@camstack/server 1.2.77 → 1.2.78

package/dist/api/trpc/share-view-access.js

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
 "use strict";
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.SHARE_SCOPE_PROJECTED_METHODS = void 0;
 exports.checkShareViewAccess = checkShareViewAccess;
 exports.projectListAllForShareScope = projectListAllForShareScope;
+exports.projectShareScopeRows = projectShareScopeRows;
 exports.liveEventInShareScope = liveEventInShareScope;
 /**
  * Methods callable WITHOUT a per-device check — their input carries no
@@ -37,7 +39,95 @@ function extractDeviceId(input) {
     const candidate = Reflect.get(input, 'deviceId');
     return typeof candidate === 'number' && Number.isFinite(candidate) ? candidate : null;
 }
+/**
+ * The EVENTS embed's real call graph (`events-client.ts` in the embed):
+ *   • `auth.me`                                — SDK boot/auth probe
+ *   • `deviceManager.listAll`                  — camera names + the "all
+ *     cameras" resolution (already projected to the scope)
+ *   • `pipelineAnalytics.listRecentTracks`     — the feed itself
+ *   • `pipelineAnalytics.listEventKindsBatch`  — the class→macro taxonomy
+ *   • `pipelineAnalytics.searchObjectEvents`   — CLIP text search
+ *
+ * Intentionally NOT here: everything the grid link gets (WebRTC signalling,
+ * snapshots, TURN, camera metrics) — a shared events page is not a camera
+ * wall — and every mutating analytics method (`deleteTracks`, `setTrackFlags`,
+ * the retrain surface, the export planes).
+ */
+const EVENTS_VIEW_OPEN_METHODS = new Set(['auth.me', 'deviceManager.listAll']);
+/**
+ * Methods whose input carries a `deviceIds` ARRAY. The rule is INTERSECTION,
+ * and the outcome is FILTER-AND-SERVE: a request that names at least one
+ * in-scope device passes, and the RESPONSE is stripped to the scope by
+ * {@link projectShareScopeRows}.
+ *
+ * Filter rather than reject, because a multi-camera link whose owner later
+ * narrowed the share must keep working for the cameras it still covers —
+ * rejecting the whole page would break the link on a change that only removed
+ * one camera. A FULLY disjoint request is still denied: there is nothing to
+ * serve, and answering `[]` would read as "these cameras had no events" rather
+ * than "you cannot see these cameras".
+ */
+const EVENTS_VIEW_DEVICE_ARRAY_METHODS = new Set([
+    'pipelineAnalytics.listRecentTracks',
+    'pipelineAnalytics.listEventKindsBatch',
+]);
+/**
+ * Methods whose input carries an OPTIONAL single `deviceId`, where omitting it
+ * means EVERY camera in the deployment.
+ *
+ * A present id must be in scope. An ABSENT id is allowed — and that is safe
+ * only because the response is filtered server-side
+ * ({@link projectShareScopeRows}); the caller is never trusted to have scoped
+ * its own query. Rejecting the absent case instead would leave a multi-camera
+ * share link unable to search at all, and would not be one bit safer.
+ */
+const EVENTS_VIEW_OPTIONAL_DEVICE_METHODS = new Set([
+    'pipelineAnalytics.searchObjectEvents',
+]);
+/** Pull a `deviceIds` array off a raw tRPC input. Null when absent/malformed. */
+function extractDeviceIds(input) {
+    if (input === null || typeof input !== 'object')
+        return null;
+    const candidate = Reflect.get(input, 'deviceIds');
+    if (!Array.isArray(candidate))
+        return null;
+    const ids = candidate.filter((x) => typeof x === 'number' && Number.isFinite(x));
+    return ids.length === candidate.length ? ids : null;
+}
+function checkEventsViewAccess(scope, path, input) {
+    if (EVENTS_VIEW_OPEN_METHODS.has(path)) {
+        return { ok: true };
+    }
+    if (EVENTS_VIEW_DEVICE_ARRAY_METHODS.has(path)) {
+        const requested = extractDeviceIds(input);
+        if (requested === null || requested.length === 0) {
+            return { ok: false, reason: `'${path}' requires a deviceIds array for share-view access` };
+        }
+        const allowed = new Set(scope.deviceIds);
+        if (!requested.some((id) => allowed.has(id))) {
+            return {
+                ok: false,
+                reason: `Devices ${requested.join(', ')} are outside this share link's scope`,
+            };
+        }
+        return { ok: true };
+    }
+    if (EVENTS_VIEW_OPTIONAL_DEVICE_METHODS.has(path)) {
+        const deviceId = extractDeviceId(input);
+        // Absent = every camera; the RESPONSE filter is what scopes it.
+        if (deviceId === null)
+            return { ok: true };
+        if (!scope.deviceIds.includes(deviceId)) {
+            return { ok: false, reason: `Device ${deviceId} is outside this share link's scope` };
+        }
+        return { ok: true };
+    }
+    return { ok: false, reason: `'${path}' is not available to share-view tokens` };
+}
 function checkShareViewAccess(scope, path, input) {
+    if (scope.kind === 'events-view') {
+        return checkEventsViewAccess(scope, path, input);
+    }
     if (scope.kind !== 'grid-view') {
         return { ok: false, reason: `Unknown share scope kind '${String(scope.kind)}'` };
     }
@@ -88,6 +178,58 @@ function projectListAllForShareScope(data, scope) {
     }
     return rows;
 }
+/**
+ * Strip every row a share token may not see, by `deviceId`.
+ *
+ * This is the half that makes the events surface safe, and it is not
+ * defence-in-depth — it is the ACTUAL enforcement for two of the three
+ * methods:
+ *
+ *  - `searchObjectEvents` with no `deviceId` searches the whole deployment.
+ *    The call is allowed (see the enumeration) precisely because the answer is
+ *    cut here; trusting the caller to scope its own query would be trusting a
+ *    URL a third party is holding.
+ *  - `listRecentTracks` / `listEventKindsBatch` pass the intersection check, so
+ *    a partially in-scope request reaches the provider — and comes back with
+ *    rows the link may not see. Those are removed here.
+ *
+ * Two payload shapes, because the methods answer differently: a bare array of
+ * rows (`searchObjectEvents`, `listEventKindsBatch`) and a PAGED envelope
+ * (`listRecentTracks` → `{tracks, nextCursor}`). The cursor is preserved —
+ * dropping it would silently end a shared page's infinite scroll at page one.
+ *
+ * A row with NO numeric `deviceId` is DROPPED, never kept: "it probably
+ * belongs to a device in scope" is not a security argument.
+ *
+ * Anything that is not a row payload passes through untouched (the route
+ * errored upstream, and rewriting an error into `[]` would hide it).
+ */
+function projectShareScopeRows(data, scope) {
+    const allowed = new Set(scope.deviceIds);
+    const keep = (row) => {
+        if (row === null || typeof row !== 'object')
+            return false;
+        const id = Reflect.get(row, 'deviceId');
+        return typeof id === 'number' && allowed.has(id);
+    };
+    if (Array.isArray(data))
+        return data.filter(keep);
+    if (data !== null && typeof data === 'object') {
+        const tracks = Reflect.get(data, 'tracks');
+        if (Array.isArray(tracks)) {
+            return { ...data, tracks: tracks.filter(keep) };
+        }
+    }
+    return data;
+}
+/** Paths whose RESPONSE must be cut to the share scope before it leaves the
+ *  server. Kept beside the enumeration so a method added to one and forgotten
+ *  in the other is visible in a single file. */
+exports.SHARE_SCOPE_PROJECTED_METHODS = new Set([
+    'pipelineAnalytics.listRecentTracks',
+    'pipelineAnalytics.listEventKindsBatch',
+    'pipelineAnalytics.searchObjectEvents',
+]);
 /**
  * Whether a live event belongs to a device inside the share scope.
  * Matches the device identity two ways (fail closed — no match, no push):

package/dist/api/trpc/trpc.middleware.js

@@ -6,12 +6,12 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
 exports.agentProcedure = exports.adminProcedure = exports.protectedProcedure = exports.createCallerFactory = exports.publicProcedure = exports.trpcRouter = void 0;
 exports.iterableSubscription = iterableSubscription;
 exports.iterableInterval = iterableInterval;
+const system_1 = require("@camstack/system");
 const server_1 = require("@trpc/server");
 const superjson_1 = __importDefault(require("superjson"));
-const system_1 = require("@camstack/system");
+const cap_route_error_formatter_js_1 = require("./cap-route-error-formatter.js");
 const scope_access_js_1 = require("./scope-access.js");
 const share_view_access_js_1 = require("./share-view-access.js");
-const cap_route_error_formatter_js_1 = require("./cap-route-error-formatter.js");
 const t = server_1.initTRPC.context().create({
     transformer: superjson_1.default,
     errorFormatter: cap_route_error_formatter_js_1.formatTrpcError,
@@ -114,6 +114,20 @@ exports.protectedProcedure = t.procedure.use(async ({ ctx, next, path, getRawInp
             }
             return out;
         }
+        // The events surface answers with ROWS carrying a `deviceId`, and two of
+        // its three methods can legitimately reach devices outside the scope: a
+        // partially in-scope `listRecentTracks`, and a `searchObjectEvents` with
+        // no `deviceId` at all (which means EVERY camera). The enumeration lets
+        // those calls through — this is where the answer is cut. Without it the
+        // allowlist would be a doorman who checks the ticket and then hands over
+        // the whole building.
+        if (share_view_access_js_1.SHARE_SCOPE_PROJECTED_METHODS.has(path)) {
+            const out = await next({ ctx: { ...ctx, user: ctx.user } });
+            if (out.ok) {
+                return { ...out, data: (0, share_view_access_js_1.projectShareScopeRows)(out.data, ctx.user.shareView.scope) };
+            }
+            return out;
+        }
         return next({ ctx: { ...ctx, user: ctx.user } });
     }
     // Spread+reassign of `user` narrows downstream ctx from `User | null`

package/dist/core/auth/share-token.service.js

@@ -69,12 +69,25 @@ exports.SHARE_TOKEN_TTL_MAX_SEC = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60; // 30 days
 exports.SHARE_TOKEN_TTL_DEFAULT_SEC = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60; // 7 days
 exports.SHARE_TOKEN_MAX_DEVICES = 64;
 /**
- * What a share token is allowed to see. Discriminated on `kind` so future
- * share surfaces (single-camera view, recording clip, …) extend the union
- * without touching verification plumbing.
+ * What a share token is allowed to see. Keyed on `kind` so future share
+ * surfaces (single-camera view, recording clip, …) extend the set without
+ * touching verification plumbing.
+ */
+/**
+ * `grid-view` — the live camera wall (WebRTC + snapshots).
+ * `events-view` — the events embed (track feed, kind taxonomy, CLIP search).
+ *
+ * They are SEPARATE kinds, not one kind with a bigger surface. Adding the
+ * track methods to `grid-view` would retroactively widen every share link an
+ * operator has already handed out: a link minted to show a camera wall would
+ * silently start serving that camera's event history. A token keeps the
+ * perimeter it was minted with, and a new perimeter needs a new mint.
+ *
+ * Neither kind is a superset of the other — an events link cannot open a
+ * WebRTC session, and a grid link cannot read a track.
  */
 exports.ShareTokenScopeSchema = zod_1.z.object({
-    kind: zod_1.z.literal('grid-view'),
+    kind: zod_1.z.enum(['grid-view', 'events-view']),
     deviceIds: zod_1.z.array(zod_1.z.number().int().nonnegative()).min(1).max(exports.SHARE_TOKEN_MAX_DEVICES),
 });
 /** Persisted record — never leaves the server with `tokenHash` attached. */

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@camstack/server",
-  "version": "1.2.77",
+  "version": "1.2.78",
   "private": false,
   "files": [
     "dist",
@@ -33,18 +33,18 @@
     ]
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@camstack/addon-admin-ui": "1.2.37",
+    "@camstack/addon-admin-ui": "1.2.38",
     "@camstack/addon-agent-ui": "1.2.10",
     "@camstack/addon-auth": "1.2.11",
     "@camstack/addon-decoder-nodeav": "1.2.9",
     "@camstack/addon-notifiers": "1.2.13",
-    "@camstack/addon-pipeline": "1.2.48",
-    "@camstack/addon-pipeline-orchestrator": "1.2.31",
-    "@camstack/addon-post-analysis": "1.2.53",
+    "@camstack/addon-pipeline": "1.2.49",
+    "@camstack/addon-pipeline-orchestrator": "1.2.32",
+    "@camstack/addon-post-analysis": "1.2.54",
     "@camstack/sdk": "1.2.10",
     "@camstack/shm-ring": "1.1.9",
-    "@camstack/system": "1.2.63",
-    "@camstack/types": "1.2.47",
+    "@camstack/system": "1.2.64",
+    "@camstack/types": "1.2.48",
     "@camstack/ui-library": "1.2.35",
     "@fastify/compress": "^9.0.0",
     "@fastify/cookie": "^11.0.2",