@camstack/server 1.2.580 → 1.2.582

package/dist/api/core/auth-device-cert.procedures.js

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ const zod_1 = require("zod");
 const session_mint_js_1 = require("../../auth/session-mint.js");
 const trpc_middleware_js_1 = require("../trpc/trpc.middleware.js");
 const auth_reauth_procedures_js_1 = require("./auth-reauth.procedures.js");
+const user_error_js_1 = require("../trpc/user-error.js");
 const DeviceLoginResultSchema = zod_1.z.discriminatedUnion('ok', [
     zod_1.z.object({
         ok: zod_1.z.literal(true),
@@ -75,10 +76,7 @@ function createDeviceCertProcedures(deps) {
             ? null
             : (0, system_1.getUserManagementInternal)(deps.registry.getSingleton('user-management'));
         if (found === null) {
-            throw new server_1.TRPCError({
-                code: 'PRECONDITION_FAILED',
-                message: 'Device certificates are not available',
-            });
+            throw (0, user_error_js_1.trpcUserError)('PRECONDITION_FAILED', 'device.certificates-unavailable', undefined, 'Device certificates are not available');
         }
         return found;
     };
@@ -113,7 +111,7 @@ function createDeviceCertProcedures(deps) {
     };
     const assertPerson = (user) => {
         if (user.isScoped === true || user.shareView !== undefined || user.adminTokenId !== undefined) {
-            throw new server_1.TRPCError({ code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Requires a signed-in user session' });
+            throw (0, user_error_js_1.trpcUserError)('FORBIDDEN', 'auth.session-required', undefined, 'Requires a signed-in user session');
         }
     };
     const selfLimit = (userId, path) => {

package/dist/api/core/auth-reauth.procedures.js

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ const zod_1 = require("zod");
 const passkey_provider_js_1 = require("../../auth/passkey-provider.js");
 const trpc_middleware_js_1 = require("../trpc/trpc.middleware.js");
 const auth_limits_js_1 = require("./auth-limits.js");
+const user_error_js_1 = require("../trpc/user-error.js");
 /** The input field a re-auth-gated procedure takes. */
 exports.ReauthTokenInput = zod_1.z.string().min(1).max(4096);
 exports.REAUTH_REQUIRED_MESSAGE = 'Confirm it is you first: re-enter your password or use a passkey (update the app if it cannot ask).';
@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ function isPasswordChecker(value) {
 /** Real user sessions only: a scoped or share token cannot prove a password. */
 function assertPerson(user) {
     if (user.isScoped === true || user.shareView !== undefined || user.adminTokenId !== undefined) {
-        throw new server_1.TRPCError({ code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Requires a signed-in user session' });
+        throw (0, user_error_js_1.trpcUserError)('FORBIDDEN', 'auth.session-required', undefined, 'Requires a signed-in user session');
     }
 }
 function createReauthProcedures(deps) {
@@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ function createReauthProcedures(deps) {
                 });
                 if (record === null || record.id !== ctx.user.id) {
                     (0, auth_limits_js_1.recordAccountFailure)(deps.limiters, ctx.user.username);
-                    throw new server_1.TRPCError({ code: 'UNAUTHORIZED', message: 'Password is incorrect' });
+                    throw (0, user_error_js_1.trpcUserError)('UNAUTHORIZED', 'auth.password-incorrect', undefined, 'Password is incorrect');
                 }
                 method = 'password';
             }
@@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ function createReauthProcedures(deps) {
                 });
                 if (!result.verified) {
                     (0, auth_limits_js_1.recordAccountFailure)(deps.limiters, ctx.user.username);
-                    throw new server_1.TRPCError({ code: 'UNAUTHORIZED', message: 'Passkey verification failed' });
+                    throw (0, user_error_js_1.trpcUserError)('UNAUTHORIZED', 'auth.passkey-verification-failed', undefined, 'Passkey verification failed');
                 }
                 method = 'passkey';
             }

package/dist/api/core/auth-sessions.procedures.js

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ const types_1 = require("@camstack/types");
 const hub_sessions_js_1 = require("../../auth/hub-sessions.js");
 const session_mint_js_1 = require("../../auth/session-mint.js");
 const trpc_middleware_js_1 = require("../trpc/trpc.middleware.js");
+const user_error_js_1 = require("../trpc/user-error.js");
 /** One login session as the UI lists it. */
 exports.LoginSessionSchema = zod_1.z.object({
     id: zod_1.z.string(),
@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ function requireSessions(registry) {
 /** Real user sessions only — a scoped or share token has no login session to manage. */
 function assertLoginSession(user) {
     if (user.isScoped === true || user.shareView !== undefined || user.adminTokenId !== undefined) {
-        throw new server_1.TRPCError({ code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Requires a signed-in user session' });
+        throw (0, user_error_js_1.trpcUserError)('FORBIDDEN', 'auth.session-required', undefined, 'Requires a signed-in user session');
     }
 }
 function createSessionProcedures(deps) {

package/dist/api/core/auth.router.js

@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ const auth_reauth_procedures_js_1 = require("./auth-reauth.procedures.js");
 const auth_device_cert_procedures_js_1 = require("./auth-device-cert.procedures.js");
 const auth_sessions_procedures_js_1 = require("./auth-sessions.procedures.js");
 const server_name_js_1 = require("./server-name.js");
+const types_2 = require("@camstack/types");
+const user_error_js_1 = require("../trpc/user-error.js");
 /**
  * A public procedure limited per (procedure, REAL client address) — see
  * `auth-limits.ts` for the tiers and why the address is the forwarded client.
@@ -351,7 +353,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
         }
         catch (error) {
             if (error instanceof session_mint_js_1.SessionUserGoneError) {
-                throw new server_1.TRPCError({ code: 'UNAUTHORIZED', message: 'User no longer exists' });
+                throw (0, user_error_js_1.trpcUserError)('UNAUTHORIZED', 'auth.user-gone', undefined, 'User no longer exists');
             }
             throw error;
         }
@@ -582,7 +584,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
             });
             if (!user) {
                 (0, auth_limits_js_1.recordAccountFailure)(limiters, input.username);
-                throw new Error('Invalid credentials');
+                throw (0, types_2.userError)('auth.invalid-credentials', undefined, 'Invalid credentials');
             }
             // ── Second-factor gate ───────────────────────────────────────
             // After credentials validate, collect every ACTIVE second
@@ -644,7 +646,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
                 : { valid: false };
             if (!verify.valid) {
                 (0, auth_limits_js_1.recordAccountFailure)(limiters, claims.username);
-                throw new Error('Invalid TOTP code');
+                throw (0, types_2.userError)('auth.invalid-totp', undefined, 'Invalid TOTP code');
             }
             return mintSessionForUserId(claims.userId, issueFor(ctx.req, claims.method ?? 'password', input.refreshable));
         }),
@@ -661,7 +663,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
             .mutation(async ({ input }) => {
             const claims = auth.verifyTotpChallengeToken(input.challengeToken);
             if (!claims) {
-                throw new Error('Invalid or expired login challenge — please re-enter your password');
+                throw (0, types_2.userError)('auth.login-challenge-expired', undefined, 'Invalid or expired login challenge — please re-enter your password');
             }
             const provider = (0, passkey_provider_js_1.resolvePasskeyProvider)(registry, moleculer);
             if (!provider)
@@ -685,7 +687,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
             .mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
             const claims = auth.verifyTotpChallengeToken(input.challengeToken);
             if (!claims) {
-                throw new Error('Invalid or expired login challenge — please re-enter your password');
+                throw (0, types_2.userError)('auth.login-challenge-expired', undefined, 'Invalid or expired login challenge — please re-enter your password');
             }
             const provider = (0, passkey_provider_js_1.resolvePasskeyProvider)(registry, moleculer);
             if (!provider)
@@ -697,7 +699,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
             });
             if (!result.verified) {
                 (0, auth_limits_js_1.recordAccountFailure)(limiters, claims.username);
-                throw new Error('Passkey verification failed');
+                throw (0, types_2.userError)('auth.passkey-verification-failed', undefined, 'Passkey verification failed');
             }
             return mintSessionForUserId(claims.userId, issueFor(ctx.req, claims.method ?? 'password', input.refreshable));
         }),
@@ -747,7 +749,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
                 response: input.response,
             });
             if (!result.verified || !result.userId) {
-                throw new server_1.TRPCError({ code: 'UNAUTHORIZED', message: 'Passkey verification failed' });
+                throw (0, user_error_js_1.trpcUserError)('UNAUTHORIZED', 'auth.passkey-verification-failed', undefined, 'Passkey verification failed');
             }
             const secondFactors = await factorsOwedHere(result.userId, 'passkey', ctx.req);
             if (secondFactors.length > 0) {
@@ -803,14 +805,14 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
             }
             const cookieToken = (0, session_cookie_js_1.readSessionCookieFromHeader)(readRequestHeader(ctx.req, 'cookie') ?? undefined);
             if (!cookieToken) {
-                throw new server_1.TRPCError({ code: 'UNAUTHORIZED', message: 'No session cookie' });
+                throw (0, user_error_js_1.trpcUserError)('UNAUTHORIZED', 'auth.no-session-cookie', undefined, 'No session cookie');
             }
             let payload;
             try {
                 payload = auth.verifyToken(cookieToken);
             }
             catch {
-                throw new server_1.TRPCError({ code: 'UNAUTHORIZED', message: 'Invalid session cookie' });
+                throw (0, user_error_js_1.trpcUserError)('UNAUTHORIZED', 'auth.invalid-session-cookie', undefined, 'Invalid session cookie');
             }
             // Reject non-session JWTs that verify under the same secret:
             // challenge/bridge tokens carry a `kind` discriminator, and a
@@ -819,7 +821,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
             if (kind !== undefined ||
                 typeof payload.isAdmin !== 'boolean' ||
                 typeof payload.userId !== 'string') {
-                throw new server_1.TRPCError({ code: 'UNAUTHORIZED', message: 'Invalid session cookie' });
+                throw (0, user_error_js_1.trpcUserError)('UNAUTHORIZED', 'auth.invalid-session-cookie', undefined, 'Invalid session cookie');
             }
             // A session of its own for the client that asked (the hub-served
             // viewer): signing out of one never signs the other out.
@@ -912,10 +914,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
                 });
             }
             if (!grant || grant.purpose === 'step-up') {
-                throw new server_1.TRPCError({
-                    code: 'UNAUTHORIZED',
-                    message: 'Invalid or expired handoff code',
-                });
+                throw (0, user_error_js_1.trpcUserError)('UNAUTHORIZED', 'auth.handoff-code-invalid', undefined, 'Invalid or expired handoff code');
             }
             // A `renew` code continues THE SESSION IT WAS MINTED FROM. One without a session would
             // open a brand-new session with no PKCE behind it: refused.
@@ -923,10 +922,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
                 options.logger?.warn('Handoff redeem refused: a renew code with no session behind it', {
                     tags: { userId: grant.userId },
                 });
-                throw new server_1.TRPCError({
-                    code: 'UNAUTHORIZED',
-                    message: 'Invalid or expired handoff code',
-                });
+                throw (0, user_error_js_1.trpcUserError)('UNAUTHORIZED', 'auth.handoff-code-invalid', undefined, 'Invalid or expired handoff code');
             }
             if (grant.purpose === 'renew' && grant.sessionId !== undefined) {
                 // A legacy client renewing: the SAME session, its expiry slides. A
@@ -1015,7 +1011,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
             if (!userMgmt)
                 throw new Error('user-management capability not available');
             if (!ctx.user)
-                throw new Error('Not authenticated');
+                throw (0, types_2.userError)('auth.not-authenticated', undefined, 'Not authenticated');
             // Re-validate the current password against the live store to
             // confirm session identity → password ownership match. Stops a
             // stolen session-token from rotating credentials silently.
@@ -1045,7 +1041,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
             if (!userMgmt)
                 throw new Error('user-management capability not available');
             if (!ctx.user)
-                throw new Error('Not authenticated');
+                throw (0, types_2.userError)('auth.not-authenticated', undefined, 'Not authenticated');
             return userMgmt.setupTotp({ userId: ctx.user.id });
         }),
         confirmOwnTotp: trpc_middleware_js_1.protectedProcedure
@@ -1056,7 +1052,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
             if (!userMgmt)
                 throw new Error('user-management capability not available');
             if (!ctx.user)
-                throw new Error('Not authenticated');
+                throw (0, types_2.userError)('auth.not-authenticated', undefined, 'Not authenticated');
             return userMgmt.confirmTotp({ userId: ctx.user.id, code: input.code });
         }),
         disableOwnTotp: trpc_middleware_js_1.protectedProcedure
@@ -1069,7 +1065,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
             if (!userMgmt)
                 throw new Error('user-management capability not available');
             if (!ctx.user)
-                throw new Error('Not authenticated');
+                throw (0, types_2.userError)('auth.not-authenticated', undefined, 'Not authenticated');
             return userMgmt.disableTotp({ userId: ctx.user.id });
         }),
         getOwnTotpStatus: trpc_middleware_js_1.protectedProcedure
@@ -1094,7 +1090,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
             .output(passkey_provider_js_1.OptionsJsonSchema)
             .mutation(async ({ ctx }) => {
             if (!ctx.user)
-                throw new Error('Not authenticated');
+                throw (0, types_2.userError)('auth.not-authenticated', undefined, 'Not authenticated');
             const provider = (0, passkey_provider_js_1.resolvePasskeyProvider)(registry, moleculer);
             if (!provider)
                 throw new Error('Passkey enrollment is not available');
@@ -1105,7 +1101,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
             .output(passkey_provider_js_1.FinishRegistrationSchema)
             .mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
             if (!ctx.user)
-                throw new Error('Not authenticated');
+                throw (0, types_2.userError)('auth.not-authenticated', undefined, 'Not authenticated');
             const provider = (0, passkey_provider_js_1.resolvePasskeyProvider)(registry, moleculer);
             if (!provider)
                 throw new Error('Passkey enrollment is not available');
@@ -1137,7 +1133,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
             .output(zod_1.z.object({ success: zod_1.z.literal(true) }))
             .mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
             if (!ctx.user)
-                throw new Error('Not authenticated');
+                throw (0, types_2.userError)('auth.not-authenticated', undefined, 'Not authenticated');
             (0, auth_reauth_procedures_js_1.assertReauthenticated)(auth, ctx.user, input.reauthToken);
             const provider = (0, passkey_provider_js_1.resolvePasskeyProvider)(registry, moleculer);
             if (!provider)
@@ -1173,7 +1169,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
             .output(passkey_provider_js_1.SetSecondFactorPreferenceSchema)
             .mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
             if (!ctx.user)
-                throw new Error('Not authenticated');
+                throw (0, types_2.userError)('auth.not-authenticated', undefined, 'Not authenticated');
             const provider = (0, passkey_provider_js_1.resolvePasskeyProvider)(registry, moleculer);
             if (!provider)
                 throw new Error('Passkey management is not available');
@@ -1243,10 +1239,7 @@ function createAuthRouter(auth, registry, moleculer = null, shareTokens = null,
                     callerIsAdmin: ctx.user.isAdmin,
                 });
                 if (record.expiresAt === null) {
-                    throw new server_1.TRPCError({
-                        code: 'BAD_REQUEST',
-                        message: 'A never-expiring share token cannot be extended',
-                    });
+                    throw (0, user_error_js_1.trpcUserError)('BAD_REQUEST', 'auth.share-never-expiring-extend', undefined, 'A never-expiring share token cannot be extended');
                 }
                 return { id: record.id, expiresAt: record.expiresAt };
             }

package/dist/api/core/live-events.router.js

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ const trpc_middleware_js_1 = require("../trpc/trpc.middleware.js");
 const share_view_access_js_1 = require("../trpc/share-view-access.js");
 const principal_visibility_js_1 = require("../trpc/principal-visibility.js");
 const public_event_filter_js_1 = require("./public-event-filter.js");
+const types_1 = require("@camstack/types");
 // The pushed wire shape is `SystemEvent` from @camstack/types — the exact
 // type `EventBusService.subscribe` hands its handlers. It MUST be a type
 // exported from @camstack/types (not a local interface): the AppRouter
@@ -82,22 +83,22 @@ function createLiveEventsRouter(eb, ar) {
                 const deviceRegistry = ar.getDeviceRegistry();
                 const device = deviceRegistry.getById(input.deviceId);
                 if (!device)
-                    throw new Error(`Device id=${input.deviceId} not found`);
+                    throw (0, types_1.userError)('device.not-found', { id: input.deviceId }, `Device id=${input.deviceId} not found`);
                 // Permission check — new IDevice has no providerId; admin bypass only
                 if (!ctx.user.isAdmin) {
                     const ad = ctx.user.permissions?.allowedDevices;
                     if (!ad)
-                        throw new Error('Access denied');
+                        throw (0, types_1.userError)('auth.access-denied', undefined, 'Access denied');
                     // Find which addon owns this device to determine the provider key
                     const ownerAddonId = deviceRegistry.getAddonId(input.deviceId);
                     if (!ownerAddonId)
-                        throw new Error('Access denied');
+                        throw (0, types_1.userError)('auth.access-denied', undefined, 'Access denied');
                     const pd = ad[ownerAddonId];
                     // Permission lists are still keyed by stableId — that's the
                     // external admin-facing identifier. Resolve the device's
                     // stableId for the membership check.
                     if (!pd || (pd !== '*' && !pd.includes(device.stableId))) {
-                        throw new Error('Access denied');
+                        throw (0, types_1.userError)('auth.access-denied', undefined, 'Access denied');
                     }
                 }
                 return eb.subscribe({ source: { type: 'device', id: input.deviceId } }, (evt) => {

package/dist/api/trpc/cap-route-error-formatter.js

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ exports.formatTrpcError = formatTrpcError;
  * The formatter is EXPORTED for unit testing (no side-effects, pure function).
  */
 const system_1 = require("@camstack/system");
+const types_1 = require("@camstack/types");
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Type guards
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -110,6 +111,29 @@ function extractCapRouteError(err) {
  * Returns the shape unchanged for all other errors.
  */
 function formatTrpcError(opts) {
+    return withErrorI18n(opts, withCapRouteData(opts));
+}
+/**
+ * A coded error (`userError(...)`, D863) gets its response `message` in the
+ * request language when the `server` catalog has the code; the code and params
+ * stay in `data.i18n` whatever the language. A legacy error (no code), an
+ * unknown code and English all pass through with the original message.
+ */
+function withErrorI18n(opts, shape) {
+    const coded = (0, types_1.readErrorI18n)(opts.error);
+    if (coded === null)
+        return shape;
+    const lang = opts.ctx?.lang ?? types_1.DEFAULT_CATALOG_LANG;
+    const text = lang === types_1.DEFAULT_CATALOG_LANG
+        ? undefined
+        : (0, system_1.getCatalogRegistry)().lookup(lang, system_1.SERVER_NAMESPACE, coded.code);
+    return {
+        ...shape,
+        ...(text !== undefined ? { message: (0, types_1.interpolate)(text, coded.params) } : {}),
+        data: { ...shape.data, i18n: coded },
+    };
+}
+function withCapRouteData(opts) {
     const { error, shape } = opts;
     // extractCapRouteError already walks the full .cause chain, so a single call
     // starting from `error` covers both `error instanceof CapRouteError` and

package/dist/api/trpc/generated-cap-mounts.js

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 // AUTO-GENERATED by scripts/generate-cap-mounts.ts — DO NOT EDIT
 // Re-run: npx tsx scripts/generate-cap-mounts.ts
 //
-// Mounted: 170    Skipped (legacy): 3
+// Mounted: 171    Skipped (legacy): 3
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
 exports.LEGACY_SHAPE_SKIP = void 0;
 exports.mountAllCaps = mountAllCaps;
@@ -228,6 +228,22 @@ function mountAllCaps(services) {
                 discoverDevices: (0, cap_mount_helpers_js_1.concatCollection)(providers, 'discoverDevices'),
             };
         }, remoteCapProxy),
+        deviceRemovalHook: (0, generated_cap_routers_js_1.createCapRouter_deviceRemovalHook)((_ctx, addonId) => {
+            if (!reg)
+                return null;
+            if (addonId !== undefined) {
+                return reg.getProviderByAddonId('device-removal-hook', addonId);
+            }
+            const entries = reg.getCollectionEntries('device-removal-hook');
+            if (entries.length === 0)
+                return null;
+            const providers = entries.map(([, p]) => p);
+            const first = providers[0];
+            return {
+                ...first,
+                listDeviceData: (0, cap_mount_helpers_js_1.concatCollection)(providers, 'listDeviceData'),
+            };
+        }, remoteCapProxy),
         deviceState: (0, generated_cap_routers_js_1.createCapRouter_deviceState)((_ctx) => reg?.getSingleton('device-state') ?? null, remoteCapProxy),
         deviceStatus: (0, generated_cap_routers_js_1.createCapRouter_deviceStatus)((_ctx) => (0, cap_mount_helpers_js_1.requireDeviceScoped)(reg, 'device-status'), remoteCapProxy),
         doorbell: (0, generated_cap_routers_js_1.createCapRouter_doorbell)((_ctx) => (0, cap_mount_helpers_js_1.requireDeviceScoped)(reg, 'doorbell'), remoteCapProxy),