@camstack/addon-provider-amcrest 0.2.25 → 0.2.27

package/dist/addon.js

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ var __commonJSMin = (cb, mod) => () => (mod || (cb((mod = { exports: {} }).expor
 //#endregion
 let node_crypto = require("node:crypto");
 let node_os = require("node:os");
-//#region ../types/dist/event-category-XfKNtfCc.mjs
+//#region ../types/dist/event-category-CIa_iT6b.mjs
 var EventCategory = /* @__PURE__ */ function(EventCategory) {
 	EventCategory["SystemBoot"] = "system.boot";
 	EventCategory["SystemAddonsReady"] = "system.addons-ready";
@@ -20,6 +20,15 @@ var EventCategory = /* @__PURE__ */ function(EventCategory) {
 	*/
 	EventCategory["SystemRestartCompleted"] = "system.restart-completed";
 	/**
+	* The hub reissued its own TLS certificate at boot (`ensureTlsCert`).
+	* Emitted only when the material on disk actually changed, so an
+	* operator who trusted the old certificate by hand is told rather than
+	* discovering it as a browser error. Payload `TlsCertChangedPayload`.
+	*
+	* Rule: docs/decisions/adr-0227-*.md
+	*/
+	EventCategory["SystemTlsCertChanged"] = "system.tls-cert-changed";
+	/**
 	* A newer addon or server-root package version was found by the
 	* authoritative registry check. Emitted once when any observed
 	* `latestVersion` changes (or a package/node first appears behind);
@@ -18974,6 +18983,12 @@ var CameraStatusSchema = object({
 	/** Unix timestamp (ms) when this snapshot was composed server-side. */
 	fetchedAt: number()
 });
+var InferenceDeviceExclusionReasonSchema = _enum([
+	"disabled",
+	"unavailable",
+	"cannot-host-camera-root",
+	"accelerator-preferred"
+]);
 var NodeInferenceDeviceSchema = object({
 	/** Stable per-node device key, e.g. `openvino:npu`, `edgetpu:usb`, `cpu`. */
 	key: string(),
@@ -19004,7 +19019,17 @@ var NodeInferenceDeviceSchema = object({
 	* available per format; this is the stored selection that becomes the
 	* default for EVERY camera landing on this accelerator.
 	*/
-	steps: record(string(), DeviceStepConfigSchema).optional()
+	steps: record(string(), DeviceStepConfigSchema).optional(),
+	/**
+	* `null` when the device IS a camera-root candidate on this node; otherwise
+	* the reason the dispatcher drops it. Computed by the SAME
+	* `resolveInferenceDeviceEligibility` the dispatcher runs, so this view can
+	* never disagree with the election — deriving it in the UI from
+	* `enabled`/`available` would silently miss `cannot-host-camera-root` (needs
+	* the node's model catalog) and `accelerator-preferred` (needs the node-wide
+	* "an accelerator is serving" predicate).
+	*/
+	exclusion: InferenceDeviceExclusionReasonSchema.nullable()
 });
 var NodeInferenceDevicesSchema = object({
 	nodeId: string(),
@@ -23959,7 +23984,12 @@ var ListResultSchema = object({
 	probedAt: number()
 });
 var PreferredSchema = LocalInterfaceSchema.nullable();
-var GetConnectionEndpointsResultSchema = object({ endpoints: array(object({
+/**
+* Candidate base URL for the SDK to race on connect. Order matters —
+* the SDK should attempt these top-to-bottom with a short per-candidate
+* timeout (e.g. 1500ms) and cache the winner for the session.
+*/
+var ConnectionEndpointSchema = object({
 	/** Operator-facing label (e.g. "LAN — en0", "Public tunnel"). */
 	label: string(),
 	/** Fully-formed base URL with scheme + host + port. */
@@ -24002,7 +24032,42 @@ var GetConnectionEndpointsResultSchema = object({ endpoints: array(object({
 	* ordering between polls.
 	*/
 	priority: number()
-})).readonly() });
+});
+/**
+* Where the advertised local port came from. Ordered most → least
+* authoritative, and the whole point of returning it: a client must be able to
+* tell a FACT about the hub's socket from an echo of its own guess.
+*/
+var LocalPortSourceEnum = _enum([
+	"server-config",
+	"server-env",
+	"caller-hint",
+	"default"
+]);
+/** The port every LAN/loopback `baseUrl` in the same result was built with. */
+var AdvertisedLocalPortSchema = object({
+	port: number().int().min(1).max(65535),
+	source: LocalPortSourceEnum
+});
+var GetConnectionEndpointsResultSchema = object({
+	endpoints: array(ConnectionEndpointSchema).readonly(),
+	/**
+	* The port the hub built the LAN/loopback URLs with, and where that number
+	* came from.
+	*
+	* Returned rather than merely applied, because "the URL is right" and "the
+	* client can KNOW the URL is right" are different properties. A client that
+	* only sees a corrected URL cannot distinguish a hub that fixed the port from
+	* a hub that echoed the port the client sent, so it cannot decide whether to
+	* race the candidate or discard it. With `source` it can: anything but
+	* `caller-hint` is the hub's own socket.
+	*
+	* Absent on hubs predating this field — a client that finds it missing is
+	* talking to an echoing hub and must degrade exactly as it does for
+	* `caller-hint`.
+	*/
+	localPort: AdvertisedLocalPortSchema
+});
 /**
 * The chosen outbound endpoint for notification artifacts. `baseUrl: null` =
 * AUTO (resolved from the candidate ranking at send time); `resolved` reports
@@ -24023,8 +24088,13 @@ var AllowedAddressesSchema = object({
 */
 addresses: array(string()).readonly() });
 method(_void(), ListResultSchema), method(_void(), PreferredSchema), method(object({
-	/** Local hub HTTP port to use in base URLs. */
-	port: number().int().min(1).max(65535),
+	/**
+	* LEGACY HINT — do not send from new code. Kept optional so clients
+	* written against the echoing contract keep working; the hub uses it
+	* only when it cannot read its own port, and says so via
+	* `localPort.source === 'caller-hint'`.
+	*/
+	port: number().int().min(1).max(65535).optional(),
 	/** Include `http(s)://127.0.0.1:<port>` as the lowest-priority
 	*  candidate. Default `true`. */
 	includeLoopback: boolean().optional(),
@@ -30183,11 +30253,51 @@ function startReachabilityPoll(options) {
 	} };
 }
 var LAST_FETCHED_FIELD = "lastFetchedAt";
+/**
+* The freshness window for a cap whose value changes ONLY when WE write it.
+*
+* The usual `staleMs: 10_000` is tuned for a reading that moves on its own — a
+* battery level, a day/night state that flips at dusk. It is the wrong number
+* for a cap like `privacy-mask`, whose two facts (is the video mask on, is the
+* microphone on) change when an operator changes them, through a `setMask` /
+* `setAudioEnabled` that **re-reads the camera and rewrites this very slice**.
+* A write is therefore its own invalidation: the window never delays an
+* operator's own change, however long it is.
+*
+* What the window really bounds is the ONE case we do not write: somebody
+* changing the mask in the vendor app or the camera's web UI. Ten minutes is
+* the trade — that change is visible within ten minutes, and a fleet of 29
+* cameras behind a page that polls every 5s costs about 3 camera round trips a
+* minute instead of 696
+* ([D221](../../../../docs/decisions/adr-0221-a-polled-list-never-dials-a-camera.md)).
+*
+* Use it ONLY with {@link RuntimeStateStaleReadPolicy} `'serve-and-revalidate'`.
+* On the awaiting default a window this long does not remove the stall, it
+* merely makes it rarer and just as long.
+*/
+var OPERATOR_WRITTEN_STALE_MS = 10 * 6e4;
 function createRuntimeStateBridge(params) {
 	const { runtimeState, cap, ownDeviceId, refresh, staleMs, empty, logger } = params;
 	const missCooldownMs = params.refreshMissCooldownMs ?? 6e4;
+	const staleRead = params.staleRead ?? "await-refresh";
 	/** Epoch ms until which a refresh is not re-attempted. 0 = no cooldown. */
 	let missCooldownUntil = 0;
+	/**
+	* The refresh this bridge currently has in the air, if any.
+	*
+	* Providers single-flight their own camera client, so this is not what stops
+	* a second round trip. What it stops is a POLLED reader JOINING one: under
+	* `'serve-and-revalidate'` a read that finds a refresh already outstanding is
+	* answered from the slice at once — even a cold, empty slice, which reports
+	* UNKNOWN, which is the truth about a camera nobody has reached.
+	*
+	* That distinction is the whole cost of an unreachable camera. Measured on
+	* the live hub (device 3629, an offline battery Reolink): its refresh takes
+	* 23.1s to give up, so without this every 5s poll landing inside those 23s
+	* joined the wait and spent the caller's full 1.2s source budget — five
+	* stalled polls per cooldown cycle, for one camera, forever.
+	*/
+	let refreshInFlight = null;
 	const readFetchedAt = () => {
 		const value = runtimeState.getCapState(cap.name)?.[LAST_FETCHED_FIELD];
 		return typeof value === "number" ? value : 0;
@@ -30208,14 +30318,14 @@ function createRuntimeStateBridge(params) {
 			}
 		});
 	};
-	const ensureFresh = async () => {
-		const slice = runtimeState.getCapState(cap.name);
-		const fetchedAt = readFetchedAt();
-		if (slice && Date.now() - fetchedAt <= staleMs) {
-			missCooldownUntil = 0;
-			return;
-		}
-		if (Date.now() < missCooldownUntil) return;
+	/**
+	* One refresh attempt, plus the LANDED check that decides the cooldown.
+	*
+	* @param fetchedAt What `lastFetchedAt` was before the attempt — the only
+	*                  evidence the bridge has that the refresh persisted
+	*                  anything, since providers swallow their own camera errors.
+	*/
+	const runRefresh = async (fetchedAt) => {
 		try {
 			await refresh();
 		} catch (err) {
@@ -30231,6 +30341,41 @@ function createRuntimeStateBridge(params) {
 		}
 		openMissCooldown(void 0);
 	};
+	/**
+	* Start a refresh and remember it, at most one at a time.
+	*
+	* It never rejects: under `'serve-and-revalidate'` the caller is answered
+	* from the slice either way, so a floating rejection would take the process
+	* down for a fault the miss cooldown has already recorded and logged.
+	*/
+	const startRefresh = (fetchedAt) => {
+		const existing = refreshInFlight;
+		if (existing !== null) return existing;
+		const started = runRefresh(fetchedAt).catch(() => void 0).finally(() => {
+			refreshInFlight = null;
+		});
+		refreshInFlight = started;
+		return started;
+	};
+	const ensureFresh = async () => {
+		const slice = runtimeState.getCapState(cap.name);
+		const fetchedAt = readFetchedAt();
+		if (slice && Date.now() - fetchedAt <= staleMs) {
+			missCooldownUntil = 0;
+			return;
+		}
+		if (Date.now() < missCooldownUntil) return;
+		if (staleRead === "serve-and-revalidate") {
+			if (refreshInFlight !== null) return;
+			if (slice && fetchedAt > 0) {
+				startRefresh(fetchedAt);
+				return;
+			}
+			await startRefresh(fetchedAt);
+			return;
+		}
+		await runRefresh(fetchedAt);
+	};
 	const projectStatus = () => {
 		const slice = runtimeState.getCapState(cap.name);
 		if (!slice) return empty();
@@ -39455,7 +39600,6 @@ var AmcrestCamera = class AmcrestCamera extends BaseDevice {
 	static PRIVACY_COORD_MAX = 8191;
 	registerPrivacyMaskCap() {
 		const CAP_NAME = "privacy-mask";
-		const STALE_MS = 1e4;
 		const maxRegions = AmcrestCamera.PRIVACY_MASK_MAX_REGIONS;
 		const coordMax = AmcrestCamera.PRIVACY_COORD_MAX;
 		const refreshFromCamera = async () => {
@@ -39510,7 +39654,8 @@ var AmcrestCamera = class AmcrestCamera extends BaseDevice {
 				cap: privacyMaskCapability,
 				ownDeviceId: this.id,
 				refresh: refreshFromCamera,
-				staleMs: STALE_MS,
+				staleMs: OPERATOR_WRITTEN_STALE_MS,
+				staleRead: "serve-and-revalidate",
 				logger: this.ctx.logger,
 				empty: () => ({
 					enabled: false,

package/dist/addon.mjs

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import { networkInterfaces } from "node:os";
 var __commonJSMin = (cb, mod) => () => (mod || (cb((mod = { exports: {} }).exports, mod), cb = null), mod.exports);
 var __require = /* @__PURE__ */ createRequire(import.meta.url);
 //#endregion
-//#region ../types/dist/event-category-XfKNtfCc.mjs
+//#region ../types/dist/event-category-CIa_iT6b.mjs
 var EventCategory = /* @__PURE__ */ function(EventCategory) {
 	EventCategory["SystemBoot"] = "system.boot";
 	EventCategory["SystemAddonsReady"] = "system.addons-ready";
@@ -21,6 +21,15 @@ var EventCategory = /* @__PURE__ */ function(EventCategory) {
 	*/
 	EventCategory["SystemRestartCompleted"] = "system.restart-completed";
 	/**
+	* The hub reissued its own TLS certificate at boot (`ensureTlsCert`).
+	* Emitted only when the material on disk actually changed, so an
+	* operator who trusted the old certificate by hand is told rather than
+	* discovering it as a browser error. Payload `TlsCertChangedPayload`.
+	*
+	* Rule: docs/decisions/adr-0227-*.md
+	*/
+	EventCategory["SystemTlsCertChanged"] = "system.tls-cert-changed";
+	/**
 	* A newer addon or server-root package version was found by the
 	* authoritative registry check. Emitted once when any observed
 	* `latestVersion` changes (or a package/node first appears behind);
@@ -18975,6 +18984,12 @@ var CameraStatusSchema = object({
 	/** Unix timestamp (ms) when this snapshot was composed server-side. */
 	fetchedAt: number()
 });
+var InferenceDeviceExclusionReasonSchema = _enum([
+	"disabled",
+	"unavailable",
+	"cannot-host-camera-root",
+	"accelerator-preferred"
+]);
 var NodeInferenceDeviceSchema = object({
 	/** Stable per-node device key, e.g. `openvino:npu`, `edgetpu:usb`, `cpu`. */
 	key: string(),
@@ -19005,7 +19020,17 @@ var NodeInferenceDeviceSchema = object({
 	* available per format; this is the stored selection that becomes the
 	* default for EVERY camera landing on this accelerator.
 	*/
-	steps: record(string(), DeviceStepConfigSchema).optional()
+	steps: record(string(), DeviceStepConfigSchema).optional(),
+	/**
+	* `null` when the device IS a camera-root candidate on this node; otherwise
+	* the reason the dispatcher drops it. Computed by the SAME
+	* `resolveInferenceDeviceEligibility` the dispatcher runs, so this view can
+	* never disagree with the election — deriving it in the UI from
+	* `enabled`/`available` would silently miss `cannot-host-camera-root` (needs
+	* the node's model catalog) and `accelerator-preferred` (needs the node-wide
+	* "an accelerator is serving" predicate).
+	*/
+	exclusion: InferenceDeviceExclusionReasonSchema.nullable()
 });
 var NodeInferenceDevicesSchema = object({
 	nodeId: string(),
@@ -23960,7 +23985,12 @@ var ListResultSchema = object({
 	probedAt: number()
 });
 var PreferredSchema = LocalInterfaceSchema.nullable();
-var GetConnectionEndpointsResultSchema = object({ endpoints: array(object({
+/**
+* Candidate base URL for the SDK to race on connect. Order matters —
+* the SDK should attempt these top-to-bottom with a short per-candidate
+* timeout (e.g. 1500ms) and cache the winner for the session.
+*/
+var ConnectionEndpointSchema = object({
 	/** Operator-facing label (e.g. "LAN — en0", "Public tunnel"). */
 	label: string(),
 	/** Fully-formed base URL with scheme + host + port. */
@@ -24003,7 +24033,42 @@ var GetConnectionEndpointsResultSchema = object({ endpoints: array(object({
 	* ordering between polls.
 	*/
 	priority: number()
-})).readonly() });
+});
+/**
+* Where the advertised local port came from. Ordered most → least
+* authoritative, and the whole point of returning it: a client must be able to
+* tell a FACT about the hub's socket from an echo of its own guess.
+*/
+var LocalPortSourceEnum = _enum([
+	"server-config",
+	"server-env",
+	"caller-hint",
+	"default"
+]);
+/** The port every LAN/loopback `baseUrl` in the same result was built with. */
+var AdvertisedLocalPortSchema = object({
+	port: number().int().min(1).max(65535),
+	source: LocalPortSourceEnum
+});
+var GetConnectionEndpointsResultSchema = object({
+	endpoints: array(ConnectionEndpointSchema).readonly(),
+	/**
+	* The port the hub built the LAN/loopback URLs with, and where that number
+	* came from.
+	*
+	* Returned rather than merely applied, because "the URL is right" and "the
+	* client can KNOW the URL is right" are different properties. A client that
+	* only sees a corrected URL cannot distinguish a hub that fixed the port from
+	* a hub that echoed the port the client sent, so it cannot decide whether to
+	* race the candidate or discard it. With `source` it can: anything but
+	* `caller-hint` is the hub's own socket.
+	*
+	* Absent on hubs predating this field — a client that finds it missing is
+	* talking to an echoing hub and must degrade exactly as it does for
+	* `caller-hint`.
+	*/
+	localPort: AdvertisedLocalPortSchema
+});
 /**
 * The chosen outbound endpoint for notification artifacts. `baseUrl: null` =
 * AUTO (resolved from the candidate ranking at send time); `resolved` reports
@@ -24024,8 +24089,13 @@ var AllowedAddressesSchema = object({
 */
 addresses: array(string()).readonly() });
 method(_void(), ListResultSchema), method(_void(), PreferredSchema), method(object({
-	/** Local hub HTTP port to use in base URLs. */
-	port: number().int().min(1).max(65535),
+	/**
+	* LEGACY HINT — do not send from new code. Kept optional so clients
+	* written against the echoing contract keep working; the hub uses it
+	* only when it cannot read its own port, and says so via
+	* `localPort.source === 'caller-hint'`.
+	*/
+	port: number().int().min(1).max(65535).optional(),
 	/** Include `http(s)://127.0.0.1:<port>` as the lowest-priority
 	*  candidate. Default `true`. */
 	includeLoopback: boolean().optional(),
@@ -30184,11 +30254,51 @@ function startReachabilityPoll(options) {
 	} };
 }
 var LAST_FETCHED_FIELD = "lastFetchedAt";
+/**
+* The freshness window for a cap whose value changes ONLY when WE write it.
+*
+* The usual `staleMs: 10_000` is tuned for a reading that moves on its own — a
+* battery level, a day/night state that flips at dusk. It is the wrong number
+* for a cap like `privacy-mask`, whose two facts (is the video mask on, is the
+* microphone on) change when an operator changes them, through a `setMask` /
+* `setAudioEnabled` that **re-reads the camera and rewrites this very slice**.
+* A write is therefore its own invalidation: the window never delays an
+* operator's own change, however long it is.
+*
+* What the window really bounds is the ONE case we do not write: somebody
+* changing the mask in the vendor app or the camera's web UI. Ten minutes is
+* the trade — that change is visible within ten minutes, and a fleet of 29
+* cameras behind a page that polls every 5s costs about 3 camera round trips a
+* minute instead of 696
+* ([D221](../../../../docs/decisions/adr-0221-a-polled-list-never-dials-a-camera.md)).
+*
+* Use it ONLY with {@link RuntimeStateStaleReadPolicy} `'serve-and-revalidate'`.
+* On the awaiting default a window this long does not remove the stall, it
+* merely makes it rarer and just as long.
+*/
+var OPERATOR_WRITTEN_STALE_MS = 10 * 6e4;
 function createRuntimeStateBridge(params) {
 	const { runtimeState, cap, ownDeviceId, refresh, staleMs, empty, logger } = params;
 	const missCooldownMs = params.refreshMissCooldownMs ?? 6e4;
+	const staleRead = params.staleRead ?? "await-refresh";
 	/** Epoch ms until which a refresh is not re-attempted. 0 = no cooldown. */
 	let missCooldownUntil = 0;
+	/**
+	* The refresh this bridge currently has in the air, if any.
+	*
+	* Providers single-flight their own camera client, so this is not what stops
+	* a second round trip. What it stops is a POLLED reader JOINING one: under
+	* `'serve-and-revalidate'` a read that finds a refresh already outstanding is
+	* answered from the slice at once — even a cold, empty slice, which reports
+	* UNKNOWN, which is the truth about a camera nobody has reached.
+	*
+	* That distinction is the whole cost of an unreachable camera. Measured on
+	* the live hub (device 3629, an offline battery Reolink): its refresh takes
+	* 23.1s to give up, so without this every 5s poll landing inside those 23s
+	* joined the wait and spent the caller's full 1.2s source budget — five
+	* stalled polls per cooldown cycle, for one camera, forever.
+	*/
+	let refreshInFlight = null;
 	const readFetchedAt = () => {
 		const value = runtimeState.getCapState(cap.name)?.[LAST_FETCHED_FIELD];
 		return typeof value === "number" ? value : 0;
@@ -30209,14 +30319,14 @@ function createRuntimeStateBridge(params) {
 			}
 		});
 	};
-	const ensureFresh = async () => {
-		const slice = runtimeState.getCapState(cap.name);
-		const fetchedAt = readFetchedAt();
-		if (slice && Date.now() - fetchedAt <= staleMs) {
-			missCooldownUntil = 0;
-			return;
-		}
-		if (Date.now() < missCooldownUntil) return;
+	/**
+	* One refresh attempt, plus the LANDED check that decides the cooldown.
+	*
+	* @param fetchedAt What `lastFetchedAt` was before the attempt — the only
+	*                  evidence the bridge has that the refresh persisted
+	*                  anything, since providers swallow their own camera errors.
+	*/
+	const runRefresh = async (fetchedAt) => {
 		try {
 			await refresh();
 		} catch (err) {
@@ -30232,6 +30342,41 @@ function createRuntimeStateBridge(params) {
 		}
 		openMissCooldown(void 0);
 	};
+	/**
+	* Start a refresh and remember it, at most one at a time.
+	*
+	* It never rejects: under `'serve-and-revalidate'` the caller is answered
+	* from the slice either way, so a floating rejection would take the process
+	* down for a fault the miss cooldown has already recorded and logged.
+	*/
+	const startRefresh = (fetchedAt) => {
+		const existing = refreshInFlight;
+		if (existing !== null) return existing;
+		const started = runRefresh(fetchedAt).catch(() => void 0).finally(() => {
+			refreshInFlight = null;
+		});
+		refreshInFlight = started;
+		return started;
+	};
+	const ensureFresh = async () => {
+		const slice = runtimeState.getCapState(cap.name);
+		const fetchedAt = readFetchedAt();
+		if (slice && Date.now() - fetchedAt <= staleMs) {
+			missCooldownUntil = 0;
+			return;
+		}
+		if (Date.now() < missCooldownUntil) return;
+		if (staleRead === "serve-and-revalidate") {
+			if (refreshInFlight !== null) return;
+			if (slice && fetchedAt > 0) {
+				startRefresh(fetchedAt);
+				return;
+			}
+			await startRefresh(fetchedAt);
+			return;
+		}
+		await runRefresh(fetchedAt);
+	};
 	const projectStatus = () => {
 		const slice = runtimeState.getCapState(cap.name);
 		if (!slice) return empty();
@@ -39456,7 +39601,6 @@ var AmcrestCamera = class AmcrestCamera extends BaseDevice {
 	static PRIVACY_COORD_MAX = 8191;
 	registerPrivacyMaskCap() {
 		const CAP_NAME = "privacy-mask";
-		const STALE_MS = 1e4;
 		const maxRegions = AmcrestCamera.PRIVACY_MASK_MAX_REGIONS;
 		const coordMax = AmcrestCamera.PRIVACY_COORD_MAX;
 		const refreshFromCamera = async () => {
@@ -39511,7 +39655,8 @@ var AmcrestCamera = class AmcrestCamera extends BaseDevice {
 				cap: privacyMaskCapability,
 				ownDeviceId: this.id,
 				refresh: refreshFromCamera,
-				staleMs: STALE_MS,
+				staleMs: OPERATOR_WRITTEN_STALE_MS,
+				staleRead: "serve-and-revalidate",
 				logger: this.ctx.logger,
 				empty: () => ({
 					enabled: false,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@camstack/addon-provider-amcrest",
-  "version": "0.2.25",
+  "version": "0.2.27",
   "description": "Amcrest/Dahua camera device provider addon for CamStack — Dahua CGI over HTTP(S) with digest auth (snapshot, RTSP catalog, PTZ, image/day-night config)",
   "keywords": [
     "camstack",