@camstack/addon-provider-tuya 0.2.39 → 0.2.42

package/dist/addon.js

@@ -14719,6 +14719,50 @@ var NodeProcessSchema = object({
 	/** Wall-clock uptime (seconds). Parsed from `ps etime`. */
 	uptimeSec: number()
 });
+/**
+* One retained container-memory reading.
+*
+* `atMs` is the timestamp of the PROCESS snapshot taken in the same tick, not
+* a second clock: that is what makes "processes sum to X, container says Y"
+* subtractable per point rather than an eyeballed comparison of two series
+* sampled at different instants.
+*
+* A reduced window keeps the sample with the LARGEST `currentBytes` in each
+* bucket, WHOLE. Taking a per-field maximum would synthesise a row whose parts
+* never coexisted, and a mean would smear away the peak this exists to find.
+*/
+var ContainerMemoryPointSchema = object({
+	/** Which hierarchy answered, so a reading is never ambiguous. */
+	source: _enum(["cgroup-v2", "cgroup-v1"]),
+	/** `memory.current` (v2) / `memory.usage_in_bytes` (v1). Always known. */
+	currentBytes: number(),
+	/** The cgroup's ceiling. `null` = NO LIMIT — never a sentinel, never zero. */
+	limitBytes: number().nullable(),
+	/** Anonymous pages: the closest thing to "what the processes allocated". */
+	anonBytes: number().nullable(),
+	/** Page cache. Charged to the cgroup, owned by no process. */
+	fileBytes: number().nullable(),
+	/**
+	* Shared memory — and the field that explained the largest single surprise.
+	* The i915 driver backs GPU buffers with shmem, so an inference pool or a
+	* hardware-decode session holding DRM objects is charged HERE and appears
+	* nowhere in a `ps` scan.
+	*/
+	shmemBytes: number().nullable(),
+	/** Kernel slab charged to this cgroup. `null` on v1, which never publishes it. */
+	slabBytes: number().nullable(),
+	/**
+	* Shrinkable i915 GEM object bytes, from debugfs.
+	*
+	* **Host-wide across every DRM client, NOT cgroup-scoped.** It is not a
+	* component of `currentBytes` and must not be subtracted from it; it says
+	* what put the shmem there, where `shmemBytes` only says how much.
+	*
+	* `null` wherever debugfs is not mounted — which is inside every camstack
+	* container today — and on any node with no Intel GPU.
+	*/
+	gpuShmemBytes: number().nullable()
+}).extend({ atMs: number() });
 var DumpHeapSnapshotInputSchema = object({ 
 /** The addon whose runner should dump a heap snapshot. */
 addonId: string() });
@@ -14782,6 +14826,21 @@ var NodeLoadSeriesSchema = object({
 	/** One entry per function seen in the window, heaviest-first. */
 	series: array(LoadFunctionSeriesSchema).readonly(),
 	/**
+	* The CONTAINER's memory over the same window, oldest-first.
+	*
+	* Sits next to `series` rather than in a method of its own because the whole
+	* question is a subtraction: the per-process rows in `series` sum to one
+	* number and this one is another, and an operator who has to issue two calls
+	* to compare them will compare two different instants. Same reader, same
+	* `sinceMs`, same `bucketMs`, same timestamps.
+	*
+	* **EMPTY means ABSENT, never zero.** A node with no cgroup — a developer
+	* Mac, a bare-metal host, a container with the hierarchy hidden — reports no
+	* points at all. A zero here would be indistinguishable from a healthy
+	* container and is precisely the lie this field exists to avoid.
+	*/
+	containerMemory: array(ContainerMemoryPointSchema).readonly(),
+	/**
 	* Width of one returned bucket, in ms. Equals the sampling cadence when no
 	* reduction was needed — so a caller can always say what one point covers
 	* without having to know whether it was reduced.
@@ -25728,6 +25787,33 @@ var intercomCapability = {
 	deviceNative: true,
 	mode: "singleton",
 	deviceTypes: [DeviceType.Camera],
+	/**
+	* **Auth tier: `protected` on every method — deliberate, and load-bearing.**
+	*
+	* Talking through a camera is an OPERATE action, not a CONFIGURE one. This
+	* cap has no configuration surface at all: all six methods open, feed and
+	* close one live audio session against one `deviceId`. That is the same
+	* authority as `ptz.move` or `snapshot.getSnapshot`, both `protected` — and
+	* the opposite of `ptz.savePreset` / `snapshot.invalidateCache`, which are
+	* `admin` because they change what the device IS.
+	*
+	* `protected` does not mean ungated: `protectedProcedure` runs the
+	* `METHOD_ACCESS_MAP` scope check, and every method here is `scope: 'device'`
+	* with `access: 'create'` and a `deviceId` in its input. So a caller needs a
+	* grant that covers THAT camera at `create` — a `camera-viewer` (`view`
+	* only) still cannot talk, and a grant on camera 5 cannot talk through
+	* camera 7.
+	*
+	* Every method was `auth: 'admin'` from the initial commit, which made the
+	* cap unreachable by every non-admin principal — `adminProcedure` throws
+	* `FORBIDDEN: Admin required` BEFORE the scope check runs, so the scope
+	* machinery generated for this cap (`METHOD_ACCESS_MAP`,
+	* `DEVICE_SCOPED_CAPS`, `METHOD_DEVICE_SELECTORS`) was complete and dead. The
+	* `camera-operator` scope preset has promised "PTZ control, intercom,
+	* snapshots" since that same commit; the promise could not be kept. Recorded
+	* as D289; `scripts/check-scope-preset-promises.ts` now fails the build if a
+	* preset promises a cap no row of that preset can reach.
+	*/
 	methods: {
 		/**
 		* Open a server-side WebRTC audio-only session. Returns an SDP
@@ -25740,7 +25826,7 @@ var intercomCapability = {
 			sdpOffer: string()
 		}), {
 			kind: "mutation",
-			auth: "admin"
+			auth: "protected"
 		}),
 		handleAnswer: method(object({
 			deviceId: number(),
@@ -25748,7 +25834,7 @@ var intercomCapability = {
 			sdpAnswer: string()
 		}), _void(), {
 			kind: "mutation",
-			auth: "admin"
+			auth: "protected"
 		}),
 		/** Close explicitly. Server also auto-closes on 30s idle. */
 		stopSession: method(object({
@@ -25756,7 +25842,7 @@ var intercomCapability = {
 			sessionId: string()
 		}), _void(), {
 			kind: "mutation",
-			auth: "admin"
+			auth: "protected"
 		}),
 		/**
 		* Open a raw-PCM talk session (no WebRTC SDP plumbing). Used by
@@ -25769,7 +25855,7 @@ var intercomCapability = {
 		*/
 		startTalkSession: method(object({ deviceId: number() }), object({ sessionId: string() }), {
 			kind: "mutation",
-			auth: "admin"
+			auth: "protected"
 		}),
 		/**
 		* Push one chunk of talk-back audio onto the active talk session.
@@ -25804,12 +25890,12 @@ var intercomCapability = {
 			sequenceNumber: number().int()
 		}), object({ accepted: boolean() }), {
 			kind: "mutation",
-			auth: "admin"
+			auth: "protected"
 		}),
 		/** Close the raw-PCM talk session. Idempotent. */
 		endTalkSession: method(object({ deviceId: number() }), _void(), {
 			kind: "mutation",
-			auth: "admin"
+			auth: "protected"
 		})
 	},
 	events: { onStatusChanged: { data: object({
@@ -28485,10 +28571,10 @@ DeviceType.Camera, DeviceType.Sensor, DeviceType.Switch, method(object({ deviceI
 * recording config. NOTE on events (source of truth, R5/C3): this cap carries
 * NO event surface — `getPlaybackManifest` returns playlist URLs only. Timeline
 * events (motion/object/audio) come from `pipelineAnalytics` (durable SQLite
-* rows); the recorder's internal EventMap markers are ephemeral in-RAM
-* annotations that are not exposed here and must not be treated as an event
-* feed. Event<->footage joins are by time, padded with the shared `EVENT_PAD_MS`
-* (`interfaces/recording-config.ts`).
+* rows) and are the ONLY event surface — the recorder has none. The in-RAM
+* playback markers it used to build were deleted on 2026-08-29 because nothing
+* ever read them. Event<->footage joins are by time, padded with the shared
+* `EVENT_PAD_MS` (`interfaces/recording-config.ts`).
 */
 var RecordingStatusSchema = object({
 	deviceId: number(),

package/dist/addon.mjs

@@ -14718,6 +14718,50 @@ var NodeProcessSchema = object({
 	/** Wall-clock uptime (seconds). Parsed from `ps etime`. */
 	uptimeSec: number()
 });
+/**
+* One retained container-memory reading.
+*
+* `atMs` is the timestamp of the PROCESS snapshot taken in the same tick, not
+* a second clock: that is what makes "processes sum to X, container says Y"
+* subtractable per point rather than an eyeballed comparison of two series
+* sampled at different instants.
+*
+* A reduced window keeps the sample with the LARGEST `currentBytes` in each
+* bucket, WHOLE. Taking a per-field maximum would synthesise a row whose parts
+* never coexisted, and a mean would smear away the peak this exists to find.
+*/
+var ContainerMemoryPointSchema = object({
+	/** Which hierarchy answered, so a reading is never ambiguous. */
+	source: _enum(["cgroup-v2", "cgroup-v1"]),
+	/** `memory.current` (v2) / `memory.usage_in_bytes` (v1). Always known. */
+	currentBytes: number(),
+	/** The cgroup's ceiling. `null` = NO LIMIT — never a sentinel, never zero. */
+	limitBytes: number().nullable(),
+	/** Anonymous pages: the closest thing to "what the processes allocated". */
+	anonBytes: number().nullable(),
+	/** Page cache. Charged to the cgroup, owned by no process. */
+	fileBytes: number().nullable(),
+	/**
+	* Shared memory — and the field that explained the largest single surprise.
+	* The i915 driver backs GPU buffers with shmem, so an inference pool or a
+	* hardware-decode session holding DRM objects is charged HERE and appears
+	* nowhere in a `ps` scan.
+	*/
+	shmemBytes: number().nullable(),
+	/** Kernel slab charged to this cgroup. `null` on v1, which never publishes it. */
+	slabBytes: number().nullable(),
+	/**
+	* Shrinkable i915 GEM object bytes, from debugfs.
+	*
+	* **Host-wide across every DRM client, NOT cgroup-scoped.** It is not a
+	* component of `currentBytes` and must not be subtracted from it; it says
+	* what put the shmem there, where `shmemBytes` only says how much.
+	*
+	* `null` wherever debugfs is not mounted — which is inside every camstack
+	* container today — and on any node with no Intel GPU.
+	*/
+	gpuShmemBytes: number().nullable()
+}).extend({ atMs: number() });
 var DumpHeapSnapshotInputSchema = object({ 
 /** The addon whose runner should dump a heap snapshot. */
 addonId: string() });
@@ -14781,6 +14825,21 @@ var NodeLoadSeriesSchema = object({
 	/** One entry per function seen in the window, heaviest-first. */
 	series: array(LoadFunctionSeriesSchema).readonly(),
 	/**
+	* The CONTAINER's memory over the same window, oldest-first.
+	*
+	* Sits next to `series` rather than in a method of its own because the whole
+	* question is a subtraction: the per-process rows in `series` sum to one
+	* number and this one is another, and an operator who has to issue two calls
+	* to compare them will compare two different instants. Same reader, same
+	* `sinceMs`, same `bucketMs`, same timestamps.
+	*
+	* **EMPTY means ABSENT, never zero.** A node with no cgroup — a developer
+	* Mac, a bare-metal host, a container with the hierarchy hidden — reports no
+	* points at all. A zero here would be indistinguishable from a healthy
+	* container and is precisely the lie this field exists to avoid.
+	*/
+	containerMemory: array(ContainerMemoryPointSchema).readonly(),
+	/**
 	* Width of one returned bucket, in ms. Equals the sampling cadence when no
 	* reduction was needed — so a caller can always say what one point covers
 	* without having to know whether it was reduced.
@@ -25727,6 +25786,33 @@ var intercomCapability = {
 	deviceNative: true,
 	mode: "singleton",
 	deviceTypes: [DeviceType.Camera],
+	/**
+	* **Auth tier: `protected` on every method — deliberate, and load-bearing.**
+	*
+	* Talking through a camera is an OPERATE action, not a CONFIGURE one. This
+	* cap has no configuration surface at all: all six methods open, feed and
+	* close one live audio session against one `deviceId`. That is the same
+	* authority as `ptz.move` or `snapshot.getSnapshot`, both `protected` — and
+	* the opposite of `ptz.savePreset` / `snapshot.invalidateCache`, which are
+	* `admin` because they change what the device IS.
+	*
+	* `protected` does not mean ungated: `protectedProcedure` runs the
+	* `METHOD_ACCESS_MAP` scope check, and every method here is `scope: 'device'`
+	* with `access: 'create'` and a `deviceId` in its input. So a caller needs a
+	* grant that covers THAT camera at `create` — a `camera-viewer` (`view`
+	* only) still cannot talk, and a grant on camera 5 cannot talk through
+	* camera 7.
+	*
+	* Every method was `auth: 'admin'` from the initial commit, which made the
+	* cap unreachable by every non-admin principal — `adminProcedure` throws
+	* `FORBIDDEN: Admin required` BEFORE the scope check runs, so the scope
+	* machinery generated for this cap (`METHOD_ACCESS_MAP`,
+	* `DEVICE_SCOPED_CAPS`, `METHOD_DEVICE_SELECTORS`) was complete and dead. The
+	* `camera-operator` scope preset has promised "PTZ control, intercom,
+	* snapshots" since that same commit; the promise could not be kept. Recorded
+	* as D289; `scripts/check-scope-preset-promises.ts` now fails the build if a
+	* preset promises a cap no row of that preset can reach.
+	*/
 	methods: {
 		/**
 		* Open a server-side WebRTC audio-only session. Returns an SDP
@@ -25739,7 +25825,7 @@ var intercomCapability = {
 			sdpOffer: string()
 		}), {
 			kind: "mutation",
-			auth: "admin"
+			auth: "protected"
 		}),
 		handleAnswer: method(object({
 			deviceId: number(),
@@ -25747,7 +25833,7 @@ var intercomCapability = {
 			sdpAnswer: string()
 		}), _void(), {
 			kind: "mutation",
-			auth: "admin"
+			auth: "protected"
 		}),
 		/** Close explicitly. Server also auto-closes on 30s idle. */
 		stopSession: method(object({
@@ -25755,7 +25841,7 @@ var intercomCapability = {
 			sessionId: string()
 		}), _void(), {
 			kind: "mutation",
-			auth: "admin"
+			auth: "protected"
 		}),
 		/**
 		* Open a raw-PCM talk session (no WebRTC SDP plumbing). Used by
@@ -25768,7 +25854,7 @@ var intercomCapability = {
 		*/
 		startTalkSession: method(object({ deviceId: number() }), object({ sessionId: string() }), {
 			kind: "mutation",
-			auth: "admin"
+			auth: "protected"
 		}),
 		/**
 		* Push one chunk of talk-back audio onto the active talk session.
@@ -25803,12 +25889,12 @@ var intercomCapability = {
 			sequenceNumber: number().int()
 		}), object({ accepted: boolean() }), {
 			kind: "mutation",
-			auth: "admin"
+			auth: "protected"
 		}),
 		/** Close the raw-PCM talk session. Idempotent. */
 		endTalkSession: method(object({ deviceId: number() }), _void(), {
 			kind: "mutation",
-			auth: "admin"
+			auth: "protected"
 		})
 	},
 	events: { onStatusChanged: { data: object({
@@ -28484,10 +28570,10 @@ DeviceType.Camera, DeviceType.Sensor, DeviceType.Switch, method(object({ deviceI
 * recording config. NOTE on events (source of truth, R5/C3): this cap carries
 * NO event surface — `getPlaybackManifest` returns playlist URLs only. Timeline
 * events (motion/object/audio) come from `pipelineAnalytics` (durable SQLite
-* rows); the recorder's internal EventMap markers are ephemeral in-RAM
-* annotations that are not exposed here and must not be treated as an event
-* feed. Event<->footage joins are by time, padded with the shared `EVENT_PAD_MS`
-* (`interfaces/recording-config.ts`).
+* rows) and are the ONLY event surface — the recorder has none. The in-RAM
+* playback markers it used to build were deleted on 2026-08-29 because nothing
+* ever read them. Event<->footage joins are by time, padded with the shared
+* `EVENT_PAD_MS` (`interfaces/recording-config.ts`).
 */
 var RecordingStatusSchema = object({
 	deviceId: number(),

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@camstack/addon-provider-tuya",
-  "version": "0.2.39",
+  "version": "0.2.42",
   "description": "Tuya / Smart Life device-provider addon for CamStack — account-onboarded (Tuya IoT cloud fetch of device localKeys) + LOCAL DP control via the @apocaliss92/nodetuya encrypted-LAN client, exposing switch / water-heater-family kettle entities",
   "keywords": [
     "camstack",