callers arrive through `ctx.api` / UDS and never
+ * touch this middleware, so redacting here withholds the secret from the WIRE
+ * without blinding the system to its own credentials. The transport boundary
+ * is also the only layer that knows the principal.
+ *
+ * WHY ADMINS ARE UNTOUCHED. The settings form renders the current value into a
+ * password field, and `updateConfig` is `auth: 'admin'`, so a redacted value
+ * can never be written back by a caller who received one. Making the field
+ * write-only for admins too is a bigger, UI-side change; it is not needed to
+ * close this hole and would regress the form.
+ *
+ * Share-view (`csv_*`) principals never reach this code — they are gated
+ * earlier by the fail-closed allowlist in `share-view-access.ts`, which does
+ * not expose `getDevice` at all and projects `listAll` down to seven presentation
+ * fields. This module is the gate for the tier BETWEEN a share link and an admin.
+ *
+ * Pure module — no tRPC machinery — so the spec exercises it directly (same
+ * pattern as `scope-access.ts` and `share-view-access.ts`).
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.NON_ADMIN_CONFIG_REDACTED_METHODS = exports.REDACTED_SECRET = void 0;
+exports.isSecretConfigKey = isSecretConfigKey;
+exports.redactDeviceInfoSecrets = redactDeviceInfoSecrets;
+exports.redactSettingsSections = redactSettingsSections;
+exports.redactSettingsAggregate = redactSettingsAggregate;
+exports.redactConfigEntries = redactConfigEntries;
+/** What a non-admin sees instead of the value. Matches the `***` convention
+ *  `maskUrlCredentials` already uses for credentials in log output, so one
+ *  redaction marker means one thing across the system. */
+exports.REDACTED_SECRET = '***';
+/**
+ * Config keys whose VALUE is a credential.
+ *
+ * Deliberately the same rule the settings UI uses to decide that a field
+ * renders as a password input (`zodEntriesToConfigUI` in
+ * `packages/types/src/device/zod-to-config-ui.ts`). The two are pinned
+ * together by an assertion in `device-config-secret-redaction.spec.ts`: a
+ * keyword added to one and forgotten in the other fails the suite instead of
+ * leaking. It is duplicated rather than imported because `@camstack/types` is
+ * a framework package on the publish train, and a redaction fix must not have
+ * to wait for one.
+ */
+const SECRET_KEY_SUBSTRINGS = [
+    'password',
+    'secret',
+    'token',
+    'apikey',
+    'api_key',
+];
+/** True when a config key names a credential. Case-insensitive substring match. */
+function isSecretConfigKey(key) {
+    const lower = key.toLowerCase();
+    return SECRET_KEY_SUBSTRINGS.some((needle) => lower.includes(needle));
+}
+/** Non-null, non-array plain object. */
+function isRecord(x) {
+    return x !== null && typeof x === 'object' && !Array.isArray(x);
+}
+/**
+ * Replace the value of every credential-named key with {@link REDACTED_SECRET}.
+ *
+ * An EMPTY value stays empty: "not configured" and "configured, withheld" are
+ * different facts, and flattening them would make a broken camera look set up.
+ * A non-string value is left alone — a numeric `maxTokens` is not a secret, and
+ * the only credentials this repo persists are strings.
+ */
+function redactRecord(config) {
+    const out = {};
+    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(config)) {
+        out[key] =
+            isSecretConfigKey(key) && typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0
+                ? exports.REDACTED_SECRET
+                : value;
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+/**
+ * Project a `DeviceInfo` (or an array of them) with its `config` redacted.
+ * Anything that is not a device row passes through untouched — a route that
+ * errored upstream must not be rewritten into a plausible-looking shape.
+ */
+function redactDeviceInfoSecrets(data) {
+    if (Array.isArray(data))
+        return data.map((row) => redactDeviceInfoSecrets(row));
+    if (!isRecord(data))
+        return data;
+    const config = data['config'];
+    if (!isRecord(config))
+        return data;
+    return { ...data, config: redactRecord(config) };
+}
+/** One settings field as the aggregate emits it: `{ key, value, … }`. */
+function redactField(field) {
+    if (!isRecord(field))
+        return field;
+    const key = field['key'];
+    if (typeof key !== 'string' || !isSecretConfigKey(key))
+        return field;
+    const value = field['value'];
+    if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0)
+        return field;
+    return { ...field, value: exports.REDACTED_SECRET };
+}
+/**
+ * Project a `SettingsSchemaWithValues` (`{ sections: [{ fields: [...] }] }`).
+ * Used by `getDeviceSettingsAggregate` and `getSettingsSchema`.
+ */
+function redactSettingsSections(data) {
+    if (!isRecord(data))
+        return data;
+    const sections = data['sections'];
+    if (!Array.isArray(sections))
+        return data;
+    return {
+        ...data,
+        sections: sections.map((section) => {
+            if (!isRecord(section))
+                return section;
+            const fields = section['fields'];
+            if (!Array.isArray(fields))
+                return section;
+            return { ...section, fields: fields.map(redactField) };
+        }),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Project the combined aggregate, whose settings live one level down under
+ * `settings`. The live half carries no config blob.
+ */
+function redactSettingsAggregate(data) {
+    if (!isRecord(data))
+        return data;
+    const settings = data['settings'];
+    if (!isRecord(settings))
+        return data;
+    return { ...data, settings: redactSettingsSections(settings) };
+}
+/** Project a flat `ConfigEntry[]` — `getConfigSchema`'s `{ key, value }` rows. */
+function redactConfigEntries(data) {
+    if (!Array.isArray(data))
+        return data;
+    return data.map(redactField);
+}
+/**
+ * Every device-manager read whose response carries a device `config` blob, and
+ * the projection that cuts it.
+ *
+ * ENUMERATED rather than applied blanket-wise on purpose: a structural
+ * "redact anything credential-named" pass over every non-admin response would
+ * also strip `turnProvider.getTurnServers().credential` (the browser needs it),
+ * `auth.listShareTokens().tokenPrefix`, and a notification rule's
+ * `conditions.eventTypeTokens` — breaking live surfaces to fix a leak that
+ * lives in one cap.
+ *
+ * `deviceManager.listPersistedByAddon` is absent by inspection, not omission:
+ * `SavedDeviceRowSchema` has no `config` field, confirmed against the live hub.
+ * A new device-manager method returning `DeviceInfoSchema` must be added here —
+ * `device-config-secret-redaction.spec.ts` pins the list so the addition is a
+ * failing test rather than a silent leak.
+ */
+exports.NON_ADMIN_CONFIG_REDACTED_METHODS = new Map([
+    ['deviceManager.getDevice', redactDeviceInfoSecrets],
+    ['deviceManager.listAll', redactDeviceInfoSecrets],
+    ['deviceManager.getChildren', redactDeviceInfoSecrets],
+    ['deviceManager.getDeviceSettingsAggregate', redactSettingsSections],
+    ['deviceManager.getSettingsSchema', redactSettingsSections],
+    ['deviceManager.getDeviceAggregate', redactSettingsAggregate],
+    ['deviceManager.getConfigSchema', redactConfigEntries],
+]);

package/dist/api/trpc/trpc.middleware.js

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ const system_1 = require("@camstack/system");
 const server_1 = require("@trpc/server");
 const superjson_1 = __importDefault(require("superjson"));
 const cap_route_error_formatter_js_1 = require("./cap-route-error-formatter.js");
+const device_config_secret_redaction_js_1 = require("./device-config-secret-redaction.js");
 const scope_access_js_1 = require("./scope-access.js");
 const share_view_access_js_1 = require("./share-view-access.js");
 const t = server_1.initTRPC.context().create({
@@ -136,23 +137,37 @@ exports.protectedProcedure = t.procedure.use(async ({ ctx, next, path, getRawInp
     if (ctx.user.isAdmin) {
         return next({ ctx: { ...ctx, user: ctx.user } });
     }
-    // Hand-written core route — no cap entry. Authentication has already
-    // passed; defer further gating to any explicit `adminProcedure`
-    // chained on top of this one.
-    if (!(path in system_1.METHOD_ACCESS_MAP)) {
-        return next({ ctx: { ...ctx, user: ctx.user } });
+    // Everything below this line is a NON-ADMIN principal.
+    //
+    // A hand-written core route has no cap entry. Authentication has
+    // already passed; defer further gating to any explicit
+    // `adminProcedure` chained on top of this one. A cap route is
+    // scope-matched first.
+    if (path in system_1.METHOD_ACCESS_MAP) {
+        // Device-scope caps may be gated by a `device:N` scope. Resolve the
+        // raw input once so the matcher can read `input.deviceId` without
+        // re-doing the Zod parse (tRPC caches the parsed input downstream).
+        // The `getDeviceAncestors` hook lets the matcher walk parent → child
+        // accessory inheritance (grant on Reolink also covers its siren / PIR).
+        const rawInput = await getRawInput();
+        const result = (0, scope_access_js_1.checkScopeAccess)(ctx.user.scopes ?? [], path, rawInput, ctx.getDeviceAncestors);
+        if (!result.ok) {
+            throw new server_1.TRPCError({ code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: result.reason });
+        }
     }
-    // Device-scope caps may be gated by a `device:N` scope. Resolve the
-    // raw input once so the matcher can read `input.deviceId` without
-    // re-doing the Zod parse (tRPC caches the parsed input downstream).
-    // The `getDeviceAncestors` hook lets the matcher walk parent → child
-    // accessory inheritance (grant on Reolink also covers its siren / PIR).
-    const rawInput = await getRawInput();
-    const result = (0, scope_access_js_1.checkScopeAccess)(ctx.user.scopes ?? [], path, rawInput, ctx.getDeviceAncestors);
-    if (!result.ok) {
-        throw new server_1.TRPCError({ code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: result.reason });
+    // A non-admin who is allowed to READ a device is not thereby allowed to
+    // read the credential that opens it. `deviceManager.getDevice` &co. are
+    // `auth: 'protected'`, so a read-only `category:system` grant reaches
+    // them — and the raw row carries `config.password` in plaintext for
+    // every camera in the deployment. The value is withheld HERE, at the
+    // transport boundary, so in-process callers (`ctx.api`, the pipeline
+    // orchestrator, the drivers that must actually connect) are unaffected.
+    const redactConfigSecrets = device_config_secret_redaction_js_1.NON_ADMIN_CONFIG_REDACTED_METHODS.get(path);
+    const out = await next({ ctx: { ...ctx, user: ctx.user } });
+    if (redactConfigSecrets && out.ok) {
+        return { ...out, data: redactConfigSecrets(out.data) };
     }
-    return next({ ctx: { ...ctx, user: ctx.user } });
+    return out;
 });
 /**
  * Destructive-ops gate. Adds an explicit admin check on top of

package/dist/api/trpc/trpc.router.js

@@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ function buildCapabilityRouters(services) {
         capabilityRegistry: services.capabilityRegistry,
         moleculer: services.moleculer,
         serverProviders: buildServerProviders(services),
+        logger: services.loggingService.createLogger('cap-router'),
     });
     return {
         // ── Runtime-built cap routers: EVERY cap whose mount is

package/dist/core/addon/addon-registry.service.js

@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ const fs = __importStar(require("node:fs"));
 const node_url_1 = require("node:url");
 const require_cache_js_1 = require("./require-cache.js");
 const addon_settings_provider_js_1 = require("./addon-settings-provider.js");
+const integration_visibility_js_1 = require("./integration-visibility.js");
 const addon_call_gateway_js_1 = require("./addon-call-gateway.js");
 const system_6 = require("@camstack/system");
 const types_2 = require("@camstack/types");
@@ -1053,73 +1054,20 @@ class AddonRegistryService {
     getRawIntegrationRegistry() {
         return this.integrationRegistry;
     }
+    /**
+     * The installed-addon VIEW over the integration store. The rule it enforces
+     * — a principal that cannot read an integration must not create one, and a
+     * read that hides an existing row says so — lives in
+     * `integration-visibility.ts`, on its own, with its own tests.
+     */
     createFilteredRegistry(raw) {
-        const installedAddonIds = new Set(this.addonEntries.keys());
-        // Build set of integration IDs whose addon IS installed
-        // Cache per call — lightweight, called infrequently
-        let activeIntegrationIds = null;
-        const ensureActiveIds = async () => {
-            if (activeIntegrationIds)
-                return activeIntegrationIds;
-            const all = await raw.listIntegrations();
-            activeIntegrationIds = new Set(all.filter((i) => installedAddonIds.has(i.addonId)).map((i) => i.id));
-            return activeIntegrationIds;
-        };
-        return {
-            // Integrations: filter out orphaned
-            createIntegration: (input) => raw.createIntegration(input),
-            getIntegration: async (id) => {
-                const i = await raw.getIntegration(id);
-                return i && installedAddonIds.has(i.addonId) ? i : null;
-            },
-            getIntegrationByAddonId: async (addonId) => {
-                if (!installedAddonIds.has(addonId))
-                    return null;
-                return raw.getIntegrationByAddonId(addonId);
-            },
-            listIntegrations: async () => {
-                const all = await raw.listIntegrations();
-                return all.filter((i) => installedAddonIds.has(i.addonId));
-            },
-            updateIntegration: (id, updates) => raw.updateIntegration(id, updates),
-            deleteIntegration: (id) => raw.deleteIntegration(id),
-            // Integration settings: passthrough (already gated by getIntegration)
-            getIntegrationSettings: (id) => raw.getIntegrationSettings(id),
-            setIntegrationSetting: (id, key, value) => raw.setIntegrationSetting(id, key, value),
-            setIntegrationSettings: (id, settings) => raw.setIntegrationSettings(id, settings),
-            // Devices: filter out devices belonging to orphaned integrations
-            createDevice: (input) => raw.createDevice(input),
-            getDevice: async (id) => {
-                const d = await raw.getDevice(id);
-                if (!d)
-                    return null;
-                const ids = await ensureActiveIds();
-                return ids.has(d.integrationId) ? d : null;
-            },
-            getDeviceByStableId: async (stableId) => {
-                const d = await raw.getDeviceByStableId(stableId);
-                if (!d)
-                    return null;
-                const ids = await ensureActiveIds();
-                return ids.has(d.integrationId) ? d : null;
-            },
-            listDevices: async (integrationId) => {
-                const devices = await raw.listDevices(integrationId);
-                const ids = await ensureActiveIds();
-                return devices.filter((d) => ids.has(d.integrationId));
-            },
-            listCameras: async () => {
-                const cameras = await raw.listCameras();
-                const ids = await ensureActiveIds();
-                return cameras.filter((d) => ids.has(d.integrationId));
-            },
-            updateDevice: (id, updates) => raw.updateDevice(id, updates),
-            deleteDevice: (id) => raw.deleteDevice(id),
-            // Device settings: passthrough
-            getDeviceSettings: (id) => raw.getDeviceSettings(id),
-            setDeviceSetting: (id, key, value) => raw.setDeviceSetting(id, key, value),
-            setDeviceSettings: (id, settings) => raw.setDeviceSettings(id, settings),
-        };
+        return (0, integration_visibility_js_1.createFilteredIntegrationRegistry)({
+            raw,
+            // The LIVE map, not a snapshot: an addon registered after this wrapper
+            // was built is installed, and a stale copy would refuse its first write.
+            isAddonInstalled: (addonId) => this.addonEntries.has(addonId),
+            logger: this.logger,
+        });
     }
     // InferenceCapabilitiesService removed — now lives in pipeline-executor addon.
     // Use capabilityRegistry.getSingleton('pipeline-executor') instead.

package/dist/core/addon/integration-visibility.js

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Who may see, and who may mint, an integration.
+ *
+ * The integration store is shared by every addon on the node, so the registry
+ * handed out to callers is a VIEW: rows whose declaring addon is not installed
+ * are hidden, and the data stays in the database so a reinstall reconnects to
+ * it rather than starting empty.
+ *
+ * That filter had a hole, and it was the silent, accumulating kind. Extracted
+ * here verbatim from `AddonRegistryService.createFilteredRegistry` so the rule
+ * is testable on its own.
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.createFilteredIntegrationRegistry = createFilteredIntegrationRegistry;
+const types_1 = require("@camstack/types");
+/**
+ * Wrap `raw` in the installed-addon view.
+ *
+ * Two rules, and they are the same rule read in both directions:
+ *
+ * 1. **A principal that cannot READ an integration may not CREATE one.**
+ *    Until this guard existed, `createIntegration` was the only unfiltered
+ *    entry point in the whole surface. A core block — addon id
+ *    `core-block-<uuid>`, never in the installed set — therefore minted a fresh
+ *    row on EVERY start: `getIntegrationByAddonId` answered null forever, so
+ *    the get-or-create above it never found what it had just made.
+ *    `listIntegrations` hid the row from the operator and `integrations.delete`
+ *    answered *"not found"* for the same reason, so nothing could ever remove
+ *    it. Measured on the live hub: `int_0021` and `int_0022`, two starts of one
+ *    block, invisible and undeletable. A declarer that is not an installed
+ *    addon hangs its devices off an integration somebody else owns —
+ *    `DeclaredDevicesSpec.integrationId`.
+ *
+ * 2. **Hidden is not absent.** A read that suppresses a row that EXISTS logs
+ *    it. Both branches returned a bare `null`, and that indistinguishability is
+ *    precisely what kept rule 1's breach invisible for as long as it lasted.
+ */
+function createFilteredIntegrationRegistry(deps) {
+    const { raw, logger } = deps;
+    // A co-located builtin's `ctx.id` is `addon:<manifest id>`; every registry
+    // key is bare (D72). Normalise on the way in, or the create guard rejects
+    // exactly the builtins that legitimately declare an integration.
+    const isInstalled = (addonId) => deps.isAddonInstalled((0, types_1.bareAddonId)(addonId));
+    // Integration ids whose addon IS installed. Cached per wrapper — these
+    // wrappers are built per `getIntegrationRegistry()` call, so the cache never
+    // outlives a request path.
+    let activeIntegrationIds = null;
+    const ensureActiveIds = async () => {
+        if (activeIntegrationIds)
+            return activeIntegrationIds;
+        const all = await raw.listIntegrations();
+        activeIntegrationIds = new Set(all.filter((i) => isInstalled(i.addonId)).map((i) => i.id));
+        return activeIntegrationIds;
+    };
+    /** The suppression log line. Only ever called when the row EXISTS. */
+    const logHidden = (integration, phase) => {
+        logger.warn('integration hidden — its addon is not installed, so this read answers null even though the row exists', {
+            tags: { integrationId: integration.id, addonId: integration.addonId },
+            meta: { phase, name: integration.name },
+        });
+    };
+    const createIntegration = async (input) => {
+        if (!isInstalled(input.addonId)) {
+            // Refuse, loudly. The alternative is not "it works": it is a row this
+            // same wrapper will hide from every later read, from the operator's list
+            // and from delete — the row can only accumulate.
+            logger.error('refused to mint an integration for a principal that cannot read one', {
+                tags: { addonId: input.addonId },
+                meta: { phase: 'create', name: input.name },
+            });
+            throw new Error(`addon "${input.addonId}" is not installed, so it cannot read an integration — ` +
+                'and a principal that cannot read one must not create one (it would be invisible ' +
+                'and undeletable). Hang the devices off an existing integration instead: ' +
+                'DeclaredDevicesSpec.integrationId.');
+        }
+        return raw.createIntegration(input);
+    };
+    return {
+        createIntegration,
+        getIntegration: async (id) => {
+            const i = await raw.getIntegration(id);
+            if (i === null)
+                return null;
+            if (isInstalled(i.addonId))
+                return i;
+            logHidden(i, 'getIntegration');
+            return null;
+        },
+        getIntegrationByAddonId: async (addonId) => {
+            const i = await raw.getIntegrationByAddonId(addonId);
+            if (i === null)
+                return null;
+            if (isInstalled(i.addonId))
+                return i;
+            logHidden(i, 'getIntegrationByAddonId');
+            return null;
+        },
+        listIntegrations: async () => {
+            const all = await raw.listIntegrations();
+            return all.filter((i) => isInstalled(i.addonId));
+        },
+        updateIntegration: (id, updates) => raw.updateIntegration(id, updates),
+        deleteIntegration: (id) => raw.deleteIntegration(id),
+        // Integration settings: passthrough (already gated by getIntegration)
+        getIntegrationSettings: (id) => raw.getIntegrationSettings(id),
+        setIntegrationSetting: (id, key, value) => raw.setIntegrationSetting(id, key, value),
+        setIntegrationSettings: (id, settings) => raw.setIntegrationSettings(id, settings),
+        // Devices: filter out devices belonging to hidden integrations
+        createDevice: (input) => raw.createDevice(input),
+        getDevice: async (id) => {
+            const d = await raw.getDevice(id);
+            if (!d)
+                return null;
+            const ids = await ensureActiveIds();
+            return ids.has(d.integrationId) ? d : null;
+        },
+        getDeviceByStableId: async (stableId) => {
+            const d = await raw.getDeviceByStableId(stableId);
+            if (!d)
+                return null;
+            const ids = await ensureActiveIds();
+            return ids.has(d.integrationId) ? d : null;
+        },
+        listDevices: async (integrationId) => {
+            const devices = await raw.listDevices(integrationId);
+            const ids = await ensureActiveIds();
+            return devices.filter((d) => ids.has(d.integrationId));
+        },
+        listCameras: async () => {
+            const cameras = await raw.listCameras();
+            const ids = await ensureActiveIds();
+            return cameras.filter((d) => ids.has(d.integrationId));
+        },
+        updateDevice: (id, updates) => raw.updateDevice(id, updates),
+        deleteDevice: (id) => raw.deleteDevice(id),
+        // Device settings: passthrough
+        getDeviceSettings: (id) => raw.getDeviceSettings(id),
+        setDeviceSetting: (id, key, value) => raw.setDeviceSetting(id, key, value),
+        setDeviceSettings: (id, settings) => raw.setDeviceSettings(id, settings),
+    };
+}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@camstack/server",
-  "version": "1.2.78",
+  "version": "1.2.80",
   "private": false,
   "files": [
     "dist",
@@ -33,19 +33,19 @@
     ]
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@camstack/addon-admin-ui": "1.2.38",
+    "@camstack/addon-admin-ui": "1.2.40",
     "@camstack/addon-agent-ui": "1.2.10",
     "@camstack/addon-auth": "1.2.11",
     "@camstack/addon-decoder-nodeav": "1.2.9",
     "@camstack/addon-notifiers": "1.2.13",
-    "@camstack/addon-pipeline": "1.2.49",
-    "@camstack/addon-pipeline-orchestrator": "1.2.32",
-    "@camstack/addon-post-analysis": "1.2.54",
+    "@camstack/addon-pipeline": "1.2.52",
+    "@camstack/addon-pipeline-orchestrator": "1.2.33",
+    "@camstack/addon-post-analysis": "1.2.55",
     "@camstack/sdk": "1.2.10",
     "@camstack/shm-ring": "1.1.9",
-    "@camstack/system": "1.2.64",
-    "@camstack/types": "1.2.48",
-    "@camstack/ui-library": "1.2.35",
+    "@camstack/system": "1.2.67",
+    "@camstack/types": "1.2.51",
+    "@camstack/ui-library": "1.2.36",
     "@fastify/compress": "^9.0.0",
     "@fastify/cookie": "^11.0.2",
     "@fastify/cors": "^11.2.0",