@camstack/addon-post-analysis 1.2.47 → 1.2.49

package/dist/{dist-B5O4mNmd.js → dist-BaqsyWbd.js}

@@ -6531,9 +6531,38 @@ var CAP_NODE_PIN_CONTEXT_KEY = "__camstackNodePin";
 /**
 * Build the tRPC request options that pin a single capability call to `nodeId`.
 * Pass as the second argument to `.query(input, …)` / `.mutate(input, …)`.
+*
+* ## The id is normalised here, and it has to be
+*
+* A forked addon reads its own node from `ctx.kernel.localNodeId`, and inside a
+* worker that value is a RUNNER id — `hub/export-hap`, not `hub`. Routing
+* compares a pin against real node ids, so such a pin matches nothing and the
+* call fails with `no provider registered for cap "…"`. The local-first
+* resolver already guarded against this (`localNodeId.split('/')[0]`), which
+* made the hazard invisible: unpinned calls worked, and only an explicit pin —
+* the thing you reach for when you specifically need THIS node — silently
+* addressed a node that does not exist.
+*
+* Cost of it being missing: `addon-export-hap` pinned `decoder.getInfo` to its
+* own node to read the host's hardware-decode backend. It never once answered,
+* so every HomeKit egress transcode decoded in SOFTWARE — including 4K H.265 —
+* while D67's whole premise was that the decoder addon is the authority on
+* hardware. The warn said `decoding in SOFTWARE` and read as "this node has no
+* hardware", which was false.
+*
+* Normalising in the ONE constructor fixes every caller at once, which is why
+* it is here and not at the call sites.
 */
 function nodePin(nodeId) {
-	return { context: { [CAP_NODE_PIN_CONTEXT_KEY]: nodeId } };
+	return { context: { [CAP_NODE_PIN_CONTEXT_KEY]: toNodeId(nodeId) } };
+}
+/**
+* A runner id is `<nodeId>/<addonId>`; a node id has no slash. Taking the head
+* is idempotent, so passing an already-clean id costs nothing.
+*/
+function toNodeId(idOrRunnerId) {
+	const head = idOrRunnerId.split("/")[0];
+	return head === void 0 || head.length === 0 ? idOrRunnerId : head;
 }
 /**
 * Output schema shared by the contribution + live methods.
@@ -7090,6 +7119,30 @@ var DEVICE_SCOPED_CAPS = new Set([
 function isDeviceScopedCap(capName) {
 	return DEVICE_SCOPED_CAPS.has(capName);
 }
+/**
+* Promise-based timer helpers — used everywhere the codebase needs to
+* wait, back off, or schedule a retry. Before these helpers landed, each
+* call site re-implemented `new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, ms))` inline,
+* with subtle variations (some swallowing cancellation, some not). Two
+* shapes cover every observed use case:
+*
+*  - {@link sleep} for a plain, uncancellable wait — the default choice.
+*  - {@link sleepCancellable} for a wait that wakes early when an
+*    abort signal trips, used by long-running pollers whose teardown
+*    must stop a pending backoff promptly.
+*/
+/**
+* Resolve after `ms` milliseconds. Never rejects, never cancels. The
+* sleep cannot be interrupted; for a wakeable variant use
+* {@link sleepCancellable}.
+*
+* `ms <= 0` resolves on the next microtask via `setTimeout(0)`, which
+* still gives the event loop a chance to drain — useful for breaking
+* up tight async loops without changing call-site semantics.
+*/
+function sleep(ms) {
+	return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, Math.max(0, ms)));
+}
 //#endregion
 //#region ../types/dist/err-msg-IQTHeDzc.mjs
 /**
@@ -7114,6 +7167,14 @@ var EncodeProfileSchema = object({
 			"main",
 			"high"
 		]).optional(),
+		/**
+		* `-level`, e.g. `'3.1'`. A consumer that ADVERTISES a level in its SDP
+		* (`profile-level-id=42e01f` is Baseline 3.1) must constrain the encoder to
+		* it, or it ships a stream that does not match its own advertisement — the
+		* defect class that kept HomeKit black for a year and that Alexa carried
+		* silently. Optional because a browser negotiates the level itself.
+		*/
+		level: string().optional(),
 		width: number().int().positive().optional(),
 		height: number().int().positive().optional(),
 		fps: number().positive().optional(),
@@ -7161,6 +7222,29 @@ var EncodeProfileSchema = object({
 	outputArgs: array(string()).optional()
 });
 /**
+* The shape every live egress starts from: H.264 Baseline 3.1 at 720p25.
+* Baseline because it is the one profile every consumer in this repo decodes
+* (Echo, iOS, an old browser); 3.1 because that is what the SDPs advertise.
+*/
+var BASE_LIVE_EGRESS_PROFILE = {
+	video: {
+		codec: "h264",
+		profile: "baseline",
+		level: "3.1",
+		width: 1280,
+		height: 720,
+		fps: 25,
+		bitrateKbps: 2500,
+		gopFrames: 25,
+		bf: 0,
+		preset: "veryfast",
+		tune: "zerolatency"
+	},
+	audio: "passthrough"
+};
+({ ...BASE_LIVE_EGRESS_PROFILE }), { ...BASE_LIVE_EGRESS_PROFILE.video };
+({ ...BASE_LIVE_EGRESS_PROFILE });
+/**
 * Deep wiring healthcheck — snapshot of active reachability probes across
 * every declared capability + widget of every installed plugin, on every
 * node. Produced by the backend `WiringHealthService` and surfaced via
@@ -7210,6 +7294,154 @@ object({
 	})
 });
 /**
+* Per-camera FUNCTION SWITCHES — the one coherent on/off surface over the
+* pipeline functions an operator thinks in terms of.
+*
+* ## This file adds no state
+*
+* Every switch here is a VIEW onto an authority that already existed
+* ([D62](../../../../docs/decisions/adr-0062.md)). The whole point of the
+* group is that there is exactly one place each function is turned off, and
+* the group routes to it:
+*
+* | Switch | Authority | Proven "off stops the work" gate |
+* | --- | --- | --- |
+* | `stream-broker` | `deviceManager.setDisabled` | `StreamBrokerManager.reconcileAllCatalogs` releases the brokers; `ensureBroker` refuses re-creation |
+* | `object-detection` | `deviceManager.setWrapperActive('detection-pipeline')` | `PipelineSettingsStore.resolvePipelineForDevice` returns `{ steps: [], audio: null }` |
+* | `audio-analysis` | `deviceManager.setWrapperActive('audio-analysis')` | `AudioSubscriptionController.subscribeAudioStream` returns `null` before opening the stream |
+* | `recording` | `recording.setDeviceConfig` → `RecordingConfig.enabled` | `band-decision.shouldRecord` returns false; the controller detaches the device |
+* | `notifications` | `notificationRules.setDeviceMuted` | `NotificationCenter.evaluateAndEnqueue` returns before any rule is evaluated |
+* | `privacy-mask` | `privacyMask.setMask({ enabled })` → the CAMERA | the camera blanks the masked regions itself; every stream and recording carries the black boxes |
+* | `device-audio` | `privacyMask.setAudioEnabled` → the CAMERA | the camera stops encoding an audio track at all; every consumer sees silent video |
+*
+* ## The two switches whose authority is not on this server
+*
+* `privacy-mask` and `device-audio` write the CAMERA. That is not a loophole
+* in "the group stores nothing" — it is the purest form of it: the camera
+* holds the fact, every read is a read-through, and there is no server-side
+* copy that could drift. Their availability therefore cannot come from
+* `listBindableCapsForDeviceType` (a device-NATIVE cap carries no wrappers and
+* is filtered out there); it comes from the cap's own camera-probed
+* `privacyMask.getOptions()`, which is strictly more honest — it answers for
+* THIS camera rather than for the device type
+* ([D74](../../../../docs/decisions/adr-0074.md)).
+*
+* ## `privacy-mask` is the one row whose ON is not "the function is working"
+*
+* Every other switch means *this camera's function is doing its job*, so
+* `enabled: false` is a thing an operator took away. `privacy-mask` means **the
+* MASK is active** — `enabled: true` is video deliberately obscured. The
+* polarity is not a choice made here: `addon-export-hap`'s privacy `Switch`
+* (`builders/privacy-switch.ts`) already mirrors `patch.enabled` verbatim, and
+* a HomeKit toggle that disagreed with the app's toggle for the same camera is
+* worse than either surface not having one.
+*
+* Two consequences follow and both are load-bearing:
+*
+* - **It never counts as `switchedOff`.** `countsAsSwitchedOff` is `false` for
+*   exactly this row. With the polarity above, every camera that has NOT drawn
+*   a privacy mask would otherwise report `switchedOff: ['privacy-mask']` — the
+*   normal, healthy state of most cameras rendered as an operator disablement.
+* - **Its cost line names BOTH directions.** `costWhenOff` is rendered
+*   unconditionally by both clients, so for this row it has to read correctly
+*   whichever way the switch is sitting.
+*
+* The wrapper-binding pair is not a new idea: `legacy-migrations.ts` already
+* migrated the legacy `audioEnabled` / `pipelineEnabled` /
+* `motionDetectionEnabled` booleans ONTO `setWrapperActive`. The group is the
+* surface that decision never got.
+*
+* ## Two rules that are load-bearing
+*
+* - **Recording's switch is `enabled`, never the bands.** `bands` is the only
+*   authored intent and `mode` is derived from it (`deriveRecordingMode`).
+*   Expressing "off" by clearing bands destroys the operator's schedule and
+*   turning the camera back on would then silently record nothing.
+* - **A switch that is off must be reported as off**, not merely produce
+*   nothing. {@link CameraSwitch.enabled} is what a status surface renders as
+*   "disabled by an operator" instead of "broken" — see
+*   `CameraStatus.switchedOff`.
+*/
+/**
+* The functions the operator named — five on 2026-08-05, plus the camera's own
+* microphone on 2026-08-07. Deliberately NOT one id per pipeline step: face
+* recognition and plate/LPR are per-step toggles on
+* `pipelineOrchestrator.setCameraStepToggle` and belong in the pipeline
+* editor, not in a safety group.
+*/
+var CameraSwitchIdSchema = _enum([
+	"stream-broker",
+	"object-detection",
+	"privacy-mask",
+	"device-audio",
+	"audio-analysis",
+	"recording",
+	"notifications"
+]);
+/**
+* WHERE the switch's state actually lives. A discriminated union rather than a
+* string so both the writer (the orchestrator's `setCameraSwitch`) and any
+* reader can exhaustively narrow — and so "the group added a parallel map" is
+* a compile error rather than a review comment.
+*/
+var CameraSwitchAuthoritySchema = discriminatedUnion("kind", [
+	object({ kind: literal("device-disabled") }),
+	object({
+		kind: literal("wrapper-binding"),
+		capName: string()
+	}),
+	object({ kind: literal("recording-config") }),
+	object({ kind: literal("notification-mute") }),
+	object({
+		kind: literal("camera-audio"),
+		capName: string()
+	}),
+	object({
+		kind: literal("camera-mask"),
+		capName: string()
+	})
+]);
+/**
+* Why a switch is not offered for this camera. Rendered instead of the
+* control, never as a dead control — an absent function and a broken one must
+* not look the same.
+*/
+var CameraSwitchUnavailableReasonSchema = _enum([
+	"no-provider",
+	"source-unreachable",
+	"not-configured"
+]);
+/**
+* One switch, resolved for one camera.
+*
+* `label` and `costWhenOff` travel ON THE WIRE rather than being looked up
+* client-side: the viewer is a separate repository that does not import
+* `@camstack/types`, and a cost line duplicated in two clients is a cost line
+* that will disagree with itself. Five rows per camera is nothing.
+*/
+var CameraSwitchSchema = object({
+	id: CameraSwitchIdSchema,
+	label: string(),
+	/**
+	* What the operator LOSES while this is off, in one sentence. Required, not
+	* optional: a switch that cannot say what it costs should not ship.
+	*/
+	costWhenOff: string(),
+	/** False = do not render a control. `unavailableReason` says why. */
+	available: boolean(),
+	unavailableReason: CameraSwitchUnavailableReasonSchema.optional(),
+	/** Current state. Meaningless when `available` is false — read it as `true`. */
+	enabled: boolean(),
+	authority: CameraSwitchAuthoritySchema
+});
+/** The whole group for one camera. */
+var CameraSwitchGroupSchema = object({
+	deviceId: number().int(),
+	switches: array(CameraSwitchSchema).readonly(),
+	/** Unix ms when the group was composed server-side. */
+	fetchedAt: number()
+});
+/**
 * Ops-log — the durable, append-only operations audit shared by the
 * recordings and events management surfaces.
 *
@@ -7228,14 +7460,16 @@ var OpsLogOpSchema = _enum([
 	"manual-delete",
 	"rescan",
 	"retention-run",
-	"relocate"
+	"relocate",
+	"orphan-audit"
 ]);
 /** Why the operation ran. */
 var OpsLogReasonSchema = _enum([
 	"retention",
 	"quota",
 	"manual",
-	"operator"
+	"operator",
+	"maintenance"
 ]);
 /** One audit row, shared verbatim by both domains. */
 var OpsLogEntrySchema = object({
@@ -9121,6 +9355,126 @@ var RtpSourceSchema = object({
 	encoder: string(),
 	pipelineKey: string()
 });
+/**
+* The encode request — **structured and serialisable, with NO raw-flag escape
+* hatch.** This is deliberate and it is the one lesson taken from
+* `getStreamWithCodec`: that method's `outputArgs: string[]` is simultaneously
+* its extensibility mechanism AND part of `pipelineKeyFor`'s sharing key, so
+* adding a flag silently forks the shared child, and two consumers that mean
+* the same thing but spell it differently never share. Here every knob is a
+* NAMED field: a new requirement becomes a schema field (and a codegen run),
+* never an opaque array.
+*
+* `inputArgs` / `outputArgs` are omitted from the profile for the same reason.
+* The operator-facing derived-stream transform editor still has them — that is
+* a different surface (`publishCameraStream({ kind: 'derived' })`) with a
+* different purpose (reshaping a badly-behaved SOURCE), and it is unchanged.
+*/
+var EgressEncodeSchema = EncodeProfileSchema.omit({
+	inputArgs: true,
+	outputArgs: true
+});
+/**
+* How the encoder is bounded. `'tight'` is a one-second VBV window for a
+* consumer whose budget is enforced per second (HomeKit); `'relaxed'` is two
+* seconds, letting a keyframe spike borrow from the next second (a browser,
+* an Echo). Named rather than numeric so the INTENT survives.
+*/
+var EgressRateControlSchema = _enum(["tight", "relaxed"]);
+var EgressTranscodeRequestSchema = object({
+	deviceId: number().int().nonnegative(),
+	/** Which published stream to read. */
+	source: discriminatedUnion("kind", [object({
+		kind: literal("profile"),
+		profile: CamProfileSchema
+	}), object({
+		kind: literal("cam-stream"),
+		camStreamId: string().min(1)
+	})]),
+	encode: EgressEncodeSchema,
+	rateControl: EgressRateControlSchema.optional(),
+	/**
+	* `-bsf:v`. A consumer that negotiates its OWN SDP (HomeKit) cannot carry
+	* out-of-band extradata and needs `dump_extra` on both the copy and encode
+	* branches. Enumerated, not free text.
+	*/
+	bitstreamFilter: _enum([
+		"dump_extra",
+		"h264_mp4toannexb",
+		"hevc_mp4toannexb"
+	]).optional(),
+	/**
+	* Publish the transcode as a LOCAL push cam stream, instead of leaving the
+	* consumer to dial the returned url. The broker picks the id and returns it
+	* as `camStreamId` — a caller-supplied one would be circular, since the
+	* sharing key is computed FROM this request.
+	*
+	* The url is still returned and still the contract for a transcode pinned to
+	* another node. But dialling it locally costs an RTSP round trip that changes
+	* the transport underneath the consumer: a dialled stream is an RTP source,
+	* so `isRtpSource()` is true and the session takes the RTP-passthrough +
+	* repacketizer branch. The push branch — the one the derived mechanism has
+	* live hours on — is never reached. Measured on Alexa: broker registered, RTP
+	* arriving, key frame arriving, black screen, on a chain healthy at every
+	* other point.
+	*
+	* Same idea the transport already applies to CALLS, where `classifyCapRoute`
+	* gives priority to `hub-in-process` so a local call never leaves the node.
+	* This is that rule for media.
+	*/
+	publishLocally: boolean().optional(),
+	pixelFormat: _enum(["yuv420p", "nv12"]).optional(),
+	/**
+	* Operator/consumer override for decode hardware. ABSENT is the normal case
+	* and the one that matters: the broker then resolves the backend from the
+	* DECODER ADDON's per-node `probedBestHwaccel` (see
+	* `@camstack/types` `ffmpeg/hwaccel.ts`), which is the ranking known to work
+	* on this hardware — never the raw kernel resolver's qsv-first order.
+	*/
+	decodeHwAccel: _enum([
+		"auto",
+		"none",
+		"videotoolbox",
+		"vaapi",
+		"qsv",
+		"cuda"
+	]).optional(),
+	/**
+	* Host to embed in the returned restream `url`. The broker mints hub-local
+	* `127.0.0.1` URLs; a consumer on another node passes a cluster-resolvable
+	* host (`NodeTopologyService.reachableHostByNode`) so the returned URL is
+	* dialable from there. Same contract as `getStreamWithCodec.hostname` —
+	* `substituteRtspHost` rewrites only the dial address, never the restreamer.
+	*/
+	hostname: string().optional(),
+	/** Attribution for the broker panel. Never part of the sharing key. */
+	tag: string().optional()
+});
+var EgressTranscodeSchema = object({
+	/** Dial-able RTSP url (host-substituted when `hostname` was supplied). */
+	url: string(),
+	/** Release handle. Refcounted — the child dies when the last holder releases. */
+	pipelineKey: string(),
+	videoCodec: _enum(["H264", "H265"]),
+	resolution: object({
+		width: number().int().positive(),
+		height: number().int().positive()
+	}),
+	transcoded: boolean(),
+	encoder: string(),
+	/**
+	* The decode backend the child ACTUALLY ran with — `null` for software.
+	* Returned rather than assumed: a consumer that asked for hardware and got
+	* software needs to be able to see that without reading the broker's logs.
+	*/
+	decodeHwAccel: string().nullable(),
+	/**
+	* Set when `publishLocally` was honoured: attach to THIS instead of dialling
+	* `url`, and the session takes the push/deframe transport rather than the
+	* RTP-passthrough one. `null` means the consumer must dial.
+	*/
+	camStreamId: string().nullable()
+});
 method(object({
 	deviceId: number().int().nonnegative(),
 	camStreamId: string().min(1),
@@ -9230,6 +9584,15 @@ method(object({
 }), {
 	kind: "mutation",
 	auth: "admin"
+}), method(EgressTranscodeRequestSchema, EgressTranscodeSchema, {
+	kind: "mutation",
+	auth: "admin"
+}), method(object({ pipelineKey: string() }), object({
+	released: boolean(),
+	refcount: number().int().nonnegative()
+}), {
+	kind: "mutation",
+	auth: "admin"
 }), method(SubscribeAudioChunksInputSchema, SubscribeAudioChunksResultSchema, { kind: "mutation" }), method(object({
 	subscriptionId: string(),
 	maxCount: number().int().positive().default(8)
@@ -13842,12 +14205,13 @@ var NcConditionsSchema = object({
 	* source; otherwise the subject's source must equal it. Legacy records
 	* with no stamped source are treated as `pipeline`. The union spans both
 	* record kinds — object events carry `pipeline` | `onboard`, synthetic
-	* tracks carry `sensor`.
+	* tracks carry `sensor` (a linked device) or `audio` (a D62 audio marker).
 	*/
 	source: _enum([
 		"pipeline",
 		"onboard",
 		"sensor",
+		"audio",
 		"any"
 	]).optional(),
 	/**
@@ -14401,6 +14765,10 @@ var NC_CONDITION_CATALOG = [
 			{
 				value: "sensor",
 				label: "Sensor"
+			},
+			{
+				value: "audio",
+				label: "Audio marker"
 			}
 		],
 		operator: "in",
@@ -14411,7 +14779,7 @@ var NC_CONDITION_CATALOG = [
 			"package-event"
 		],
 		phase: "P1",
-		description: "pipeline / onboard / sensor; a record with no stamped source counts as pipeline."
+		description: "pipeline / onboard / sensor / audio; a record with no stamped source counts as pipeline."
 	},
 	{
 		id: "deviceState",
@@ -14757,6 +15125,35 @@ var notificationRulesCapability = {
 			auth: "admin"
 		}),
 		/**
+		* PERMANENT per-camera mute — the notifications half of the per-camera
+		* function switch group ([D61](../../../../docs/decisions/adr-0067.md)).
+		*
+		* Deliberately NOT a snooze. A snooze is bounded at
+		* {@link NC_SNOOZE_MAX_MINUTES} on purpose — "a snooze that could not
+		* expire would be an outage the operator asked for once and forgot" — and
+		* widening it to express "this camera never notifies" would destroy that
+		* property for every snooze. A mute is the other thing: an explicit,
+		* indefinite, admin-only decision, visible in the switch group next to the
+		* other four, and reported on `CameraStatus.switchedOff` so a silent
+		* camera never reads as a working one.
+		*
+		* Returned as ONE list rather than a per-camera query: the group's reader
+		* needs every camera's state, and a per-camera fan-out over the viewer's
+		* single WebSocket is N frames serialised on one socket.
+		*/
+		listDeviceMutes: method(object({}), object({ mutedDeviceIds: array(number().int()).readonly() }), { auth: "admin" }),
+		/**
+		* Mute or unmute one camera. Idempotent; an unmute of a camera that was
+		* never muted succeeds.
+		*/
+		setDeviceMuted: method(object({
+			deviceId: number().int(),
+			muted: boolean()
+		}), object({ success: literal(true) }), {
+			kind: "mutation",
+			auth: "admin"
+		}),
+		/**
 		* Dry-run a rule against recently persisted records (object events for
 		* `immediate`, closed tracks for `track-end`). Mutation kind only to
 		* carry the full rule object safely; no side effects.
@@ -15162,12 +15559,60 @@ var TrackAudioLabelSchema = object({
 });
 /**
 * How a track was produced. `pipeline` (default / absent) = the spatial
-* detection+tracking pipeline. `sensor` = a SYNTHETIC track projected from a
-* linked sensor/control state change (no positions; carries a snapshot). The
-* spatial subsystems (tracker association, occupancy count, re-id/embedding,
-* resurrection) MUST skip `sensor` tracks — they have no bbox trajectory.
+* detection+tracking pipeline. Every OTHER value is a SYNTHETIC projection —
+* no positions, a single snapshot, and no bbox trajectory at all:
+*
+*  - `sensor` — a linked sensor/control device state change.
+*  - `audio` — an audio event on the camera itself that was anomalous for
+*    THAT camera, loud, and heard while nothing visual was happening (D62).
+*
+* The spatial subsystems (tracker association, occupancy count, re-id /
+* embedding, resurrection) MUST skip every synthetic source. Test for that
+* with `isSpatialTrack`, which allow-lists `pipeline` — a `!== 'sensor'`
+* check silently readmits every source added after it was written.
+*/
+var TrackSourceSchema = _enum([
+	"pipeline",
+	"sensor",
+	"audio"
+]);
+/**
+* Per-track OPERATOR flags — set by hand from the admin UI or the viewer, never
+* by the pipeline. Spread into `TrackSchema` and `KeyEventSchema` from one place
+* so the two surfaces cannot drift.
+*
+* **Absent ≠ false.** A track that has never been touched omits the field; an
+* explicitly un-flagged track carries `false`. Legacy rows written before the
+* columns existed read as absent, and a consumer that needs a boolean should say
+* `flag === true`, not `flag !== false`.
+*
+* What the flags DO is deliberately UNDEFINED at the time of writing: they are
+* operator curation, and the behaviour they drive will be specified separately.
+* In particular a `markForTrain` track is NOT pinned against retention — see
+* `docs/decisions/adr-0059.md` for why that is a store-level change, not a flag.
+*/
+var TrackFlagFields = {
+	/** Operator marked this track as training material. */
+	markForTrain: boolean().optional(),
+	/** Operator marked this track for diagnostic attention. */
+	debug: boolean().optional()
+};
+/**
+* The write half: a PARTIAL patch. An omitted key is left untouched, so setting
+* one flag can never clear the other — the toggles are independent and are
+* driven from three surfaces that do not know about each other.
 */
-var TrackSourceSchema = _enum(["pipeline", "sensor"]);
+var TrackFlagsPatchSchema = object(TrackFlagFields);
+/**
+* The resolved flag state after a write. Both fields are REQUIRED here (absent
+* collapses to `false`) so a caller can drive a toggle's checked state off the
+* mutation result without a re-fetch.
+*/
+var TrackFlagsSchema = object({
+	trackId: string(),
+	markForTrain: boolean(),
+	debug: boolean()
+});
 var TrackSchema = object({
 	trackId: string(),
 	deviceId: number(),
@@ -15210,7 +15655,8 @@ var TrackSchema = object({
 	/** Normalized 0..1 trajectory envelope (see {@link TrackEnvelopeSchema}).
 	*  Populated from the persisted envelope columns on historical reads;
 	*  absent on legacy rows, dims-less tracks and active (in-RAM) tracks. */
-	envelope: TrackEnvelopeSchema.optional()
+	envelope: TrackEnvelopeSchema.optional(),
+	...TrackFlagFields
 });
 var BaseEventFields = {
 	id: string(),
@@ -15423,7 +15869,8 @@ var KeyEventSchema = object({
 	/** Highest-confidence ObjectEvent id for the track (empty when none). */
 	bestEventId: string(),
 	/** Track lifetime in ms (lastSeen - firstSeen). */
-	windowMs: number().optional()
+	windowMs: number().optional(),
+	...TrackFlagFields
 });
 object({
 	trackId: string(),
@@ -15509,7 +15956,31 @@ var RebuildObjectEmbeddingsInput = object({
 	since: number().optional(),
 	until: number().optional(),
 	/** Stop after this many tracks; the result reports whether more remain. */
-	maxTracks: number().int().positive().optional()
+	maxTracks: number().int().positive().optional(),
+	/**
+	* Run every embedding on THIS node instead of round-robining the fleet.
+	*
+	* Named `executeOnNodeId` and not `nodeId` on purpose: an inline `nodeId`
+	* field in cap args is read by `parent-unowned-call.ts` as a ROUTING PIN, so
+	* calling it that would pin the rebuild REQUEST itself to that node — the
+	* rebuild orchestration lives on the hub, and only the per-track step runs
+	* remotely. This field is data; the per-track pin is applied inside.
+	*
+	* Absent ⇒ round-robin over every online node whose runner can serve the
+	* pinned model.
+	*/
+	executeOnNodeId: string().optional(),
+	/**
+	* Milliseconds to wait between tracks; omit for the built-in default, `0` to
+	* run flat out.
+	*
+	* A rebuild is bulk maintenance on hub-main's single thread. Measured
+	* 2026-08-06, an unpaced pass held that thread busy 82.2 s out of 120 and
+	* pushed `nodes.topology` from 0.25 s to 26 s for 43 minutes. The value in
+	* force is logged at start and finish so a deliberately slow pass reads
+	* differently from a stalled one.
+	*/
+	pacingMs: number().int().nonnegative().optional()
 });
 /**
 * Result of emptying the CLIP index.
@@ -15543,13 +16014,23 @@ var RebuildStatusSchema = object({
 	/** Tracks with no usable detection box. */
 	missingBbox: number(),
 	/**
-	* Tracks the pipeline REFUSED rather than broke on: the camera is not
-	* attached, or `clip-embedding` is not enabled in its step tree. Separate
-	* from `failed` because the remedy is a configuration change, not an engine
-	* investigation — and because a pass over decommissioned cameras would
-	* otherwise read as a total engine outage.
+	* Tracks an executing node REFUSED rather than broke on — an unreadable key
+	* frame, a step that threw. Separate from `failed` because the remedy is
+	* different, and because a whole camera silently contributing zero vectors
+	* is the shape of failure a rebuild must never hide.
 	*/
 	notRunnable: number(),
+	/**
+	* The pass stopped because NO node could serve the pinned model.
+	*
+	* Distinct from `notRunnable` on purpose: that one says "this track was
+	* refused", this one says "the cluster cannot do this work at all" — every
+	* candidate node either lacks the `clip-embedding` step, lacks a build of the
+	* pinned model for its engine format, or dropped out. The remedy is a model /
+	* engine change, not a per-camera one. Non-zero here always comes with
+	* `complete: false`.
+	*/
+	noCapableNode: number(),
 	failed: number(),
 	/** Set once a pass ends: true only when EVERYTHING was covered. */
 	complete: boolean().nullable(),
@@ -15739,6 +16220,31 @@ var pipelineAnalyticsCapability = {
 			auth: "admin"
 		}),
 		/**
+		* Set the per-track operator flags (`markForTrain`, `debug`) on ONE track.
+		* The patch is PARTIAL — an omitted key is left untouched — because the
+		* three surfaces that write it (admin Events grid, viewer track detail,
+		* viewer cluster detail) each own one toggle and must not clobber the other.
+		*
+		* Writes the track ROW: `markForTrain`/`debug` are per-TRACK state, so they
+		* live where `label` and `importance` live, not in any per-device settings
+		* store. Updates the in-RAM active track too, so a flag set on a live track
+		* survives its expiry-time persist.
+		*
+		* `auth: 'protected'` (the default), NOT `admin`: the viewer is an
+		* authenticated non-admin surface and two of the three call sites are
+		* there. Revisit if a flag ever gains an effect that costs storage —
+		* `deleteTracks` next door is admin for exactly that reason.
+		*
+		* Returns the RESOLVED state of both flags (absent → `false`) so a caller
+		* can drive its toggle without a re-fetch. Rejects an unknown track.
+		*/
+		setTrackFlags: method(object({
+			/** Log/audit scope only — the trackId is globally unique on its own. */
+			deviceId: number(),
+			trackId: string(),
+			flags: TrackFlagsPatchSchema
+		}), TrackFlagsSchema, { kind: "mutation" }),
+		/**
 		* Durable event-store footprint for the management UI: event rows
 		* (motion + object + audio) counted per camera + total, plus the
 		* event-owned media bytes on disk per camera + total. Stat/count-based,
@@ -16465,6 +16971,53 @@ var DetailResultSchema = object({
 	nativeFaceShortSidePx: number().optional()
 });
 /**
+* Why an executing node REFUSED a stateless step run (`runStatelessStep`).
+*
+* A refusal is a first-class answer, not an error, because the caller's next
+* move depends on WHICH one it is — and because "the pass produced nothing"
+* must never be reachable without a named, counted cause. The two tiers:
+*
+* - **node-level** (`unknown-step`, `model-not-servable`) — this node can
+*   never serve this (step, model) pair. The caller drops it from its rotation
+*   and retries the same work elsewhere; nothing about the work changes.
+* - **work-level** (`unreadable-frame`, `execution-failed`) — this node is
+*   fine, this one request is not. Retrying it on another node would only
+*   spread the same failure.
+*/
+var StatelessStepRefusalSchema = _enum([
+	"unknown-step",
+	"model-not-servable",
+	"unreadable-frame",
+	"execution-failed"
+]);
+/**
+* Answer to `runStatelessStep` — a discriminated union rather than a nullable
+* result, because `null` is exactly what made the camera-bound detail path
+* unable to tell "refused" from "never asked".
+*/
+var RunStatelessStepResultSchema = discriminatedUnion("kind", [object({
+	kind: literal("ran"),
+	/** The node that actually executed it — the pin, echoed back for the log. */
+	nodeId: string(),
+	/**
+	* The model the step ran with.
+	*
+	* The node verified this exact id has a build for the format it dispatched
+	* on BEFORE running, so the executor's format resolution returns it
+	* unchanged. A caller that pinned a model must compare this field and
+	* treat a mismatch as a refusal — the whole point of the pin is that a
+	* pass writes one feature space.
+	*/
+	modelId: string(),
+	details: array(DetailResultSchema)
+}), object({
+	kind: literal("refused"),
+	nodeId: string(),
+	reason: StatelessStepRefusalSchema,
+	/** Human-readable specifics — the format tried, the formats shipped, etc. */
+	detail: string()
+})]);
+/**
 * Per-camera tunable ranges + defaults. Single source of truth used
 * by both the Zod data schema (validation + default fallback) and
 * the device settings UI (slider min/max/step). Touch one place and
@@ -16814,7 +17367,32 @@ method(RunnerCameraConfigSchema, object({ success: literal(true) }), { kind: "mu
 	cropJpeg: string().optional(),
 	parent: DetailParentSchema,
 	steps: array(string()).optional()
-}), object({ details: array(DetailResultSchema) }).nullable(), { kind: "mutation" });
+}), object({ details: array(DetailResultSchema) }).nullable(), { kind: "mutation" }), method(object({
+	/** Catalog step id, e.g. `clip-embedding`. */
+	stepId: string(),
+	/**
+	* REQUIRED model pin. The node runs this exact model or refuses with
+	* `model-not-servable` — it never substitutes a format default, because
+	* a fleet pass that round-robins across nodes would then fill one index
+	* from several encoders.
+	*/
+	modelId: string(),
+	/** FULL FRAME, base64 JPEG. The runner cuts — do NOT pre-crop. */
+	frameJpeg: string(),
+	/**
+	* The subject box, NORMALISED [0,1] against `frameJpeg`. Normalised on
+	* purpose: the caller stores boxes against a downscaled analysis frame
+	* while the stored key frame is native-resolution, and the only side
+	* that reliably knows the image's pixel dimensions is the side that
+	* decodes it. Denormalising here removes a second reader of the
+	* dimensions and the class of mismatch that comes with it.
+	*/
+	bbox: NativeCropBboxSchema,
+	/** Parent class of the subject (`person`, `vehicle`, …) — carried into the result. */
+	className: string(),
+	/** Camera the pixels came from. Diagnostics + log tags ONLY — never routing. */
+	sourceDeviceId: number()
+}), RunStatelessStepResultSchema, { kind: "mutation" });
 var CameraPipelineConfigSchema = object({
 	engine: PipelineEngineChoiceSchema.optional(),
 	steps: array(PipelineStepInputSchema).readonly(),
@@ -17112,6 +17690,20 @@ var CameraStatusSchema = object({
 	detection: CameraDetectionStatusSchema.nullable(),
 	audio: CameraAudioStatusSchema.nullable(),
 	recording: CameraRecordingStatusSchema.nullable(),
+	/**
+	* Per-camera function switches an OPERATOR has turned off
+	* ([D61](../../../../docs/decisions/adr-0067.md)).
+	*
+	* This is the difference between DISABLED and BROKEN. A camera whose
+	* `detection` block reports zero fps and whose `switchedOff` contains
+	* `'object-detection'` was switched off by a person; the same camera with an
+	* empty list is failing. Every status surface must render the two
+	* differently — a quiet camera that looks identical to a dead one is the
+	* silence-reads-as-never-happened trap this repo keeps paying for.
+	*
+	* Empty when nothing is off. Never contains a switch no provider offers.
+	*/
+	switchedOff: array(CameraSwitchIdSchema).readonly(),
 	/** Unix timestamp (ms) when this snapshot was composed server-side. */
 	fetchedAt: number()
 });
@@ -17280,7 +17872,14 @@ method(object({
 }), method(object({
 	deviceId: number(),
 	agentNodeId: string().optional()
-}), CameraPipelineConfigSchema), method(object({ deviceId: number() }), CameraStatusSchema), method(object({ deviceIds: array(number()).optional() }), array(CameraStatusSchema).readonly()), method(_void(), array(PipelineTemplateSchema).readonly()), method(object({
+}), CameraPipelineConfigSchema), method(object({ deviceId: number() }), CameraSwitchGroupSchema), method(object({
+	deviceId: number(),
+	switchId: CameraSwitchIdSchema,
+	enabled: boolean()
+}), CameraSwitchGroupSchema, {
+	kind: "mutation",
+	auth: "admin"
+}), method(object({ deviceId: number() }), CameraStatusSchema), method(object({ deviceIds: array(number()).optional() }), array(CameraStatusSchema).readonly()), method(_void(), array(PipelineTemplateSchema).readonly()), method(object({
 	name: string(),
 	description: string().optional(),
 	config: CameraPipelineConfigSchema
@@ -17633,9 +18232,15 @@ DeviceType.Camera, method(object({
 	* Bypass the cache freshness check and fetch directly from the
 	* native (or stream-broker fallback). Triggered by the UI's
 	* "refresh" button so an operator can force a fresh frame
-	* even when the cache is well within `snapshotMaxAgeMs`.
-	* On battery cams this WILL wake the camera — accept the
-	* cost only when the user explicitly asks for it.
+	* even when the cache is well within the device's
+	* `snapshotMaxAgeS` window.
+	*
+	* **`force` is an OPERATOR signal, not a freshness preference.** On a
+	* battery camera it is the one thing that walks past the wrapper's
+	* sleep gate and wakes the camera, so a background caller — a poller,
+	* an event handler, a thumbnail — must NEVER set it. Every such caller
+	* gets the cached frame, which on a sleeping battery camera is the
+	* correct answer: stale but honest beats woken.
 	*/
 	force: boolean().optional()
 }), SnapshotImageSchema.nullable()), method(object({ deviceId: number() }), _void(), {
@@ -23117,12 +23722,30 @@ var pressureSensorCapability = {
 	runtimeState: PressureSensorStatusSchema
 };
 /**
-* Privacy mask = up to `maxRegions` SHAPES the camera blanks out (NOT a
-* cell grid). Reolink `<shelterList>` zones are rectangles; Hikvision
-* ISAPI `<RegionCoordinatesList>` zones are free polygons (this camera:
-* exactly 4 vertices, not necessarily axis-aligned). The cap composes the
-* shared rect|polygon subset of the MaskShape vocabulary. All coords are
-* normalized 0..1 (top-left origin).
+* PRIVACY — what the camera deliberately does not capture. Two planes:
+*
+*  - **video**: up to `maxRegions` SHAPES the camera blanks out (NOT a cell
+*    grid). Reolink `<shelterList>` zones are rectangles; Hikvision ISAPI
+*    `<RegionCoordinatesList>` zones are free polygons (this camera: exactly
+*    4 vertices, not necessarily axis-aligned). The cap composes the shared
+*    rect|polygon subset of the MaskShape vocabulary. All coords are
+*    normalized 0..1 (top-left origin).
+*  - **audio**: the camera's microphone. `setAudioEnabled(false)` stops the
+*    camera encoding an audio track at all, so EVERY consumer — live view,
+*    recording, the audio analyzer, an export — sees silent video. There is
+*    no server-side copy of this fact; the camera is the store and every read
+*    is a read-through, which is why a switch over it cannot drift
+*    ([D62](../../../../docs/decisions/adr-0062.md)).
+*
+* Both belong here for one reason: they are the two things an operator turns
+* off when the answer to "what is this camera allowed to record" changes, and
+* both are applied ON the device, before anything leaves it.
+*
+* **The audio flag has exactly one writer.** `stream-params` used to carry a
+* per-profile `audio` in its patch schema — reachable from no UI and honoured
+* by one provider — and it was removed when this landed. A second writer onto
+* one device register is the shape of every knob this repo has shipped that
+* disagreed with the one the reader read.
 */
 /** A privacy-mask region's geometry — rectangle or free polygon. */
 var PrivacyMaskShapeSchema = discriminatedUnion("kind", [MaskRectShapeSchema, MaskPolygonShapeSchema]);
@@ -23134,21 +23757,45 @@ var PrivacyMaskRegionSchema = object({
 	enabled: boolean(),
 	shape: PrivacyMaskShapeSchema
 });
-/** Current on-camera privacy-mask state — master enable + zones. */
+/** Current on-camera privacy state — mask master enable + zones + microphone. */
 var PrivacyMaskStatusSchema = object({
 	enabled: boolean(),
 	/** Active zones (normalized 0..1). Length ≤ maxRegions. */
 	regions: array(PrivacyMaskRegionSchema),
+	/**
+	* Is the camera capturing sound right now? Read from the camera, never from
+	* a server-side mirror.
+	*
+	* `null` means "no answer" — either this camera exposes no controllable
+	* microphone (`getOptions().supportsAudioMute === false`) or the read
+	* failed. A consumer must render `null` as UNKNOWN and never as `false`:
+	* "the microphone is off" and "we could not ask" look identical to an
+	* operator only until one of them is wrong.
+	*
+	* On a camera whose profiles carry the flag independently (Reolink writes
+	* it per stream), `true` means AT LEAST ONE profile still carries audio —
+	* privacy is only satisfied when every one of them is silent.
+	*/
+	audioEnabled: boolean().nullable(),
 	lastFetchedAt: number()
 });
-/** Per-camera availability. */
+/** Per-camera availability. Probed, never assumed from the model name. */
 var PrivacyMaskOptionsSchema = object({
 	/** Maximum number of supported zones. */
 	maxRegions: number(),
 	/** Shape kinds this camera accepts — Reolink: ['rect']; Hikvision: ['rect','polygon']. */
 	supportedShapes: array(MaskShapeKindSchema),
 	/** Polygon vertex bounds when 'polygon' is supported (Hikvision: {min:4,max:4}). */
-	polygonVertices: MaskPolygonVerticesSchema.optional()
+	polygonVertices: MaskPolygonVerticesSchema.optional(),
+	/**
+	* Does this camera expose a microphone switch we can actually write?
+	*
+	* Camera-probed: `true` only when the firmware answered with an audio flag
+	* we know how to patch. A camera that never answered is `false` — a control
+	* the operator can press that changes nothing is worse than no control, and
+	* the switch group renders "not available" instead.
+	*/
+	supportsAudioMute: boolean()
 });
 /** Partial change — every field optional. */
 var PrivacyMaskPatchSchema = object({
@@ -23175,6 +23822,27 @@ var privacyMaskCapability = {
 		}), _void(), {
 			kind: "mutation",
 			auth: "admin"
+		}),
+		/**
+		* Turn the camera's microphone on or off, at the camera.
+		*
+		* Deliberately its OWN mutation rather than a field on
+		* {@link PrivacyMaskPatchSchema}: `patch.enabled` already means "the video
+		* mask master switch", and overloading it would make one boolean mean two
+		* unrelated things on the same call. It is also the only method here whose
+		* write leaves the device in a state a later `getStatus` reads back
+		* verbatim, which is what makes it safe as a switch authority.
+		*
+		* A camera whose `getOptions().supportsAudioMute` is false must REJECT
+		* this rather than silently accept it — a write nothing applies is exactly
+		* what the switch group exists to remove.
+		*/
+		setAudioEnabled: method(object({
+			deviceId: number(),
+			enabled: boolean()
+		}), _void(), {
+			kind: "mutation",
+			auth: "admin"
 		})
 	},
 	status: {
@@ -23457,6 +24125,21 @@ var LocateSegmentResultSchema = discriminatedUnion("kind", [object({
 })]);
 /** Raw bytes of one finalized footage segment (read off disk on the recording node). */
 var ReadSegmentBytesResultSchema = object({ data: _instanceof(Uint8Array) });
+/**
+* One GOP of a finalized segment, cut by byte range through the segment's own
+* `mfra` (D31 on the D42 feeder path). `data` is the `ftyp`+`moov` head plus
+* the single `moof`+`mdat` covering the requested instant — standalone-
+* demuxable, never the whole file. When the segment's index cannot be parsed
+* the provider degrades INSIDE the mechanism to the whole segment (still one
+* `data`, `gopStartMs` = the segment start) — a worse read, not another path.
+*/
+var ReadGopBytesResultSchema = object({
+	data: _instanceof(Uint8Array),
+	/** Absolute epoch ms of the returned fragment's first sample. */
+	gopStartMs: number(),
+	/** Media ms the returned fragment covers. */
+	gopDurMs: number()
+});
 method(object({
 	deviceId: number(),
 	fromMs: number(),
@@ -23499,6 +24182,14 @@ method(object({
 }), ReadSegmentBytesResultSchema, {
 	kind: "query",
 	auth: "admin"
+}), method(object({
+	deviceId: number(),
+	profile: string(),
+	startMs: number(),
+	epochMs: number()
+}), ReadGopBytesResultSchema, {
+	kind: "query",
+	auth: "admin"
 }), method(object({
 	deviceId: number(),
 	config: RecordingConfigSchema
@@ -24058,6 +24749,16 @@ var StreamProfileConfigSchema = object({
 		"baseline"
 	]).optional(),
 	gop: number().optional(),
+	/**
+	* Whether THIS profile currently carries an audio track. READ-ONLY here.
+	*
+	* There is no matching field on {@link StreamProfilePatchSchema}: the
+	* camera's microphone is owned by `privacy-mask` (`setAudioEnabled`), which
+	* writes every profile at once so "audio off" means silent everywhere. A
+	* per-profile writer beside it would let a camera be half-muted and would be
+	* a second knob onto one device register — the failure D62 exists to
+	* prevent. Absent when the firmware does not report the flag.
+	*/
 	audio: boolean().optional()
 });
 var StreamParamsStatusSchema = object({
@@ -24098,7 +24799,13 @@ var StreamParamsOptionsSchema = object({
 	ext: StreamProfileOptionsSchema.optional()
 });
 /** A partial change to one profile — every field optional; a provider
-*  ignores fields it doesn't support. */
+*  ignores fields it doesn't support.
+*
+*  There is deliberately NO `audio` here. It existed until 2026-08-07,
+*  reachable from no form and honoured by exactly one provider, while the
+*  camera's microphone is a whole-device fact. It now has one writer,
+*  `privacyMask.setAudioEnabled`, which writes every profile — see
+*  `privacy-mask.cap.ts`. */
 var StreamProfilePatchSchema = object({
 	width: number().optional(),
 	height: number().optional(),
@@ -24111,8 +24818,7 @@ var StreamProfilePatchSchema = object({
 		"main",
 		"baseline"
 	]).optional(),
-	gop: number().optional(),
-	audio: boolean().optional()
+	gop: number().optional()
 });
 var streamParamsCapability = {
 	name: "stream-params",
@@ -28854,6 +29560,12 @@ Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "view"
 	},
+	"notificationRules.listDeviceMutes": {
+		capName: "notification-rules",
+		capScope: "system",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "view"
+	},
 	"notificationRules.listRules": {
 		capName: "notification-rules",
 		capScope: "system",
@@ -28872,6 +29584,12 @@ Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "create"
 	},
+	"notificationRules.setDeviceMuted": {
+		capName: "notification-rules",
+		capScope: "system",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "create"
+	},
 	"notificationRules.setRuleEnabled": {
 		capName: "notification-rules",
 		capScope: "system",
@@ -29148,6 +29866,12 @@ Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "view"
 	},
+	"pipelineAnalytics.setTrackFlags": {
+		capName: "pipeline-analytics",
+		capScope: "device",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "create"
+	},
 	"pipelineAnalytics.wipeAllAnalytics": {
 		capName: "pipeline-analytics",
 		capScope: "device",
@@ -29454,6 +30178,12 @@ Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "view"
 	},
+	"pipelineOrchestrator.getCameraSwitches": {
+		capName: "pipeline-orchestrator",
+		capScope: "system",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "view"
+	},
 	"pipelineOrchestrator.getCapabilityBindings": {
 		capName: "pipeline-orchestrator",
 		capScope: "system",
@@ -29586,6 +30316,12 @@ Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "create"
 	},
+	"pipelineOrchestrator.setCameraSwitch": {
+		capName: "pipeline-orchestrator",
+		capScope: "system",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "create"
+	},
 	"pipelineOrchestrator.setCapabilityBinding": {
 		capName: "pipeline-orchestrator",
 		capScope: "system",
@@ -29676,6 +30412,12 @@ Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "create"
 	},
+	"pipelineRunner.runStatelessStep": {
+		capName: "pipeline-runner",
+		capScope: "system",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "create"
+	},
 	"plateGallery.assignPlate": {
 		capName: "plate-gallery",
 		capScope: "system",
@@ -29808,6 +30550,12 @@ Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "view"
 	},
+	"privacyMask.setAudioEnabled": {
+		capName: "privacy-mask",
+		capScope: "device",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "create"
+	},
 	"privacyMask.setMask": {
 		capName: "privacy-mask",
 		capScope: "device",
@@ -29976,6 +30724,12 @@ Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "create"
 	},
+	"recording.readGopBytes": {
+		capName: "recording",
+		capScope: "system",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "view"
+	},
 	"recording.readSegmentBytes": {
 		capName: "recording",
 		capScope: "system",
@@ -30492,6 +31246,12 @@ Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "create"
 	},
+	"streamBroker.acquireEgressTranscode": {
+		capName: "stream-broker",
+		capScope: "system",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "create"
+	},
 	"streamBroker.assignProfile": {
 		capName: "stream-broker",
 		capScope: "system",
@@ -30600,6 +31360,12 @@ Object.freeze({
 		addonId: null,
 		access: "create"
 	},
+	"streamBroker.releaseEgressTranscode": {
+		capName: "stream-broker",
+		capScope: "system",
+		addonId: null,
+		access: "create"
+	},
 	"streamBroker.releaseStreamWithCodec": {
 		capName: "stream-broker",
 		capScope: "system",
@@ -31430,6 +32196,88 @@ object({
 	paddingRatio: .15,
 	square: false
 }).paddingRatio;
+/**
+* WHICH delivered frames the decode worker retains a native copy of.
+*
+* - `all` — every frame the worker delivered to the runner. The shipped
+*   behaviour, and the only correct one if something can ask for a crop of a
+*   frame the runner never sent to inference.
+* - `inferred` — only the frames the runner ADMITTED to its detection queue.
+*   A native-crop request always names a `frameId` that rode an inference
+*   result, so that is the only set a request can name. How much it drops is
+*   the two-plane governor's admit ratio and nothing else: measured at ~50% on
+*   this cluster, not the ~80% the design sketch assumed, because the governor
+*   was not throttling as hard as the sketch supposed. Read
+*   `leaseAdmitted`/`leaseOffered` off the metrics line for the camera in front
+*   of you rather than quoting a number from here. The newest delivered frame is
+*   croppable regardless — it is still the worker's reserved slot, not a lease —
+*   which covers the one-frame race between a mark and the supersede that
+*   consumes it.
+*/
+var NativeLeaseAdmissionSchema = _enum(["all", "inferred"]);
+object({
+	/**
+	* How long a retained native frame is served before it counts as a miss.
+	*
+	* Must cover the FULL late-crop horizon: detection inference + the
+	* cross-process inference-result hop to hub post-analysis + tracking + the
+	* tRPC crop round-trip back. Below ~500 ms the busiest cameras' subject crops
+	* outrun it and fall back to the ≤640 detection frame; above ~3 s the resident
+	* RAM per busy camera grows linearly with no measured hit-rate gain.
+	*/
+	ttlMs: number().int().min(250).max(1e4),
+	/**
+	* Hard per-decode-worker RAM ceiling for retained native frames, in MB.
+	*
+	* Intended as a SAFETY ceiling with the TTL as the effective cap — but check
+	* which one is actually binding before reasoning from that. At the shipped
+	* 1024 MB and a 2 800 ms TTL, a 4K camera hits the CEILING first (~43 frames
+	* at ~24 MB each) and the TTL never gets to expire anything; `leaseMb` /
+	* `leaseFrames` on the metrics line say which. When the ceiling binds, a
+	* change that admits fewer frames buys retention WINDOW at constant RAM
+	* rather than giving RAM back — lower this knob if RAM is what you wanted.
+	* `0` DISABLES the lease entirely and falls the worker back to the tiny
+	* leak-prone GPU surface ring (~85% crop miss; that is what the lease exists
+	* to replace).
+	*/
+	budgetMb: number().int().min(0).max(4096),
+	/**
+	* Demand window: eager per-frame native retention runs only within this many
+	* ms of the last native-crop request (or of the dial starting).
+	*
+	* `0` means ALWAYS ON — it disables the gate, it does not disable retention.
+	* That is the legacy behaviour that saturated an N100 (24 native-4K downloads
+	* per second on a camera with zero crop demand), so leave it non-zero unless
+	* you are reproducing that.
+	*/
+	activityMs: number().int().min(0).max(12e4),
+	/**
+	* Which delivered frames are retained at all — see
+	* {@link NativeLeaseAdmissionSchema}. This is the only knob of the four that
+	* changes WHAT is kept rather than for how long, so it is also the only one
+	* that can turn a crop that used to hit into a miss. The worker counts every
+	* crop request naming a frame it did NOT see marked
+	* (`leaseUnmarkedCrops` on the session-decode metrics line): a non-zero value
+	* there is the signal that some caller names frames outside the inference set
+	* and that this must go back to `all`.
+	*/
+	admission: NativeLeaseAdmissionSchema
+});
+/**
+* The values in force when the operator has set nothing — byte-for-byte the
+* constants the decode worker shipped with as env-var defaults, so making these
+* settings changed no behaviour on the day it landed.
+*/
+var DEFAULT_NATIVE_LEASE_SETTINGS = {
+	ttlMs: 1200,
+	budgetMb: 1024,
+	activityMs: 15e3,
+	admission: "inferred"
+};
+DEFAULT_NATIVE_LEASE_SETTINGS.ttlMs;
+DEFAULT_NATIVE_LEASE_SETTINGS.budgetMb;
+DEFAULT_NATIVE_LEASE_SETTINGS.activityMs;
+DEFAULT_NATIVE_LEASE_SETTINGS.admission;
 //#endregion
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "BaseAddon", {
 	enumerable: true,
@@ -31557,6 +32405,12 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, "TimelapseRuleSchema", {
 		return TimelapseRuleSchema;
 	}
 });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "TrackSourceSchema", {
+	enumerable: true,
+	get: function() {
+		return TrackSourceSchema;
+	}
+});
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__toESM", {
 	enumerable: true,
 	get: function() {
@@ -31731,6 +32585,12 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, "record", {
 		return record;
 	}
 });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "sleep", {
+	enumerable: true,
+	get: function() {
+		return sleep;
+	}
+});
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "string", {
 	enumerable: true,
 	get: function() {