@calliopelabs/cli 3.5.4 → 3.6.0

package/docs/delegation-ledger.md

@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+# Delegation ledger (`delegation-ledger/v1`)
+
+One parent execution allowance, shared with children that run in other processes or on other
+hosts (#415). The authority is the existing reservation ledger (`src/execution/ledger.ts`):
+requests are charged before dispatch, every ancestor is charged, child accounts come from
+`child_grant` events, original deadlines hold, and unknown outcomes never restore capacity. This
+protocol serves that ledger; it adds no second set of budget rules.
+
+## Placement
+
+The user chooses where a run's ledger lives:
+
+- **local**: the parent CLI serves its own ledger from the user's machine or container.
+- **astrolift**: Astrolift runs the same `calliope ledger serve` as a durable managed service, so
+  children in pods, restarts and disconnects never lose reservations.
+
+Children only receive a URL and a scoped token.
+
+## Serve
+
+```sh
+calliope ledger serve --budget RUNS/<run>/budget --project /path/to/project \
+  --token-file /private/parent.token [--host 127.0.0.1] [--port 0]
+```
+
+It prints `{"protocol":"delegation-ledger/v1","url":...,"runId":...}` once listening. The parent
+token goes to `--token-file` (created new, mode 0600) and is never printed. Server state (signing
+key, grant epochs) lives in a private sibling directory, never inside the budget directory.
+
+## Serve a reviewed native run
+
+```sh
+calliope ledger serve-reviewed --run RUN_ID --agent AGENT_ID \
+  --max-output-tokens 1024 --project /path/to/project \
+  --token-file /private/owner.token
+```
+
+This mode calls `prepareReviewedLedger`, reuses the run's native permission gates,
+original budget, parent funding and deadline, and serves only the selected agent's
+subtree. The token file must be outside the project in a private canonical directory;
+it is created exclusively and never printed. Output includes the owner, original
+deadline and versioned reviewed-host capability. SIGINT/SIGTERM close the listener.
+Failed credential delivery also closes it without replacing an existing file.
+Library hosts can call `prepareReviewedLedger(cwd, runId, agentId, maxOutputTokens,
+options)` for the unbound server and private credential. They control where it listens.
+
+Version 2 credentials bind the owner scope and exact native run review. Older
+servers reject that token version; current raw-ledger endpoints reject its reviewed
+authority binding. Child credentials retain that binding. A sibling owner endpoint
+cannot accept the token, and reservations, settlements and revocations enforce the
+selected subtree. Each new request also checks the target account's native admission,
+stop/escalation state and the host's output cap. Existing requests can still settle
+after owner cancellation; grant revocation and token expiry retain their existing
+semantics.
+
+The HTTP grant operation only returns credentials for an **exact, already admitted**
+native child grant. It cannot create a proposal, approve children, bypass native
+depth/count limits or promote an interrupted ledger grant into the execution graph.
+Use the existing native proposal review/admission flow first. Reissuing a credential
+preserves its account, deadline and all recorded spending; revoked grants stay revoked.
+
+All owners of a run share its private signing key and revocation history. A native
+writer lock serializes revocations from separate processes; only confirmed dead locks
+are reclaimed. Malformed, missing, public or linked revocation/key files are refused.
+New keys initialize an empty revocation history once. A retained legacy key without
+that history requires verified restoration or an explicit owner-managed credential
+rotation; opening it never silently treats missing revocations as an empty history.
+
+This is reviewed ledger hosting, not automatic Cykick/Astrolift enrollment. Remote
+workspace identity, dispatcher credential delivery, task-attempt ownership, transport
+reachability and any narrower Cykick file-mutation policy still need their native
+bindings. A loopback listener does not make a desktop reachable from a remote pod.
+
+## Run a delegated child
+
+A host (Cy, an Astrolift task) grants the child, writes its scoped token to a private file and
+starts a headless run or native ACP process:
+
+```sh
+calliope --headless --json --ledger-url URL --ledger-token-file /private/child.token \
+  --ledger-agent CHILD_ACCOUNT "objective"
+
+calliope acp --ledger-url URL --ledger-token-file /private/child.token \
+  --ledger-agent CHILD_ACCOUNT
+```
+
+The turn runs under `ExecutionGuard` with the parent's ledger: the child's tools, paths, deadline
+and budget come from its grant, and every provider request is reserved and settled with the
+parent. A revoked or unknown grant, or an unreachable parent, stops the child before any turn.
+The three flags go together, using separate flag/value arguments. Partial, repeated,
+unknown or equals-form ledger flags fail before execution; they never select an
+undelegated fallback.
+
+## Operations
+
+`POST /v1/<op>` with `Authorization: Bearer <token>` and a JSON body.
+
+| Op | Who | Effect |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `hello` | any | protocol and operations |
+| `journal` | any | the full hash-chained history (`manifest`, `events`) |
+| `execution` | account owner | verify `{agentId, project: {root, key}}` against the retained owner grant and return its native workspace binding |
+| `reserve` | owner of `reservation.agentId` | charge before dispatch; same id replays the original admission |
+| `settle` | owner of the reserved request | record usage or an outcome; same settlement replays |
+| `grant` | parent, or a child for its own accounts | allocate child accounts; returns the child's scoped token |
+| `revoke` | parent | permanently fence a grant and every descendant |
+
+A token may act for its accounts and their descendants only. A child cannot charge a sibling or
+the root, cannot mint a root allowance, and a revoked grant cannot be reissued. Errors carry the
+ledger's codes (`budget`, `deadline`, `authority`, `conflict`, `limit`, `locked`, `unavailable`).
+
+Admission rechecks token expiry and grant revocation while holding the ledger's
+writer lock, immediately before committing a reservation or nested grant. A
+request queued before revocation cannot acquire authority when the lock opens.
+
+An embedded owner can also supply `createLedgerServer({ledger, cwd, state,
+assertAuthority: execution.assertAuthority})`, using the handle returned by
+`prepareAgentExecution`. The server rechecks this trusted callback before new
+admission and under the writer lock, including grant reissue. Cancelling the
+native reviewed run then fences remote reservations and grants even before a
+coordinator journal exists. Once the journal exists, completing the run or stopping
+the handle's selected agent (or an ancestor) through an explicit stop control also
+fences new work. Reopening the handle does not bypass those controls; an independently active sibling remains
+eligible under its own handle. These checks reuse native execution history.
+The callback is host code, never a request argument.
+The standalone `ledger serve --budget ...` command serves an explicitly selected
+raw ledger; it does not infer a reviewed-run binding.
+
+Owner cancellation, agent stops and run completion still permit authenticated
+journal inspection, replay of an already admitted reservation, and settlement
+of existing requests. These reconcile
+prior work; they do not authorize another provider call. Unknown/cancelled usage
+retains its reserved charge. Token expiry and grant revocation continue to apply
+to every operation, so a revoked child needs its owner to reconcile its requests.
+
+## Client behaviour
+
+`RemoteReservationLedger` gives `ExecutionGuard` the same read/reserve/settle surface as the local
+ledger. It replays and verifies the hash chain itself and refuses any history that is not an
+append-only extension of what it has seen, so a server reset or rollback cannot return spent
+capacity. Writes retry with the same id; if every attempt is lost it inspects the journal, and
+only an outcome the parent recorded counts. Otherwise the result is `unavailable` and nothing is
+authorized (a reservation that was admitted stays charged).
+
+The verified history is checkpointed atomically beneath the client's private
+`root` as `verified-parent/history.json`. Reuse that root after reconnect or
+restart. A missing, damaged, public or linked history file is an error; it is
+never replaced with an empty allowance. Concurrent clients retain the longest
+verified history, so an older response cannot overwrite a newer checkpoint.
+The checkpoint contains no bearer token and never admits a provider request by
+itself. Only the parent service can reserve or settle usage.
+
+Headless and ACP children keep this state under `~/.calliope-cli/delegation-ledgers`,
+keyed by the canonical project, configured token-file location and account. Rotating
+the token or its projected-secret symlink at that location preserves verified history; restarting against a
+rolled-back parent stops before the turn starts. Keep this directory on the
+child's persistent private volume when running in a container. A new configured
+token path is a separate connection, not recovery of the old one. These client
+checkpoints do not by themselves wire Astrolift task admission or cancellation
+to the ledger service.
+
+The shared project budget also retains its reservation while admission is unknown.
+An error releases project capacity only after a confirmed rejection before any
+lost response. Even a fresh journal can lag an in-flight admission. Neither a
+disconnect nor restarting the child restores the reserved project capacity.
+Reservation errors optionally report `admission: refused` when the server has
+verified non-admission after the local operation ends, or `unknown` otherwise.
+Clients retain capacity when talking to older v1 servers that omit this evidence.
+
+## Owner-bound remote workspaces
+
+A copied checkout has a different path and filesystem identity. It cannot use a
+parent grant just because its files look the same. The ledger owner may issue a
+version 2 child grant with `project: {root, key}`, captured using the CLI's
+`projectIdentity()` on the intended child host. The existing proposal hash,
+review revision and native run manifest references remain part of that immutable
+grant. The trusted host must establish the identity and authorize the binding;
+model output or an unauthenticated workspace claim is not sufficient.
+
+Only a parent token may issue these workspace grants. Child-issued version 1
+grants inherit the nearest owner-bound workspace, and cannot change it. Workspace
+grants use reservation event version 5 and projection version 4; existing grant
+events, manifests and hashes are unchanged. A restarted client replays the same
+grant through its retained verified checkpoint.
+
+Headless and ACP invocations negotiate `execution` before starting their turn. The server
+checks the token's account scope, live owner authority and exact project identity.
+The client independently checks the response against the native journal and its
+actual local directory. Missing protocol support, another account, a substituted
+binding or a replaced directory stops execution. Library callers opt in with
+`RemoteReservationLedger.connect({..., execution: {cwd, agentId}})`.
+
+File and brain-path checks use the bound child root and key, with the original
+relative tool/path grants. Filesystem separators are normalized for grant checks;
+parent traversal and symlink aliases remain denied. The immutable source budget
+manifest, account ancestry, reservations and deadline remain on the parent ledger.
+The checkpoint stays outside the child's project, and local project spending
+limits still apply. Binding a folder does not copy files, mount a volume, import
+brain content, install credentials or create another allowance.
+
+The protocol now supports explicit workspace identity binding. Astrolift must
+still establish that identity from its native runtime authority, enroll the task
+under its owner, and connect lifecycle cancellation and funding. The raw ledger
+service and a parent task UUID do not establish those bindings automatically.
+
+`tests/delegation-ledger.test.ts` is the local-host conformance suite: concurrent and nested
+children exhausting one allowance, duplicate dispatch and lost acknowledgements, an unreachable
+parent, restart and rollback, revocation of a child and its descendants, foreign runs, siblings
+and forged tokens, and `ExecutionGuard` admission through the parent.
+
+### Runner capability negotiation
+
+`calliope --version --json` is an offline, credential-free probe.
+`headless: {protocol: 1, delegation: 1, workspaceBinding: 1}` advertises
+NDJSON terminal events, native parent-ledger admission and owner-bound workspace
+validation. Embedders must verify these fields before supplying delegated tasks;
+a matching package version alone does not establish those capabilities. This
+probe does not grant authority: each invocation still negotiates with the live
+parent and validates its token, journal and workspace before inference.
+
+
+### Native ACP session continuity
+
+ACP connects to the parent's ledger before opening its protocol transport. The
+process has one trusted execution context; `session/new` and `session/load` cannot
+replace it through client parameters. `initialize` advertises
+`agentCapabilities._meta.calliopeDelegation` with `version: 1`,
+`workspaceBinding: 1` and `sessionBinding: 1`. A host must negotiate this metadata
+before relying on delegated ACP behavior.
+
+New delegated sessions retain a versioned restriction containing the original
+manifest hash and account ID in private session metadata. Saving a conversation
+or creating a manual/safety branch preserves it. This marker does not mint a
+grant, reserve tokens or confer authority. Loading requires the same live ledger
+and account, an exact workspace match and an unexpired original deadline. A
+plain ACP process cannot load a bound session, and a delegated process cannot
+attach its allowance to old unbound history. The shared turn engine also checks
+the restriction before inference through other clients.
+
+Follow-up prompts use the original account's reservations, costs and clock.
+Native one-time approvals, tool results, cancellation and protocol replay remain
+in use. Automatic project memory/context is filtered through the granted read
+scope before inclusion in the system prompt; project trust alone does not widen
+that scope. Operator-owned global preferences remain trusted configuration.
+
+This is a CLI capability, not completed Astrolift enrollment. The runtime adapter
+must still pass the trusted tuple, retain its task binding across restarts, verify
+the capability and connect owner lifecycle/funding. Retained metadata is a
+restriction within the private store, not protection against an administrator
+rewriting that store or explicitly transferring conversation content elsewhere.
+
+### Private reverse transport for hosted tasks
+
+The execution API exports `LEDGER_TUNNEL_CAPABILITY`, `attachLedgerTunnel` (owner)
+and `listenLedgerTunnel` (task). The owner injects an authenticated, non-replayed
+duplex exec connection; ordinary HTTP framing and backpressure carry only native
+ledger requests. The owner opens no public listener. The task binds its original
+loopback port, and never picks another port after a conflict. This does not yet
+supply an Astrolift websocket endpoint or its task-placement authorization.
+
+Both ends pin the original child credential's SHA-256, reviewed audience, run,
+grant and expiration. Parent/replacement credentials are refused before task
+traffic enters the exec stream. Claims are restrictions, not authentication:
+the existing native server still verifies the signature, current grant, workspace
+and account controls. The owner URL must be its trusted reviewed loopback host;
+requests cannot choose another URL, follow redirects or invoke revocation.
+
+Requests retain the native 256 KiB limit. Responses stream with a 32 MiB bound
+for the bounded journal and envelope. There is one task request in flight;
+heartbeats, request deadlines, stream closure and the original credential expiry
+close both ends on loss of the owner. Bridge failures never assert non-admission.
+The remote ledger retains unknown charges and retries the original request ID.
+
+Reconnect attaches a new authorized stream to the original task port and native
+stores, using the same credential and child checkpoint. It must not mint another
+grant or replace a task binding. The trusted host must revalidate task identity,
+placement and caller access through `assertConnection`, and abort the connection
+when that lease ends. Do not use terminal replay, chat events or logs for these
+streams: request headers contain the child bearer credential. The API performs
+no task enrollment, credential persistence, scheduling or independent accounting.
+
+### Live execution authority
+
+A retained journal proves accounting history, not current permission to execute.
+Delegated clients revalidate the exact account and workspace through `execution`
+before model requests and tool effects, and again before committing staged file
+bytes. Revoked grants, stopped owners and an unreachable authority refuse further
+work even when cached history is readable. Reconciliation reads do not restore
+execution permission or release unresolved reservations.
+
+
+### Runnable host conformance example
+
+Run `npm run test:reviewed-host` from the source checkout. The example at
+`scripts/qualification/reviewed-host.mjs` creates a reviewed native run, serves
+its parent ledger over HTTP and launches two concurrent built headless CLI
+processes with separate account-scoped credentials against a deterministic local
+inference endpoint. Each account ledger is also served by its own CLI process,
+which is stopped and recreated during the restart check. Both children settle
+into one parent allowance. Retained unknown requests then exhaust that allowance;
+a host restart preserves them, and real CLI invocations refuse exhausted,
+foreign-workspace, sibling-account and cancelled authority without another
+inference request.
+It uses private disposable configuration and makes no paid provider requests.
+
+To qualify a standalone artifact built from the same source:
+
+```sh
+npm run build
+bun packaging/build-binary.mjs --native
+CALLIOPE_REVIEWED_HOST_BINARY="$PWD/packaging/dist/calliope-native" \
+  node scripts/qualification/reviewed-host.mjs
+```
+
+To qualify an extracted npm tarball with its production dependencies installed,
+set `CALLIOPE_REVIEWED_HOST_PACKAGE` to that package directory instead. Both the
+host library and all child processes then use the extracted package. The package
+and standalone-binary options are mutually exclusive.
+
+The executable reports its tested artifact type and invariant results as JSON.
+This is a local HTTP host example, not a deployed Astrolift acceptance test.
+Use `delegation-ledger/v1`, reviewed host capability version 1 and the headless
+capability tuple above; a matching package version alone is insufficient.
+The current CLI entry point requests a 4096-token output limit, so the reviewed
+host and discovered model must both permit that bound. Lower output caps are
+available to library callers through `DelegatedExecutionOptions.maxOutputTokens`.
+The existing ledger, workspace and session suites cover nested grants, lost
+acknowledgments, rollback and approval/session replay; those are separate from
+this example's process-level assertions.

package/docs/migration-assessment.md

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+# Read-only migration assessment
+
+`calliope migration assess --repository /path/to/clone --request request.json --json`
+produces a feasibility report, rulebook and work manifest from a pinned source
+inventory and supplied pilot evidence. It does not run scripts, invoke Docker,
+start workers, create a workflow, write project artifacts or propose brain changes.
+Save the returned JSON through the project's authorized artifact owner when wanted.
+
+`migration assessment-schema` returns the request/report JSON Schemas.
+`migration review-assessment --request request.json` validates the request and
+returns its digest without reading a repository. Schemas describe structure;
+runtime validation also checks normalized paths, ownership and cross-references.
+The assessment CLI exits 0 when it produced a report, including `investigate` or
+`do-not-migrate`. Read `recommendation`; exit 0 is not a migration approval.
+
+## Request and inventory
+
+The versioned request records:
+
+- Source commit and authorized literal read paths, target adapter/stack/runtime.
+- Port, redesign or incremental-upgrade intent, motivation, compatibility
+  obligations, deployment constraints and success criteria.
+- USD budget in integer micros, duration limit and maximum concurrency.
+- The rulebook's exact commit/path/blob, unique source/target unit ownership,
+  explicit source-file dependencies, risk and rationale, and reasoned exclusions.
+- Up to 16 pilot plan/report pairs with separately evidenced implementation,
+  verification and review measurements. Measurements bind the exact report digest.
+
+One request is bounded to 2 MiB, 128 units, 128 exclusions and 64 read prefixes.
+All repository reads use the existing bounded committed inventory. The repository
+is canonicalized before asynchronous work; moving a path alias cannot redirect
+later reads. Evidence pins outside the selected read scope are reported without
+reading them. Hosts must supply a scope already authorized for the user/task.
+
+Every selected source file must be owned by a unit or explicitly excluded. Original
+tests, build configuration, manifests and lockfiles remain listed in the rulebook.
+The assessment identifies unsupported adapter/runtime/unit shapes, unavailable
+sources, uncovered code, external dependencies, declared package cycles and unit
+cycles. Unit dependencies must include declared local-package ordering. This is
+declaration analysis, not an import parser or proof of dynamic dependency coverage.
+
+The current adapter supports self-contained `.mjs` to `.mts` CLI ports on the pinned
+Node 24 runtime. A redesign or incremental upgrade requires a different plan;
+passing old CLI cases does not make it a structure-preserving port. Unsupported
+scope yields `do-not-migrate` **for this plan and adapter**, not a general claim
+that the selected technology or a migration is unsuitable.
+
+## Evidence and independent host review
+
+Each pilot goes through [saved evidence review](migration-verification.md#review-saved-observations).
+The assessment then checks every source, candidate, negative-control and rules pin
+against actual committed blobs. Self-consistent JSON with invented Git pins is not
+enough. Changed source, rules, runtime, cases or pilot accounting require a new
+assessment and review. Missing or nonpassing baselines, known-failure checks or
+candidate observations remain findings, regardless of a host's acceptance.
+
+Library hosts call `assessMigration(repository, request, { signal, implementation, review })`.
+`implementation` contains `kitSha256` and `verifierSha256`, supplied by the trusted
+host from its installed kit artifact and the verifier that produced the pilot
+evidence. These exact identities join the logical versions in the report, review
+digest and unit bindings. Missing identities prevent `go`; request JSON cannot
+supply them as authority. The host must check these hashes against its own
+installation and evidence-producer records, not blindly copy a client's claims.
+The optional `review` callback is trusted host code, never deserialized request
+data. It receives the canonical repository, request, inventory digest, findings
+and a digest binding that exact review context. The host must verify evidence
+provenance, behavioral/compatibility coverage, risk classification, representative
+pilot selection and measurement receipts through its owning records. It returns
+`{ decision: 'accepted' | 'rejected', receipt: 'opaque-review-reference' }`.
+
+Callbacks get a detached copy and cannot rewrite the assessment's inputs or
+findings. A rejection, invalid receipt, unavailable review or absent host callback
+prevents `go`. The standalone CLI deliberately has no flag that turns an authored
+JSON report into independent review authority; it can still complete a read-only
+assessment and return the work to investigate. A future native host adapter must
+resolve review receipts through its existing authenticated owner.
+
+`go` means the supported, pinned plan has no unresolved assessment findings and
+its pilot evidence/coverage has been accepted by that host. It does not mean all
+manifest units were migrated or verified. Every unit remains `planned`. Neither
+the output digest nor an opaque review reference is portable authentication or
+execution permission. A workflow owner must validate current bindings and its own
+authority before dispatch; merely loading this report must never start work.
+
+## Measured ranges and work artifacts
+
+Every populated risk group, including high-risk units, requires a passing pilot,
+with representativeness checked by the host. The manifest shows coverage by risk
+group; one passing example does not establish coverage of every unit. A measurement
+records total pilot cost, work time (implementation plus verification), independent
+review time and an accounting evidence ID. Zero billed cost is valid for an
+evidenced local fixture; missing measurements are not represented as zero.
+
+Only accepted, fully qualified evidence produces estimates. Cost bounds multiply
+the observed pilot minimum/maximum by the exact manifest unit count. Lower time
+uses concurrency and dependency depth, then serial review; upper time assumes
+serial work and review. These are explicit extrapolation assumptions, not
+statistical confidence intervals. Unmeasured deployment, external data migration
+and operating costs are excluded. A lower bound over budget yields
+`do-not-migrate`; an overlapping range yields `investigate`.
+
+The manifest has stable source-path unit IDs, deterministic dependency ordering
+or cycle components, exact source blobs, per-unit binding digests and pilot
+references. Binding digests conservatively include the complete assessment inputs,
+including source/config/rules, logical revisions and exact kit/verifier hashes. A changed plan
+requires re-review; this version does not claim minimal per-unit invalidation or
+resume reconciliation. Execution must honor the pinned worker package artifact.
+
+The evidence storage plan names a project-relative directory, assessment/rulebook/
+manifest files and per-unit pin, verification, accounting and review artifacts.
+`written: false` makes its status explicit. Native Astrolift project/agent bindings,
+artifact persistence, conversational setup, reviewed compatibility exceptions,
+rule-update replay and resumable execution remain separate host integration work.

package/docs/migration-example-plan.json

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+{
+  "format": "calliope.migration.verification-plan/v1",
+  "adapter": "javascript-to-typescript-cli/v1",
+  "verifier": "byte-parity-v1",
+  "runtime": {
+    "image": "sha256:55fb5f5a527ea2c5c4a95f963e48ef90aa38c7b346054fdc8ee9957a2b55d205",
+    "node": "v24.22.1"
+  },
+  "source": {
+    "revision": "54bdcbfa6e40806cd709736e448bd50c453799ea",
+    "path": "source.mjs",
+    "object": "b96c6972d5a4bfc7e1c52fea78ba340ff24b97c5"
+  },
+  "negative": {
+    "revision": "54bdcbfa6e40806cd709736e448bd50c453799ea",
+    "path": "negative.mts",
+    "object": "0d6091a5c5d47ed8b4c97b7f74f296853fcc09a0"
+  },
+  "rules": {
+    "revision": "54bdcbfa6e40806cd709736e448bd50c453799ea",
+    "path": "RULES.md",
+    "object": "ece25894441e04857adea069e792b6f622fb2e7b"
+  },
+  "cases": [
+    {
+      "id": "positive",
+      "argument": "[1,2,3]",
+      "expected": {
+        "exitCode": 0,
+        "stdout": "{\"sum\":6,\"count\":3}\n",
+        "stderr": ""
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "empty",
+      "argument": "[]",
+      "expected": {
+        "exitCode": 0,
+        "stdout": "{\"sum\":0,\"count\":0}\n",
+        "stderr": ""
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "negative-values",
+      "argument": "[-2,5]",
+      "expected": {
+        "exitCode": 0,
+        "stdout": "{\"sum\":3,\"count\":2}\n",
+        "stderr": ""
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "invalid-type",
+      "argument": "[\"1\"]",
+      "expected": {
+        "exitCode": 2,
+        "stdout": "",
+        "stderr": "Expected an array of safe integers.\n"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "invalid-json",
+      "argument": "not-json",
+      "expected": {
+        "exitCode": 2,
+        "stdout": "",
+        "stderr": "Invalid JSON.\n"
+      }
+    }
+  ],
+  "negativeControl": {
+    "caseId": "positive",
+    "expected": {
+      "exitCode": 0,
+      "stdout": "{\"sum\":9,\"count\":3}\n",
+      "stderr": ""
+    }
+  },
+  "limits": {
+    "commandTimeoutMs": 10000,
+    "totalMs": 120000
+  },
+  "candidate": {
+    "revision": "f4732441c67d285f5005ac0afb25d412c2d74f93",
+    "path": "candidate.mts",
+    "object": "4b551e05cce761a68a30a20207c47add9a9f4eff"
+  }
+}