@calimero-network/mero-js 19.27.0 → 19.27.1

package/dist/index.browser.mjs.map

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "version": 3,
   "sources": ["../src/http-client/signal-utils.ts", "../src/http-client/web-client.ts", "../src/http-client/http-factory.ts", "../src/http-client/retry.ts", "../src/auth-api/auth-client.ts", "../src/auth-api/auth-factory.ts", "../src/capabilities.ts", "../src/admin-api/admin-client.ts", "../src/admin-api/admin-types.ts", "../src/admin-api/admin-factory.ts", "../src/auth/index.ts", "../src/crypto/internal.ts", "../src/request/request-sig.ts", "../src/request/caller-proof.ts", "../src/request/proof-signer.ts", "../src/rpc/index.ts", "../src/events/group.ts", "../src/events/sse.ts", "../src/events/ws.ts", "../src/ephemeral/codec.ts", "../src/ephemeral/index.ts", "../src/device-cert/device-cert.ts", "../src/account/wordlist.ts", "../src/account/account.ts", "../src/cloud/routing-proof.ts", "../src/cloud/cloud-client.ts", "../src/mero-js.ts", "../src/token-store/index.ts", "../src/warrant/warrant.ts", "../src/relay/relay-client.ts", "../src/relay/nonce-source.ts", "../src/sealed/noise.ts", "../src/sealed/sealed.ts", "../src/cloud/connect.ts", "../src/sealed/verify.ts", "../src/namespace-op/namespace-op.ts", "../src/login/login.ts", "../src/login/session.ts", "../src/nodeDiscovery.ts"],
-  "sourcesContent": ["// Utility for combining multiple AbortSignals\nexport function combineSignals(\n  signals: Array<AbortSignal | undefined>,\n): AbortSignal | undefined {\n  const list = signals.filter(Boolean) as AbortSignal[];\n  if (list.length === 0) return undefined;\n\n  // Prefer native any(), but fall back if unavailable or it throws\n  const AbortSignalAny = AbortSignal as {\n    any?: (signals: AbortSignal[]) => AbortSignal;\n  };\n  if (typeof AbortSignalAny.any === 'function') {\n    try {\n      return AbortSignalAny.any(list);\n    } catch {\n      // Fall through to manual implementation\n    }\n  }\n\n  const controller = new AbortController();\n  const onAbort = (evt: Event) => {\n    controller.abort((evt.target as AbortSignal).reason);\n    for (const s of list) s.removeEventListener('abort', onAbort);\n  };\n\n  for (const s of list) {\n    if (s.aborted) return AbortSignal.abort(s.reason);\n    s.addEventListener('abort', onAbort, { once: true });\n  }\n\n  return controller.signal;\n}\n\n// Helper to create a timeout signal\nexport function createTimeoutSignal(timeoutMs: number): AbortSignal {\n  // Use AbortSignal.timeout if available (Node 18.17+, modern browsers)\n  if (typeof AbortSignal.timeout === 'function') {\n    return AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs);\n  }\n\n  // Fallback for older environments\n  const controller = new AbortController();\n  setTimeout(() => {\n    controller.abort(new DOMException('Timeout', 'TimeoutError'));\n  }, timeoutMs);\n\n  return controller.signal;\n}\n", "// ErrorResponse import removed as it's not used\nimport {\n  HttpClient,\n  Transport,\n  RequestOptions,\n  ResponseParser,\n} from './http-types.js';\nimport { combineSignals, createTimeoutSignal } from './signal-utils.js';\n\n/**\n * `x-auth-error` reasons that mean the whole token family is gone.\n *\n * Refresh tokens are single-use (calimero-network/core#3083): presenting a\n * consumed refresh token is treated as token theft and the server revokes the\n * family. Refreshing or retrying afterwards is pointless \u2014 the only way out is\n * a fresh login.\n */\nconst TERMINAL_AUTH_ERRORS = new Set(['token_reuse', 'token_revoked']);\n\n/**\n * Pull the node's explanation out of an error body. Core answers every handled\n * failure with `{\"error\": \"<message>\"}` (`ApiError::into_response`); the nested\n * `{\"error\": {\"message\": ...}}` form is what proxies in front of a node emit.\n * Returns undefined for a non-JSON, empty, or envelope-less body.\n */\nfunction extractErrorMessage(bodyText?: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!bodyText) return undefined;\n  try {\n    const body = JSON.parse(bodyText) as { error?: unknown; detail?: unknown };\n    const error = body?.error;\n    if (typeof error === 'string' && error.trim() !== '') return error;\n    const nested = (error as { message?: unknown } | null)?.message;\n    if (typeof nested === 'string' && nested.trim() !== '') return nested;\n    // FastAPI's spelling, which is what every Calimero Cloud route answers\n    // with. Without it a manager's carefully worded refusal \u2014 \"ownership is\n    // recorded, but the account is not linked\" \u2014 reached callers as a bare\n    // \"HTTP 403\", and the one thing they could do about it was invisible.\n    const detail = body?.detail;\n    if (typeof detail === 'string' && detail.trim() !== '') return detail;\n  } catch {\n    // Not JSON \u2014 the status line is all we can honestly report.\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n// Custom error class for HTTP errors\nexport class HTTPError extends Error {\n  name = 'HTTPError';\n\n  constructor(\n    public status: number,\n    public statusText: string,\n    public url: string,\n    public headers: Headers,\n    public bodyText?: string, // cap at ~64KB\n  ) {\n    const explanation = extractErrorMessage(bodyText);\n    super(\n      explanation\n        ? `HTTP ${status} ${statusText}: ${explanation}`\n        : `HTTP ${status} ${statusText}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  toJSON(): {\n    status: number;\n    statusText: string;\n    url: string;\n    headers: Record<string, string>;\n    bodyText?: string;\n  } {\n    return {\n      status: this.status,\n      statusText: this.statusText,\n      url: this.url,\n      headers: headersToRecord(this.headers),\n      bodyText: this.bodyText,\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Terminal authentication error: the refresh-token family was revoked (single-use\n * refresh token replayed, or the token was explicitly revoked). Never retried and\n * never refreshed \u2014 apps should catch this and force a re-login.\n *\n * Extends {@link HTTPError} so existing `instanceof HTTPError` handling keeps working.\n */\nexport class AuthRevokedError extends HTTPError {\n  name = 'AuthRevokedError';\n\n  constructor(\n    /** Value of the `x-auth-error` header, e.g. `token_reuse` or `token_revoked`. */\n    public reason: string,\n    status: number,\n    statusText: string,\n    url: string,\n    headers: Headers,\n    bodyText?: string,\n  ) {\n    super(status, statusText, url, headers, bodyText);\n    this.message = `Authentication revoked (${reason}): HTTP ${status} ${statusText}`;\n  }\n}\n\n// Helper function to convert Headers to Record\nfunction headersToRecord(headers: Headers): Record<string, string> {\n  const record: Record<string, string> = {};\n  headers.forEach((value, key) => {\n    record[key] = value;\n  });\n  return record;\n}\n\n// Web Standards HTTP client implementation\n/**\n * The path a node will verify a request signature against.\n *\n * `new URL` drops the query and keeps any prefix the base URL contributed,\n * which is exactly what reaches the server. The fallback covers a `url` that is\n * already relative \u2014 it cannot be parsed, and signing the whole string with its\n * query attached would be worse than signing the part before the `?`.\n */\nfunction pathForProof(url: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(url).pathname;\n  } catch {\n    const query = url.indexOf('?');\n    return query === -1 ? url : url.slice(0, query);\n  }\n}\n\nexport class WebHttpClient implements HttpClient {\n  // Cache for concurrent refresh token calls to prevent race conditions\n  private refreshTokenPromise: Promise<string> | null = null;\n  // Cache for concurrent onTokenRefresh calls to prevent duplicate callbacks\n  private onTokenRefreshPromise: Promise<void> | null = null;\n  \n  constructor(private transport: Transport) {}\n\n  async get<T>(path: string, init?: RequestOptions): Promise<T> {\n    return this.request<T>(path, { ...init, method: 'GET' });\n  }\n\n  async post<T>(\n    path: string,\n    body?: unknown,\n    init?: RequestOptions,\n  ): Promise<T> {\n    return this.request<T>(path, {\n      ...init,\n      method: 'POST',\n      body: body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,\n      headers: {\n        'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n        ...init?.headers,\n      },\n    });\n  }\n\n  async put<T>(\n    path: string,\n    body?: unknown,\n    init?: RequestOptions,\n  ): Promise<T> {\n    return this.request<T>(path, {\n      ...init,\n      method: 'PUT',\n      body: body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,\n      headers: {\n        'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n        ...init?.headers,\n      },\n    });\n  }\n\n  async delete<T>(path: string, init?: RequestOptions): Promise<T> {\n    return this.request<T>(path, { ...init, method: 'DELETE' });\n  }\n\n  async patch<T>(\n    path: string,\n    body?: unknown,\n    init?: RequestOptions,\n  ): Promise<T> {\n    return this.request<T>(path, {\n      ...init,\n      method: 'PATCH',\n      body: body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,\n      headers: {\n        'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n        ...init?.headers,\n      },\n    });\n  }\n\n  async head(\n    path: string,\n    init?: RequestOptions,\n  ): Promise<{ headers: Record<string, string>; status: number }> {\n    const response = await this.makeRequest<Response>(path, {\n      ...init,\n      method: 'HEAD',\n      parse: 'response',\n    });\n    return {\n      headers: headersToRecord(response.headers),\n      status: response.status,\n    };\n  }\n\n  async request<T>(path: string, init?: RequestOptions): Promise<T> {\n    return this.makeRequest<T>(path, init);\n  }\n\n  private async makeRequest<T>(\n    path: string,\n    init?: RequestOptions,\n    retryCount = 0,\n    requestStartTime?: number,\n  ): Promise<T> {\n    // Maximum retry attempts to prevent infinite loops\n    const MAX_RETRY_ATTEMPTS = 1;\n    const url = this.buildUrl(path);\n    \n    // Track request start time for timeout calculation (only on first attempt)\n    // Use per-request start time to avoid corruption from concurrent requests\n    const startTime = requestStartTime ?? Date.now();\n    // Note: Tauri proxy script now handles AbortSignal, so we can use full RequestInit\n    // Removed Tauri-specific minimal path - proxy script handles AbortSignal properly\n    const signal = this.createAbortSignal(init);\n    const headers = await this.buildHeaders(init?.headers);\n    let headersObj: Record<string, string>;\n    if (headers instanceof Headers) {\n      headersObj = {};\n      headers.forEach((value, key) => {\n        headersObj[key] = value;\n      });\n    } else {\n      headersObj = headers;\n    }\n    \n    const requestInit: RequestInit = {\n      method: init?.method || 'GET',\n      headers: headersObj,\n    };\n    \n    // Check if body is a stream (ReadableStream) that can't be reused\n    // Note: Blob is reusable, so it's not included here\n    const isStreamBody = init?.body instanceof ReadableStream ||\n                        (typeof init?.body === 'object' && init?.body !== null && 'getReader' in init.body && !(init.body instanceof Blob));\n    \n    if (init?.body !== undefined && !isStreamBody) {\n      requestInit.body = init.body;\n    } else if (init?.body !== undefined && isStreamBody && retryCount === 0) {\n      // Only include stream body on first attempt - can't retry with streams\n      requestInit.body = init.body;\n    }\n    \n    // For retries, calculate remaining timeout to prevent timeout reset\n    // Track elapsed time and use remaining timeout for retry\n    // Note: This is calculated before the request, so it doesn't include token refresh time\n    // The actual remaining timeout check happens after token refresh completes\n    let retrySignal: AbortSignal | undefined;\n    if (retryCount > 0 && requestStartTime !== undefined) {\n      const timeoutMs = init?.timeoutMs || this.transport.timeoutMs;\n      if (timeoutMs) {\n        // Calculate elapsed time (will be recalculated after token refresh if needed)\n        const elapsed = Date.now() - startTime;\n        const remaining = Math.max(0, timeoutMs - elapsed);\n        // Create signal with remaining timeout, preserving user's signal\n        retrySignal = this.createAbortSignal({ ...init, timeoutMs: remaining });\n      } else {\n        // No timeout, just preserve user's signal\n        retrySignal = this.createAbortSignal(init);\n      }\n    } else {\n      retrySignal = signal;\n    }\n    \n    if (retrySignal) {\n      requestInit.signal = retrySignal;\n    }\n    \n    if (this.transport.credentials !== undefined) {\n      requestInit.credentials = this.transport.credentials;\n    }\n    \n    if (init?.mode !== undefined) {\n      requestInit.mode = init.mode;\n    }\n    if (init?.cache !== undefined) {\n      requestInit.cache = init.cache;\n    }\n    if (init?.redirect !== undefined) {\n      requestInit.redirect = init.redirect;\n    }\n    if (init?.referrer !== undefined) {\n      requestInit.referrer = init.referrer;\n    }\n    if (init?.referrerPolicy !== undefined) {\n      requestInit.referrerPolicy = init.referrerPolicy;\n    }\n    if (init?.integrity !== undefined) {\n      requestInit.integrity = init.integrity;\n    }\n    if (init?.keepalive !== undefined) {\n      requestInit.keepalive = init.keepalive;\n    }\n\n    // Signed here rather than in `buildHeaders`, which sees neither the method\n    // nor the body \u2014 and a proof commits to both. Signed AFTER the body is\n    // settled above, so what is hashed is what is sent.\n    //\n    // The path comes from the built URL's `pathname`, not from the `path`\n    // argument: that argument may carry a query string, and may be relative to\n    // a base URL that contributes its own prefix. The node verifies against the\n    // path it received, so the only safe source is the URL actually being\n    // fetched. A query string is deliberately not covered \u2014 core's `RequestSig`\n    // signs the path alone, and signing more here would fail every request.\n    if (this.transport.getProof) {\n      const proof = await this.transport.getProof({\n        method: requestInit.method ?? 'GET',\n        path: pathForProof(url),\n        body: requestInit.body,\n      });\n      if (proof) {\n        headersObj['X-Calimero-Proof'] = proof;\n      }\n    }\n\n    try {\n      const response = await this.transport.fetch(url, requestInit);\n\n      if (!response.ok) {\n        const bodyText = await this.getBodyText(response);\n        const httpError = new HTTPError(\n          response.status,\n          response.statusText,\n          url,\n          response.headers,\n          bodyText,\n        );\n\n        // Handle a revoked token family (single-use refresh token replayed, or an\n        // explicitly revoked token). This is terminal: refreshing would only burn\n        // another token and retrying would 401 again, so clear the tokens via the\n        // onAuthRevoked hook and surface a distinguishable error.\n        const authError = response.headers.get('x-auth-error');\n        if (\n          (response.status === 401 || response.status === 403) &&\n          authError &&\n          TERMINAL_AUTH_ERRORS.has(authError)\n        ) {\n          // Any in-flight refresh is based on a now-dead family \u2014 drop the caches.\n          this.refreshTokenPromise = null;\n          this.onTokenRefreshPromise = null;\n\n          if (this.transport.onAuthRevoked) {\n            try {\n              await this.transport.onAuthRevoked();\n            } catch {\n              // Never mask the auth error with a cleanup failure.\n            }\n          }\n\n          throw new AuthRevokedError(\n            authError,\n            response.status,\n            response.statusText,\n            url,\n            response.headers,\n            bodyText,\n          );\n        }\n\n        // Handle 401 with token_expired - attempt automatic token refresh\n        const userAborted = init?.signal?.aborted === true;\n        if (\n          response.status === 401 &&\n          this.transport.refreshToken &&\n          authError === 'token_expired' &&\n          retryCount < MAX_RETRY_ATTEMPTS &&\n          !isStreamBody &&\n          !userAborted\n        ) {\n          try {\n            // Use cached refresh promise if one is in progress (prevents race conditions)\n            let refreshPromise = this.refreshTokenPromise;\n            if (!refreshPromise) {\n              refreshPromise = this.transport.refreshToken();\n              this.refreshTokenPromise = refreshPromise;\n            }\n            \n            // Attempt to refresh the token\n            const newToken = await refreshPromise;\n            \n            // Validate token - must be non-empty\n            if (!newToken || newToken.trim() === '') {\n              // Clear caches on error\n              this.refreshTokenPromise = null;\n              this.onTokenRefreshPromise = null;\n              throw new Error('Refresh token returned empty token');\n            }\n            \n            // onTokenRefresh is required when refreshToken is provided\n            // Without it, the new token cannot be stored and getAuthToken() will return the old token\n            if (!this.transport.onTokenRefresh) {\n              // Clear caches on error\n              this.refreshTokenPromise = null;\n              this.onTokenRefreshPromise = null;\n              throw new Error(\n                'onTokenRefresh callback is required when refreshToken is provided. ' +\n                'The callback must update the token storage so getAuthToken() returns the new token.'\n              );\n            }\n            \n            // Use cached onTokenRefresh promise if one is in progress (prevents duplicate callbacks)\n            // This ensures onTokenRefresh is only called once per token refresh, even with concurrent requests\n            let onTokenRefreshPromise = this.onTokenRefreshPromise;\n            if (!onTokenRefreshPromise) {\n              onTokenRefreshPromise = this.transport.onTokenRefresh(newToken);\n              this.onTokenRefreshPromise = onTokenRefreshPromise;\n            }\n            \n            // Update token via callback (only called once per refresh, even with concurrent requests)\n            // Errors from onTokenRefresh callback should be preserved (don't mask as 401)\n            // This helps developers debug token storage issues\n            await onTokenRefreshPromise;\n            \n            // Clear caches after both refresh and callback complete\n            this.refreshTokenPromise = null;\n            this.onTokenRefreshPromise = null;\n            \n            // Check if timeout has expired during token refresh\n            // If so, throw the original 401 error instead of retrying with 0ms timeout\n            // This prevents timeout/abort errors that obscure the root cause (expired token)\n            const timeoutMs = init?.timeoutMs || this.transport.timeoutMs;\n            if (timeoutMs && requestStartTime !== undefined) {\n              const elapsed = Date.now() - startTime;\n              const remaining = timeoutMs - elapsed;\n              if (remaining <= 0) {\n                // Timeout expired during token refresh - throw original 401 error\n                // This is better than retrying with 0ms timeout which would cause confusing timeout errors\n                throw httpError;\n              }\n            }\n            \n            // Retry the request with the new token (increment retry count)\n            // Preserve user's abort signal and start time in retry\n            return this.makeRequest<T>(path, init, retryCount + 1, startTime);\n          } catch (refreshError) {\n            // Clear caches on error\n            this.refreshTokenPromise = null;\n            this.onTokenRefreshPromise = null;\n            // Configuration errors (missing onTokenRefresh) should be thrown as-is\n            if (refreshError instanceof Error && refreshError.message.includes('onTokenRefresh')) {\n              throw refreshError;\n            }\n            // Errors from onTokenRefresh callback are already thrown above, so if we get here,\n            // it's either a refreshToken() failure or empty token - throw original 401\n            // This matches the PR description: \"If refresh fails, throws the original 401 error\"\n            throw httpError;\n          }\n        }\n\n        throw httpError;\n      }\n\n      return this.parseResponse<T>(response, init?.parse);\n    } catch (error) {\n      if (error instanceof HTTPError) {\n        throw error;\n      }\n      // Preserve configuration errors (like missing onTokenRefresh)\n      if (error instanceof Error && error.message.includes('onTokenRefresh')) {\n        throw error;\n      }\n      throw new HTTPError(\n        0,\n        'Network Error',\n        url,\n        new Headers(),\n        error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error',\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  private buildUrl(path: string): string {\n    // Handle absolute URLs\n    if (path.startsWith('http://') || path.startsWith('https://')) {\n      return path;\n    }\n\n    // Handle baseUrl with path\n    const baseUrl = this.transport.baseUrl;\n    if (path.startsWith('/')) {\n      // If path starts with /, combine with baseUrl\n      const base = baseUrl.endsWith('/') ? baseUrl.slice(0, -1) : baseUrl;\n      return `${base}${path}`;\n    } else {\n      // If path doesn't start with /, append to baseUrl\n      const base = baseUrl.endsWith('/') ? baseUrl : `${baseUrl}/`;\n      return `${base}${path}`;\n    }\n  }\n\n  private createAbortSignal(init?: RequestOptions): AbortSignal | undefined {\n    const signals: AbortSignal[] = [];\n\n    if (this.transport.defaultAbortSignal) {\n      signals.push(this.transport.defaultAbortSignal);\n    }\n\n    if (init?.signal) {\n      signals.push(init.signal);\n    }\n\n    const timeoutMs = init?.timeoutMs || this.transport.timeoutMs;\n    if (timeoutMs) {\n      signals.push(createTimeoutSignal(timeoutMs));\n    }\n\n    return signals.length > 0 ? combineSignals(signals) : undefined;\n  }\n\n  private async buildHeaders(\n    initHeaders?: HeadersInit,\n  ): Promise<Record<string, string>> {\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n      ...this.transport.defaultHeaders,\n    };\n\n    // Add auth token if available and not empty\n    if (this.transport.getAuthToken) {\n      try {\n        const token = await this.transport.getAuthToken();\n        if (token && token.trim() !== '') {\n          headers.Authorization = `Bearer ${token}`;\n        }\n      } catch (error) {\n        // Ignore auth token errors\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Add init headers\n    if (initHeaders) {\n      if (initHeaders instanceof Headers) {\n        initHeaders.forEach((value, key) => {\n          headers[key] = value;\n        });\n      } else if (Array.isArray(initHeaders)) {\n        initHeaders.forEach(([key, value]) => {\n          headers[key] = value;\n        });\n      } else {\n        Object.assign(headers, initHeaders);\n      }\n    }\n\n    return headers;\n  }\n\n  private async parseResponse<T>(\n    response: Response,\n    parse?: ResponseParser,\n  ): Promise<T> {\n    switch (parse) {\n      case 'text':\n        return (await response.text()) as T;\n      case 'blob':\n        return (await response.blob()) as T;\n      case 'arrayBuffer':\n        return (await response.arrayBuffer()) as T;\n      case 'response':\n        return response as T;\n      case 'json':\n      default: {\n        // Tolerate empty 2xx bodies (e.g. 204 No Content from delete/resync):\n        // `response.json()` throws on '', so read text and return null when empty.\n        const text = await response.text();\n        if (!text) return null as T;\n        try {\n          return JSON.parse(text) as T;\n        } catch {\n          // Non-JSON body on a 2xx (e.g. an HTML error page) \u2014 surface a clear\n          // error with a snippet instead of a bare SyntaxError.\n          throw new Error(\n            `Expected a JSON response (status ${response.status}) but body was not JSON: ${text.slice(0, 200)}`,\n          );\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  private async getBodyText(response: Response): Promise<string> {\n    try {\n      const text = await response.text();\n      return text.length > 65536 ? text.slice(0, 65536) + '...' : text;\n    } catch {\n      return '';\n    }\n  }\n}\n", "import { WebHttpClient } from './web-client.js';\nimport { Transport, HttpClient } from './http-types.js';\n\n// Factory function to create HTTP client with sensible defaults\nexport function createHttpClient(transport: Transport): HttpClient {\n  return new WebHttpClient(transport);\n}\n\n// Factory function for browser environments\nexport function createBrowserHttpClient(options: {\n  baseUrl: string;\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  getAuthToken?: () => Promise<string | undefined>;\n  getProof?: Transport['getProof'];\n  onTokenRefresh?: (newToken: string) => Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Callback to refresh the access token when a 401 error with 'token_expired' is detected.\n   * Should return the new access token, or throw an error if refresh fails.\n   * If provided, the client will automatically retry the request after a successful refresh.\n   */\n  refreshToken?: () => Promise<string>;\n  /**\n   * Callback invoked when the server reports a revoked token family\n   * (`x-auth-error: token_reuse` / `token_revoked`). Terminal \u2014 the request is\n   * never retried; clear stored tokens and force a re-login.\n   */\n  onAuthRevoked?: () => Promise<void> | void;\n  defaultHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  credentials?: RequestCredentials;\n  defaultAbortSignal?: AbortSignal;\n}): HttpClient {\n  const transport: Transport = {\n    // globalThis.fetch must be called as a method on globalThis, not through a\n    // variable, or browsers throw \"Illegal invocation\".\n    fetch: (url: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) =>\n      options.fetch ? options.fetch(url, init) : globalThis.fetch(url, init),\n    baseUrl: options.baseUrl,\n    getAuthToken: options.getAuthToken,\n    getProof: options.getProof,\n    onTokenRefresh: options.onTokenRefresh,\n    refreshToken: options.refreshToken,\n    onAuthRevoked: options.onAuthRevoked,\n    defaultHeaders: options.defaultHeaders,\n    timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs,\n    credentials: options.credentials, // No default credentials\n    defaultAbortSignal: options.defaultAbortSignal,\n  };\n\n  return createHttpClient(transport);\n}\n\n// Factory function for Node.js environments\nexport function createNodeHttpClient(options: {\n  baseUrl: string;\n  fetch?: typeof fetch; // Allow injection of undici.fetch or other fetch implementations\n  getAuthToken?: () => Promise<string | undefined>;\n  getProof?: Transport['getProof'];\n  onTokenRefresh?: (newToken: string) => Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Callback to refresh the access token when a 401 error with 'token_expired' is detected.\n   * Should return the new access token, or throw an error if refresh fails.\n   * If provided, the client will automatically retry the request after a successful refresh.\n   */\n  refreshToken?: () => Promise<string>;\n  /**\n   * Callback invoked when the server reports a revoked token family\n   * (`x-auth-error: token_reuse` / `token_revoked`). Terminal \u2014 the request is\n   * never retried; clear stored tokens and force a re-login.\n   */\n  onAuthRevoked?: () => Promise<void> | void;\n  defaultHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  credentials?: RequestCredentials;\n  defaultAbortSignal?: AbortSignal;\n}): HttpClient {\n  // Use provided fetch or try to use global fetch (Node 18+)\n  const fetchImpl = options.fetch ?? globalThis.fetch;\n\n  if (!fetchImpl) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'No fetch implementation available. Please provide a fetch implementation ' +\n        '(e.g., undici.fetch) or use Node.js 18+ which has native fetch support.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Check if we're using the default globalThis.fetch to preserve context\n  // When fetchImpl is globalThis.fetch, we must call it directly, not through a variable\n  // Custom fetch implementations (like undici.fetch) can be called through the variable\n  const isDefaultFetch = fetchImpl === globalThis.fetch;\n\n  const transport: Transport = {\n    // Wrap fetch in arrow function to prevent \"Illegal invocation\" error\n    // For globalThis.fetch, call it directly to preserve 'this' context\n    // For custom implementations, calling through the variable is safe\n    fetch: isDefaultFetch\n      ? (url: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => globalThis.fetch(url, init)\n      : (url: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => fetchImpl(url, init),\n    baseUrl: options.baseUrl,\n    getAuthToken: options.getAuthToken,\n    getProof: options.getProof,\n    onTokenRefresh: options.onTokenRefresh,\n    refreshToken: options.refreshToken,\n    onAuthRevoked: options.onAuthRevoked,\n    defaultHeaders: options.defaultHeaders,\n    timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs,\n    credentials: options.credentials, // Node.js doesn't have default credentials\n    defaultAbortSignal: options.defaultAbortSignal,\n  };\n\n  return createHttpClient(transport);\n}\n\n// Universal factory that works in both environments\nexport function createUniversalHttpClient(options: {\n  baseUrl: string;\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  getAuthToken?: () => Promise<string | undefined>;\n  getProof?: Transport['getProof'];\n  onTokenRefresh?: (newToken: string) => Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Callback to refresh the access token when a 401 error with 'token_expired' is detected.\n   * Should return the new access token, or throw an error if refresh fails.\n   * If provided, the client will automatically retry the request after a successful refresh.\n   */\n  refreshToken?: () => Promise<string>;\n  /**\n   * Callback invoked when the server reports a revoked token family\n   * (`x-auth-error: token_reuse` / `token_revoked`). Terminal \u2014 the request is\n   * never retried; clear stored tokens and force a re-login.\n   */\n  onAuthRevoked?: () => Promise<void> | void;\n  defaultHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  credentials?: RequestCredentials;\n  defaultAbortSignal?: AbortSignal;\n}): HttpClient {\n  // Try to detect environment and use appropriate factory\n  if (typeof window !== 'undefined') {\n    // Browser environment\n    return createBrowserHttpClient(options);\n  } else {\n    // Node.js environment\n    return createNodeHttpClient(options);\n  }\n}\n", "// Retry helper for HTTP requests\nexport interface RetryOptions {\n  attempts?: number;\n}\n\n// Error types for retry logic\ninterface ErrorWithName extends Error {\n  name: string;\n}\n\ninterface ErrorWithStatus extends Error {\n  status: number;\n}\n\ninterface ErrorWithHeaders extends Error {\n  headers?: Headers;\n}\n\n// Default retry condition - retry on network errors and 5xx status codes\nfunction defaultRetryCondition(error: Error, attempt: number): boolean {\n  // Don't retry on the last attempt\n  if (attempt <= 0) return false;\n\n  // Distinguish timeout vs. user abort:\n  // - Timeout: name === 'TimeoutError' (per spec/platforms)\n  // - User abort: name === 'AbortError'\n  const errorWithName = error as ErrorWithName;\n  const name = errorWithName?.name;\n  if (name === 'TimeoutError') return true;\n  if (name === 'AbortError') return false;\n\n  // HTTP 5xx and 429 (including HTTPError from web-client)\n  const errorWithStatus = error as ErrorWithStatus;\n  if (\n    'status' in errorWithStatus &&\n    typeof errorWithStatus.status === 'number'\n  ) {\n    const status = errorWithStatus.status;\n    return status >= 500 || status === 429;\n  }\n  // Network TypeError (DNS/reset) is reasonably retryable\n  if (name === 'TypeError') return true;\n\n  return false;\n}\n\n// Calculate delay with exponential backoff and jitter\nfunction calculateDelay(attempt: number): number {\n  const baseDelayMs = 250; // Base 250ms as per spec\n  const delay = baseDelayMs * Math.pow(2, attempt - 1);\n\n  // Add \u00B120% jitter to reduce stampedes\n  const jitter = (Math.random() - 0.5) * 0.4 * delay;\n  return Math.max(0, delay + jitter);\n}\n\n// Retry helper function with new signature\nexport async function withRetry<T>(\n  fn: (attempt: number) => Promise<T>,\n  options: RetryOptions = {},\n): Promise<T> {\n  const { attempts = 3 } = options;\n\n  let lastError: Error | undefined;\n\n  for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= attempts; attempt++) {\n    try {\n      return await fn(attempt);\n    } catch (error) {\n      lastError = error as Error;\n\n      // Check if we should retry (this handles the last attempt check)\n      if (!defaultRetryCondition(lastError, attempts - attempt)) {\n        throw lastError;\n      }\n\n      // Calculate delay\n      let delayMs = calculateDelay(attempt);\n\n      // Check for Retry-After header if it's an HTTP error\n      const errorWithHeaders = lastError as ErrorWithHeaders;\n      const hdrs = errorWithHeaders.headers;\n      const retryAfter = hdrs?.get?.('Retry-After');\n      if (retryAfter) {\n        // If it's a number, treat as seconds\n        const seconds = parseInt(retryAfter, 10);\n        if (!isNaN(seconds)) {\n          delayMs = Math.max(delayMs, seconds * 1000);\n        } else {\n          // If it's a date, calculate the difference\n          const date = new Date(retryAfter);\n          if (!isNaN(date.getTime())) {\n            const waitTime = Math.max(0, date.getTime() - Date.now());\n            // Cap wait at 60s per attempt as per spec\n            delayMs = Math.max(delayMs, Math.min(waitTime, 60000));\n          }\n        }\n      }\n\n      // Wait before retrying\n      await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, delayMs));\n    }\n  }\n\n  throw lastError || new Error('Retry failed without error');\n}\n\n// Helper to create a retry-enabled HTTP client method\nexport function createRetryableMethod<T extends unknown[], R>(\n  method: (...args: T) => Promise<R>,\n  retryOptions: RetryOptions = {},\n) {\n  return async (...args: T): Promise<R> => {\n    return withRetry(() => method(...args), retryOptions);\n  };\n}\n", "import { HttpClient } from '../http-client/index.js';\nimport {\n  // Common types\n  ApiResponse,\n  // Health and Status\n  HealthResponse,\n  IdentityResponse,\n  ProvidersResponse,\n  // Authentication\n  TokenRequest,\n  TokenResponse,\n  RefreshTokenRequest,\n  // Mock Token (testing)\n  MockTokenRequest,\n  // Token Management\n  RevokeTokenRequest,\n  RevokeTokenResponse,\n  // Key Management\n  CreateKeyRequest,\n  CreateKeyResponse,\n  DeleteKeyResponse,\n  RootKey,\n  // Client Management\n  ClientKey,\n  GenerateClientKeyRequest,\n  DeleteClientResponse,\n  // Permissions\n  PermissionResponse,\n  UpdateKeyPermissionsRequest,\n} from './auth-types.js';\n\nexport class AuthApiClient {\n  constructor(private httpClient: HttpClient) {}\n\n  // Health and Status Endpoints\n  async getHealth(): Promise<HealthResponse> {\n    const response =\n      await this.httpClient.get<ApiResponse<HealthResponse>>('/auth/health');\n    if (!response.data) {\n      throw new Error('Health response data is null');\n    }\n    return response.data;\n  }\n\n  async getIdentity(): Promise<IdentityResponse> {\n    const response =\n      await this.httpClient.get<ApiResponse<IdentityResponse>>(\n        '/admin/identity',\n      );\n    if (!response.data) {\n      throw new Error('Identity response data is null');\n    }\n    return response.data;\n  }\n\n  async getProviders(): Promise<ProvidersResponse> {\n    const response =\n      await this.httpClient.get<ApiResponse<ProvidersResponse>>(\n        '/auth/providers',\n      );\n    if (!response.data) {\n      throw new Error('Providers response data is null');\n    }\n    return response.data;\n  }\n\n  // Authentication Endpoints\n  async getLoginPage(): Promise<string> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<string>('/auth/login', { parse: 'text' });\n  }\n\n  async generateTokens(request: TokenRequest): Promise<TokenResponse> {\n    return this.httpClient.post<TokenResponse>('/auth/token', request);\n  }\n\n  async refreshToken(request: RefreshTokenRequest): Promise<TokenResponse> {\n    return this.httpClient.post<TokenResponse>('/auth/refresh', request);\n  }\n\n  async generateMockTokens(request: MockTokenRequest): Promise<TokenResponse> {\n    return this.httpClient.post<TokenResponse>('/auth/mock-token', request);\n  }\n\n  async validateToken(token: string): Promise<{\n    valid: boolean;\n    headers: Record<string, string>;\n    status: number;\n  }> {\n    try {\n      const response = await this.validateTokenGet(token);\n      return {\n        valid: response.status === 200,\n        headers: response.headers,\n        status: response.status,\n      };\n    } catch (error) {\n      return {\n        valid: false,\n        headers: {},\n        status: 401,\n      };\n    }\n  }\n\n  async validateTokenGet(\n    token: string,\n  ): Promise<{ status: number; headers: Record<string, string> }> {\n    const response = await this.httpClient.head('/auth/validate', {\n      headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },\n    });\n    return {\n      status: response.status,\n      headers: response.headers,\n    };\n  }\n\n  // Token Management Endpoints\n  // NOTE: node auth status lives on AdminApiClient.isAuthed() (/admin-api/is-authed);\n  // there is no /auth/is-authed on the auth service.\n  async revokeTokens(\n    request: RevokeTokenRequest,\n  ): Promise<RevokeTokenResponse> {\n    const response = await this.httpClient.post<ApiResponse<RevokeTokenResponse>>(\n      '/admin/revoke',\n      request,\n    );\n    if (!response.data) {\n      throw new Error('Revoke tokens response data is null');\n    }\n    return response.data;\n  }\n\n  // Key Management Endpoints\n  async listRootKeys(): Promise<RootKey[]> {\n    const response =\n      await this.httpClient.get<ApiResponse<RootKey[]>>('/admin/keys');\n    if (!response.data) {\n      throw new Error('Root keys response data is null');\n    }\n    return response.data;\n  }\n\n  async createRootKey(request: CreateKeyRequest): Promise<CreateKeyResponse> {\n    const response = await this.httpClient.post<ApiResponse<CreateKeyResponse>>(\n      '/admin/keys',\n      request,\n    );\n    if (!response.data) {\n      throw new Error('Create root key response data is null');\n    }\n    return response.data;\n  }\n\n  async deleteRootKey(keyId: string): Promise<DeleteKeyResponse> {\n    return this.httpClient.delete<DeleteKeyResponse>(`/admin/keys/${keyId}`);\n  }\n\n  // Client Management Endpoints\n  async listClientKeys(): Promise<ClientKey[]> {\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<ApiResponse<ClientKey[]>>(\n      '/admin/keys/clients',\n    );\n    if (!response.data) {\n      throw new Error('Client keys response data is null');\n    }\n    return response.data;\n  }\n\n  async generateClientKey(\n    request: GenerateClientKeyRequest,\n  ): Promise<TokenResponse> {\n    return this.httpClient.post<TokenResponse>('/admin/client-key', request);\n  }\n\n  async deleteClientKey(\n    keyId: string,\n    clientId: string,\n  ): Promise<DeleteClientResponse> {\n    return this.httpClient.delete<DeleteClientResponse>(\n      `/admin/keys/${keyId}/clients/${clientId}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Permission Management Endpoints\n  async getKeyPermissions(keyId: string): Promise<PermissionResponse> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<PermissionResponse>(\n      `/admin/keys/${keyId}/permissions`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  async updateKeyPermissions(\n    keyId: string,\n    changes: UpdateKeyPermissionsRequest,\n  ): Promise<PermissionResponse> {\n    // Core expects an { add, remove } delta, not a { permissions } replacement.\n    return this.httpClient.put<PermissionResponse>(\n      `/admin/keys/${keyId}/permissions`,\n      { add: changes.add, remove: changes.remove },\n    );\n  }\n}\n", "import { AuthApiClient } from './auth-client.js';\nimport { AuthApiClientConfig } from './auth-types.js';\nimport { HttpClient } from '../http-client/index.js';\n\n// Mock HTTP client for testing\nclass MockHttpClient implements HttpClient {\n  async get<T>(): Promise<T> {\n    throw new Error(\n      'HTTP client not implemented - use createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient with a real HTTP client',\n    );\n  }\n  async post<T>(): Promise<T> {\n    throw new Error(\n      'HTTP client not implemented - use createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient with a real HTTP client',\n    );\n  }\n  async put<T>(): Promise<T> {\n    throw new Error(\n      'HTTP client not implemented - use createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient with a real HTTP client',\n    );\n  }\n  async delete<T>(): Promise<T> {\n    throw new Error(\n      'HTTP client not implemented - use createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient with a real HTTP client',\n    );\n  }\n  async patch<T>(): Promise<T> {\n    throw new Error(\n      'HTTP client not implemented - use createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient with a real HTTP client',\n    );\n  }\n  async head(): Promise<{ headers: Record<string, string>; status: number }> {\n    throw new Error(\n      'HTTP client not implemented - use createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient with a real HTTP client',\n    );\n  }\n  async request<T>(): Promise<T> {\n    throw new Error(\n      'HTTP client not implemented - use createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient with a real HTTP client',\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n// Factory functions for creating Auth API clients\nexport function createBrowserAuthApiClient(\n  _config: AuthApiClientConfig,\n): AuthApiClient {\n  const httpClient = new MockHttpClient();\n  return new AuthApiClient(httpClient);\n}\n\nexport function createNodeAuthApiClient(\n  _config: AuthApiClientConfig,\n): AuthApiClient {\n  const httpClient = new MockHttpClient();\n  return new AuthApiClient(httpClient);\n}\n\nexport function createAuthApiClient(\n  _config: AuthApiClientConfig,\n): AuthApiClient {\n  const httpClient = new MockHttpClient();\n  return new AuthApiClient(httpClient);\n}\n\nexport function createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient(\n  httpClient: HttpClient,\n  _config: AuthApiClientConfig,\n): AuthApiClient {\n  return new AuthApiClient(httpClient);\n}\n", "// Member capability bitmask constants \u2014 mirrors core's `MemberCapabilities`\n// (crates/context/config/src/lib.rs). The value stored per-member is a u32\n// bitmask. Core currently assigns bits 0..=9; bits 10 and above are unassigned\n// and may be claimed by future core versions, so an application MUST NOT\n// assume any particular bit is safe for its own use unless core documents it\n// as reserved for applications.\n\n/**\n * Capability bits as defined by core's `MemberCapabilities`.\n *\n * The per-member value is a u32 bitmask. Core currently assigns bits 0..=9\n * (the entries below); bits 10 and above are unassigned \u2014 do not repurpose\n * them for application data, as a future core release may claim them.\n */\nexport const CAPABILITIES = {\n  CAN_CREATE_CONTEXT: 1 << 0,\n  CAN_INVITE_MEMBERS: 1 << 1,\n  CAN_JOIN_OPEN_SUBGROUPS: 1 << 2,\n  MANAGE_MEMBERS: 1 << 3,\n  MANAGE_APPLICATION: 1 << 4,\n  CAN_CREATE_SUBGROUP: 1 << 5,\n  CAN_DELETE_SUBGROUP: 1 << 6,\n  CAN_MANAGE_VISIBILITY: 1 << 7,\n  CAN_MANAGE_METADATA: 1 << 8,\n  /**\n   * Publish writes attributed to ANOTHER member, under a warrant that member\n   * signed \u2014 the grant delegated execution runs on.\n   *\n   * Implied by nothing: not by membership, not by admin, and not propagated by\n   * the subgroup-admit cascade. So every group is authorship-closed until an\n   * admin sets this bit, and a relay without it is refused at\n   * `performIntent` before anything executes. That is why it is worth naming\n   * here rather than leaving callers to write `1 << 9`: a client granting it\n   * has to be able to say what it is granting.\n   */\n  CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF: 1 << 9,\n} as const;\n\nexport type CapabilityName = keyof typeof CAPABILITIES;\nexport type CapabilityBit = (typeof CAPABILITIES)[CapabilityName];\n\n/**\n * Returns true if `mask` has every bit of `cap` set. Both operands are\n * coerced to unsigned 32-bit (`>>> 0`) before comparing so a high bit such\n * as `1 << 31` doesn't fall foul of `&` yielding a signed result.\n */\nexport function hasCap(mask: number, cap: number): boolean {\n  const capU32 = cap >>> 0;\n  return ((mask & capU32) >>> 0) === capU32;\n}\n\n/** Returns `mask` with every bit of `cap` set (u32-normalized). */\nexport function withCap(mask: number, cap: number): number {\n  return (mask | cap) >>> 0;\n}\n\n/** Returns `mask` with every bit of `cap` cleared (u32-normalized). */\nexport function withoutCap(mask: number, cap: number): number {\n  return (mask & ~cap) >>> 0;\n}\n", "import { HttpClient, withRetry } from '../http-client/index.js';\nimport { CAPABILITIES, hasCap, withCap } from '../capabilities.js';\nimport type {\n  HealthStatus,\n  ReadinessStatus,\n  AdminAuthStatus,\n  InstallApplicationRequest,\n  InstallApplicationResponseData,\n  InstallDevApplicationRequest,\n  UninstallApplicationResponseData,\n  ListApplicationsResponseData,\n  GetApplicationResponseData,\n  ApplicationVersionEntry,\n  GetApplicationAbiResponseData,\n  GetLatestVersionResponseData,\n  ListPackagesResponseData,\n  ListVersionsResponseData,\n  RegistryBundleManifest,\n  CreateContextRequest,\n  CreateContextResponseData,\n  DeleteContextResponseData,\n  GetContextsResponseData,\n  Context,\n  GenerateContextIdentityResponseData,\n  GetContextIdentitiesResponseData,\n  JoinContextResponseData,\n  JoinSubgroupInheritanceResponseData,\n  ContextGroupResponseData,\n  ContextStorageResponseData,\n  InviteSpecializedNodeRequest,\n  InviteSpecializedNodeResponseData,\n  UpdateContextApplicationRequest,\n  ResyncContextRequest,\n  ResyncContextResponseData,\n  ContextsWithExecutorsResponseData,\n  UploadBlobRequest,\n  UploadBlobResponseData,\n  DeleteBlobResponseData,\n  ListBlobsResponseData,\n  GetBlobInfoResponseData,\n  BlobReadOptions,\n  CreateContextAliasRequest,\n  CreateApplicationAliasRequest,\n  CreateDeviceAliasRequest,\n  CreateAliasResponseData,\n  LookupAliasResponseData,\n  DeleteAliasResponseData,\n  ListAliasesResponseData,\n  ListNamespacesResponseData,\n  CreateNamespaceRequest,\n  CreateNamespaceResponseData,\n  DeleteNamespaceResponseData,\n  CreateNamespaceInvitationRequest,\n  CreateNamespaceInvitationResponseData,\n  CreateRecursiveInvitationResponseData,\n  JoinNamespaceRequest,\n  JoinNamespaceResponseData,\n  CreateGroupInNamespaceRequest,\n  CreateGroupInNamespaceResponseData,\n  SubgroupEntry,\n  Namespace,\n  NamespaceIdentity,\n  NodeIdentity,\n  AccountPairInitRequest,\n  AccountPairInitResponseData,\n  AccountPairCompleteRequest,\n  AccountPairCompleteResponseData,\n  AccountSignWithRootRequest,\n  AccountSignWithRootResponseData,\n  RelinkDeviceRequest,\n  RelinkDeviceResponseData,\n  RescopeDeviceRequest,\n  RescopeDeviceResponseData,\n  LabelDeviceRequest,\n  LabelDeviceResponseData,\n  AccountDeviceEntry,\n  AccountApplicationEntry,\n  RevokeAccountDeviceRequest,\n  RevokeAccountDeviceResponseData,\n  GroupInfoResponseData,\n  CreateGroupRequest,\n  CreateGroupResponseData,\n  DeleteGroupResponseData,\n  ListGroupMembersResponseData,\n  ListGroupContextsResponseData,\n  AddGroupMembersRequest,\n  RemoveGroupMembersRequest,\n  UpdateMemberRoleRequest,\n  MemberCapabilities,\n  SetMemberCapabilitiesRequest,\n  SetDefaultCapabilitiesRequest,\n  SetMemberAutoFollowRequest,\n  SetSubgroupVisibilityRequest,\n  SetTeeAdmissionPolicyRequest,\n  GetTeeAdmissionPolicyResponseData,\n  SetTeeAuthoringPolicyRequest,\n  SetGroupMetadataRequest,\n  SetMemberMetadataRequest,\n  SetContextMetadataRequest,\n  MetadataRecord,\n  GetMetadataResponseData,\n  SyncGroupResponseData,\n  UpgradeGroupRequest,\n  UpgradeGroupResponseData,\n  GroupUpgradeStatusResponseData,\n  MigrationStatus,\n  CascadeStatusEntry,\n  RetryGroupUpgradeResponseData,\n  ReparentGroupRequest,\n  ReparentGroupResponseData,\n  IssueOwnershipProofRequest,\n  IssueNamespaceOwnershipProofRequest,\n  IssueOwnershipProofResponseData,\n  CreateGroupInvitationRequest,\n  CreateGroupInvitationResponseData,\n  CreateRecursiveGroupInvitationResponseData,\n  JoinGroupRequest,\n  JoinGroupResponseData,\n  TeeInfoResponseData,\n  TeeAttestRequest,\n  TeeAttestResponseData,\n  TeeVerifyQuoteRequest,\n  TeeVerifyQuoteResponseData,\n  PerformIntentRequest,\n  PerformIntentResponseData,\n  IntentRelayInfo,\n  QueryContextRequest,\n  QueryContextResponseData,\n  ListMemberDevicesOptions,\n  ListMemberDevicesResponseData,\n  SealToAccountRequest,\n  SealedEnvelope,\n  AdmitJoinRequest,\n  AdmitJoinResponseData,\n} from './admin-types.js';\n\n/**\n * Helper: server wraps most responses in `{ data: T }`.\n * This extracts `.data` so callers get the inner payload directly. Null-safe so an\n * empty 2xx body (parsed as null) yields undefined instead of throwing.\n */\nfunction unwrap<T>(response: { data: T }): T {\n  return response?.data as T;\n}\n\n/**\n * Compare two version strings by SemVer 2.0 precedence, ascending: negative if\n * `a < b`, positive if `a > b`, `0` if equal. Build metadata (`+...`) is stripped\n * and ignored. The numeric `major.minor.patch` core is compared field-by-field\n * (numerically when both parse, so `1.10.0 > 1.9.0`; a missing field is `0`). A\n * version WITH a pre-release ranks below the same core without one, and\n * pre-release identifiers compare per spec: dot-separated, numeric identifiers\n * numerically, alphanumeric lexically by ASCII, numeric below alphanumeric, and a\n * shorter set of identifiers loses when all preceding fields are equal.\n */\nexport function compareSemver(a: string, b: string): number {\n  const [coreA, preA] = splitVersion(a);\n  const [coreB, preB] = splitVersion(b);\n\n  const na = coreA.split('.');\n  const nb = coreB.split('.');\n  const n = Math.max(na.length, nb.length);\n  for (let i = 0; i < n; i++) {\n    const c = compareSemverId(na[i] ?? '0', nb[i] ?? '0');\n    if (c !== 0) return c;\n  }\n\n  // A pre-release ranks below the same core version with no pre-release.\n  if (preA === undefined && preB === undefined) return 0;\n  if (preA === undefined) return 1;\n  if (preB === undefined) return -1;\n\n  const pa = preA.split('.');\n  const pb = preB.split('.');\n  const m = Math.max(pa.length, pb.length);\n  for (let i = 0; i < m; i++) {\n    if (i >= pa.length) return -1; // shorter set loses when all preceding equal\n    if (i >= pb.length) return 1;\n    const c = compareSemverId(pa[i], pb[i]);\n    if (c !== 0) return c;\n  }\n  return 0;\n}\n\n/** Drop build metadata and split the pre-release tail: `1.2.3-rc.1+b` -> `['1.2.3', 'rc.1']`. */\nfunction splitVersion(v: string): [string, string | undefined] {\n  const core = v.split('+', 1)[0];\n  const dash = core.indexOf('-');\n  return dash === -1 ? [core, undefined] : [core.slice(0, dash), core.slice(dash + 1)];\n}\n\n/**\n * Compare one identifier: numerically when both are all-digits, else lexically by\n * ASCII with a numeric identifier ranking below an alphanumeric one. Fallback: a\n * non-numeric core component (loose/malformed input) is treated as a string, so\n * comparison never throws.\n */\nfunction compareSemverId(a: string, b: string): number {\n  const na = /^\\d+$/.test(a);\n  const nb = /^\\d+$/.test(b);\n  if (na && nb) {\n    const d = Number(a) - Number(b);\n    return d < 0 ? -1 : d > 0 ? 1 : 0;\n  }\n  if (na) return -1;\n  if (nb) return 1;\n  return a < b ? -1 : a > b ? 1 : 0;\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch a URL from the (foreign-origin) registry with a per-attempt timeout and\n * retry on transient failures. Deliberately NOT routed through the node\n * `HttpClient`: that client attaches the node's bearer token to every request,\n * which must never leak to the registry's origin. Each attempt times out after\n * ~10s; network errors and 5xx are retried (2 retries, short backoff via the\n * shared `withRetry`), while a 4xx is a definitive answer and is not retried.\n * `kind`/`context` shape the error message so failures stay debuggable in logs.\n */\nasync function fetchRegistry(url: string, kind: string, context: string): Promise<Response> {\n  return withRetry(\n    async () => {\n      const resp = await fetch(url, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000) });\n      if (!resp.ok) {\n        // Carry `status` so withRetry retries 5xx but leaves 4xx to throw.\n        const err = new Error(\n          `registry ${kind} fetch failed (${resp.status}) for ${context}`,\n        ) as Error & { status: number };\n        err.status = resp.status;\n        throw err;\n      }\n      return resp;\n    },\n    { attempts: 3 },\n  );\n}\n\nexport class AdminApiClient {\n  constructor(private httpClient: HttpClient) {}\n\n  // ---- Health and Status (public, no auth) ----\n\n  async healthCheck(): Promise<HealthStatus> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: HealthStatus }>('/admin-api/health'));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Whether the node has finished starting and its store answers. Public, like\n   * {@link healthCheck}; unlike it, a node that is up but not ready answers\n   * `503`, which this surfaces as an `HTTPError` whose body names the stage.\n   */\n  async readinessCheck(): Promise<ReadinessStatus> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ReadinessStatus }>('/admin-api/ready'));\n  }\n\n  async isAuthed(): Promise<AdminAuthStatus> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<AdminAuthStatus>('/admin-api/is-authed');\n  }\n\n  // ---- Application Management ----\n\n  /**\n   * Install a published application by its `package@version` coordinates. The\n   * node resolves and fetches them from its own configured `[registry]`, so no\n   * URL is passed and none is accepted. A 502 means the node's source has\n   * nothing published at those coordinates. This is the discrete \"download\"\n   * step an Updates flow pairs with a subsequent `upgradeGroup`.\n   */\n  async installApplication(request: InstallApplicationRequest): Promise<InstallApplicationResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.post<{ data: InstallApplicationResponseData }>('/admin-api/install-application', request));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * List a package's published versions from the registry, newest-first by\n   * semver. Reads the registry's V2 bundle listing\n   * (`GET {registry}/api/v2/bundles?package={package}`), taking each bundle's\n   * `appVersion`. Registry-side data \u2014 distinct from the node's\n   * installed-version list \u2014 and the source an Updates view compares against\n   * the running `Context.applicationVersion` to detect \"a new version exists\".\n   */\n  async getRegistryVersions(registryUrl: string, packageName: string): Promise<string[]> {\n    const url = new URL('/api/v2/bundles', new URL(registryUrl).origin);\n    url.searchParams.set('package', packageName);\n    const resp = await fetchRegistry(url.toString(), 'versions', packageName);\n    const bundles = (await resp.json()) as RegistryBundleManifest[];\n    return (Array.isArray(bundles) ? bundles : [])\n      .map((b) => b.appVersion)\n      .filter((v): v is string => typeof v === 'string')\n      .sort((a, b) => compareSemver(b, a));\n  }\n\n  async installDevApplication(request: InstallDevApplicationRequest): Promise<InstallApplicationResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.post<{ data: InstallApplicationResponseData }>('/admin-api/install-dev-application', request));\n  }\n\n  async uninstallApplication(appId: string): Promise<UninstallApplicationResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.delete<{ data: UninstallApplicationResponseData }>(`/admin-api/applications/${appId}`));\n  }\n\n  async listApplications(): Promise<ListApplicationsResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ListApplicationsResponseData }>('/admin-api/applications'));\n  }\n\n  async getApplication(appId: string): Promise<GetApplicationResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: GetApplicationResponseData }>(`/admin-api/applications/${appId}`));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Installed-blob inventory for an application \u2014 one entry per locally installed\n   * version. This is the *installed* inventory (source for a \"pick a version to\n   * pin\" UI); the registry equivalent is `listPackageVersions`.\n   */\n  async listApplicationVersions(applicationId: string): Promise<ApplicationVersionEntry[]> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ApplicationVersionEntry[] }>(`/admin-api/applications/${applicationId}/versions`),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The application's embedded `wasm-abi/1` manifest. Omit `serviceName` for\n   * single-service apps; core 400s if the ABI is absent or the name is ambiguous.\n   */\n  async getApplicationAbi(applicationId: string, serviceName?: string): Promise<GetApplicationAbiResponseData> {\n    const query = serviceName ? `?service_name=${encodeURIComponent(serviceName)}` : '';\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.get<{ data: GetApplicationAbiResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/applications/${applicationId}/abi${query}`,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  // ---- Package Management ----\n\n  async listPackages(): Promise<ListPackagesResponseData> {\n    // Core returns this flat ({ packages: [...] }), not under `data`; tolerate both.\n    const r = await this.httpClient.get<ListPackagesResponseData & { data?: ListPackagesResponseData }>(\n      '/admin-api/packages',\n    );\n    return (r?.data ?? r) as ListPackagesResponseData;\n  }\n\n  async listPackageVersions(packageName: string): Promise<ListVersionsResponseData> {\n    // Core returns this flat ({ versions: [...] }), not under `data`; tolerate both.\n    const r = await this.httpClient.get<ListVersionsResponseData & { data?: ListVersionsResponseData }>(\n      `/admin-api/packages/${encodeURIComponent(packageName)}/versions`,\n    );\n    return (r?.data ?? r) as ListVersionsResponseData;\n  }\n\n  async getLatestPackageVersion(packageName: string): Promise<GetLatestVersionResponseData> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<GetLatestVersionResponseData>(\n      `/admin-api/packages/${encodeURIComponent(packageName)}/latest`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // ---- Context Management ----\n\n  async createContext(request: CreateContextRequest): Promise<CreateContextResponseData> {\n    // Core requires `initializationParams` (no default); default it to an empty\n    // byte array so callers that pass none don't get a 400.\n    const body = { ...request, initializationParams: request.initializationParams ?? [] };\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateContextResponseData }>('/admin-api/contexts', body));\n  }\n\n  async deleteContext(contextId: string): Promise<DeleteContextResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.delete<{ data: DeleteContextResponseData }>(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}`));\n  }\n\n  async getContexts(): Promise<GetContextsResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: GetContextsResponseData }>('/admin-api/contexts'));\n  }\n\n  async getContext(contextId: string): Promise<Context> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: Context }>(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}`));\n  }\n\n  async getContextsForApplication(applicationId: string): Promise<GetContextsResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: GetContextsResponseData }>(`/admin-api/contexts/for-application/${applicationId}`));\n  }\n\n  // ---- Context Identity ----\n\n  async generateContextIdentity(): Promise<GenerateContextIdentityResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.post<{ data: GenerateContextIdentityResponseData }>('/admin-api/identity/context', {}));\n  }\n\n  async getContextIdentities(contextId: string): Promise<GetContextIdentitiesResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: GetContextIdentitiesResponseData }>(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/identities`));\n  }\n\n  async getContextIdentitiesOwned(contextId: string): Promise<GetContextIdentitiesResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: GetContextIdentitiesResponseData }>(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/identities-owned`));\n  }\n\n  // ---- Context join (group membership) ----\n\n  async joinContext(contextId: string): Promise<JoinContextResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: JoinContextResponseData }>(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/join`, {}),\n    );\n  }\n\n  // ---- Context group / storage / sync ----\n\n  async getContextGroup(contextId: string): Promise<ContextGroupResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ContextGroupResponseData }>(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/group`));\n  }\n\n  async getContextStorage(contextId: string): Promise<ContextStorageResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ContextStorageResponseData }>(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/storage`));\n  }\n\n  /** Sync one context, or every context when `contextId` is omitted. */\n  async syncContext(contextId?: string): Promise<void> {\n    // Sync-all is `/contexts/sync` with no trailing slash - core routes the two\n    // spellings separately and 404s the trailing one.\n    const path = contextId ? `/admin-api/contexts/sync/${contextId}` : '/admin-api/contexts/sync';\n    await this.httpClient.post(path, {});\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Kick off a full state re-pull for a context (operator recovery for a\n   * stranded context). `force` re-pulls even when the node does not flag the\n   * context as stranded.\n   */\n  async resyncContext(\n    contextId: string,\n    request: ResyncContextRequest = {},\n  ): Promise<ResyncContextResponseData> {\n    // Core's `ResyncContextApiResponse` is a flat payload (no inner `data`\n    // field), so parse the body directly \u2014 do NOT `unwrap`, or `resyncStarted`\n    // reads as undefined and the resync silently appears to never start.\n    const r = await this.httpClient.post<ResyncContextResponseData | null>(\n      `/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/resync`,\n      request,\n    );\n    // An empty 2xx body means the resync was accepted; synthesize the result so\n    // callers always get a typed value instead of null.\n    return r ?? { contextId, resyncStarted: true };\n  }\n\n  async inviteSpecializedNode(request: InviteSpecializedNodeRequest): Promise<InviteSpecializedNodeResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: InviteSpecializedNodeResponseData }>(\n        '/admin-api/contexts/invite-specialized-node',\n        request,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async updateContextApplication(\n    contextId: string,\n    request: UpdateContextApplicationRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.post(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/application`, request);\n  }\n\n  async getContextsWithExecutorsForApplication(applicationId: string): Promise<ContextsWithExecutorsResponseData> {\n    // Core returns this flat as { contexts: [...] } (not a bare array under `data`).\n    const r = await this.httpClient.get<\n      | ContextsWithExecutorsResponseData\n      | { contexts: ContextsWithExecutorsResponseData }\n      | { data: ContextsWithExecutorsResponseData }\n    >(`/admin-api/contexts/with-executors/for-application/${applicationId}`);\n    if (Array.isArray(r)) return r;\n    return (\n      (r as { contexts?: ContextsWithExecutorsResponseData } | null)?.contexts ??\n      (r as { data?: ContextsWithExecutorsResponseData } | null)?.data ??\n      []\n    );\n  }\n\n  // ---- Blob Management ----\n\n  async uploadBlob(request: UploadBlobRequest): Promise<UploadBlobResponseData> {\n    // Core streams the raw request body into blob storage (no JSON) and takes\n    // its params from the query string (`hash`, `context_id` \u2014 snake_case).\n    const params = new URLSearchParams();\n    if (request.hash) params.set('hash', request.hash);\n    if (request.contextId) params.set('context_id', request.contextId);\n    const query = params.toString();\n    const path = query ? `/admin-api/blobs?${query}` : '/admin-api/blobs';\n    // request.data (Uint8Array view | ArrayBuffer | Blob) is a valid BodyInit and\n    // is streamed verbatim \u2014 no JSON, no cast. fetch honors a Uint8Array view's\n    // byteOffset/byteLength, so subarrays upload the correct region.\n    // Core's BlobInfo is snake_case (`blob_id`); map to camelCase like deleteBlob.\n    const res = unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.request<{ data: { blob_id: string; size: number } }>(path, {\n        method: 'PUT',\n        body: request.data,\n        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/octet-stream' },\n      }),\n    );\n    return { blobId: res.blob_id, size: res.size };\n  }\n\n  async deleteBlob(blobId: string): Promise<DeleteBlobResponseData> {\n    // Core's `BlobDeleteResponse` is a flat, snake_case payload (`{ blob_id,\n    // deleted }`) \u2014 the lone admin DTO without a camelCase rename and without an\n    // inner `data` field. Parse directly (no `unwrap`) and map to camelCase.\n    const body = await this.httpClient.delete<{ blob_id: string; deleted: boolean }>(\n      `/admin-api/blobs/${blobId}`,\n    );\n    return { blobId: body.blob_id, deleted: body.deleted };\n  }\n\n  async listBlobs(): Promise<ListBlobsResponseData> {\n    // Core's BlobInfo is snake_case (`blob_id`); map to camelCase.\n    const res = unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.get<{ data: { blobs: Array<{ blob_id: string; size: number }> } }>(\n        '/admin-api/blobs',\n      ),\n    );\n    return { blobs: res.blobs.map((b) => ({ blobId: b.blob_id, size: b.size })) };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Blob-read query params. `context_id` is the same snake_case param\n   * {@link uploadBlob} announces with; building it in one place keeps the read\n   * side from drifting from the write side.\n   */\n  private blobPath(blobId: string, options?: BlobReadOptions): string {\n    if (!options?.contextId) return `/admin-api/blobs/${blobId}`;\n    const params = new URLSearchParams({ context_id: options.contextId });\n    return `/admin-api/blobs/${blobId}?${params.toString()}`;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Download a blob's raw bytes. `GET /admin-api/blobs/:id` streams the blob\n   * content (e.g. `application/gzip`), NOT JSON \u2014 so fetch it as an ArrayBuffer.\n   * Use {@link listBlobs} for `{ blobId, size }` metadata.\n   *\n   * Without `contextId` the read is local-only: the node answers from its own\n   * blob store and returns immediately, or 404s. Passing `contextId` opts into\n   * network discovery \u2014 the node probes that context's peers (availability\n   * nodes first) for a holder, then transfers the bytes. Budget for it: core\n   * bounds discovery by a ~30s deadline, and the transfer is on top of that, so\n   * the worst case is well past what a UI should block on unhinted.\n   */\n  async getBlob(blobId: string, options?: BlobReadOptions): Promise<ArrayBuffer> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<ArrayBuffer>(this.blobPath(blobId, options), {\n      parse: 'arrayBuffer',\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Fetch a blob's metadata without downloading it. `HEAD /admin-api/blobs/:id`\n   * returns the info in response headers (size via `content-length`, plus\n   * `x-blob-id`/`x-blob-hash`/`x-blob-mime-type`).\n   *\n   * Without `contextId` this is a local-only presence check that returns\n   * immediately. Passing `contextId` opts into the same network discovery\n   * {@link getBlob} uses \u2014 presence and size answered by probing the context's\n   * peers, with no transfer \u2014 so it inherits core's ~30s discovery deadline as\n   * its worst case. A probe only carries `found` and `size`, so a peer-sourced\n   * answer has no `hash`/`mimeType`; read `source` to tell the two apart.\n   */\n  async getBlobInfo(\n    blobId: string,\n    options?: BlobReadOptions,\n  ): Promise<GetBlobInfoResponseData> {\n    // HEAD throws (HttpError) on a non-2xx status, so we only reach here on success\n    // \u2014 the x-blob-* headers are present. Guard size against a missing/non-numeric\n    // content-length anyway (defaults to 0 rather than NaN).\n    const { headers } = await this.httpClient.head(this.blobPath(blobId, options));\n    const size = Number(headers['content-length']);\n    return {\n      blobId: headers['x-blob-id'] ?? blobId,\n      size: Number.isFinite(size) ? size : 0,\n      hash: headers['x-blob-hash'],\n      mimeType: headers['x-blob-mime-type'],\n      // Nodes that predate the context-aware HEAD omit this header entirely, so\n      // it stays undefined rather than being defaulted to 'local' \u2014 absent means\n      // \"the node didn't say\", which is not the same claim as \"served locally\".\n      source: headers['x-blob-source'] as GetBlobInfoResponseData['source'],\n    };\n  }\n\n  // ---- Alias Management ----\n\n  async createContextAlias(\n    request: CreateContextAliasRequest,\n  ): Promise<CreateAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateAliasResponseData }>(\n        '/admin-api/alias/create/context',\n        { alias: request.alias, contextId: request.contextId },\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async createApplicationAlias(\n    request: CreateApplicationAliasRequest,\n  ): Promise<CreateAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateAliasResponseData }>(\n        '/admin-api/alias/create/application',\n        { alias: request.alias, applicationId: request.applicationId },\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async lookupContextAlias(name: string): Promise<LookupAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: LookupAliasResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/alias/lookup/context/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`,\n        {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async lookupApplicationAlias(name: string): Promise<LookupAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: LookupAliasResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/alias/lookup/application/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`,\n        {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async deleteContextAlias(name: string): Promise<DeleteAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: DeleteAliasResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/alias/delete/context/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`,\n        {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async deleteApplicationAlias(name: string): Promise<DeleteAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: DeleteAliasResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/alias/delete/application/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`,\n        {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async listContextAliases(): Promise<ListAliasesResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ListAliasesResponseData }>('/admin-api/alias/list/context'));\n  }\n\n  async listApplicationAliases(): Promise<ListAliasesResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ListAliasesResponseData }>('/admin-api/alias/list/application'));\n  }\n\n  async createDeviceAlias(request: CreateDeviceAliasRequest): Promise<CreateAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateAliasResponseData }>(\n        '/admin-api/alias/create/device',\n        { alias: request.alias, deviceId: request.deviceId },\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async lookupDeviceAlias(name: string): Promise<LookupAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: LookupAliasResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/alias/lookup/device/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`,\n        {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async deleteDeviceAlias(name: string): Promise<DeleteAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: DeleteAliasResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/alias/delete/device/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`,\n        {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async listDeviceAliases(): Promise<ListAliasesResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ListAliasesResponseData }>('/admin-api/alias/list/device'));\n  }\n\n  // ---- Namespace Management ----\n\n  async listNamespaces(): Promise<ListNamespacesResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ListNamespacesResponseData }>('/admin-api/namespaces'));\n  }\n\n  async getNamespace(namespaceId: string): Promise<Namespace> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: Namespace }>(`/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}`));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Who this node is \u2014 the account it writes as, the device it is, the key it\n   * signs with, and the account root a second device pairs against.\n   *\n   * Takes no namespace, and that is the point: one root key is one account\n   * everywhere, and a node signs with one key, so none of it varies by\n   * namespace.\n   */\n  async getNodeIdentity(): Promise<NodeIdentity> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: NodeIdentity }>('/admin-api/identity'));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @deprecated Use {@link getNodeIdentity} instead. Every field this returns is\n   * node-level, so the namespace was only ever decoration \u2014 it now delegates to\n   * the node-level route and reshapes the answer.\n   *\n   * Three consequences of that delegation, all visible to a caller who relied on\n   * the old route's behaviour:\n   *\n   * - **No participation gate.** The namespace route answered 404 when this node\n   *   had never joined the namespace; this answers whatever the node's identity\n   *   is, regardless. If you were using it to ask \"am I in this namespace?\", ask\n   *   {@link listNamespaces} instead \u2014 that is the question you were really\n   *   asking.\n   * - **`namespaceId` is echoed verbatim.** The old route resolved a subgroup id\n   *   to its root namespace and returned that; passing a subgroup id here gives\n   *   the subgroup id back.\n   * - **404 means something else.** Previously \"not my namespace\", now \"this node\n   *   holds no account root yet\".\n   */\n  async getNamespaceIdentity(namespaceId: string): Promise<NamespaceIdentity> {\n    const node = await this.getNodeIdentity();\n    return { namespaceId, publicKey: node.publicKey, account: node.accountId };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Ask this node to run one method on a member's behalf, under a warrant that\n   * member signed.\n   *\n   * The node executes and signs the envelope with its own key; the change is\n   * attributed to the **author**. Both halves travel together, so every peer\n   * re-checks that the member consented instead of trusting the relay.\n   *\n   * Three things have to be true first, and none is implied by the others:\n   *\n   * - the author's **account** is a member of the group owning the context \u2014\n   *   their device joins nothing and is in no group's binding rows, which is\n   *   exactly the case a device certificate covers;\n   * - this node holds `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` on that group, which is implied by\n   *   neither membership nor admin;\n   * - the warrant has not been spent. It is single-use: presenting a valid one\n   *   twice is refused, because the signature stays valid forever and replay is\n   *   not forgery.\n   *\n   * A refusal comes back as a `403` carrying the reason \u2014 \"an admin must grant\n   * CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF to \u2026\", or that the nonce is already spent \u2014 so a caller\n   * can tell which precondition failed rather than only that one did.\n   *\n   * Mint the warrant with {@link signWarrant}; see\n   * {@link PerformIntentRequest.warrant}.\n   */\n  async performIntent(\n    contextId: string,\n    request: PerformIntentRequest,\n  ): Promise<PerformIntentResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: PerformIntentResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/intents`,\n        request,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Read a context as the session's ACCOUNT, without minting a warrant.\n   *\n   * Needs an account-authenticated session \u2014 one from {@link login}, not the\n   * admin password login \u2014 and refuses otherwise with a `401`. The account must\n   * be a member of the group owning the context (`403` if not), and the method\n   * must be declared read-only in the app's ABI (`409` if not; a write needs\n   * {@link performIntent}).\n   */\n  async queryContext(\n    contextId: string,\n    request: QueryContextRequest,\n  ): Promise<QueryContextResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: QueryContextResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/query`,\n        request,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Ask what this node can do for a member in `contextId`, before they sign\n   * anything.\n   *\n   * The two facts {@link performIntent} needs and a client cannot derive: whose\n   * account goes in the warrant's `executor`, and whether this node holds\n   * `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` on the owning group. `canAuthorOnBehalf: false` comes\n   * back as an answer rather than an error \u2014 it is the default state of every\n   * context \u2014 so a caller can say \"an admin of `groupId` must grant it to\n   * `executorAccount`\" instead of presenting a warrant that will be refused\n   * after the author has spent a nonce on it.\n   *\n   * `404` means the context belongs to no group, or this node holds no account\n   * yet; either way it can be named as no warrant's executor.\n   *\n   * For a caller with no credential on the node at all \u2014 a browser tab holding\n   * one signing key \u2014 use `RelayClient`, which reads this same route on a node\n   * run as a relay.\n   */\n  async getIntentRelay(contextId: string): Promise<IntentRelayInfo> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.get<{ data: IntentRelayInfo }>(\n        `/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/intents`,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async listNamespacesForApplication(applicationId: string): Promise<ListNamespacesResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ListNamespacesResponseData }>(`/admin-api/namespaces/for-application/${applicationId}`));\n  }\n\n  async createNamespace(request: CreateNamespaceRequest): Promise<CreateNamespaceResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateNamespaceResponseData }>('/admin-api/namespaces', request),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async deleteNamespace(namespaceId: string): Promise<DeleteNamespaceResponseData> {\n    // Core requires `Content-Type: application/json` on this DELETE even though\n    // the body is always empty, so send the header and an empty JSON object.\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.request<{ data: DeleteNamespaceResponseData }>(`/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}`, {\n        method: 'DELETE',\n        body: '{}',\n        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n      }),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async createNamespaceInvitation(\n    namespaceId: string,\n    request?: CreateNamespaceInvitationRequest,\n  ): Promise<CreateNamespaceInvitationResponseData | CreateRecursiveInvitationResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateNamespaceInvitationResponseData | CreateRecursiveInvitationResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}/invite`,\n        request ?? {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Present a join this caller signed to a node the inviter named as an\n   * admitter.\n   *\n   * For a member with no node. `joinNamespace` publishes the membership op from\n   * the node making the call; this hands an already-signed op to somebody else's\n   * node to publish. The distinction matters because a keyholder has nowhere to\n   * publish from.\n   *\n   * The op must be signed by the **device key** in the credential it carries \u2014\n   * every peer checks that when applying a join. So the admitter cannot author\n   * this, only carry it: a hostile one can refuse, and nothing else. It cannot\n   * admit a different account, change the group, or grant a role.\n   *\n   * @param namespaceId the namespace being joined, 64 hex\n   * @param request the invitation and the hex-encoded signed op\n   */\n  async admitJoin(\n    namespaceId: string,\n    request: AdmitJoinRequest,\n  ): Promise<AdmitJoinResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: AdmitJoinResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}/admit`,\n        request,\n        { timeoutMs: 65000 },\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async joinNamespace(\n    namespaceId: string,\n    request: JoinNamespaceRequest,\n  ): Promise<JoinNamespaceResponseData> {\n    const data = unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: JoinNamespaceResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}/join`,\n        request,\n        { timeoutMs: 65000 },\n      ),\n    );\n\n    // core 0.11.0-rc.25 renamed this response's `groupId` to `namespaceId`\n    // (core#3598). Bind whichever spelling the node actually sent rather than\n    // picking one: the rename lands as `undefined` on the field the client\n    // reads, and nothing errors \u2014 no 4xx, no thrown parse \u2014 so a client that\n    // knows only one spelling fails much later and somewhere else. Normalising\n    // here means one mero-js works against nodes either side of that release.\n    if (data && data.namespaceId === undefined && data.groupId !== undefined) {\n      return { ...data, namespaceId: data.groupId };\n    }\n    return data;\n  }\n\n  async createGroupInNamespace(\n    namespaceId: string,\n    request?: CreateGroupInNamespaceRequest,\n  ): Promise<CreateGroupInNamespaceResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateGroupInNamespaceResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}/groups`,\n        request ?? {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async listNamespaceGroups(namespaceId: string): Promise<SubgroupEntry[]> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: SubgroupEntry[] }>(`/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}/groups`));\n  }\n\n  // ---- Account Devices & Pairing ----\n\n  /**\n   * Mint this node a device for an account that already lives somewhere else -\n   * the first half of pairing, run on the joining node.\n   *\n   * Publishes nothing and needs no key: it produces the device id, the two\n   * public keys and the signature that the account holder's\n   * {@link completeAccountPairing} certifies, plus a code to read out to them\n   * over a channel the payload does not travel on. Until that second half runs,\n   * the device this mints is inert.\n   *\n   * Takes a set of namespaces rather than one, and takes it from the caller\n   * because this node cannot discover it: a node that is a member of nothing can\n   * neither read the account's namespace set off a DAG nor derive it. One device\n   * covers however many are named - the certificate is over the account, not a\n   * scope - so there is one id and one code to hand over regardless.\n   */\n  async initAccountPairing(request: AccountPairInitRequest): Promise<AccountPairInitResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: AccountPairInitResponseData }>('/admin-api/account/pair-init', request),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Certify a device another node minted, link it, and deliver its scope keys -\n   * the second half of pairing, run on the node that holds the account root.\n   *\n   * Every field but `applications` is copied verbatim out of that node's\n   * {@link initAccountPairing} answer. Only this side can complete it: the\n   * certificate is signed by the account root, which never leaves the node that\n   * holds it.\n   *\n   * The scope is named in applications, not namespaces, because that is the\n   * question a person can answer - a namespace is an implementation unit they\n   * never chose. Leave it out to grant every application.\n   */\n  async completeAccountPairing(\n    request: AccountPairCompleteRequest,\n  ): Promise<AccountPairCompleteResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: AccountPairCompleteResponseData }>('/admin-api/account/pair-complete', request),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Re-run the pairing fan-out for a device this account already certified,\n   * against the namespaces this node takes part in now.\n   *\n   * Pairing is a snapshot, and this is how it is repeated. A namespace created\n   * or joined afterwards holds no binding for a device paired before it, and the\n   * symptom is silence - the device simply never sees that namespace. Nothing\n   * but the id is needed to repair it: the certificate is already held here,\n   * root-signed and naming no namespace, so a fresh endorsement and a key wrap\n   * are all a later namespace is missing. The device does not have to be online.\n   *\n   * Passing `applications` widens the device's stored scope as well as\n   * repairing. Passing none - or an empty list - repairs against the scope\n   * already stored, which is deliberately NOT the \"every application\" that an\n   * empty list means on {@link completeAccountPairing}: overloading it here\n   * would make the accidental request the widest one.\n   */\n  async relinkAccountDevice(\n    deviceId: string,\n    request?: RelinkDeviceRequest,\n  ): Promise<RelinkDeviceResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: RelinkDeviceResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/account/devices/${deviceId}/relink`,\n        request ?? {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Replace a device's scope outright, in one root-signed op.\n   *\n   * {@link relinkAccountDevice} only ever adds applications; this is how a\n   * scope is narrowed - or an `all` device is given a fixed list instead. The\n   * device need not be online.\n   */\n  async rescopeAccountDevice(\n    deviceId: string,\n    request: RescopeDeviceRequest,\n  ): Promise<RescopeDeviceResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.put<{ data: RescopeDeviceResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/account/devices/${encodeURIComponent(deviceId)}/scope`,\n        request,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Sign a payload an outside verifier specified, with this account's root.\n   *\n   * The counterpart to a verifier that issued a challenge and will check the\n   * signature against the account id it derives \u2014 the cloud's account link and\n   * login exchanges being the ones this exists for. The root never leaves the\n   * node, so this is the only way a client can produce that signature.\n   *\n   * `domain` is a NAME from a closed set the node knows, never the domain bytes.\n   * That is the security property rather than an encoding preference: signing\n   * caller-supplied bytes under a caller-supplied prefix would be an oracle over\n   * the one key that can certify a device. A node refuses a name it does not\n   * know, and refuses one whose bytes could be extended into a credential of its\n   * own.\n   *\n   * What comes back proves possession of the root and nothing else. Whether the\n   * payload is a challenge anyone issued, whether it is fresh, and whether the\n   * holder may link this account are the verifier's to decide \u2014 it issued the\n   * challenge and knows who to.\n   *\n   * ```ts\n   * const { nonce } = await cloud.getAccountLoginChallenge();\n   * const { rootPublicKey, signature } = await admin.signWithAccountRoot({\n   *   domain: 'mdma.account-login',\n   *   payload: hexEncodeUtf8(nonce),\n   * });\n   * await cloud.submitAccountLogin({ rootPublicKey, nonce, signature });\n   * ```\n   */\n  async signWithAccountRoot(\n    request: AccountSignWithRootRequest,\n  ): Promise<AccountSignWithRootResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: AccountSignWithRootResponseData }>(\n        '/admin-api/account/sign-with-root',\n        request,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Name a device of this account, for a listing to render.\n   *\n   * Run on the node holding the account root to name any device; a paired\n   * node is accepted only for that device's own id.\n   */\n  async labelAccountDevice(\n    deviceId: string,\n    request: LabelDeviceRequest,\n  ): Promise<LabelDeviceResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.put<{ data: LabelDeviceResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/account/devices/${encodeURIComponent(deviceId)}/label`,\n        request,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Every device of this account, as this node sees them - its own included.\n   *\n   * Joined from the node-local certificate cache and the live bindings of every\n   * namespace this node takes part in, so it is this node's view rather than a\n   * global one: a device certified by another holder appears with an empty\n   * `applications`, because the certificate that would name its scope is not\n   * cached here.\n   *\n   * The wire wraps this in `devices` rather than the usual `data`; the array is\n   * what a caller wants, so that wrapper is not passed on.\n   */\n  async listAccountDevices(): Promise<AccountDeviceEntry[]> {\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<{ devices: AccountDeviceEntry[] }>('/admin-api/account/devices');\n    return response.devices;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Every application this account speaks in, with the namespaces targeting each.\n   *\n   * What a device-scoping UI lists: {@link completeAccountPairing} and\n   * {@link relinkAccountDevice} both take applications, and this is where the\n   * ids they take come from. Derived from the namespaces this node takes part\n   * in, so an application installed with no namespace yet is absent - it has\n   * nothing to scope a device to until one exists.\n   *\n   * Wrapped in `applications` on the wire rather than `data`, unwrapped here for\n   * the same reason {@link listAccountDevices} unwraps `devices`.\n   */\n  async listAccountApplications(): Promise<AccountApplicationEntry[]> {\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<{ applications: AccountApplicationEntry[] }>(\n      '/admin-api/account/applications',\n    );\n    return response.applications;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Withdraw a device from this account, terminally.\n   *\n   * Two authorities reach the same endpoint. An admin may revoke any device and\n   * rotates the scope key as it goes. The account holder may revoke its own with\n   * a root-signed `proof`, which does not rotate - so read\n   * {@link RevokeAccountDeviceResponseData.revokedIn} rather than assuming the\n   * device lost its access: a namespace reporting `keyRotated: false` has\n   * stopped the device writing but leaves it able to read until an admin\n   * rotates.\n   *\n   * `namespaceId` names where to publish from, not the extent of the revocation:\n   * a device belongs to the account, so every namespace holding a binding for it\n   * is withdrawn from and reported back.\n   */\n  async revokeAccountDevice(\n    namespaceId: string,\n    request: RevokeAccountDeviceRequest,\n  ): Promise<RevokeAccountDeviceResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: RevokeAccountDeviceResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}/account/revoke`,\n        request,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  // ---- Group Management ----\n\n  async getGroupInfo(groupId: string): Promise<GroupInfoResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: GroupInfoResponseData }>(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}`));\n  }\n\n  /** Thin wrapper over {@link getGroupInfo}: returns the group's `defaultCapabilities` bitmask. */\n  async getDefaultCapabilities(groupId: string): Promise<number> {\n    return (await this.getGroupInfo(groupId)).defaultCapabilities;\n  }\n\n  /** Thin wrapper over {@link getGroupInfo}: returns the group's `subgroupVisibility`. */\n  async getSubgroupVisibility(groupId: string): Promise<string> {\n    return (await this.getGroupInfo(groupId)).subgroupVisibility;\n  }\n\n  async deleteGroup(groupId: string): Promise<DeleteGroupResponseData> {\n    // Core requires `Content-Type: application/json` on this DELETE even though\n    // the body is always empty, so send the header and an empty JSON object.\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.request<{ data: DeleteGroupResponseData }>(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}`, {\n        method: 'DELETE',\n        body: '{}',\n        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n      }),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async listGroupMembers(groupId: string): Promise<ListGroupMembersResponseData> {\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<ListGroupMembersResponseData>(\n      `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members`,\n    );\n    // Validate the field we declare as non-optional in the type so a\n    // contract-violating response (proxy error body, future API drift,\n    // etc.) surfaces as a clear error rather than silently producing an\n    // empty list. Empty groups still satisfy this \u2014 merod returns\n    // `members: []`, not an omitted field.\n    if (!Array.isArray(response?.members)) {\n      // Sanitize before interpolation: groupId reaches us from caller code,\n      // not parsed input, but defending the message keeps untrusted bytes\n      // out of error logs and downstream UIs.\n      const safeId = String(groupId).replace(/[\\r\\n\\t\\s]/g, '').slice(0, 64);\n      throw new Error(\n        `Invalid listGroupMembers response for group ${safeId}: missing or non-array \\`members\\` field`,\n      );\n    }\n    return response;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Member accounts in the group and the devices bound to each. An admin node\n   * sees every account; a plain member only its own. `403` if this node is not a\n   * member of the group.\n   */\n  async listMemberDevices(\n    groupId: string,\n    options: ListMemberDevicesOptions = {},\n  ): Promise<ListMemberDevicesResponseData> {\n    const params = new URLSearchParams();\n    if (options.offset !== undefined) params.set('offset', String(options.offset));\n    if (options.limit !== undefined) params.set('limit', String(options.limit));\n    const query = params.toString();\n    const path = `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/member-devices${query ? `?${query}` : ''}`;\n    return this.httpClient.get<ListMemberDevicesResponseData>(path);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Seal a small payload to a member account's root key. This node must be a\n   * member of the group, and `account` must be an account the group knows, so\n   * the route reaches no further than the caller already does.\n   */\n  async sealToAccount(\n    groupId: string,\n    account: string,\n    request: SealToAccountRequest,\n  ): Promise<SealedEnvelope> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: SealedEnvelope }>(\n        `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/accounts/${account}/seal`,\n        request,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async listGroupContexts(groupId: string): Promise<ListGroupContextsResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ListGroupContextsResponseData }>(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/contexts`));\n  }\n\n  async addGroupMembers(groupId: string, request: AddGroupMembersRequest): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.post(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members`, request);\n  }\n\n  async removeGroupMembers(groupId: string, request: RemoveGroupMembersRequest): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.post(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members/remove`, request);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * `identity` is the member's ACCOUNT (64 hex), as returned by\n   * {@link listGroupMembers} \u2014 not the signing key that added them. Both are\n   * 64 hex, so nothing but the source tells them apart.\n   */\n  async updateMemberRole(\n    groupId: string,\n    identity: string,\n    request: UpdateMemberRoleRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members/${identity}/role`, request);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * `identity` is the member's ACCOUNT (64 hex), as returned by\n   * {@link listGroupMembers} \u2014 not the signing key that added them. Both are\n   * 64 hex, so nothing but the source tells them apart.\n   */\n  async getMemberCapabilities(groupId: string, identity: string): Promise<MemberCapabilities> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.get<{ data: MemberCapabilities }>(\n        `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members/${identity}/capabilities`,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * `identity` is the member's ACCOUNT (64 hex), as returned by\n   * {@link listGroupMembers} \u2014 not the signing key that added them. Both are\n   * 64 hex, so nothing but the source tells them apart.\n   */\n  async setMemberCapabilities(\n    groupId: string,\n    identity: string,\n    request: SetMemberCapabilitiesRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members/${identity}/capabilities`, request);\n  }\n\n  async setDefaultCapabilities(\n    groupId: string,\n    request: SetDefaultCapabilitiesRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/settings/default-capabilities`, request);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Make every member admitted to `groupId` from now on able to relay a\n   * delegated write, without a per-node governance op each time.\n   *\n   * `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` is implied by nothing \u2014 not membership, not admin \u2014\n   * so every group is authorship-closed and each fleet relay otherwise needs an\n   * admin to grant it individually, at the moment the relay is assigned and the\n   * admin is not watching. Setting it in the group's DEFAULT mask is core's own\n   * answer to that: `add_member` seeds a non-admin's capability row from the\n   * default, so an attested node admitted afterwards lands open.\n   *\n   * Call it on the NAMESPACE (the root group). A grant resolves through the\n   * membership anchor, so one at the root reaches every Open subgroup beneath\n   * it, which is where contexts actually live; a `Restricted` subgroup is a\n   * membership boundary and needs its own call.\n   *\n   * ### Two things this does not do\n   *\n   * **It is not retroactive.** The default is copied into a member's row when\n   * that member is admitted, so nodes already admitted keep the row they got.\n   * Use {@link grantAuthorship} for those \u2014 or call this at namespace creation,\n   * which is the only point that needs no backfill at all.\n   *\n   * **It does not reach admins.** Core seeds the default only for non-admin\n   * roles, and `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` is deliberately not implied by admin. An\n   * admin's own node therefore stays closed and needs {@link grantAuthorship}.\n   *\n   * ### What it widens\n   *\n   * Every future non-admin member of the group, not only attested TEE nodes, so\n   * any of them may be named as a warrant's `executor`. The bound worth knowing\n   * before deciding: an executor cannot FORGE. A delegated write is authorized\n   * by the author's own warrant \u2014 signed by their device key, committed to one\n   * context, method and exact arguments, with its nonce checked unspent \u2014 so a\n   * holder can only spend a warrant it was deliberately handed. What it does\n   * gain is the arguments in cleartext and the choice of when, or whether, to\n   * publish.\n   *\n   * Read-modify-write rather than a blind set: core seeds a new group's default\n   * with `CAN_JOIN_OPEN_SUBGROUPS`, and overwriting that would quietly stop\n   * every later member inheriting into Open subgroups.\n   *\n   * Returns the resulting mask and whether an op was published \u2014 it is a no-op\n   * when the bit is already set, so it is safe to call on every startup.\n   */\n  async openToDelegatedExecution(\n    groupId: string,\n  ): Promise<{ changed: boolean; defaultCapabilities: number }> {\n    const current = await this.getDefaultCapabilities(groupId);\n    if (hasCap(current, CAPABILITIES.CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF)) {\n      return { changed: false, defaultCapabilities: current };\n    }\n    const next = withCap(current, CAPABILITIES.CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF);\n    await this.setDefaultCapabilities(groupId, { defaultCapabilities: next });\n    return { changed: true, defaultCapabilities: next };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Grant `account` the authorship bit on `groupId`, leaving its other\n   * capabilities alone.\n   *\n   * The per-member counterpart to {@link openToDelegatedExecution}, and what\n   * closes the gap that method cannot: a relay admitted BEFORE the default was\n   * set, and an admin's own node, which never receives the default at all.\n   *\n   * `account` is the member's ACCOUNT id (64 hex) as `listGroupMembers` returns\n   * it \u2014 for a fleet relay, the `account` the cloud reports for that node. Not\n   * the signing key that added them; both are 64 hex, so nothing but the source\n   * tells them apart.\n   *\n   * Read-modify-write, so it adds the bit rather than replacing the member's\n   * mask. A no-op when the member already holds it.\n   */\n  async grantAuthorship(\n    groupId: string,\n    account: string,\n  ): Promise<{ changed: boolean; capabilities: number }> {\n    const { capabilities } = await this.getMemberCapabilities(groupId, account);\n    if (hasCap(capabilities, CAPABILITIES.CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF)) {\n      return { changed: false, capabilities };\n    }\n    const next = withCap(capabilities, CAPABILITIES.CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF);\n    await this.setMemberCapabilities(groupId, account, { capabilities: next });\n    return { changed: true, capabilities: next };\n  }\n\n  async setSubgroupVisibility(\n    groupId: string,\n    request: SetSubgroupVisibilityRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/settings/subgroup-visibility`, request);\n  }\n\n  async setTeeAdmissionPolicy(\n    groupId: string,\n    request: SetTeeAdmissionPolicyRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/settings/tee-admission-policy`, request);\n  }\n\n  async getTeeAdmissionPolicy(groupId: string): Promise<GetTeeAdmissionPolicyResponseData> {\n    // Intersection (not union) so the type is unambiguous: `data` is optional, so\n    // `?? response` cleanly falls back to a flat (un-enveloped) response.\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<\n      GetTeeAdmissionPolicyResponseData & { data?: GetTeeAdmissionPolicyResponseData }\n    >(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/settings/tee-admission-policy`);\n    return response.data ?? response;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Sets which admitted TEEs may author as the TEE authority. Pass\n   * `{ allowedMrtd: [] }` to turn TEE authorship off. `groupId` must be a\n   * namespace root; the node refuses a subgroup. The node exposes no read-back\n   * route for this policy.\n   */\n  async setTeeAuthoringPolicy(\n    groupId: string,\n    request: SetTeeAuthoringPolicyRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/settings/tee-authoring-policy`, request);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Turns TEE authorship off in the namespace: every TEE loses its authority,\n   * and admitted TEEs stay members. The node applies the same op as\n   * `setTeeAuthoringPolicy(groupId, { allowedMrtd: [] })`. `groupId` must be a\n   * namespace root.\n   */\n  async disableTeeAuthoringPolicy(groupId: string): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.delete(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/settings/tee-authoring-policy`);\n  }\n\n  // ---- Group / member / context metadata ----\n\n  async setGroupMetadata(groupId: string, request: SetGroupMetadataRequest): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/metadata`, request);\n  }\n\n  async getGroupMetadata(groupId: string): Promise<MetadataRecord | null> {\n    // Core single-envelopes the record: `{ data: MetadataRecord | null }`.\n    // \"No record yet\" is `{ data: null }` (or a bare null body on older nodes),\n    // so optional-chain to a clean null. Returns the full record (name + data +\n    // updatedAt/updatedBy), not just the data map.\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<GetMetadataResponseData | null>(\n      `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/metadata`,\n    );\n    return response?.data ?? null;\n  }\n\n  async setMemberMetadata(\n    groupId: string,\n    identity: string,\n    request: SetMemberMetadataRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members/${identity}/metadata`, request);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * `identity` is the member's ACCOUNT (64 hex), as returned by\n   * {@link listGroupMembers} \u2014 not the signing key that added them. Both are\n   * 64 hex, so nothing but the source tells them apart.\n   */\n  async getMemberMetadata(groupId: string, identity: string): Promise<MetadataRecord | null> {\n    // Single-enveloped record; see getGroupMetadata.\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<GetMetadataResponseData | null>(\n      `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members/${identity}/metadata`,\n    );\n    return response?.data ?? null;\n  }\n\n  async setContextMetadata(\n    groupId: string,\n    contextId: string,\n    request: SetContextMetadataRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/contexts/${contextId}/metadata`, request);\n  }\n\n  async getContextMetadata(groupId: string, contextId: string): Promise<MetadataRecord | null> {\n    // Single-enveloped record; see getGroupMetadata.\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<GetMetadataResponseData | null>(\n      `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/contexts/${contextId}/metadata`,\n    );\n    return response?.data ?? null;\n  }\n\n  async syncGroup(groupId: string): Promise<SyncGroupResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.post<{ data: SyncGroupResponseData }>(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/sync`, {}));\n  }\n\n  async upgradeGroup(groupId: string, request: UpgradeGroupRequest): Promise<UpgradeGroupResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.post<{ data: UpgradeGroupResponseData }>(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/upgrade`, request));\n  }\n\n  async getGroupUpgradeStatus(groupId: string): Promise<GroupUpgradeStatusResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.get<{ data: GroupUpgradeStatusResponseData }>(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/upgrade/status`),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The operator-facing \"have all peers migrated?\" rollup for a namespace.\n   * The handler serializes the payload directly, so there is no `{ data }`\n   * envelope to unwrap here (unlike most admin reads).\n   */\n  async getMigrationStatus(namespaceId: string): Promise<MigrationStatus> {\n    const id = encodeURIComponent(namespaceId);\n    return this.httpClient.get<MigrationStatus>(`/admin-api/groups/${id}/migration-status`);\n  }\n\n  /** Per-group cascade-migration snapshots for a namespace. */\n  async getCascadeStatus(namespaceId: string): Promise<CascadeStatusEntry[]> {\n    const id = encodeURIComponent(namespaceId);\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.get<{ data: CascadeStatusEntry[] }>(`/admin-api/groups/${id}/cascade-status`),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async retryGroupUpgrade(groupId: string): Promise<RetryGroupUpgradeResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: RetryGroupUpgradeResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/upgrade/retry`,\n        {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /** Move `childGroupId` under `request.newParentId`. */\n  async reparentGroup(\n    childGroupId: string,\n    request: ReparentGroupRequest,\n  ): Promise<ReparentGroupResponseData> {\n    // Core returns this flat ({ reparented }); tolerate the { data } envelope too.\n    const r = await this.httpClient.post<\n      ReparentGroupResponseData & { data?: ReparentGroupResponseData }\n    >(`/admin-api/groups/${childGroupId}/reparent`, request);\n    return (r?.data ?? r) as ReparentGroupResponseData;\n  }\n\n  async listSubgroups(groupId: string): Promise<SubgroupEntry[]> {\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<{ subgroups?: SubgroupEntry[]; data?: SubgroupEntry[] }>(\n      `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/subgroups`,\n    );\n    return response.subgroups ?? response.data ?? [];\n  }\n\n  async detachContextFromGroup(groupId: string, contextId: string): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.post(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/contexts/${contextId}/remove`, {});\n  }\n\n  // ---- Group Invitation & Join ----\n\n  async createGroupInvitation(\n    groupId: string,\n    request?: CreateGroupInvitationRequest,\n  ): Promise<CreateGroupInvitationResponseData | CreateRecursiveGroupInvitationResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateGroupInvitationResponseData | CreateRecursiveGroupInvitationResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/invite`,\n        request ?? {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async joinGroup(request: JoinGroupRequest): Promise<JoinGroupResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: JoinGroupResponseData }>('/admin-api/groups/join', request),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async joinSubgroupInheritance(groupId: string): Promise<JoinSubgroupInheritanceResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: JoinSubgroupInheritanceResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/join-via-inheritance`,\n        {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  // ---- TEE ----\n\n  async getTeeInfo(): Promise<TeeInfoResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: TeeInfoResponseData }>('/admin-api/tee/info'));\n  }\n\n  async teeAttest(request: TeeAttestRequest): Promise<TeeAttestResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.post<{ data: TeeAttestResponseData }>('/admin-api/tee/attest', request));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @deprecated Nodes no longer serve `/admin-api/tee/verify-quote` (removed in\n   * core#3262), so this fails. Verify quotes with `createQuoteVerifier`.\n   */\n  async teeVerifyQuote(request: TeeVerifyQuoteRequest): Promise<TeeVerifyQuoteResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: TeeVerifyQuoteResponseData }>('/admin-api/tee/verify-quote', request),\n    );\n  }\n\n  // ---- Network ----\n\n  async getPeersCount(): Promise<{ count: number }> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<{ count: number }>('/admin-api/peers');\n  }\n\n  /** Node network status (GET /admin-api/network/status). */\n  async getNetworkStatus(): Promise<unknown> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<unknown>('/admin-api/network/status');\n  }\n\n  /** Node storage/usage stats (GET /admin-api/usage). */\n  async getUsage(): Promise<unknown> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<unknown>('/admin-api/usage');\n  }\n\n  /** Node TLS certificate, PEM text (GET /admin-api/certificate). */\n  async getCertificate(): Promise<string> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<string>('/admin-api/certificate', { parse: 'text' });\n  }\n\n  // ---- Group / context / namespace membership ----\n\n  /** Create a standalone group (POST /admin-api/groups). */\n  async createGroup(request: CreateGroupRequest): Promise<CreateGroupResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateGroupResponseData }>('/admin-api/groups', request),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /** Leave a group (POST /admin-api/groups/:group_id/leave). */\n  async leaveGroup(groupId: string): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.post(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/leave`, {});\n  }\n\n  /** Leave a context (POST /admin-api/contexts/:context_id/leave). */\n  async leaveContext(contextId: string): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.post(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/leave`, {});\n  }\n\n  /** Leave a namespace (POST /admin-api/namespaces/:namespace_id/leave). */\n  async leaveNamespace(namespaceId: string): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.post(`/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}/leave`, {});\n  }\n\n  /** Issue a group ownership proof (POST /admin-api/groups/:group_id/issue-ownership-proof). */\n  async issueOwnershipProof(\n    groupId: string,\n    request: IssueOwnershipProofRequest,\n  ): Promise<IssueOwnershipProofResponseData> {\n    return this.httpClient.post<IssueOwnershipProofResponseData>(\n      `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/issue-ownership-proof`,\n      request,\n    );\n  }\n\n  /** Issue a namespace ownership proof (POST /admin-api/groups/:group_id/issue-namespace-ownership-proof). */\n  async issueNamespaceOwnershipProof(\n    groupId: string,\n    request: IssueNamespaceOwnershipProofRequest,\n  ): Promise<IssueOwnershipProofResponseData> {\n    return this.httpClient.post<IssueOwnershipProofResponseData>(\n      `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/issue-namespace-ownership-proof`,\n      request,\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Set a member's auto-follow flag (PUT\n   * /admin-api/groups/:group_id/members/:identity/auto-follow).\n   *\n   * `identity` is the member's ACCOUNT (64 hex), as returned by\n   * {@link listGroupMembers} \u2014 not the signing key that added them. Both are\n   * 64 hex, so nothing but the source tells them apart.\n   */\n  async setMemberAutoFollow(\n    groupId: string,\n    identity: string,\n    request: SetMemberAutoFollowRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members/${identity}/auto-follow`, request);\n  }\n\n  /** Abort a namespace migration (POST /admin-api/groups/:namespace_id/migration/abort). */\n  async abortMigration(namespaceId: string): Promise<unknown> {\n    return this.httpClient.post<unknown>(`/admin-api/groups/${namespaceId}/migration/abort`, {});\n  }\n}\n", "import type { DcapCollateral } from '../sealed/verify.js';\n\n// Admin API Types \u2014 aligned with core server routes\n// All types use camelCase to match core's #[serde(rename_all = \"camelCase\")]\n\n// Re-export shared types\nexport { ApiResponse } from '../http-client/index.js';\n\n// ---- Health and Status ----\n\nexport interface HealthStatus {\n  status: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * What `GET /admin-api/ready` reports: `ready` once the node has finished\n * starting up and its store answers. A node that is not ready answers `503`\n * with its lifecycle stage (or `store_unavailable`) as the status, which the\n * client surfaces as an `HTTPError`.\n */\nexport interface ReadinessStatus {\n  status: string;\n}\n\nexport interface AdminAuthStatus {\n  data: { status: string };\n}\n\n// ---- Applications ----\n\n/**\n * Install by coordinates. The node fetches only from its own configured\n * `[registry]`, so there is no caller-supplied URL; both halves are required.\n */\nexport interface InstallApplicationRequest {\n  package: string;\n  version: string;\n}\n\nexport interface InstallDevApplicationRequest {\n  path: string;\n}\n\nexport interface InstallApplicationResponseData {\n  applicationId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface UninstallApplicationResponseData {\n  applicationId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ApplicationBlob {\n  bytecode: string;\n  compiled: string;\n}\n\nexport interface Application {\n  id: string;\n  blob: ApplicationBlob;\n  size: number;\n  source: string;\n  metadata: number[];\n  /** Absent for a raw-wasm install (no signed bundle) and for bootstrap stubs. */\n  signer_id?: string;\n  /** Absent on a bootstrap stub row, written before the app's blob arrives. */\n  package?: string;\n  /** Absent when the stored version is empty or not valid semver. */\n  version?: string;\n  /** Named services of a multi-service bundle; absent for single-service apps. */\n  services?: Record<string, ApplicationBlob>;\n}\n\nexport interface ListApplicationsResponseData {\n  apps: Application[];\n}\n\nexport interface GetApplicationResponseData {\n  application: Application | null;\n}\n\n/** One installed blob for an application (distinct from the package registry). */\nexport interface ApplicationVersionEntry {\n  version: string;\n  blobId: string;\n  size: number;\n  package: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ListApplicationVersionsResponseData {\n  data: ApplicationVersionEntry[];\n}\n\n/** The application's `wasm-abi/1` manifest, returned verbatim by the node. */\nexport type GetApplicationAbiResponseData = Record<string, unknown>;\n\n// ---- Packages ----\n\nexport interface GetLatestVersionResponseData {\n  applicationId: string | null;\n  version: string | null;\n}\n\nexport interface ListPackagesResponseData {\n  packages: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface ListVersionsResponseData {\n  versions: string[];\n}\n\n// ---- Bundle migration metadata ----\n\n/**\n * Per-service migration descriptor carried in a multi-service bundle manifest,\n * emitted from the app's `#[app::migrate]` declaration. `toSchemaVersion` is the\n * ABI state version the migrate targets (from `#[app::state(version = N)]`,\n * the engine's gate) \u2014 NOT the bundle semver, which is `toVersion`, the\n * user-facing string an admin matches on; `method` is the migrate entrypoint.\n */\nexport interface BundleMigration {\n  method: string;\n  toSchemaVersion: number;\n  toVersion?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * The subset of a registry bundle manifest that `getRegistryVersions` consumes.\n * The registry serves these at `GET {registry}/api/v2/bundles?package={package}`;\n * installation itself needs only the coordinates, which the node resolves.\n */\nexport interface RegistryBundleManifest {\n  package: string;\n  appVersion: string;\n  /** Present when this bundle's app declares a migration. */\n  migration?: BundleMigration;\n}\n\n// ---- Contexts ----\n\nexport interface CreateContextRequest {\n  applicationId: string;\n  groupId: string;\n  serviceName?: string;\n  contextSeed?: string;\n  initializationParams?: number[];\n  identitySecret?: string;\n  /** Optional human-readable label for the context. */\n  name?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateContextResponseData {\n  contextId: string;\n  memberPublicKey: string;\n  groupId?: string;\n  groupCreated?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface DeleteContextResponseData {\n  isDeleted: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface Context {\n  id: string;\n  applicationId: string;\n  serviceName?: string;\n  /**\n   * Context state/root hash. Core's wire key is `contextStateHash` (part of the\n   * cross-DAG auth three-level naming: contextStateHash / groupStateHash /\n   * namespaceStateHash). Renamed from `rootHash`, which never populated.\n   */\n  contextStateHash: string;\n  /** Absent while the context has no deltas yet (core omits an empty list). */\n  dagHeads?: number[][];\n  /** Bundle semver of the installed application (skew #2). Absent on older nodes. */\n  applicationVersion?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ContextWithGroup extends Context {\n  groupId?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface GetContextsResponseData {\n  contexts: ContextWithGroup[];\n}\n\n// ---- Context Identity ----\n\nexport interface GenerateContextIdentityResponseData {\n  publicKey: string;\n}\n\nexport interface GetContextIdentitiesResponseData {\n  identities: string[];\n}\n\n// ---- Context join (group membership; POST /contexts/:id/join) ----\n\nexport interface JoinContextResponseData {\n  contextId: string;\n  memberPublicKey: string;\n}\n\n// ---- Open subgroup join via inheritance (POST /groups/:group_id/join-via-inheritance) ----\n\nexport interface JoinSubgroupInheritanceResponseData {\n  groupId: string;\n  memberPublicKey: string;\n  // `true` if the call had to publish a `MemberJoinedOpen` op to materialise\n  // inherited membership; `false` if the caller was already a direct member\n  // and the call was a no-op.\n  wasInherited: boolean;\n}\n\n// ---- Context group / storage / sync ----\n\nexport type ContextGroupResponseData = string | null;\n\nexport interface ContextStorageResponseData {\n  sizeInBytes: number;\n}\n\n// Sync context returns empty\nexport type SyncContextResponseData = null;\n\n// ---- Specialized Node Invite ----\n\nexport interface InviteSpecializedNodeRequest {\n  contextId: string;\n  inviterId?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface InviteSpecializedNodeResponseData {\n  nonce: string;\n}\n\n// ---- Update Context Application ----\n\nexport interface UpdateContextApplicationRequest {\n  applicationId: string;\n  executorPublicKey: string;\n}\n\n// Update context application returns empty\nexport type UpdateContextApplicationResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\n// ---- Resync Context ----\n\nexport interface ResyncContextRequest {\n  /** Force a full re-pull even if the context is not detected as stranded. */\n  force?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface ResyncContextResponseData {\n  contextId: string;\n  resyncStarted: boolean;\n}\n\n// ---- Contexts With Executors ----\n\nexport interface ContextWithExecutors {\n  contextId: string;\n  executors: string[];\n}\n\nexport type ContextsWithExecutorsResponseData = ContextWithExecutors[];\n\n// ---- Blobs ----\n\nexport interface UploadBlobRequest {\n  /** Raw blob bytes; streamed verbatim as the request body (octet-stream). */\n  data: Uint8Array | ArrayBuffer | Blob;\n  /** Optional expected blob hash; sent as the `hash` query param for server-side verification. */\n  hash?: string;\n  /** Optional context to announce the blob to; sent as the `context_id` query param. */\n  contextId?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface BlobInfo {\n  blobId: string;\n  size: number;\n}\n\nexport type UploadBlobResponseData = BlobInfo;\n\nexport interface DeleteBlobResponseData {\n  blobId: string;\n  deleted: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface ListBlobsResponseData {\n  blobs: BlobInfo[];\n}\n\nexport type GetBlobResponseData = BlobInfo;\n\n/**\n * Optional context for a blob read. Supplying `contextId` sends the\n * `context_id` query param (the same one {@link UploadBlobRequest} announces\n * with) and opts the read into network discovery instead of a local-only\n * lookup \u2014 see {@link AdminClient.getBlob}/{@link AdminClient.getBlobInfo} for\n * the latency this buys.\n */\nexport interface BlobReadOptions {\n  /** Context whose peers to probe for the blob; sent as the `context_id` query param. */\n  contextId?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface GetBlobInfoResponseData extends BlobInfo {\n  /** Absent when the answer came from a peer probe, which carries only presence and size. */\n  hash?: string;\n  /** Absent when the answer came from a peer probe, which carries only presence and size. */\n  mimeType?: string;\n  /**\n   * Where the node answered from, per the `x-blob-source` response header:\n   * `'local'` for its own blob store, `'peer'` for a context probe. Undefined\n   * on nodes that don't send the header.\n   */\n  source?: 'local' | 'peer';\n}\n\n// ---- Aliases ----\n\n// Core's CreateAliasRequest is `{ alias, #[serde(flatten)] value }`, so each\n// alias kind flattens a different id field at the top level of the body.\nexport interface CreateContextAliasRequest {\n  alias: string;\n  contextId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateApplicationAliasRequest {\n  alias: string;\n  applicationId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateDeviceAliasRequest {\n  alias: string;\n  deviceId: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Core's `ListAliasesResponse` is `{ data: BTreeMap<Alias<T>, T> }`, so once the\n * `data` envelope is stripped the payload is a flat `{ alias: id }` map \u2014 not a\n * list of entries. Applies to context, application, and device aliases.\n */\nexport type ListAliasesResponseData = Record<string, string>;\n\n// Create/delete alias returns empty\nexport type CreateAliasResponseData = Record<string, never>;\nexport type DeleteAliasResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\nexport interface LookupAliasResponseData {\n  value?: string;\n}\n\n// ---- Shared invitation types ----\n\n/**\n * The signed half of an invitation. Wire keys are snake_case: this type mirrors\n * a core primitive (`calimero_context_config::types`), which carries no\n * camelCase rename \u2014 unlike the admin DTOs that wrap it.\n */\nexport interface GroupInvitationFromAdmin {\n  readonly inviter_identity: number[];\n  readonly group_id: number[];\n  readonly expiration_timestamp: number;\n  /** Per-invitation nonce; core keeps the legacy `secret_salt` wire name. */\n  readonly secret_salt: number[];\n  readonly invited_role: number;\n  /**\n   * Accounts permitted to admit a claim of this invitation, 64 hex characters\n   * each \u2014 the same spelling every other account-addressing field uses.\n   *\n   * Empty means admission by broadcast: the joiner announces itself on the\n   * namespace topic and any ready peer answers \u2014 which publishes the invitation\n   * to every subscriber of that topic. Naming admitters keeps it off the topic,\n   * and the joiner presents it to one of them directly.\n   *\n   * Inside the inviter's signature, so it cannot be redirected.\n   */\n  readonly admitters?: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * An invitation blob the node signed. **Opaque: pass it through unchanged.**\n *\n * `inviter_signature` covers `invitation`, and the trailing bootstrap fields\n * (`application_id`, `app_key`) are needed by the joiner even though they sit\n * outside the signature \u2014 so a value that has been rebuilt field-by-field is\n * not the value the node signed. Rebuilding is what a schema derived from these\n * declarations does: an object schema drops the keys it wasn't told about, and\n * core may add more (both trailing fields were added this way). Carry the value\n * verbatim from the call that produced it to {@link JoinGroupRequest}, and treat\n * the fields below as read-only detail for display.\n *\n * The `never`-typed brand makes that structural: an object literal or a schema\n * result cannot satisfy this type, while a value the SDK returned \u2014 or one\n * recovered with `JSON.parse` after transport \u2014 still does.\n */\nexport interface SignedGroupOpenInvitation {\n  readonly invitation: GroupInvitationFromAdmin;\n  readonly inviter_signature: string;\n  /**\n   * libp2p addresses for the accounts in\n   * {@link GroupInvitationFromAdmin.admitters}, each a full multiaddr including\n   * its `/p2p/<peer-id>` suffix.\n   *\n   * The peer id travels with the address because a joiner cannot derive it:\n   * resolving an account to a peer needs governance state, which is exactly what\n   * a joiner has not synced yet.\n   *\n   * Outside the signature, like the other bootstrap fields. A wrong address\n   * costs a failed dial \u2014 libp2p authenticates the peer id on connect, and the\n   * admitting node still has to be in the signed list for its admission to\n   * count.\n   *\n   * Best-effort: absent on invitations from nodes predating the field, and empty\n   * when the minting node had no address for any admitter.\n   */\n  readonly admitter_addrs?: readonly string[];\n  /**\n   * The account the inviter acts as, as 64 hex characters \u2014 not the\n   * `inviter_identity` key inside the signed body is written in. Governance\n   * rows name accounts, and a joiner cannot derive this one: an account is a\n   * hash of a root it has never seen.\n   *\n   * Unsigned bootstrap field, and outside the signature deliberately \u2014 a\n   * client that round-trips an invitation through its own typed model would\n   * drop an unknown field and invalidate the signature with it. Absent on\n   * invitations from older nodes.\n   */\n  readonly inviter_account?: string;\n  /** Unsigned bootstrap field; absent on invitations from older nodes. */\n  readonly application_id?: number[];\n  /** Unsigned bootstrap field; absent on invitations from older nodes. */\n  /**\n   * The wire name is `app_key`; core's Rust field is `bytecode_id` behind a\n   * `rename` that covers both directions, and core pins this spelling in a test.\n   * `Option<[u8; 32]>` crosses JSON as an array of byte values, not as hex \u2014\n   * unlike `AccountId`, which has its own hex representation.\n   */\n  readonly app_key?: number[];\n  /** @internal Brand \u2014 never present at runtime, never write it. */\n  readonly __nodeSigned: never;\n}\n\nexport interface RecursiveInvitationEntry {\n  groupId: string;\n  invitation: SignedGroupOpenInvitation;\n  groupName?: string;\n}\n\n// ---- Namespaces ----\n\nexport interface Namespace {\n  namespaceId: string;\n  appKey: string;\n  targetApplicationId: string;\n  /**\n   * Absent from nodes that have dropped the concept, always `\"LazyOnAccess\"` on\n   * every released one. Optional because this SDK talks to both; it carries no\n   * information either way. Delete once no supported release still sends it.\n   */\n  upgradePolicy?: string;\n  createdAt: number;\n  name?: string;\n  memberCount: number;\n  contextCount: number;\n  subgroupCount: number;\n  /**\n   * Bundle version of this namespace's `appKey` blob \u2014 the per-namespace truth,\n   * where the application row only says \"latest fetched\". Absent when core\n   * cannot resolve it (raw-wasm app, legacy key, blob not retained locally).\n   */\n  appVersion?: string;\n}\n\nexport type ListNamespacesResponseData = Namespace[];\n\n/**\n * Who this node is: the account it writes as, the device it is, and the key it\n * signs with.\n *\n * Every field is node-level. One root key means one account, everywhere, and a\n * node signs with one key \u2014 so none of this varies by namespace, which is why\n * the endpoint behind it takes none.\n */\n/**\n * A member's request that a node run one method on their behalf.\n *\n * Delegated authorship exists for a holder that cannot run the application\n * itself \u2014 a device with only a signing key, which can neither compile the WASM\n * nor decrypt the state. What makes the resulting write *theirs* is the warrant:\n * a statement they signed, which travels with the change so every peer verifies\n * they consented rather than taking the node's word.\n */\nexport interface PerformIntentRequest {\n  /** The method to run. */\n  method: string;\n  /** Its arguments, as the JSON the guest will receive. */\n  argsJson: unknown;\n  /**\n   * The author's consent: hex-encoded borsh of a `Warrant`.\n   *\n   * Opaque on purpose. Its canonical form is those bytes \u2014 the signature covers\n   * them \u2014 so re-describing the fields as JSON would create a second spelling\n   * that could disagree with what was signed.\n   *\n   * Mint it with {@link signWarrant}, or out of band with `merod account\n   * warrant` / `meroctl context intent`.\n   *\n   * Signing here needs no dependency, which is why it is available at all: the\n   * hash is WebCrypto SHA-256, the signature is WebCrypto Ed25519, and every\n   * field of a warrant is fixed-width so the encoding is concatenation rather\n   * than borsh. The byte contract is pinned on the node's side, at\n   * `crates/account/src/tests/warrant_wire_fixture.rs`, because a drift there\n   * would otherwise surface here as a 403 rather than as an encoding error.\n   */\n  warrant: string;\n  /**\n   * Hex-encoded borsh of the author's `AccountProof<DeviceCert>`, proving the\n   * key that signed the warrant is a device of the account it names.\n   *\n   * Only the author's own half. The node attaches its own credential, so a\n   * caller never learns which of the node's processes runs the intent \u2014 and a\n   * re-key on its side does not void a warrant already issued.\n   */\n  authorProof: string;\n}\n\n/** What a performed intent reports back. */\n/**\n * A read of a context, run as the caller's account. Needs no warrant: a read\n * publishes nothing, so there is no peer to convince.\n */\nexport interface QueryContextRequest {\n  /**\n   * The method to call. It must be declared read-only in the application's ABI\n   * (a `&self` method in a Rust app); anything else is refused with a `409`,\n   * because a write needs a warrant ({@link PerformIntentRequest}).\n   */\n  method: string;\n  /** Its arguments, as the JSON the guest will receive. */\n  argsJson: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface QueryContextResponseData {\n  /** The method's own return value. */\n  returns: unknown | null;\n}\n\nexport interface PerformIntentResponseData {\n  /**\n   * The context's scope root after the run \u2014 how a caller sees that it wrote.\n   *\n   * Worth asserting on rather than the status alone: an accepted intent that\n   * advanced no state is a real failure mode, and it is cheaper to catch here\n   * than on a later read of a value that was never written.\n   */\n  rootHash: string;\n  /** The method's own return value, if it had one. */\n  returns: unknown | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * What a node says about running intents in one context \u2014 read before minting a\n * warrant, not after being refused one.\n *\n * Every input to a warrant is something the author already holds except two:\n * whose name goes in `executor`, and whether that node may act here at all. Both\n * belong to the node, so both are answered here, on the path the intent will be\n * presented to.\n *\n * Reading it first is what lets a client fail before signing. A warrant spends a\n * nonce from a monotonic per-device sequence, and one naming the wrong executor\n * is unspendable \u2014 the number is gone and the write never happened.\n */\nexport interface IntentRelayInfo {\n  /**\n   * The account a warrant for this node must name as its `executor`, 64 hex.\n   *\n   * An account, not the node's signing key: one of its processes re-keying must\n   * not void warrants already issued to it.\n   */\n  executorAccount: string;\n  /**\n   * Whether this node holds `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` on the group owning the\n   * context.\n   *\n   * `false` is an answer, not an error, and it is the *default* state of every\n   * context \u2014 the capability is implied by neither membership nor admin, and is\n   * not propagated by the subgroup cascade. A client reads it to tell \"ask an\n   * admin of `groupId`\" from \"retry later\".\n   */\n  canAuthorOnBehalf: boolean;\n  /** The group whose admin must grant that capability, 64 hex. */\n  groupId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface NodeIdentity {\n  /**\n   * The account this node writes as, 64 hex characters. This \u2014 not\n   * `publicKey` \u2014 is what member-addressing endpoints take, and what\n   * `listGroupMembers` entries are keyed by, so it is how a caller locates\n   * itself in a member list.\n   */\n  accountId: string;\n  /**\n   * The device this node is, 64 hex characters, or `null` before it has\n   * enrolled anywhere.\n   *\n   * `null` is a real answer rather than a missing one: the account id above\n   * exists as soon as the node has a root, and enrolment \u2014 which a join\n   * performs \u2014 is what adds the device that speaks for it.\n   */\n  deviceId: string | null;\n  /**\n   * The key this node signs ops with, 64 hex.\n   *\n   * The device's signing key, not the account root: the root signs\n   * certificates and never an op, so a signature on the wire verifies against\n   * this one.\n   */\n  publicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * The epoch-0 root **public** key of this node's account, 64 hex characters.\n   *\n   * What a second device needs to pair into this account, and public by\n   * construction \u2014 it is hashed into `accountId` and travels in every genesis.\n   * The private root never leaves the node over HTTP.\n   *\n   * Optional because a node at or below `0.11.0-rc.22` does not send it: the\n   * field landed after that release. Required in the type would make this SDK\n   * claim something the node the caller chose may not report.\n   */\n  accountRootPublicKey?: string;\n  /**\n   * Whether this node holds the root key of the account it speaks for. `false`\n   * means it runs on a delegate device key, so it cannot certify another device\n   * into the account \u2014 which is what a pairing invite needs to know before\n   * offering the option.\n   *\n   * Optional for the same reason as `accountRootPublicKey`: a node at or below\n   * `0.11.0-rc.30` does not send it. `undefined` is therefore \"this node is too\n   * old to say\", which is not the same answer as `false`, and a caller gating an\n   * invite on it should not collapse the two.\n   */\n  holdsAccountRoot?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Whether this node's device is certified into the account it speaks for.\n   *\n   * Pair-init mints a device but only pair-complete certifies it, and\n   * `holdsAccountRoot` is `false` across both states, so this is what tells\n   * them apart. Absent on a node predating the field.\n   */\n  deviceCertified?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Hex X25519 public agreement key of this node's device, `null` before it\n   * has a device row.\n   *\n   * The same key pairing calls `kemPublicKey`; core's name is kept here.\n   */\n  deviceAgreementKey?: string | null;\n  /**\n   * Hex id of the account namespace this node follows.\n   *\n   * A holder derives it before the namespace exists so an invite can carry\n   * it; a device records it at pair-init. `null` on a node that neither holds\n   * a root nor has paired with the id; absent on an old node.\n   */\n  accountNamespaceId?: string | null;\n  /**\n   * The account that withdrew this node's device, absent on a node no\n   * revocation has reached.\n   */\n  revokedFrom?: RevokedFromEntry;\n}\n\n/** Which account withdrew this node's device, and which device it was. */\nexport interface RevokedFromEntry {\n  /** The account the device spoke for, 64 hex characters. */\n  accountId: string;\n  /** The device that was withdrawn, 64 hex characters. */\n  deviceId: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * @deprecated Use {@link AdminApiClient.getNodeIdentity} instead. Nothing here\n * varies by namespace, so the parameter could only ever be decoration.\n */\nexport interface NamespaceIdentity {\n  /** Echoed back from the argument; it does not describe the identity. */\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /** The key this node signs with, 64 hex. */\n  publicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * The account this node writes as, 64 hex characters. This \u2014 not\n   * `publicKey` \u2014 is what member-addressing endpoints take, and what\n   * `listGroupMembers` entries are keyed by, so it is how a caller locates\n   * itself in a member list.\n   */\n  account: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateNamespaceRequest {\n  applicationId: string;\n  name?: string;\n  /** Hex 32-byte blob id; pins the namespace to a specific installed version. */\n  appKey?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateNamespaceResponseData {\n  namespaceId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface DeleteNamespaceResponseData {\n  isDeleted: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateNamespaceInvitationRequest {\n  expirationTimestamp?: number;\n  recursive?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateNamespaceInvitationResponseData {\n  invitation: SignedGroupOpenInvitation;\n  groupName?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateRecursiveInvitationResponseData {\n  invitations: RecursiveInvitationEntry[];\n}\n\nexport interface JoinNamespaceRequest {\n  invitation: SignedGroupOpenInvitation;\n  groupName?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface JoinNamespaceResponseData {\n  /**\n   * The namespace that was joined.\n   *\n   * core `0.11.0-rc.25` renamed this field on the wire from `groupId`\n   * (core#3598). The endpoint had been sharing a response DTO with\n   * `POST /admin-api/groups/join`, which leaked the internal \"a namespace is a\n   * root group\" detail into the namespace API and meant a caller could not use\n   * one spelling across the family.\n   *\n   * {@link AdminClient.joinNamespace} fills this in from whichever spelling the\n   * node sent, so it is populated against nodes on either side of that release.\n   */\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /**\n   * @deprecated The pre-`0.11.0-rc.25` spelling of {@link namespaceId}. Present\n   * only when the node predates that release \u2014 read `namespaceId` instead,\n   * which is always set.\n   */\n  groupId?: string;\n  /** The key the joiner signs with, 64 hex. */\n  memberIdentity: string;\n  /**\n   * The account that key joined as, 64 hex characters. This \u2014 not\n   * `memberIdentity` \u2014 is what every member-addressing endpoint takes, so it\n   * is how the caller addresses the member it just became.\n   */\n  memberAccount: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateGroupInNamespaceRequest {\n  groupName?: string;\n  /** Subgroup visibility at birth. Absent means `'restricted'`. */\n  visibility?: 'open' | 'restricted';\n}\n\nexport interface CreateGroupInNamespaceResponseData {\n  groupId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface SubgroupEntry {\n  groupId: string;\n  name?: string;\n}\n\n// ---- Account devices & pairing ----\n\n/**\n * Adopt an account that already lives on another device, and mint this node a\n * device of its own for it.\n *\n * The first half of pairing, run on the joining node. It publishes nothing and\n * needs no key: it produces the values the account holder's\n * {@link AdminApiClient.completeAccountPairing} certifies, plus a confirmation\n * code to read out to them.\n *\n * Account-level, and that is the whole point of it: both credentials pairing\n * mints were always account-wide - the certificate is root-signed and the\n * endorsement node-level, so neither ever named a namespace - while the older\n * per-namespace route still made the caller name one, and the device then\n * listened on that one topic while its holder's link fanned out across all of\n * them.\n */\nexport interface AccountPairInitRequest {\n  /**\n   * The epoch-0 root **public** key of the account to join, 64 hex characters -\n   * exactly what {@link NodeIdentity.accountRootPublicKey} reports on the node\n   * that already holds the account.\n   *\n   * Named for the half it carries. An ed25519 private and public key are both 32\n   * bytes and both hex, so nothing but the name tells them apart; the private\n   * root never crosses this boundary at all.\n   */\n  accountRootPublicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * Ids of the namespaces to enroll into, 64 hex characters each.\n   *\n   * The caller has to supply these, because the joining node cannot discover\n   * them - it is a member of nothing and holds no scope key, so it can neither\n   * read the account's namespace set off a DAG nor derive it. The device that\n   * already holds the account is the only party that knows it.\n   *\n   * This decides what the new device *listens* on, and it does not have to agree\n   * with the applications the holder scopes `pair-complete` to: a binding\n   * published where the device is not listening is picked up whenever it does\n   * subscribe, and a subscription the holder never reaches costs nothing.\n   *\n   * Core refuses only a request that names neither this nor `accountNamespace`.\n   * A caller that sends `accountNamespace` may leave this empty.\n   */\n  namespaces?: string[];\n  /**\n   * Hex id of the account namespace to follow - the value\n   * {@link NodeIdentity.accountNamespaceId} reports on the holder.\n   *\n   * The device then learns the account's namespaces from the account namespace\n   * itself, so the caller need not know them up front. A caller that does not\n   * send this must name at least one namespace above.\n   */\n  accountNamespace?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * What the joining device minted, for the account holder to certify.\n *\n * These are round-trip tokens: a caller copies them verbatim into\n * {@link AdminApiClient.completeAccountPairing}. The signing key is the NEW\n * device's, so it appears in no member listing yet and there is nothing here to\n * compare it against.\n *\n * One device is minted however many namespaces were named, so there is one of\n * each of these to hand over, not one per namespace.\n */\nexport interface AccountPairInitResponseData {\n  /** The account this device will speak for once linked, 64 hex characters. */\n  accountId: string;\n  /** The device that was minted, 64 hex characters. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /** X25519 agreement key a scope key must be wrapped under to reach this device, hex. */\n  kemPublicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * The Ed25519 key this device signs its ops with, hex.\n   *\n   * The account holder cannot derive this - it is minted here - and the\n   * certificate names it, so it has to travel with the other two.\n   */\n  signPublicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * Ed25519 signature over the account, the device id and both keys above, hex.\n   *\n   * Carried so the three values arrive as a statement by the device that minted\n   * them rather than as assertions by whoever relayed them; `pair-complete`\n   * refuses without it.\n   */\n  statement: string;\n  /**\n   * The value to read out to the account holder, who compares it against what\n   * their `pair-complete` reports.\n   *\n   * The part a substituting attacker cannot fake: it can re-sign its own\n   * statement, but it would have to make its own keys derive the code the other\n   * side is already reading.\n   */\n  confirmationCode: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Certify a device another node minted, link it, and deliver its scope keys.\n *\n * The second half of pairing, run on the node that holds the account root - the\n * only party that can sign the certificate that makes the device real. Every\n * field but `applications` is copied verbatim from that other node's\n * {@link AccountPairInitResponseData}.\n */\nexport interface AccountPairCompleteRequest {\n  /** The `deviceId` the other node minted, 64 hex characters. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /** That device's X25519 agreement key, 64 hex characters. */\n  kemPublicKey: string;\n  /** That device's Ed25519 signing key, 64 hex characters. */\n  signPublicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * The signature from that node's pair-init, 128 hex characters (64 bytes).\n   *\n   * Not optional: without it the three values above are only claims by whoever\n   * sent them, and certifying those would make attacker-supplied keys a trusted\n   * device of this account.\n   */\n  statement: string;\n  /**\n   * The code the account holder read off the pairing device, e.g.\n   * `7BC0-DAAC-CCB4-84A4`. Grouping and case are ignored.\n   *\n   * Required so the comparison cannot be skipped: this side re-derives the code\n   * for the key material that actually arrived and refuses a mismatch. Its value\n   * rests on the code reaching the holder independently of this payload - sent\n   * beside the keys, it proves nothing. One code covers the whole pairing,\n   * because one device was minted for it.\n   */\n  confirmationCode: string;\n  /**\n   * Which applications this device may speak for, 64 hex each. Omitted or empty means\n   * every one of them.\n   *\n   * Scoped by application rather than by namespace because a person can answer\n   * \"which apps may this device use\" and cannot answer \"which namespaces\" - a\n   * namespace is an implementation unit they never named. The node resolves\n   * these to namespaces through the same lookup\n   * {@link AdminApiClient.listNamespacesForApplication} reads.\n   */\n  applications?: string[];\n}\n\n/** What pairing established. */\nexport interface AccountPairCompleteResponseData {\n  /** The account the device now speaks for, 64 hex characters. */\n  accountId: string;\n  /** The device that was linked, 64 hex characters. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /**\n   * Whether the current scope key was wrapped and published for the device.\n   *\n   * `false` does not mean pairing failed - the link is what confers authority,\n   * and the device's own sync pull re-requests the key. It does mean the device\n   * cannot read until that lands.\n   */\n  keyDelivered: boolean;\n  /**\n   * The code for the key material this certified - the same value the request\n   * carried, echoed so the operator can see what the certificate names.\n   */\n  confirmationCode: string;\n  /**\n   * The `AccountProof<DeviceCert>` this pairing minted, hex-encoded borsh.\n   *\n   * The certified device needs this to present itself as a device of the\n   * account, and cannot read it off the DAG: doing so means being a member of a\n   * group the account speaks in, which a thin client never is. Not a secret - a\n   * certificate is public and proves nothing without the device key it names.\n   */\n  credential: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * A domain an outside verifier defined, which the account root may sign under.\n *\n * A name from a closed set, never the domain bytes. The node prepends the bytes\n * itself: \"sign these bytes with the account root\" would be a signing oracle\n * over the one key that can certify a device, which is account takeover. A node\n * refuses any name it does not know.\n *\n * Typed as a union plus `(string & {})` so a node newer than this SDK can be\n * reached without a cast, while the known names still autocomplete.\n */\nexport type ExternalSigningDomain =\n  | 'mdma.account-link'\n  | 'mdma.account-login'\n  | 'mdma.account-recovery'\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/ban-types\n  | (string & {});\n\n/**\n * Ask this node's account root to sign a payload an outside verifier specified.\n *\n * The verifier owns the format; the node supplies only the domain. For the cloud\n * this is how a challenge it sealed and issued gets signed by a root that\n * deliberately never leaves the node holding it.\n */\nexport interface AccountSignWithRootRequest {\n  /** Which verifier's domain to sign under. */\n  domain: ExternalSigningDomain;\n  /**\n   * The bytes to sign after the domain, hex-encoded.\n   *\n   * Hex rather than text because the field is bytes. For the cloud's challenge \u2014\n   * an ASCII string \u2014 that is the UTF-8 of it, hex-encoded; {@link hexEncodeUtf8}\n   * does exactly that and exists so each caller does not re-derive it.\n   */\n  payload: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Hex-encode a string's UTF-8 bytes, for {@link AccountSignWithRootRequest.payload}.\n *\n * Exists so each caller does not write the same loop. Every verifier this is\n * used with issues its challenge as text, and the node takes bytes \u2014 getting\n * that conversion subtly wrong (UTF-16 code units, a stray newline from a shell)\n * produces a signature over the wrong message, which fails at the verifier with\n * nothing local to point at.\n */\nexport function hexEncodeUtf8(text: string): string {\n  return Array.from(new TextEncoder().encode(text), (b) =>\n    b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'),\n  ).join('');\n}\n\n/** What the node signed, and the key to check it against. */\nexport interface AccountSignWithRootResponseData {\n  /** The account root's public key, 64 hex characters. */\n  rootPublicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * The signature over `domain \u2016 payload`, **base64**.\n   *\n   * Base64 rather than hex because that is what the consuming verifiers decode;\n   * re-encoding it on the way out is a step that fails silently at the far end.\n   */\n  signature: string;\n  /** The account the signing key belongs to, 64 hex characters. */\n  accountId: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Repair or widen the reach of a device this account already certified.\n *\n * Pairing is a snapshot: it bound the device wherever this node took part at the\n * time, so a namespace created or joined afterwards holds no binding for it and\n * the paired device silently never sees that namespace. This re-runs the fan-out\n * against the namespaces this node takes part in now. The device need not be\n * online, and nothing but its id is required - the certificate is already held\n * here, root-signed and naming no namespace, so a fresh endorsement and a key\n * wrap are all a later namespace is missing.\n */\nexport interface RelinkDeviceRequest {\n  /**\n   * Applications to add to the device's stored scope, 64 hex each.\n   *\n   * **Omitted or empty changes nothing** and repairs against the scope already\n   * stored, which is the request an operator makes to heal drift. Note that this\n   * is the one place an empty list does not mean \"all\": widening a narrow scope\n   * to every application is deliberately not expressible here, because\n   * overloading the empty list would make the accidental request the widest one.\n   */\n  applications?: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * The scope to hold: every application, or only the ones named.\n *\n * A tagged shape rather than a list whose emptiness means everything - `all`\n * and `only: []` differ by a whole order of magnitude in what they grant, and\n * an empty `only` is refused rather than treated as `all`.\n */\nexport type DeviceScope = 'all' | { only: string[] };\n\n/**\n * Replace a device's scope outright, in one root-signed op.\n *\n * {@link relinkAccountDevice} only ever adds applications; this is how a\n * scope is narrowed, or an `all` device is given a fixed list instead.\n */\nexport interface RescopeDeviceRequest {\n  scope: DeviceScope;\n}\n\n/** One namespace the relink published the device's link into. */\nexport interface RelinkOutcomeEntry {\n  /** The namespace id, 64 hex characters. */\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /**\n   * Whether the scope key was wrapped and published for the device here.\n   *\n   * `false` means the link landed and the delivery did not; the link is what\n   * confers authority, and the device's own sync pull re-requests the key.\n   */\n  keyDelivered: boolean;\n}\n\n/** One namespace the relink published nothing into, and why. */\nexport interface RelinkSkipEntry {\n  /** The namespace id, 64 hex characters. */\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /**\n   * Why nothing was published there. Currently one of `outOfScope`,\n   * `alreadyBound`, `noScopeKey`, `revoked`, `ownDevice`, `failed`; left as a\n   * string because a node may report a reason newer than this SDK.\n   */\n  reason: string;\n}\n\n/** One namespace a scope replacement no longer reaches. */\nexport interface RescopeDescopeEntry {\n  /** The namespace id, 64 hex characters. */\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /**\n   * Whether the scope key was rotated. `false` means the device stopped writing\n   * there but still holds the key it had, until an admin rotates.\n   */\n  keyRotated: boolean;\n}\n\n/** The scope a device now holds, and what each namespace did about it. */\nexport interface RescopeDeviceResponseData {\n  /** The account the device speaks for, 64 hex characters. */\n  accountId: string;\n  /** The device that was rescoped, 64 hex characters. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /** The scope after the request, 64 hex each. Empty means every application. */\n  applications: string[];\n  /** Namespaces the new scope no longer reaches. */\n  descoped: RescopeDescopeEntry[];\n  /** Namespaces the device was linked into by this call. */\n  linkedIn: RelinkOutcomeEntry[];\n  /** Namespaces nothing was published into, and why. */\n  skipped: RelinkSkipEntry[];\n}\n\n/** What the relink repaired, and what it left alone. */\nexport interface RelinkDeviceResponseData {\n  /** The account the device speaks for, 64 hex characters. */\n  accountId: string;\n  /** The device that was repaired, 64 hex characters. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /**\n   * The device's scope after the request, 64 hex each. Empty means every\n   * application, which is what a pairing that named none asked for.\n   */\n  applications: string[];\n  /**\n   * Namespaces the link was published into by this call. Reported per namespace\n   * because publication is per-DAG, so which namespaces a device actually\n   * reached is a state the caller has to be able to see.\n   */\n  linkedIn: RelinkOutcomeEntry[];\n  /** Namespaces nothing was published into. */\n  skipped: RelinkSkipEntry[];\n}\n\n/**\n * One device of this account, joined from the node-local certificate cache and\n * the live bindings of every namespace this node takes part in.\n */\nexport interface AccountDeviceEntry {\n  /** This device's id, 64 hex characters. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /** The key this device signs its ops with, 64 hex. */\n  signingKey: string;\n  /** Set only on the device this node itself presents. */\n  isSelf: boolean;\n  revoked: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Applications this device may speak for, 64 hex each. **Empty means every\n   * application**, the same convention the stored certificate uses - and the\n   * opposite of what an empty {@link RelinkDeviceRequest.applications} asks for.\n   * Empty also for a device this node holds no cached certificate for: one bound\n   * before the cache existed, or certified by another holder.\n   */\n  applications: string[];\n  /**\n   * Ids of the namespaces currently holding a live binding for this device, 64\n   * hex characters each. Empty for a certified device not yet bound anywhere.\n   */\n  namespaces: string[];\n  /**\n   * The replicated name the account gave this device, absent while it has\n   * none. Every device of the account reads the same one.\n   */\n  label?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Name a device of this account, for a listing to render.\n *\n * Run on the node holding the account root to name any device; a paired node\n * is accepted only for that device's own id.\n */\nexport interface LabelDeviceRequest {\n  /** Trimmed, non-empty, bounded and free of control characters. */\n  label: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * The name that was published, and the epoch that orders it against a rename\n * another device of the account made at the same time.\n */\nexport interface LabelDeviceResponseData {\n  /** The account the device speaks for, 64 hex characters. */\n  accountId: string;\n  /** The device that was named, 64 hex characters. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  label: string;\n  labelEpoch: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * One application this account speaks in, derived from the namespaces this node\n * takes part in that target it.\n *\n * An application installed with no namespace yet is absent here: it has no\n * cross-device meaning until a namespace exists, so there is nothing to scope a\n * device to.\n */\nexport interface AccountApplicationEntry {\n  /** The application id, 64 hex. */\n  applicationId: string;\n  /** Ids of the namespaces targeting it, 64 hex characters each. */\n  namespaces: string[];\n}\n\n/** Withdraw a device from an account, terminally. */\nexport interface RevokeAccountDeviceRequest {\n  /** The device to withdraw, 64 hex. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /**\n   * A hex-encoded, borsh-serialized signed revocation minted elsewhere -\n   * the output of `merod account revoke-proof`.\n   *\n   * The lost-device path: the account root that owns the device is not on this\n   * node, so the proof is signed offline and this node only publishes it. Omit\n   * it and the node mints its own proof if it owns the account, and otherwise\n   * revokes as an admin.\n   *\n   * Not a credential and not a secret - it authorises this one revocation of\n   * this one device, and only alongside a stored binding naming the same\n   * account.\n   */\n  proof?: string;\n}\n\n/** What a revocation withdrew in one namespace. */\nexport interface RevocationOutcome {\n  /** The namespace, 64 hex. */\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /**\n   * Whether the scope key rotated in the same op, in THIS namespace.\n   *\n   * `false` means the device stopped writing there at once but still holds the\n   * key it had, so it can keep READING until an admin rotates. Only an admin\n   * may rotate and an account holder revoking their own device usually is not\n   * one, so this is commonly owed rather than exceptional.\n   */\n  keyRotated: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface RevokeAccountDeviceResponseData {\n  /** The account the device spoke for, 64 hex. */\n  accountId: string;\n  /** The device that was withdrawn, 64 hex. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /**\n   * Whether the scope key rotated in the namespace named in the request.\n   *\n   * {@link revokedIn} is the full picture; prefer it. This reports only the one\n   * namespace the caller asked about and is retained because core keeps it for\n   * a released `calimero-client-py` wheel that requires the field.\n   */\n  keyRotated: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Every namespace the revocation was published into.\n   *\n   * A device belongs to an account rather than to a scope, so revoking it\n   * withdraws it from every namespace holding a binding for it - not only the\n   * one named in the request. Per namespace because publication is per-DAG: a\n   * namespace absent here did not receive the op, and a partially propagated\n   * revocation is a state the caller has to be able to see.\n   */\n  revokedIn: RevocationOutcome[];\n}\n\n// ---- Groups ----\n\nexport interface CreateGroupRequest {\n  applicationId: string;\n  groupId?: string;\n  appKey?: string;\n  name?: string;\n  parentGroupId?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateGroupResponseData {\n  groupId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface GroupUpgradeStatus {\n  fromVersion: string;\n  toVersion: string;\n  initiatedAt: number;\n  initiatedBy: string;\n  status: string;\n  /** Contexts THIS NODE enumerated for the upgrade. Node-local; fleet progress\n   * is the `getMigrationStatus` rollup. */\n  localContextsTotal?: number;\n  localContextsSwapped?: number;\n  /** Contexts whose swap failed on this node; a non-zero value is what\n   * `retryGroupUpgrade` picks up. */\n  localContextsFailed?: number;\n  /** Unix seconds at which THIS NODE finished its own context swaps. Not fleet\n   * convergence - that is `MigrationStatus.fleetCompletedAt`. */\n  completedAt?: number;\n}\n\n// ---- Migration status (migration-UX core surfaces) ----\n\nexport type MemberMigrationState =\n  | 'migrated'\n  | 'in_progress'\n  | 'unknown'\n  | 'failed';\n\n/** Why a member's migration did not complete. */\nexport type MigrationFailureReason =\n  | 'check_aborted'\n  | 'apply_failed'\n  | 'no_migration_path';\n\nexport interface MemberMigrationReport {\n  /** ABI state version the member has loaded, from `#[app::state(version = N)]` -\n   * the engine's migration gate, not the bundle semver and not a CRDT concept.\n   * The wrong reading here is how the core rollup defect (comparing bundle-semver\n   * majors instead of state versions) went unnoticed. */\n  schemaVersion: number;\n  residueAuto: number;\n  syncedUpToHlc: number;\n  reportedAt: number;\n  /** Member's self-reported pending-authored count (best-effort; skew #1). */\n  authoredRemaining: number;\n  /**\n   * Set when the member's migrate did not complete (its migration-check\n   * aborted, or the apply errored). Absent otherwise.\n   */\n  migrationFailed?: MigrationFailureReason;\n}\n\nexport interface MemberMigrationStatusEntry {\n  /** The reporting device's signing KEY, bs58. One account with two devices\n   * appears as two rows: the cohort is replicas, not people. */\n  peer: string;\n  /** The ACCOUNT `peer` speaks for, 64 hex - join it to `listGroupMembers` to\n   * name a person. Absent from nodes predating the field. */\n  account?: string;\n  /** Freshest reported facts. Omitted (not `null`) when the member's state is\n   * `unknown`, so test falsiness rather than `=== null`. */\n  report?: MemberMigrationReport | null;\n  state: MemberMigrationState;\n}\n\nexport interface MigrationStatusRollup {\n  migrated: number;\n  inProgress: number;\n  unknown: number;\n  /** Members whose migrate aborted (migration-check failed or apply errored). */\n  failed: number;\n  total: number;\n  allMigrated: boolean;\n  /** Count of members with authoredRemaining > 0 (owners still to re-sign). */\n  membersPendingSignature: number;\n}\n\nexport interface MigrationStatus {\n  targetVersion: number;\n  expectedMembers: number;\n  /** Governance HLC the cohort was pinned at, as an opaque display string.\n   * Absent when there is no migration record. */\n  cohortPinnedAtHlc?: string;\n  /** Unix seconds at which this node watched the FLEET converge, absent while it\n   * has not. Distinct from `GroupUpgradeStatus.completedAt`, which is this node's\n   * own local swap completion. Durable, unlike `rollup.allMigrated`, which is\n   * recomputed from in-TTL heartbeats and lapses when a member goes quiet. */\n  fleetCompletedAt?: number;\n  rollup: MigrationStatusRollup;\n  members: MemberMigrationStatusEntry[];\n}\n\n// ---- Cascade status ----\n\nexport interface CascadeStatusEntry {\n  groupId: string;\n  upgrade: GroupUpgradeStatus;\n  cascadeHlc?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface GroupInfo {\n  groupId: string;\n  appKey: string;\n  targetApplicationId: string;\n  /**\n   * Absent from nodes that have dropped the concept, always `\"LazyOnAccess\"` on\n   * every released one. Optional because this SDK talks to both; it carries no\n   * information either way. Delete once no supported release still sends it.\n   */\n  upgradePolicy?: string;\n  memberCount: number;\n  contextCount: number;\n  activeUpgrade?: GroupUpgradeStatus;\n  defaultCapabilities: number;\n  subgroupVisibility: string;\n  /**\n   * The group's generic metadata record (replaces the old `alias` field).\n   * `null` if no metadata has ever been set for this group.\n   */\n  metadata?: MetadataRecord | null;\n}\n\nexport type GroupInfoResponseData = GroupInfo;\n\nexport interface GroupMember {\n  /**\n   * The member's ACCOUNT: 64 hex characters.\n   *\n   * Not a signing key \u2014 a person may hold several keys\n   * and governance rows name the person. Both are 32 bytes, so nothing here or\n   * on the server will object if you pass the wrong one; it will simply name a\n   * principal that exists nowhere. Feed this value to\n   * {@link RemoveGroupMembersRequest} and {@link UpdateMemberRoleRequest}, not\n   * to {@link GroupMemberInput}.\n   */\n  identity: string;\n  role: string;\n  name?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ListGroupMembersResponseData {\n  members: GroupMember[];\n  /**\n   * @deprecated The server response uses `members`, not `data`. This alias\n   * is retained so existing callers compile during the upgrade window; it\n   * is never populated by the client and will be removed in the next\n   * major. Switch reads to `response.members`.\n   */\n  data?: GroupMember[];\n}\n\n/** One device bound to a member account. */\nexport interface MemberDevice {\n  /** 64 hex; the form `revokeAccountDevice` takes. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /**\n   * The key this device's signatures carry, 64 hex. Joins against the\n   * identities a context lists.\n   */\n  signingKey: string;\n}\n\n/** A member account and the devices bound to it in the namespace. */\nexport interface MemberDevicesEntry {\n  /** The member's ACCOUNT, 64 hex. */\n  account: string;\n  devices: MemberDevice[];\n}\n\nexport interface ListMemberDevicesOptions {\n  offset?: number;\n  limit?: number;\n}\n\nexport interface ListMemberDevicesResponseData {\n  /**\n   * Every account in the group if the calling node is an admin; only its own\n   * entry if it is a plain member.\n   */\n  members: MemberDevicesEntry[];\n}\n\nexport interface SealToAccountRequest {\n  /**\n   * Hex-encoded plaintext. Small by design: the route exists to hand an account\n   * something like a list of namespace ids, and the node caps the size.\n   */\n  plaintext: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * A payload sealed to an account's root key. Only that account's root can open\n * it; the node that sealed it cannot.\n */\nexport interface SealedEnvelope {\n  /**\n   * The root-key epoch it was sealed under. A rotated root still opens envelopes\n   * from its own epoch, so a recipient holding several needs to know which.\n   */\n  accountRootEpoch: number;\n  /** Hex, 32 bytes: the one-shot sender key. */\n  ephemeralPublicKey: string;\n  /** Hex, 12 bytes: the AES-256-GCM nonce. */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** Hex: the ciphertext with its 16-byte tag appended. */\n  ciphertext: string;\n}\n\nexport interface GroupContextEntry {\n  contextId: string;\n  name?: string;\n}\n\nexport type ListGroupContextsResponseData = GroupContextEntry[];\n\nexport interface DeleteGroupResponseData {\n  isDeleted: boolean;\n}\n\n// ---- Group Members ----\n\nexport interface GroupMemberInput {\n  /**\n   * The invitee's signing KEY, 64 hex \u2014 NOT an account. It is spelled exactly\n   * like one, so only the field name says which this is.\n   *\n   * Adding is the one member-facing call that names a key: the node binds the\n   * key to an account as it admits it, so before that there is no account to\n   * name. Every call that names an EXISTING member takes the account instead.\n   */\n  identity: string;\n  role: string;\n}\n\nexport interface AddGroupMembersRequest {\n  members: GroupMemberInput[];\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type AddGroupMembersResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\nexport interface RemoveGroupMembersRequest {\n  /**\n   * The members to remove, as ACCOUNTS (64 hex) \u2014 the same ids\n   * {@link GroupMember.identity} returns, and not the keys\n   * {@link GroupMemberInput.identity} took to add them.\n   */\n  members: string[];\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type RemoveGroupMembersResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\nexport interface UpdateMemberRoleRequest {\n  role: string;\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type UpdateMemberRoleResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\n// ---- Group Capabilities & Settings ----\n\nexport interface MemberCapabilities {\n  capabilities: number;\n}\n\nexport interface SetMemberCapabilitiesRequest {\n  capabilities: number;\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type SetMemberCapabilitiesResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\nexport interface SetDefaultCapabilitiesRequest {\n  defaultCapabilities: number;\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type SetDefaultCapabilitiesResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\nexport interface SetMemberAutoFollowRequest {\n  /** Auto-join contexts registered in this group. */\n  autoFollowContexts: boolean;\n  /** Self-admit into subgroups nested under this group. */\n  autoFollowSubgroups: boolean;\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type SetMemberAutoFollowResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\nexport interface SetSubgroupVisibilityRequest {\n  subgroupVisibility: string;\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type SetSubgroupVisibilityResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\n/**\n * The signed-release form of a TEE admission policy: admit a TEE running any\n * mero-tee node release the mero-tee release workflow signed, if its quote\n * matches one of `allowedProfiles` in that release's `published-mrtds.json`.\n * Unlike the measurement lists, it does not need updating for each release.\n */\nexport interface SignedReleaseTeePolicy {\n  /** Image profiles to admit, e.g. `locked-read-only`. */\n  allowedProfiles: string[];\n  /** The oldest release admitted (`2.3.72`); any signed release when absent. */\n  minReleaseVersion?: string;\n}\n\n/** A policy that lists the measurements it admits. */\nexport interface MeasurementTeeAdmissionPolicyRequest {\n  allowedMrtd: string[];\n  allowedRtmr0: string[];\n  allowedRtmr1: string[];\n  allowedRtmr2: string[];\n  allowedRtmr3: string[];\n  allowedTcbStatuses: string[];\n  acceptMock: boolean;\n}\n\n/** A policy that admits by signed release. The node refuses measurement lists beside it. */\nexport interface SignedReleaseTeeAdmissionPolicyRequest {\n  signedRelease: SignedReleaseTeePolicy;\n  allowedTcbStatuses: string[];\n  acceptMock: boolean;\n}\n\nexport type SetTeeAdmissionPolicyRequest =\n  | MeasurementTeeAdmissionPolicyRequest\n  | SignedReleaseTeeAdmissionPolicyRequest;\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type SetTeeAdmissionPolicyResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\nexport interface GetTeeAdmissionPolicyResponseData {\n  allowedMrtd: string[];\n  allowedRtmr0: string[];\n  allowedRtmr1: string[];\n  allowedRtmr2: string[];\n  allowedRtmr3: string[];\n  allowedTcbStatuses: string[];\n  acceptMock: boolean;\n  /** Set when the policy admits by signed release; the lists are then empty. */\n  signedRelease?: SignedReleaseTeePolicy;\n}\n\n/**\n * Which admitted TEEs may author as the group's TEE authority (the writer behind\n * `TeeOnly` storage and `#[app::tee]` methods). A TEE whose attested MRTD is in\n * `allowedMrtd` may author; an empty list turns TEE authorship off.\n *\n * Namespace-scoped: set it on the namespace root. The node refuses it on a subgroup.\n */\nexport interface SetTeeAuthoringPolicyRequest {\n  allowedMrtd: string[];\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type SetTeeAuthoringPolicyResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\n// ---- Group / member / context metadata ----\n\n/**\n * Generic metadata record attached to a group, group member, or\n * context-registered-in-a-group (core `calimero_primitives::metadata::MetadataRecord`).\n *\n * `data` is application-defined and opaque to core \u2014 it is stored verbatim.\n * Server-enforced size limits: `name` <= 64 bytes; at most 64 entries in\n * `data`; each key <= 64 bytes; each value <= 4096 bytes. Clients do not need\n * to enforce these \u2014 the server validates.\n */\nexport interface MetadataRecord {\n  name: string | null;\n  data: Record<string, string>;\n  updatedAt: number;\n  /** Public key (hex) of the member that last updated the record. */\n  updatedBy: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Request body for setting a metadata record. **This wholly replaces the\n * record**: `data` defaults to `{}` server-side and replaces the stored map,\n * while omitting `name` keeps the current name. To change `name` while\n * preserving existing `data`, GET the record first and pass its `data` back.\n */\nexport interface SetMetadataRequest {\n  name?: string;\n  data?: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\nexport type SetGroupMetadataRequest = SetMetadataRequest;\nexport type SetMemberMetadataRequest = SetMetadataRequest;\nexport type SetContextMetadataRequest = SetMetadataRequest;\n\n// Set-metadata returns empty\nexport type SetMetadataResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\n/**\n * Inner payload of a GET metadata response. `data` is `null` if no metadata\n * has ever been set for the target group/member/context.\n */\nexport interface GetMetadataResponseData {\n  data: MetadataRecord | null;\n}\n\n// ---- Group Sync, Signing & Upgrades ----\n\nexport interface SyncGroupResponseData {\n  groupId: string;\n  appKey: string;\n  targetApplicationId: string;\n  memberCount: number;\n  contextCount: number;\n}\n\nexport interface UpgradeGroupRequest {\n  targetApplicationId: string;\n  /** Fan the upgrade out to every descendant subgroup running the same app\n   *  (one atomic cascade op). Without it the upgrade applies to the target\n   *  group only - members' subgroups never learn the migration. Server\n   *  default: false. */\n  cascade?: boolean;\n  /** Proceed code-only when the target build embeds no ABI. Core refuses such an\n   *  upgrade by default; setting this asserts the new code is layout-compatible\n   *  with the running state so the upgrade goes ahead. It never bypasses a\n   *  declared-migration or downgrade refusal. Wire name is camelCase passthrough;\n   *  older nodes ignore the unknown field. Server default: false. */\n  forceCodeOnly?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface UpgradeGroupResponseData {\n  groupId: string;\n  status: string;\n  localContextsTotal?: number;\n  localContextsSwapped?: number;\n  localContextsFailed?: number;\n}\n\nexport type GroupUpgradeStatusResponseData = GroupUpgradeStatus | null;\n\n// Retry returns same shape as upgrade\nexport type RetryGroupUpgradeResponseData = UpgradeGroupResponseData;\n\n// ---- Group Reparent & Context Attachments ----\n\nexport interface ReparentGroupRequest {\n  /** 64-char id of the destination parent group. */\n  newParentId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ReparentGroupResponseData {\n  reparented: boolean;\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type DetachContextFromGroupResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\n// ---- Group Ownership Proofs ----\n\nexport interface IssueOwnershipProofRequest {\n  /** Who the proof is for. Non-empty, <= 256 characters. */\n  audience: string;\n  /** 64-hex context id the proof is scoped to. */\n  contextId: string;\n  /** What is being claimed. Non-empty, <= 512 characters. */\n  subject: string;\n  /** Caller-chosen hex nonce, 32-128 characters (even length). */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** Requested expiry, unix ms. Core clamps it to issue time + 5 minutes. */\n  expiresAtMs: number;\n}\n\n/** Namespace-scoped sibling: identical minus `contextId`. */\nexport type IssueNamespaceOwnershipProofRequest = Omit<IssueOwnershipProofRequest, 'contextId'>;\n\nexport interface IssueOwnershipProofResponseData {\n  /** Hex 32-byte ed25519 public key of the signer. */\n  signerPublicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * Base64 opaque UTF-8 JSON bytes of the claim. Verifiers re-parse these exact\n   * bytes and sign over `\"calimero.ownership-claim.v1\\0\" || signedPayload`.\n   */\n  signedPayload: string;\n  /** Base64 64-byte ed25519 signature. */\n  signature: string;\n}\n\n// ---- Group Invitation & Join ----\n\nexport interface CreateGroupInvitationRequest {\n  expirationTimestamp?: number;\n  recursive?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Accounts permitted to admit a claim of this invitation, 64 hex each.\n   *\n   * Omitted or empty is filled in by the node from the group's admins and its\n   * TEE nodes; it refuses to mint if that set comes back empty, because an empty\n   * list on the wire authorises any node to admit. Naming admitters narrows that\n   * set.\n   *\n   * Core signs this list into the invitation, so it cannot be redirected after\n   * the fact.\n   */\n  admitters?: string[];\n  /**\n   * libp2p addresses for those admitters, each including its `/p2p/<peer-id>`\n   * suffix.\n   *\n   * Omitted or empty asks the node to fill them in from addresses it already has\n   * on file \u2014 which is usually what you want. Values supplied here are used as\n   * given rather than merged, on the grounds that a caller naming an address is\n   * correcting the node's view rather than extending it.\n   *\n   * Not signed, so a wrong address costs a failed dial and nothing more.\n   */\n  admitterAddrs?: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface CreateGroupInvitationResponseData {\n  invitation: SignedGroupOpenInvitation;\n  groupName?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateRecursiveGroupInvitationResponseData {\n  invitations: RecursiveInvitationEntry[];\n}\n\nexport interface JoinGroupRequest {\n  invitation: SignedGroupOpenInvitation;\n  groupName?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface JoinGroupResponseData {\n  groupId: string;\n  /** The key the joiner signs with, 64 hex. */\n  memberIdentity: string;\n  /**\n   * The account that key joined as, 64 hex characters. This \u2014 not\n   * `memberIdentity` \u2014 is what every member-addressing endpoint takes, so it\n   * is how the caller addresses the member it just became.\n   */\n  memberAccount: string;\n}\n\n// ---- TEE ----\n\nexport interface TeeInfoResponseData {\n  cloudProvider: string;\n  osImage: string;\n  mrtd: string;\n}\n\nexport interface TeeAttestRequest {\n  nonce: string;\n  applicationId?: string;\n  /**\n   * Bind the node's X25519 transport key into the quote; the response names it\n   * as `transportPublicKey`. See `fetchAttestedTransportKey`.\n   */\n  bindTransportKey?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Also return the Intel-signed collateral the quote is verified against, as\n   * `collateral`, so the quote can be verified with nothing but the node. See\n   * `createQuoteVerifier`. A node that predates it refuses the field.\n   */\n  includeCollateral?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface QuoteHeader {\n  version: number;\n  attestationKeyType: number;\n  teeType: number;\n  qeVendorId: string;\n  userData: string;\n}\n\nexport interface QuoteBody {\n  tdxVersion: string;\n  teeTcbSvn: string;\n  mrseam: string;\n  mrsignerseam: string;\n  seamattributes: string;\n  tdattributes: string;\n  xfam: string;\n  mrtd: string;\n  mrconfigid: string;\n  mrowner: string;\n  mrownerconfig: string;\n  rtmr0: string;\n  rtmr1: string;\n  rtmr2: string;\n  rtmr3: string;\n  reportdata: string;\n  teeTcbSvn2?: string;\n  mrservicetd?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface Quote {\n  header: QuoteHeader;\n  body: QuoteBody;\n  signature: string;\n  attestationKey: string;\n  certificationData: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface TeeAttestResponseData {\n  quoteB64: string;\n  quote: Quote;\n  /** Hex X25519 transport key, present only when the request set `bindTransportKey`. */\n  transportPublicKey?: string;\n  /**\n   * The Intel-signed collateral the quote verifies against, present only when\n   * the request set `includeCollateral` and the quote is not a mock.\n   */\n  collateral?: DcapCollateral;\n}\n\n/**\n * @deprecated Nodes no longer serve `/admin-api/tee/verify-quote` (removed in\n * core#3262), so a request for it fails. Verify quotes with\n * `createQuoteVerifier`.\n */\nexport interface TeeVerifyQuoteRequest {\n  quoteB64: string;\n  nonce: string;\n  expectedApplicationHash?: string;\n}\n\n/** @deprecated See {@link TeeVerifyQuoteRequest}. */\nexport interface TeeVerifyQuoteResponseData {\n  quoteVerified: boolean;\n  nonceVerified: boolean;\n  applicationHashVerified?: boolean;\n  quote: Quote;\n}\n\n// ---- Client Configuration ----\n\nexport interface AdminApiClientConfig {\n  baseUrl: string;\n  getAuthToken?: () => Promise<string | undefined>;\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n}\n\n/** A join signed by its subject, handed to an admitter to publish. */\nexport interface AdmitJoinRequest {\n  /** The invitation being claimed. Must name the admitter in `admitters`. */\n  readonly invitation: SignedGroupOpenInvitation;\n  /**\n   * The signed `SignedNamespaceOp`, borsh-encoded and hex.\n   *\n   * Signed by the joiner's device key, which is what stops an admitter\n   * substituting a different member: peers check the op's signer against the\n   * credential the op carries.\n   */\n  readonly signedOp: string;\n}\n\n/** What the admitter did with it. */\nexport interface AdmitJoinResponseData {\n  /**\n   * Whether the op reached the namespace topic.\n   *\n   * Not \"joined\" \u2014 membership lands when peers apply the op, which the admitter\n   * neither performs nor waits for.\n   */\n  readonly published: boolean;\n}\n", "import { AdminApiClient } from './admin-client.js';\nimport { AdminApiClientConfig } from './admin-types.js';\nimport {\n  HttpClient,\n  createBrowserHttpClient,\n  createNodeHttpClient,\n  createUniversalHttpClient,\n} from '../http-client/index.js';\n\n// Factory functions for creating Admin API clients\n\n/** Admin client over a browser HTTP transport (global `fetch`). */\nexport function createBrowserAdminApiClient(\n  config: AdminApiClientConfig,\n): AdminApiClient {\n  return new AdminApiClient(createBrowserHttpClient(config));\n}\n\n/** Admin client over a Node HTTP transport (Node 18+ `fetch`). */\nexport function createNodeAdminApiClient(\n  config: AdminApiClientConfig,\n): AdminApiClient {\n  return new AdminApiClient(createNodeHttpClient(config));\n}\n\n/** Admin client over whichever transport suits the current runtime. */\nexport function createAdminApiClient(\n  config: AdminApiClientConfig,\n): AdminApiClient {\n  return new AdminApiClient(createUniversalHttpClient(config));\n}\n\n/**\n * Admin client over a caller-supplied HTTP client \u2014 use this to share one\n * transport (and its token handling) with the other API clients.\n */\nexport function createAdminApiClientFromHttpClient(\n  httpClient: HttpClient,\n  _config: AdminApiClientConfig,\n): AdminApiClient {\n  return new AdminApiClient(httpClient);\n}\n", "export interface AuthCallbackResult {\n  accessToken: string;\n  refreshToken: string;\n  applicationId: string;\n  contextId: string;\n  contextIdentity: string;\n  nodeUrl: string;\n}\n\nexport interface AuthLoginOptions {\n  callbackUrl: string;\n  packageName?: string;\n  mode: string;\n  permissions?: string[];\n  registryUrl?: string;\n  packageVersion?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse an auth callback URL hash fragment.\n * Returns null if access_token is missing.\n */\nexport function parseAuthCallback(url: string): AuthCallbackResult | null {\n  try {\n    const hashIndex = url.indexOf('#');\n    if (hashIndex === -1) return null;\n\n    const hash = url.substring(hashIndex + 1);\n    const params = new URLSearchParams(hash);\n\n    const accessToken = params.get('access_token');\n    if (!accessToken) return null;\n\n    return {\n      accessToken,\n      refreshToken: params.get('refresh_token') ?? '',\n      applicationId: params.get('application_id') ?? '',\n      contextId: params.get('context_id') ?? '',\n      contextIdentity: params.get('context_identity') ?? '',\n      nodeUrl: params.get('node_url') ?? '',\n    };\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the auth login URL for redirecting users to the node's auth page.\n */\nexport function buildAuthLoginUrl(nodeUrl: string, opts: AuthLoginOptions): string {\n  const params = new URLSearchParams();\n  params.set('callback-url', opts.callbackUrl);\n\n  if (opts.permissions && opts.permissions.length > 0) {\n    params.set('permissions', opts.permissions.join(','));\n  }\n\n  params.set('mode', opts.mode);\n\n  if (opts.packageName) {\n    params.set('package-name', opts.packageName);\n    if (opts.packageVersion) {\n      params.set('package-version', opts.packageVersion);\n    }\n    if (opts.registryUrl) {\n      params.set('registry-url', opts.registryUrl);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Trim trailing slash from nodeUrl\n  const base = nodeUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n  return `${base}/auth/login?${params.toString()}`;\n}\n", "/**\n * Byte-level primitives shared by everything in this package that signs.\n *\n * Extracted from `warrant/warrant.ts` when the device-cert signer arrived and\n * needed the same `domainHash`, hex handling and ed25519 import. Keeping one\n * copy is the point: these have to stay byte-identical with core, and two\n * copies drifting apart is exactly the failure the byte-parity e2e exists to\n * catch. Internal \u2014 not exported from the package root.\n */\n\nconst PKCS8_ED25519_PREFIX = new Uint8Array([\n  0x30, 0x2e, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x30, 0x05, 0x06, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x70, 0x04,\n  0x22, 0x04, 0x20,\n]);\n\n/** Little-endian u32, for borsh fixed-width fields and epoch counters. */\nexport function u32le(value: number): Uint8Array {\n  const out = new Uint8Array(4);\n  new DataView(out.buffer).setUint32(0, value, true);\n  return out;\n}\n\nexport function hex(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  return Array.from(bytes, (b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');\n}\n\nexport function fromHex(value: string, label: string, expectedBytes: number): Uint8Array {\n  const clean = value.trim();\n  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]*$/.test(clean) || clean.length !== expectedBytes * 2) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `${label} must be ${expectedBytes * 2} hex characters, got ${clean.length}`,\n    );\n  }\n  // Indexed rather than `match(/../g)!`: the length is already validated above,\n  // so the assertion would only be telling the compiler what the guard proved,\n  // and this needs no assertion at all.\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(expectedBytes);\n  for (let i = 0; i < expectedBytes; i += 1) {\n    bytes[i] = Number.parseInt(clean.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);\n  }\n  return bytes;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode hex of an unknown length.\n *\n * The sized {@link fromHex} is the right default \u2014 every key and digest here\n * has a fixed width, and checking it catches a truncated paste at the edge\n * rather than deep inside a signature check. This one exists for the already-\n * encoded structures whose length is genuinely variable: a device certificate,\n * a login statement, a request signature. It still rejects odd-length and\n * non-hex input, so the only check it gives up is the one that cannot apply.\n */\nexport function fromHexUnsized(value: string, label: string): Uint8Array {\n  const clean = value.trim();\n  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]*$/.test(clean) || clean.length % 2 !== 0) {\n    throw new Error(`${label} must be an even number of hex characters`);\n  }\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(clean.length / 2);\n  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i += 1) {\n    bytes[i] = Number.parseInt(clean.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);\n  }\n  return bytes;\n}\n\nexport function u64le(value: number | bigint): Uint8Array {\n  const out = new Uint8Array(8);\n  new DataView(out.buffer).setBigUint64(0, BigInt(value), true);\n  return out;\n}\n\nexport function concat(...parts: Uint8Array[]): Uint8Array {\n  const out = new Uint8Array(parts.reduce((total, p) => total + p.length, 0));\n  let offset = 0;\n  for (const part of parts) {\n    out.set(part, offset);\n    offset += part.length;\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\n/**\n * core's `domain_hash`: SHA-256 over the length-prefixed domain, then each\n * length-prefixed part. The lengths are what stop two different field splits from\n * hashing alike.\n */\nexport async function domainHash(\n  domain: Uint8Array,\n  parts: Uint8Array[],\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [u64le(domain.length), domain];\n  for (const part of parts) {\n    chunks.push(u64le(part.length), part);\n  }\n  return new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', concat(...chunks)),\n  );\n}\n\nexport async function importSigningKey(secretHex: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const seed = fromHex(secretHex, 'deviceSecret', 32);\n  const pkcs8 = concat(PKCS8_ED25519_PREFIX, seed);\n  try {\n    return await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n      'pkcs8',\n      pkcs8,\n      { name: 'Ed25519' },\n      false,\n      ['sign'],\n    );\n  } catch (cause) {\n    // The original message is folded in rather than passed as `cause`: this\n    // package targets ES2020, where `Error` has no `cause` option.\n    const detail = cause instanceof Error ? `: ${cause.message}` : '';\n    throw new Error(\n      'this runtime has no WebCrypto Ed25519, so a warrant cannot be signed ' +\n        'here. Node 18.4+, Safari 17+, Firefox 129+ and Chrome 137+ have it; ' +\n        'otherwise mint the warrant with `merod account warrant`' +\n        detail,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * The public half of an ed25519 seed.\n *\n * Derived rather than taken as an argument, for the reason core does the same: a\n * caller able to name a key it does not hold could produce a warrant it cannot\n * sign, and the field would stop meaning \"who authorised this\".\n */\nexport async function derivePublicKey(secretHex: string): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const seed = fromHex(secretHex, 'deviceSecret', 32);\n  const pkcs8 = concat(PKCS8_ED25519_PREFIX, seed);\n  const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'pkcs8',\n    pkcs8,\n    { name: 'Ed25519' },\n    true,\n    ['sign'],\n  );\n  const jwk = await crypto.subtle.exportKey('jwk', key);\n  const raw = (jwk as JsonWebKey & { x: string }).x;\n  return Uint8Array.from(atob(raw.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/')), (c) =>\n    c.charCodeAt(0),\n  );\n}\n", "/**\n * Sign one HTTP request, so a caller's identity travels with it.\n *\n * This is the bottom link of the chain a delegated client presents. A session\n * has the node mint and remember something; this has the caller prove itself on\n * every call, so the node holds no session state and the same path works\n * whether or not the node runs a login provider at all.\n *\n * ```text\n * account root \u2500\u2500signs\u2500\u2500\u25B6 DeviceCert       cold, once, offline\n * device key   \u2500\u2500signs\u2500\u2500\u25B6 LoginStatement   once per session, hours\n * session key  \u2500\u2500signs\u2500\u2500\u25B6 RequestSig       per call   \u25C0\u2500\u2500 this module\n * ```\n *\n * **The middle link is optional.** A CLI or a server-side job signs with its\n * device key directly and presents two links; a browser keeping the device key\n * behind a hardware or extension boundary mints a session key and presents\n * three. The node's verifier handles both, so which you produce here is a\n * question about where your key lives, not about what the node accepts.\n *\n * **What it binds.** Method, path and a hash of the body. A signature for\n * `GET /a` is not a signature for `POST /a`, for `GET /b`, or for the same call\n * with different arguments.\n *\n * **The path excludes the query string**, deliberately: a proxy may legitimately\n * rewrite it \u2014 a token parameter most of all \u2014 and signing over bytes something\n * else is entitled to change means failing for reasons the caller cannot see.\n * Anything that must be bound belongs in the body.\n *\n * **The method is not normalized.** `HEAD` and `GET` are the same *permission*\n * and the node's permission layer folds them, but they are different requests.\n * Sign the method you are about to send.\n *\n * **Replay inside the window performs the identical request** and is bounded\n * rather than prevented \u2014 keep `expiresAt` short. A warrant, which authorizes a\n * change with lasting effect, carries a nonce ledger for this; a request\n * signature does not.\n *\n * **The byte contract is pinned in core**, at\n * `crates/account/src/tests/request_wire_fixture.rs`, for the same reason the\n * warrant and login ones are: the domains are `pub(crate)` there and the field\n * order is implicit in a `derive`, so nothing on that side forces anyone to\n * notice this file depends on both. This module's test asserts the same vectors.\n */\n\nimport {\n  concat,\n  domainHash,\n  fromHex,\n  hex,\n  importSigningKey,\n  u32le,\n  u64le,\n} from \"../crypto/internal.js\";\n\nconst SIGN_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode(\"calimero.auth.request.v1\");\n\n/**\n * Its own domain, distinct from the signing one.\n *\n * The two are different jobs on the same bytes: this produces the commitment,\n * the other signs over it. Sharing a domain would make the commitment a\n * truncated disclosure of bytes something signs.\n */\nconst BODY_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode(\"calimero.auth.request.body.v1\");\n\n/** A borsh `String`: its own `u32` little-endian length, then the UTF-8. */\nfunction borshString(value: string): Uint8Array {\n  const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(value);\n  return concat(u32le(bytes.length), bytes);\n}\n\n/**\n * Commit to a request body.\n *\n * Always call it, including for a body-less request: an empty body hashes to a\n * value like any other, and there is no \"absent body\" encoding for a verifier\n * to disagree with you about.\n */\nexport async function requestBodyHash(\n  body: Uint8Array | string = new Uint8Array(0),\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const bytes =\n    typeof body === \"string\" ? new TextEncoder().encode(body) : body;\n  return domainHash(BODY_DOMAIN, [bytes]);\n}\n\n/** What a caller is about to send. */\nexport interface RequestSigInput {\n  /**\n   * The HTTP method, exactly as it will appear on the wire \u2014 `GET`, `POST`,\n   * `HEAD`. Not folded: see the module note.\n   */\n  method: string;\n  /**\n   * The path, **without** the query string. `/admin-api/namespaces`, not\n   * `/admin-api/namespaces?token=\u2026`.\n   */\n  path: string;\n  /**\n   * The request body, or nothing. Pass exactly the bytes you will send: the\n   * signature commits to their hash, so a body re-serialized between signing\n   * and sending is a signature for a different request.\n   */\n  body?: Uint8Array | string;\n  /** Unix seconds at signing. */\n  issuedAt: number | bigint;\n  /**\n   * Unix seconds after which the node must refuse it.\n   *\n   * Keep it short \u2014 minutes, not hours. It is what bounds replay, and nothing\n   * else does.\n   */\n  expiresAt: number | bigint;\n  /**\n   * The ed25519 signing secret, hex (32 bytes): the session key on the\n   * three-link chain, the device key on the two-link one.\n   *\n   * Never sent anywhere. It signs locally and only the signature travels.\n   */\n  signerSecret: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign one request and return it hex-encoded, ready to present.\n *\n * Returns the encoding rather than an object for the reason `signWarrant` and\n * `signLoginStatement` do: the signature covers exactly these bytes, and a\n * caller that rebuilt the fields from JSON would have a second spelling able to\n * disagree with what was signed.\n */\nexport async function signRequest(input: RequestSigInput): Promise<string> {\n  const key = await importSigningKey(input.signerSecret);\n  const bodyHash = await requestBodyHash(input.body);\n\n  const issuedAt = u64le(input.issuedAt);\n  const expiresAt = u64le(input.expiresAt);\n\n  const encoder = new TextEncoder();\n  const preimage = await domainHash(SIGN_DOMAIN, [\n    encoder.encode(input.method),\n    encoder.encode(input.path),\n    bodyHash,\n    issuedAt,\n    expiresAt,\n  ]);\n\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign({ name: \"Ed25519\" }, key, preimage),\n  );\n\n  return hex(\n    concat(\n      borshString(input.method),\n      borshString(input.path),\n      bodyHash,\n      issuedAt,\n      expiresAt,\n      signature,\n    ),\n  );\n}\n\n/** Re-exported so a caller can check a hex signer key before signing with it. */\nexport { fromHex };\n", "/**\n * Assemble the credential a node reads from `X-Calimero-Proof`.\n *\n * A request-carried proof is three links, and the node needs all of them in one\n * header: the account root certified the device, the device (optionally)\n * certified a short-lived session key, and that key signed THIS request. Each\n * link is minted by its own function here \u2014 {@link signDeviceCert},\n * {@link signLoginStatement}, {@link signRequest} \u2014 and each already returns\n * the borsh encoding of the Rust type the node deserializes. Rust's\n * `CallerProof` is a plain struct of those three fields, and borsh writes a\n * struct as its fields back to back, so assembling the header is concatenation\n * rather than a fourth encoder.\n *\n * That is worth stating because it is load-bearing and it is not obvious: if it\n * were re-encoded here there would be a second spelling of a signed structure,\n * able to disagree with the one that was signed. `caller-proof.test.ts` pins the\n * concatenation against bytes produced by core itself.\n */\n\nimport { fromHexUnsized, hex, concat } from \"../crypto/internal.js\";\n\n/** The three links, each already hex-encoded by the function that signed it. */\nexport interface CallerProofInput {\n  /**\n   * `signDeviceCert(...)` \u2014 the account root's certificate over the device key,\n   * with the genesis that names the account.\n   */\n  credential: string;\n  /**\n   * `signLoginStatement(...)`, when signing with a session key.\n   *\n   * Omit it on the two-link chain, where the device key signs the request\n   * itself. Omitting is not the same as passing an empty string: borsh writes\n   * `Option` as a tag byte, so the two produce different bytes and only one of\n   * them parses.\n   */\n  session?: string;\n  /** `signRequest(...)` \u2014 the signature over this exact method, path and body. */\n  request: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Concatenate the three links into the header value.\n *\n * Returns hex, ready to present as `X-Calimero-Proof`.\n */\nexport function callerProof(input: CallerProofInput): string {\n  const credential = fromHexUnsized(input.credential, \"credential\");\n  const request = fromHexUnsized(input.request, \"request signature\");\n\n  // Borsh `Option<T>`: a single tag byte, then the value when present. A\n  // two-link chain is `None`, not an empty `Some` \u2014 the node reads the tag\n  // before anything else, so getting it backwards fails to parse rather than\n  // failing to verify, which at least is loud.\n  const session =\n    input.session === undefined\n      ? new Uint8Array([0])\n      : concat(new Uint8Array([1]), fromHexUnsized(input.session, \"session statement\"));\n\n  return hex(concat(credential, session, request));\n}\n", "/**\n * Turn a device key into something the HTTP client can call per request.\n *\n * A session is a bearer token: mint once, present many times. A request-carried\n * proof is the opposite \u2014 it commits to one method, one path and one body, so\n * it has to be produced at the moment of the call, by something holding the\n * signing key. This is that something, shaped like `getAuthToken` so the key\n * stays with the caller and never reaches the transport.\n */\n\nimport { callerProof } from \"./caller-proof.js\";\nimport { signRequest } from \"./request-sig.js\";\n\n/** What the transport knows about the call it is about to make. */\nexport interface ProofRequest {\n  /** `GET`, `POST`, \u2026 exactly as it will be sent. */\n  method: string;\n  /** The URL path the node will see, **without** the query string. */\n  path: string;\n  /** The exact bytes that will be sent, if any. */\n  body?: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface ProofSignerOptions {\n  /** `signDeviceCert(...)`, hex. */\n  credential: string;\n  /**\n   * `signLoginStatement(...)`, hex \u2014 the three-link chain.\n   *\n   * Omit for the two-link chain, where `signerSecret` is the device key itself.\n   */\n  session?: string;\n  /**\n   * The ed25519 secret that signs each request, hex: the session key when\n   * `session` is set, otherwise the device key.\n   */\n  signerSecret: string;\n  /**\n   * How long each signature stays valid. Seconds, default 120.\n   *\n   * This is what bounds replay and nothing else does, so it is deliberately\n   * short and deliberately not configurable to \"never\". A clock skew allowance\n   * lives on the node; this only has to outlive the flight time.\n   */\n  ttlSeconds?: number;\n  /** Unix seconds. Injectable so a test does not depend on the wall clock. */\n  now?: () => number;\n}\n\n/**\n * The bytes a body will actually be sent as.\n *\n * Refuses what it cannot hash without consuming or re-encoding. A stream can be\n * read once, and reading it here would send an empty body; `FormData` and\n * `URLSearchParams` are serialized by `fetch` in ways this cannot reproduce\n * byte for byte. Signing a guess would produce a signature over bytes that\n * never travelled, and the node would reject it with a signature error that\n * says nothing about the real cause \u2014 so this throws, naming the type.\n */\nfunction bodyBytes(body: unknown): Uint8Array | string {\n  if (body === undefined || body === null) return new Uint8Array(0);\n  if (typeof body === \"string\") return body;\n  if (body instanceof Uint8Array) return body;\n  if (body instanceof ArrayBuffer) return new Uint8Array(body);\n  if (ArrayBuffer.isView(body)) {\n    return new Uint8Array(body.buffer, body.byteOffset, body.byteLength);\n  }\n  throw new Error(\n    `a request-carried proof cannot commit to a ${\n      (body as { constructor?: { name?: string } })?.constructor?.name ?? typeof body\n    } body: pass a string or bytes, or use a session for this call`,\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the `X-Calimero-Proof` value for one request.\n *\n * Pass the result to the HTTP client's `getProof`.\n */\nexport function createProofSigner(\n  options: ProofSignerOptions,\n): (request: ProofRequest) => Promise<string> {\n  const ttl = options.ttlSeconds ?? 120;\n  const clock = options.now ?? (() => Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));\n\n  return async (request: ProofRequest): Promise<string> => {\n    const issuedAt = clock();\n    return callerProof({\n      credential: options.credential,\n      session: options.session,\n      request: await signRequest({\n        method: request.method,\n        path: request.path,\n        body: bodyBytes(request.body),\n        issuedAt,\n        expiresAt: issuedAt + ttl,\n        signerSecret: options.signerSecret,\n      }),\n    });\n  };\n}\n", "import type { HttpClient } from '../http-client/index.js';\n\n/** Result of the owner-driven `migrate_my_entries` convert (counts are u32). */\nexport interface MigrateMyEntriesSummary {\n  converted: number;\n  remaining: number;\n}\n\nexport interface ExecuteParams {\n  contextId: string;\n  method: string;\n  argsJson?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** @deprecated No longer used by the server. Ignored if provided. */\n  executorPublicKey?: string;\n}\n\nexport class RpcError extends Error {\n  code: number;\n  type?: string;\n  data?: unknown;\n\n  constructor(code: number, message: string, data?: unknown, type?: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'RpcError';\n    this.code = code;\n    this.data = data;\n    this.type = type;\n  }\n}\n\ninterface JsonRpcResponse {\n  jsonrpc: string;\n  id: number;\n  result?: {\n    output?: unknown;\n    [key: string]: unknown;\n  };\n  error?: {\n    // Standard JSON-RPC fields\n    code?: number;\n    message?: string;\n    // Server-specific fields\n    type?: string;\n    data?: unknown;\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * POST a JSON-RPC call and unwrap `result`, converting an `error` payload into\n * an `RpcError`. The node returns `{ type, data }` (not always `{ code,\n * message }`), so this is the one place that normalization lives \u2014 every\n * JSON-RPC caller in this SDK shares it rather than re-deriving a bare\n * `Error(message)` and dropping the typed detail.\n */\nexport async function jsonRpcCall<T>(\n  httpClient: HttpClient,\n  method: string,\n  params: unknown,\n): Promise<T> {\n  const response = await httpClient.post<JsonRpcResponse>('/jsonrpc', {\n    jsonrpc: '2.0',\n    id: 1,\n    method,\n    params,\n  });\n\n  if (response.error) {\n    const err = response.error;\n    throw new RpcError(err.code ?? -1, err.message ?? err.type ?? 'RPC error', err.data, err.type);\n  }\n\n  return response.result as T;\n}\n\nexport class RpcClient {\n  private httpClient: HttpClient;\n\n  constructor(opts: { httpClient: HttpClient }) {\n    this.httpClient = opts.httpClient;\n  }\n\n  async execute<T = unknown>(params: ExecuteParams): Promise<T> {\n    const result = await jsonRpcCall<JsonRpcResponse['result']>(this.httpClient, 'execute', {\n      contextId: params.contextId,\n      method: params.method,\n      argsJson: params.argsJson ?? {},\n    });\n\n    if (result && 'output' in result) {\n      return result.output as T;\n    }\n\n    return result as T;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * One-tap owner-driven convert: re-signs the caller's identity-gated entries\n   * to the current schema. The export converts all of the caller's\n   * below-target entries in a single sweep, so this issues one call and returns\n   * the resulting summary \u2014 it does not loop.\n   */\n  async migrateMyEntries(contextId: string): Promise<MigrateMyEntriesSummary> {\n    return this.execute<MigrateMyEntriesSummary>({ contextId, method: 'migrate_my_entries' });\n  }\n\n  /** Read-only count of the caller's entries still below the target schema. */\n  async countMyPending(contextId: string): Promise<number> {\n    return this.execute<number>({ contextId, method: 'count_my_pending' });\n  }\n}\n", "/** Parsed group-membership event (core's untagged `NodeEvent` group variant). */\nexport interface GroupMembershipEventData {\n  groupId: string;\n  type: 'MemberJoined' | 'MemberAdded' | 'MemberRemoved';\n  data: {\n    /** The member's ACCOUNT, hex-encoded 32 bytes (64 chars) - the principal the\n     * governance rows name. Not a signing key: the field this replaced\n     * carried one, and both are strings, so the rename is what makes a stale\n     * consumer fail loudly instead of comparing accounts against keys forever. */\n    memberAccount: string;\n    /** Absent on `MemberRemoved`, and on a `MemberJoined` inherited from an Open\n     * subgroup. Core's set is closed. */\n    role?: 'Admin' | 'Member' | 'ReadOnly' | 'ReadOnlyTee';\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * A migration was accepted and its target ABI state version resolved.\n * `toStateVersion` is the `#[app::state(version = N)]` number, not the bundle\n * semver (`toVersion`).\n */\nexport interface MigrationStartedData {\n  fromVersion: string;\n  toVersion: string;\n  toStateVersion: number;\n  /** Contexts the EMITTING NODE enumerated for the migration. Node-local, never\n   * the fleet cohort size that `MigrationProgressData.total` carries. */\n  localContextsTotal: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Fleet rollup counters, recomputed as peers' heartbeat facts change. Counters\n * only: the per-member detail behind them stays in the admin-gated\n * `getMigrationStatus` read.\n */\nexport interface MigrationProgressData {\n  migrated: number;\n  inProgress: number;\n  unknown: number;\n  failed: number;\n  /** The pinned FLEET COHORT size, never a node-local context count like\n   * `MigrationStartedData.localContextsTotal`. */\n  total: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * One subgroup's local context swaps advanced on the emitting node.\n *\n * Admin-only: it names a descendant subgroup, which a plain namespace member\n * may not enumerate, so core withholds it from non-admin subscribers. A\n * non-admin never receiving this variant is correct behaviour, not a gap.\n */\nexport interface CascadeProgressData {\n  /** Hex-encoded descendant subgroup id, never the namespace root the event is\n   * keyed on. */\n  subgroupId: string;\n  localContextsSwapped: number;\n  /** Contexts the emitting node holds for THIS SUBGROUP. Node-local and\n   * per-subgroup; unrelated to both sibling totals. */\n  localContextsTotal: number;\n}\n\n/** Every pinned-cohort member reported the target version. */\nexport interface MigrationCompletedData {\n  toVersion: string;\n  /** FLEET convergence, in seconds since the epoch: the same stamp\n   * `MigrationStatus.fleetCompletedAt` returns. Not `GroupUpgradeStatus.completedAt`,\n   * which is this node's own local swap completion. */\n  completedAt: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parsed group-migration event (core's `GroupMigration` `NodeEvent` variant),\n * keyed on the namespace root a client subscribes with.\n *\n * `MigrationStarted`, `MigrationProgress` and `MigrationCompleted` reach every\n * subscribed member; `CascadeProgress` reaches namespace admins only.\n */\nexport type GroupMigrationEventData =\n  | { groupId: string; type: 'MigrationStarted'; data: MigrationStartedData }\n  | { groupId: string; type: 'MigrationProgress'; data: MigrationProgressData }\n  | { groupId: string; type: 'CascadeProgress'; data: CascadeProgressData }\n  | { groupId: string; type: 'MigrationCompleted'; data: MigrationCompletedData };\n\nconst MIGRATION_EVENT_TYPES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  'MigrationStarted',\n  'MigrationProgress',\n  'CascadeProgress',\n  'MigrationCompleted',\n]);\n\n/** Narrows a raw `'event'` payload to the group-migration family by its tag. */\nexport function isGroupMigrationEvent(\n  event: { type?: string },\n): event is GroupMigrationEventData {\n  return event.type !== undefined && MIGRATION_EVENT_TYPES.has(event.type);\n}\n", "import type { GroupMembershipEventData, GroupMigrationEventData } from './group.js';\nimport { isGroupMigrationEvent } from './group.js';\nimport { AuthRevokedError, HTTPError } from '../http-client/index.js';\n\n/**\n * `x-auth-error` reasons that mean the whole token family is gone, mirroring\n * the request path in `web-client.ts`. Anything else \u2014 `token_expired` above\n * all \u2014 is recoverable by refreshing and reconnecting.\n */\nconst TERMINAL_AUTH_ERRORS = new Set(['token_reuse', 'token_revoked']);\n\n/**\n * Statuses a terminal `x-auth-error` can arrive on.\n *\n * Measured against merod 0.11.0-rc.41: a revoked token family answers\n * `GET /sse` and `POST /sse/subscription` with **403**, `x-auth-error:\n * token_revoked` and `content-length: 0` \u2014 `token_expired` is the 401.\n * Keying the check on 401 alone made the branch below unreachable for the one\n * reason a stream actually sees, so a dead token family surfaced as a bare\n * `HTTPError(403)` and reconnected on a timer forever.\n */\nconst TERMINAL_AUTH_STATUSES = new Set([401, 403]);\n\n/**\n * Whether a failed response means the whole token family is gone, so the caller\n * must re-authenticate and the client must stop reconnecting.\n *\n * The body carries nothing on this path (`content-length: 0`), so the header is\n * the only evidence there is.\n */\nfunction isTerminalAuthFailure(response: { status: number; headers: Headers }): string | null {\n  const authError = response.headers.get('x-auth-error');\n  if (!authError) return null;\n  if (!TERMINAL_AUTH_STATUSES.has(response.status)) return null;\n  return TERMINAL_AUTH_ERRORS.has(authError) ? authError : null;\n}\n\nexport type { GroupMembershipEventData, GroupMigrationEventData };\n\nexport interface SseEventData {\n  contextId: string;\n  /** The context-event discriminator (core serializes it as a sibling of\n   * `data`, e.g. `\"AppVersionChanged\"`). Undefined for events without a tag. */\n  type?: string;\n  data: unknown;\n}\n\n/** Parsed `AppVersionChanged` context event (bundle-version flip; skew #2). */\nexport interface AppVersionChangedEvent {\n  contextId: string;\n  fromVersion?: string;\n  toVersion?: string;\n}\n\n/** Anything the `'event'` stream can deliver: context events plus the\n * group-keyed membership and migration families. */\ntype SseEvent = SseEventData | GroupMembershipEventData | GroupMigrationEventData;\ntype SseEventHandler = (event: SseEvent) => void;\ntype SseConnectHandler = (sessionId: string) => void;\ntype SseErrorHandler = (error: Error) => void;\n\ninterface SseListeners {\n  connect: SseConnectHandler[];\n  event: SseEventHandler[];\n  error: SseErrorHandler[];\n}\n\nexport class SseClient {\n  private baseUrl: string;\n  private getAuthToken: () => Promise<string>;\n  private reconnectDelayMs: number;\n  private sessionId: string | null = null;\n  private abortController: AbortController | null = null;\n  private reconnectTimer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null = null;\n  private subscribedContextIds: Set<string> = new Set();\n  private subscribedGroupIds: Set<string> = new Set();\n  private closed = false;\n  private listeners: SseListeners = { connect: [], event: [], error: [] };\n  private fetchImpl: typeof fetch;\n\n  constructor(opts: {\n    baseUrl: string;\n    getAuthToken: () => Promise<string>;\n    reconnectDelayMs?: number;\n    fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  }) {\n    this.baseUrl = opts.baseUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n    this.getAuthToken = opts.getAuthToken;\n    this.reconnectDelayMs = opts.reconnectDelayMs ?? 3000;\n    // globalThis.fetch must be called as a method on globalThis, not through a\n    // variable, or browsers throw \"Illegal invocation\".\n    this.fetchImpl = (url: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) =>\n      opts.fetch ? opts.fetch(url, init) : globalThis.fetch(url, init);\n  }\n\n  on(event: 'connect', handler: SseConnectHandler): void;\n  on(event: 'event', handler: SseEventHandler): void;\n  on(event: 'error', handler: SseErrorHandler): void;\n  on(event: string, handler: SseConnectHandler | SseEventHandler | SseErrorHandler): void {\n    const key = event as keyof SseListeners;\n    if (key in this.listeners) {\n      // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n      const arr = this.listeners[key] as any[];\n      if (!arr.includes(handler)) arr.push(handler);\n    }\n  }\n\n  off(event: 'connect', handler: SseConnectHandler): void;\n  off(event: 'event', handler: SseEventHandler): void;\n  off(event: 'error', handler: SseErrorHandler): void;\n  off(event: string, handler: SseConnectHandler | SseEventHandler | SseErrorHandler): void {\n    const key = event as keyof SseListeners;\n    if (key in this.listeners) {\n      // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n      const arr = this.listeners[key] as any[];\n      const idx = arr.indexOf(handler);\n      if (idx !== -1) arr.splice(idx, 1);\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Typed convenience over the generic `'event'` stream: invokes `handler` only\n   * for `AppVersionChanged` context events, with the payload already parsed.\n   * Returns an unsubscribe closure (so callers need not retain the listener).\n   */\n  onAppVersionChanged(handler: (e: AppVersionChangedEvent) => void): () => void {\n    const listener: SseEventHandler = (ev) => {\n      // Core flattens the tagged payload: the event carries `type` as a sibling\n      // of `data`, and `data` is the `{ fromVersion?, toVersion? }` payload.\n      if (ev.type !== 'AppVersionChanged') return;\n      const d = ev.data as { fromVersion?: string; toVersion?: string } | undefined;\n      handler({ contextId: ev.contextId, fromVersion: d?.fromVersion, toVersion: d?.toVersion });\n    };\n    this.on('event', listener);\n    return () => this.off('event', listener);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Typed convenience over the generic `'event'` stream: invokes `handler` only\n   * for group-migration events, narrowed on `type` so `data` is the matching\n   * payload. Returns an unsubscribe closure.\n   *\n   * A non-admin subscriber sees `MigrationStarted`, `MigrationProgress` and\n   * `MigrationCompleted` but never `CascadeProgress`, which core delivers to\n   * namespace admins only.\n   */\n  onMigrationEvent(handler: (e: GroupMigrationEventData) => void): () => void {\n    const listener: SseEventHandler = (ev) => {\n      if (isGroupMigrationEvent(ev)) handler(ev);\n    };\n    this.on('event', listener);\n    return () => this.off('event', listener);\n  }\n\n  private emit(event: 'connect', sessionId: string): void;\n  private emit(event: 'event', data: SseEvent): void;\n  private emit(event: 'error', error: Error): void;\n  private emit(event: string, arg?: string | SseEvent | Error): void {\n    const key = event as keyof SseListeners;\n    if (key in this.listeners) {\n      for (const handler of this.listeners[key]) {\n        try {\n          // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n          (handler as any)(arg);\n        } catch {\n          // Swallow handler errors\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  async connect(): Promise<void> {\n    // Already connected \u2014 don't reconnect\n    if (this.abortController && !this.closed) {\n      return;\n    }\n    this.closed = false;\n    this.abortController = new AbortController();\n\n    try {\n      const token = await this.getAuthToken();\n      const url = `${this.baseUrl}/sse`;\n      const response = await this.fetchImpl(url, {\n        headers: {\n          'Authorization': `Bearer ${token}`,\n          'Accept': 'text/event-stream',\n        },\n        signal: this.abortController.signal,\n      });\n\n      if (!response.ok) {\n        // Throw the same typed errors the request path throws. A bare\n        // `Error(\"SSE connection failed: 401\")` forced callers to string-match\n        // the status and guess what it meant, and the honest guess \u2014 treat any\n        // 401 as fatal \u2014 logs the user out on a routine reconnect after the\n        // access token ages out, discarding a refresh token that was still\n        // good. The distinction is in the header; surface it.\n        const terminal = isTerminalAuthFailure(response);\n        const bodyText = await response.text().catch(() => undefined);\n\n        if (terminal) {\n          throw new AuthRevokedError(\n            terminal,\n            response.status,\n            response.statusText,\n            url,\n            response.headers,\n            bodyText,\n          );\n        }\n\n        throw new HTTPError(\n          response.status,\n          response.statusText,\n          url,\n          response.headers,\n          bodyText,\n        );\n      }\n\n      if (!response.body) {\n        throw new Error('SSE response has no body');\n      }\n\n      this.readStream(response.body).catch((err) => {\n        if (this.closed) return;\n        const error = err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err));\n        this.emit('error', error);\n        this.scheduleReconnect();\n      });\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (this.closed) return;\n      const error = err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err));\n      this.emit('error', error);\n      // Reconnecting against a revoked token family is a timer that never\n      // succeeds: every attempt re-sends the same dead credential. The caller\n      // has to re-authenticate, and an AuthRevokedError is how it is told.\n      if (error instanceof AuthRevokedError) return;\n      this.scheduleReconnect();\n    }\n  }\n\n  private async readStream(body: ReadableStream<Uint8Array>): Promise<void> {\n    const reader = body.getReader();\n    const decoder = new TextDecoder();\n    let buffer = '';\n\n    try {\n      for (;;) {\n        const { done, value } = await reader.read();\n        if (done) break;\n\n        buffer += decoder.decode(value, { stream: true });\n\n        const lines = buffer.split('\\n');\n        // Keep the last partial line in the buffer\n        buffer = lines.pop() ?? '';\n\n        for (const line of lines) {\n          if (line.startsWith('data:')) {\n            const jsonStr = line.slice(5).trim();\n            if (jsonStr) {\n              this.handleMessage(jsonStr);\n            }\n          }\n        }\n      }\n      // Flush remaining bytes from the decoder\n      buffer += decoder.decode();\n      if (buffer.startsWith('data:')) {\n        const jsonStr = buffer.slice(5).trim();\n        if (jsonStr) {\n          this.handleMessage(jsonStr);\n        }\n      }\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (this.closed) return;\n      const error = err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err));\n      this.emit('error', error);\n    }\n\n    // Stream ended, reconnect\n    if (!this.closed) {\n      this.scheduleReconnect();\n    }\n  }\n\n  private handleMessage(jsonStr: string): void {\n    try {\n      const msg = JSON.parse(jsonStr);\n\n      // Connection message\n      if (msg.type === 'connect' && msg.session_id) {\n        this.sessionId = msg.session_id;\n        this.emit('connect', msg.session_id);\n        // Re-subscribe after reconnect\n        if (this.subscribedContextIds.size > 0 || this.subscribedGroupIds.size > 0) {\n          this.sendSubscription('subscribe', {\n            contextIds: [...this.subscribedContextIds],\n            groupIds: [...this.subscribedGroupIds],\n          });\n        }\n        return;\n      }\n\n      if (!msg.result) return;\n\n      let eventData = msg.result.data;\n      // Decode byte-array data if needed\n      if (Array.isArray(eventData)) {\n        try {\n          const bytes = new Uint8Array(eventData);\n          const text = new TextDecoder().decode(bytes);\n          eventData = JSON.parse(text);\n        } catch {\n          // Keep raw data\n        }\n      }\n\n      // Context event message\n      if (msg.result.contextId) {\n        this.emit('event', {\n          contextId: msg.result.contextId,\n          // Forward the event tag (sibling of `data` in core's flattened\n          // payload) so typed helpers like `onAppVersionChanged` can discriminate.\n          type: msg.result.type,\n          data: eventData,\n        });\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Group-keyed event message (untagged NodeEvent's membership and\n      // migration variants; the `type` tag tells them apart).\n      if (msg.result.groupId) {\n        this.emit('event', {\n          groupId: msg.result.groupId,\n          type: msg.result.type,\n          data: eventData,\n        });\n      }\n    } catch {\n      // Invalid JSON, ignore\n    }\n  }\n\n  async subscribe(idsOrOpts: string[] | { contextIds?: string[]; groupIds?: string[] }): Promise<void> {\n    const opts = Array.isArray(idsOrOpts) ? { contextIds: idsOrOpts } : idsOrOpts;\n    const newContextIds = (opts.contextIds ?? []).filter(id => !this.subscribedContextIds.has(id));\n    const newGroupIds = (opts.groupIds ?? []).filter(id => !this.subscribedGroupIds.has(id));\n    for (const id of opts.contextIds ?? []) {\n      this.subscribedContextIds.add(id);\n    }\n    for (const id of opts.groupIds ?? []) {\n      this.subscribedGroupIds.add(id);\n    }\n    if ((newContextIds.length > 0 || newGroupIds.length > 0) && this.sessionId) {\n      await this.sendSubscription('subscribe', { contextIds: newContextIds, groupIds: newGroupIds });\n    }\n  }\n\n  async unsubscribe(idsOrOpts: string[] | { contextIds?: string[]; groupIds?: string[] }): Promise<void> {\n    const opts = Array.isArray(idsOrOpts) ? { contextIds: idsOrOpts } : idsOrOpts;\n    const hadContextIds = (opts.contextIds ?? []).filter(id => this.subscribedContextIds.has(id));\n    const hadGroupIds = (opts.groupIds ?? []).filter(id => this.subscribedGroupIds.has(id));\n    for (const id of opts.contextIds ?? []) {\n      this.subscribedContextIds.delete(id);\n    }\n    for (const id of opts.groupIds ?? []) {\n      this.subscribedGroupIds.delete(id);\n    }\n    if ((hadContextIds.length > 0 || hadGroupIds.length > 0) && this.sessionId) {\n      await this.sendSubscription('unsubscribe', { contextIds: hadContextIds, groupIds: hadGroupIds });\n    }\n  }\n\n  private async sendSubscription(\n    method: 'subscribe' | 'unsubscribe',\n    ids: { contextIds?: string[]; groupIds?: string[] },\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    try {\n      const token = await this.getAuthToken();\n      const params: { contextIds?: string[]; groupIds?: string[] } = {};\n      if (ids.contextIds && ids.contextIds.length > 0) params.contextIds = ids.contextIds;\n      if (ids.groupIds && ids.groupIds.length > 0) params.groupIds = ids.groupIds;\n      const response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/sse/subscription`, {\n        method: 'POST',\n        headers: {\n          'Authorization': `Bearer ${token}`,\n          'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n        },\n        body: JSON.stringify({\n          id: this.sessionId,\n          method,\n          params,\n        }),\n      });\n      if (!response.ok) {\n        // The subscribe path used to report only the status. On the one failure\n        // that matters it is the whole of what the caller got: a revoked family\n        // answers 403 with an empty body, so a bare `SSE subscribe failed: 403`\n        // discarded the only evidence of what went wrong \u2014 and a 403 here reads\n        // identically to the unrelated \"not the session owner\" refusal, which\n        // does carry a body.\n        const terminal = isTerminalAuthFailure(response);\n        const bodyText = await response.text().catch(() => undefined);\n        this.emit(\n          'error',\n          terminal\n            ? new AuthRevokedError(\n                terminal,\n                response.status,\n                response.statusText,\n                `${this.baseUrl}/sse/subscription`,\n                response.headers,\n                bodyText,\n              )\n            : new HTTPError(\n                response.status,\n                response.statusText,\n                `${this.baseUrl}/sse/subscription`,\n                response.headers,\n                bodyText,\n              ),\n        );\n      }\n    } catch (err) {\n      this.emit('error', err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(`SSE ${method} failed`));\n    }\n  }\n\n  private forceReconnect(): void {\n    if (this.abortController) {\n      this.abortController.abort();\n      this.abortController = null;\n    }\n    this.sessionId = null;\n    this.connect();\n  }\n\n  private scheduleReconnect(): void {\n    if (this.closed) return;\n    if (this.reconnectTimer) {\n      clearTimeout(this.reconnectTimer);\n    }\n    this.reconnectTimer = setTimeout(() => {\n      this.reconnectTimer = null;\n      this.forceReconnect();\n    }, this.reconnectDelayMs);\n  }\n\n  close(): void {\n    this.closed = true;\n    if (this.abortController) {\n      this.abortController.abort();\n      this.abortController = null;\n    }\n    if (this.reconnectTimer) {\n      clearTimeout(this.reconnectTimer);\n      this.reconnectTimer = null;\n    }\n    this.sessionId = null;\n    this.subscribedContextIds.clear();\n    this.subscribedGroupIds.clear();\n  }\n}\n", "import type { GroupMembershipEventData, GroupMigrationEventData } from './group.js';\n\nexport type { GroupMembershipEventData, GroupMigrationEventData };\n\nexport interface WsEventData {\n  contextId: string;\n  /** The context-event discriminator (core serializes it as a sibling of\n   * `data`, e.g. `\"AppVersionChanged\"`). Undefined for events without a tag. */\n  type?: string;\n  data: unknown;\n}\n\n/** Anything the `'event'` stream can deliver: context events plus the\n * group-keyed membership and migration families. */\ntype WsEvent = WsEventData | GroupMembershipEventData | GroupMigrationEventData;\ntype WsEventHandler = (event: WsEvent) => void;\ntype WsConnectHandler = () => void;\ntype WsErrorHandler = (error: Error) => void;\n\ninterface WsListeners {\n  connect: WsConnectHandler[];\n  event: WsEventHandler[];\n  error: WsErrorHandler[];\n}\n\n/**\n * @experimental WebSocket event client. The SSE client (`SseClient`) is the\n * recommended transport for production \u2014 use `MeroJs.events` instead of `MeroJs.ws`.\n */\nexport class WsClient {\n  private baseUrl: string;\n  private getAuthToken: () => Promise<string>;\n  private ws: WebSocket | null = null;\n  private closed = false;\n  private reconnectAttempt = 0;\n  private reconnectTimer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null = null;\n  private subscribedContextIds: Set<string> = new Set();\n  private subscribedGroupIds: Set<string> = new Set();\n  private listeners: WsListeners = { connect: [], event: [], error: [] };\n\n  private static readonly MAX_BACKOFF_MS = 30000;\n\n  constructor(opts: {\n    baseUrl: string;\n    getAuthToken: () => Promise<string>;\n  }) {\n    this.baseUrl = opts.baseUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n    this.getAuthToken = opts.getAuthToken;\n  }\n\n  on(event: 'connect', handler: WsConnectHandler): void;\n  on(event: 'event', handler: WsEventHandler): void;\n  on(event: 'error', handler: WsErrorHandler): void;\n  on(event: string, handler: WsConnectHandler | WsEventHandler | WsErrorHandler): void {\n    const key = event as keyof WsListeners;\n    if (key in this.listeners) {\n      // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n      const arr = this.listeners[key] as any[];\n      if (!arr.includes(handler)) arr.push(handler);\n    }\n  }\n\n  off(event: 'connect', handler: WsConnectHandler): void;\n  off(event: 'event', handler: WsEventHandler): void;\n  off(event: 'error', handler: WsErrorHandler): void;\n  off(event: string, handler: WsConnectHandler | WsEventHandler | WsErrorHandler): void {\n    const key = event as keyof WsListeners;\n    if (key in this.listeners) {\n      // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n      const arr = this.listeners[key] as any[];\n      const idx = arr.indexOf(handler);\n      if (idx !== -1) arr.splice(idx, 1);\n    }\n  }\n\n  private emit(event: 'connect'): void;\n  private emit(event: 'event', data: WsEvent): void;\n  private emit(event: 'error', error: Error): void;\n  private emit(event: string, arg?: WsEvent | Error): void {\n    const key = event as keyof WsListeners;\n    if (key in this.listeners) {\n      for (const handler of this.listeners[key]) {\n        try {\n          // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n          (handler as any)(arg);\n        } catch {\n          // Swallow handler errors\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  async connect(): Promise<void> {\n    if (this.ws && (this.ws.readyState === 0 /* CONNECTING */ || this.ws.readyState === 1 /* OPEN */)) {\n      return;\n    }\n    this.closed = false;\n\n    try {\n      const token = await this.getAuthToken();\n      if (!token) {\n        throw new Error('No authentication token available for WebSocket connection');\n      }\n      // Browser WebSocket API can't set headers, use query param\n      const wsUrl = this.baseUrl.replace(/^http/, 'ws');\n      this.ws = new WebSocket(`${wsUrl}/ws?token=${encodeURIComponent(token)}`);\n\n      this.ws.onopen = () => {\n        this.reconnectAttempt = 0;\n        this.emit('connect');\n        this.resubscribeAfterReconnect();\n      };\n\n      this.ws.onmessage = (event) => {\n        this.handleMessage(event.data);\n      };\n\n      this.ws.onerror = () => {\n        this.emit('error', new Error('WebSocket error'));\n      };\n\n      this.ws.onclose = () => {\n        if (!this.closed) {\n          this.scheduleReconnect();\n        }\n      };\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (this.closed) return;\n      const error = err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err));\n      this.emit('error', error);\n      this.scheduleReconnect();\n    }\n  }\n\n  private handleMessage(raw: string | ArrayBuffer | Blob): void {\n    if (typeof raw !== 'string') return;\n\n    try {\n      const msg = JSON.parse(raw);\n\n      if (!msg.result) return;\n\n      let eventData = msg.result.data;\n      if (Array.isArray(eventData)) {\n        try {\n          const bytes = new Uint8Array(eventData);\n          const text = new TextDecoder().decode(bytes);\n          eventData = JSON.parse(text);\n        } catch {\n          // Keep raw data\n        }\n      }\n\n      if (msg.result.contextId) {\n        this.emit('event', {\n          contextId: msg.result.contextId,\n          // Forward the event tag (sibling of `data` in core's flattened\n          // payload) so consumers can discriminate, matching `SseClient`.\n          type: msg.result.type,\n          data: eventData,\n        });\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Group-keyed event message (untagged NodeEvent's membership and\n      // migration variants; the `type` tag tells them apart).\n      if (msg.result.groupId) {\n        this.emit('event', {\n          groupId: msg.result.groupId,\n          type: msg.result.type,\n          data: eventData,\n        });\n      }\n    } catch {\n      // Invalid JSON, ignore\n    }\n  }\n\n  subscribe(idsOrOpts: string[] | { contextIds?: string[]; groupIds?: string[] }): void {\n    const opts = Array.isArray(idsOrOpts) ? { contextIds: idsOrOpts } : idsOrOpts;\n    for (const id of opts.contextIds ?? []) {\n      this.subscribedContextIds.add(id);\n    }\n    for (const id of opts.groupIds ?? []) {\n      this.subscribedGroupIds.add(id);\n    }\n\n    if (this.ws && this.ws.readyState === 1 /* OPEN */) {\n      this.sendMessage({\n        id: null,\n        method: 'subscribe',\n        params: this.buildSubscriptionParams(opts.contextIds ?? [], opts.groupIds ?? []),\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  unsubscribe(idsOrOpts: string[] | { contextIds?: string[]; groupIds?: string[] }): void {\n    const opts = Array.isArray(idsOrOpts) ? { contextIds: idsOrOpts } : idsOrOpts;\n    for (const id of opts.contextIds ?? []) {\n      this.subscribedContextIds.delete(id);\n    }\n    for (const id of opts.groupIds ?? []) {\n      this.subscribedGroupIds.delete(id);\n    }\n\n    if (this.ws && this.ws.readyState === 1 /* OPEN */) {\n      this.sendMessage({\n        id: null,\n        method: 'unsubscribe',\n        params: this.buildSubscriptionParams(opts.contextIds ?? [], opts.groupIds ?? []),\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  private resubscribeAfterReconnect(): void {\n    if (this.subscribedContextIds.size === 0 && this.subscribedGroupIds.size === 0) return;\n    this.sendMessage({\n      id: null,\n      method: 'subscribe',\n      params: this.buildSubscriptionParams([...this.subscribedContextIds], [...this.subscribedGroupIds]),\n    });\n  }\n\n  private buildSubscriptionParams(\n    contextIds: string[],\n    groupIds: string[],\n  ): { contextIds?: string[]; groupIds?: string[] } {\n    const params: { contextIds?: string[]; groupIds?: string[] } = {};\n    if (contextIds.length > 0) params.contextIds = contextIds;\n    if (groupIds.length > 0) params.groupIds = groupIds;\n    return params;\n  }\n\n  private sendMessage(msg: unknown): void {\n    if (this.ws && this.ws.readyState === 1 /* OPEN */) {\n      this.ws.send(JSON.stringify(msg));\n    }\n  }\n\n  private scheduleReconnect(): void {\n    if (this.closed) return;\n    if (this.reconnectTimer) {\n      clearTimeout(this.reconnectTimer);\n    }\n    const delay = Math.min(\n      1000 * Math.pow(2, this.reconnectAttempt),\n      WsClient.MAX_BACKOFF_MS,\n    );\n    this.reconnectAttempt++;\n    this.reconnectTimer = setTimeout(() => {\n      this.reconnectTimer = null;\n      this.connect();\n    }, delay);\n  }\n\n  close(): void {\n    this.closed = true;\n    if (this.reconnectTimer) {\n      clearTimeout(this.reconnectTimer);\n      this.reconnectTimer = null;\n    }\n    if (this.ws) {\n      this.ws.onclose = null;\n      this.ws.close();\n      this.ws = null;\n    }\n    this.subscribedContextIds.clear();\n    this.subscribedGroupIds.clear();\n  }\n}\n", "import type { Codec } from './types.js';\n\n/** Default codec: JSON text as a byte array. The wire carries `state` as\n * `number[]`, not a string, so this encodes to bytes rather than to text. */\nexport function jsonCodec<T>(): Codec<T> {\n  return {\n    encode(value: T): number[] {\n      return Array.from(new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(value)));\n    },\n    decode(bytes: number[]): T {\n      return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(new Uint8Array(bytes))) as T;\n    },\n  };\n}\n", "import type { HttpClient } from '../http-client/index.js';\nimport type { SseClient } from '../events/index.js';\nimport { jsonRpcCall } from '../rpc/index.js';\nimport { jsonCodec } from './codec.js';\nimport type { Codec, EphemeralEntry } from './types.js';\n\nexport { jsonCodec };\nexport type { Codec, EphemeralEntry };\n\n/**\n * Ephemeral presence: transient, encrypted, never-persisted state (cursors,\n * typing, presence) that gossips between nodes without a WASM run or DAG\n * growth.\n *\n * The write/read asymmetry is the model, not an oversight. `set` takes no\n * author: you can only ever write your OWN slot, and the node resolves the\n * author server-side from its owned context identity \u2014 which is also why a\n * client cannot publish as somebody else. `subscribe` returns everyone's\n * slots, so each carries its `author`. The store is N independent\n * single-writer registers keyed by author; there is no merge across authors.\n *\n * There is a single read path: `subscribe`. On subscribing to a context, the\n * node replays that context's current presence to this connection as\n * ordinary `Ephemeral` events (carrying `ageMs`), before any live deltas\n * (which carry no `ageMs`). There is no separate snapshot RPC.\n */\nexport class EphemeralClient {\n  private httpClient: HttpClient;\n  private sse: SseClient;\n\n  constructor(opts: { httpClient: HttpClient; sse: SseClient }) {\n    this.httpClient = opts.httpClient;\n    this.sse = opts.sse;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Publish your own presence slice, replacing it wholesale.\n   *\n   * Rejects with an `RpcError` (not a bare `Error`), so a typed failure such as\n   * an oversized slice keeps its `type` and `data` \u2014 e.g. `SliceTooLarge` with\n   * the offending size \u2014 and is `instanceof RpcError` like every other RPC in\n   * this SDK.\n   */\n  async set<T>(contextId: string, state: T, codec: Codec<T> = jsonCodec<T>()): Promise<void> {\n    await jsonRpcCall<Record<string, never>>(this.httpClient, 'set_ephemeral', {\n      contextId,\n      state: codec.encode(state),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Observe presence changes for a context.\n   *\n   * This adds NO transport \u2014 it is a typed filter over the existing SSE event\n   * stream, which already carries `{ contextId, type, data }`. On subscribing,\n   * the node replays that context's current presence to this connection as\n   * ordinary `Ephemeral` events before any live deltas; a replayed entry\n   * carries `ageMs`, a live delta does not (never synthesized as `0` \u2014 absent\n   * and zero mean different things). Returns an unsubscribe function.\n   */\n  subscribe<T>(\n    contextId: string,\n    handler: (entry: EphemeralEntry<T>) => void,\n    codec: Codec<T> = jsonCodec<T>(),\n  ): () => void {\n    const listener = (event: unknown): void => {\n      const e = event as { contextId?: string; type?: string; data?: unknown };\n      if (e.type !== 'Ephemeral' || e.contextId !== contextId) return;\n\n      const data = e.data as\n        | { author?: string; state?: number[]; removed?: boolean; ageMs?: number }\n        | undefined;\n      if (!data?.author) return;\n\n      // `removed` is omitted on an upsert, so normalize to a boolean here and\n      // spare every caller the truthiness rule.\n      const removed = Boolean(data.removed);\n      const entry: EphemeralEntry<T> = {\n        author: data.author,\n        state: removed || data.state === undefined ? undefined : codec.decode(data.state),\n        removed,\n      };\n      // `ageMs` is present only on a replayed seed entry; pass it through as-is\n      // rather than defaulting a live delta to 0.\n      if (data.ageMs !== undefined) entry.ageMs = data.ageMs;\n      handler(entry);\n    };\n\n    this.sse.on('event', listener);\n    // Errors surface via the SSE client's own 'error' event; nothing more to\n    // do with them here.\n    void this.sse.connect().catch(() => undefined);\n    void this.sse.subscribe([contextId]).catch(() => undefined);\n\n    return () => {\n      this.sse.off('event', listener);\n    };\n  }\n}\n", "/**\n * Minting and certifying a device offline, with a key that never reaches a node.\n *\n * This is the second half of the keyholder story. `signWarrant` lets an account\n * with no node *write*; this lets one exist in the first place \u2014 an account root\n * certifies a device, and the resulting credential is what a joiner presents.\n *\n * As with the warrant signer, the risk is that this reproduces core's encoding\n * and has to keep doing so. The answer is the same: a golden vector here, and an\n * e2e that diffs this output against `merod account sign-cert` byte for byte.\n *\n * Everything below is derived from core:\n *\n * - `DeviceCert::signing_payload` \u2014 `crates/account/src/device.rs`\n * - `DeviceId::mint`              \u2014 `crates/primitives/src/identity.rs`\n * - `AccountProof` / `AccountGenesis` borsh layout \u2014 `crates/account/src/{signed,account}.rs`\n */\nimport {\n  concat,\n  derivePublicKey,\n  domainHash,\n  fromHex,\n  hex,\n  importSigningKey,\n  u32le,\n} from '../crypto/internal.js';\n\nconst CERT_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode('calimero.device.cert.v1');\nconst ACCOUNT_ID_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode('calimero.account.genesis.v1');\nconst DEVICE_ID_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode('calimero.device.id.v1');\n\n/** `AccountGenesis::version`, which the credential's borsh encoding leads with. */\n/**\n * Core's `ACCOUNT_GENESIS_VERSION`. It is part of the `AccountId` preimage, so\n * this value decides which account a root key names \u2014 a mismatch does not fail\n * as a version error at the edge, it silently derives a different account and\n * core refuses the credential as unverifiable.\n *\n * `2` since the genesis dropped its per-namespace nonce. This was `1`, which\n * produced credentials current core rejects outright; the shape was already v2,\n * only the tag was stale.\n */\nconst ACCOUNT_GENESIS_VERSION = 2;\n\n/** What a root certifies about one device. */\nexport interface DeviceCertInput {\n  /** The account root's signing secret, 64 hex. Signs the certificate. */\n  rootSecret: string;\n  /** The device being certified, 64 hex \u2014 see {@link mintDeviceId}. */\n  device: string;\n  /** The key that device signs with, 64 hex. */\n  signPublicKey: string;\n  /** The key the group key is delivered to, 64 hex (X25519). */\n  kemPublicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * Must strictly exceed any epoch already folded for this device.\n   *\n   * The projection refuses a link that does not advance it, so a re-issued\n   * certificate reusing an epoch is inert rather than a rollback.\n   */\n  deviceEpoch: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a device id: `H(DEVICE_ID_DOMAIN, account \u2016 nonce)`.\n *\n * Derived from the account and a fresh nonce rather than from the device's keys,\n * so rotating a keypair keeps the replica identity \u2014 and with it the counter\n * slots and HLC lineage \u2014 intact.\n */\nexport async function mintDeviceId(\n  account: string,\n  nonce: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<string> {\n  if (nonce.length !== 16) {\n    throw new Error(`nonce must be 16 bytes, got ${nonce.length}`);\n  }\n  const accountBytes = fromHex(account, 'account', 32);\n  return hex(await domainHash(DEVICE_ID_DOMAIN, [accountBytes, nonce]));\n}\n\n/**\n * The 32 bytes a root signs to certify a device.\n *\n * Both keys are covered, so neither the signing key nor the delivery key can be\n * substituted into a certificate that otherwise verifies \u2014 which is what stops a\n * relay carrying someone's credential from making itself the reader.\n */\nexport async function deviceCertPayload(input: {\n  account: string;\n  device: string;\n  signPublicKey: string;\n  kemPublicKey: string;\n  keyEpoch: number;\n  deviceEpoch: number;\n}): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  return domainHash(CERT_DOMAIN, [\n    fromHex(input.account, 'account', 32),\n    fromHex(input.device, 'device', 32),\n    fromHex(input.signPublicKey, 'signPublicKey', 32),\n    fromHex(input.kemPublicKey, 'kemPublicKey', 32),\n    u32le(input.keyEpoch),\n    u32le(input.deviceEpoch),\n  ]);\n}\n\n/**\n * Borsh-encode an `AccountProof<DeviceCert>` \u2014 what core calls a\n * `JoinAccountCredential`.\n *\n * Extracted so the device-cert path and the namespace-op signer encode this from\n * one implementation. Two copies of a borsh layout drift silently: the encoding\n * is only checked by a peer rejecting a signature, which points at the signature\n * rather than at whichever copy went stale.\n *\n * Layout is `AccountProof { genesis, chain, statement }`:\n * `AccountGenesis` (version u8 + root pk 32) + `chain` (empty Vec, u32 len) +\n * `DeviceCert` (account 32 + device 32 + sign pk 32 + kem pk 32 + key_epoch u32\n * + device_epoch u32 + signature 64) = 237 bytes with an empty chain.\n */\nexport function accountProofBytes(input: {\n  rootPublicKey: Uint8Array;\n  account: string;\n  device: string;\n  signPublicKey: string;\n  kemPublicKey: string;\n  keyEpoch: number;\n  deviceEpoch: number;\n  signature: Uint8Array;\n}): Uint8Array {\n  return concat(\n    new Uint8Array([ACCOUNT_GENESIS_VERSION]),\n    input.rootPublicKey,\n    u32le(0),\n    fromHex(input.account, 'account', 32),\n    fromHex(input.device, 'device', 32),\n    fromHex(input.signPublicKey, 'signPublicKey', 32),\n    fromHex(input.kemPublicKey, 'kemPublicKey', 32),\n    u32le(input.keyEpoch),\n    u32le(input.deviceEpoch),\n    input.signature,\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Certify a device, returning the hex credential `merod account sign-cert`\n * prints \u2014 a borsh-encoded `AccountProof<DeviceCert>`.\n *\n * The layout, field for field, is core's:\n *\n * ```\n * AccountProof { genesis: AccountGenesis, chain: Vec<RootKeyHandoff>, statement: DeviceCert }\n *   AccountGenesis { version: u8, root_sign_pk: [u8; 32] }\n *   chain          \u2192 u32-LE count, then that many handoffs\n *   DeviceCert     { account, device, sign_pk, kem_pk: [u8; 32] x4,\n *                    key_epoch: u32, device_epoch: u32, signature: [u8; 64] }\n * ```\n *\n * Borsh for plain fixed-width data is concatenation; the only variable part is\n * the chain's length prefix. `chain` is empty here for the same reason it is in\n * `sign-cert`: a root that has never been handed off signs directly, and a\n * handoff chain is only needed once it has.\n *\n * `keyEpoch` is 0 for the same reason \u2014 it names the root epoch that signed, and\n * an un-rotated root is at 0. Re-signing after a handoff is a separate flow that\n * needs the chain, so this deliberately does not take it as an argument rather\n * than accepting a value it would then have to ignore.\n */\nexport async function signDeviceCert(input: DeviceCertInput): Promise<string> {\n  const rootPublicKey = await derivePublicKey(input.rootSecret);\n  const account = hex(\n    await domainHash(ACCOUNT_ID_DOMAIN, [\n      concat(new Uint8Array([ACCOUNT_GENESIS_VERSION]), rootPublicKey),\n    ]),\n  );\n\n  const keyEpoch = 0;\n  const payload = await deviceCertPayload({\n    account,\n    device: input.device,\n    signPublicKey: input.signPublicKey,\n    kemPublicKey: input.kemPublicKey,\n    keyEpoch,\n    deviceEpoch: input.deviceEpoch,\n  });\n\n  const key = await importSigningKey(input.rootSecret);\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign('Ed25519', key, payload),\n  );\n\n  const credential = accountProofBytes({\n    rootPublicKey,\n    account,\n    device: input.device,\n    signPublicKey: input.signPublicKey,\n    kemPublicKey: input.kemPublicKey,\n    keyEpoch,\n    deviceEpoch: input.deviceEpoch,\n    signature,\n  });\n\n  return hex(credential);\n}\n\n/** The account this root owns \u2014 the content address of its genesis. */\nexport async function accountForRoot(rootSecret: string): Promise<string> {\n  const rootPublicKey = await derivePublicKey(rootSecret);\n  return hex(\n    await domainHash(ACCOUNT_ID_DOMAIN, [\n      concat(new Uint8Array([ACCOUNT_GENESIS_VERSION]), rootPublicKey),\n    ]),\n  );\n}\n", "/**\n * The BIP39 English wordlist, verbatim \u2014 2048 words, index order significant.\n *\n * Vendored rather than depended on because this package ships with no runtime\n * dependencies, and a recovery phrase is useless if the list it was written\n * against is not the one everybody else implements. The list is content-checked\n * in `account.test.ts` against its canonical SHA-256\n * (`2f5eed53a4727b4bf8880d8f3f199efc90e58503646d9ff8eff3a2ed3b24dbda` over the\n * newline-joined, newline-terminated file), so a stray edit here fails the suite\n * instead of silently minting phrases no other wallet can restore.\n *\n * Its own module so bundlers can drop it: nothing outside `account/` imports it,\n * and the package is `sideEffects: false`, so a consumer who only signs never\n * pays for the ~13 KB.\n */\nexport const ENGLISH_WORDLIST: readonly string[] = [\n  'abandon', 'ability', 'able', 'about', 'above', 'absent', 'absorb', 'abstract',\n  'absurd', 'abuse', 'access', 'accident', 'account', 'accuse', 'achieve', 'acid',\n  'acoustic', 'acquire', 'across', 'act', 'action', 'actor', 'actress', 'actual',\n  'adapt', 'add', 'addict', 'address', 'adjust', 'admit', 'adult', 'advance',\n  'advice', 'aerobic', 'affair', 'afford', 'afraid', 'again', 'age', 'agent',\n  'agree', 'ahead', 'aim', 'air', 'airport', 'aisle', 'alarm', 'album',\n  'alcohol', 'alert', 'alien', 'all', 'alley', 'allow', 'almost', 'alone',\n  'alpha', 'already', 'also', 'alter', 'always', 'amateur', 'amazing', 'among',\n  'amount', 'amused', 'analyst', 'anchor', 'ancient', 'anger', 'angle', 'angry',\n  'animal', 'ankle', 'announce', 'annual', 'another', 'answer', 'antenna', 'antique',\n  'anxiety', 'any', 'apart', 'apology', 'appear', 'apple', 'approve', 'april',\n  'arch', 'arctic', 'area', 'arena', 'argue', 'arm', 'armed', 'armor',\n  'army', 'around', 'arrange', 'arrest', 'arrive', 'arrow', 'art', 'artefact',\n  'artist', 'artwork', 'ask', 'aspect', 'assault', 'asset', 'assist', 'assume',\n  'asthma', 'athlete', 'atom', 'attack', 'attend', 'attitude', 'attract', 'auction',\n  'audit', 'august', 'aunt', 'author', 'auto', 'autumn', 'average', 'avocado',\n  'avoid', 'awake', 'aware', 'away', 'awesome', 'awful', 'awkward', 'axis',\n  'baby', 'bachelor', 'bacon', 'badge', 'bag', 'balance', 'balcony', 'ball',\n  'bamboo', 'banana', 'banner', 'bar', 'barely', 'bargain', 'barrel', 'base',\n  'basic', 'basket', 'battle', 'beach', 'bean', 'beauty', 'because', 'become',\n  'beef', 'before', 'begin', 'behave', 'behind', 'believe', 'below', 'belt',\n  'bench', 'benefit', 'best', 'betray', 'better', 'between', 'beyond', 'bicycle',\n  'bid', 'bike', 'bind', 'biology', 'bird', 'birth', 'bitter', 'black',\n  'blade', 'blame', 'blanket', 'blast', 'bleak', 'bless', 'blind', 'blood',\n  'blossom', 'blouse', 'blue', 'blur', 'blush', 'board', 'boat', 'body',\n  'boil', 'bomb', 'bone', 'bonus', 'book', 'boost', 'border', 'boring',\n  'borrow', 'boss', 'bottom', 'bounce', 'box', 'boy', 'bracket', 'brain',\n  'brand', 'brass', 'brave', 'bread', 'breeze', 'brick', 'bridge', 'brief',\n  'bright', 'bring', 'brisk', 'broccoli', 'broken', 'bronze', 'broom', 'brother',\n  'brown', 'brush', 'bubble', 'buddy', 'budget', 'buffalo', 'build', 'bulb',\n  'bulk', 'bullet', 'bundle', 'bunker', 'burden', 'burger', 'burst', 'bus',\n  'business', 'busy', 'butter', 'buyer', 'buzz', 'cabbage', 'cabin', 'cable',\n  'cactus', 'cage', 'cake', 'call', 'calm', 'camera', 'camp', 'can',\n  'canal', 'cancel', 'candy', 'cannon', 'canoe', 'canvas', 'canyon', 'capable',\n  'capital', 'captain', 'car', 'carbon', 'card', 'cargo', 'carpet', 'carry',\n  'cart', 'case', 'cash', 'casino', 'castle', 'casual', 'cat', 'catalog',\n  'catch', 'category', 'cattle', 'caught', 'cause', 'caution', 'cave', 'ceiling',\n  'celery', 'cement', 'census', 'century', 'cereal', 'certain', 'chair', 'chalk',\n  'champion', 'change', 'chaos', 'chapter', 'charge', 'chase', 'chat', 'cheap',\n  'check', 'cheese', 'chef', 'cherry', 'chest', 'chicken', 'chief', 'child',\n  'chimney', 'choice', 'choose', 'chronic', 'chuckle', 'chunk', 'churn', 'cigar',\n  'cinnamon', 'circle', 'citizen', 'city', 'civil', 'claim', 'clap', 'clarify',\n  'claw', 'clay', 'clean', 'clerk', 'clever', 'click', 'client', 'cliff',\n  'climb', 'clinic', 'clip', 'clock', 'clog', 'close', 'cloth', 'cloud',\n  'clown', 'club', 'clump', 'cluster', 'clutch', 'coach', 'coast', 'coconut',\n  'code', 'coffee', 'coil', 'coin', 'collect', 'color', 'column', 'combine',\n  'come', 'comfort', 'comic', 'common', 'company', 'concert', 'conduct', 'confirm',\n  'congress', 'connect', 'consider', 'control', 'convince', 'cook', 'cool', 'copper',\n  'copy', 'coral', 'core', 'corn', 'correct', 'cost', 'cotton', 'couch',\n  'country', 'couple', 'course', 'cousin', 'cover', 'coyote', 'crack', 'cradle',\n  'craft', 'cram', 'crane', 'crash', 'crater', 'crawl', 'crazy', 'cream',\n  'credit', 'creek', 'crew', 'cricket', 'crime', 'crisp', 'critic', 'crop',\n  'cross', 'crouch', 'crowd', 'crucial', 'cruel', 'cruise', 'crumble', 'crunch',\n  'crush', 'cry', 'crystal', 'cube', 'culture', 'cup', 'cupboard', 'curious',\n  'current', 'curtain', 'curve', 'cushion', 'custom', 'cute', 'cycle', 'dad',\n  'damage', 'damp', 'dance', 'danger', 'daring', 'dash', 'daughter', 'dawn',\n  'day', 'deal', 'debate', 'debris', 'decade', 'december', 'decide', 'decline',\n  'decorate', 'decrease', 'deer', 'defense', 'define', 'defy', 'degree', 'delay',\n  'deliver', 'demand', 'demise', 'denial', 'dentist', 'deny', 'depart', 'depend',\n  'deposit', 'depth', 'deputy', 'derive', 'describe', 'desert', 'design', 'desk',\n  'despair', 'destroy', 'detail', 'detect', 'develop', 'device', 'devote', 'diagram',\n  'dial', 'diamond', 'diary', 'dice', 'diesel', 'diet', 'differ', 'digital',\n  'dignity', 'dilemma', 'dinner', 'dinosaur', 'direct', 'dirt', 'disagree', 'discover',\n  'disease', 'dish', 'dismiss', 'disorder', 'display', 'distance', 'divert', 'divide',\n  'divorce', 'dizzy', 'doctor', 'document', 'dog', 'doll', 'dolphin', 'domain',\n  'donate', 'donkey', 'donor', 'door', 'dose', 'double', 'dove', 'draft',\n  'dragon', 'drama', 'drastic', 'draw', 'dream', 'dress', 'drift', 'drill',\n  'drink', 'drip', 'drive', 'drop', 'drum', 'dry', 'duck', 'dumb',\n  'dune', 'during', 'dust', 'dutch', 'duty', 'dwarf', 'dynamic', 'eager',\n  'eagle', 'early', 'earn', 'earth', 'easily', 'east', 'easy', 'echo',\n  'ecology', 'economy', 'edge', 'edit', 'educate', 'effort', 'egg', 'eight',\n  'either', 'elbow', 'elder', 'electric', 'elegant', 'element', 'elephant', 'elevator',\n  'elite', 'else', 'embark', 'embody', 'embrace', 'emerge', 'emotion', 'employ',\n  'empower', 'empty', 'enable', 'enact', 'end', 'endless', 'endorse', 'enemy',\n  'energy', 'enforce', 'engage', 'engine', 'enhance', 'enjoy', 'enlist', 'enough',\n  'enrich', 'enroll', 'ensure', 'enter', 'entire', 'entry', 'envelope', 'episode',\n  'equal', 'equip', 'era', 'erase', 'erode', 'erosion', 'error', 'erupt',\n  'escape', 'essay', 'essence', 'estate', 'eternal', 'ethics', 'evidence', 'evil',\n  'evoke', 'evolve', 'exact', 'example', 'excess', 'exchange', 'excite', 'exclude',\n  'excuse', 'execute', 'exercise', 'exhaust', 'exhibit', 'exile', 'exist', 'exit',\n  'exotic', 'expand', 'expect', 'expire', 'explain', 'expose', 'express', 'extend',\n  'extra', 'eye', 'eyebrow', 'fabric', 'face', 'faculty', 'fade', 'faint',\n  'faith', 'fall', 'false', 'fame', 'family', 'famous', 'fan', 'fancy',\n  'fantasy', 'farm', 'fashion', 'fat', 'fatal', 'father', 'fatigue', 'fault',\n  'favorite', 'feature', 'february', 'federal', 'fee', 'feed', 'feel', 'female',\n  'fence', 'festival', 'fetch', 'fever', 'few', 'fiber', 'fiction', 'field',\n  'figure', 'file', 'film', 'filter', 'final', 'find', 'fine', 'finger',\n  'finish', 'fire', 'firm', 'first', 'fiscal', 'fish', 'fit', 'fitness',\n  'fix', 'flag', 'flame', 'flash', 'flat', 'flavor', 'flee', 'flight',\n  'flip', 'float', 'flock', 'floor', 'flower', 'fluid', 'flush', 'fly',\n  'foam', 'focus', 'fog', 'foil', 'fold', 'follow', 'food', 'foot',\n  'force', 'forest', 'forget', 'fork', 'fortune', 'forum', 'forward', 'fossil',\n  'foster', 'found', 'fox', 'fragile', 'frame', 'frequent', 'fresh', 'friend',\n  'fringe', 'frog', 'front', 'frost', 'frown', 'frozen', 'fruit', 'fuel',\n  'fun', 'funny', 'furnace', 'fury', 'future', 'gadget', 'gain', 'galaxy',\n  'gallery', 'game', 'gap', 'garage', 'garbage', 'garden', 'garlic', 'garment',\n  'gas', 'gasp', 'gate', 'gather', 'gauge', 'gaze', 'general', 'genius',\n  'genre', 'gentle', 'genuine', 'gesture', 'ghost', 'giant', 'gift', 'giggle',\n  'ginger', 'giraffe', 'girl', 'give', 'glad', 'glance', 'glare', 'glass',\n  'glide', 'glimpse', 'globe', 'gloom', 'glory', 'glove', 'glow', 'glue',\n  'goat', 'goddess', 'gold', 'good', 'goose', 'gorilla', 'gospel', 'gossip',\n  'govern', 'gown', 'grab', 'grace', 'grain', 'grant', 'grape', 'grass',\n  'gravity', 'great', 'green', 'grid', 'grief', 'grit', 'grocery', 'group',\n  'grow', 'grunt', 'guard', 'guess', 'guide', 'guilt', 'guitar', 'gun',\n  'gym', 'habit', 'hair', 'half', 'hammer', 'hamster', 'hand', 'happy',\n  'harbor', 'hard', 'harsh', 'harvest', 'hat', 'have', 'hawk', 'hazard',\n  'head', 'health', 'heart', 'heavy', 'hedgehog', 'height', 'hello', 'helmet',\n  'help', 'hen', 'hero', 'hidden', 'high', 'hill', 'hint', 'hip',\n  'hire', 'history', 'hobby', 'hockey', 'hold', 'hole', 'holiday', 'hollow',\n  'home', 'honey', 'hood', 'hope', 'horn', 'horror', 'horse', 'hospital',\n  'host', 'hotel', 'hour', 'hover', 'hub', 'huge', 'human', 'humble',\n  'humor', 'hundred', 'hungry', 'hunt', 'hurdle', 'hurry', 'hurt', 'husband',\n  'hybrid', 'ice', 'icon', 'idea', 'identify', 'idle', 'ignore', 'ill',\n  'illegal', 'illness', 'image', 'imitate', 'immense', 'immune', 'impact', 'impose',\n  'improve', 'impulse', 'inch', 'include', 'income', 'increase', 'index', 'indicate',\n  'indoor', 'industry', 'infant', 'inflict', 'inform', 'inhale', 'inherit', 'initial',\n  'inject', 'injury', 'inmate', 'inner', 'innocent', 'input', 'inquiry', 'insane',\n  'insect', 'inside', 'inspire', 'install', 'intact', 'interest', 'into', 'invest',\n  'invite', 'involve', 'iron', 'island', 'isolate', 'issue', 'item', 'ivory',\n  'jacket', 'jaguar', 'jar', 'jazz', 'jealous', 'jeans', 'jelly', 'jewel',\n  'job', 'join', 'joke', 'journey', 'joy', 'judge', 'juice', 'jump',\n  'jungle', 'junior', 'junk', 'just', 'kangaroo', 'keen', 'keep', 'ketchup',\n  'key', 'kick', 'kid', 'kidney', 'kind', 'kingdom', 'kiss', 'kit',\n  'kitchen', 'kite', 'kitten', 'kiwi', 'knee', 'knife', 'knock', 'know',\n  'lab', 'label', 'labor', 'ladder', 'lady', 'lake', 'lamp', 'language',\n  'laptop', 'large', 'later', 'latin', 'laugh', 'laundry', 'lava', 'law',\n  'lawn', 'lawsuit', 'layer', 'lazy', 'leader', 'leaf', 'learn', 'leave',\n  'lecture', 'left', 'leg', 'legal', 'legend', 'leisure', 'lemon', 'lend',\n  'length', 'lens', 'leopard', 'lesson', 'letter', 'level', 'liar', 'liberty',\n  'library', 'license', 'life', 'lift', 'light', 'like', 'limb', 'limit',\n  'link', 'lion', 'liquid', 'list', 'little', 'live', 'lizard', 'load',\n  'loan', 'lobster', 'local', 'lock', 'logic', 'lonely', 'long', 'loop',\n  'lottery', 'loud', 'lounge', 'love', 'loyal', 'lucky', 'luggage', 'lumber',\n  'lunar', 'lunch', 'luxury', 'lyrics', 'machine', 'mad', 'magic', 'magnet',\n  'maid', 'mail', 'main', 'major', 'make', 'mammal', 'man', 'manage',\n  'mandate', 'mango', 'mansion', 'manual', 'maple', 'marble', 'march', 'margin',\n  'marine', 'market', 'marriage', 'mask', 'mass', 'master', 'match', 'material',\n  'math', 'matrix', 'matter', 'maximum', 'maze', 'meadow', 'mean', 'measure',\n  'meat', 'mechanic', 'medal', 'media', 'melody', 'melt', 'member', 'memory',\n  'mention', 'menu', 'mercy', 'merge', 'merit', 'merry', 'mesh', 'message',\n  'metal', 'method', 'middle', 'midnight', 'milk', 'million', 'mimic', 'mind',\n  'minimum', 'minor', 'minute', 'miracle', 'mirror', 'misery', 'miss', 'mistake',\n  'mix', 'mixed', 'mixture', 'mobile', 'model', 'modify', 'mom', 'moment',\n  'monitor', 'monkey', 'monster', 'month', 'moon', 'moral', 'more', 'morning',\n  'mosquito', 'mother', 'motion', 'motor', 'mountain', 'mouse', 'move', 'movie',\n  'much', 'muffin', 'mule', 'multiply', 'muscle', 'museum', 'mushroom', 'music',\n  'must', 'mutual', 'myself', 'mystery', 'myth', 'naive', 'name', 'napkin',\n  'narrow', 'nasty', 'nation', 'nature', 'near', 'neck', 'need', 'negative',\n  'neglect', 'neither', 'nephew', 'nerve', 'nest', 'net', 'network', 'neutral',\n  'never', 'news', 'next', 'nice', 'night', 'noble', 'noise', 'nominee',\n  'noodle', 'normal', 'north', 'nose', 'notable', 'note', 'nothing', 'notice',\n  'novel', 'now', 'nuclear', 'number', 'nurse', 'nut', 'oak', 'obey',\n  'object', 'oblige', 'obscure', 'observe', 'obtain', 'obvious', 'occur', 'ocean',\n  'october', 'odor', 'off', 'offer', 'office', 'often', 'oil', 'okay',\n  'old', 'olive', 'olympic', 'omit', 'once', 'one', 'onion', 'online',\n  'only', 'open', 'opera', 'opinion', 'oppose', 'option', 'orange', 'orbit',\n  'orchard', 'order', 'ordinary', 'organ', 'orient', 'original', 'orphan', 'ostrich',\n  'other', 'outdoor', 'outer', 'output', 'outside', 'oval', 'oven', 'over',\n  'own', 'owner', 'oxygen', 'oyster', 'ozone', 'pact', 'paddle', 'page',\n  'pair', 'palace', 'palm', 'panda', 'panel', 'panic', 'panther', 'paper',\n  'parade', 'parent', 'park', 'parrot', 'party', 'pass', 'patch', 'path',\n  'patient', 'patrol', 'pattern', 'pause', 'pave', 'payment', 'peace', 'peanut',\n  'pear', 'peasant', 'pelican', 'pen', 'penalty', 'pencil', 'people', 'pepper',\n  'perfect', 'permit', 'person', 'pet', 'phone', 'photo', 'phrase', 'physical',\n  'piano', 'picnic', 'picture', 'piece', 'pig', 'pigeon', 'pill', 'pilot',\n  'pink', 'pioneer', 'pipe', 'pistol', 'pitch', 'pizza', 'place', 'planet',\n  'plastic', 'plate', 'play', 'please', 'pledge', 'pluck', 'plug', 'plunge',\n  'poem', 'poet', 'point', 'polar', 'pole', 'police', 'pond', 'pony',\n  'pool', 'popular', 'portion', 'position', 'possible', 'post', 'potato', 'pottery',\n  'poverty', 'powder', 'power', 'practice', 'praise', 'predict', 'prefer', 'prepare',\n  'present', 'pretty', 'prevent', 'price', 'pride', 'primary', 'print', 'priority',\n  'prison', 'private', 'prize', 'problem', 'process', 'produce', 'profit', 'program',\n  'project', 'promote', 'proof', 'property', 'prosper', 'protect', 'proud', 'provide',\n  'public', 'pudding', 'pull', 'pulp', 'pulse', 'pumpkin', 'punch', 'pupil',\n  'puppy', 'purchase', 'purity', 'purpose', 'purse', 'push', 'put', 'puzzle',\n  'pyramid', 'quality', 'quantum', 'quarter', 'question', 'quick', 'quit', 'quiz',\n  'quote', 'rabbit', 'raccoon', 'race', 'rack', 'radar', 'radio', 'rail',\n  'rain', 'raise', 'rally', 'ramp', 'ranch', 'random', 'range', 'rapid',\n  'rare', 'rate', 'rather', 'raven', 'raw', 'razor', 'ready', 'real',\n  'reason', 'rebel', 'rebuild', 'recall', 'receive', 'recipe', 'record', 'recycle',\n  'reduce', 'reflect', 'reform', 'refuse', 'region', 'regret', 'regular', 'reject',\n  'relax', 'release', 'relief', 'rely', 'remain', 'remember', 'remind', 'remove',\n  'render', 'renew', 'rent', 'reopen', 'repair', 'repeat', 'replace', 'report',\n  'require', 'rescue', 'resemble', 'resist', 'resource', 'response', 'result', 'retire',\n  'retreat', 'return', 'reunion', 'reveal', 'review', 'reward', 'rhythm', 'rib',\n  'ribbon', 'rice', 'rich', 'ride', 'ridge', 'rifle', 'right', 'rigid',\n  'ring', 'riot', 'ripple', 'risk', 'ritual', 'rival', 'river', 'road',\n  'roast', 'robot', 'robust', 'rocket', 'romance', 'roof', 'rookie', 'room',\n  'rose', 'rotate', 'rough', 'round', 'route', 'royal', 'rubber', 'rude',\n  'rug', 'rule', 'run', 'runway', 'rural', 'sad', 'saddle', 'sadness',\n  'safe', 'sail', 'salad', 'salmon', 'salon', 'salt', 'salute', 'same',\n  'sample', 'sand', 'satisfy', 'satoshi', 'sauce', 'sausage', 'save', 'say',\n  'scale', 'scan', 'scare', 'scatter', 'scene', 'scheme', 'school', 'science',\n  'scissors', 'scorpion', 'scout', 'scrap', 'screen', 'script', 'scrub', 'sea',\n  'search', 'season', 'seat', 'second', 'secret', 'section', 'security', 'seed',\n  'seek', 'segment', 'select', 'sell', 'seminar', 'senior', 'sense', 'sentence',\n  'series', 'service', 'session', 'settle', 'setup', 'seven', 'shadow', 'shaft',\n  'shallow', 'share', 'shed', 'shell', 'sheriff', 'shield', 'shift', 'shine',\n  'ship', 'shiver', 'shock', 'shoe', 'shoot', 'shop', 'short', 'shoulder',\n  'shove', 'shrimp', 'shrug', 'shuffle', 'shy', 'sibling', 'sick', 'side',\n  'siege', 'sight', 'sign', 'silent', 'silk', 'silly', 'silver', 'similar',\n  'simple', 'since', 'sing', 'siren', 'sister', 'situate', 'six', 'size',\n  'skate', 'sketch', 'ski', 'skill', 'skin', 'skirt', 'skull', 'slab',\n  'slam', 'sleep', 'slender', 'slice', 'slide', 'slight', 'slim', 'slogan',\n  'slot', 'slow', 'slush', 'small', 'smart', 'smile', 'smoke', 'smooth',\n  'snack', 'snake', 'snap', 'sniff', 'snow', 'soap', 'soccer', 'social',\n  'sock', 'soda', 'soft', 'solar', 'soldier', 'solid', 'solution', 'solve',\n  'someone', 'song', 'soon', 'sorry', 'sort', 'soul', 'sound', 'soup',\n  'source', 'south', 'space', 'spare', 'spatial', 'spawn', 'speak', 'special',\n  'speed', 'spell', 'spend', 'sphere', 'spice', 'spider', 'spike', 'spin',\n  'spirit', 'split', 'spoil', 'sponsor', 'spoon', 'sport', 'spot', 'spray',\n  'spread', 'spring', 'spy', 'square', 'squeeze', 'squirrel', 'stable', 'stadium',\n  'staff', 'stage', 'stairs', 'stamp', 'stand', 'start', 'state', 'stay',\n  'steak', 'steel', 'stem', 'step', 'stereo', 'stick', 'still', 'sting',\n  'stock', 'stomach', 'stone', 'stool', 'story', 'stove', 'strategy', 'street',\n  'strike', 'strong', 'struggle', 'student', 'stuff', 'stumble', 'style', 'subject',\n  'submit', 'subway', 'success', 'such', 'sudden', 'suffer', 'sugar', 'suggest',\n  'suit', 'summer', 'sun', 'sunny', 'sunset', 'super', 'supply', 'supreme',\n  'sure', 'surface', 'surge', 'surprise', 'surround', 'survey', 'suspect', 'sustain',\n  'swallow', 'swamp', 'swap', 'swarm', 'swear', 'sweet', 'swift', 'swim',\n  'swing', 'switch', 'sword', 'symbol', 'symptom', 'syrup', 'system', 'table',\n  'tackle', 'tag', 'tail', 'talent', 'talk', 'tank', 'tape', 'target',\n  'task', 'taste', 'tattoo', 'taxi', 'teach', 'team', 'tell', 'ten',\n  'tenant', 'tennis', 'tent', 'term', 'test', 'text', 'thank', 'that',\n  'theme', 'then', 'theory', 'there', 'they', 'thing', 'this', 'thought',\n  'three', 'thrive', 'throw', 'thumb', 'thunder', 'ticket', 'tide', 'tiger',\n  'tilt', 'timber', 'time', 'tiny', 'tip', 'tired', 'tissue', 'title',\n  'toast', 'tobacco', 'today', 'toddler', 'toe', 'together', 'toilet', 'token',\n  'tomato', 'tomorrow', 'tone', 'tongue', 'tonight', 'tool', 'tooth', 'top',\n  'topic', 'topple', 'torch', 'tornado', 'tortoise', 'toss', 'total', 'tourist',\n  'toward', 'tower', 'town', 'toy', 'track', 'trade', 'traffic', 'tragic',\n  'train', 'transfer', 'trap', 'trash', 'travel', 'tray', 'treat', 'tree',\n  'trend', 'trial', 'tribe', 'trick', 'trigger', 'trim', 'trip', 'trophy',\n  'trouble', 'truck', 'true', 'truly', 'trumpet', 'trust', 'truth', 'try',\n  'tube', 'tuition', 'tumble', 'tuna', 'tunnel', 'turkey', 'turn', 'turtle',\n  'twelve', 'twenty', 'twice', 'twin', 'twist', 'two', 'type', 'typical',\n  'ugly', 'umbrella', 'unable', 'unaware', 'uncle', 'uncover', 'under', 'undo',\n  'unfair', 'unfold', 'unhappy', 'uniform', 'unique', 'unit', 'universe', 'unknown',\n  'unlock', 'until', 'unusual', 'unveil', 'update', 'upgrade', 'uphold', 'upon',\n  'upper', 'upset', 'urban', 'urge', 'usage', 'use', 'used', 'useful',\n  'useless', 'usual', 'utility', 'vacant', 'vacuum', 'vague', 'valid', 'valley',\n  'valve', 'van', 'vanish', 'vapor', 'various', 'vast', 'vault', 'vehicle',\n  'velvet', 'vendor', 'venture', 'venue', 'verb', 'verify', 'version', 'very',\n  'vessel', 'veteran', 'viable', 'vibrant', 'vicious', 'victory', 'video', 'view',\n  'village', 'vintage', 'violin', 'virtual', 'virus', 'visa', 'visit', 'visual',\n  'vital', 'vivid', 'vocal', 'voice', 'void', 'volcano', 'volume', 'vote',\n  'voyage', 'wage', 'wagon', 'wait', 'walk', 'wall', 'walnut', 'want',\n  'warfare', 'warm', 'warrior', 'wash', 'wasp', 'waste', 'water', 'wave',\n  'way', 'wealth', 'weapon', 'wear', 'weasel', 'weather', 'web', 'wedding',\n  'weekend', 'weird', 'welcome', 'west', 'wet', 'whale', 'what', 'wheat',\n  'wheel', 'when', 'where', 'whip', 'whisper', 'wide', 'width', 'wife',\n  'wild', 'will', 'win', 'window', 'wine', 'wing', 'wink', 'winner',\n  'winter', 'wire', 'wisdom', 'wise', 'wish', 'witness', 'wolf', 'woman',\n  'wonder', 'wood', 'wool', 'word', 'work', 'world', 'worry', 'worth',\n  'wrap', 'wreck', 'wrestle', 'wrist', 'write', 'wrong', 'yard', 'year',\n  'yellow', 'you', 'young', 'youth', 'zebra', 'zero', 'zone', 'zoo',\n];\n", "/**\n * Creating an account root, and proving you hold one.\n *\n * `signDeviceCert` assumes an account root already exists and asks only what it\n * certifies. This is the step before that: where the root comes from, how a\n * person keeps it, and how they show a server they have it.\n *\n * Two things live here because they are the two halves of onboarding:\n *\n * - {@link generateAccountRoot} mints a root and hands back a 24-word recovery\n *   phrase. The phrase *is* the key \u2014 see the interop note on that function \u2014\n *   so a holder who writes it down can restore the account on any device.\n * - {@link signAccountLink} signs a cloud-issued challenge with that root, which\n *   is how Calimero Cloud binds a billing login to a Calimero account.\n * - {@link signAccountLogin} signs a different cloud-issued challenge with the\n *   same root to claim the account outright and open a session as it \u2014 the\n *   password-free counterpart to signing in with Google.\n *\n * Both are offline and hold no state. Nothing here talks to a node or to the\n * cloud; `CloudClient.linkAccount` is the wrapper that does.\n *\n * Derived from:\n *\n * - `ACCOUNT_LINK_DOMAIN` / `ACCOUNT_LOGIN_DOMAIN`, and\n *   `verify_account_link_proof` / `verify_login_proof` \u2014 mdma's\n *   `manager/app/account_proof.py`\n * - the account derivation \u2014 `accountForRoot` in `../device-cert`, which is\n *   core's `AccountId` preimage\n */\nimport {\n  concat,\n  derivePublicKey,\n  fromHex,\n  hex,\n  importSigningKey,\n} from '../crypto/internal.js';\nimport { accountForRoot } from '../device-cert/index.js';\nimport { ENGLISH_WORDLIST } from './wordlist.js';\n\n/**\n * mdma's `ACCOUNT_LINK_DOMAIN`, trailing NUL included.\n *\n * Prefixed raw rather than run through `domainHash`: mdma verifies\n * `ed25519_verify(root_pk, ACCOUNT_LINK_DOMAIN \u2016 nonce_utf8)` over exactly these\n * bytes. The separator is what stops a signature gathered here being replayable\n * into any other protocol that has a root sign opaque bytes, so it is not\n * cosmetic \u2014 and the NUL is part of it.\n */\nconst ACCOUNT_LINK_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode(\n  'calimero.mdma.account-link.v1\u0000',\n);\n\n/**\n * mdma's `ACCOUNT_LOGIN_DOMAIN`, trailing NUL included.\n *\n * A separate domain from {@link ACCOUNT_LINK_DOMAIN} because the two\n * exchanges are otherwise byte-identical \u2014 both are a root signature over a\n * cloud-issued nonce \u2014 and a signature gathered while linking is gathered from\n * someone already signed in and trusting the page. Without the separation it\n * would be replayable as a login by whoever collected it.\n */\nconst ACCOUNT_LOGIN_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode(\n  'calimero.mdma.account-login.v1\\0',\n);\n\n/** Entropy carried by a phrase. 256 bits \u2014 32 bytes, an ed25519 seed exactly. */\nconst ENTROPY_BITS = 256;\n/** BIP39's checksum length: one bit per 32 bits of entropy. */\nconst CHECKSUM_BITS = ENTROPY_BITS / 32;\n/** 11 bits per word, so (256 + 8) / 11 = 24 words. */\nconst PHRASE_WORDS = (ENTROPY_BITS + CHECKSUM_BITS) / 11;\n\n/** An account root: the secret, the key it derives, and the account it names. */\nexport interface AccountRoot {\n  /**\n   * The root signing secret, 64 hex.\n   *\n   * The whole account. It signs device certificates and cloud links, and there\n   * is no recovery path that does not go through it or its phrase \u2014 so it is\n   * never sent anywhere, and in a browser it does not belong in `localStorage`.\n   */\n  secret: string;\n  /** The root's ed25519 public key, 64 hex. Safe to publish. */\n  publicKey: string;\n  /** The account this root names, 64 hex \u2014 the content address of its genesis. */\n  accountId: string;\n}\n\n/** An account root together with the phrase that restores it. */\nexport interface RecoverableAccountRoot extends AccountRoot {\n  /**\n   * A 24-word BIP39 English recovery phrase, single-space separated.\n   *\n   * Show it once, have the holder write it down, and do not keep it: it is the\n   * secret in a form a person can copy by hand without transcription errors.\n   */\n  phrase: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a brand-new account root from the platform CSPRNG.\n *\n * This is the \"generate a new key\" half of cloud registration \u2014 the other half\n * being a root the holder already has, on a desktop app or a hardware key, which\n * signs without this ever running.\n *\n * **Interop note, and it matters.** The phrase encodes the root secret as BIP39\n * *entropy*, not as a BIP39 *seed*. A tool restoring it must call the equivalent\n * of `mnemonicToEntropy(phrase)` \u2014 32 bytes \u2014 and use those bytes as the ed25519\n * secret directly. `mnemonicToSeed(phrase)`, which most wallet libraries reach\n * for first, runs PBKDF2 and returns 64 different bytes; feeding those in names\n * a different account and fails as \"wrong account\", not as a decoding error.\n * There is no passphrase and no BIP32 derivation path: the 24 words are the key.\n */\nexport async function generateAccountRoot(): Promise<RecoverableAccountRoot> {\n  const entropy = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(ENTROPY_BITS / 8));\n  return withPhrase(hex(entropy), await encodePhrase(entropy));\n}\n\n/**\n * Restore an account root from its recovery phrase.\n *\n * Whitespace and case are normalised, so a phrase pasted out of a text editor\n * with a trailing newline or a stray double space restores fine. A word outside\n * the list, a wrong word count, or a failed checksum throws rather than\n * returning some other account \u2014 a single mistyped word is the common case, and\n * BIP39's checksum catches all but 1 in 256 of them.\n */\nexport async function accountRootFromPhrase(\n  phrase: string,\n): Promise<RecoverableAccountRoot> {\n  const words = normalisePhrase(phrase);\n  return withPhrase(hex(await decodePhrase(words)), words.join(' '));\n}\n\n/** The public half of a root you already hold, without re-deriving it by hand. */\nexport async function accountRootFromSecret(\n  secret: string,\n): Promise<AccountRoot> {\n  // Validates the length and alphabet before anything derives from it, so a\n  // truncated paste fails here rather than naming an unrelated account.\n  fromHex(secret, 'secret', 32);\n  return {\n    secret,\n    publicKey: hex(await derivePublicKey(secret)),\n    accountId: await accountForRoot(secret),\n  };\n}\n\n/** What {@link signAccountLink} needs. */\nexport interface AccountLinkInput {\n  /** The account root's signing secret, 64 hex. */\n  rootSecret: string;\n  /**\n   * The challenge from `GET /api/cloud/me/accounts/challenge`, verbatim.\n   *\n   * Signed as its UTF-8 bytes, not decoded first: mdma seals it as an opaque\n   * string and verifies over the same string it issued.\n   */\n  nonce: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign a cloud link challenge with the account root. Returns base64.\n *\n * Standard base64, not base64url \u2014 mdma decodes it with `validate=True`, so the\n * `-`/`_` alphabet is rejected outright rather than silently mis-decoded.\n *\n * Root-signed rather than device-signed on purpose: this is the credential\n * someone still holds after losing a device, which is the case linking exists to\n * serve.\n */\nexport async function signAccountLink(\n  input: AccountLinkInput,\n): Promise<string> {\n  if (!input.nonce) throw new Error('nonce is required to sign an account link');\n  const key = await importSigningKey(input.rootSecret);\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign(\n      'Ed25519',\n      key,\n      concat(ACCOUNT_LINK_DOMAIN, new TextEncoder().encode(input.nonce)),\n    ),\n  );\n  return base64(signature);\n}\n\n/** What {@link signAccountLogin} needs. */\nexport interface AccountLoginInput {\n  /** The account root's signing secret, 64 hex. */\n  rootSecret: string;\n  /** The challenge from `GET /api/auth/account/challenge`, verbatim UTF-8. */\n  nonce: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign a cloud login challenge with the account root. Returns base64.\n *\n * The statement this makes is *\"I hold the root of account X\"*, and it is the\n * one statement a device credential can never make. A routing read proves the\n * caller holds a device the root certified \u2014 the credential carries the root's\n * signature over that device \u2014 but a certificate is public and travels in the\n * clear inside every device-link op, so anyone who has seen one can say \"a\n * device of X is asking\". Only the root can say the account is theirs.\n *\n * Which is why this is worth doing **once**: the cloud records the claim, and\n * from then on it knows the account behind a device proof was proven by its\n * owner. The session it also mints is the ordinary MDMA session token, accepted\n * everywhere a Google-issued one is.\n *\n * Standard base64, not base64url \u2014 mdma decodes with `validate=True`.\n */\nexport async function signAccountLogin(\n  input: AccountLoginInput,\n): Promise<string> {\n  if (!input.nonce) throw new Error('nonce is required to sign an account login');\n  const key = await importSigningKey(input.rootSecret);\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign(\n      'Ed25519',\n      key,\n      concat(ACCOUNT_LOGIN_DOMAIN, new TextEncoder().encode(input.nonce)),\n    ),\n  );\n  return base64(signature);\n}\n\nasync function withPhrase(\n  secret: string,\n  phrase: string,\n): Promise<RecoverableAccountRoot> {\n  return { ...(await accountRootFromSecret(secret)), phrase };\n}\n\nfunction normalisePhrase(phrase: string): string[] {\n  // NFKD per BIP39. A no-op for the English list, which is ASCII, but the\n  // normalisation is what the spec pins and costs nothing to honour.\n  const words = phrase.normalize('NFKD').toLowerCase().trim().split(/\\s+/);\n  const count = words[0] === '' ? 0 : words.length;\n  if (count !== PHRASE_WORDS) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `recovery phrase must be ${PHRASE_WORDS} words, got ${count}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return words;\n}\n\n/** Entropy then checksum, chopped into 11-bit indices. */\nasync function encodePhrase(entropy: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  const bits = bitsOf(entropy) + (await checksumBits(entropy));\n  const words: string[] = [];\n  for (let i = 0; i < PHRASE_WORDS; i += 1) {\n    const index = Number.parseInt(bits.slice(i * 11, i * 11 + 11), 2);\n    words.push(ENGLISH_WORDLIST[index]);\n  }\n  return words.join(' ');\n}\n\nasync function decodePhrase(words: string[]): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  let bits = '';\n  for (const word of words) {\n    const index = ENGLISH_WORDLIST.indexOf(word);\n    if (index < 0) {\n      throw new Error(`\"${word}\" is not a word in the recovery phrase list`);\n    }\n    bits += index.toString(2).padStart(11, '0');\n  }\n\n  const entropy = new Uint8Array(ENTROPY_BITS / 8);\n  for (let i = 0; i < entropy.length; i += 1) {\n    entropy[i] = Number.parseInt(bits.slice(i * 8, i * 8 + 8), 2);\n  }\n  if (bits.slice(ENTROPY_BITS) !== (await checksumBits(entropy))) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'recovery phrase checksum failed \u2014 check for a mistyped or transposed word',\n    );\n  }\n  return entropy;\n}\n\n/** The leading `CHECKSUM_BITS` of SHA-256 over the entropy, as a bit string. */\nasync function checksumBits(entropy: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  const digest = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', entropy));\n  return bitsOf(digest).slice(0, CHECKSUM_BITS);\n}\n\nfunction bitsOf(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  let bits = '';\n  for (const byte of bytes) bits += byte.toString(2).padStart(8, '0');\n  return bits;\n}\n\nfunction base64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  // Built a character at a time rather than spreading into `String.fromCharCode`:\n  // the spread is fine for a 64-byte signature but blows the argument limit on\n  // anything larger, and this has no such cliff to remember.\n  let binary = '';\n  for (const byte of bytes) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);\n  return btoa(binary);\n}\n", "/**\n * Proving an account to the cloud for the one read a joiner cannot avoid.\n *\n * `GET /api/cloud/namespaces/{ns}/admitters` answers where to send a signed\n * membership op. A joiner needs it and *cannot* hold a cloud login: it is by\n * construction not the namespace owner, and not needing an account on the cloud\n * is the entire point of the path \u2014 a keyholder mints a root, certifies a\n * device and signs its own join offline, and this read is the only thing that\n * tells it where to post the result.\n *\n * So the caller proves possession of the credential it already holds. The cloud\n * mints a sealed, namespace-bound nonce; the device signs it; the read carries\n * the certificate and that signature.\n *\n * ## What this establishes, and what it does not\n *\n * It establishes that the caller holds a device key certified by some account\n * root, and *which* account that is. It does **not** establish that the account\n * was invited to the namespace, nor that it is a member \u2014 the cloud cannot\n * check either, because membership is governance state held by the nodes.\n * Anyone can mint an account root offline, so this is not a wall. It buys\n * attribution (every read names an account and can be rate-limited) and it ends\n * anonymous bulk discovery. Authorization stays where it always was: at the\n * node, on the signed op.\n *\n * ## Why the DEVICE signs, not the root\n *\n * The opposite choice from {@link signAccountLink}, deliberately. That one\n * exists for the device-loss case, so only the root will do. This one runs on\n * every routing read from a browser that discards the root immediately after\n * certifying its device \u2014 requiring the root would mean re-entering a 24-word\n * phrase to look up a URL.\n *\n * The certificate alone is not enough and the signature is not redundant with\n * it: a certificate travels in the clear inside every device-link op, so anyone\n * who has seen one can replay it. Only the nonce signature binds the presenter\n * to the device.\n */\n\nimport { concat, fromHex, importSigningKey } from '../crypto/internal.js';\n\n/**\n * The signing domain, followed immediately by the nonce as UTF-8.\n *\n * A flat prefix rather than this SDK's usual length-prefixed `domainHash`,\n * because the verifier is MDMA's `verify_routing_proof` and it checks\n * `DOMAIN \u2016 nonce` against the raw message. The trailing NUL is part of the\n * domain string on both sides; it is what stops a domain that is a prefix of\n * some future one from colliding with it.\n */\nconst ROUTING_PROOF_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode(\n  'calimero.mdma.routing-read.v1\\0',\n);\n\n/**\n * The credential a routing read presents: a certificate, and the key to sign\n * the challenge with.\n *\n * `credential` is the 237-byte `AccountProof<DeviceCert>` as hex \u2014 exactly what\n * {@link signDeviceCert} returns, and the same string a login statement and a\n * warrant carry. It is public by construction.\n *\n * `deviceSecret` never leaves the process. It signs the challenge locally and\n * only the signature travels.\n */\nexport interface RoutingCredential {\n  /** The `AccountProof<DeviceCert>`, hex borsh, as `signDeviceCert` returns it. */\n  credential: string;\n  /** The certified device's ed25519 signing secret, hex (32 bytes). */\n  deviceSecret: string;\n}\n\n/** A challenge to sign, as the cloud minted it. */\nexport interface RoutingChallenge {\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /** Opaque and sealed \u2014 the client neither parses nor constructs this. */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** Epoch **milliseconds**, as MDMA reports it. Nonces live about two minutes. */\n  expiresAtMs: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * A challenge bound to an ACCOUNT rather than a namespace, for asking which\n * relays serve that account.\n *\n * Separate from {@link RoutingChallenge} because the binding is the security\n * property, not a field name: MDMA seals the account into this one and the\n * namespace into that one, and refuses each at the other's route. Keeping the\n * TypeScript types distinct is what stops a caller passing the wrong one and\n * learning about it as a 403.\n */\nexport interface DiscoveryChallenge {\n  accountId: string;\n  /** Opaque and sealed \u2014 the client neither parses nor constructs this. */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** Epoch **milliseconds**, as MDMA reports it. Nonces live about two minutes. */\n  expiresAtMs: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * The three header values a proven routing read carries.\n *\n * Intersected with `Record<string, string>` rather than declared as a plain\n * interface so it drops straight into a headers bag: an interface has no index\n * signature, so TypeScript refuses it where `Record<string, string>` is wanted\n * even though every field is a string.\n */\nexport type RoutingProofHeaders = Record<string, string> & {\n  'X-Calimero-Credential': string;\n  'X-Calimero-Nonce': string;\n  'X-Calimero-Signature': string;\n};\n\n/**\n * Sign a routing challenge with the device key.\n *\n * Returns base64, which is what the header carries and what MDMA's verifier\n * decodes \u2014 the one place this SDK does not spell a signature as hex, because\n * the wire format is not ours to choose.\n */\nexport async function signRoutingChallenge(\n  nonce: string,\n  deviceSecret: string,\n): Promise<string> {\n  // Validate the secret the same way every other signing path does, so a\n  // truncated or mis-cased key fails here rather than as a 403 from the cloud.\n  fromHex(deviceSecret, 'deviceSecret', 32);\n  const key = await importSigningKey(deviceSecret);\n\n  const message = concat(\n    ROUTING_PROOF_DOMAIN,\n    new TextEncoder().encode(nonce),\n  );\n\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign({ name: 'Ed25519' }, key, message),\n  );\n\n  return base64(signature);\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the headers for one routing read, from a challenge the cloud minted.\n *\n * Separated from the request so a caller that fetches its own challenge \u2014 a\n * test, or a client batching several reads against one nonce \u2014 can use the same\n * encoding rather than a second spelling of it.\n *\n * Takes either challenge kind: only the nonce is signed and both are signed\n * over the same domain, so one encoder serves both. What separates them is what\n * MDMA sealed inside, which is checked server-side.\n */\nexport async function routingProofHeaders(\n  challenge: RoutingChallenge | DiscoveryChallenge,\n  credential: RoutingCredential,\n): Promise<RoutingProofHeaders> {\n  return {\n    'X-Calimero-Credential': credential.credential,\n    'X-Calimero-Nonce': challenge.nonce,\n    'X-Calimero-Signature': await signRoutingChallenge(\n      challenge.nonce,\n      credential.deviceSecret,\n    ),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * base64, the encoding the header carries.\n *\n * `btoa` is global in every browser and in Node since 16, and this package\n * requires Node 18 \u2014 so there is no runtime here that needs a `Buffer`\n * fallback, and adding one would pull a Node-only global into browser code.\n */\nfunction base64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  let binary = '';\n  for (const byte of bytes) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);\n  return btoa(binary);\n}\n", "/**\n * Calimero Cloud (MDMA) client.\n *\n * # Why the SDK knows about the cloud at all\n *\n * Delegated execution lets an account that holds one signing key write into a\n * context without running a node \u2014 but only through a *relay*, and a relay is\n * something the client has to be told about. A warrant names an executor\n * account, so a client that cannot discover which relay serves its namespace,\n * and which account that relay writes as, cannot mint a usable warrant at all.\n *\n * For a self-hosted namespace the operator hands those two facts over out of\n * band. For the hosted tier the cloud is the directory: the user signs in, the\n * cloud knows which namespaces they own and which attested TEE nodes are\n * assigned to each, and it answers with the relay's URL and executor account.\n * That is what this client is for \u2014 it is the discovery half of\n * {@link RelayClient}, not a second way to talk to a node.\n *\n * # What it deliberately is not\n *\n * It never sees a warrant, a device secret, or an intent. Discovery goes\n * through the cloud; the write goes straight from the client to the relay. A\n * cloud that proxied intents would read every method and argument its users\n * ever sent, and would be a throughput bottleneck on a path that has no reason\n * to involve it.\n */\n\nimport {\n  accountRootFromSecret,\n  signAccountLink,\n  signAccountLogin,\n} from '../account/index.js';\nimport { HTTPError } from '../http-client/web-client.js';\nimport {\n  routingProofHeaders,\n  type DiscoveryChallenge,\n  type RoutingChallenge,\n  type RoutingCredential,\n} from './routing-proof.js';\n\n/** Where the hosted cloud lives when a caller names no other. */\nconst DEFAULT_CLOUD_BASE_URL = 'https://cloud.calimero.network';\n\nexport interface CloudClientConfig {\n  cloudBaseUrl?: string;\n  /**\n   * An MDMA session token to start out authenticated with \u2014 from a previous\n   * {@link CloudClient.signInWithGoogle}, persisted by the app.\n   *\n   * Sessions are 7-day JWTs with a rolling refresh, so a stored one is usually\n   * still live and re-running the Google flow on every launch is avoidable.\n   */\n  sessionToken?: string;\n  /**\n   * Called whenever the session token changes \u2014 a sign-in, an explicit\n   * refresh, or a rolling refresh the server performed mid-request. Persist it\n   * here; errors thrown are swallowed so a storage failure cannot mask the\n   * response the caller is waiting for.\n   */\n  onSession?: (session: CloudSession | null) => void | Promise<void>;\n  /** Injected for tests and non-browser runtimes. Defaults to global `fetch`. */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  /** Per-request timeout. Defaults to 10s, as the node clients do. */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * The device credential to prove an account with on the routing read.\n   *\n   * Nothing to do with {@link sessionToken}: a cloud session says who is signed\n   * in, this says which account holds the key. A joiner has the second and\n   * cannot have the first \u2014 see `routing-proof.ts` for why that is not an\n   * oversight.\n   *\n   * Omitting it leaves {@link CloudClient.getNamespaceRouting} anonymous, which\n   * the cloud still answers while `require_routing_proof` is off. Supply it and\n   * the read is attributed; the cloud verifies a supplied proof either way, so\n   * a wrong one surfaces immediately rather than on the day the flag flips.\n   */\n  routingCredential?: RoutingCredential;\n}\n\n/** Who is signed in, and until when. */\nexport interface CloudSession {\n  sessionToken: string;\n  /** Epoch **seconds**, as MDMA reports it \u2014 not milliseconds. */\n  expiresAt: number;\n  user: { email: string; name?: string; picture?: string };\n}\n\n/** One namespace the signed-in user owns. */\nexport interface CloudNamespace {\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /** Always equal to `namespaceId`; MDMA keeps it for wire compatibility. */\n  groupId: string;\n  /** `'enabled' | 'disabled' | 'none'` \u2014 `'none'` means HA was never enabled. */\n  haStatus: string;\n  haEnabledAt?: string | null;\n  contexts: string[];\n  fleetReplicas?: { current?: number; limit?: number } | unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * One attested node the cloud has assigned to a namespace, described as a\n * relay.\n *\n * `authorshipReady` is the field that decides whether a write can happen, and\n * it is reported rather than assumed because it is not the cloud's to grant:\n * `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` is a governance capability, set by an admin of the\n * namespace, and the cloud only relays what the node observed. A relay that is\n * `active` with `authorshipReady: false` is a healthy node waiting for a grant.\n */\nexport interface CloudRelay {\n  peerId: string;\n  /** Base URL to present intents to, or `null` when the cloud knows none yet. */\n  relayUrl: string | null;\n  /** The account a warrant for this relay must name as its `executor`, hex. */\n  executorAccount: string | null;\n  /** `'assigned'` (admitted pending confirm) or `'active'`. */\n  status: string;\n  /** Whether this relay holds `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` on the namespace. */\n  authorshipReady: boolean;\n  lastSeenAt?: string | null;\n  confirmedAt?: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * One node serving a namespace, as a caller with no cloud account sees it.\n *\n * The public counterpart to {@link CloudRelay}: same fleet rows, but keyed on a\n * namespace id anyone holding an invitation already has, and answering both\n * things a keyholder needs from a node rather than one of them.\n */\n/**\n * One relay that serves an account, as the bootstrap read reports it.\n *\n * `fresh` and a null `relayUrl` are reported rather than filtered, because\n * \"your relay is down\", \"we have no address for it\" and \"you have no relay\"\n * need different actions from a caller and an empty list erases the\n * distinction. A caller looking for somewhere to talk to wants\n * `fresh && relayUrl`; one diagnosing wants the rest.\n */\nexport interface CloudAccountRelay {\n  peerId: string;\n  relayUrl: string | null;\n  fresh: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface CloudNamespaceNode {\n  peerId: string;\n  /**\n   * The node's own account id, hex.\n   *\n   * Intersect this against the invitation's signed `admitters` list before\n   * using the node. That list is a MINT-TIME SNAPSHOT, so a node assigned after\n   * an invitation was created is live, healthy, listed here, and still refused\n   * with 403 \u2014 the cloud cannot know which invitation you hold.\n   */\n  account: string | null;\n  /** Base URL, or `null` when the cloud knows none yet. */\n  relayUrl: string | null;\n  /** Ready-made admission URL, so a caller never rebuilds the path. */\n  admitUrl: string | null;\n  /** `'assigned'` (admitted pending confirm) or `'active'`. */\n  status: string;\n  /** Whether the node's heartbeat for this namespace is recent. */\n  fresh: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Whether a signed join can be presented here now.\n   *\n   * Deliberately independent of {@link CloudNamespaceNode.authorshipReady}:\n   * relaying a join the joiner already signed is not authoring on anyone's\n   * behalf, so a node with no grant admits perfectly well.\n   */\n  canAdmit: boolean;\n  /** Whether the node holds `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` on the namespace root group. */\n  authorshipReady: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Whether a delegated write can be posted here now \u2014 a URL, an account, a\n   * fresh heartbeat and the grant.\n   *\n   * Namespace-level. A context in a RESTRICTED SUBGROUP is governed by that\n   * subgroup, so per-context routing remains the exact answer if a write is\n   * refused despite this being true.\n   */\n  canExecute: boolean;\n}\n\n/** What {@link CloudClient.getNamespaceRouting} reports. */\nexport interface CloudNamespaceRouting {\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /** Usable nodes first, then a stable order, so a polling caller sees no shuffle. */\n  nodes: CloudNamespaceNode[];\n  /** Whether any listed node can take a join now. */\n  servable: boolean;\n  /** Whether any listed node can take a delegated write now. */\n  writable: boolean;\n}\n\n/** One namespace of the caller's that a machine is serving. */\nexport interface CloudMachineNamespace {\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /** `'assigned'` (admitted pending confirm) or `'active'`. */\n  status: string;\n  /** Whether the machine holds `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` on this namespace. */\n  authorshipReady: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Whether the machine's heartbeat for this namespace is recent.\n   *\n   * The same freshness rule the per-plan fleet cap uses, so a replica that\n   * stopped polling reads as stale here rather than continuing to look\n   * healthy \u2014 otherwise \"my writes stopped working\" has no visible cause.\n   */\n  fresh: boolean;\n  confirmedAt?: string | null;\n  lastSeenAt?: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * One attested machine serving this account.\n *\n * A narrow view on purpose: the zone, machine type, instance name, public IP\n * and KMS ids are operator data with no client use, and a cloud user is not an\n * operator.\n */\nexport interface CloudMachine {\n  peerId: string;\n  relayUrl: string | null;\n  executorAccount: string | null;\n  /**\n   * Whether this machine can write for the caller *somewhere* \u2014 a URL, an\n   * executor account, and the grant on at least one namespace.\n   *\n   * Folded here so a client does not re-derive the three-way precondition and\n   * get a refusal it cannot explain.\n   */\n  canExecute: boolean;\n  /** Only the caller's own namespaces, even on a machine shared with others. */\n  namespaces: CloudMachineNamespace[];\n}\n\n/** A Calimero account linked to this cloud login. */\nexport interface CloudLinkedAccount {\n  /** The account id, 64 hex. */\n  accountId: string;\n  linkedAt?: string | null;\n  /**\n   * Whether a recovery envelope has been stored for this account, so a UI can\n   * say \"recoverable\" without fetching the blob.\n   */\n  hasRecoveryEnvelope: boolean;\n}\n\n/** What {@link CloudClient.getMyAccounts} reports. */\nexport interface CloudLinkedAccounts {\n  accounts: CloudLinkedAccount[];\n  /** How many the caller's plan allows. `null` means no limit. */\n  limit: number | null;\n}\n\n/** A single-use challenge to sign with an account root. */\nexport interface AccountLinkChallenge {\n  /** Sign this verbatim \u2014 it is an opaque sealed string, not a decodable id. */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** When it stops being accepted, epoch milliseconds. */\n  expiresAtMs: number | null;\n}\n\n/** A proof assembled by whoever holds the root, for {@link CloudClient.submitAccountLink}. */\nexport interface AccountLinkProof {\n  /** The account being claimed, 64 hex. */\n  accountId: string;\n  /** The root that names it, 64 hex. */\n  rootPublicKey: string;\n  /** The challenge that was signed. */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** `signAccountLink`'s output \u2014 standard base64. */\n  signature: string;\n}\n\n/** Where to send someone so a cloud login can consent to linking an account. */\nexport interface AccountLinkHandoff {\n  /** The cloud portal URL to open \u2014 a new tab, a popup, or the system browser. */\n  url: string;\n  /** The account the consent will be for, echoed so a caller can show it. */\n  accountId: string;\n}\n\n/** What comes back on the callback: a grant, a refusal, or neither. */\nexport interface AccountLinkCallback {\n  /** The grant to spend with {@link CloudClient.linkAccountWithGrant}. */\n  grant?: string;\n  /** The account the grant is for, as the portal echoed it. */\n  accountId?: string;\n  /** `'denied'` when the person cancelled. Absent on success. */\n  error?: string;\n}\n\n/** A single-use challenge for an account root to sign itself in with. */\nexport interface AccountLoginChallenge {\n  /** Sign this verbatim. Opaque and sealed by the cloud; nonces live ~2 minutes. */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** When it stops being accepted, epoch milliseconds. */\n  expiresAtMs: number;\n}\n\n/** A proof assembled by whoever holds the root, for {@link CloudClient.submitAccountLogin}. */\nexport interface AccountLoginProof {\n  /**\n   * The root that names the account, 64 hex.\n   *\n   * No `accountId` field, unlike {@link AccountLinkProof}: the cloud derives\n   * the account from this key rather than accepting one alongside it, so there\n   * is nothing a caller could state that the signature would then contradict.\n   */\n  rootPublicKey: string;\n  /** The challenge that was signed. */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** `signAccountLogin`'s output \u2014 standard base64. */\n  signature: string;\n}\n\n/** The outcome of {@link CloudClient.linkAccount}. */\nexport interface CloudAccountLink {\n  accountId: string;\n  linkedAt?: string | null;\n  /**\n   * True when this account was already linked to this same login, which the\n   * cloud treats as a 200 no-op rather than an error. A caller re-running\n   * onboarding gets success, not a confusing failure.\n   */\n  alreadyLinked: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface EnableHAOptions {\n  groupId: string;\n  contextId: string;\n  redirectUrl?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface DisableHAOptions {\n  groupId: string;\n  contextId: string;\n  redirectUrl?: string;\n}\n\n/** Response headers MDMA uses to hand back a rolling-refreshed session. */\nconst REFRESH_HEADER = 'x-mdma-session-refresh';\nconst REFRESH_EXPIRES_HEADER = 'x-mdma-session-expires';\n\nexport class CloudClient {\n  private baseUrl: string;\n  private session: CloudSession | null = null;\n  private readonly onSession?: CloudClientConfig['onSession'];\n  private readonly fetchImpl: typeof fetch;\n  private readonly timeoutMs: number;\n  private readonly routingCredential?: RoutingCredential;\n\n  constructor(config: CloudClientConfig = {}) {\n    this.baseUrl = (config.cloudBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CLOUD_BASE_URL).replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n    this.onSession = config.onSession;\n    // Bound through an arrow function: an unbound `globalThis.fetch` throws\n    // \"Illegal invocation\" in a browser, the same reason the node HTTP clients\n    // wrap it.\n    const injected = config.fetch;\n    this.fetchImpl = injected\n      ? (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => injected(input, init)\n      : (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => globalThis.fetch(input, init);\n    this.timeoutMs = config.timeoutMs ?? 10_000;\n    this.routingCredential = config.routingCredential;\n\n    if (config.sessionToken) {\n      // Expiry unknown until the server tells us; 0 means \"do not reason about\n      // it locally\", never \"expired\" \u2014 the server is the only judge and it\n      // answers 401 when it disagrees.\n      this.session = {\n        sessionToken: config.sessionToken,\n        expiresAt: 0,\n        user: { email: '' },\n      };\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** The current session, or `null` when nobody is signed in. */\n  getSession(): CloudSession | null {\n    return this.session;\n  }\n\n  /** Whether a session token is held. Says nothing about the server agreeing. */\n  isSignedIn(): boolean {\n    return this.session !== null;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Exchange a Google OAuth2 ID token for an MDMA session.\n   *\n   * The app owns the Google flow (One Tap, an auth-code popup, a native\n   * browser) and hands the resulting ID token here once. Everything after this\n   * uses the returned session token, so the Google credential does not have to\n   * be kept or re-minted per call.\n   */\n  async signInWithGoogle(idToken: string): Promise<CloudSession> {\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      session_token: string;\n      expires_at: number;\n      user: { email: string; name?: string; picture?: string };\n    }>('POST', '/api/auth/google', { body: { id_token: idToken }, anonymous: true });\n    return this.adoptSession(body);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Sign in as a Calimero account, proving it with its root key.\n   *\n   * The password-free counterpart to {@link signInWithGoogle}: no Google, no\n   * password, no server-held secret \u2014 the cloud mints a challenge, the account\n   * root signs it, and the session that comes back is the same MDMA session\n   * token every other cloud route already accepts.\n   *\n   * Doing this **once** is what makes an account's later device proofs mean\n   * something. A routing read shows that the caller holds a device the root\n   * certified, but certificates are public, so it can never show that anyone\n   * held the root; the cloud records this claim and from then on knows the\n   * account behind those reads was claimed by its owner. The claim is recorded\n   * even when the session is refused.\n   *\n   * @param rootSecret the account root's signing secret, 64 hex. It never\n   *   leaves this process \u2014 only a signature over the cloud's nonce travels.\n   *\n   * A `403` means either the signature did not verify, or the account is not\n   * linked to a cloud login: ownership alone says who you are, and the link\n   * says what you are entitled to. Anyone can mint a root offline, so a session\n   * on the proof alone would authenticate perfectly and authorize nothing. The\n   * ownership claim is recorded either way, so linking later needs no re-proof.\n   */\n  async signInWithAccount(rootSecret: string): Promise<CloudSession> {\n    const root = await accountRootFromSecret(rootSecret);\n    const { nonce } = await this.getAccountLoginChallenge();\n    return this.submitAccountLogin({\n      rootPublicKey: root.publicKey,\n      nonce,\n      signature: await signAccountLogin({ rootSecret, nonce }),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Mint a challenge for an account root to sign.\n   *\n   * Public, and deliberately so: the caller has no session \u2014 obtaining one is\n   * what this exchange does. The nonce is not a capability, it is the thing a\n   * capability gets demonstrated against, and demonstrating it needs the root.\n   *\n   * Split out of {@link signInWithAccount} for the case that call cannot serve:\n   * a root held by a hardware key, a desktop app or an air-gapped machine,\n   * which signs without the secret ever reaching this process.\n   */\n  async getAccountLoginChallenge(): Promise<AccountLoginChallenge> {\n    const body = await this.request<{ nonce: string; expires_at_ms: number }>(\n      'GET',\n      '/api/auth/account/challenge',\n      { anonymous: true },\n    );\n    return { nonce: body.nonce, expiresAtMs: body.expires_at_ms };\n  }\n\n  /** Post a proof assembled elsewhere. The other half of {@link getAccountLoginChallenge}. */\n  async submitAccountLogin(proof: AccountLoginProof): Promise<CloudSession> {\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      session_token: string;\n      expires_at: number;\n      user: { email: string; name?: string; picture?: string };\n    }>('POST', '/api/auth/account', {\n      body: {\n        root_public_key: proof.rootPublicKey,\n        nonce: proof.nonce,\n        signature: proof.signature,\n      },\n      anonymous: true,\n    });\n    return this.adoptSession(body);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Refresh the session token explicitly.\n   *\n   * Rarely needed: MDMA rolling-refreshes on ordinary authenticated calls and\n   * this client adopts the replacement automatically. Use it when an app wants\n   * a fresh token before going idle rather than on the next request.\n   */\n  async refreshSession(): Promise<CloudSession> {\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      session_token: string;\n      expires_at: number;\n      user: { email: string; name?: string; picture?: string };\n    }>('POST', '/api/auth/refresh');\n    return this.adoptSession(body);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Revoke this session server-side and forget it locally.\n   *\n   * Local state is cleared even if the server call fails: the caller asked to\n   * be signed out, and keeping a token they believe is gone is the worse of the\n   * two failures.\n   */\n  async signOut(): Promise<void> {\n    try {\n      if (this.session) await this.request<void>('POST', '/api/auth/logout', { parse: 'none' });\n    } finally {\n      this.session = null;\n      void this.notifySession(null);\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Namespaces the signed-in user owns. */\n  async getMyNamespaces(): Promise<CloudNamespace[]> {\n    const rows = await this.request<Array<Record<string, unknown>>>(\n      'GET',\n      '/api/cloud/me/namespaces',\n    );\n    return rows.map((row) => ({\n      namespaceId: String(row.namespace_id ?? row.group_id ?? ''),\n      groupId: String(row.group_id ?? row.namespace_id ?? ''),\n      haStatus: String(row.ha_status ?? 'none'),\n      haEnabledAt: (row.ha_enabled_at as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      contexts: Array.isArray(row.contexts) ? (row.contexts as string[]) : [],\n      fleetReplicas: row.fleet_replicas,\n    }));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The relays serving one namespace: where to present an intent, and as whom.\n   *\n   * Everything a client needs in order to mint a warrant it can actually\n   * spend. Filter on `authorshipReady` before signing \u2014 a warrant presented to\n   * a relay with no grant is refused *after* the author has burned a nonce from\n   * its monotonic sequence on it.\n   */\n  async getNamespaceRelays(namespaceId: string): Promise<CloudRelay[]> {\n    const body = await this.request<{ relays?: Array<Record<string, unknown>> }>(\n      'GET',\n      `/api/cloud/me/namespaces/${encodeURIComponent(namespaceId)}/relays`,\n    );\n    return (body.relays ?? []).map((row) => ({\n      peerId: String(row.peer_id ?? ''),\n      relayUrl: (row.relay_url as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      executorAccount: (row.executor_account as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      status: String(row.status ?? ''),\n      authorshipReady: row.authorship_ready === true,\n      lastSeenAt: (row.last_seen_at as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      confirmedAt: (row.confirmed_at as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n    }));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The first relay for `namespaceId` that can actually run an intent, or\n   * `null`.\n   *\n   * \"Can actually run one\" is three conditions, and a client that checks fewer\n   * gets a refusal it cannot explain: the cloud must know a URL, the relay must\n   * have reported the executor account a warrant has to name, and the grant\n   * must be in place.\n   */\n  async findExecutingRelay(namespaceId: string): Promise<CloudRelay | null> {\n    const relays = await this.getNamespaceRelays(namespaceId);\n    return (\n      relays.find((r) => r.authorshipReady && r.relayUrl !== null && r.executorAccount !== null) ??\n      null\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Where to reach a namespace without owning it: one read, both verbs.\n   *\n   * **Anonymous.** A joiner is by construction not the namespace owner and holds\n   * no cloud session \u2014 needing one is exactly what this path exists to avoid.\n   * Discovery is not authorization: merod refuses an `/admit` call unless the\n   * relaying node's account is on the invitation's signed `admitters` list, and\n   * refuses an intent unless the warrant is genuinely the member's, so naming a\n   * node grants the caller nothing it did not already have.\n   *\n   * A keyholder resolves a namespace to a node ONCE and then admits, reads and\n   * posts intents against that same node, which is why admission and writability\n   * are answered together rather than across two endpoints \u2014 the per-context\n   * read needs a context id a joiner does not yet have.\n   *\n   * An empty `nodes` list is a state, not an error: a namespace with no fleet\n   * assignment has no cloud node, and the joiner must use one of the\n   * invitation's other admitters \u2014 another admin's node, or a self-hosted peer.\n   */\n  async getNamespaceRouting(namespaceId: string): Promise<CloudNamespaceRouting> {\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      namespace_id?: unknown;\n      admitters?: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;\n      servable?: unknown;\n      writable?: unknown;\n    }>('GET', `/api/cloud/namespaces/${encodeURIComponent(namespaceId)}/admitters`, {\n      anonymous: true,\n      headers: await this.routingProof(namespaceId),\n    });\n    return {\n      namespaceId: String(body.namespace_id ?? namespaceId),\n      nodes: (body.admitters ?? []).map((row) => ({\n        peerId: String(row.peer_id ?? ''),\n        account: (row.account as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n        relayUrl: (row.relay_url as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n        admitUrl: (row.admit_url as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n        status: String(row.status ?? ''),\n        fresh: row.fresh === true,\n        canAdmit: row.can_admit === true,\n        authorshipReady: row.authorship_ready === true,\n        canExecute: row.can_execute === true,\n      })),\n      servable: body.servable === true,\n      writable: body.writable === true,\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Ask the cloud for a challenge to prove an account against.\n   *\n   * Public and unauthenticated on purpose, and safe to be: the nonce is sealed\n   * and bound to this one namespace, so it is not a capability \u2014 it is the\n   * thing a capability gets demonstrated against. A caller with no credential\n   * gains nothing by holding one.\n   *\n   * {@link getNamespaceRouting} calls this for you when the client was\n   * constructed with a `routingCredential`. Call it directly only to sign a\n   * challenge somewhere this client cannot reach the key.\n   */\n  async getRoutingChallenge(namespaceId: string): Promise<RoutingChallenge> {\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      namespace_id?: unknown;\n      nonce?: unknown;\n      expires_at_ms?: unknown;\n    }>('GET', `/api/cloud/namespaces/${encodeURIComponent(namespaceId)}/challenge`, {\n      anonymous: true,\n    });\n    return {\n      namespaceId: String(body.namespace_id ?? namespaceId),\n      nonce: String(body.nonce ?? ''),\n      expiresAtMs: Number(body.expires_at_ms ?? 0),\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The proof headers for one routing read, or nothing when no credential was\n   * configured.\n   *\n   * A challenge per read rather than a cached one: they expire in about two\n   * minutes and are single-namespace, so caching would trade one cheap request\n   * for a class of expiry bug that only shows up on a slow client.\n   */\n  private async routingProof(\n    namespaceId: string,\n  ): Promise<Record<string, string> | undefined> {\n    if (!this.routingCredential) return undefined;\n    const challenge = await this.getRoutingChallenge(namespaceId);\n    return routingProofHeaders(challenge, this.routingCredential);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Ask the cloud for a challenge bound to one ACCOUNT.\n   *\n   * Public and unauthenticated like {@link getRoutingChallenge}: an account id\n   * is `H(genesis(root_pk))` and travels in the clear in every device-link op,\n   * so naming one here reveals nothing and authorises nothing. MDMA re-derives\n   * the account from the certificate and refuses a mismatch.\n   */\n  async getAccountRelaysChallenge(accountId: string): Promise<DiscoveryChallenge> {\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      account_id?: unknown;\n      nonce?: unknown;\n      expires_at_ms?: unknown;\n    }>('GET', `/api/cloud/accounts/${encodeURIComponent(accountId)}/challenge`, {\n      anonymous: true,\n    });\n    return {\n      accountId: String(body.account_id ?? accountId),\n      nonce: String(body.nonce ?? ''),\n      expiresAtMs: Number(body.expires_at_ms ?? 0),\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Which relays serve this account \u2014 the bootstrap, and nothing more.\n   *\n   * A device holding a certificate can resolve a namespace it can *name*\n   * ({@link getNamespaceRouting}) and can ask a node it can *reach* what its\n   * account belongs to. It starts with neither. This closes that one gap.\n   *\n   * **It does not return namespaces, deliberately.** The node answers that from\n   * the governance DAG, scoped to the calling account: log in at one of these\n   * relays with an account proof and read its namespace listing. A cloud-side\n   * copy would be a second source of truth built from rows that linger for an\n   * account which left a namespace.\n   *\n   * So the sequence is: this \u2192 log in at a relay \u2192 ask it what you are in.\n   *\n   * Proven with the **device certificate**, not a cloud session, so it needs a\n   * `routingCredential` and throws without one rather than returning an empty\n   * list \u2014 \"you configured no credential\" and \"you have no relays\" are\n   * different answers and must not look alike.\n   */\n  async getAccountRelays(accountId: string): Promise<CloudAccountRelay[]> {\n    if (!this.routingCredential) {\n      throw new Error(\n        'getAccountRelays needs a routingCredential: construct the client with the device ' +\n          'certificate and its signing secret, since this read is proven by the device, not by a session.',\n      );\n    }\n    const challenge = await this.getAccountRelaysChallenge(accountId);\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      account_id?: unknown;\n      relays?: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;\n    }>('GET', `/api/cloud/accounts/${encodeURIComponent(accountId)}/relays`, {\n      anonymous: true,\n      headers: await routingProofHeaders(challenge, this.routingCredential),\n    });\n    return (body.relays ?? []).map((row) => ({\n      peerId: String(row.peer_id ?? ''),\n      relayUrl: (row.relay_url as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      fresh: row.fresh === true,\n    }));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The node to send a signed join to, chosen from those an invitation names.\n   *\n   * Pass the invitation's `admitters` and the intersection is done here, because\n   * skipping it is the failure this method exists to prevent: the cloud lists\n   * every node assigned to the namespace, while `admitters` is a snapshot signed\n   * when the invitation was minted. A node added afterwards looks perfect in\n   * every field here and answers 403.\n   *\n   * Omit `admitters` only for an invitation that names none \u2014 an empty list on\n   * the wire authorises any node to admit.\n   */\n  async findAdmitter(\n    namespaceId: string,\n    admitters?: readonly string[],\n  ): Promise<CloudNamespaceNode | null> {\n    const { nodes } = await this.getNamespaceRouting(namespaceId);\n    const allowed =\n      admitters && admitters.length > 0 ? new Set(admitters.map((a) => a.toLowerCase())) : null;\n    return (\n      nodes.find(\n        (n) =>\n          n.canAdmit &&\n          (allowed === null || (n.account !== null && allowed.has(n.account.toLowerCase()))),\n      ) ?? null\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Every attested machine currently serving something this account owns.\n   *\n   * The account-wide view of the same rows {@link getNamespaceRelays} returns\n   * per namespace, keyed by machine \u2014 so a UI can answer \"what is running for\n   * me?\" in one call. `canExecute` folds the three-way precondition, so a\n   * caller does not re-derive it.\n   *\n   * Only the caller's own namespaces appear on each machine. A plan's\n   * `usersPerMachine` is greater than one, so a fleet node routinely serves\n   * several accounts at once.\n   */\n  async getMyMachines(): Promise<CloudMachine[]> {\n    const body = await this.request<{ machines?: Array<Record<string, unknown>> }>(\n      'GET',\n      '/api/cloud/me/machines',\n    );\n    return (body.machines ?? []).map((row) => ({\n      peerId: String(row.peer_id ?? ''),\n      relayUrl: (row.relay_url as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      executorAccount: (row.executor_account as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      canExecute: row.can_execute === true,\n      namespaces: (Array.isArray(row.namespaces) ? row.namespaces : []).map((n) => {\n        const ns = n as Record<string, unknown>;\n        return {\n          namespaceId: String(ns.namespace_id ?? ''),\n          status: String(ns.status ?? ''),\n          authorshipReady: ns.authorship_ready === true,\n          fresh: ns.fresh === true,\n          confirmedAt: (ns.confirmed_at as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n          lastSeenAt: (ns.last_seen_at as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n        };\n      }),\n    }));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Claim a namespace under this account, proving ownership.\n   *\n   * The cloud has no other way to learn a namespace exists \u2014 namespaces are\n   * created on a node, and there is deliberately no \"create namespace\" in the\n   * cloud. `ownershipProof` comes from\n   * `admin.issueNamespaceOwnershipProof(namespaceId, \u2026)` on a node that is a\n   * **direct admin** of that namespace; merod refuses to issue one otherwise.\n   *\n   * Pass merod's response object straight through. The cloud accepts core's\n   * `signerPublicKey`/`signedPayload` casing as well as snake_case, so there is\n   * no re-keying step \u2014 and getting that wrong used to surface as a `422`\n   * naming three missing fields.\n   *\n   * Idempotent for the same account. A namespace already claimed by someone\n   * else is a `409`; a replayed proof nonce is a `403`.\n   */\n  async claimNamespace(namespaceId: string, ownershipProof: unknown): Promise<void> {\n    await this.request<unknown>('POST', '/api/cloud/namespaces/claim', {\n      body: { namespace_id: namespaceId, ownership_proof: ownershipProof },\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Ask the fleet to host a claimed namespace \u2014 the step that gets a relay\n   * assigned.\n   *\n   * Carries no proof: {@link claimNamespace} already established ownership,\n   * and this is the separate \"now host it\" half. Idempotent.\n   *\n   * `admitterAddrs` is where the owner's own node can be dialed \u2014 take it from\n   * that node's network status with {@link admitterAddrsFromNetworkStatus}.\n   * The first fleet node placed on a namespace has nobody but the owner to ask\n   * for admission, and without these it can only broadcast and hope the\n   * owner's node \u2014 often a laptop behind a relay \u2014 hears it. They are a dial\n   * hint, not a grant: the owner's node admits by its own policy. Omit them to\n   * leave whatever the cloud already holds; pass them again when the node's\n   * relay address changes, and they replace the stored ones.\n   *\n   * Not to be confused with {@link enableHA}, which opens the cloud's web flow\n   * in a browser tab for a user to complete by hand. This is the API call.\n   */\n  async enableNamespaceHa(\n    namespaceId: string,\n    options: { admitterAddrs?: readonly string[] } = {},\n  ): Promise<unknown> {\n    const body =\n      options.admitterAddrs === undefined\n        ? {}\n        : { admitter_addrs: [...options.admitterAddrs] };\n    return this.request<unknown>(\n      'POST',\n      `/api/cloud/namespaces/${encodeURIComponent(namespaceId)}/enable-ha`,\n      { body },\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Stop hosting a claimed namespace.\n   *\n   * The fleet's own reconcile loop does the rest: each assigned node notices\n   * the namespace is no longer assigned to it and **self-leaves**, which makes\n   * core evict it and purge its local data and keys. So this is not just a\n   * billing flip.\n   */\n  async disableNamespaceHa(namespaceId: string): Promise<unknown> {\n    return this.request<unknown>(\n      'POST',\n      `/api/cloud/namespaces/${encodeURIComponent(namespaceId)}/disable-ha`,\n      { body: {} },\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The node assigned to the signed-in user, or `null`.\n   *\n   * @deprecated Use {@link getMyMachines}. This reads the cloud's retired\n   * `NodeAssignment` ledger, which nothing has written since the v1\n   * retirement, so it answers `null` for every namespace-native account \u2014\n   * which reads as \"you have no machine\" when the truth is \"that is no longer\n   * how a machine is assigned\".\n   */\n  async getMyNode(): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null> {\n    const body = await this.request<{ node: Record<string, unknown> | null }>(\n      'GET',\n      '/api/cloud/me/node',\n    );\n    return body.node ?? null;\n  }\n\n  enableHA(options: EnableHAOptions): void {\n    const params = new URLSearchParams({\n      group_id: options.groupId,\n      context_id: options.contextId,\n    });\n    if (options.redirectUrl) {\n      params.set('redirect_url', options.redirectUrl);\n    }\n    window.open(`${this.baseUrl}/enable-ha?${params.toString()}`);\n  }\n\n  disableHA(options: DisableHAOptions): void {\n    const params = new URLSearchParams({\n      group_id: options.groupId,\n      context_id: options.contextId,\n    });\n    if (options.redirectUrl) {\n      params.set('redirect_url', options.redirectUrl);\n    }\n    window.open(`${this.baseUrl}/disable-ha?${params.toString()}`);\n  }\n\n  /** Record a freshly-issued session and tell the app to persist it. */\n  /**\n   * Link a Calimero account to this cloud login, proving possession of its root.\n   *\n   * Two hops, folded into one call because they are useless apart: fetch a\n   * single-use challenge, then sign it with the account root and post the proof.\n   * The secret never leaves this process \u2014 only a signature over a nonce the\n   * cloud minted does.\n   *\n   * This is the binding the cloud bills against. A relay does not need it to run\n   * an intent; the cloud needs it to know whose plan a hosted node is spending,\n   * and to sign that account back in later.\n   *\n   * @param rootSecret the account root's signing secret, 64 hex \u2014 from\n   *   {@link generateAccountRoot}, from a restored recovery phrase, or from a\n   *   desktop app or hardware key that already holds one.\n   *\n   * Idempotent for the same login. An account already linked to a *different*\n   * cloud login is a `409`; a replayed or expired challenge is a `403`; and\n   * exceeding the plan's account limit is a `402`.\n   */\n  async linkAccount(rootSecret: string): Promise<CloudAccountLink> {\n    const root = await accountRootFromSecret(rootSecret);\n    const { nonce } = await this.getAccountLinkChallenge();\n    return this.submitAccountLink({\n      accountId: root.accountId,\n      rootPublicKey: root.publicKey,\n      nonce,\n      signature: await signAccountLink({ rootSecret, nonce }),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Mint a single-use challenge for an account root to sign.\n   *\n   * The split half of {@link linkAccount}, for the case that call cannot serve:\n   * a root held by a desktop app, a hardware key or an air-gapped machine, which\n   * signs without the secret ever reaching this process. Fetch the challenge\n   * here, have the holder sign it, then hand the proof to\n   * {@link submitAccountLink}.\n   *\n   * Bound to the signed-in login and short-lived, so it is not a standing\n   * capability if it leaks \u2014 but it IS single-use, so a challenge fetched and\n   * abandoned is spent.\n   */\n  async getAccountLinkChallenge(): Promise<AccountLinkChallenge> {\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      nonce: string;\n      expires_at_ms?: number | null;\n    }>('GET', '/api/cloud/me/accounts/challenge');\n    return { nonce: body.nonce, expiresAtMs: body.expires_at_ms ?? null };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Post a proof assembled elsewhere. The other half of\n   * {@link getAccountLinkChallenge}.\n   *\n   * `accountId` must be the account `rootPublicKey` names \u2014 the cloud refuses a\n   * valid signature by a key that names a different account, or a caller could\n   * prove one root and link somebody else's account. Derive both from the same\n   * key rather than letting a user type either.\n   */\n  async submitAccountLink(proof: AccountLinkProof): Promise<CloudAccountLink> {\n    const body = await this.request<Record<string, unknown>>(\n      'POST',\n      '/api/cloud/me/accounts',\n      {\n        body: {\n          account_id: proof.accountId,\n          root_public_key: proof.rootPublicKey,\n          nonce: proof.nonce,\n          signature: proof.signature,\n        },\n      },\n    );\n    return {\n      accountId: String(body.account_id ?? proof.accountId),\n      linkedAt: (body.linked_at as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      alreadyLinked: body.already_linked === true,\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Where to send someone to authorise linking this account, and what to expect\n   * back. Pairs with {@link readAccountLinkCallback} and\n   * {@link linkAccountWithGrant}.\n   *\n   * This exists because a browser app is in a bind: it holds an account root and\n   * can never hold a *first* cloud session, since only Google issues one. So the\n   * person goes to the cloud, where they are signed in, and consents there. What\n   * comes back is a grant \u2014 consent to link this one account, spendable only by\n   * whoever can sign with its root.\n   *\n   * @param callbackUrl where the portal sends the person back. Must be an origin\n   *   the cloud allows; unlisted ones are refused when the grant is minted, not\n   *   here. The grant arrives in the URL **fragment**, which browsers do not\n   *   send to servers.\n   *\n   * Static, so it needs no client and no session: there is nothing to\n   * authenticate as yet.\n   */\n  static accountLinkHandoff(options: {\n    /** The cloud portal's origin, e.g. `https://cloud.calimero.network`. */\n    portalUrl: string;\n    /** The account to be linked, 64 hex \u2014 derive it, never let a user type it. */\n    accountId: string;\n    /** Where to come back to. */\n    callbackUrl: string;\n  }): AccountLinkHandoff {\n    const portal = options.portalUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n    const query = new URLSearchParams({\n      'link-account': options.accountId,\n      'callback-url': options.callbackUrl,\n    });\n    return { url: `${portal}/?${query.toString()}`, accountId: options.accountId };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Read the portal's answer out of a callback URL's fragment.\n   *\n   * Returns `{}` when there is nothing to read, so it is safe to call on every\n   * load \u2014 which is how a redirected app finds out it has been sent back.\n   *\n   * @param href defaults to the current location, when there is one.\n   */\n  static readAccountLinkCallback(href?: string): AccountLinkCallback {\n    const source = href ?? (typeof window === 'undefined' ? '' : window.location.href);\n    if (!source) return {};\n    let hash: string;\n    try {\n      hash = new URL(source).hash;\n    } catch {\n      return {};\n    }\n    const params = new URLSearchParams(hash.replace(/^#/, ''));\n    const grant = params.get('grant');\n    const accountId = params.get('account');\n    const error = params.get('error');\n    const out: AccountLinkCallback = {};\n    if (grant) out.grant = grant;\n    if (accountId) out.accountId = accountId;\n    if (error) out.error = error;\n    return out;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Spend a link grant: sign it with the account root and post the pair.\n   *\n   * Anonymous, and it has to be \u2014 the app doing this holds no cloud session,\n   * which is the whole reason the grant exists. The grant carries the consenting\n   * login sealed inside it, so nothing here names one; a caller-supplied email\n   * would be a field to lie in.\n   *\n   * The signature is an ordinary account-link signature with the grant as the\n   * nonce, so the same {@link signAccountLink} every other link path uses signs\n   * this one. Both halves are required: a grant without the key links nothing,\n   * which is what makes it safe to carry through a browser redirect.\n   *\n   * A `403` means the grant was bad, expired, already spent, or signed by a key\n   * that names a different account; `409` that the account belongs to another\n   * login; `402` that the plan is full.\n   */\n  async linkAccountWithGrant(options: {\n    grant: string;\n    /** The root of the account the grant names, 64 hex. */\n    rootSecret: string;\n  }): Promise<CloudAccountLink> {\n    const root = await accountRootFromSecret(options.rootSecret);\n    const body = await this.request<Record<string, unknown>>(\n      'POST',\n      '/api/cloud/accounts/link',\n      {\n        body: {\n          grant: options.grant,\n          root_public_key: root.publicKey,\n          signature: await signAccountLink({\n            rootSecret: options.rootSecret,\n            nonce: options.grant,\n          }),\n        },\n        anonymous: true,\n      },\n    );\n    return {\n      accountId: String(body.account_id ?? root.accountId),\n      linkedAt: (body.linked_at as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      alreadyLinked: body.already_linked === true,\n    };\n  }\n\n  /** The accounts linked to this login, and how many the plan allows. */\n  async getMyAccounts(): Promise<CloudLinkedAccounts> {\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      accounts?: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;\n      limit?: number | null;\n    }>('GET', '/api/cloud/me/accounts');\n    return {\n      accounts: (body.accounts ?? []).map((row) => ({\n        accountId: String(row.account_id ?? ''),\n        linkedAt: (row.linked_at as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n        hasRecoveryEnvelope: row.has_recovery_envelope === true,\n      })),\n      limit: body.limit ?? null,\n    };\n  }\n\n  private adoptSession(body: {\n    session_token: string;\n    expires_at: number;\n    user: { email: string; name?: string; picture?: string };\n  }): CloudSession {\n    this.session = {\n      sessionToken: body.session_token,\n      expiresAt: body.expires_at,\n      user: body.user,\n    };\n    void this.notifySession(this.session);\n    return this.session;\n  }\n\n  private async notifySession(session: CloudSession | null): Promise<void> {\n    try {\n      await this.onSession?.(session);\n    } catch {\n      // A failing persistence callback must not mask the call's own result.\n    }\n  }\n\n  private async request<T>(\n    method: string,\n    path: string,\n    options: {\n      body?: unknown;\n      anonymous?: boolean;\n      parse?: 'json' | 'none';\n      /** Extra request headers. Never overrides `Authorization` \u2014 see below. */\n      headers?: Record<string, string>;\n    } = {},\n  ): Promise<T> {\n    if (!options.anonymous && !this.session) {\n      throw new Error(\n        'Not signed in to Calimero Cloud: call signInWithGoogle() or construct the client with a sessionToken',\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Caller headers go in FIRST, so the lines below win on any collision: a\n    // per-call header must never be able to replace the session's\n    // `Authorization` or change how the body is parsed.\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n      ...options.headers,\n      Accept: 'application/json',\n    };\n    if (options.body !== undefined) headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';\n    if (!options.anonymous && this.session) {\n      headers.Authorization = `Bearer ${this.session.sessionToken}`;\n    }\n\n    const controller = new AbortController();\n    const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), this.timeoutMs);\n    let response: Response;\n    try {\n      response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`, {\n        method,\n        headers,\n        body: options.body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(options.body),\n        signal: controller.signal,\n      });\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Same shape the node clients use for a transport failure: an `HTTPError`\n      // with `status: 0`, so a caller has one error type to handle rather than\n      // one per layer.\n      throw new HTTPError(\n        0,\n        err instanceof Error ? err.name : 'NetworkError',\n        `${this.baseUrl}${path}`,\n        new Headers(),\n        err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),\n      );\n    } finally {\n      clearTimeout(timer);\n    }\n\n    this.adoptRollingRefresh(response);\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      const bodyText = await response.text().catch(() => undefined);\n      throw new HTTPError(\n        response.status,\n        response.statusText,\n        `${this.baseUrl}${path}`,\n        response.headers,\n        bodyText,\n      );\n    }\n\n    if (options.parse === 'none' || response.status === 204) return undefined as T;\n    return (await response.json()) as T;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Adopt a session token the server refreshed mid-request.\n   *\n   * MDMA rotates the token on activity and returns the replacement in a\n   * response header rather than making the client ask. Ignoring it costs\n   * nothing immediately and then logs the user out a week later, which is the\n   * kind of bug that is impossible to reproduce in a short session.\n   *\n   * The user identity is carried over: the header holds only a token, and the\n   * refresh is the same logical session as the sign-in that named the user.\n   */\n  private adoptRollingRefresh(response: Response): void {\n    const token = response.headers.get(REFRESH_HEADER);\n    if (!token || !this.session) return;\n    const expiresRaw = response.headers.get(REFRESH_EXPIRES_HEADER);\n    const expiresAt = Number(expiresRaw);\n    this.session = {\n      sessionToken: token,\n      expiresAt: Number.isFinite(expiresAt) && expiresAt > 0 ? expiresAt : this.session.expiresAt,\n      user: this.session.user,\n    };\n    void this.notifySession(this.session);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * The addresses a fleet node can dial to ask this node for admission, from the\n * node's `GET /admin-api/network/status` (see `AdminApiClient`).\n *\n * Its `externalAddrs`, each made to end in `/p2p/<localPeerId>`: that is the\n * shape core dials, and an external address is usually reported without it. A\n * relay-circuit address already contains `/p2p/` \u2014 the relay's \u2014 so the test is\n * whether it ends in this node's own id, not whether it names a peer at all.\n * Anything that is not a multiaddr is dropped. Empty when the status names no\n * peer id or no external address, which is an honest \"not dialable yet\".\n */\nexport function admitterAddrsFromNetworkStatus(status: unknown): string[] {\n  const record =\n    status && typeof status === 'object'\n      ? ((status as { data?: unknown }).data ?? status)\n      : undefined;\n  if (!record || typeof record !== 'object') return [];\n  const peerId = (record as { localPeerId?: unknown }).localPeerId;\n  const external = (record as { externalAddrs?: unknown }).externalAddrs;\n  if (typeof peerId !== 'string' || !peerId || !Array.isArray(external)) return [];\n  const suffix = `/p2p/${peerId}`;\n  const out: string[] = [];\n  for (const entry of external) {\n    if (typeof entry !== 'string') continue;\n    const addr = entry.trim();\n    if (!addr.startsWith('/')) continue;\n    const dialable = addr.endsWith(suffix) ? addr : `${addr}${suffix}`;\n    if (!out.includes(dialable)) out.push(dialable);\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n", "import { createBrowserHttpClient } from './http-client/index.js';\nimport { createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient } from './auth-api/index.js';\nimport { createAdminApiClientFromHttpClient } from './admin-api/index.js';\nimport type { AuthApiClient } from './auth-api/index.js';\nimport type { AdminApiClient } from './admin-api/index.js';\nimport type { HttpClient } from './http-client/index.js';\nimport type { TokenStore } from './token-store/index.js';\nimport { parseAuthCallback, buildAuthLoginUrl } from './auth/index.js';\nimport { createProofSigner } from './request/index.js';\nimport type { ProofRequest, ProofSignerOptions } from './request/index.js';\nimport type { AuthCallbackResult, AuthLoginOptions } from './auth/index.js';\nimport { RpcClient } from './rpc/index.js';\nimport { SseClient } from './events/sse.js';\nimport { WsClient } from './events/ws.js';\nimport { EphemeralClient } from './ephemeral/index.js';\nimport { CloudClient } from './cloud/cloud-client.js';\nimport type { CloudClientConfig } from './cloud/cloud-client.js';\n\ntype ProofCallback = (\n  request: ProofRequest,\n) => Promise<string | undefined>;\n\n/**\n * Accept either the keys or a ready signer.\n *\n * Taking a callback as well as an options object is not a convenience: it is\n * how a caller keeps the signing key out of the SDK entirely when it lives\n * somewhere the SDK cannot reach.\n */\nfunction resolveProofSigner(\n  config: MeroJsConfig['requestProof'],\n): ProofCallback | undefined {\n  if (!config) return undefined;\n  return typeof config === 'function' ? config : createProofSigner(config);\n}\n\nexport interface MeroJsConfig {\n  /** Base URL for the Calimero node */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  /** Initial credentials for authentication */\n  credentials?: {\n    username: string;\n    password: string;\n  };\n  /** Custom HTTP client timeout in milliseconds */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Request credentials mode for fetch (omit, same-origin, include) */\n  requestCredentials?: RequestCredentials;\n  /** Custom fetch for every HTTP request (`auth`, `admin`, `rpc`, `events`). Defaults to global `fetch`. */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  /** Optional token store for persistence */\n  tokenStore?: TokenStore;\n  /**\n   * Called when the node reports that the credential family is gone\n   * (`x-auth-error: token_reuse` / `token_revoked`). Terminal: the tokens have\n   * already been cleared by the time this runs and nothing is retried, so use it\n   * to send the user back through login. Errors thrown here are swallowed \u2014\n   * never let a UI failure mask the auth error.\n   */\n  onAuthRevoked?: () => Promise<void> | void;\n  /**\n   * Calimero Cloud, reachable as `sdk.cloud`.\n   *\n   * A node connection and a cloud account are separate things a client can have\n   * either of, both of, or neither \u2014 a desktop app with a local node and a\n   * cloud subscription has both, and needs them from one object. So this is\n   * configuration on the existing SDK rather than a second SDK: pass the\n   * session token (or none, and sign in through `sdk.cloud`) and the node half\n   * is unaffected.\n   *\n   * For a caller with *no* node at all, `connectCloud` is the entry point\n   * instead \u2014 it returns a connection that can write without one.\n   */\n  cloud?: CloudClientConfig;\n  /**\n   * Sign every request with a device key, instead of or alongside a session.\n   *\n   * A session is a bearer token: obtained once, presented many times. A\n   * request-carried proof commits to one method, one path and one body, so it\n   * is minted per call and cannot be lifted onto another request. It is what\n   * lets a client talk to a relay it has no account on \u2014 nothing was ever\n   * issued to it.\n   *\n   * Pass the keys and let the SDK mint each proof:\n   *\n   * ```ts\n   * new MeroJs({\n   *   baseUrl,\n   *   requestProof: { credential, session, signerSecret },\n   * });\n   * ```\n   *\n   * \u2026or pass your own signer, when the key must not reach the SDK at all \u2014 a\n   * hardware token, or a worker that holds it:\n   *\n   * ```ts\n   * new MeroJs({ baseUrl, requestProof: (req) => myWorker.sign(req) });\n   * ```\n   *\n   * The node only honours this when it runs with `--delegated-access`; a node\n   * that does not answers `403`, which is distinct from the `401` a bad proof\n   * gets.\n   *\n   * Applies to the request/response API. `events` (SSE) and `ws` are long-lived\n   * connections rather than requests, so a per-request signature does not\n   * describe them \u2014 they still use the session.\n   */\n  requestProof?:\n    | ProofSignerOptions\n    | ((request: ProofRequest) => Promise<string | undefined>);\n}\n\nexport interface TokenData {\n  access_token: string;\n  refresh_token: string;\n  expires_at: number;\n}\n\n/** Name of the Web Lock that serializes token refresh across tabs / webviews. */\nconst REFRESH_LOCK_NAME = 'mero-js:token-refresh';\n\n/** Minimal structural view of the Web Locks API (not available in every runtime). */\ninterface LockManagerLike {\n  request<T>(name: string, callback: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T>;\n}\n\n/** Returns `navigator.locks` when the runtime supports the Web Locks API. */\nfunction getLockManager(): LockManagerLike | null {\n  const nav = (globalThis as unknown as { navigator?: { locks?: LockManagerLike } }).navigator;\n  const locks = nav?.locks;\n  return locks && typeof locks.request === 'function' ? locks : null;\n}\n\n/** Try to extract `exp` (seconds) from a JWT, return ms timestamp or fallback. */\nfunction expiresAtFromJwt(token: string, fallbackMs: number): number {\n  try {\n    const parts = token.split('.');\n    if (parts.length === 3) {\n      // JWT uses base64url encoding: replace -/_ with +// and add padding\n      let b64 = parts[1].replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/');\n      while (b64.length % 4) b64 += '=';\n      const payload = JSON.parse(atob(b64));\n      if (typeof payload.exp === 'number') {\n        return payload.exp * 1000;\n      }\n    }\n  } catch {\n    // not a JWT or can't parse\n  }\n  return fallbackMs;\n}\n\n/**\n * Main MeroJs SDK class that manages all API clients and authentication\n */\nexport class MeroJs {\n  private config: MeroJsConfig;\n  private httpClient: HttpClient;\n  private authClient: AuthApiClient;\n  private adminClient: AdminApiClient;\n  private tokenData: TokenData | null = null;\n  private refreshPromise: Promise<TokenData> | null = null;\n  private tokenStore: TokenStore | null;\n  private rpcClient: RpcClient | null = null;\n  private sseClient: SseClient | null = null;\n  private wsClient: WsClient | null = null;\n  private wsWarned = false;\n  private ephemeralClient?: EphemeralClient;\n  private cloudClient?: CloudClient;\n\n  constructor(config: MeroJsConfig) {\n    this.config = {\n      timeoutMs: 10000,\n      ...config,\n    };\n\n    this.tokenStore = config.tokenStore ?? null;\n\n    // Restore tokens from store if available\n    if (this.tokenStore) {\n      this.tokenData = this.tokenStore.getTokens();\n    }\n\n    // Create HTTP client with token management\n    // For Tauri, explicitly set credentials to 'omit' to avoid network errors\n    const isTauri = typeof window !== 'undefined' && '__TAURI_INTERNALS__' in window;\n    // One signer for the whole connection: `authClient` and `adminClient` are\n    // both built FROM this transport, so wiring it here covers every request\n    // either of them makes.\n    const getProof = resolveProofSigner(this.config.requestProof);\n\n    this.httpClient = createBrowserHttpClient({\n      baseUrl: this.config.baseUrl,\n      fetch: this.config.fetch,\n      getProof,\n      getAuthToken: async () => {\n        const token = await this.getValidToken();\n        return token?.access_token || '';\n      },\n      refreshToken: async () => {\n        const refreshed = await this.performTokenRefresh();\n        return refreshed.access_token;\n      },\n      onTokenRefresh: async (newToken: string) => {\n        if (this.tokenData) {\n          this.tokenData.access_token = newToken;\n          this.tokenStore?.setTokens(this.tokenData);\n        }\n      },\n      onAuthRevoked: async () => {\n        // The refresh-token family is gone (a single-use refresh token was\n        // replayed, or the token was revoked). Nothing left to refresh with \u2014\n        // drop the bundle so the app can force a re-login, then let the app react.\n        this.clearToken();\n        try {\n          await this.config.onAuthRevoked?.();\n        } catch {\n          // A failing app callback must not mask the auth error.\n        }\n      },\n      timeoutMs: this.config.timeoutMs,\n      credentials: this.config.requestCredentials ?? (isTauri ? 'omit' : undefined),\n    });\n\n    // Create API clients\n    this.authClient = createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient(this.httpClient, {\n      baseUrl: this.config.baseUrl,\n      getAuthToken: async () => {\n        const token = await this.getValidToken();\n        return token?.access_token || '';\n      },\n      timeoutMs: this.config.timeoutMs,\n    });\n\n    this.adminClient = createAdminApiClientFromHttpClient(this.httpClient, {\n      baseUrl: this.config.baseUrl,\n      getAuthToken: async () => {\n        const token = await this.getValidToken();\n        return token?.access_token || '';\n      },\n      timeoutMs: this.config.timeoutMs,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get the Auth API client\n   */\n  get auth(): AuthApiClient {\n    return this.authClient;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get the Admin API client\n   */\n  get admin(): AdminApiClient {\n    return this.adminClient;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get the RPC client (lazy initialized)\n   */\n  get rpc(): RpcClient {\n    if (!this.rpcClient) {\n      this.rpcClient = new RpcClient({ httpClient: this.httpClient });\n    }\n    return this.rpcClient;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get the SSE event client (lazy initialized)\n   */\n  get events(): SseClient {\n    if (!this.sseClient) {\n      this.sseClient = new SseClient({\n        baseUrl: this.config.baseUrl,\n        fetch: this.config.fetch,\n        getAuthToken: async () => {\n          const token = await this.getValidToken();\n          return token?.access_token || '';\n        },\n      });\n    }\n    return this.sseClient;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get the ephemeral-presence client (lazy initialized).\n   *\n   * Shares this instance's SSE client, so `subscribe` reuses the one event\n   * stream rather than opening a second connection.\n   */\n  get ephemeral(): EphemeralClient {\n    if (!this.ephemeralClient) {\n      this.ephemeralClient = new EphemeralClient({\n        httpClient: this.httpClient,\n        sse: this.events,\n      });\n    }\n    return this.ephemeralClient;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Calimero Cloud (lazy initialized).\n   *\n   * Available whether or not `cloud` was configured \u2014 an app that signs in\n   * later gets an unauthenticated client it can call `signInWithGoogle` on,\n   * which is one fewer construction path than making the getter conditional.\n   * It is entirely independent of this instance's node credential: the cloud\n   * knows nothing about the node's tokens and the node knows nothing about the\n   * cloud session.\n   */\n  get cloud(): CloudClient {\n    if (!this.cloudClient) {\n      this.cloudClient = new CloudClient(this.config.cloud ?? {});\n    }\n    return this.cloudClient;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get the WebSocket event client (lazy initialized).\n   * @experimental Use `events` (SSE) for production. WsClient is experimental.\n   */\n  get ws(): WsClient {\n    if (!this.wsWarned) {\n      this.wsWarned = true;\n      console.warn('[mero-js] WsClient is experimental. Use mero.events (SSE) for production.');\n    }\n    if (!this.wsClient) {\n      this.wsClient = new WsClient({\n        baseUrl: this.config.baseUrl,\n        getAuthToken: async () => {\n          const token = await this.getValidToken();\n          return token?.access_token || '';\n        },\n      });\n    }\n    return this.wsClient;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Authenticate with the provided credentials\n   * This will create the root key on first use\n   */\n  async authenticate(credentials?: {\n    username: string;\n    password: string;\n  }): Promise<TokenData> {\n    const creds = credentials || this.config.credentials;\n    if (!creds) {\n      throw new Error('No credentials provided for authentication');\n    }\n\n    try {\n      const requestBody = {\n        auth_method: 'user_password',\n        public_key: creds.username,\n        client_name: 'mero-js-sdk',\n        permissions: ['admin'],\n        timestamp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),\n        provider_data: {\n          username: creds.username,\n          password: creds.password,\n        },\n      };\n\n      const response = await this.authClient.generateTokens(requestBody);\n\n      const accessToken = response.data.access_token;\n      this.tokenData = {\n        access_token: accessToken,\n        refresh_token: response.data.refresh_token,\n        expires_at: expiresAtFromJwt(accessToken, Date.now() + 3600_000),\n      };\n\n      this.tokenStore?.setTokens(this.tokenData);\n\n      return this.tokenData;\n    } catch (error) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Authentication failed: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error'}`,\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get a valid token. Returns the current token as-is.\n   * The server rejects refresh attempts while the access token is still valid,\n   * so we never proactively refresh. Instead, the WebHttpClient handles 401\n   * responses reactively via the refreshToken transport hook.\n   */\n  private async getValidToken(): Promise<TokenData | null> {\n    return this.tokenData;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Refresh the access token. Single-flight: every caller (including the HTTP\n   * transport's 401 hook) goes through here.\n   *\n   * Refresh tokens are single-use (calimero-network/core#3083): each refresh\n   * consumes the presented token and returns a new one, and replaying a consumed\n   * token makes the server revoke the whole family. A refresh must therefore\n   * happen exactly once per rotation, which needs three layers:\n   *  - an in-process promise, so concurrent 401s in this instance share one call;\n   *  - a Web Lock (when available), so other tabs/webviews don't refresh at the\n   *    same time on the same stored token;\n   *  - a re-read of the token store inside the lock, so a bundle that another\n   *    instance already rotated is adopted instead of replaying a stale token.\n   */\n  private async performTokenRefresh(): Promise<TokenData> {\n    if (this.refreshPromise) {\n      return this.refreshPromise;\n    }\n\n    // The access token that triggered this refresh. If the store holds a different\n    // one by the time we get the lock, someone else already rotated for us.\n    const triggeringAccessToken = this.tokenData?.access_token;\n\n    const promise = this.withRefreshLock(() =>\n      this.performTokenRefreshLocked(triggeringAccessToken),\n    );\n    this.refreshPromise = promise;\n\n    try {\n      return await promise;\n    } finally {\n      if (this.refreshPromise === promise) {\n        this.refreshPromise = null;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Run `fn` under the cross-tab refresh lock, or directly if Web Locks are unavailable. */\n  private withRefreshLock<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {\n    const locks = getLockManager();\n    return locks ? locks.request(REFRESH_LOCK_NAME, fn) : fn();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Perform the actual token refresh. Runs with the refresh lock held.\n   */\n  private async performTokenRefreshLocked(\n    triggeringAccessToken?: string,\n  ): Promise<TokenData> {\n    // Another instance/tab may have rotated the bundle while we were queued behind\n    // the lock \u2014 the store, not our in-memory copy, is the source of truth.\n    const stored = this.tokenStore?.getTokens() ?? null;\n    if (stored?.refresh_token) {\n      this.tokenData = stored;\n\n      if (triggeringAccessToken && stored.access_token !== triggeringAccessToken) {\n        // Someone else already refreshed. Reuse their bundle rather than replaying\n        // our (now consumed) refresh token, which would revoke the family.\n        return stored;\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!this.tokenData?.refresh_token) {\n      throw new Error('No refresh token available');\n    }\n\n    try {\n      const response = await this.authClient.refreshToken({\n        access_token: this.tokenData.access_token,\n        refresh_token: this.tokenData.refresh_token,\n      });\n\n      const accessToken = response.data.access_token;\n      this.tokenData = {\n        access_token: accessToken,\n        // The refresh token is rotated on every refresh \u2014 persist the new one or\n        // the next refresh replays a consumed token.\n        refresh_token: response.data.refresh_token,\n        expires_at: expiresAtFromJwt(accessToken, Date.now() + 3600_000),\n      };\n\n      this.tokenStore?.setTokens(this.tokenData);\n\n      return this.tokenData;\n    } catch (error) {\n      // Don't clear tokens on refresh failure \u2014 the access token may still be\n      // valid (server rejects refresh while access token hasn't expired yet).\n      // A genuinely dead family arrives as `x-auth-error: token_reuse` and is\n      // handled by the onAuthRevoked transport hook. Let the caller handle this.\n      throw new Error(\n        `Token refresh failed: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error'}`,\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Clear the current token\n   */\n  public clearToken(): void {\n    this.refreshPromise = null;\n    this.tokenData = null;\n    this.tokenStore?.clear();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Check if the SDK is authenticated\n   */\n  public isAuthenticated(): boolean {\n    return this.tokenData !== null;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Set token data directly (e.g., from auth callback).\n   * If `expires_at` is missing or 0, attempts to parse the JWT exp claim,\n   * falling back to 1 hour from now.\n   */\n  public setTokenData(data: TokenData): void {\n    const expiresAt = data.expires_at || expiresAtFromJwt(data.access_token, Date.now() + 3600_000);\n    this.tokenData = { ...data, expires_at: expiresAt };\n    this.tokenStore?.setTokens(this.tokenData);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get the current token data (for debugging)\n   */\n  public getTokenData(): TokenData | null {\n    return this.tokenData;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Close all event connections and clean up resources\n   */\n  public close(): void {\n    this.sseClient?.close();\n    this.wsClient?.close();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Parse an auth callback URL hash fragment (static utility)\n   */\n  static parseAuthCallback(url: string): AuthCallbackResult | null {\n    return parseAuthCallback(url);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Build an auth login URL (static utility)\n   */\n  static buildAuthLoginUrl(nodeUrl: string, opts: AuthLoginOptions): string {\n    return buildAuthLoginUrl(nodeUrl, opts);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Create a new MeroJs SDK instance\n */\nexport function createMeroJs(config: MeroJsConfig): MeroJs {\n  return new MeroJs(config);\n}\n", "import type { TokenData } from '../mero-js.js';\n\nexport interface TokenStore {\n  getTokens(): TokenData | null;\n  setTokens(data: TokenData): void;\n  clear(): void;\n}\n\nexport class MemoryTokenStore implements TokenStore {\n  private tokens: TokenData | null = null;\n\n  getTokens(): TokenData | null {\n    return this.tokens;\n  }\n\n  setTokens(data: TokenData): void {\n    this.tokens = data;\n  }\n\n  clear(): void {\n    this.tokens = null;\n  }\n}\n\nconst STORAGE_KEY = 'mero-tokens';\n\nexport class LocalStorageTokenStore implements TokenStore {\n  private readonly key: string;\n\n  constructor(key: string = STORAGE_KEY) {\n    this.key = key;\n  }\n\n  getTokens(): TokenData | null {\n    try {\n      if (typeof localStorage === 'undefined') return null;\n      const raw = localStorage.getItem(this.key);\n      if (!raw) return null;\n      const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);\n      if (parsed && parsed.access_token && parsed.refresh_token) {\n        return {\n          access_token: parsed.access_token,\n          refresh_token: parsed.refresh_token,\n          expires_at: typeof parsed.expires_at === 'number' ? parsed.expires_at : Date.now() + 3600_000,\n        };\n      }\n      return null;\n    } catch {\n      return null;\n    }\n  }\n\n  setTokens(data: TokenData): void {\n    try {\n      if (typeof localStorage === 'undefined') return;\n      localStorage.setItem(this.key, JSON.stringify(data));\n    } catch {\n      // Storage unavailable\n    }\n  }\n\n  clear(): void {\n    try {\n      if (typeof localStorage === 'undefined') return;\n      localStorage.removeItem(this.key);\n    } catch {\n      // Storage unavailable\n    }\n  }\n}\n", "/**\n * Mint a warrant: the author's consent for one relay to run one intent, once.\n *\n * This exists because the case delegated authorship is *for* is an account that\n * holds no node \u2014 a browser tab, a Node service, a bot. Every one of those is a\n * JS runtime, and until now the only thing that could mint a warrant was `merod`,\n * so \"a member with no node\" in practice meant \"a member with a node it is not\n * allowed to use for anything else\".\n *\n * **No dependencies, and that is not incidental.** The primitives are all built\n * in: `crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256')` for the hash, `crypto.subtle` Ed25519\n * for the signature, and `DataView` for the integers.\n *\n * Warrant v2 (core#3933) gave up the fixed-width encoding that used to make this\n * pure concatenation: `method` travels in the clear as a string and each cited\n * head list is a vector, so three borsh `u32` counts now sit inside the bytes.\n * Two widths to keep straight, and they are not the same: the counts **inside\n * the encoding** are `u32`, while the counts the **signing preimage** hashes are\n * `u64`. Same numbers, different serialization \u2014 reusing one for the other\n * produces a warrant that is well-formed and verifies nowhere.\n *\n * **The byte contract is pinned in core**, at\n * `crates/account/src/tests/warrant_wire_fixture.rs`. The domain strings below\n * are `pub(crate)` there, so nothing in that repository forces anyone to notice\n * this file depends on them \u2014 which is exactly why the fixture lives on that side\n * and this module's test asserts the same vectors. A drift would otherwise leave\n * this producing well-formed warrants whose signatures verify nowhere, surfacing\n * at a relay as a 403: an authorization refusal, nowhere near the cause.\n */\n\nimport {\n  concat,\n  derivePublicKey,\n  domainHash,\n  fromHex,\n  hex,\n  importSigningKey,\n  u32le,\n  u64le,\n} from '../crypto/internal.js';\n\nconst SIGN_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode('calimero.warrant.v2');\nconst INTENT_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode('calimero.warrant.intent.v1');\n\n/**\n * core's `MAX_WARRANT_CITED_HEADS`. A node refuses more than this before doing\n * any Ed25519 work, so minting past it produces a warrant nothing will spend.\n */\nconst MAX_CITED_HEADS = 64;\n\n/** 32 zero bytes \u2014 the `appVersion` default. See {@link WarrantInput.appVersion}. */\nconst UNPINNED_APP = '00'.repeat(32);\n\n/** Ed25519 PKCS#8 prefix, so a raw 32-byte seed can be imported by WebCrypto. */\n/** What a warrant authorises. */\nexport interface WarrantInput {\n  /**\n   * The context, hex \u2014 the same string every other method here takes.\n   *\n   * Hex like everything else on this interface. It was base58 while the node\n   * spelled `ContextId` and `PublicKey` that way and `AccountId` and `DeviceId`\n   * in hex; that split is gone, so this module no longer needs a rule per field\n   * and no longer needs a base58 decoder to enforce one.\n   */\n  context: string;\n  /** The author's account, hex \u2014 whose consent this is. */\n  authorAccount: string;\n  /** The relay authorised to act, hex. An account, not a key. */\n  executor: string;\n  /**\n   * The application build this warrant is signed against, hex (32 bytes).\n   *\n   * Pins the code rather than a version string, so a relay cannot wait for an\n   * upgrade that widens what `method` does and then spend a warrant signed\n   * against the narrower one. Read it from the context\n   * (`GET /admin-api/contexts/{id}` \u2192 `applicationId`); a value guessed here\n   * pins the wrong build, which is worse than not pinning.\n   *\n   * Defaults to 32 zero bytes, matching `merod account sign-warrant`'s\n   * `--app-version` default. Nothing verifies the field yet \u2014 core#3933 landed\n   * the field set ahead of its enforcement so a signer is written once against\n   * the final bytes \u2014 but a warrant minted with the default will be refused once\n   * pinning lands, so pass the real value for anything meant to outlive it.\n   */\n  appVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * The method the relay may run.\n   *\n   * Carried in the clear as of v2, so a peer can select a per-method write-set\n   * without reversing a hash against the app's ABI. The *arguments* are still\n   * committed to rather than carried \u2014 see {@link intentHash}.\n   */\n  method: string;\n  /** Its arguments, as the JSON the guest will receive. */\n  argsJson: unknown;\n  /**\n   * Monotonic per author **device**.\n   *\n   * Per device rather than per account because two devices of one account are\n   * independent replicas: they cannot coordinate on a counter, so an\n   * account-scoped sequence would have them refusing each other's warrants.\n   */\n  nonce: number | bigint;\n  /**\n   * Account-log heads this author saw when signing, each hex (32 bytes).\n   *\n   * Empty by default, and empty is the honest answer for a client that tracks\n   * no log \u2014 a fabricated view is worse than none. At most\n   * {@link MAX_CITED_HEADS}.\n   */\n  accountHeads?: string[];\n  /**\n   * Governance heads this author's view descended from, each hex (32 bytes).\n   *\n   * **Where these come from decides whether they mean anything.** A floor the\n   * relay supplied is a floor the relay chose: a relay that withholds a\n   * governance op can hand you a stale view and collect a warrant citing it.\n   * Take the value from the account's own devices or a co-signing peer outside\n   * the relay's operator. As it stands this detects an honest relay's staleness\n   * and does not constrain a dishonest one.\n   */\n  governanceFloor?: string[];\n  /** Unix seconds after which the relay must refuse it. */\n  notAfter: number | bigint;\n  /**\n   * The author device's ed25519 signing secret, hex (32 bytes).\n   *\n   * Never sent anywhere. It signs locally and only the signature travels, which\n   * is the whole reason a warrant can be minted by something holding no node.\n   */\n  deviceSecret: string;\n}\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n/**\n * The commitment a warrant carries in place of the intent itself.\n *\n * Its own domain, distinct from the signing one, so a value computed for one\n * purpose cannot be presented for the other.\n */\nexport async function intentHash(\n  method: string,\n  argsJson: unknown,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const args = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(argsJson));\n  return domainHash(INTENT_DOMAIN, [new TextEncoder().encode(method), args]);\n}\n\n\n/**\n * Sign a warrant and return it hex-encoded, ready for `performIntent`.\n *\n * Returns the encoding rather than an object because the signature covers\n * exactly these bytes: a caller that rebuilt the fields from JSON would have a\n * second spelling able to disagree with what was signed.\n */\nexport async function signWarrant(input: WarrantInput): Promise<string> {\n  const context = fromHex(input.context, 'context', 32);\n  const authorAccount = fromHex(input.authorAccount, 'authorAccount', 32);\n  const executor = fromHex(input.executor, 'executor', 32);\n  const appVersion = fromHex(\n    input.appVersion ?? UNPINNED_APP,\n    'appVersion',\n    32,\n  );\n  const accountHeads = citedHeads(input.accountHeads, 'accountHeads');\n  const governanceFloor = citedHeads(input.governanceFloor, 'governanceFloor');\n\n  const key = await importSigningKey(input.deviceSecret);\n  const publicKey = await derivePublicKey(input.deviceSecret);\n\n  const method = new TextEncoder().encode(input.method);\n  const commitment = await intentHash(input.method, input.argsJson);\n  const nonce = u64le(input.nonce);\n  const notAfter = u64le(input.notAfter);\n\n  // Each head list is preceded by its own count. `domainHash` length-prefixes\n  // every part it is given, so the heads are individually unambiguous \u2014 but the\n  // two lists are adjacent, so without the counts `accountHeads = [a, b],\n  // governanceFloor = []` hashes identically to `[a], [b]`, and a relay could\n  // relabel which plane a head was cited from. u64 HERE; u32 in the encoding.\n  const preimage = await domainHash(SIGN_DOMAIN, [\n    context,\n    authorAccount,\n    publicKey,\n    executor,\n    appVersion,\n    method,\n    commitment,\n    u64le(accountHeads.length),\n    ...accountHeads,\n    u64le(governanceFloor.length),\n    ...governanceFloor,\n    nonce,\n    notAfter,\n  ]);\n\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign({ name: 'Ed25519' }, key, preimage),\n  );\n\n  // Borsh: a `String` is a u32 length then its UTF-8 bytes; a `Vec<[u8; 32]>` is\n  // a u32 count then the elements. u32 HERE; u64 in the preimage above.\n  return hex(\n    concat(\n      context,\n      authorAccount,\n      publicKey,\n      executor,\n      appVersion,\n      u32le(method.length),\n      method,\n      commitment,\n      u32le(accountHeads.length),\n      ...accountHeads,\n      u32le(governanceFloor.length),\n      ...governanceFloor,\n      nonce,\n      notAfter,\n      signature,\n    ),\n  );\n}\n\n/** Decode a cited-head list, refusing one longer than a node will accept. */\nfunction citedHeads(heads: string[] | undefined, label: string): Uint8Array[] {\n  const list = heads ?? [];\n  if (list.length > MAX_CITED_HEADS) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `${label} cites ${list.length} heads, over the ${MAX_CITED_HEADS} a node accepts`,\n    );\n  }\n  return list.map((head, i) => fromHex(head, `${label}[${i}]`, 32));\n}\n\n/** A warrant's fields, as hex, decoded from the wire encoding. */\nexport interface WarrantFields {\n  context: string;\n  authorAccount: string;\n  /** The author device key `signWarrant` derived from the secret. */\n  deviceKey: string;\n  executor: string;\n  appVersion: string;\n  method: string;\n  intentHash: string;\n  accountHeads: string[];\n  governanceFloor: string[];\n  /** u64 little-endian, as it sits on the wire. */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** u64 little-endian, as it sits on the wire. */\n  notAfter: string;\n  signature: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a hex warrant back into its fields.\n *\n * Exists because v2's offsets are no longer constants: `method` is a string and\n * the head lists are vectors, so everything after `appVersion` moves with the\n * method's length. Anything reading a warrant by fixed offset \u2014 a test, a client\n * inspecting one it was handed \u2014 silently reads the wrong field instead of\n * failing, which is how the three call sites that did so passed while comparing\n * the method's length prefix to a nonce.\n *\n * One copy of the layout, beside the encoder that produces it, so the two cannot\n * drift. Internal: not exported from the package root, because a client that\n * needs a warrant's fields has the input it signed.\n */\nexport function parseWarrant(warrant: string): WarrantFields {\n  const at = (start: number, bytes: number) =>\n    warrant.slice(start * 2, (start + bytes) * 2);\n  // A borsh u32 is little-endian, so the hex pairs read back to front.\n  const u32At = (start: number) =>\n    Number.parseInt((at(start, 4).match(/../g) ?? []).reverse().join(''), 16);\n\n  let o = 0;\n  const take = (bytes: number) => {\n    const field = at(o, bytes);\n    o += bytes;\n    return field;\n  };\n\n  const context = take(32);\n  const authorAccount = take(32);\n  const deviceKey = take(32);\n  const executor = take(32);\n  const appVersion = take(32);\n  const methodLen = u32At(o);\n  o += 4;\n  const method = take(methodLen);\n  const intentHashField = take(32);\n  const accountCount = u32At(o);\n  o += 4;\n  const accountHeads = Array.from({ length: accountCount }, () => take(32));\n  const governanceCount = u32At(o);\n  o += 4;\n  const governanceFloor = Array.from({ length: governanceCount }, () =>\n    take(32),\n  );\n  const nonce = take(8);\n  const notAfter = take(8);\n  const signature = take(64);\n\n  if (o * 2 !== warrant.length) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `warrant is ${warrant.length / 2} bytes but its fields account for ${o}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  return {\n    context,\n    authorAccount,\n    deviceKey,\n    executor,\n    appVersion,\n    method,\n    intentHash: intentHashField,\n    accountHeads,\n    governanceFloor,\n    nonce,\n    notAfter,\n    signature,\n  };\n}\n", "/**\n * Write to a context through a relay, holding nothing but a signing key.\n *\n * # What this replaces\n *\n * `sdk.rpc.execute` asks a node to run a method *as itself*: it needs a node,\n * that node needs to be a member, and the caller needs a credential on it. For\n * a browser tab, a phone, or an agent, none of those three is available \u2014 the\n * runtime cannot compile WASM against materialized state, never received the\n * scope key that seals the deltas, and has no account on anybody's node.\n *\n * This client is the other path. The caller signs a warrant locally, the relay\n * runs the method as the *author's* principal, and the resulting delta is\n * attributed to the author's account and device \u2014 their replica slot, their\n * membership, their name in the app. The relay's key signs the envelope and\n * nothing else.\n *\n * # The three preconditions, and why they are checked in this order\n *\n * `describe()` answers the first two in one call, before anything is signed:\n * the relay's executor account (which the warrant must name) and whether it\n * holds `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` on the owning group. The third \u2014 that the\n * author's account is a member \u2014 only the group knows, and it surfaces as a\n * refusal.\n *\n * Checking before signing is not politeness. A warrant consumes a nonce from a\n * monotonic per-device sequence, and one minted against the wrong executor is\n * unspendable: the number is gone and the write never happened.\n */\n\nimport { signWarrant } from '../warrant/warrant.js';\nimport { HTTPError } from '../http-client/web-client.js';\nimport type { NonceSource } from './nonce-source.js';\n\n/** How long a freshly minted warrant stays presentable, in seconds. */\nconst DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS = 300;\n\n/** Where and as whom to write, plus the key that consents. */\nexport interface RelayClientConfig {\n  /**\n   * The relay's base URL \u2014 the node's origin, not a path.\n   *\n   * Discover it from {@link CloudClient.getNamespaceRelays} for a hosted\n   * namespace, or take it from the operator for a self-hosted one.\n   */\n  relayUrl: string;\n  /**\n   * The account the relay writes as, hex \u2014 a warrant's `executor`.\n   *\n   * An account rather than a key, so one of the relay's processes rotating its\n   * signing key does not void warrants already issued to it. Left unset, the\n   * first `execute` learns it from {@link RelayClient.describe}.\n   */\n  executorAccount?: string;\n  /** The author's account, hex \u2014 whose consent the warrant carries. */\n  authorAccount: string;\n  /**\n   * The author's `AccountProof<DeviceCert>`, hex-encoded borsh.\n   *\n   * Proves the key that signed the warrant is a device of the account it names.\n   * The author sends only its own half; the relay attaches its own.\n   */\n  authorProof: string;\n  /**\n   * The author device's ed25519 signing secret, hex (32 bytes).\n   *\n   * Never transmitted. It signs in this process and only the signature leaves,\n   * which is the whole reason a keyholder can author without a node.\n   */\n  deviceSecret: string;\n  /** Where nonces come from. See {@link NonceSource} \u2014 a reset replays. */\n  nonces: NonceSource;\n  /**\n   * Seconds a minted warrant stays valid. Defaults to 300.\n   *\n   * Checked by the relay against its own clock and deliberately never by peers,\n   * so this bounds how long *this* request may sit in flight \u2014 not how long the\n   * network will accept the delta.\n   */\n  ttlSeconds?: number;\n  /** Injected for tests and non-browser runtimes. Defaults to global `fetch`. */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n}\n\n/** What a relay says about its ability to run intents in one context. */\nexport interface RelayDescription {\n  /** The account a warrant must name as `executor`, hex. */\n  executorAccount: string;\n  /** Whether the relay holds `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` on the owning group. */\n  canAuthorOnBehalf: boolean;\n  /** The group whose admin grants that capability, hex. */\n  groupId: string;\n}\n\n/** Where an accepted intent landed. */\nexport interface IntentResult<T = unknown> {\n  /** The context's scope root after the run \u2014 did this change anything? */\n  rootHash: string;\n  /** The method's own return value. */\n  returns: T | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Thrown when a relay refuses an intent, carrying which precondition failed.\n *\n * The distinction is the whole reason this type exists. A `403` from this\n * endpoint means one of three unrelated things \u2014 no grant on the relay, the\n * author is not a member, or the nonce was already spent \u2014 and they send a\n * caller somewhere completely different: ask an admin, ask for an invitation,\n * or just retry. Collapsing them into \"forbidden\" makes a retryable replay look\n * like a permissions bug.\n */\nexport class IntentRefusedError extends Error {\n  name = 'IntentRefusedError';\n\n  constructor(\n    /** The relay's own explanation, verbatim. */\n    public readonly reason: string,\n    /** `true` when re-presenting the same intent under a *fresh* warrant may work. */\n    public readonly retryable: boolean,\n    public readonly status: number,\n  ) {\n    super(`relay refused the intent (HTTP ${status}): ${reason}`);\n  }\n}\n\nexport class RelayClient {\n  private readonly baseUrl: string;\n  private executorAccount: string | undefined;\n  private readonly config: RelayClientConfig;\n  private readonly fetchImpl: typeof fetch;\n  private readonly timeoutMs: number;\n\n  constructor(config: RelayClientConfig) {\n    this.config = config;\n    this.baseUrl = config.relayUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n    this.executorAccount = config.executorAccount;\n    const injected = config.fetch;\n    this.fetchImpl = injected\n      ? (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => injected(input, init)\n      : (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => globalThis.fetch(input, init);\n    this.timeoutMs = config.timeoutMs ?? 10_000;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Ask the relay what it can do in `contextId`.\n   *\n   * Cheap and unauthenticated on a relay that serves delegated execution\n   * publicly, which is what makes it usable as a precondition check rather than\n   * as diagnostics after a failure.\n   */\n  async describe(contextId: string): Promise<RelayDescription> {\n    const body = await this.json<{\n      data: { executorAccount: string; canAuthorOnBehalf: boolean; groupId: string };\n    }>('GET', `/admin-api/contexts/${encodeURIComponent(contextId)}/intents`);\n    // Learned, not merely returned: a client that called `describe` should not\n    // then have to pass the account back in to `execute`.\n    this.executorAccount = body.data.executorAccount;\n    return body.data;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Mint a warrant for `method(args)` and present it to the relay.\n   *\n   * One intent, once: the warrant authorizes exactly this method and these\n   * arguments in exactly this context, and its nonce is spent by the network on\n   * apply. Nothing accumulates and nothing is reusable.\n   */\n  async execute<T = unknown>(\n    contextId: string,\n    method: string,\n    argsJson: unknown = {},\n  ): Promise<IntentResult<T>> {\n    const executor = this.executorAccount ?? (await this.describe(contextId)).executorAccount;\n\n    const nonce = await this.config.nonces.next();\n    const ttl = this.config.ttlSeconds ?? DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS;\n    const warrant = await signWarrant({\n      context: contextId,\n      authorAccount: this.config.authorAccount,\n      executor,\n      method,\n      argsJson,\n      nonce,\n      notAfter: BigInt(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)) + BigInt(ttl),\n      deviceSecret: this.config.deviceSecret,\n    });\n\n    const body = await this.json<{ data: { rootHash: string; returns: T | null } }>(\n      'POST',\n      `/admin-api/contexts/${encodeURIComponent(contextId)}/intents`,\n      { method, argsJson, warrant, authorProof: this.config.authorProof },\n    );\n    return { rootHash: body.data.rootHash, returns: body.data.returns ?? null };\n  }\n\n  private async json<T>(method: string, path: string, body?: unknown): Promise<T> {\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = { Accept: 'application/json' };\n    if (body !== undefined) headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';\n\n    const controller = new AbortController();\n    const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), this.timeoutMs);\n    let response: Response;\n    try {\n      response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`, {\n        method,\n        headers,\n        body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body),\n        signal: controller.signal,\n      });\n    } catch (err) {\n      throw new HTTPError(\n        0,\n        err instanceof Error ? err.name : 'NetworkError',\n        `${this.baseUrl}${path}`,\n        new Headers(),\n        err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),\n      );\n    } finally {\n      clearTimeout(timer);\n    }\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      const text = await response.text().catch(() => '');\n      // 400 and 403 are both caller preconditions and core separates them\n      // deliberately: 400 means re-sending the same bytes cannot help, 403\n      // means the bytes are genuine but authority is missing. Only the spent\n      // nonce is worth retrying, and only under a fresh warrant.\n      if (response.status === 400 || response.status === 403) {\n        const reason = extractReason(text);\n        throw new IntentRefusedError(reason, /nonce/i.test(reason), response.status);\n      }\n      throw new HTTPError(\n        response.status,\n        response.statusText,\n        `${this.baseUrl}${path}`,\n        response.headers,\n        text,\n      );\n    }\n\n    return (await response.json()) as T;\n  }\n}\n\n/** Pull the relay's explanation out of its error body, or fall back to the raw text. */\nfunction extractReason(bodyText: string): string {\n  if (!bodyText) return 'no reason given';\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(bodyText) as { error?: unknown; message?: unknown };\n    for (const candidate of [parsed.error, parsed.message]) {\n      if (typeof candidate === 'string' && candidate) return candidate;\n    }\n  } catch {\n    // Not JSON \u2014 the text itself is the best available explanation.\n  }\n  return bodyText;\n}\n", "/**\n * Where a warrant's nonce comes from.\n *\n * # Why this is a named concept and not a counter in the relay client\n *\n * A warrant's nonce is spent, once, per `(context, author device)` on every\n * node that applies the delta. So the sequence a client emits is not a local\n * detail \u2014 it is state the network remembers, and the client is the only party\n * that can keep it.\n *\n * The receiving ledger is a **sliding window** 64 wide, not a high-water mark,\n * which is what makes the two failure modes so different:\n *\n * - **Skipping** numbers is free. Gossip gives no ordering, so the window\n *   exists precisely to accept whatever unseen nonce arrives.\n * - **Restarting** the sequence is fatal. A tab that reloads and resumes at `1`\n *   re-presents nonces the network has already spent, and every one of those\n *   writes is refused as a replay \u2014 indistinguishable, to the user, from the\n *   app silently not saving.\n *\n * That asymmetry is why persistence is the default here and an in-memory source\n * is the one you have to ask for. It is also why a source may jump: reserving a\n * block and losing the tail is the correct trade.\n */\n\n/** Produces the next nonce for one author device. Must never go backwards. */\nexport interface NonceSource {\n  next(): Promise<bigint>;\n}\n\n/**\n * A counter in memory, starting at `start`.\n *\n * Correct only for a process whose lifetime is the whole sequence \u2014 a script, a\n * server-side worker that owns its own device key, a test. In a browser tab it\n * resets on reload and replays; use {@link createLocalStorageNonceSource}\n * there.\n */\nexport function createMemoryNonceSource(start: number | bigint = 1): NonceSource {\n  let next = BigInt(start);\n  if (next < 1n) {\n    throw new Error('nonce sequence starts at 1');\n  }\n  return {\n    next(): Promise<bigint> {\n      const value = next;\n      next += 1n;\n      return Promise.resolve(value);\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * A counter persisted in `localStorage`, so a reload continues the sequence.\n *\n * Key it per author **device**, not per account: two devices of one account are\n * independent replicas with independent sequences, and sharing a counter would\n * have them refusing each other's warrants.\n *\n * **Reserve-then-hand-out.** The stored value is advanced *before* the nonce is\n * returned, so a crash between the two loses a number rather than reusing one.\n * Losing a number costs nothing (the window accepts gaps); reusing one costs a\n * write.\n *\n * Concurrent tabs are the case this cannot fully solve, because `localStorage`\n * has no atomic read-modify-write. Two tabs racing can hand out the same nonce,\n * and the loser's write is refused as a replay rather than silently\n * misattributed \u2014 a visible error, not corruption. An app that genuinely writes\n * from several tabs at once should hold a Web Lock around `next()` or give each\n * tab its own device.\n */\nexport function createLocalStorageNonceSource(\n  key: string,\n  storage?: { getItem(k: string): string | null; setItem(k: string, v: string): void },\n): NonceSource {\n  const store =\n    storage ?? (globalThis as unknown as { localStorage?: typeof storage }).localStorage;\n  if (!store) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'no localStorage in this runtime: pass a storage implementation, or use createMemoryNonceSource for a process that owns its whole sequence',\n    );\n  }\n  return {\n    next(): Promise<bigint> {\n      const raw = store.getItem(key);\n      // A missing, empty, or corrupted value means \"no sequence recorded\", and\n      // the safe reading of that is not 1 \u2014 a cleared storage on a device that\n      // has already written would replay. But the client cannot know, and 1 is\n      // the only defensible start, so it is what a fresh key gets. This is why\n      // the doc above tells apps to key per device: a device whose storage was\n      // cleared should be re-paired rather than resumed.\n      let current = 0n;\n      if (raw !== null && raw !== '') {\n        try {\n          const parsed = BigInt(raw);\n          if (parsed > 0n) current = parsed;\n        } catch {\n          current = 0n;\n        }\n      }\n      const value = current + 1n;\n      store.setItem(key, value.toString());\n      return Promise.resolve(value);\n    },\n  };\n}\n", "/**\n * The Noise NK handshake (`Noise_NK_25519_AESGCM_SHA256`) that opens a sealed\n * session, written against WebCrypto from the Noise specification\n * (revision 34, http://www.noiseprotocol.org/noise.html). The node runs the\n * other side with `snow`; core's published vectors check the two against each\n * other.\n *\n * NK: the initiator knows the responder's static key in advance \u2014 here the\n * transport key the node's quote commits to \u2014 and sends nothing but an\n * ephemeral key before both ephemerals are mixed in, so everything after the\n * handshake has forward secrecy.\n */\n\nimport { concat } from '../crypto/internal.js';\n\nconst PROTOCOL_NAME = 'Noise_NK_25519_AESGCM_SHA256';\nconst DH_LEN = 32;\nconst TAG_LEN = 16;\n/** PKCS#8 wrapping of a raw X25519 private key (RFC 8410). */\nconst PKCS8_X25519_PREFIX = new Uint8Array([\n  0x30, 0x2e, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x30, 0x05, 0x06, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x04,\n  0x22, 0x04, 0x20,\n]);\n\n/** Noise's `SymmetricState`: the chaining key, the handshake hash and the cipher key. */\nexport class SymmetricState {\n  private ck: Uint8Array;\n  private h: Uint8Array;\n  private k: CryptoKey | null = null;\n  private n = 0;\n\n  private constructor(h: Uint8Array) {\n    this.ck = h;\n    this.h = h;\n  }\n\n  static async initialize(): Promise<SymmetricState> {\n    // A name of 32 bytes or fewer is used as the hash, zero-padded.\n    const name = new TextEncoder().encode(PROTOCOL_NAME);\n    const h = new Uint8Array(32);\n    h.set(name);\n    return new SymmetricState(h);\n  }\n\n  async mixHash(data: Uint8Array): Promise<void> {\n    this.h = await sha256(concat(this.h, data));\n  }\n\n  async mixKey(inputKeyMaterial: Uint8Array): Promise<void> {\n    const [ck, key] = await hkdf2(this.ck, inputKeyMaterial);\n    this.ck = ck;\n    this.k = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', key, 'AES-GCM', false, ['encrypt', 'decrypt']);\n    this.n = 0;\n  }\n\n  async encryptAndHash(plaintext: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    if (!this.k) throw new Error('Noise: no cipher key yet');\n    const ciphertext = new Uint8Array(\n      await crypto.subtle.encrypt(\n        { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: noiseNonce(this.n), additionalData: this.h },\n        this.k,\n        plaintext,\n      ),\n    );\n    this.n += 1;\n    await this.mixHash(ciphertext);\n    return ciphertext;\n  }\n\n  async decryptAndHash(ciphertext: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    if (!this.k) throw new Error('Noise: no cipher key yet');\n    const plaintext = new Uint8Array(\n      await crypto.subtle.decrypt(\n        { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: noiseNonce(this.n), additionalData: this.h },\n        this.k,\n        ciphertext,\n      ),\n    );\n    this.n += 1;\n    await this.mixHash(ciphertext);\n    return plaintext;\n  }\n\n  /** The initiator-to-responder key, then the responder-to-initiator key. */\n  split(): Promise<[Uint8Array, Uint8Array]> {\n    return hkdf2(this.ck, new Uint8Array());\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface X25519KeyPair {\n  privateKey: CryptoKey;\n  publicKey: Uint8Array;\n}\n\n/**\n * Start an NK handshake to `remoteStatic`. `fixedEphemeral` pins the\n * ephemeral secret, for the published test vectors only; leave it out.\n */\nexport async function initiate(\n  remoteStatic: Uint8Array,\n  prologue: Uint8Array,\n  fixedEphemeral?: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<{\n  message1: Uint8Array;\n  finish(message2: Uint8Array): Promise<{ payload: Uint8Array; split: [Uint8Array, Uint8Array] }>;\n}> {\n  const state = await SymmetricState.initialize();\n  await state.mixHash(prologue);\n  // <- s (known in advance)\n  await state.mixHash(remoteStatic);\n  // -> e, es\n  const ephemeral = await x25519KeyPair(fixedEphemeral);\n  await state.mixHash(ephemeral.publicKey);\n  await state.mixKey(await dh(ephemeral.privateKey, remoteStatic));\n  const message1 = concat(ephemeral.publicKey, await state.encryptAndHash(new Uint8Array()));\n\n  return {\n    message1,\n    async finish(message2) {\n      if (message2.length < DH_LEN + TAG_LEN) throw new Error('Noise: message 2 is too short');\n      // <- e, ee\n      const remoteEphemeral = message2.slice(0, DH_LEN);\n      await state.mixHash(remoteEphemeral);\n      await state.mixKey(await dh(ephemeral.privateKey, remoteEphemeral));\n      const payload = await state.decryptAndHash(message2.slice(DH_LEN));\n      return { payload, split: await state.split() };\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nexport async function x25519KeyPair(secret?: Uint8Array): Promise<X25519KeyPair> {\n  if (!secret) {\n    let pair: CryptoKeyPair;\n    try {\n      pair = (await crypto.subtle.generateKey({ name: 'X25519' }, true, [\n        'deriveBits',\n      ])) as CryptoKeyPair;\n    } catch (error) {\n      throw new Error(\n        'Sealed transport needs WebCrypto with X25519, which this runtime lacks ' +\n          `(${(error as Error)?.name ?? 'no crypto.subtle'}). Current browsers and Node have ` +\n          'it; in React Native, install react-native-quick-crypto as the global crypto.',\n      );\n    }\n    const publicKey = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.exportKey('raw', pair.publicKey));\n    return { privateKey: pair.privateKey, publicKey };\n  }\n  const privateKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'pkcs8',\n    concat(PKCS8_X25519_PREFIX, secret),\n    { name: 'X25519' },\n    true,\n    ['deriveBits'],\n  );\n  const jwk = await crypto.subtle.exportKey('jwk', privateKey);\n  return { privateKey, publicKey: base64UrlDecode(jwk.x as string) };\n}\n\nexport async function dh(privateKey: CryptoKey, publicKey: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const peer = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', publicKey, { name: 'X25519' }, false, []);\n  return new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.deriveBits({ name: 'X25519', public: peer } as EcdhKeyDeriveParams, privateKey, 256),\n  );\n}\n\n/** Noise's AESGCM nonce: 32 zero bits, then the counter as a big-endian u64. */\nfunction noiseNonce(n: number): Uint8Array {\n  const nonce = new Uint8Array(12);\n  new DataView(nonce.buffer).setBigUint64(4, BigInt(n), false);\n  return nonce;\n}\n\nasync function sha256(data: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', data));\n}\n\nasync function hmacSha256(key: Uint8Array, data: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const hmacKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', key, { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' }, false, [\n    'sign',\n  ]);\n  return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', hmacKey, data));\n}\n\n/** Noise's `HKDF` with two outputs. */\nasync function hkdf2(chainingKey: Uint8Array, inputKeyMaterial: Uint8Array): Promise<[Uint8Array, Uint8Array]> {\n  const temp = await hmacSha256(chainingKey, inputKeyMaterial);\n  const first = await hmacSha256(temp, new Uint8Array([1]));\n  const second = await hmacSha256(temp, concat(first, new Uint8Array([2])));\n  return [first, second];\n}\n\nfunction base64UrlDecode(value: string): Uint8Array {\n  const base64 = value.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/');\n  const binary = atob(base64 + '='.repeat((4 - (base64.length % 4)) % 4));\n  return Uint8Array.from(binary, (char) => char.charCodeAt(0));\n}\n", "/**\n * Sealed transport: requests encrypted end to end to a TEE node's attested key.\n *\n * A node speaks plain HTTP and any TLS in front of it ends outside the enclave,\n * at whatever proxy or relay the operator runs, so everything crossing that hop\n * (the bearer token, JSON-RPC arguments, results) is readable there. Sealing\n * encrypts it so that only the attested TD can read it, and only the TD can\n * produce a response the client accepts.\n *\n * The client opens a session with a Noise NK handshake to the X25519 transport\n * key the node's quote commits to ({@link fetchAttestedTransportKey}). The\n * transport key only authenticates the node: the session keys come from both\n * sides' ephemeral keys, so once a session is gone (an hour at most) what was\n * sent in it cannot be opened, not even with the transport key. Each request\n * is sealed under the session; each response streams back in sealed frames, so\n * server-sent events are sealed too. WebSockets cannot be, and the node\n * refuses one inside the envelope with a 501.\n *\n * The node's side, and the wire format this implements byte for byte, are in\n * core's `crates/server/src/sealed.rs`:\n *\n * ```text\n * handshake   Noise_NK_25519_AESGCM_SHA256, prologue \"calimero/sealed-http/v2\"\n *   request   POST /sealed/v2/handshake   0x02 || transport_pk || Noise message 1\n *   response  0x02 || Noise message 2 (payload = session_id(16) || lifetime secs, u32 BE)\n *   keys      (req key, resp key) = Split()\n * exchange    POST /sealed/v2\n *   header    0x02 || session_id(16) || request_id (u64 BE; from 1, each used once)\n *   request   header || AES-256-GCM(req key, nonce = request_id || 0u32, aad = header, inner)\n *   response  frames, each u32 BE length || AES-256-GCM(resp key,\n *             nonce = request_id || frame index (u32 BE, from 0), aad = header, kind || data)\n *             kind 0 = head (JSON), 1 = body bytes, 2 = end; no end frame = cut short\n *   inner     u32 BE head length || head (JSON) || body\n * ```\n *\n * Use it by handing {@link createSealedFetch} to `MeroJsConfig.fetch`.\n */\n\nimport { concat, fromHex, hex } from '../crypto/internal.js';\nimport type { TeeAttestRequest, TeeAttestResponseData } from '../admin-api/admin-types.js';\nimport { initiate } from './noise.js';\nimport type { DcapCollateral } from './verify.js';\n\n/** Where a session is opened, relative to the node's base URL. */\nexport const HANDSHAKE_PATH = '/sealed/v2/handshake';\n/** Where sealed requests are posted, relative to the node's base URL. */\nexport const SEALED_PATH = '/sealed/v2';\n/** Content type of every sealed body. */\nexport const SEALED_CONTENT_TYPE = 'application/vnd.calimero.sealed';\n\nconst VERSION = 2;\nconst PROLOGUE = new TextEncoder().encode('calimero/sealed-http/v2');\nconst SESSION_ID_LEN = 16;\nconst HEADER_LEN = 1 + SESSION_ID_LEN + 8;\nconst FRAME_HEAD = 0;\nconst FRAME_DATA = 1;\nconst FRAME_END = 2;\n/**\n * The largest frame the node sends: a kind byte, at most 64 KiB of data, a tag.\n * Anything larger is refused before it is buffered, so a proxy cannot make the\n * client hold an unbounded frame it has yet to authenticate.\n */\nconst MAX_FRAME_LEN = 1 + 64 * 1024 + 16;\n/** Far more than a handshake reply (69 bytes) ever is. */\nconst MAX_HANDSHAKE_REPLY = 1024;\n/** Open a new session this long before the node would drop the current one. */\nconst RENEW_BEFORE_MS = 60_000;\nconst TRANSPORT_BINDING_DOMAIN = 'calimero.tee-attest.transport-key.v1';\nconst NULL_BODY_STATUSES = [101, 204, 205, 304];\n\nconst utf8 = new TextEncoder();\n\n/** The node no longer holds the transport key this client attested (it restarted). */\nexport class StaleTransportKeyError extends Error {\n  name = 'StaleTransportKeyError';\n\n  constructor() {\n    super('The node no longer holds the attested transport key; attest again for the current one');\n  }\n}\n\n/** The node refused the envelope itself, before anything inside it ran. */\nexport class SealedTransportError extends Error {\n  name = 'SealedTransportError';\n\n  constructor(\n    public status: number,\n    public code: string | undefined,\n    message: string,\n    /** How long the node asked to wait before retrying (`Retry-After`), if it did. */\n    public retryAfterMs?: number,\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * What the attest endpoint puts in report data bytes `32..64` when asked to\n * bind its transport key. `inner` is what would have been there otherwise: the\n * expected application hash, or 32 zero bytes when none was asked for.\n * Mirrors core's `attest_transport_binding`.\n */\nexport async function transportKeyBinding(\n  inner: Uint8Array,\n  transportKey: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest(\n    'SHA-256',\n    concat(utf8.encode(TRANSPORT_BINDING_DOMAIN), inner, transportKey),\n  );\n  return new Uint8Array(digest);\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyTransportQuote {\n  /**\n   * Verify `quoteB64` \u2014 never by asking the node being attested \u2014 and check\n   * that its report data is `nonce || reportDataSuffix` (both hex). Resolve\n   * true only when the quote is genuine, its measurements are ones you accept,\n   * and the report data matches. {@link createQuoteVerifier} does all of this\n   * in the page. `collateral` is what the node sent with the quote, when the\n   * verifier asked for it.\n   */\n  (args: {\n    quoteB64: string;\n    nonce: string;\n    reportDataSuffix: string;\n    collateral?: DcapCollateral;\n  }): Promise<boolean>;\n  /**\n   * Ask the node for the collateral its quote verifies against, and pass it\n   * in as `collateral`. Off unless set, because a node that predates the field\n   * refuses the request.\n   */\n  readonly includeCollateral?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Ask a node for its transport key and accept it only if a quote you verified\n * commits to it.\n *\n * `applicationHash` (hex), when given, is the bytecode hash you expect the\n * attested application to have; the node is asked to bind that application,\n * and the quote only verifies if it runs that exact bytecode.\n */\nexport async function fetchAttestedTransportKey(\n  admin: { teeAttest(request: TeeAttestRequest): Promise<TeeAttestResponseData> },\n  verify: VerifyTransportQuote,\n  options: { applicationId?: string; applicationHash?: string } = {},\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  if ((options.applicationId === undefined) !== (options.applicationHash === undefined)) {\n    throw new Error('applicationId and applicationHash are given together or not at all');\n  }\n  const nonce = hex(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)));\n  const attested = await admin.teeAttest({\n    nonce,\n    applicationId: options.applicationId,\n    bindTransportKey: true,\n    ...(verify.includeCollateral ? { includeCollateral: true } : {}),\n  });\n  if (!attested.transportPublicKey) {\n    throw new Error('The node did not report a transport key; it predates sealed transport');\n  }\n  const transportKey = fromHex(attested.transportPublicKey, 'transportPublicKey', 32);\n  const inner = options.applicationHash\n    ? fromHex(options.applicationHash, 'applicationHash', 32)\n    : new Uint8Array(32);\n  const reportDataSuffix = hex(await transportKeyBinding(inner, transportKey));\n  const verified = await verify({\n    quoteB64: attested.quoteB64,\n    nonce,\n    reportDataSuffix,\n    collateral: attested.collateral,\n  });\n  if (!verified) {\n    throw new Error('The attestation did not verify, so its transport key is not trusted');\n  }\n  return transportKey;\n}\n\nexport interface AttestedSealedFetchOptions {\n  /** The node's base URL. */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  /**\n   * Decides whether the node's quote is one you trust \u2014 typically\n   * {@link createQuoteVerifier}. Asked again whenever the node restarts.\n   */\n  verify: VerifyTransportQuote;\n  /** Also require the node to run this application with this bytecode hash. */\n  applicationId?: string;\n  applicationHash?: string;\n  /** Fetch that carries the attestation and the envelopes. Defaults to global `fetch`. */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n}\n\n/**\n * {@link createSealedFetch} for a node you know only by URL: it attests the\n * node's transport key with `verify`, over `POST /admin-api/tee/attest` (the\n * one call that needs no credential and is never sealed), and seals everything\n * else to it. A restarted node is attested again, through the same verifier.\n *\n * This is what to hand a {@link RelayClient} for a TEE relay, so the warrant\n * and the method's arguments reach only the attested TD:\n *\n * ```ts\n * const relay = new RelayClient({\n *   relayUrl,\n *   fetch: createAttestedSealedFetch({ baseUrl: relayUrl, verify: createQuoteVerifier(...) }),\n *   ...\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function createAttestedSealedFetch(options: AttestedSealedFetchOptions): typeof fetch {\n  const baseFetch = options.fetch ?? ((input, init) => fetch(input, init));\n  const attestUrl = `${options.baseUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '')}/admin-api/tee/attest`;\n  const admin = {\n    async teeAttest(request: TeeAttestRequest): Promise<TeeAttestResponseData> {\n      const response = await baseFetch(attestUrl, {\n        method: 'POST',\n        headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },\n        body: JSON.stringify(request),\n      });\n      if (!response.ok) {\n        throw new Error(`The node refused to attest: HTTP ${response.status}`);\n      }\n      const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: TeeAttestResponseData };\n      if (!body.data) throw new Error('The attestation response is malformed');\n      return body.data;\n    },\n  };\n  return createSealedFetch({\n    baseUrl: options.baseUrl,\n    transportPublicKey: () =>\n      fetchAttestedTransportKey(admin, options.verify, {\n        applicationId: options.applicationId,\n        applicationHash: options.applicationHash,\n      }),\n    fetch: baseFetch,\n  });\n}\n\nexport interface SealedFetchOptions {\n  /** The node's base URL, as given to `MeroJsConfig.baseUrl`. */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  /**\n   * The node's attested transport key, or a function that attests and returns\n   * it \u2014 typically `() => fetchAttestedTransportKey(admin, verify)`. Given a\n   * function, a restarted node is handled: the key is attested again, through\n   * your verifier, and the request retried once. Given bytes, a restart\n   * surfaces as {@link StaleTransportKeyError}.\n   */\n  transportPublicKey: Uint8Array | (() => Promise<Uint8Array>);\n  /** Fetch that carries the sealed envelope. Defaults to global `fetch`. */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n}\n\n/**\n * A `fetch` that seals every request to the node's attested transport key.\n * Pass it as `MeroJsConfig.fetch`.\n *\n * A request for any URL outside `baseUrl` is refused rather than sent in the\n * clear: falling back to plaintext would silently undo the point of sealing.\n */\nexport function createSealedFetch(options: SealedFetchOptions): typeof fetch {\n  const base = new URL(options.baseUrl);\n  const basePath = base.pathname.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n  const nodeUrl = `${base.origin}${basePath}`;\n  const baseFetch = options.fetch ?? ((input, init) => fetch(input, init));\n  const attest =\n    typeof options.transportPublicKey === 'function' ? options.transportPublicKey : undefined;\n  let transportKey: Promise<Uint8Array> = attest\n    ? Promise.resolve().then(attest)\n    : Promise.resolve(options.transportPublicKey as Uint8Array);\n  // Attesting starts now, before any request awaits it. A node that fails to\n  // attest must surface on the request that needed the key, not earlier as an\n  // unhandled rejection; the failure is still thrown to every awaiter.\n  transportKey.catch(() => undefined);\n  let session: Promise<Session> | undefined;\n\n  const openSession = async (): Promise<Session> => {\n    try {\n      return await handshake(baseFetch, nodeUrl, await checkedKey(transportKey));\n    } catch (error) {\n      if (!(error instanceof StaleTransportKeyError) || !attest) throw error;\n      transportKey = Promise.resolve().then(attest);\n      return handshake(baseFetch, nodeUrl, await checkedKey(transportKey));\n    }\n  };\n  /** The session to use now, and the promise it came from, to name it if it turns out stale. */\n  const currentSession = async (): Promise<[Session, Promise<Session>]> => {\n    const pending = session ?? renew(undefined);\n    const open = await pending;\n    if (Date.now() < open.renewAt) return [open, pending];\n    const renewed = renew(pending);\n    return [await renewed, renewed];\n  };\n  // Replace the session only if it is still the one found stale, so concurrent\n  // requests that all find it stale open one new session between them.\n  const renew = (stale: Promise<Session> | undefined): Promise<Session> => {\n    if (session === stale) {\n      const opening = openSession();\n      session = opening;\n      opening.catch(() => {\n        if (session === opening) session = undefined;\n      });\n    }\n    return session as Promise<Session>;\n  };\n\n  return async (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response> => {\n    const request = new Request(input, init);\n    const url = new URL(request.url);\n    if (url.origin !== base.origin || !url.pathname.startsWith(`${basePath}/`)) {\n      throw new Error(`Refusing to send ${url.href} outside the sealed node at ${options.baseUrl}`);\n    }\n    const headers: Array<[string, string]> = [];\n    request.headers.forEach((value, name) => headers.push([name, value]));\n    const head = { method: request.method, path: url.pathname.slice(basePath.length) + url.search, headers };\n    const body = new Uint8Array(await request.arrayBuffer());\n\n    const send = async (open: Session): Promise<Response> => {\n      const { requestId, header, envelope } = await sealRequest(open, head, body);\n      const response = await baseFetch(`${nodeUrl}${SEALED_PATH}`, {\n        method: 'POST',\n        headers: { 'content-type': SEALED_CONTENT_TYPE },\n        body: envelope,\n        signal: request.signal,\n      });\n      if (response.headers.get('content-type') !== SEALED_CONTENT_TYPE) {\n        throw await envelopeRefusal(response);\n      }\n      return openResponse(response, open.responseKey, header, requestId);\n    };\n\n    const [open, pending] = await currentSession();\n    try {\n      return await send(open);\n    } catch (error) {\n      // The node refused the envelope before running anything in it, so the\n      // request can be sent again safely under a new session.\n      if (!(error instanceof SealedTransportError) || error.code !== 'unknown_session') throw error;\n      return send(await renew(pending));\n    }\n  };\n}\n\nasync function checkedKey(key: Promise<Uint8Array>): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const bytes = await key;\n  if (bytes.length !== 32) throw new Error('transportPublicKey must be 32 bytes');\n  return bytes;\n}\n\nexport interface Session {\n  requestKey: CryptoKey;\n  responseKey: CryptoKey;\n  nextRequestId: number;\n  renewAt: number;\n  header(requestId: number): Uint8Array;\n}\n\nasync function handshake(\n  baseFetch: typeof fetch,\n  nodeUrl: string,\n  transportKey: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Session> {\n  try {\n    return await handshakeOnce(baseFetch, nodeUrl, transportKey);\n  } catch (error) {\n    // The node limits how fast sessions open. A refused handshake opened\n    // nothing, so trying once more after the pause it asks for is safe.\n    if (!(error instanceof SealedTransportError) || error.code !== 'busy') throw error;\n    await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, error.retryAfterMs ?? 1000));\n    return handshakeOnce(baseFetch, nodeUrl, transportKey);\n  }\n}\n\nasync function handshakeOnce(\n  baseFetch: typeof fetch,\n  nodeUrl: string,\n  transportKey: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Session> {\n  const noise = await initiate(transportKey, PROLOGUE);\n  const response = await baseFetch(`${nodeUrl}${HANDSHAKE_PATH}`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'content-type': SEALED_CONTENT_TYPE },\n    body: concat(new Uint8Array([VERSION]), transportKey, noise.message1),\n  });\n  if (response.headers.get('content-type') !== SEALED_CONTENT_TYPE) {\n    throw await envelopeRefusal(response);\n  }\n  const reply = await readAtMost(response, MAX_HANDSHAKE_REPLY);\n  return sessionFrom(noise, reply);\n}\n\n/** Finish the handshake with the node's reply. Exported for the published vectors. */\nexport async function sessionFrom(\n  noise: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof initiate>>,\n  reply: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Session> {\n  if (reply[0] !== VERSION) throw new Error('The handshake reply is malformed');\n  let finished: Awaited<ReturnType<(typeof noise)['finish']>>;\n  try {\n    finished = await noise.finish(reply.slice(1));\n  } catch {\n    throw new Error('The handshake reply did not open: it did not come from the attested node');\n  }\n  const { payload, split } = finished;\n  if (payload.length !== SESSION_ID_LEN + 4) throw new Error('The handshake reply is malformed');\n  const sessionId = payload.slice(0, SESSION_ID_LEN);\n  const lifetimeSecs = new DataView(payload.buffer, payload.byteOffset).getUint32(SESSION_ID_LEN, false);\n  const [requestKey, responseKey] = await Promise.all([\n    crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', split[0], 'AES-GCM', false, ['encrypt']),\n    crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', split[1], 'AES-GCM', false, ['decrypt']),\n  ]);\n  split[0].fill(0);\n  split[1].fill(0);\n  return {\n    requestKey,\n    responseKey,\n    nextRequestId: 1,\n    renewAt: Date.now() + lifetimeSecs * 1000 - RENEW_BEFORE_MS,\n    header(requestId) {\n      const header = new Uint8Array(HEADER_LEN);\n      header[0] = VERSION;\n      header.set(sessionId, 1);\n      new DataView(header.buffer).setBigUint64(1 + SESSION_ID_LEN, BigInt(requestId), false);\n      return header;\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/** Seal one request under the session's next request id. */\nexport async function sealRequest(\n  session: Session,\n  head: RequestHead,\n  body: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<{ requestId: number; header: Uint8Array; envelope: Uint8Array }> {\n  const requestId = session.nextRequestId;\n  session.nextRequestId += 1;\n  const header = session.header(requestId);\n  const sealed = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: nonce(requestId, 0), additionalData: header },\n    session.requestKey,\n    joinInner(head, body),\n  );\n  return { requestId, header, envelope: concat(header, new Uint8Array(sealed)) };\n}\n\n/** `request_id || index`, as the node numbers them. */\nfunction nonce(requestId: number, index: number): Uint8Array {\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(12);\n  const view = new DataView(bytes.buffer);\n  view.setBigUint64(0, BigInt(requestId), false);\n  view.setUint32(8, index, false);\n  return bytes;\n}\n\nexport interface RequestHead {\n  method: string;\n  path: string;\n  headers: Array<[string, string]>;\n}\n\nexport interface ResponseHead {\n  status: number;\n  headers: Array<[string, string]>;\n}\n\nfunction joinInner(head: RequestHead, body: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n  const encoded = utf8.encode(JSON.stringify(head));\n  const len = new Uint8Array(4);\n  new DataView(len.buffer).setUint32(0, encoded.length, false);\n  return concat(len, encoded, body);\n}\n\n/**\n * Open a sealed response as it streams: wait for its head, then hand back a\n * `Response` whose body opens each frame as it arrives. A frame that does not\n * open, arrives out of order, or a stream that stops before its end frame\n * errors the body rather than passing anything unauthenticated on.\n */\nexport async function openResponse(\n  response: Response,\n  responseKey: CryptoKey,\n  header: Uint8Array,\n  requestId: number,\n): Promise<Response> {\n  if (!response.body) throw new Error('The sealed response has no body');\n  const frames = frameReader(response.body.getReader());\n  let index = 0;\n  const next = async (): Promise<{ kind: number; data: Uint8Array } | null> => {\n    const sealed = await frames.next();\n    if (!sealed) return null;\n    let plain: Uint8Array;\n    try {\n      plain = new Uint8Array(\n        await crypto.subtle.decrypt(\n          { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: nonce(requestId, index), additionalData: header },\n          responseKey,\n          sealed,\n        ),\n      );\n    } catch {\n      throw new Error('A sealed response frame did not open: it was not sealed by the attested node');\n    }\n    index += 1;\n    return { kind: plain[0], data: plain.slice(1) };\n  };\n\n  const first = await next();\n  if (!first || first.kind !== FRAME_HEAD) throw new Error('The sealed response is malformed');\n  const head = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(first.data)) as ResponseHead;\n  if (NULL_BODY_STATUSES.includes(head.status)) {\n    await frames.cancel();\n    return new Response(null, { status: head.status, headers: head.headers });\n  }\n\n  const body = new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({\n    async pull(controller) {\n      try {\n        const frame = await next();\n        if (!frame) {\n          controller.error(new Error('The sealed response was cut short'));\n        } else if (frame.kind === FRAME_DATA) {\n          controller.enqueue(frame.data);\n        } else if (frame.kind === FRAME_END) {\n          controller.close();\n          await frames.cancel();\n        } else {\n          controller.error(new Error('The sealed response is malformed'));\n        }\n      } catch (error) {\n        controller.error(error);\n      }\n    },\n    cancel() {\n      return frames.cancel();\n    },\n  });\n  return new Response(body, { status: head.status, headers: head.headers });\n}\n\n/** Split a byte stream into length-prefixed frames. */\nfunction frameReader(reader: ReadableStreamDefaultReader<Uint8Array>): {\n  next(): Promise<Uint8Array | null>;\n  cancel(): Promise<void>;\n} {\n  let buffer = new Uint8Array();\n  const fill = async (length: number): Promise<boolean> => {\n    while (buffer.length < length) {\n      const { done, value } = await reader.read();\n      if (done) return false;\n      buffer = concat(buffer, value);\n    }\n    return true;\n  };\n  return {\n    async next() {\n      if (!(await fill(4))) return null;\n      const length = new DataView(buffer.buffer, buffer.byteOffset).getUint32(0, false);\n      if (length > MAX_FRAME_LEN) {\n        await reader.cancel();\n        throw new Error('The sealed response is malformed: a frame is larger than the node sends');\n      }\n      if (!(await fill(4 + length))) return null;\n      const frame = buffer.slice(4, 4 + length);\n      buffer = buffer.slice(4 + length);\n      return frame;\n    },\n    cancel: () => reader.cancel(),\n  };\n}\n\n/** Read a body, refusing one longer than `limit` rather than buffering it. */\nasync function readAtMost(response: Response, limit: number): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  if (!response.body) return new Uint8Array();\n  const reader = response.body.getReader();\n  let bytes = new Uint8Array();\n  for (;;) {\n    const { done, value } = await reader.read();\n    if (done) return bytes;\n    bytes = concat(bytes, value);\n    if (bytes.length > limit) {\n      await reader.cancel();\n      throw new Error('The handshake reply is malformed: it is too long');\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nasync function envelopeRefusal(response: Response): Promise<Error> {\n  let code: string | undefined;\n  let message = `Sealed request refused: HTTP ${response.status}`;\n  try {\n    const body = (await response.json()) as { error?: { code?: string; message?: string } };\n    code = body?.error?.code;\n    if (body?.error?.message) message = `Sealed request refused: ${body.error.message}`;\n  } catch {\n    // Not the node's JSON refusal \u2014 a proxy's page, most likely. The status is\n    // all that can honestly be reported.\n  }\n  if (code === 'stale_transport_key') return new StaleTransportKeyError();\n  const retryAfter = Number(response.headers.get('retry-after'));\n  const retryAfterMs =\n    Number.isFinite(retryAfter) && retryAfter > 0 ? Math.min(retryAfter, 5) * 1000 : undefined;\n  return new SealedTransportError(response.status, code, message, retryAfterMs);\n}\n", "/**\n * The second way to log in: sign in to Calimero Cloud instead of connecting to\n * a node.\n *\n * # Two connection shapes, one SDK\n *\n * `createMeroJs({ baseUrl })` is the node connection: point at a node, hold a\n * credential on it, and drive its admin API and JSON-RPC. It assumes the caller\n * has a node \u2014 their own, or one they have an account on.\n *\n * `connectCloud(...)` is for the caller who has neither. They sign in with the\n * identity they already use (Google, through the cloud), and the cloud answers\n * with an attested TEE relay serving their namespace. Writes then go through\n * delegated execution: signed here, run there, attributed here.\n *\n * The two are not alternatives to be picked at random \u2014 they answer different\n * questions. \"Which node do I talk to?\" has an answer for a desktop app and no\n * answer at all for a web app whose user has never installed anything. This\n * function is that missing answer, which is why the login step it replaces is\n * the *node URL prompt* rather than the authentication.\n *\n * # What it does not do\n *\n * # Sealing the relay\n *\n * TLS in front of a relay ends outside its TD, at the host's ingress, where\n * the warrant and the method's arguments are readable. Pass `seal` (a quote\n * verifier) and every call to the relay is sealed to the key its attested TD\n * holds, so they are readable only inside it.\n *\n * It does not read state. A relay writes on the author's behalf; reads still\n * come from a node the client can query, or from the app's own projection of\n * the events it receives. `connectCloud` is deliberately narrow about this\n * rather than presenting a half-working `MeroJs` whose `admin` and `rpc` would\n * need a credential nobody holds.\n */\n\nimport { CloudClient } from './cloud-client.js';\nimport type { CloudClientConfig, CloudNamespace, CloudRelay } from './cloud-client.js';\nimport { RelayClient } from '../relay/relay-client.js';\nimport type { IntentResult, NonceSource } from '../relay/index.js';\nimport { createLocalStorageNonceSource, createMemoryNonceSource } from '../relay/nonce-source.js';\nimport { derivePublicKey, hex } from '../crypto/internal.js';\nimport { createAttestedSealedFetch } from '../sealed/sealed.js';\nimport type { VerifyTransportQuote } from '../sealed/sealed.js';\n\nexport interface ConnectCloudOptions {\n  /** Defaults to the hosted cloud. */\n  cloudBaseUrl?: string;\n  /** A stored MDMA session token. Provide this or `googleIdToken`. */\n  sessionToken?: string;\n  /** A Google ID token to exchange for a session. Provide this or `sessionToken`. */\n  googleIdToken?: string;\n  /** Persist a new or rolling-refreshed session. See {@link CloudClientConfig.onSession}. */\n  onSession?: CloudClientConfig['onSession'];\n\n  /** The author's account, hex \u2014 whose writes these will be. */\n  authorAccount: string;\n  /** The author's `AccountProof<DeviceCert>`, hex-encoded borsh. */\n  authorProof: string;\n  /** The author device's ed25519 signing secret, hex. Never transmitted. */\n  deviceSecret: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Which namespace to write in.\n   *\n   * Optional only when the user owns exactly one: guessing among several would\n   * pick a tenant for them, and the failure would be a write landing in the\n   * wrong place rather than an error.\n   */\n  namespaceId?: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Where nonces come from.\n   *\n   * Defaults to `localStorage`, keyed by the author's device public key, so a\n   * reload continues the sequence instead of replaying it. Pass\n   * {@link createMemoryNonceSource} explicitly for a process that owns its\n   * whole sequence, or your own source to coordinate across tabs.\n   */\n  nonces?: NonceSource;\n  /** Seconds a minted warrant stays presentable. Defaults to 300. */\n  ttlSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Seal every call to the relay to its attested TEE, verified with this \u2014 for\n   * example {@link createQuoteVerifier} with the MRTDs you trust. The warrant\n   * and the method's arguments then reach only the relay's TD, not whatever\n   * terminates TLS in front of it, and the relay is one this client checked\n   * itself rather than one the cloud vouched for. Calls to the cloud are not\n   * sealed; they carry no intent.\n   *\n   * Without it, calls to the relay are plain HTTPS.\n   */\n  seal?: VerifyTransportQuote;\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n}\n\n/** A signed-in cloud session with a relay ready to write through. */\nexport interface CloudConnection {\n  /** The cloud API, for namespaces, billing, HA and sign-out. */\n  cloud: CloudClient;\n  /** The relay chosen for this namespace. */\n  relay: RelayClient;\n  /** The namespace writes will land in. */\n  namespaceId: string;\n  namespace: CloudNamespace;\n  /** What the cloud reported about the chosen relay. */\n  relayInfo: CloudRelay;\n  /** Run one method in one context, on the author's behalf. */\n  execute<T = unknown>(\n    contextId: string,\n    method: string,\n    argsJson?: unknown,\n  ): Promise<IntentResult<T>>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign in to the cloud and return a connection that can write.\n *\n * Throws rather than returning a half-usable connection, and the message says\n * which step is missing \u2014 no namespace, several to choose between, HA not\n * enabled, or no relay holding the authorship grant. Every one of those is\n * something the user has to go and do, and a client that reports them alike\n * cannot tell them what.\n */\nexport async function connectCloud(options: ConnectCloudOptions): Promise<CloudConnection> {\n  if (!options.sessionToken && !options.googleIdToken) {\n    throw new Error('connectCloud needs either a sessionToken or a googleIdToken');\n  }\n\n  const cloud = new CloudClient({\n    cloudBaseUrl: options.cloudBaseUrl,\n    sessionToken: options.sessionToken,\n    onSession: options.onSession,\n    fetch: options.fetch,\n    timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs,\n  });\n\n  if (!options.sessionToken && options.googleIdToken) {\n    await cloud.signInWithGoogle(options.googleIdToken);\n  }\n\n  const namespaces = await cloud.getMyNamespaces();\n  const namespace = pickNamespace(namespaces, options.namespaceId);\n\n  // One read, used for both the choice and the diagnostic. `findExecutingRelay`\n  // would fetch again to explain itself, and a second call can disagree with the\n  // first \u2014 reporting \"waiting for the grant\" about a relay that was already\n  // usable a moment ago.\n  const relays = await cloud.getNamespaceRelays(namespace.namespaceId);\n  const relayInfo =\n    relays.find((r) => r.authorshipReady && r.relayUrl !== null && r.executorAccount !== null) ??\n    null;\n  if (!relayInfo) {\n    throw new Error(explainNoRelay(namespace, relays));\n  }\n\n  const relay = new RelayClient({\n    // Checked by `findExecutingRelay`, which is the only thing that returns a\n    // relay \u2014 narrowed here rather than re-validated, so the invariant lives in\n    // one place.\n    relayUrl: relayInfo.relayUrl as string,\n    executorAccount: relayInfo.executorAccount as string,\n    authorAccount: options.authorAccount,\n    authorProof: options.authorProof,\n    deviceSecret: options.deviceSecret,\n    nonces: options.nonces ?? (await defaultNonceSource(options.deviceSecret)),\n    ttlSeconds: options.ttlSeconds,\n    // Only the relay is sealed: a sealed fetch is bound to one node and refuses\n    // any other URL, and the cloud calls above carry no intent.\n    fetch: options.seal\n      ? createAttestedSealedFetch({\n          baseUrl: relayInfo.relayUrl as string,\n          verify: options.seal,\n          fetch: options.fetch,\n        })\n      : options.fetch,\n    timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs,\n  });\n\n  return {\n    cloud,\n    relay,\n    namespaceId: namespace.namespaceId,\n    namespace,\n    relayInfo,\n    execute: (contextId, method, argsJson) => relay.execute(contextId, method, argsJson),\n  };\n}\n\n/** The one namespace to write in, or an error naming the actual ambiguity. */\nfunction pickNamespace(namespaces: CloudNamespace[], requested?: string): CloudNamespace {\n  if (requested) {\n    const found = namespaces.find((n) => n.namespaceId === requested);\n    if (!found) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `this account owns no namespace ${requested}; it owns: ${\n          namespaces.map((n) => n.namespaceId).join(', ') || '(none)'\n        }`,\n      );\n    }\n    return found;\n  }\n  if (namespaces.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'this account owns no namespaces in the cloud: claim one first, then enable HA on it so a relay is assigned',\n    );\n  }\n  if (namespaces.length > 1) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `this account owns ${namespaces.length} namespaces \u2014 pass namespaceId to say which: ${namespaces\n        .map((n) => n.namespaceId)\n        .join(', ')}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return namespaces[0];\n}\n\n/**\n * Why no relay can write here \u2014 the three states, kept apart.\n *\n * They are three different asks of the user (turn HA on, wait, or get an admin\n * to grant a capability) and one message for all of them would send them to\n * the wrong one.\n */\nfunction explainNoRelay(namespace: CloudNamespace, relays: CloudRelay[]): string {\n  if (relays.length === 0) {\n    return namespace.haStatus === 'enabled'\n      ? `namespace ${namespace.namespaceId} has HA enabled but no relay has been assigned to it yet \u2014 retry shortly`\n      : `namespace ${namespace.namespaceId} has no relays: enable HA on it in the cloud to have an attested node assigned`;\n  }\n  const waitingOnGrant = relays.filter((r) => !r.authorshipReady);\n  if (waitingOnGrant.length === relays.length) {\n    // Name the call, not just the capability. The grant is a governance op only\n    // a namespace admin can publish, so this message is read by someone who has\n    // to go ask for it \u2014 and \"grant CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF\" alone leaves them\n    // relaying a constant to an admin who then has to work out the command.\n    // `openToDelegatedExecution` is the durable half (every relay assigned from\n    // then on lands open), `grantAuthorship` the one for relays already here.\n    return (\n      `every relay on namespace ${namespace.namespaceId} is waiting for the authorship grant: ` +\n      `an admin of the namespace must grant CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF to ${\n        waitingOnGrant.map((r) => r.executorAccount ?? r.peerId).join(', ') || 'the relay account'\n      } \u2014 with AdminClient.grantAuthorship(namespaceId, account) for these relays, and ` +\n      `AdminClient.openToDelegatedExecution(namespaceId) so relays assigned later need no further op`\n    );\n  }\n  return `namespace ${namespace.namespaceId} has ${relays.length} relay(s), but none reported both a URL and an executor account yet \u2014 retry shortly`;\n}\n\n/**\n * A persisted nonce source keyed by the author's device public key.\n *\n * The key is the *public* key, derived locally: a per-device key is required\n * (two devices of one account are independent replicas) and the secret must\n * never end up in a storage key an extension or another script can enumerate.\n *\n * Falls back to memory where there is no `localStorage` \u2014 Node, a worker, an\n * edge runtime. Those are processes that own their whole sequence, which is\n * exactly the case a memory counter is correct for.\n */\nasync function defaultNonceSource(deviceSecret: string): Promise<NonceSource> {\n  const key = `mero-js:warrant-nonce:${hex(await derivePublicKey(deviceSecret))}`;\n  try {\n    return createLocalStorageNonceSource(key);\n  } catch {\n    return createMemoryNonceSource(1);\n  }\n}\n", "/**\n * Verifying a TEE node's quote in the page, before trusting the key it binds.\n *\n * A quote proves what runs in a TD only once it has been checked: its\n * signatures against Intel's root, the TCB status of the platform, the\n * measurements of the image, and that its report data is the nonce and the\n * binding this client asked for. {@link createQuoteVerifier} does all of that\n * here, with nothing but the node: the node hands over the Intel-signed\n * collateral with its quote (`includeCollateral`), and a node cannot forge\n * collateral, only choose which valid collateral to serve.\n *\n * The DCAP verification itself \u2014 parsing the quote, checking its signature\n * chain and appraising its TCB level against the collateral \u2014 comes from a\n * library you pass in, normally `verify` from `@phala/dcap-qvl`, a pure\n * JavaScript implementation that runs in browsers, Node and React Native. It\n * is passed in rather than bundled so this SDK keeps no runtime dependencies,\n * and applications that never talk to a TEE node pay nothing for it.\n */\n\nimport { hex } from '../crypto/internal.js';\nimport type { VerifyTransportQuote } from './sealed.js';\n\n/**\n * The collateral a quote is verified against \u2014 TCB info, QE identity, CRLs and\n * their chains \u2014 in dcap-qvl's form: byte fields are hex strings or byte\n * arrays. What `/admin-api/tee/attest` returns with `includeCollateral`, and\n * what `@phala/dcap-qvl`'s `getCollateral` fetches.\n */\nexport interface DcapCollateral {\n  pck_crl_issuer_chain: string;\n  root_ca_crl: number[] | string;\n  pck_crl: number[] | string;\n  tcb_info_issuer_chain: string;\n  tcb_info: string;\n  tcb_info_signature: number[] | string;\n  qe_identity_issuer_chain: string;\n  qe_identity: string;\n  qe_identity_signature: number[] | string;\n}\n\n/** The fields of a TDX report this verifier reads. */\ninterface TdReport {\n  mrTd: Uint8Array;\n  rtMr0: Uint8Array;\n  rtMr1: Uint8Array;\n  rtMr2: Uint8Array;\n  rtMr3: Uint8Array;\n  reportData: Uint8Array;\n}\n\n/** What a DCAP verifier returns for a quote whose signature chain verified. */\nexport interface DcapVerifiedReport {\n  status: string;\n  advisory_ids?: string[];\n  report: { type: string; data: unknown };\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a quote's signature chain against `collateral` as of `nowSecs`, and\n * appraise its TCB level. Throws when it does not verify. `verify` from\n * `@phala/dcap-qvl` has exactly this shape.\n */\nexport type DcapVerify = (\n  quote: Uint8Array,\n  collateral: DcapCollateral,\n  nowSecs: number,\n) => DcapVerifiedReport;\n\nexport interface QuoteVerifierOptions {\n  /** DCAP verification: `verify` from `@phala/dcap-qvl`. */\n  dcapVerify: DcapVerify;\n  /**\n   * MRTDs (hex) of the images trusted. Required: the MRTD names the image a TD\n   * booted, and a quote that proves only \"some genuine TD\" proves nothing\n   * about which code reads the traffic.\n   */\n  allowedMrtd: string[];\n  /** RTMR allowlists (hex); a register is not checked when its list is left out. */\n  allowedRtmr0?: string[];\n  allowedRtmr1?: string[];\n  allowedRtmr2?: string[];\n  allowedRtmr3?: string[];\n  /**\n   * TCB statuses accepted. Defaults to `['UpToDate']`. `Revoked` is refused\n   * even when listed.\n   */\n  allowedTcbStatuses?: string[];\n  /**\n   * Where to get collateral when the node sends none (it predates\n   * `includeCollateral`): for example\n   * `(quote) => getCollateral(PHALA_PCCS_URL, quote)` from `@phala/dcap-qvl`.\n   * Without it, such a node's quote is refused.\n   */\n  fetchCollateral?: (quote: Uint8Array) => Promise<DcapCollateral>;\n  /** The current time in milliseconds; defaults to `Date.now`. For tests. */\n  now?: () => number;\n}\n\n/** A verifier for {@link fetchAttestedTransportKey}, which asks the node for collateral. */\nexport type QuoteVerifier = VerifyTransportQuote & { readonly includeCollateral: true };\n\nconst MEASUREMENT_HEX = /^[0-9a-f]{96}$/;\n\n/**\n * A verifier that checks a TEE node's quote here, in the page, and accepts it\n * only when every check passes:\n *\n * - its signatures verify against Intel's root, with collateral that is valid\n *   now;\n * - the platform's TCB status is one allowed (`UpToDate` by default), and\n *   never `Revoked`;\n * - the MRTD, and any RTMRs given, are ones allowed;\n * - its report data is the nonce followed by the binding the client computed.\n *\n * Any failure rejects with the reason; nothing is trusted from a quote that\n * does not pass. Mock quotes never pass: they carry no signature.\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { verify as dcapVerify } from '@phala/dcap-qvl';\n *\n * const verifier = createQuoteVerifier({ dcapVerify, allowedMrtd: [trustedMrtd] });\n * const fetch = createSealedFetch({\n *   baseUrl,\n *   transportPublicKey: () => fetchAttestedTransportKey(admin, verifier),\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function createQuoteVerifier(options: QuoteVerifierOptions): QuoteVerifier {\n  const allowedMrtd = measurements(options.allowedMrtd, 'allowedMrtd');\n  if (allowedMrtd.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error('allowedMrtd is empty, so no quote would ever be accepted');\n  }\n  const allowedRtmr = [\n    measurements(options.allowedRtmr0 ?? [], 'allowedRtmr0'),\n    measurements(options.allowedRtmr1 ?? [], 'allowedRtmr1'),\n    measurements(options.allowedRtmr2 ?? [], 'allowedRtmr2'),\n    measurements(options.allowedRtmr3 ?? [], 'allowedRtmr3'),\n  ];\n  const allowedStatuses = options.allowedTcbStatuses ?? ['UpToDate'];\n  const now = options.now ?? Date.now;\n\n  const verifier = async ({\n    quoteB64,\n    nonce,\n    reportDataSuffix,\n    collateral,\n  }: Parameters<VerifyTransportQuote>[0]): Promise<boolean> => {\n    const quote = fromBase64(quoteB64);\n    const against = collateral ?? (await options.fetchCollateral?.(quote));\n    if (!against) {\n      throw new Error(\n        'The node sent no collateral for its quote, and no fetchCollateral was given to get it',\n      );\n    }\n\n    let verified: DcapVerifiedReport;\n    try {\n      verified = options.dcapVerify(quote, against, Math.floor(now() / 1000));\n    } catch (error) {\n      throw new Error(`The quote did not verify: ${(error as Error)?.message ?? String(error)}`);\n    }\n\n    if (verified.status === 'Revoked' || !allowedStatuses.includes(verified.status)) {\n      throw new Error(`The platform's TCB status is ${verified.status}, which is not accepted`);\n    }\n    const td = tdReport(verified.report);\n    if (!allowedMrtd.includes(hex(td.mrTd))) {\n      throw new Error(`MRTD ${hex(td.mrTd)} is not an image this verifier trusts`);\n    }\n    const registers = [td.rtMr0, td.rtMr1, td.rtMr2, td.rtMr3];\n    registers.forEach((register, index) => {\n      const allowed = allowedRtmr[index];\n      if (allowed.length > 0 && !allowed.includes(hex(register))) {\n        throw new Error(`RTMR${index} ${hex(register)} is not one this verifier trusts`);\n      }\n    });\n    if (hex(td.reportData) !== `${nonce}${reportDataSuffix}`.toLowerCase()) {\n      throw new Error('The quote does not commit to this nonce and binding');\n    }\n    return true;\n  };\n  return Object.assign(verifier, { includeCollateral: true as const });\n}\n\nfunction measurements(values: string[], label: string): string[] {\n  return values.map((value) => {\n    const normalized = value.trim().toLowerCase();\n    if (!MEASUREMENT_HEX.test(normalized)) {\n      throw new Error(`${label} holds ${JSON.stringify(value)}, which is not a 48-byte hex measurement`);\n    }\n    return normalized;\n  });\n}\n\n/** The TD report of a TDX quote (1.0 or 1.5); anything else is refused. */\nfunction tdReport(report: DcapVerifiedReport['report']): TdReport {\n  const data = report.data as (TdReport & { base?: TdReport }) | undefined;\n  if (report.type === 'td10' && data) return data;\n  if (report.type === 'td15' && data?.base) return data.base;\n  throw new Error(`The quote is a ${report.type} quote, not a TDX one`);\n}\n\nfunction fromBase64(value: string): Uint8Array {\n  const binary = atob(value);\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length);\n  for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i += 1) bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);\n  return bytes;\n}\n", "/**\n * Sign a namespace governance op from the SDK \u2014 specifically the membership op a\n * keyholder needs to join without running a node.\n *\n * `admitJoin` carries an already-signed op to a node the inviter named as an\n * admitter. Producing that op is the piece a keyholder could not do before: the\n * op must be signed by the device key in the credential it carries, because every\n * peer checks `signer == credential.statement.sign_pk` when applying a join. An\n * admitter can relay it and can never author it.\n *\n * The encoding is borsh, hand-written to match core's structs. Correctness is not\n * asserted against bytes recorded here \u2014 a layout transcribed by eye is exactly\n * how a golden ends up confidently wrong. It is asserted by a node accepting the\n * op, which is what the e2e does.\n */\nimport type { SignedGroupOpenInvitation } from '../admin-api/admin-types.js';\nimport {\n  concat,\n  derivePublicKey,\n  fromHex,\n  hex,\n  importSigningKey,\n  u32le,\n  u64le,\n} from '../crypto/internal.js';\n\n/** Core's `SIGNED_NAMESPACE_OP_SCHEMA_VERSION`. A node refuses any other value. */\nexport const SIGNED_NAMESPACE_OP_SCHEMA_VERSION = 8;\n\n/** Domain prefixed to the signable bytes; core's `NAMESPACE_GOVERNANCE_SIGN_DOMAIN`. */\nconst NAMESPACE_SIGN_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode('calimero.namespace.v1');\n\n/** `NamespaceOp::Root` is the first variant. */\nconst NAMESPACE_OP_ROOT = 0;\n\n/**\n * `RootOp` discriminants, in declaration order. Only the two join variants are\n * emitted here; the rest are listed so the numbering is checkable against core\n * rather than inferred from the two in use.\n */\nconst ROOT_OP = {\n  GroupCreated: 0,\n  GroupReparented: 1,\n  GroupDeleted: 2,\n  AdminChanged: 3,\n  PolicyUpdated: 4,\n  MemberJoined: 5,\n  KeyDelivery: 6,\n  MemberJoinedOpen: 7,\n  MemberJoinedAt: 8,\n  NamespaceCreated: 9,\n  MemberJoinedViaTeeAttestation: 10,\n} as const;\n\n/** A required `[u8; 32]`, as JSON carries it: 32 byte values. */\nfunction bytes32(value: readonly number[], label: string): Uint8Array {\n  if (value.length !== 32) {\n    throw new Error(`${label} must be 32 bytes, got ${value.length}`);\n  }\n  return new Uint8Array(value);\n}\n\n/**\n * Borsh `Option<[u8; 32]>` from the byte array JSON carries it as.\n *\n * `[u8; 32]` crosses JSON as 32 numbers, not as hex \u2014 the hex spelling belongs to\n * `AccountId`, which has its own representation. Encoding one of these from a hex\n * string would silently produce the wrong 32 bytes.\n */\nfunction optionalBytes32(\n  value: readonly number[] | null | undefined,\n  label: string,\n): Uint8Array {\n  if (value === null || value === undefined) {\n    return new Uint8Array([0]);\n  }\n  if (value.length !== 32) {\n    throw new Error(`${label} must be 32 bytes, got ${value.length}`);\n  }\n  return concat(new Uint8Array([1]), new Uint8Array(value));\n}\n\n/** Borsh `String`: u32 length then UTF-8 bytes. */\nfunction borshString(value: string): Uint8Array {\n  const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(value);\n  return concat(u32le(bytes.length), bytes);\n}\n\n\n/**\n * Borsh-encode a `SignedGroupOpenInvitation`.\n *\n * Re-encoded rather than passed through, because it has to go inside the op that\n * gets signed. That makes this function version-locked to core: a field added to\n * the invitation and omitted here produces an op whose inner invitation no longer\n * matches the inviter's signature over it. That exact drift, in client-py, broke\n * 93 scenarios \u2014 the failure surfaces as `invalid invitation signature` and points\n * nowhere near the encoder.\n */\nexport function encodeSignedInvitation(signed: SignedGroupOpenInvitation): Uint8Array {\n  const body = signed.invitation;\n  const admitters = body.admitters ?? [];\n  const admitterAddrs = signed.admitter_addrs ?? [];\n\n  return concat(\n    // GroupInvitationFromAdmin.\n    //\n    // `SignerId` and `ContextGroupId` cross JSON as 32 numbers; `AccountId`\n    // crosses as hex. Same width, different spelling, and reading either the\n    // wrong way yields 32 bytes that encode cleanly and verify as nothing.\n    bytes32(body.inviter_identity, 'inviter_identity'),\n    bytes32(body.group_id, 'group_id'),\n    u64le(body.expiration_timestamp),\n    bytes32(body.secret_salt, 'secret_salt'),\n    new Uint8Array([body.invited_role]),\n    u32le(admitters.length),\n    ...admitters.map((a, i) => fromHex(a, `admitters[${i}]`, 32)),\n    // ...then the enclosing SignedGroupOpenInvitation, in declaration order.\n    // `inviter_account` sits between the signature and the addresses; putting it\n    // anywhere else still encodes 32 bytes and still verifies as nothing.\n    borshString(signed.inviter_signature),\n    signed.inviter_account\n      ? concat(new Uint8Array([1]), fromHex(signed.inviter_account, 'inviter_account', 32))\n      : new Uint8Array([0]),\n    // A `Vec<String>`, so each entry is a bare borsh string. This carried an\n    // enum until core dropped the URL variant, and an enum writes a\n    // discriminant byte ahead of each entry \u2014 encoding one here now would shift\n    // every following byte and fail as `invalid invitation signature`, pointing\n    // nowhere near this line.\n    u32le(admitterAddrs.length),\n    ...admitterAddrs.map(borshString),\n    optionalBytes32(signed.application_id, 'application_id'),\n    // Borsh order follows core's field order, where this is `bytecode_id`; the\n    // JSON key is `app_key`, a rename covering both directions that core pins in\n    // a test. Encoding by the Rust name would read `undefined` and emit a None\n    // where the inviter signed a Some.\n    optionalBytes32(signed.app_key, 'app_key'),\n  );\n}\n\nexport interface SignMemberJoinInput {\n  /** The namespace being joined, 64 hex. */\n  readonly namespaceId: string;\n  /** The account joining, 64 hex \u2014 the subject of the credential. */\n  readonly member: string;\n  /** The invitation, as the admin API returned it. */\n  readonly invitation: SignedGroupOpenInvitation;\n  /**\n   * The joiner's `AccountProof<DeviceCert>`, hex \u2014 from `signDeviceCert`.\n   *\n   * Its `sign_pk` must be the public key of `deviceSecret`; a peer checks that\n   * when applying the join and refuses otherwise.\n   */\n  readonly credential: string;\n  /** The device signing secret, 64 hex. Must match the credential's `sign_pk`. */\n  readonly deviceSecret: string;\n  /**\n   * Heads this op is written against. Empty means \"signed against an empty head\"\n   * \u2014 which is NOT the same as genesis, and a node with a non-empty head will\n   * reject it as stale rather than treat it as a first op.\n   */\n  readonly parentOpHashes?: readonly string[];\n  /** Anti-replay nonce; a node keeps a window per signer. */\n  readonly nonce: number | bigint;\n  /**\n   * When the join happened, unix seconds. Defaults to now.\n   *\n   * Carried only by `MemberJoinedAt`, which is the variant used whenever the\n   * invitation expires \u2014 and since core clamps every invitation to\n   * `MAX_INVITATION_VALIDITY_SECS`, that is every invitation. The variant is\n   * inferred from the invitation rather than selected by a flag: an expiring\n   * invitation joined with plain `MemberJoined` is refused at apply with\n   * \"expiration is set but joined_at is absent\", which is not a mistake worth\n   * leaving available.\n   */\n  readonly joinedAt?: number | bigint;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign a `MemberJoined` (or `MemberJoinedAt`) namespace op and return it\n * borsh-encoded and hex \u2014 the `signedOp` that `admitJoin` takes.\n */\nexport async function signMemberJoinOp(input: SignMemberJoinInput): Promise<string> {\n  const parents = input.parentOpHashes ?? [];\n  const credential = fromHex(input.credential, 'credential', input.credential.length / 2);\n\n  // An invitation that expires must be claimed with `MemberJoinedAt`, which\n  // carries `joined_at` between the invitation and the credential. Choosing the\n  // variant from the invitation keeps the two in step: the discriminant and the\n  // presence of that field are one decision, and splitting them produces bytes\n  // that decode into the wrong shape rather than failing to decode.\n  const expires = BigInt(input.invitation.invitation.expiration_timestamp ?? 0) !== 0n;\n  const joinedAt =\n    input.joinedAt ?? BigInt(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));\n\n  const rootOp = expires\n    ? concat(\n        new Uint8Array([ROOT_OP.MemberJoinedAt]),\n        fromHex(input.member, 'member', 32),\n        encodeSignedInvitation(input.invitation),\n        u64le(joinedAt),\n        credential,\n      )\n    : concat(\n        new Uint8Array([ROOT_OP.MemberJoined]),\n        fromHex(input.member, 'member', 32),\n        encodeSignedInvitation(input.invitation),\n        credential,\n      );\n\n  const op = concat(new Uint8Array([NAMESPACE_OP_ROOT]), rootOp);\n\n  const key = await importSigningKey(input.deviceSecret);\n  const signer = await derivePublicKey(input.deviceSecret);\n\n  const signable = concat(\n    new Uint8Array([SIGNED_NAMESPACE_OP_SCHEMA_VERSION]),\n    fromHex(input.namespaceId, 'namespaceId', 32),\n    u32le(parents.length),\n    ...parents.map((p, i) => fromHex(p, `parentOpHashes[${i}]`, 32)),\n    signer,\n    u64le(input.nonce),\n    op,\n  );\n\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign('Ed25519', key, concat(NAMESPACE_SIGN_DOMAIN, signable)),\n  );\n\n  // The signed struct repeats the signable fields, then the signature, then the\n  // admitter endorsement. The domain is a signing prefix only and is never part\n  // of the encoded op.\n  //\n  // The endorsement is written as borsh `None` \u2014 a single `0x00` \u2014 and that is\n  // the correct value from here, not a placeholder. It authorises the membership\n  // and can only be signed by an account the invitation named as an admitter,\n  // which a keyholder is not. The admitter attaches its own as it relays the op\n  // through `admitJoin`.\n  //\n  // It sits outside `signable`, so it is outside this signature and outside the\n  // op's id. That is what makes attaching it possible: the admitter changes\n  // neither what was signed here nor which op this is.\n  const unendorsed = new Uint8Array([0]);\n\n  return hex(concat(signable, signature, unendorsed));\n}\n", "/**\n * Sign the statement a device key presents to obtain a session on a node.\n *\n * This is the half of password-free login that has to run where the device key\n * lives, and for the case delegated execution exists for that is a browser tab.\n * Until this module, the only thing that could produce a login statement was\n * `merod account login-statement` \u2014 which is to say, a client had to hold a node\n * to ask a node for a session.\n *\n * **What this gets you, and what it does not.** A statement proves a device key\n * asked for this session. It says nothing about which account that device\n * belongs to: that is the `AccountProof` travelling beside it, which the node\n * checks separately. Signing here and presenting no proof gets a 401 that looks\n * exactly like a bad signature.\n *\n * **The session key is minted by the caller, not here.** The device key signs\n * once, over a short-lived key the caller generates and keeps; that key does the\n * talking for the rest of the session, which is what keeps the device key off\n * the wire. Passing a key you do not hold the private half of produces a session\n * you cannot speak on.\n *\n * **`node` must come from something you pinned.** Not from the challenge\n * response, and not from any field the node itself chose \u2014 an attacker who can\n * answer on the node's behalf would otherwise pick what your device signs about,\n * which is the whole reason the field exists. Read it out of band from the node\n * operator.\n *\n * **The byte contract is pinned in core**, at\n * `crates/account/src/tests/login_wire_fixture.rs`, for the same reason the\n * warrant one is: `AUTH_LOGIN_SIGN_DOMAIN` is `pub(crate)` there and the field\n * order is implicit in a `derive`, so nothing on that side forces anyone to\n * notice this file depends on both. This module's test asserts the same vectors.\n */\n\nimport {\n  concat,\n  derivePublicKey,\n  domainHash,\n  fromHex,\n  hex,\n  importSigningKey,\n  u32le,\n  u64le,\n} from '../crypto/internal.js';\n\nconst SIGN_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode('calimero.auth.login.v1');\n\n/**\n * The client surface a session is bound to.\n *\n * A session minted for one surface cannot be presented from another, so a single\n * compromised surface does not yield sessions usable everywhere.\n */\nexport type Audience =\n  | {\n      /**\n       * A browser origin, spelled exactly as the browser spells it\n       * (`https://host:port`, no trailing slash).\n       *\n       * Compared byte for byte by the node. Do not normalize it here: two\n       * spellings of one origin would mean a verifier that disagrees with the\n       * browser about which one a token was for. `location.origin` is already\n       * the spelling you want.\n       */\n      kind: 'webOrigin';\n      origin: string;\n    }\n  | {\n      /** A signed native client, named by its code-signing identity. */\n      kind: 'codeSigningId';\n      id: string;\n    }\n  | {\n      /**\n       * A command-line client, which has no origin and no signing identity.\n       *\n       * Carries no payload deliberately: a string here would be an audience that\n       * binds nothing while looking like it binds something.\n       */\n      kind: 'cli';\n    };\n\n/** The borsh enum tag for each variant, in core's declaration order. */\nconst AUDIENCE_TAG: Record<Audience['kind'], number> = {\n  webOrigin: 0,\n  codeSigningId: 1,\n  cli: 2,\n};\n\n/** The variant's payload as UTF-8 \u2014 empty for the payload-free `cli`. */\nfunction audienceBody(audience: Audience): Uint8Array {\n  const encoder = new TextEncoder();\n  switch (audience.kind) {\n    case 'webOrigin':\n      return encoder.encode(audience.origin);\n    case 'codeSigningId':\n      return encoder.encode(audience.id);\n    case 'cli':\n      return new Uint8Array(0);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * What the audience contributes to the **signing preimage**: tag then body, with\n * no length between them.\n *\n * `domainHash` length-prefixes every part it is handed, so a length written here\n * would be counted twice and the preimage would verify nowhere. This is the one\n * field spelled differently in the two encodings \u2014 see {@link audienceWire}.\n */\nfunction audienceSigningBytes(audience: Audience): Uint8Array {\n  return concat(\n    Uint8Array.from([AUDIENCE_TAG[audience.kind]]),\n    audienceBody(audience),\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * What the audience contributes to the **wire encoding**: the borsh enum tag,\n * then for the two payload-carrying variants a borsh `String` \u2014 its own `u32`\n * little-endian length, then the UTF-8.\n *\n * `cli` is a bare tag. Writing a `u32` zero after it instead produces four extra\n * bytes that a node reads as the start of the challenge, so the statement fails\n * as a bad signature rather than as a malformed one.\n */\nfunction audienceWire(audience: Audience): Uint8Array {\n  const tag = Uint8Array.from([AUDIENCE_TAG[audience.kind]]);\n  if (audience.kind === 'cli') {\n    return tag;\n  }\n  const body = audienceBody(audience);\n  return concat(tag, u32le(body.length), body);\n}\n\n/** What a device is asking for. */\nexport interface LoginStatementInput {\n  /**\n   * The node this session is for, hex (32 bytes) \u2014 its identity public key, as\n   * you pinned it. See the module note: this must not come from the node.\n   */\n  node: string;\n  /** The client surface the session is bound to. */\n  audience: Audience;\n  /** The challenge this node issued, hex (32 bytes). Proves freshness. */\n  challenge: string;\n  /**\n   * The public half of the ephemeral key this session will speak with, hex (32\n   * bytes). Minted per session by the caller and thrown away with it.\n   */\n  sessionKey: string;\n  /** Unix seconds at signing. */\n  issuedAt: number | bigint;\n  /** Unix seconds after which the node must refuse it. */\n  expiresAt: number | bigint;\n  /**\n   * The device's ed25519 signing secret, hex (32 bytes).\n   *\n   * Never sent anywhere. It signs locally and only the signature travels, which\n   * is what lets a statement be minted by something holding no node.\n   */\n  deviceSecret: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign a login statement and return it hex-encoded, ready to present with an\n * account proof.\n *\n * Returns the encoding rather than an object for the reason `signWarrant` does:\n * the signature covers exactly these bytes, and a caller that rebuilt the fields\n * from JSON would have a second spelling able to disagree with what was signed.\n */\nexport async function signLoginStatement(\n  input: LoginStatementInput,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const node = fromHex(input.node, 'node', 32);\n  const challenge = fromHex(input.challenge, 'challenge', 32);\n  const sessionKey = fromHex(input.sessionKey, 'sessionKey', 32);\n\n  const key = await importSigningKey(input.deviceSecret);\n  const deviceKey = await derivePublicKey(input.deviceSecret);\n\n  const issuedAt = u64le(input.issuedAt);\n  const expiresAt = u64le(input.expiresAt);\n\n  const preimage = await domainHash(SIGN_DOMAIN, [\n    node,\n    audienceSigningBytes(input.audience),\n    challenge,\n    sessionKey,\n    deviceKey,\n    issuedAt,\n    expiresAt,\n  ]);\n\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign({ name: 'Ed25519' }, key, preimage),\n  );\n\n  return hex(\n    concat(\n      node,\n      audienceWire(input.audience),\n      challenge,\n      sessionKey,\n      deviceKey,\n      issuedAt,\n      expiresAt,\n      signature,\n    ),\n  );\n}\n", "/**\n * Obtain a session on a node using only a device key \u2014 the handshake around\n * {@link signLoginStatement}.\n *\n * Signing a statement was never the whole job. A client also has to fetch a\n * challenge, mint a session keypair, assemble a request body whose shape it\n * cannot see from here, and read a token out of the reply. Until now every\n * consumer wrote those two HTTP calls by hand, which is how the same three\n * mistakes kept being available to make:\n *\n * 1. **Asking for permissions.** `POST /auth/token` takes an optional\n *    `permissions` list. Left unset, the node grants the account-proof\n *    provider's own scopes \u2014 `context:intent`, `context:query`,\n *    `context:subscribe` \u2014 which are the whole delegated surface and\n *    deliberately nothing above it. This module never sends the field.\n *    `authenticate()` in this same package hardcodes `['admin']` (#84); a\n *    device-key session would be refused for that and should never ask.\n * 2. **Learning the node's key from the node.** {@link LoginConfig.node} is\n *    required and has no default, because a value read from the challenge\n *    response would let whoever answered choose what the device signs about.\n *    That is the whole attack the field exists to stop, so the awkwardness of\n *    having to supply it is the point rather than something to smooth away.\n * 3. **Losing the refresh token.** A browser tab outlives a short-lived\n *    session, so both tokens are returned. Nothing here refreshes on a timer\n *    (#87, #88 track that); this only makes it possible without a second\n *    breaking change.\n *\n * **The session key never leaves.** It is minted here, the device key signs\n * over it once, and the secret half is handed back to the caller. That is what\n * keeps a device key off the wire for the life of a session: a leaked token\n * cannot be escalated into use of the key that authorised it.\n */\n\nimport { HTTPError } from '../http-client/web-client.js';\nimport { derivePublicKey, hex } from '../crypto/internal.js';\nimport { signLoginStatement, type Audience } from './login.js';\n\n/** Seconds a statement stays valid unless told otherwise. */\nconst DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS = 300;\n\n/** A freshly minted ephemeral keypair, hex-encoded. */\nexport interface SessionKeyPair {\n  /** The public half \u2014 what the statement is signed over. */\n  publicKey: string;\n  /** The private half. Held by the caller; never sent anywhere. */\n  secret: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint the ephemeral keypair a session speaks with.\n *\n * An ed25519 secret *is* 32 random bytes, so this needs no key generation\n * ceremony \u2014 `getRandomValues` and the same derivation every other signer here\n * uses. Exported because a caller that wants to persist a session across a page\n * reload needs to mint the pair itself and keep the secret.\n */\nexport async function generateSessionKey(): Promise<SessionKeyPair> {\n  const secret = hex(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)));\n  return { publicKey: hex(await derivePublicKey(secret)), secret };\n}\n\n/** What a device needs in order to ask for a session. */\nexport interface LoginConfig {\n  /** The node's base URL, e.g. `https://node.example`. */\n  nodeUrl: string;\n  /**\n   * The node's device signing key, hex (32 bytes), **as this client pinned it**.\n   *\n   * Learn it out of band \u2014 from the node's operator, or a certificate you\n   * already trust. Never from the node you are about to log in to: see the\n   * module note.\n   */\n  node: string;\n  /** The device's ed25519 signing secret, hex (32 bytes). Never sent. */\n  deviceSecret: string;\n  /**\n   * The device's account proof, hex \u2014 the credential certifying that this\n   * device belongs to its account.\n   *\n   * Travels beside the statement and is what settles *which account* is asking.\n   * The statement alone proves only that a device key asked, so logging in\n   * without this yields a 401 that looks exactly like a bad signature.\n   */\n  accountProof: string;\n  /** The client surface this session is bound to. */\n  audience: Audience;\n  /**\n   * How this client names itself to the node. Defaults to the audience's own\n   * spelling, which is the honest answer: a session bound to an origin should\n   * say that origin.\n   */\n  clientName?: string;\n  /** Seconds the statement stays valid. Defaults to {@link DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS}. */\n  ttlSeconds?: number;\n  /** Injectable for tests and non-browser runtimes. */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  /** Per-request timeout. Defaults to 10s. */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n}\n\n/** A session minted without a password. */\nexport interface DelegatedSession {\n  /** Bearer token for the delegated surface. */\n  accessToken: string;\n  /** Presented to renew the access token. See #87/#88 \u2014 nothing here schedules it. */\n  refreshToken: string;\n  /** The session's public half, as the node knows it. */\n  sessionKey: string;\n  /** The session's private half. The caller keeps this; it was never sent. */\n  sessionSecret: string;\n}\n\n/** The audience's own spelling, used as the default client name. */\nfunction audienceLabel(audience: Audience): string {\n  switch (audience.kind) {\n    case 'webOrigin':\n      return audience.origin;\n    case 'codeSigningId':\n      return audience.id;\n    case 'cli':\n      return 'cli';\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Log in with a device key and return the session.\n *\n * The challenge is fetched immediately before signing on purpose: it is\n * single-use and short-lived, so a statement minted against a stale one is\n * refused before any signature work is done.\n *\n * @throws {HTTPError} if the node refuses the challenge or the token request.\n */\nexport async function login(config: LoginConfig): Promise<DelegatedSession> {\n  const baseUrl = config.nodeUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n  const doFetch = config.fetch ?? globalThis.fetch;\n  const timeoutMs = config.timeoutMs ?? 10_000;\n\n  const request = async (path: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<unknown> => {\n    const controller = new AbortController();\n    const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);\n    let response: Response;\n    try {\n      response = await doFetch(`${baseUrl}${path}`, {\n        ...init,\n        signal: controller.signal,\n      });\n    } catch (err) {\n      throw new HTTPError(\n        0,\n        err instanceof Error ? err.name : 'NetworkError',\n        `${baseUrl}${path}`,\n        new Headers(),\n        err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),\n      );\n    } finally {\n      clearTimeout(timer);\n    }\n    const text = await response.text().catch(() => '');\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      throw new HTTPError(\n        response.status,\n        response.statusText,\n        `${baseUrl}${path}`,\n        response.headers,\n        text,\n      );\n    }\n    return text ? (JSON.parse(text) as unknown) : {};\n  };\n\n  const challengeBody = (await request('/auth/challenge', {\n    method: 'GET',\n    headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },\n  })) as { challenge?: string; data?: { challenge?: string } };\n  // The node has spelled this both bare and wrapped in `data`; accept either\n  // rather than couple a login to one envelope revision.\n  const challenge = challengeBody.challenge ?? challengeBody.data?.challenge;\n  if (!challenge) {\n    throw new Error('the node issued no challenge');\n  }\n\n  const session = await generateSessionKey();\n  const issuedAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n  const statement = await signLoginStatement({\n    node: config.node,\n    audience: config.audience,\n    challenge,\n    sessionKey: session.publicKey,\n    issuedAt,\n    expiresAt: issuedAt + (config.ttlSeconds ?? DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS),\n    deviceSecret: config.deviceSecret,\n  });\n\n  // `timestamp` is required and the request refuses unknown fields, so a body\n  // missing it is rejected during deserialization \u2014 before the provider runs,\n  // and with an error that names the request shape rather than the login.\n  //\n  // `permissions` is omitted, not empty: see the module note.\n  const tokenBody = (await request('/auth/token', {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Accept: 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify({\n      auth_method: 'account_proof',\n      public_key: session.publicKey,\n      client_name: config.clientName ?? audienceLabel(config.audience),\n      timestamp: issuedAt,\n      provider_data: {\n        challenge,\n        login_statement: statement,\n        account_proof: config.accountProof,\n      },\n    }),\n  })) as {\n    access_token?: string;\n    refresh_token?: string;\n    data?: { access_token?: string; refresh_token?: string };\n  };\n\n  const accessToken = tokenBody.access_token ?? tokenBody.data?.access_token;\n  const refreshToken = tokenBody.refresh_token ?? tokenBody.data?.refresh_token;\n  if (!accessToken) {\n    throw new Error('the node minted no session');\n  }\n\n  return {\n    accessToken,\n    refreshToken: refreshToken ?? '',\n    sessionKey: session.publicKey,\n    sessionSecret: session.secret,\n  };\n}\n", "/**\n * Local-node discovery.\n *\n * Calimero dev/desktop nodes expose a public, unauthenticated health endpoint\n * at `GET {nodeUrl}/admin-api/health` that returns `{ \"data\": { \"status\":\n * \"alive\" } }`. The most common local layouts run on a small, well-known set of\n * ports, so instead of forcing the user to type a URL we probe those ports and\n * offer whatever is actually running.\n */\n\n/**\n * Default ports probed when discovering local nodes. Covers the two-node dev\n * stacks used across the Calimero apps (RPC + alt ports for node1 / node2).\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_LOCAL_NODE_PORTS = [2428, 2429, 2528, 2529] as const;\n\n/** Host used to build local candidate URLs. */\nconst LOCAL_HOST = 'localhost';\n\n/** Per-probe timeout. A reachable local node answers almost instantly; a\n * closed port rejects fast, but a firewalled/black-holed one can hang, so we\n * cap each probe. */\nconst DEFAULT_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS = 2000;\n\nexport interface DiscoverLocalNodesOptions {\n  /** Ports to probe. Defaults to {@link DEFAULT_LOCAL_NODE_PORTS}. */\n  ports?: readonly number[];\n  /** Per-probe timeout in ms. Defaults to 2000. */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Abort the whole discovery (e.g. when the modal closes). */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n}\n\n/** Build the canonical base URL for a local node on the given port. */\nexport function localNodeUrl(port: number): string {\n  return `http://${LOCAL_HOST}:${port}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve an API `path` against a node `baseUrl`. Ensures the base ends with a\n * slash first, so a base that carries a path prefix (e.g. a `NODE_PATH_PREFIX`\n * deployment like `http://host/node1`) keeps that segment instead of having it\n * stripped by relative URL resolution.\n */\nexport function nodeEndpoint(baseUrl: string, path: string): string {\n  const base = baseUrl.endsWith('/') ? baseUrl : `${baseUrl}/`;\n  return new URL(path, base).toString();\n}\n\n/**\n * Probe a single node's health endpoint. Resolves `true` only when the node\n * answers with a 2xx and (when the body is JSON) reports a non-dead status.\n * Any network error, timeout, or non-ok response resolves `false` \u2014 never\n * throws (except on an external abort, which is swallowed as `false`).\n */\nexport async function probeNodeHealth(\n  baseUrl: string,\n  options: { timeoutMs?: number; signal?: AbortSignal } = {},\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const { timeoutMs = DEFAULT_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS, signal } = options;\n\n  // Already cancelled before we start \u2014 don't fetch, and don't register a\n  // timer or listener that would then need cleanup.\n  if (signal?.aborted) return false;\n\n  // Per-probe timeout, also linked to the caller's abort signal so closing the\n  // modal cancels every in-flight probe. Bind the signal to a local so the\n  // cleanup below stays symmetric with registration without re-narrowing.\n  const controller = new AbortController();\n  const onAbort = () => controller.abort();\n  const abortSignal = signal;\n  if (abortSignal) abortSignal.addEventListener('abort', onAbort, { once: true });\n  const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);\n\n  try {\n    const url = nodeEndpoint(baseUrl, 'admin-api/health');\n    const res = await fetch(url, {\n      method: 'GET',\n      signal: controller.signal,\n    });\n\n    if (!res.ok) return false;\n\n    // Health body is `{ data: { status: \"alive\" } }`, but tolerate plain\n    // `{ status }` and non-JSON 2xx responses. A *missing* status is treated as\n    // alive (the 2xx is enough); a status that is present but not \"alive\"\n    // (including an explicit `null`) is treated as unhealthy.\n    try {\n      const body = (await res.json()) as\n        | { data?: { status?: string | null }; status?: string | null }\n        | undefined;\n      const status =\n        body?.data?.status !== undefined ? body?.data?.status : body?.status;\n      if (status === undefined) return true;\n      return typeof status === 'string' && status.toLowerCase() === 'alive';\n    } catch {\n      return true;\n    }\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  } finally {\n    clearTimeout(timer);\n    if (abortSignal) abortSignal.removeEventListener('abort', onAbort);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Probe the configured local ports in parallel and return the base URLs that\n * responded as healthy, in the same order as the `ports` argument (which\n * defaults to ascending). Returns an empty array when nothing local is running.\n */\nexport async function discoverLocalNodes(\n  options: DiscoverLocalNodesOptions = {},\n): Promise<string[]> {\n  const { ports = DEFAULT_LOCAL_NODE_PORTS, timeoutMs, signal } = options;\n\n  const results = await Promise.all(\n    ports.map(async (port) => {\n      const url = localNodeUrl(port);\n      const ok = await probeNodeHealth(url, { timeoutMs, signal });\n      return ok ? url : null;\n    }),\n  );\n\n  return results.filter((url): url is string => url !== null);\n}\n"],
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"injected", "input", "init", "contextId", "body", "method", "argsJson", "executor", "nonce", "ttl", "warrant", "signWarrant", "path", "headers", "controller", "timer", "response", "err", "HTTPError", "text", "extractReason", "bodyText", "parsed", "candidate", "createMemoryNonceSource", "start", "next", "value", "createLocalStorageNonceSource", "key", "storage", "store", "raw", "current", "parsed", "PROTOCOL_NAME", "DH_LEN", "TAG_LEN", "PKCS8_X25519_PREFIX", "SymmetricState", "_SymmetricState", "h", "name", "data", "sha256", "concat", "inputKeyMaterial", "ck", "key", "hkdf2", "plaintext", "ciphertext", "noiseNonce", "initiate", "remoteStatic", "prologue", "fixedEphemeral", "state", "ephemeral", "x25519KeyPair", "dh", "message2", "remoteEphemeral", "secret", "pair", "error", "publicKey", "privateKey", "jwk", "base64UrlDecode", "peer", "nonce", "hmacSha256", "hmacKey", "chainingKey", "temp", "first", "second", "value", "base64", "binary", "char", "HANDSHAKE_PATH", "SEALED_PATH", "SEALED_CONTENT_TYPE", "VERSION", "PROLOGUE", "SESSION_ID_LEN", "HEADER_LEN", "FRAME_HEAD", "FRAME_DATA", "FRAME_END", "MAX_FRAME_LEN", "MAX_HANDSHAKE_REPLY", "RENEW_BEFORE_MS", "TRANSPORT_BINDING_DOMAIN", "NULL_BODY_STATUSES", "utf8", "StaleTransportKeyError", "SealedTransportError", "status", "code", "message", "retryAfterMs", "transportKeyBinding", "inner", "transportKey", "digest", "concat", "fetchAttestedTransportKey", "admin", "verify", "options", "nonce", "hex", "attested", "fromHex", "reportDataSuffix", "createAttestedSealedFetch", "baseFetch", "input", "init", "attestUrl", "request", "response", "body", "createSealedFetch", "base", "basePath", "nodeUrl", "attest", "session", "openSession", "handshake", "checkedKey", "error", "currentSession", "pending", "renew", "open", "renewed", "stale", "opening", "url", "headers", "value", "name", "head", "send", "requestId", "header", "envelope", "sealRequest", "envelopeRefusal", "openResponse", "key", "bytes", "handshakeOnce", "resolve", "noise", "initiate", "reply", "readAtMost", "sessionFrom", "finished", "payload", "split", "sessionId", "lifetimeSecs", "requestKey", "responseKey", "sealed", "joinInner", "index", "view", "encoded", "len", "frames", "frameReader", "next", "plain", "first", "controller", "frame", "reader", "buffer", "fill", "length", "done", "limit", "retryAfter", "connectCloud", "options", "cloud", "CloudClient", "namespaces", "namespace", "pickNamespace", "relays", "relayInfo", "r", "explainNoRelay", "relay", "RelayClient", "defaultNonceSource", "createAttestedSealedFetch", "contextId", "method", "argsJson", "requested", "found", "n", "waitingOnGrant", "deviceSecret", "key", "hex", "derivePublicKey", "createLocalStorageNonceSource", "createMemoryNonceSource", "MEASUREMENT_HEX", "createQuoteVerifier", "options", "allowedMrtd", "measurements", "allowedRtmr", "allowedStatuses", "now", "quoteB64", "nonce", "reportDataSuffix", "collateral", "quote", "fromBase64", "against", "verified", "error", "td", "tdReport", "hex", "register", "index", "allowed", "values", "label", "value", "normalized", "report", "data", "binary", "bytes", "i", "SIGNED_NAMESPACE_OP_SCHEMA_VERSION", "NAMESPACE_SIGN_DOMAIN", "NAMESPACE_OP_ROOT", "ROOT_OP", "bytes32", "value", "label", "optionalBytes32", "concat", "borshString", "bytes", "u32le", "encodeSignedInvitation", "signed", "body", "admitters", "admitterAddrs", "u64le", "a", "fromHex", "signMemberJoinOp", "input", "parents", "credential", "expires", "joinedAt", "rootOp", "op", "key", "importSigningKey", "signer", "derivePublicKey", "signable", "p", "i", "signature", "unendorsed", "hex", "SIGN_DOMAIN", "AUDIENCE_TAG", "audienceBody", "audience", "encoder", "audienceSigningBytes", "concat", "audienceWire", "tag", "body", "u32le", "signLoginStatement", "input", "node", "fromHex", "challenge", "sessionKey", "key", "importSigningKey", "deviceKey", "derivePublicKey", "issuedAt", "u64le", "expiresAt", "preimage", "domainHash", "signature", "hex", "DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS", "generateSessionKey", "secret", "hex", "derivePublicKey", "audienceLabel", "audience", "login", "config", "baseUrl", "doFetch", "timeoutMs", "request", "path", "init", "controller", "timer", "response", "err", "HTTPError", "text", "challengeBody", "challenge", "session", "issuedAt", "statement", "signLoginStatement", "tokenBody", "accessToken", "refreshToken", "DEFAULT_LOCAL_NODE_PORTS", "LOCAL_HOST", "DEFAULT_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS", "localNodeUrl", "port", "nodeEndpoint", "baseUrl", "path", "base", "probeNodeHealth", "options", "timeoutMs", "signal", "controller", "onAbort", "abortSignal", "timer", "url", "res", "body", "status", "discoverLocalNodes", "ports"]
+  "sourcesContent": ["// Utility for combining multiple AbortSignals\nexport function combineSignals(\n  signals: Array<AbortSignal | undefined>,\n): AbortSignal | undefined {\n  const list = signals.filter(Boolean) as AbortSignal[];\n  if (list.length === 0) return undefined;\n\n  // Prefer native any(), but fall back if unavailable or it throws\n  const AbortSignalAny = AbortSignal as {\n    any?: (signals: AbortSignal[]) => AbortSignal;\n  };\n  if (typeof AbortSignalAny.any === 'function') {\n    try {\n      return AbortSignalAny.any(list);\n    } catch {\n      // Fall through to manual implementation\n    }\n  }\n\n  const controller = new AbortController();\n  const onAbort = (evt: Event) => {\n    controller.abort((evt.target as AbortSignal).reason);\n    for (const s of list) s.removeEventListener('abort', onAbort);\n  };\n\n  for (const s of list) {\n    if (s.aborted) return AbortSignal.abort(s.reason);\n    s.addEventListener('abort', onAbort, { once: true });\n  }\n\n  return controller.signal;\n}\n\n// Helper to create a timeout signal\nexport function createTimeoutSignal(timeoutMs: number): AbortSignal {\n  // Use AbortSignal.timeout if available (Node 18.17+, modern browsers)\n  if (typeof AbortSignal.timeout === 'function') {\n    return AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs);\n  }\n\n  // Fallback for older environments\n  const controller = new AbortController();\n  setTimeout(() => {\n    controller.abort(new DOMException('Timeout', 'TimeoutError'));\n  }, timeoutMs);\n\n  return controller.signal;\n}\n", "// ErrorResponse import removed as it's not used\nimport {\n  HttpClient,\n  Transport,\n  RequestOptions,\n  ResponseParser,\n} from './http-types.js';\nimport { combineSignals, createTimeoutSignal } from './signal-utils.js';\n\n/**\n * `x-auth-error` reasons that mean the whole token family is gone.\n *\n * Refresh tokens are single-use (calimero-network/core#3083): presenting a\n * consumed refresh token is treated as token theft and the server revokes the\n * family. Refreshing or retrying afterwards is pointless \u2014 the only way out is\n * a fresh login.\n */\nconst TERMINAL_AUTH_ERRORS = new Set(['token_reuse', 'token_revoked']);\n\n/**\n * Pull the node's explanation out of an error body. Core answers every handled\n * failure with `{\"error\": \"<message>\"}` (`ApiError::into_response`); the nested\n * `{\"error\": {\"message\": ...}}` form is what proxies in front of a node emit.\n * Returns undefined for a non-JSON, empty, or envelope-less body.\n */\nfunction extractErrorMessage(bodyText?: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!bodyText) return undefined;\n  try {\n    const body = JSON.parse(bodyText) as { error?: unknown; detail?: unknown };\n    const error = body?.error;\n    if (typeof error === 'string' && error.trim() !== '') return error;\n    const nested = (error as { message?: unknown } | null)?.message;\n    if (typeof nested === 'string' && nested.trim() !== '') return nested;\n    // FastAPI's spelling, which is what every Calimero Cloud route answers\n    // with. Without it a manager's carefully worded refusal \u2014 \"ownership is\n    // recorded, but the account is not linked\" \u2014 reached callers as a bare\n    // \"HTTP 403\", and the one thing they could do about it was invisible.\n    const detail = body?.detail;\n    if (typeof detail === 'string' && detail.trim() !== '') return detail;\n  } catch {\n    // Not JSON \u2014 the status line is all we can honestly report.\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n// Custom error class for HTTP errors\nexport class HTTPError extends Error {\n  name = 'HTTPError';\n\n  constructor(\n    public status: number,\n    public statusText: string,\n    public url: string,\n    public headers: Headers,\n    public bodyText?: string, // cap at ~64KB\n  ) {\n    const explanation = extractErrorMessage(bodyText);\n    super(\n      explanation\n        ? `HTTP ${status} ${statusText}: ${explanation}`\n        : `HTTP ${status} ${statusText}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  toJSON(): {\n    status: number;\n    statusText: string;\n    url: string;\n    headers: Record<string, string>;\n    bodyText?: string;\n  } {\n    return {\n      status: this.status,\n      statusText: this.statusText,\n      url: this.url,\n      headers: headersToRecord(this.headers),\n      bodyText: this.bodyText,\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Terminal authentication error: the refresh-token family was revoked (single-use\n * refresh token replayed, or the token was explicitly revoked). Never retried and\n * never refreshed \u2014 apps should catch this and force a re-login.\n *\n * Extends {@link HTTPError} so existing `instanceof HTTPError` handling keeps working.\n */\nexport class AuthRevokedError extends HTTPError {\n  name = 'AuthRevokedError';\n\n  constructor(\n    /** Value of the `x-auth-error` header, e.g. `token_reuse` or `token_revoked`. */\n    public reason: string,\n    status: number,\n    statusText: string,\n    url: string,\n    headers: Headers,\n    bodyText?: string,\n  ) {\n    super(status, statusText, url, headers, bodyText);\n    this.message = `Authentication revoked (${reason}): HTTP ${status} ${statusText}`;\n  }\n}\n\n// Helper function to convert Headers to Record\nfunction headersToRecord(headers: Headers): Record<string, string> {\n  const record: Record<string, string> = {};\n  headers.forEach((value, key) => {\n    record[key] = value;\n  });\n  return record;\n}\n\n// Web Standards HTTP client implementation\n/**\n * The path a node will verify a request signature against.\n *\n * `new URL` drops the query and keeps any prefix the base URL contributed,\n * which is exactly what reaches the server. The fallback covers a `url` that is\n * already relative \u2014 it cannot be parsed, and signing the whole string with its\n * query attached would be worse than signing the part before the `?`.\n */\nfunction pathForProof(url: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(url).pathname;\n  } catch {\n    const query = url.indexOf('?');\n    return query === -1 ? url : url.slice(0, query);\n  }\n}\n\nexport class WebHttpClient implements HttpClient {\n  // Cache for concurrent refresh token calls to prevent race conditions\n  private refreshTokenPromise: Promise<string> | null = null;\n  // Cache for concurrent onTokenRefresh calls to prevent duplicate callbacks\n  private onTokenRefreshPromise: Promise<void> | null = null;\n  \n  constructor(private transport: Transport) {}\n\n  async get<T>(path: string, init?: RequestOptions): Promise<T> {\n    return this.request<T>(path, { ...init, method: 'GET' });\n  }\n\n  async post<T>(\n    path: string,\n    body?: unknown,\n    init?: RequestOptions,\n  ): Promise<T> {\n    return this.request<T>(path, {\n      ...init,\n      method: 'POST',\n      body: body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,\n      headers: {\n        'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n        ...init?.headers,\n      },\n    });\n  }\n\n  async put<T>(\n    path: string,\n    body?: unknown,\n    init?: RequestOptions,\n  ): Promise<T> {\n    return this.request<T>(path, {\n      ...init,\n      method: 'PUT',\n      body: body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,\n      headers: {\n        'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n        ...init?.headers,\n      },\n    });\n  }\n\n  async delete<T>(path: string, init?: RequestOptions): Promise<T> {\n    return this.request<T>(path, { ...init, method: 'DELETE' });\n  }\n\n  async patch<T>(\n    path: string,\n    body?: unknown,\n    init?: RequestOptions,\n  ): Promise<T> {\n    return this.request<T>(path, {\n      ...init,\n      method: 'PATCH',\n      body: body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,\n      headers: {\n        'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n        ...init?.headers,\n      },\n    });\n  }\n\n  async head(\n    path: string,\n    init?: RequestOptions,\n  ): Promise<{ headers: Record<string, string>; status: number }> {\n    const response = await this.makeRequest<Response>(path, {\n      ...init,\n      method: 'HEAD',\n      parse: 'response',\n    });\n    return {\n      headers: headersToRecord(response.headers),\n      status: response.status,\n    };\n  }\n\n  async request<T>(path: string, init?: RequestOptions): Promise<T> {\n    return this.makeRequest<T>(path, init);\n  }\n\n  private async makeRequest<T>(\n    path: string,\n    init?: RequestOptions,\n    retryCount = 0,\n    requestStartTime?: number,\n  ): Promise<T> {\n    // Maximum retry attempts to prevent infinite loops\n    const MAX_RETRY_ATTEMPTS = 1;\n    const url = this.buildUrl(path);\n    \n    // Track request start time for timeout calculation (only on first attempt)\n    // Use per-request start time to avoid corruption from concurrent requests\n    const startTime = requestStartTime ?? Date.now();\n    // Note: Tauri proxy script now handles AbortSignal, so we can use full RequestInit\n    // Removed Tauri-specific minimal path - proxy script handles AbortSignal properly\n    const signal = this.createAbortSignal(init);\n    const headers = await this.buildHeaders(init?.headers);\n    let headersObj: Record<string, string>;\n    if (headers instanceof Headers) {\n      headersObj = {};\n      headers.forEach((value, key) => {\n        headersObj[key] = value;\n      });\n    } else {\n      headersObj = headers;\n    }\n    \n    const requestInit: RequestInit = {\n      method: init?.method || 'GET',\n      headers: headersObj,\n    };\n    \n    // Check if body is a stream (ReadableStream) that can't be reused\n    // Note: Blob is reusable, so it's not included here\n    const isStreamBody = init?.body instanceof ReadableStream ||\n                        (typeof init?.body === 'object' && init?.body !== null && 'getReader' in init.body && !(init.body instanceof Blob));\n    \n    if (init?.body !== undefined && !isStreamBody) {\n      requestInit.body = init.body;\n    } else if (init?.body !== undefined && isStreamBody && retryCount === 0) {\n      // Only include stream body on first attempt - can't retry with streams\n      requestInit.body = init.body;\n    }\n    \n    // For retries, calculate remaining timeout to prevent timeout reset\n    // Track elapsed time and use remaining timeout for retry\n    // Note: This is calculated before the request, so it doesn't include token refresh time\n    // The actual remaining timeout check happens after token refresh completes\n    let retrySignal: AbortSignal | undefined;\n    if (retryCount > 0 && requestStartTime !== undefined) {\n      const timeoutMs = init?.timeoutMs || this.transport.timeoutMs;\n      if (timeoutMs) {\n        // Calculate elapsed time (will be recalculated after token refresh if needed)\n        const elapsed = Date.now() - startTime;\n        const remaining = Math.max(0, timeoutMs - elapsed);\n        // Create signal with remaining timeout, preserving user's signal\n        retrySignal = this.createAbortSignal({ ...init, timeoutMs: remaining });\n      } else {\n        // No timeout, just preserve user's signal\n        retrySignal = this.createAbortSignal(init);\n      }\n    } else {\n      retrySignal = signal;\n    }\n    \n    if (retrySignal) {\n      requestInit.signal = retrySignal;\n    }\n    \n    if (this.transport.credentials !== undefined) {\n      requestInit.credentials = this.transport.credentials;\n    }\n    \n    if (init?.mode !== undefined) {\n      requestInit.mode = init.mode;\n    }\n    if (init?.cache !== undefined) {\n      requestInit.cache = init.cache;\n    }\n    if (init?.redirect !== undefined) {\n      requestInit.redirect = init.redirect;\n    }\n    if (init?.referrer !== undefined) {\n      requestInit.referrer = init.referrer;\n    }\n    if (init?.referrerPolicy !== undefined) {\n      requestInit.referrerPolicy = init.referrerPolicy;\n    }\n    if (init?.integrity !== undefined) {\n      requestInit.integrity = init.integrity;\n    }\n    if (init?.keepalive !== undefined) {\n      requestInit.keepalive = init.keepalive;\n    }\n\n    // Signed here rather than in `buildHeaders`, which sees neither the method\n    // nor the body \u2014 and a proof commits to both. Signed AFTER the body is\n    // settled above, so what is hashed is what is sent.\n    //\n    // The path comes from the built URL's `pathname`, not from the `path`\n    // argument: that argument may carry a query string, and may be relative to\n    // a base URL that contributes its own prefix. The node verifies against the\n    // path it received, so the only safe source is the URL actually being\n    // fetched. A query string is deliberately not covered \u2014 core's `RequestSig`\n    // signs the path alone, and signing more here would fail every request.\n    if (this.transport.getProof) {\n      const proof = await this.transport.getProof({\n        method: requestInit.method ?? 'GET',\n        path: pathForProof(url),\n        body: requestInit.body,\n      });\n      if (proof) {\n        headersObj['X-Calimero-Proof'] = proof;\n      }\n    }\n\n    try {\n      const response = await this.transport.fetch(url, requestInit);\n\n      if (!response.ok) {\n        const bodyText = await this.getBodyText(response);\n        const httpError = new HTTPError(\n          response.status,\n          response.statusText,\n          url,\n          response.headers,\n          bodyText,\n        );\n\n        // Handle a revoked token family (single-use refresh token replayed, or an\n        // explicitly revoked token). This is terminal: refreshing would only burn\n        // another token and retrying would 401 again, so clear the tokens via the\n        // onAuthRevoked hook and surface a distinguishable error.\n        const authError = response.headers.get('x-auth-error');\n        if (\n          (response.status === 401 || response.status === 403) &&\n          authError &&\n          TERMINAL_AUTH_ERRORS.has(authError)\n        ) {\n          // Any in-flight refresh is based on a now-dead family \u2014 drop the caches.\n          this.refreshTokenPromise = null;\n          this.onTokenRefreshPromise = null;\n\n          if (this.transport.onAuthRevoked) {\n            try {\n              await this.transport.onAuthRevoked();\n            } catch {\n              // Never mask the auth error with a cleanup failure.\n            }\n          }\n\n          throw new AuthRevokedError(\n            authError,\n            response.status,\n            response.statusText,\n            url,\n            response.headers,\n            bodyText,\n          );\n        }\n\n        // Handle 401 with token_expired - attempt automatic token refresh\n        const userAborted = init?.signal?.aborted === true;\n        if (\n          response.status === 401 &&\n          this.transport.refreshToken &&\n          authError === 'token_expired' &&\n          retryCount < MAX_RETRY_ATTEMPTS &&\n          !isStreamBody &&\n          !userAborted\n        ) {\n          try {\n            // Use cached refresh promise if one is in progress (prevents race conditions)\n            let refreshPromise = this.refreshTokenPromise;\n            if (!refreshPromise) {\n              refreshPromise = this.transport.refreshToken();\n              this.refreshTokenPromise = refreshPromise;\n            }\n            \n            // Attempt to refresh the token\n            const newToken = await refreshPromise;\n            \n            // Validate token - must be non-empty\n            if (!newToken || newToken.trim() === '') {\n              // Clear caches on error\n              this.refreshTokenPromise = null;\n              this.onTokenRefreshPromise = null;\n              throw new Error('Refresh token returned empty token');\n            }\n            \n            // onTokenRefresh is required when refreshToken is provided\n            // Without it, the new token cannot be stored and getAuthToken() will return the old token\n            if (!this.transport.onTokenRefresh) {\n              // Clear caches on error\n              this.refreshTokenPromise = null;\n              this.onTokenRefreshPromise = null;\n              throw new Error(\n                'onTokenRefresh callback is required when refreshToken is provided. ' +\n                'The callback must update the token storage so getAuthToken() returns the new token.'\n              );\n            }\n            \n            // Use cached onTokenRefresh promise if one is in progress (prevents duplicate callbacks)\n            // This ensures onTokenRefresh is only called once per token refresh, even with concurrent requests\n            let onTokenRefreshPromise = this.onTokenRefreshPromise;\n            if (!onTokenRefreshPromise) {\n              onTokenRefreshPromise = this.transport.onTokenRefresh(newToken);\n              this.onTokenRefreshPromise = onTokenRefreshPromise;\n            }\n            \n            // Update token via callback (only called once per refresh, even with concurrent requests)\n            // Errors from onTokenRefresh callback should be preserved (don't mask as 401)\n            // This helps developers debug token storage issues\n            await onTokenRefreshPromise;\n            \n            // Clear caches after both refresh and callback complete\n            this.refreshTokenPromise = null;\n            this.onTokenRefreshPromise = null;\n            \n            // Check if timeout has expired during token refresh\n            // If so, throw the original 401 error instead of retrying with 0ms timeout\n            // This prevents timeout/abort errors that obscure the root cause (expired token)\n            const timeoutMs = init?.timeoutMs || this.transport.timeoutMs;\n            if (timeoutMs && requestStartTime !== undefined) {\n              const elapsed = Date.now() - startTime;\n              const remaining = timeoutMs - elapsed;\n              if (remaining <= 0) {\n                // Timeout expired during token refresh - throw original 401 error\n                // This is better than retrying with 0ms timeout which would cause confusing timeout errors\n                throw httpError;\n              }\n            }\n            \n            // Retry the request with the new token (increment retry count)\n            // Preserve user's abort signal and start time in retry\n            return this.makeRequest<T>(path, init, retryCount + 1, startTime);\n          } catch (refreshError) {\n            // Clear caches on error\n            this.refreshTokenPromise = null;\n            this.onTokenRefreshPromise = null;\n            // Configuration errors (missing onTokenRefresh) should be thrown as-is\n            if (refreshError instanceof Error && refreshError.message.includes('onTokenRefresh')) {\n              throw refreshError;\n            }\n            // Errors from onTokenRefresh callback are already thrown above, so if we get here,\n            // it's either a refreshToken() failure or empty token - throw original 401\n            // This matches the PR description: \"If refresh fails, throws the original 401 error\"\n            throw httpError;\n          }\n        }\n\n        throw httpError;\n      }\n\n      return this.parseResponse<T>(response, init?.parse);\n    } catch (error) {\n      if (error instanceof HTTPError) {\n        throw error;\n      }\n      // Preserve configuration errors (like missing onTokenRefresh)\n      if (error instanceof Error && error.message.includes('onTokenRefresh')) {\n        throw error;\n      }\n      throw new HTTPError(\n        0,\n        'Network Error',\n        url,\n        new Headers(),\n        error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error',\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  private buildUrl(path: string): string {\n    // Handle absolute URLs\n    if (path.startsWith('http://') || path.startsWith('https://')) {\n      return path;\n    }\n\n    // Handle baseUrl with path\n    const baseUrl = this.transport.baseUrl;\n    if (path.startsWith('/')) {\n      // If path starts with /, combine with baseUrl\n      const base = baseUrl.endsWith('/') ? baseUrl.slice(0, -1) : baseUrl;\n      return `${base}${path}`;\n    } else {\n      // If path doesn't start with /, append to baseUrl\n      const base = baseUrl.endsWith('/') ? baseUrl : `${baseUrl}/`;\n      return `${base}${path}`;\n    }\n  }\n\n  private createAbortSignal(init?: RequestOptions): AbortSignal | undefined {\n    const signals: AbortSignal[] = [];\n\n    if (this.transport.defaultAbortSignal) {\n      signals.push(this.transport.defaultAbortSignal);\n    }\n\n    if (init?.signal) {\n      signals.push(init.signal);\n    }\n\n    const timeoutMs = init?.timeoutMs || this.transport.timeoutMs;\n    if (timeoutMs) {\n      signals.push(createTimeoutSignal(timeoutMs));\n    }\n\n    return signals.length > 0 ? combineSignals(signals) : undefined;\n  }\n\n  private async buildHeaders(\n    initHeaders?: HeadersInit,\n  ): Promise<Record<string, string>> {\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n      ...this.transport.defaultHeaders,\n    };\n\n    // Add auth token if available and not empty\n    if (this.transport.getAuthToken) {\n      try {\n        const token = await this.transport.getAuthToken();\n        if (token && token.trim() !== '') {\n          headers.Authorization = `Bearer ${token}`;\n        }\n      } catch (error) {\n        // Ignore auth token errors\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Add init headers\n    if (initHeaders) {\n      if (initHeaders instanceof Headers) {\n        initHeaders.forEach((value, key) => {\n          headers[key] = value;\n        });\n      } else if (Array.isArray(initHeaders)) {\n        initHeaders.forEach(([key, value]) => {\n          headers[key] = value;\n        });\n      } else {\n        Object.assign(headers, initHeaders);\n      }\n    }\n\n    return headers;\n  }\n\n  private async parseResponse<T>(\n    response: Response,\n    parse?: ResponseParser,\n  ): Promise<T> {\n    switch (parse) {\n      case 'text':\n        return (await response.text()) as T;\n      case 'blob':\n        return (await response.blob()) as T;\n      case 'arrayBuffer':\n        return (await response.arrayBuffer()) as T;\n      case 'response':\n        return response as T;\n      case 'json':\n      default: {\n        // Tolerate empty 2xx bodies (e.g. 204 No Content from delete/resync):\n        // `response.json()` throws on '', so read text and return null when empty.\n        const text = await response.text();\n        if (!text) return null as T;\n        try {\n          return JSON.parse(text) as T;\n        } catch {\n          // Non-JSON body on a 2xx (e.g. an HTML error page) \u2014 surface a clear\n          // error with a snippet instead of a bare SyntaxError.\n          throw new Error(\n            `Expected a JSON response (status ${response.status}) but body was not JSON: ${text.slice(0, 200)}`,\n          );\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  private async getBodyText(response: Response): Promise<string> {\n    try {\n      const text = await response.text();\n      return text.length > 65536 ? text.slice(0, 65536) + '...' : text;\n    } catch {\n      return '';\n    }\n  }\n}\n", "import { WebHttpClient } from './web-client.js';\nimport { Transport, HttpClient } from './http-types.js';\n\n// Factory function to create HTTP client with sensible defaults\nexport function createHttpClient(transport: Transport): HttpClient {\n  return new WebHttpClient(transport);\n}\n\n// Factory function for browser environments\nexport function createBrowserHttpClient(options: {\n  baseUrl: string;\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  getAuthToken?: () => Promise<string | undefined>;\n  getProof?: Transport['getProof'];\n  onTokenRefresh?: (newToken: string) => Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Callback to refresh the access token when a 401 error with 'token_expired' is detected.\n   * Should return the new access token, or throw an error if refresh fails.\n   * If provided, the client will automatically retry the request after a successful refresh.\n   */\n  refreshToken?: () => Promise<string>;\n  /**\n   * Callback invoked when the server reports a revoked token family\n   * (`x-auth-error: token_reuse` / `token_revoked`). Terminal \u2014 the request is\n   * never retried; clear stored tokens and force a re-login.\n   */\n  onAuthRevoked?: () => Promise<void> | void;\n  defaultHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  credentials?: RequestCredentials;\n  defaultAbortSignal?: AbortSignal;\n}): HttpClient {\n  const transport: Transport = {\n    // globalThis.fetch must be called as a method on globalThis, not through a\n    // variable, or browsers throw \"Illegal invocation\".\n    fetch: (url: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) =>\n      options.fetch ? options.fetch(url, init) : globalThis.fetch(url, init),\n    baseUrl: options.baseUrl,\n    getAuthToken: options.getAuthToken,\n    getProof: options.getProof,\n    onTokenRefresh: options.onTokenRefresh,\n    refreshToken: options.refreshToken,\n    onAuthRevoked: options.onAuthRevoked,\n    defaultHeaders: options.defaultHeaders,\n    timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs,\n    credentials: options.credentials, // No default credentials\n    defaultAbortSignal: options.defaultAbortSignal,\n  };\n\n  return createHttpClient(transport);\n}\n\n// Factory function for Node.js environments\nexport function createNodeHttpClient(options: {\n  baseUrl: string;\n  fetch?: typeof fetch; // Allow injection of undici.fetch or other fetch implementations\n  getAuthToken?: () => Promise<string | undefined>;\n  getProof?: Transport['getProof'];\n  onTokenRefresh?: (newToken: string) => Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Callback to refresh the access token when a 401 error with 'token_expired' is detected.\n   * Should return the new access token, or throw an error if refresh fails.\n   * If provided, the client will automatically retry the request after a successful refresh.\n   */\n  refreshToken?: () => Promise<string>;\n  /**\n   * Callback invoked when the server reports a revoked token family\n   * (`x-auth-error: token_reuse` / `token_revoked`). Terminal \u2014 the request is\n   * never retried; clear stored tokens and force a re-login.\n   */\n  onAuthRevoked?: () => Promise<void> | void;\n  defaultHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  credentials?: RequestCredentials;\n  defaultAbortSignal?: AbortSignal;\n}): HttpClient {\n  // Use provided fetch or try to use global fetch (Node 18+)\n  const fetchImpl = options.fetch ?? globalThis.fetch;\n\n  if (!fetchImpl) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'No fetch implementation available. Please provide a fetch implementation ' +\n        '(e.g., undici.fetch) or use Node.js 18+ which has native fetch support.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Check if we're using the default globalThis.fetch to preserve context\n  // When fetchImpl is globalThis.fetch, we must call it directly, not through a variable\n  // Custom fetch implementations (like undici.fetch) can be called through the variable\n  const isDefaultFetch = fetchImpl === globalThis.fetch;\n\n  const transport: Transport = {\n    // Wrap fetch in arrow function to prevent \"Illegal invocation\" error\n    // For globalThis.fetch, call it directly to preserve 'this' context\n    // For custom implementations, calling through the variable is safe\n    fetch: isDefaultFetch\n      ? (url: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => globalThis.fetch(url, init)\n      : (url: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => fetchImpl(url, init),\n    baseUrl: options.baseUrl,\n    getAuthToken: options.getAuthToken,\n    getProof: options.getProof,\n    onTokenRefresh: options.onTokenRefresh,\n    refreshToken: options.refreshToken,\n    onAuthRevoked: options.onAuthRevoked,\n    defaultHeaders: options.defaultHeaders,\n    timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs,\n    credentials: options.credentials, // Node.js doesn't have default credentials\n    defaultAbortSignal: options.defaultAbortSignal,\n  };\n\n  return createHttpClient(transport);\n}\n\n// Universal factory that works in both environments\nexport function createUniversalHttpClient(options: {\n  baseUrl: string;\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  getAuthToken?: () => Promise<string | undefined>;\n  getProof?: Transport['getProof'];\n  onTokenRefresh?: (newToken: string) => Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Callback to refresh the access token when a 401 error with 'token_expired' is detected.\n   * Should return the new access token, or throw an error if refresh fails.\n   * If provided, the client will automatically retry the request after a successful refresh.\n   */\n  refreshToken?: () => Promise<string>;\n  /**\n   * Callback invoked when the server reports a revoked token family\n   * (`x-auth-error: token_reuse` / `token_revoked`). Terminal \u2014 the request is\n   * never retried; clear stored tokens and force a re-login.\n   */\n  onAuthRevoked?: () => Promise<void> | void;\n  defaultHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  credentials?: RequestCredentials;\n  defaultAbortSignal?: AbortSignal;\n}): HttpClient {\n  // Try to detect environment and use appropriate factory\n  if (typeof window !== 'undefined') {\n    // Browser environment\n    return createBrowserHttpClient(options);\n  } else {\n    // Node.js environment\n    return createNodeHttpClient(options);\n  }\n}\n", "// Retry helper for HTTP requests\nexport interface RetryOptions {\n  attempts?: number;\n}\n\n// Error types for retry logic\ninterface ErrorWithName extends Error {\n  name: string;\n}\n\ninterface ErrorWithStatus extends Error {\n  status: number;\n}\n\ninterface ErrorWithHeaders extends Error {\n  headers?: Headers;\n}\n\n// Default retry condition - retry on network errors and 5xx status codes\nfunction defaultRetryCondition(error: Error, attempt: number): boolean {\n  // Don't retry on the last attempt\n  if (attempt <= 0) return false;\n\n  // Distinguish timeout vs. user abort:\n  // - Timeout: name === 'TimeoutError' (per spec/platforms)\n  // - User abort: name === 'AbortError'\n  const errorWithName = error as ErrorWithName;\n  const name = errorWithName?.name;\n  if (name === 'TimeoutError') return true;\n  if (name === 'AbortError') return false;\n\n  // HTTP 5xx and 429 (including HTTPError from web-client)\n  const errorWithStatus = error as ErrorWithStatus;\n  if (\n    'status' in errorWithStatus &&\n    typeof errorWithStatus.status === 'number'\n  ) {\n    const status = errorWithStatus.status;\n    return status >= 500 || status === 429;\n  }\n  // Network TypeError (DNS/reset) is reasonably retryable\n  if (name === 'TypeError') return true;\n\n  return false;\n}\n\n// Calculate delay with exponential backoff and jitter\nfunction calculateDelay(attempt: number): number {\n  const baseDelayMs = 250; // Base 250ms as per spec\n  const delay = baseDelayMs * Math.pow(2, attempt - 1);\n\n  // Add \u00B120% jitter to reduce stampedes\n  const jitter = (Math.random() - 0.5) * 0.4 * delay;\n  return Math.max(0, delay + jitter);\n}\n\n// Retry helper function with new signature\nexport async function withRetry<T>(\n  fn: (attempt: number) => Promise<T>,\n  options: RetryOptions = {},\n): Promise<T> {\n  const { attempts = 3 } = options;\n\n  let lastError: Error | undefined;\n\n  for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= attempts; attempt++) {\n    try {\n      return await fn(attempt);\n    } catch (error) {\n      lastError = error as Error;\n\n      // Check if we should retry (this handles the last attempt check)\n      if (!defaultRetryCondition(lastError, attempts - attempt)) {\n        throw lastError;\n      }\n\n      // Calculate delay\n      let delayMs = calculateDelay(attempt);\n\n      // Check for Retry-After header if it's an HTTP error\n      const errorWithHeaders = lastError as ErrorWithHeaders;\n      const hdrs = errorWithHeaders.headers;\n      const retryAfter = hdrs?.get?.('Retry-After');\n      if (retryAfter) {\n        // If it's a number, treat as seconds\n        const seconds = parseInt(retryAfter, 10);\n        if (!isNaN(seconds)) {\n          delayMs = Math.max(delayMs, seconds * 1000);\n        } else {\n          // If it's a date, calculate the difference\n          const date = new Date(retryAfter);\n          if (!isNaN(date.getTime())) {\n            const waitTime = Math.max(0, date.getTime() - Date.now());\n            // Cap wait at 60s per attempt as per spec\n            delayMs = Math.max(delayMs, Math.min(waitTime, 60000));\n          }\n        }\n      }\n\n      // Wait before retrying\n      await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, delayMs));\n    }\n  }\n\n  throw lastError || new Error('Retry failed without error');\n}\n\n// Helper to create a retry-enabled HTTP client method\nexport function createRetryableMethod<T extends unknown[], R>(\n  method: (...args: T) => Promise<R>,\n  retryOptions: RetryOptions = {},\n) {\n  return async (...args: T): Promise<R> => {\n    return withRetry(() => method(...args), retryOptions);\n  };\n}\n", "import { HttpClient } from '../http-client/index.js';\nimport {\n  // Common types\n  ApiResponse,\n  // Health and Status\n  HealthResponse,\n  IdentityResponse,\n  ProvidersResponse,\n  // Authentication\n  TokenRequest,\n  TokenResponse,\n  RefreshTokenRequest,\n  // Mock Token (testing)\n  MockTokenRequest,\n  // Token Management\n  RevokeTokenRequest,\n  RevokeTokenResponse,\n  // Key Management\n  CreateKeyRequest,\n  CreateKeyResponse,\n  DeleteKeyResponse,\n  RootKey,\n  // Client Management\n  ClientKey,\n  GenerateClientKeyRequest,\n  DeleteClientResponse,\n  // Permissions\n  PermissionResponse,\n  UpdateKeyPermissionsRequest,\n} from './auth-types.js';\n\nexport class AuthApiClient {\n  constructor(private httpClient: HttpClient) {}\n\n  // Health and Status Endpoints\n  async getHealth(): Promise<HealthResponse> {\n    const response =\n      await this.httpClient.get<ApiResponse<HealthResponse>>('/auth/health');\n    if (!response.data) {\n      throw new Error('Health response data is null');\n    }\n    return response.data;\n  }\n\n  async getIdentity(): Promise<IdentityResponse> {\n    const response =\n      await this.httpClient.get<ApiResponse<IdentityResponse>>(\n        '/admin/identity',\n      );\n    if (!response.data) {\n      throw new Error('Identity response data is null');\n    }\n    return response.data;\n  }\n\n  async getProviders(): Promise<ProvidersResponse> {\n    const response =\n      await this.httpClient.get<ApiResponse<ProvidersResponse>>(\n        '/auth/providers',\n      );\n    if (!response.data) {\n      throw new Error('Providers response data is null');\n    }\n    return response.data;\n  }\n\n  // Authentication Endpoints\n  async getLoginPage(): Promise<string> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<string>('/auth/login', { parse: 'text' });\n  }\n\n  async generateTokens(request: TokenRequest): Promise<TokenResponse> {\n    return this.httpClient.post<TokenResponse>('/auth/token', request);\n  }\n\n  async refreshToken(request: RefreshTokenRequest): Promise<TokenResponse> {\n    return this.httpClient.post<TokenResponse>('/auth/refresh', request);\n  }\n\n  async generateMockTokens(request: MockTokenRequest): Promise<TokenResponse> {\n    return this.httpClient.post<TokenResponse>('/auth/mock-token', request);\n  }\n\n  async validateToken(token: string): Promise<{\n    valid: boolean;\n    headers: Record<string, string>;\n    status: number;\n  }> {\n    try {\n      const response = await this.validateTokenGet(token);\n      return {\n        valid: response.status === 200,\n        headers: response.headers,\n        status: response.status,\n      };\n    } catch (error) {\n      return {\n        valid: false,\n        headers: {},\n        status: 401,\n      };\n    }\n  }\n\n  async validateTokenGet(\n    token: string,\n  ): Promise<{ status: number; headers: Record<string, string> }> {\n    const response = await this.httpClient.head('/auth/validate', {\n      headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },\n    });\n    return {\n      status: response.status,\n      headers: response.headers,\n    };\n  }\n\n  // Token Management Endpoints\n  // NOTE: node auth status lives on AdminApiClient.isAuthed() (/admin-api/is-authed);\n  // there is no /auth/is-authed on the auth service.\n  async revokeTokens(\n    request: RevokeTokenRequest,\n  ): Promise<RevokeTokenResponse> {\n    const response = await this.httpClient.post<ApiResponse<RevokeTokenResponse>>(\n      '/admin/revoke',\n      request,\n    );\n    if (!response.data) {\n      throw new Error('Revoke tokens response data is null');\n    }\n    return response.data;\n  }\n\n  // Key Management Endpoints\n  async listRootKeys(): Promise<RootKey[]> {\n    const response =\n      await this.httpClient.get<ApiResponse<RootKey[]>>('/admin/keys');\n    if (!response.data) {\n      throw new Error('Root keys response data is null');\n    }\n    return response.data;\n  }\n\n  async createRootKey(request: CreateKeyRequest): Promise<CreateKeyResponse> {\n    const response = await this.httpClient.post<ApiResponse<CreateKeyResponse>>(\n      '/admin/keys',\n      request,\n    );\n    if (!response.data) {\n      throw new Error('Create root key response data is null');\n    }\n    return response.data;\n  }\n\n  async deleteRootKey(keyId: string): Promise<DeleteKeyResponse> {\n    return this.httpClient.delete<DeleteKeyResponse>(`/admin/keys/${keyId}`);\n  }\n\n  // Client Management Endpoints\n  async listClientKeys(): Promise<ClientKey[]> {\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<ApiResponse<ClientKey[]>>(\n      '/admin/keys/clients',\n    );\n    if (!response.data) {\n      throw new Error('Client keys response data is null');\n    }\n    return response.data;\n  }\n\n  async generateClientKey(\n    request: GenerateClientKeyRequest,\n  ): Promise<TokenResponse> {\n    return this.httpClient.post<TokenResponse>('/admin/client-key', request);\n  }\n\n  async deleteClientKey(\n    keyId: string,\n    clientId: string,\n  ): Promise<DeleteClientResponse> {\n    return this.httpClient.delete<DeleteClientResponse>(\n      `/admin/keys/${keyId}/clients/${clientId}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Permission Management Endpoints\n  async getKeyPermissions(keyId: string): Promise<PermissionResponse> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<PermissionResponse>(\n      `/admin/keys/${keyId}/permissions`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  async updateKeyPermissions(\n    keyId: string,\n    changes: UpdateKeyPermissionsRequest,\n  ): Promise<PermissionResponse> {\n    // Core expects an { add, remove } delta, not a { permissions } replacement.\n    return this.httpClient.put<PermissionResponse>(\n      `/admin/keys/${keyId}/permissions`,\n      { add: changes.add, remove: changes.remove },\n    );\n  }\n}\n", "import { AuthApiClient } from './auth-client.js';\nimport { AuthApiClientConfig } from './auth-types.js';\nimport { HttpClient } from '../http-client/index.js';\n\n// Mock HTTP client for testing\nclass MockHttpClient implements HttpClient {\n  async get<T>(): Promise<T> {\n    throw new Error(\n      'HTTP client not implemented - use createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient with a real HTTP client',\n    );\n  }\n  async post<T>(): Promise<T> {\n    throw new Error(\n      'HTTP client not implemented - use createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient with a real HTTP client',\n    );\n  }\n  async put<T>(): Promise<T> {\n    throw new Error(\n      'HTTP client not implemented - use createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient with a real HTTP client',\n    );\n  }\n  async delete<T>(): Promise<T> {\n    throw new Error(\n      'HTTP client not implemented - use createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient with a real HTTP client',\n    );\n  }\n  async patch<T>(): Promise<T> {\n    throw new Error(\n      'HTTP client not implemented - use createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient with a real HTTP client',\n    );\n  }\n  async head(): Promise<{ headers: Record<string, string>; status: number }> {\n    throw new Error(\n      'HTTP client not implemented - use createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient with a real HTTP client',\n    );\n  }\n  async request<T>(): Promise<T> {\n    throw new Error(\n      'HTTP client not implemented - use createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient with a real HTTP client',\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n// Factory functions for creating Auth API clients\nexport function createBrowserAuthApiClient(\n  _config: AuthApiClientConfig,\n): AuthApiClient {\n  const httpClient = new MockHttpClient();\n  return new AuthApiClient(httpClient);\n}\n\nexport function createNodeAuthApiClient(\n  _config: AuthApiClientConfig,\n): AuthApiClient {\n  const httpClient = new MockHttpClient();\n  return new AuthApiClient(httpClient);\n}\n\nexport function createAuthApiClient(\n  _config: AuthApiClientConfig,\n): AuthApiClient {\n  const httpClient = new MockHttpClient();\n  return new AuthApiClient(httpClient);\n}\n\nexport function createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient(\n  httpClient: HttpClient,\n  _config: AuthApiClientConfig,\n): AuthApiClient {\n  return new AuthApiClient(httpClient);\n}\n", "// Member capability bitmask constants \u2014 mirrors core's `MemberCapabilities`\n// (crates/context/config/src/lib.rs). The value stored per-member is a u32\n// bitmask. Core currently assigns bits 0..=9; bits 10 and above are unassigned\n// and may be claimed by future core versions, so an application MUST NOT\n// assume any particular bit is safe for its own use unless core documents it\n// as reserved for applications.\n\n/**\n * Capability bits as defined by core's `MemberCapabilities`.\n *\n * The per-member value is a u32 bitmask. Core currently assigns bits 0..=9\n * (the entries below); bits 10 and above are unassigned \u2014 do not repurpose\n * them for application data, as a future core release may claim them.\n */\nexport const CAPABILITIES = {\n  CAN_CREATE_CONTEXT: 1 << 0,\n  CAN_INVITE_MEMBERS: 1 << 1,\n  CAN_JOIN_OPEN_SUBGROUPS: 1 << 2,\n  MANAGE_MEMBERS: 1 << 3,\n  MANAGE_APPLICATION: 1 << 4,\n  CAN_CREATE_SUBGROUP: 1 << 5,\n  CAN_DELETE_SUBGROUP: 1 << 6,\n  CAN_MANAGE_VISIBILITY: 1 << 7,\n  CAN_MANAGE_METADATA: 1 << 8,\n  /**\n   * Publish writes attributed to ANOTHER member, under a warrant that member\n   * signed \u2014 the grant delegated execution runs on.\n   *\n   * Implied by nothing: not by membership, not by admin, and not propagated by\n   * the subgroup-admit cascade. So every group is authorship-closed until an\n   * admin sets this bit, and a relay without it is refused at\n   * `performIntent` before anything executes. That is why it is worth naming\n   * here rather than leaving callers to write `1 << 9`: a client granting it\n   * has to be able to say what it is granting.\n   */\n  CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF: 1 << 9,\n} as const;\n\nexport type CapabilityName = keyof typeof CAPABILITIES;\nexport type CapabilityBit = (typeof CAPABILITIES)[CapabilityName];\n\n/**\n * Returns true if `mask` has every bit of `cap` set. Both operands are\n * coerced to unsigned 32-bit (`>>> 0`) before comparing so a high bit such\n * as `1 << 31` doesn't fall foul of `&` yielding a signed result.\n */\nexport function hasCap(mask: number, cap: number): boolean {\n  const capU32 = cap >>> 0;\n  return ((mask & capU32) >>> 0) === capU32;\n}\n\n/** Returns `mask` with every bit of `cap` set (u32-normalized). */\nexport function withCap(mask: number, cap: number): number {\n  return (mask | cap) >>> 0;\n}\n\n/** Returns `mask` with every bit of `cap` cleared (u32-normalized). */\nexport function withoutCap(mask: number, cap: number): number {\n  return (mask & ~cap) >>> 0;\n}\n", "import { HttpClient, withRetry } from '../http-client/index.js';\nimport { CAPABILITIES, hasCap, withCap } from '../capabilities.js';\nimport type {\n  HealthStatus,\n  ReadinessStatus,\n  AdminAuthStatus,\n  InstallApplicationRequest,\n  InstallApplicationResponseData,\n  InstallDevApplicationRequest,\n  UninstallApplicationResponseData,\n  ListApplicationsResponseData,\n  GetApplicationResponseData,\n  ApplicationVersionEntry,\n  GetApplicationAbiResponseData,\n  GetLatestVersionResponseData,\n  ListPackagesResponseData,\n  ListVersionsResponseData,\n  RegistryBundleManifest,\n  CreateContextRequest,\n  CreateContextResponseData,\n  DeleteContextResponseData,\n  GetContextsResponseData,\n  Context,\n  GenerateContextIdentityResponseData,\n  GetContextIdentitiesResponseData,\n  JoinContextResponseData,\n  JoinSubgroupInheritanceResponseData,\n  ContextGroupResponseData,\n  ContextStorageResponseData,\n  InviteSpecializedNodeRequest,\n  InviteSpecializedNodeResponseData,\n  UpdateContextApplicationRequest,\n  ResyncContextRequest,\n  ResyncContextResponseData,\n  ContextsWithExecutorsResponseData,\n  UploadBlobRequest,\n  UploadBlobResponseData,\n  DeleteBlobResponseData,\n  ListBlobsResponseData,\n  GetBlobInfoResponseData,\n  BlobReadOptions,\n  CreateContextAliasRequest,\n  CreateApplicationAliasRequest,\n  CreateDeviceAliasRequest,\n  CreateAliasResponseData,\n  LookupAliasResponseData,\n  DeleteAliasResponseData,\n  ListAliasesResponseData,\n  ListNamespacesResponseData,\n  CreateNamespaceRequest,\n  CreateNamespaceResponseData,\n  DeleteNamespaceResponseData,\n  CreateNamespaceInvitationRequest,\n  CreateNamespaceInvitationResponseData,\n  CreateRecursiveInvitationResponseData,\n  JoinNamespaceRequest,\n  JoinNamespaceResponseData,\n  CreateGroupInNamespaceRequest,\n  CreateGroupInNamespaceResponseData,\n  SubgroupEntry,\n  Namespace,\n  NamespaceIdentity,\n  NodeIdentity,\n  AccountPairInitRequest,\n  AccountPairInitResponseData,\n  AccountPairCompleteRequest,\n  AccountPairCompleteResponseData,\n  AccountSignWithRootRequest,\n  AccountSignWithRootResponseData,\n  RelinkDeviceRequest,\n  RelinkDeviceResponseData,\n  RescopeDeviceRequest,\n  RescopeDeviceResponseData,\n  LabelDeviceRequest,\n  LabelDeviceResponseData,\n  AccountDeviceEntry,\n  AccountApplicationEntry,\n  RevokeAccountDeviceRequest,\n  RevokeAccountDeviceResponseData,\n  GroupInfoResponseData,\n  CreateGroupRequest,\n  CreateGroupResponseData,\n  DeleteGroupResponseData,\n  ListGroupMembersResponseData,\n  ListGroupContextsResponseData,\n  AddGroupMembersRequest,\n  RemoveGroupMembersRequest,\n  UpdateMemberRoleRequest,\n  MemberCapabilities,\n  SetMemberCapabilitiesRequest,\n  SetDefaultCapabilitiesRequest,\n  SetMemberAutoFollowRequest,\n  SetSubgroupVisibilityRequest,\n  SetTeeAdmissionPolicyRequest,\n  GetTeeAdmissionPolicyResponseData,\n  SetTeeAuthoringPolicyRequest,\n  SetGroupMetadataRequest,\n  SetMemberMetadataRequest,\n  SetContextMetadataRequest,\n  MetadataRecord,\n  GetMetadataResponseData,\n  SyncGroupResponseData,\n  UpgradeGroupRequest,\n  UpgradeGroupResponseData,\n  GroupUpgradeStatusResponseData,\n  MigrationStatus,\n  CascadeStatusEntry,\n  RetryGroupUpgradeResponseData,\n  ReparentGroupRequest,\n  ReparentGroupResponseData,\n  IssueOwnershipProofRequest,\n  IssueNamespaceOwnershipProofRequest,\n  IssueOwnershipProofResponseData,\n  CreateGroupInvitationRequest,\n  CreateGroupInvitationResponseData,\n  CreateRecursiveGroupInvitationResponseData,\n  JoinGroupRequest,\n  JoinGroupResponseData,\n  TeeInfoResponseData,\n  TeeAttestRequest,\n  TeeAttestResponseData,\n  TeeVerifyQuoteRequest,\n  TeeVerifyQuoteResponseData,\n  PerformIntentRequest,\n  PerformIntentResponseData,\n  IntentRelayInfo,\n  QueryContextRequest,\n  QueryContextResponseData,\n  ListMemberDevicesOptions,\n  ListMemberDevicesResponseData,\n  SealToAccountRequest,\n  SealedEnvelope,\n  AdmitJoinRequest,\n  AdmitJoinResponseData,\n} from './admin-types.js';\n\n/**\n * Helper: server wraps most responses in `{ data: T }`.\n * This extracts `.data` so callers get the inner payload directly. Null-safe so an\n * empty 2xx body (parsed as null) yields undefined instead of throwing.\n */\nfunction unwrap<T>(response: { data: T }): T {\n  return response?.data as T;\n}\n\n/**\n * Compare two version strings by SemVer 2.0 precedence, ascending: negative if\n * `a < b`, positive if `a > b`, `0` if equal. Build metadata (`+...`) is stripped\n * and ignored. The numeric `major.minor.patch` core is compared field-by-field\n * (numerically when both parse, so `1.10.0 > 1.9.0`; a missing field is `0`). A\n * version WITH a pre-release ranks below the same core without one, and\n * pre-release identifiers compare per spec: dot-separated, numeric identifiers\n * numerically, alphanumeric lexically by ASCII, numeric below alphanumeric, and a\n * shorter set of identifiers loses when all preceding fields are equal.\n */\nexport function compareSemver(a: string, b: string): number {\n  const [coreA, preA] = splitVersion(a);\n  const [coreB, preB] = splitVersion(b);\n\n  const na = coreA.split('.');\n  const nb = coreB.split('.');\n  const n = Math.max(na.length, nb.length);\n  for (let i = 0; i < n; i++) {\n    const c = compareSemverId(na[i] ?? '0', nb[i] ?? '0');\n    if (c !== 0) return c;\n  }\n\n  // A pre-release ranks below the same core version with no pre-release.\n  if (preA === undefined && preB === undefined) return 0;\n  if (preA === undefined) return 1;\n  if (preB === undefined) return -1;\n\n  const pa = preA.split('.');\n  const pb = preB.split('.');\n  const m = Math.max(pa.length, pb.length);\n  for (let i = 0; i < m; i++) {\n    if (i >= pa.length) return -1; // shorter set loses when all preceding equal\n    if (i >= pb.length) return 1;\n    const c = compareSemverId(pa[i], pb[i]);\n    if (c !== 0) return c;\n  }\n  return 0;\n}\n\n/** Drop build metadata and split the pre-release tail: `1.2.3-rc.1+b` -> `['1.2.3', 'rc.1']`. */\nfunction splitVersion(v: string): [string, string | undefined] {\n  const core = v.split('+', 1)[0];\n  const dash = core.indexOf('-');\n  return dash === -1 ? [core, undefined] : [core.slice(0, dash), core.slice(dash + 1)];\n}\n\n/**\n * Compare one identifier: numerically when both are all-digits, else lexically by\n * ASCII with a numeric identifier ranking below an alphanumeric one. Fallback: a\n * non-numeric core component (loose/malformed input) is treated as a string, so\n * comparison never throws.\n */\nfunction compareSemverId(a: string, b: string): number {\n  const na = /^\\d+$/.test(a);\n  const nb = /^\\d+$/.test(b);\n  if (na && nb) {\n    const d = Number(a) - Number(b);\n    return d < 0 ? -1 : d > 0 ? 1 : 0;\n  }\n  if (na) return -1;\n  if (nb) return 1;\n  return a < b ? -1 : a > b ? 1 : 0;\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch a URL from the (foreign-origin) registry with a per-attempt timeout and\n * retry on transient failures. Deliberately NOT routed through the node\n * `HttpClient`: that client attaches the node's bearer token to every request,\n * which must never leak to the registry's origin. Each attempt times out after\n * ~10s; network errors and 5xx are retried (2 retries, short backoff via the\n * shared `withRetry`), while a 4xx is a definitive answer and is not retried.\n * `kind`/`context` shape the error message so failures stay debuggable in logs.\n */\nasync function fetchRegistry(url: string, kind: string, context: string): Promise<Response> {\n  return withRetry(\n    async () => {\n      const resp = await fetch(url, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000) });\n      if (!resp.ok) {\n        // Carry `status` so withRetry retries 5xx but leaves 4xx to throw.\n        const err = new Error(\n          `registry ${kind} fetch failed (${resp.status}) for ${context}`,\n        ) as Error & { status: number };\n        err.status = resp.status;\n        throw err;\n      }\n      return resp;\n    },\n    { attempts: 3 },\n  );\n}\n\nexport class AdminApiClient {\n  constructor(private httpClient: HttpClient) {}\n\n  // ---- Health and Status (public, no auth) ----\n\n  async healthCheck(): Promise<HealthStatus> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: HealthStatus }>('/admin-api/health'));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Whether the node has finished starting and its store answers. Public, like\n   * {@link healthCheck}; unlike it, a node that is up but not ready answers\n   * `503`, which this surfaces as an `HTTPError` whose body names the stage.\n   */\n  async readinessCheck(): Promise<ReadinessStatus> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ReadinessStatus }>('/admin-api/ready'));\n  }\n\n  async isAuthed(): Promise<AdminAuthStatus> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<AdminAuthStatus>('/admin-api/is-authed');\n  }\n\n  // ---- Application Management ----\n\n  /**\n   * Install a published application by its `package@version` coordinates. The\n   * node resolves and fetches them from its own configured `[registry]`, so no\n   * URL is passed and none is accepted. A 502 means the node's source has\n   * nothing published at those coordinates. This is the discrete \"download\"\n   * step an Updates flow pairs with a subsequent `upgradeGroup`.\n   */\n  async installApplication(request: InstallApplicationRequest): Promise<InstallApplicationResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.post<{ data: InstallApplicationResponseData }>('/admin-api/install-application', request));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * List a package's published versions from the registry, newest-first by\n   * semver. Reads the registry's V2 bundle listing\n   * (`GET {registry}/api/v2/bundles?package={package}`), taking each bundle's\n   * `appVersion`. Registry-side data \u2014 distinct from the node's\n   * installed-version list \u2014 and the source an Updates view compares against\n   * the running `Context.applicationVersion` to detect \"a new version exists\".\n   */\n  async getRegistryVersions(registryUrl: string, packageName: string): Promise<string[]> {\n    const url = new URL('/api/v2/bundles', new URL(registryUrl).origin);\n    url.searchParams.set('package', packageName);\n    const resp = await fetchRegistry(url.toString(), 'versions', packageName);\n    const bundles = (await resp.json()) as RegistryBundleManifest[];\n    return (Array.isArray(bundles) ? bundles : [])\n      .map((b) => b.appVersion)\n      .filter((v): v is string => typeof v === 'string')\n      .sort((a, b) => compareSemver(b, a));\n  }\n\n  async installDevApplication(request: InstallDevApplicationRequest): Promise<InstallApplicationResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.post<{ data: InstallApplicationResponseData }>('/admin-api/install-dev-application', request));\n  }\n\n  async uninstallApplication(appId: string): Promise<UninstallApplicationResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.delete<{ data: UninstallApplicationResponseData }>(`/admin-api/applications/${appId}`));\n  }\n\n  async listApplications(): Promise<ListApplicationsResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ListApplicationsResponseData }>('/admin-api/applications'));\n  }\n\n  async getApplication(appId: string): Promise<GetApplicationResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: GetApplicationResponseData }>(`/admin-api/applications/${appId}`));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Installed-blob inventory for an application \u2014 one entry per locally installed\n   * version. This is the *installed* inventory (source for a \"pick a version to\n   * pin\" UI); the registry equivalent is `listPackageVersions`.\n   */\n  async listApplicationVersions(applicationId: string): Promise<ApplicationVersionEntry[]> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ApplicationVersionEntry[] }>(`/admin-api/applications/${applicationId}/versions`),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The application's embedded `wasm-abi/1` manifest. Omit `serviceName` for\n   * single-service apps; core 400s if the ABI is absent or the name is ambiguous.\n   */\n  async getApplicationAbi(applicationId: string, serviceName?: string): Promise<GetApplicationAbiResponseData> {\n    const query = serviceName ? `?service_name=${encodeURIComponent(serviceName)}` : '';\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.get<{ data: GetApplicationAbiResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/applications/${applicationId}/abi${query}`,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  // ---- Package Management ----\n\n  async listPackages(): Promise<ListPackagesResponseData> {\n    // Core returns this flat ({ packages: [...] }), not under `data`; tolerate both.\n    const r = await this.httpClient.get<ListPackagesResponseData & { data?: ListPackagesResponseData }>(\n      '/admin-api/packages',\n    );\n    return (r?.data ?? r) as ListPackagesResponseData;\n  }\n\n  async listPackageVersions(packageName: string): Promise<ListVersionsResponseData> {\n    // Core returns this flat ({ versions: [...] }), not under `data`; tolerate both.\n    const r = await this.httpClient.get<ListVersionsResponseData & { data?: ListVersionsResponseData }>(\n      `/admin-api/packages/${encodeURIComponent(packageName)}/versions`,\n    );\n    return (r?.data ?? r) as ListVersionsResponseData;\n  }\n\n  async getLatestPackageVersion(packageName: string): Promise<GetLatestVersionResponseData> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<GetLatestVersionResponseData>(\n      `/admin-api/packages/${encodeURIComponent(packageName)}/latest`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // ---- Context Management ----\n\n  async createContext(request: CreateContextRequest): Promise<CreateContextResponseData> {\n    // Core requires `initializationParams` (no default); default it to an empty\n    // byte array so callers that pass none don't get a 400.\n    const body = { ...request, initializationParams: request.initializationParams ?? [] };\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateContextResponseData }>('/admin-api/contexts', body));\n  }\n\n  async deleteContext(contextId: string): Promise<DeleteContextResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.delete<{ data: DeleteContextResponseData }>(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}`));\n  }\n\n  async getContexts(): Promise<GetContextsResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: GetContextsResponseData }>('/admin-api/contexts'));\n  }\n\n  async getContext(contextId: string): Promise<Context> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: Context }>(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}`));\n  }\n\n  async getContextsForApplication(applicationId: string): Promise<GetContextsResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: GetContextsResponseData }>(`/admin-api/contexts/for-application/${applicationId}`));\n  }\n\n  // ---- Context Identity ----\n\n  async generateContextIdentity(): Promise<GenerateContextIdentityResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.post<{ data: GenerateContextIdentityResponseData }>('/admin-api/identity/context', {}));\n  }\n\n  async getContextIdentities(contextId: string): Promise<GetContextIdentitiesResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: GetContextIdentitiesResponseData }>(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/identities`));\n  }\n\n  async getContextIdentitiesOwned(contextId: string): Promise<GetContextIdentitiesResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: GetContextIdentitiesResponseData }>(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/identities-owned`));\n  }\n\n  // ---- Context join (group membership) ----\n\n  async joinContext(contextId: string): Promise<JoinContextResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: JoinContextResponseData }>(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/join`, {}),\n    );\n  }\n\n  // ---- Context group / storage / sync ----\n\n  async getContextGroup(contextId: string): Promise<ContextGroupResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ContextGroupResponseData }>(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/group`));\n  }\n\n  async getContextStorage(contextId: string): Promise<ContextStorageResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ContextStorageResponseData }>(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/storage`));\n  }\n\n  /** Sync one context, or every context when `contextId` is omitted. */\n  async syncContext(contextId?: string): Promise<void> {\n    // Sync-all is `/contexts/sync` with no trailing slash - core routes the two\n    // spellings separately and 404s the trailing one.\n    const path = contextId ? `/admin-api/contexts/sync/${contextId}` : '/admin-api/contexts/sync';\n    await this.httpClient.post(path, {});\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Kick off a full state re-pull for a context (operator recovery for a\n   * stranded context). `force` re-pulls even when the node does not flag the\n   * context as stranded.\n   */\n  async resyncContext(\n    contextId: string,\n    request: ResyncContextRequest = {},\n  ): Promise<ResyncContextResponseData> {\n    // Core's `ResyncContextApiResponse` is a flat payload (no inner `data`\n    // field), so parse the body directly \u2014 do NOT `unwrap`, or `resyncStarted`\n    // reads as undefined and the resync silently appears to never start.\n    const r = await this.httpClient.post<ResyncContextResponseData | null>(\n      `/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/resync`,\n      request,\n    );\n    // An empty 2xx body means the resync was accepted; synthesize the result so\n    // callers always get a typed value instead of null.\n    return r ?? { contextId, resyncStarted: true };\n  }\n\n  async inviteSpecializedNode(request: InviteSpecializedNodeRequest): Promise<InviteSpecializedNodeResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: InviteSpecializedNodeResponseData }>(\n        '/admin-api/contexts/invite-specialized-node',\n        request,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async updateContextApplication(\n    contextId: string,\n    request: UpdateContextApplicationRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.post(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/application`, request);\n  }\n\n  async getContextsWithExecutorsForApplication(applicationId: string): Promise<ContextsWithExecutorsResponseData> {\n    // Core returns this flat as { contexts: [...] } (not a bare array under `data`).\n    const r = await this.httpClient.get<\n      | ContextsWithExecutorsResponseData\n      | { contexts: ContextsWithExecutorsResponseData }\n      | { data: ContextsWithExecutorsResponseData }\n    >(`/admin-api/contexts/with-executors/for-application/${applicationId}`);\n    if (Array.isArray(r)) return r;\n    return (\n      (r as { contexts?: ContextsWithExecutorsResponseData } | null)?.contexts ??\n      (r as { data?: ContextsWithExecutorsResponseData } | null)?.data ??\n      []\n    );\n  }\n\n  // ---- Blob Management ----\n\n  async uploadBlob(request: UploadBlobRequest): Promise<UploadBlobResponseData> {\n    // Core streams the raw request body into blob storage (no JSON) and takes\n    // its params from the query string (`hash`, `context_id` \u2014 snake_case).\n    const params = new URLSearchParams();\n    if (request.hash) params.set('hash', request.hash);\n    if (request.contextId) params.set('context_id', request.contextId);\n    const query = params.toString();\n    const path = query ? `/admin-api/blobs?${query}` : '/admin-api/blobs';\n    // request.data (Uint8Array view | ArrayBuffer | Blob) is a valid BodyInit and\n    // is streamed verbatim \u2014 no JSON, no cast. fetch honors a Uint8Array view's\n    // byteOffset/byteLength, so subarrays upload the correct region.\n    // Core's BlobInfo is snake_case (`blob_id`); map to camelCase like deleteBlob.\n    const res = unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.request<{ data: { blob_id: string; size: number } }>(path, {\n        method: 'PUT',\n        body: request.data,\n        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/octet-stream' },\n      }),\n    );\n    return { blobId: res.blob_id, size: res.size };\n  }\n\n  async deleteBlob(blobId: string): Promise<DeleteBlobResponseData> {\n    // Core's `BlobDeleteResponse` is a flat, snake_case payload (`{ blob_id,\n    // deleted }`) \u2014 the lone admin DTO without a camelCase rename and without an\n    // inner `data` field. Parse directly (no `unwrap`) and map to camelCase.\n    const body = await this.httpClient.delete<{ blob_id: string; deleted: boolean }>(\n      `/admin-api/blobs/${blobId}`,\n    );\n    return { blobId: body.blob_id, deleted: body.deleted };\n  }\n\n  async listBlobs(): Promise<ListBlobsResponseData> {\n    // Core's BlobInfo is snake_case (`blob_id`); map to camelCase.\n    const res = unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.get<{ data: { blobs: Array<{ blob_id: string; size: number }> } }>(\n        '/admin-api/blobs',\n      ),\n    );\n    return { blobs: res.blobs.map((b) => ({ blobId: b.blob_id, size: b.size })) };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Blob-read query params. `context_id` is the same snake_case param\n   * {@link uploadBlob} announces with; building it in one place keeps the read\n   * side from drifting from the write side.\n   */\n  private blobPath(blobId: string, options?: BlobReadOptions): string {\n    if (!options?.contextId) return `/admin-api/blobs/${blobId}`;\n    const params = new URLSearchParams({ context_id: options.contextId });\n    return `/admin-api/blobs/${blobId}?${params.toString()}`;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Download a blob's raw bytes. `GET /admin-api/blobs/:id` streams the blob\n   * content (e.g. `application/gzip`), NOT JSON \u2014 so fetch it as an ArrayBuffer.\n   * Use {@link listBlobs} for `{ blobId, size }` metadata.\n   *\n   * Without `contextId` the read is local-only: the node answers from its own\n   * blob store and returns immediately, or 404s. Passing `contextId` opts into\n   * network discovery \u2014 the node probes that context's peers (availability\n   * nodes first) for a holder, then transfers the bytes. Budget for it: core\n   * bounds discovery by a ~30s deadline, and the transfer is on top of that, so\n   * the worst case is well past what a UI should block on unhinted.\n   */\n  async getBlob(blobId: string, options?: BlobReadOptions): Promise<ArrayBuffer> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<ArrayBuffer>(this.blobPath(blobId, options), {\n      parse: 'arrayBuffer',\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Fetch a blob's metadata without downloading it. `HEAD /admin-api/blobs/:id`\n   * returns the info in response headers (size via `content-length`, plus\n   * `x-blob-id`/`x-blob-hash`/`x-blob-mime-type`).\n   *\n   * Without `contextId` this is a local-only presence check that returns\n   * immediately. Passing `contextId` opts into the same network discovery\n   * {@link getBlob} uses \u2014 presence and size answered by probing the context's\n   * peers, with no transfer \u2014 so it inherits core's ~30s discovery deadline as\n   * its worst case. A probe only carries `found` and `size`, so a peer-sourced\n   * answer has no `hash`/`mimeType`; read `source` to tell the two apart.\n   */\n  async getBlobInfo(\n    blobId: string,\n    options?: BlobReadOptions,\n  ): Promise<GetBlobInfoResponseData> {\n    // HEAD throws (HttpError) on a non-2xx status, so we only reach here on success\n    // \u2014 the x-blob-* headers are present. Guard size against a missing/non-numeric\n    // content-length anyway (defaults to 0 rather than NaN).\n    const { headers } = await this.httpClient.head(this.blobPath(blobId, options));\n    const size = Number(headers['content-length']);\n    return {\n      blobId: headers['x-blob-id'] ?? blobId,\n      size: Number.isFinite(size) ? size : 0,\n      hash: headers['x-blob-hash'],\n      mimeType: headers['x-blob-mime-type'],\n      // Nodes that predate the context-aware HEAD omit this header entirely, so\n      // it stays undefined rather than being defaulted to 'local' \u2014 absent means\n      // \"the node didn't say\", which is not the same claim as \"served locally\".\n      source: headers['x-blob-source'] as GetBlobInfoResponseData['source'],\n    };\n  }\n\n  // ---- Alias Management ----\n\n  async createContextAlias(\n    request: CreateContextAliasRequest,\n  ): Promise<CreateAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateAliasResponseData }>(\n        '/admin-api/alias/create/context',\n        { alias: request.alias, contextId: request.contextId },\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async createApplicationAlias(\n    request: CreateApplicationAliasRequest,\n  ): Promise<CreateAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateAliasResponseData }>(\n        '/admin-api/alias/create/application',\n        { alias: request.alias, applicationId: request.applicationId },\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async lookupContextAlias(name: string): Promise<LookupAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: LookupAliasResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/alias/lookup/context/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`,\n        {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async lookupApplicationAlias(name: string): Promise<LookupAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: LookupAliasResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/alias/lookup/application/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`,\n        {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async deleteContextAlias(name: string): Promise<DeleteAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: DeleteAliasResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/alias/delete/context/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`,\n        {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async deleteApplicationAlias(name: string): Promise<DeleteAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: DeleteAliasResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/alias/delete/application/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`,\n        {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async listContextAliases(): Promise<ListAliasesResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ListAliasesResponseData }>('/admin-api/alias/list/context'));\n  }\n\n  async listApplicationAliases(): Promise<ListAliasesResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ListAliasesResponseData }>('/admin-api/alias/list/application'));\n  }\n\n  async createDeviceAlias(request: CreateDeviceAliasRequest): Promise<CreateAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateAliasResponseData }>(\n        '/admin-api/alias/create/device',\n        { alias: request.alias, deviceId: request.deviceId },\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async lookupDeviceAlias(name: string): Promise<LookupAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: LookupAliasResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/alias/lookup/device/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`,\n        {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async deleteDeviceAlias(name: string): Promise<DeleteAliasResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: DeleteAliasResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/alias/delete/device/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`,\n        {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async listDeviceAliases(): Promise<ListAliasesResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ListAliasesResponseData }>('/admin-api/alias/list/device'));\n  }\n\n  // ---- Namespace Management ----\n\n  async listNamespaces(): Promise<ListNamespacesResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ListNamespacesResponseData }>('/admin-api/namespaces'));\n  }\n\n  async getNamespace(namespaceId: string): Promise<Namespace> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: Namespace }>(`/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}`));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Who this node is \u2014 the account it writes as, the device it is, the key it\n   * signs with, and the account root a second device pairs against.\n   *\n   * Takes no namespace, and that is the point: one root key is one account\n   * everywhere, and a node signs with one key, so none of it varies by\n   * namespace.\n   */\n  async getNodeIdentity(): Promise<NodeIdentity> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: NodeIdentity }>('/admin-api/identity'));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @deprecated Use {@link getNodeIdentity} instead. Every field this returns is\n   * node-level, so the namespace was only ever decoration \u2014 it now delegates to\n   * the node-level route and reshapes the answer.\n   *\n   * Three consequences of that delegation, all visible to a caller who relied on\n   * the old route's behaviour:\n   *\n   * - **No participation gate.** The namespace route answered 404 when this node\n   *   had never joined the namespace; this answers whatever the node's identity\n   *   is, regardless. If you were using it to ask \"am I in this namespace?\", ask\n   *   {@link listNamespaces} instead \u2014 that is the question you were really\n   *   asking.\n   * - **`namespaceId` is echoed verbatim.** The old route resolved a subgroup id\n   *   to its root namespace and returned that; passing a subgroup id here gives\n   *   the subgroup id back.\n   * - **404 means something else.** Previously \"not my namespace\", now \"this node\n   *   holds no account root yet\".\n   */\n  async getNamespaceIdentity(namespaceId: string): Promise<NamespaceIdentity> {\n    const node = await this.getNodeIdentity();\n    return { namespaceId, publicKey: node.publicKey, account: node.accountId };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Ask this node to run one method on a member's behalf, under a warrant that\n   * member signed.\n   *\n   * The node executes and signs the envelope with its own key; the change is\n   * attributed to the **author**. Both halves travel together, so every peer\n   * re-checks that the member consented instead of trusting the relay.\n   *\n   * Three things have to be true first, and none is implied by the others:\n   *\n   * - the author's **account** is a member of the group owning the context \u2014\n   *   their device joins nothing and is in no group's binding rows, which is\n   *   exactly the case a device certificate covers;\n   * - this node holds `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` on that group, which is implied by\n   *   neither membership nor admin;\n   * - the warrant has not been spent. It is single-use: presenting a valid one\n   *   twice is refused, because the signature stays valid forever and replay is\n   *   not forgery.\n   *\n   * A refusal comes back as a `403` carrying the reason \u2014 \"an admin must grant\n   * CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF to \u2026\", or that the nonce is already spent \u2014 so a caller\n   * can tell which precondition failed rather than only that one did.\n   *\n   * Mint the warrant with {@link signWarrant}; see\n   * {@link PerformIntentRequest.warrant}.\n   */\n  async performIntent(\n    contextId: string,\n    request: PerformIntentRequest,\n  ): Promise<PerformIntentResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: PerformIntentResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/intents`,\n        request,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Read a context as the session's ACCOUNT, without minting a warrant.\n   *\n   * Needs an account-authenticated session \u2014 one from {@link login}, not the\n   * admin password login \u2014 and refuses otherwise with a `401`. The account must\n   * be a member of the group owning the context (`403` if not), and the method\n   * must be declared read-only in the app's ABI (`409` if not; a write needs\n   * {@link performIntent}).\n   */\n  async queryContext(\n    contextId: string,\n    request: QueryContextRequest,\n  ): Promise<QueryContextResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: QueryContextResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/query`,\n        request,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Ask what this node can do for a member in `contextId`, before they sign\n   * anything.\n   *\n   * The two facts {@link performIntent} needs and a client cannot derive: whose\n   * account goes in the warrant's `executor`, and whether this node holds\n   * `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` on the owning group. `canAuthorOnBehalf: false` comes\n   * back as an answer rather than an error \u2014 it is the default state of every\n   * context \u2014 so a caller can say \"an admin of `groupId` must grant it to\n   * `executorAccount`\" instead of presenting a warrant that will be refused\n   * after the author has spent a nonce on it.\n   *\n   * `404` means the context belongs to no group, or this node holds no account\n   * yet; either way it can be named as no warrant's executor.\n   *\n   * For a caller with no credential on the node at all \u2014 a browser tab holding\n   * one signing key \u2014 use `RelayClient`, which reads this same route on a node\n   * run as a relay.\n   */\n  async getIntentRelay(contextId: string): Promise<IntentRelayInfo> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.get<{ data: IntentRelayInfo }>(\n        `/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/intents`,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async listNamespacesForApplication(applicationId: string): Promise<ListNamespacesResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ListNamespacesResponseData }>(`/admin-api/namespaces/for-application/${applicationId}`));\n  }\n\n  async createNamespace(request: CreateNamespaceRequest): Promise<CreateNamespaceResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateNamespaceResponseData }>('/admin-api/namespaces', request),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async deleteNamespace(namespaceId: string): Promise<DeleteNamespaceResponseData> {\n    // Core requires `Content-Type: application/json` on this DELETE even though\n    // the body is always empty, so send the header and an empty JSON object.\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.request<{ data: DeleteNamespaceResponseData }>(`/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}`, {\n        method: 'DELETE',\n        body: '{}',\n        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n      }),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async createNamespaceInvitation(\n    namespaceId: string,\n    request?: CreateNamespaceInvitationRequest,\n  ): Promise<CreateNamespaceInvitationResponseData | CreateRecursiveInvitationResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateNamespaceInvitationResponseData | CreateRecursiveInvitationResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}/invite`,\n        request ?? {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Present a join this caller signed to a node the inviter named as an\n   * admitter.\n   *\n   * For a member with no node. `joinNamespace` publishes the membership op from\n   * the node making the call; this hands an already-signed op to somebody else's\n   * node to publish. The distinction matters because a keyholder has nowhere to\n   * publish from.\n   *\n   * The op must be signed by the **device key** in the credential it carries \u2014\n   * every peer checks that when applying a join. So the admitter cannot author\n   * this, only carry it: a hostile one can refuse, and nothing else. It cannot\n   * admit a different account, change the group, or grant a role.\n   *\n   * @param namespaceId the namespace being joined, 64 hex\n   * @param request the invitation and the hex-encoded signed op\n   */\n  async admitJoin(\n    namespaceId: string,\n    request: AdmitJoinRequest,\n  ): Promise<AdmitJoinResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: AdmitJoinResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}/admit`,\n        request,\n        { timeoutMs: 65000 },\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async joinNamespace(\n    namespaceId: string,\n    request: JoinNamespaceRequest,\n  ): Promise<JoinNamespaceResponseData> {\n    const data = unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: JoinNamespaceResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}/join`,\n        request,\n        { timeoutMs: 65000 },\n      ),\n    );\n\n    // core 0.11.0-rc.25 renamed this response's `groupId` to `namespaceId`\n    // (core#3598). Bind whichever spelling the node actually sent rather than\n    // picking one: the rename lands as `undefined` on the field the client\n    // reads, and nothing errors \u2014 no 4xx, no thrown parse \u2014 so a client that\n    // knows only one spelling fails much later and somewhere else. Normalising\n    // here means one mero-js works against nodes either side of that release.\n    if (data && data.namespaceId === undefined && data.groupId !== undefined) {\n      return { ...data, namespaceId: data.groupId };\n    }\n    return data;\n  }\n\n  async createGroupInNamespace(\n    namespaceId: string,\n    request?: CreateGroupInNamespaceRequest,\n  ): Promise<CreateGroupInNamespaceResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateGroupInNamespaceResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}/groups`,\n        request ?? {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async listNamespaceGroups(namespaceId: string): Promise<SubgroupEntry[]> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: SubgroupEntry[] }>(`/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}/groups`));\n  }\n\n  // ---- Account Devices & Pairing ----\n\n  /**\n   * Mint this node a device for an account that already lives somewhere else -\n   * the first half of pairing, run on the joining node.\n   *\n   * Publishes nothing and needs no key: it produces the device id, the two\n   * public keys and the signature that the account holder's\n   * {@link completeAccountPairing} certifies, plus a code to read out to them\n   * over a channel the payload does not travel on. Until that second half runs,\n   * the device this mints is inert.\n   *\n   * Takes a set of namespaces rather than one, and takes it from the caller\n   * because this node cannot discover it: a node that is a member of nothing can\n   * neither read the account's namespace set off a DAG nor derive it. One device\n   * covers however many are named - the certificate is over the account, not a\n   * scope - so there is one id and one code to hand over regardless.\n   */\n  async initAccountPairing(request: AccountPairInitRequest): Promise<AccountPairInitResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: AccountPairInitResponseData }>('/admin-api/account/pair-init', request),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Certify a device another node minted, link it, and deliver its scope keys -\n   * the second half of pairing, run on the node that holds the account root.\n   *\n   * Every field but `applications` is copied verbatim out of that node's\n   * {@link initAccountPairing} answer. Only this side can complete it: the\n   * certificate is signed by the account root, which never leaves the node that\n   * holds it.\n   *\n   * The scope is named in applications, not namespaces, because that is the\n   * question a person can answer - a namespace is an implementation unit they\n   * never chose. Leave it out to grant every application.\n   */\n  async completeAccountPairing(\n    request: AccountPairCompleteRequest,\n  ): Promise<AccountPairCompleteResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: AccountPairCompleteResponseData }>('/admin-api/account/pair-complete', request),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Re-run the pairing fan-out for a device this account already certified,\n   * against the namespaces this node takes part in now.\n   *\n   * Pairing is a snapshot, and this is how it is repeated. A namespace created\n   * or joined afterwards holds no binding for a device paired before it, and the\n   * symptom is silence - the device simply never sees that namespace. Nothing\n   * but the id is needed to repair it: the certificate is already held here,\n   * root-signed and naming no namespace, so a fresh endorsement and a key wrap\n   * are all a later namespace is missing. The device does not have to be online.\n   *\n   * Passing `applications` widens the device's stored scope as well as\n   * repairing. Passing none - or an empty list - repairs against the scope\n   * already stored, which is deliberately NOT the \"every application\" that an\n   * empty list means on {@link completeAccountPairing}: overloading it here\n   * would make the accidental request the widest one.\n   */\n  async relinkAccountDevice(\n    deviceId: string,\n    request?: RelinkDeviceRequest,\n  ): Promise<RelinkDeviceResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: RelinkDeviceResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/account/devices/${deviceId}/relink`,\n        request ?? {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Replace a device's scope outright, in one root-signed op.\n   *\n   * {@link relinkAccountDevice} only ever adds applications; this is how a\n   * scope is narrowed - or an `all` device is given a fixed list instead. The\n   * device need not be online.\n   */\n  async rescopeAccountDevice(\n    deviceId: string,\n    request: RescopeDeviceRequest,\n  ): Promise<RescopeDeviceResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.put<{ data: RescopeDeviceResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/account/devices/${encodeURIComponent(deviceId)}/scope`,\n        request,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Sign a payload an outside verifier specified, with this account's root.\n   *\n   * The counterpart to a verifier that issued a challenge and will check the\n   * signature against the account id it derives \u2014 the cloud's account link and\n   * login exchanges being the ones this exists for. The root never leaves the\n   * node, so this is the only way a client can produce that signature.\n   *\n   * `domain` is a NAME from a closed set the node knows, never the domain bytes.\n   * That is the security property rather than an encoding preference: signing\n   * caller-supplied bytes under a caller-supplied prefix would be an oracle over\n   * the one key that can certify a device. A node refuses a name it does not\n   * know, and refuses one whose bytes could be extended into a credential of its\n   * own.\n   *\n   * What comes back proves possession of the root and nothing else. Whether the\n   * payload is a challenge anyone issued, whether it is fresh, and whether the\n   * holder may link this account are the verifier's to decide \u2014 it issued the\n   * challenge and knows who to.\n   *\n   * ```ts\n   * const { nonce } = await cloud.getAccountLoginChallenge();\n   * const { rootPublicKey, signature } = await admin.signWithAccountRoot({\n   *   domain: 'mdma.account-login',\n   *   payload: hexEncodeUtf8(nonce),\n   * });\n   * await cloud.submitAccountLogin({ rootPublicKey, nonce, signature });\n   * ```\n   */\n  async signWithAccountRoot(\n    request: AccountSignWithRootRequest,\n  ): Promise<AccountSignWithRootResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: AccountSignWithRootResponseData }>(\n        '/admin-api/account/sign-with-root',\n        request,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Name a device of this account, for a listing to render.\n   *\n   * Run on the node holding the account root to name any device; a paired\n   * node is accepted only for that device's own id.\n   */\n  async labelAccountDevice(\n    deviceId: string,\n    request: LabelDeviceRequest,\n  ): Promise<LabelDeviceResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.put<{ data: LabelDeviceResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/account/devices/${encodeURIComponent(deviceId)}/label`,\n        request,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Every device of this account, as this node sees them - its own included.\n   *\n   * Joined from the node-local certificate cache and the live bindings of every\n   * namespace this node takes part in, so it is this node's view rather than a\n   * global one: a device certified by another holder appears with an empty\n   * `applications`, because the certificate that would name its scope is not\n   * cached here.\n   *\n   * The wire wraps this in `devices` rather than the usual `data`; the array is\n   * what a caller wants, so that wrapper is not passed on.\n   */\n  async listAccountDevices(): Promise<AccountDeviceEntry[]> {\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<{ devices: AccountDeviceEntry[] }>('/admin-api/account/devices');\n    return response.devices;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Every application this account speaks in, with the namespaces targeting each.\n   *\n   * What a device-scoping UI lists: {@link completeAccountPairing} and\n   * {@link relinkAccountDevice} both take applications, and this is where the\n   * ids they take come from. Derived from the namespaces this node takes part\n   * in, so an application installed with no namespace yet is absent - it has\n   * nothing to scope a device to until one exists.\n   *\n   * Wrapped in `applications` on the wire rather than `data`, unwrapped here for\n   * the same reason {@link listAccountDevices} unwraps `devices`.\n   */\n  async listAccountApplications(): Promise<AccountApplicationEntry[]> {\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<{ applications: AccountApplicationEntry[] }>(\n      '/admin-api/account/applications',\n    );\n    return response.applications;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Withdraw a device from this account, terminally.\n   *\n   * Two authorities reach the same endpoint. An admin may revoke any device and\n   * rotates the scope key as it goes. The account holder may revoke its own with\n   * a root-signed `proof`, which does not rotate - so read\n   * {@link RevokeAccountDeviceResponseData.revokedIn} rather than assuming the\n   * device lost its access: a namespace reporting `keyRotated: false` has\n   * stopped the device writing but leaves it able to read until an admin\n   * rotates.\n   *\n   * `namespaceId` names where to publish from, not the extent of the revocation:\n   * a device belongs to the account, so every namespace holding a binding for it\n   * is withdrawn from and reported back.\n   */\n  async revokeAccountDevice(\n    namespaceId: string,\n    request: RevokeAccountDeviceRequest,\n  ): Promise<RevokeAccountDeviceResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: RevokeAccountDeviceResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}/account/revoke`,\n        request,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  // ---- Group Management ----\n\n  async getGroupInfo(groupId: string): Promise<GroupInfoResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: GroupInfoResponseData }>(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}`));\n  }\n\n  /** Thin wrapper over {@link getGroupInfo}: returns the group's `defaultCapabilities` bitmask. */\n  async getDefaultCapabilities(groupId: string): Promise<number> {\n    return (await this.getGroupInfo(groupId)).defaultCapabilities;\n  }\n\n  /** Thin wrapper over {@link getGroupInfo}: returns the group's `subgroupVisibility`. */\n  async getSubgroupVisibility(groupId: string): Promise<string> {\n    return (await this.getGroupInfo(groupId)).subgroupVisibility;\n  }\n\n  async deleteGroup(groupId: string): Promise<DeleteGroupResponseData> {\n    // Core requires `Content-Type: application/json` on this DELETE even though\n    // the body is always empty, so send the header and an empty JSON object.\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.request<{ data: DeleteGroupResponseData }>(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}`, {\n        method: 'DELETE',\n        body: '{}',\n        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n      }),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async listGroupMembers(groupId: string): Promise<ListGroupMembersResponseData> {\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<ListGroupMembersResponseData>(\n      `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members`,\n    );\n    // Validate the field we declare as non-optional in the type so a\n    // contract-violating response (proxy error body, future API drift,\n    // etc.) surfaces as a clear error rather than silently producing an\n    // empty list. Empty groups still satisfy this \u2014 merod returns\n    // `members: []`, not an omitted field.\n    if (!Array.isArray(response?.members)) {\n      // Sanitize before interpolation: groupId reaches us from caller code,\n      // not parsed input, but defending the message keeps untrusted bytes\n      // out of error logs and downstream UIs.\n      const safeId = String(groupId).replace(/[\\r\\n\\t\\s]/g, '').slice(0, 64);\n      throw new Error(\n        `Invalid listGroupMembers response for group ${safeId}: missing or non-array \\`members\\` field`,\n      );\n    }\n    return response;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Member accounts in the group and the devices bound to each. An admin node\n   * sees every account; a plain member only its own. `403` if this node is not a\n   * member of the group.\n   */\n  async listMemberDevices(\n    groupId: string,\n    options: ListMemberDevicesOptions = {},\n  ): Promise<ListMemberDevicesResponseData> {\n    const params = new URLSearchParams();\n    if (options.offset !== undefined) params.set('offset', String(options.offset));\n    if (options.limit !== undefined) params.set('limit', String(options.limit));\n    const query = params.toString();\n    const path = `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/member-devices${query ? `?${query}` : ''}`;\n    return this.httpClient.get<ListMemberDevicesResponseData>(path);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Seal a small payload to a member account's root key. This node must be a\n   * member of the group, and `account` must be an account the group knows, so\n   * the route reaches no further than the caller already does.\n   */\n  async sealToAccount(\n    groupId: string,\n    account: string,\n    request: SealToAccountRequest,\n  ): Promise<SealedEnvelope> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: SealedEnvelope }>(\n        `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/accounts/${account}/seal`,\n        request,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async listGroupContexts(groupId: string): Promise<ListGroupContextsResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: ListGroupContextsResponseData }>(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/contexts`));\n  }\n\n  async addGroupMembers(groupId: string, request: AddGroupMembersRequest): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.post(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members`, request);\n  }\n\n  async removeGroupMembers(groupId: string, request: RemoveGroupMembersRequest): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.post(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members/remove`, request);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * `identity` is the member's ACCOUNT (64 hex), as returned by\n   * {@link listGroupMembers} \u2014 not the signing key that added them. Both are\n   * 64 hex, so nothing but the source tells them apart.\n   */\n  async updateMemberRole(\n    groupId: string,\n    identity: string,\n    request: UpdateMemberRoleRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members/${identity}/role`, request);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * `identity` is the member's ACCOUNT (64 hex), as returned by\n   * {@link listGroupMembers} \u2014 not the signing key that added them. Both are\n   * 64 hex, so nothing but the source tells them apart.\n   */\n  async getMemberCapabilities(groupId: string, identity: string): Promise<MemberCapabilities> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.get<{ data: MemberCapabilities }>(\n        `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members/${identity}/capabilities`,\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * `identity` is the member's ACCOUNT (64 hex), as returned by\n   * {@link listGroupMembers} \u2014 not the signing key that added them. Both are\n   * 64 hex, so nothing but the source tells them apart.\n   */\n  async setMemberCapabilities(\n    groupId: string,\n    identity: string,\n    request: SetMemberCapabilitiesRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members/${identity}/capabilities`, request);\n  }\n\n  async setDefaultCapabilities(\n    groupId: string,\n    request: SetDefaultCapabilitiesRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/settings/default-capabilities`, request);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Make every member admitted to `groupId` from now on able to relay a\n   * delegated write, without a per-node governance op each time.\n   *\n   * `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` is implied by nothing \u2014 not membership, not admin \u2014\n   * so every group is authorship-closed and each fleet relay otherwise needs an\n   * admin to grant it individually, at the moment the relay is assigned and the\n   * admin is not watching. Setting it in the group's DEFAULT mask is core's own\n   * answer to that: `add_member` seeds a non-admin's capability row from the\n   * default, so an attested node admitted afterwards lands open.\n   *\n   * Call it on the NAMESPACE (the root group). A grant resolves through the\n   * membership anchor, so one at the root reaches every Open subgroup beneath\n   * it, which is where contexts actually live; a `Restricted` subgroup is a\n   * membership boundary and needs its own call.\n   *\n   * ### Two things this does not do\n   *\n   * **It is not retroactive.** The default is copied into a member's row when\n   * that member is admitted, so nodes already admitted keep the row they got.\n   * Use {@link grantAuthorship} for those \u2014 or call this at namespace creation,\n   * which is the only point that needs no backfill at all.\n   *\n   * **It does not reach admins.** Core seeds the default only for non-admin\n   * roles, and `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` is deliberately not implied by admin. An\n   * admin's own node therefore stays closed and needs {@link grantAuthorship}.\n   *\n   * ### What it widens\n   *\n   * Every future non-admin member of the group, not only attested TEE nodes, so\n   * any of them may be named as a warrant's `executor`. The bound worth knowing\n   * before deciding: an executor cannot FORGE. A delegated write is authorized\n   * by the author's own warrant \u2014 signed by their device key, committed to one\n   * context, method and exact arguments, with its nonce checked unspent \u2014 so a\n   * holder can only spend a warrant it was deliberately handed. What it does\n   * gain is the arguments in cleartext and the choice of when, or whether, to\n   * publish.\n   *\n   * Read-modify-write rather than a blind set: core seeds a new group's default\n   * with `CAN_JOIN_OPEN_SUBGROUPS`, and overwriting that would quietly stop\n   * every later member inheriting into Open subgroups.\n   *\n   * Returns the resulting mask and whether an op was published \u2014 it is a no-op\n   * when the bit is already set, so it is safe to call on every startup.\n   */\n  async openToDelegatedExecution(\n    groupId: string,\n  ): Promise<{ changed: boolean; defaultCapabilities: number }> {\n    const current = await this.getDefaultCapabilities(groupId);\n    if (hasCap(current, CAPABILITIES.CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF)) {\n      return { changed: false, defaultCapabilities: current };\n    }\n    const next = withCap(current, CAPABILITIES.CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF);\n    await this.setDefaultCapabilities(groupId, { defaultCapabilities: next });\n    return { changed: true, defaultCapabilities: next };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Grant `account` the authorship bit on `groupId`, leaving its other\n   * capabilities alone.\n   *\n   * The per-member counterpart to {@link openToDelegatedExecution}, and what\n   * closes the gap that method cannot: a relay admitted BEFORE the default was\n   * set, and an admin's own node, which never receives the default at all.\n   *\n   * `account` is the member's ACCOUNT id (64 hex) as `listGroupMembers` returns\n   * it \u2014 for a fleet relay, the `account` the cloud reports for that node. Not\n   * the signing key that added them; both are 64 hex, so nothing but the source\n   * tells them apart.\n   *\n   * Read-modify-write, so it adds the bit rather than replacing the member's\n   * mask. A no-op when the member already holds it.\n   */\n  async grantAuthorship(\n    groupId: string,\n    account: string,\n  ): Promise<{ changed: boolean; capabilities: number }> {\n    const { capabilities } = await this.getMemberCapabilities(groupId, account);\n    if (hasCap(capabilities, CAPABILITIES.CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF)) {\n      return { changed: false, capabilities };\n    }\n    const next = withCap(capabilities, CAPABILITIES.CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF);\n    await this.setMemberCapabilities(groupId, account, { capabilities: next });\n    return { changed: true, capabilities: next };\n  }\n\n  async setSubgroupVisibility(\n    groupId: string,\n    request: SetSubgroupVisibilityRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/settings/subgroup-visibility`, request);\n  }\n\n  async setTeeAdmissionPolicy(\n    groupId: string,\n    request: SetTeeAdmissionPolicyRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/settings/tee-admission-policy`, request);\n  }\n\n  async getTeeAdmissionPolicy(groupId: string): Promise<GetTeeAdmissionPolicyResponseData> {\n    // Intersection (not union) so the type is unambiguous: `data` is optional, so\n    // `?? response` cleanly falls back to a flat (un-enveloped) response.\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<\n      GetTeeAdmissionPolicyResponseData & { data?: GetTeeAdmissionPolicyResponseData }\n    >(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/settings/tee-admission-policy`);\n    return response.data ?? response;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Sets which admitted TEEs may author as the TEE authority. Pass\n   * `{ allowedMrtd: [] }` to turn TEE authorship off. `groupId` must be a\n   * namespace root; the node refuses a subgroup. The node exposes no read-back\n   * route for this policy.\n   */\n  async setTeeAuthoringPolicy(\n    groupId: string,\n    request: SetTeeAuthoringPolicyRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/settings/tee-authoring-policy`, request);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Turns TEE authorship off in the namespace: every TEE loses its authority,\n   * and admitted TEEs stay members. The node applies the same op as\n   * `setTeeAuthoringPolicy(groupId, { allowedMrtd: [] })`. `groupId` must be a\n   * namespace root.\n   */\n  async disableTeeAuthoringPolicy(groupId: string): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.delete(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/settings/tee-authoring-policy`);\n  }\n\n  // ---- Group / member / context metadata ----\n\n  async setGroupMetadata(groupId: string, request: SetGroupMetadataRequest): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/metadata`, request);\n  }\n\n  async getGroupMetadata(groupId: string): Promise<MetadataRecord | null> {\n    // Core single-envelopes the record: `{ data: MetadataRecord | null }`.\n    // \"No record yet\" is `{ data: null }` (or a bare null body on older nodes),\n    // so optional-chain to a clean null. Returns the full record (name + data +\n    // updatedAt/updatedBy), not just the data map.\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<GetMetadataResponseData | null>(\n      `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/metadata`,\n    );\n    return response?.data ?? null;\n  }\n\n  async setMemberMetadata(\n    groupId: string,\n    identity: string,\n    request: SetMemberMetadataRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members/${identity}/metadata`, request);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * `identity` is the member's ACCOUNT (64 hex), as returned by\n   * {@link listGroupMembers} \u2014 not the signing key that added them. Both are\n   * 64 hex, so nothing but the source tells them apart.\n   */\n  async getMemberMetadata(groupId: string, identity: string): Promise<MetadataRecord | null> {\n    // Single-enveloped record; see getGroupMetadata.\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<GetMetadataResponseData | null>(\n      `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members/${identity}/metadata`,\n    );\n    return response?.data ?? null;\n  }\n\n  async setContextMetadata(\n    groupId: string,\n    contextId: string,\n    request: SetContextMetadataRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/contexts/${contextId}/metadata`, request);\n  }\n\n  async getContextMetadata(groupId: string, contextId: string): Promise<MetadataRecord | null> {\n    // Single-enveloped record; see getGroupMetadata.\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<GetMetadataResponseData | null>(\n      `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/contexts/${contextId}/metadata`,\n    );\n    return response?.data ?? null;\n  }\n\n  async syncGroup(groupId: string): Promise<SyncGroupResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.post<{ data: SyncGroupResponseData }>(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/sync`, {}));\n  }\n\n  async upgradeGroup(groupId: string, request: UpgradeGroupRequest): Promise<UpgradeGroupResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.post<{ data: UpgradeGroupResponseData }>(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/upgrade`, request));\n  }\n\n  async getGroupUpgradeStatus(groupId: string): Promise<GroupUpgradeStatusResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.get<{ data: GroupUpgradeStatusResponseData }>(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/upgrade/status`),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The operator-facing \"have all peers migrated?\" rollup for a namespace.\n   * The handler serializes the payload directly, so there is no `{ data }`\n   * envelope to unwrap here (unlike most admin reads).\n   */\n  async getMigrationStatus(namespaceId: string): Promise<MigrationStatus> {\n    const id = encodeURIComponent(namespaceId);\n    return this.httpClient.get<MigrationStatus>(`/admin-api/groups/${id}/migration-status`);\n  }\n\n  /** Per-group cascade-migration snapshots for a namespace. */\n  async getCascadeStatus(namespaceId: string): Promise<CascadeStatusEntry[]> {\n    const id = encodeURIComponent(namespaceId);\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.get<{ data: CascadeStatusEntry[] }>(`/admin-api/groups/${id}/cascade-status`),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async retryGroupUpgrade(groupId: string): Promise<RetryGroupUpgradeResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: RetryGroupUpgradeResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/upgrade/retry`,\n        {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /** Move `childGroupId` under `request.newParentId`. */\n  async reparentGroup(\n    childGroupId: string,\n    request: ReparentGroupRequest,\n  ): Promise<ReparentGroupResponseData> {\n    // Core returns this flat ({ reparented }); tolerate the { data } envelope too.\n    const r = await this.httpClient.post<\n      ReparentGroupResponseData & { data?: ReparentGroupResponseData }\n    >(`/admin-api/groups/${childGroupId}/reparent`, request);\n    return (r?.data ?? r) as ReparentGroupResponseData;\n  }\n\n  async listSubgroups(groupId: string): Promise<SubgroupEntry[]> {\n    const response = await this.httpClient.get<{ subgroups?: SubgroupEntry[]; data?: SubgroupEntry[] }>(\n      `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/subgroups`,\n    );\n    return response.subgroups ?? response.data ?? [];\n  }\n\n  async detachContextFromGroup(groupId: string, contextId: string): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.post(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/contexts/${contextId}/remove`, {});\n  }\n\n  // ---- Group Invitation & Join ----\n\n  async createGroupInvitation(\n    groupId: string,\n    request?: CreateGroupInvitationRequest,\n  ): Promise<CreateGroupInvitationResponseData | CreateRecursiveGroupInvitationResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateGroupInvitationResponseData | CreateRecursiveGroupInvitationResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/invite`,\n        request ?? {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async joinGroup(request: JoinGroupRequest): Promise<JoinGroupResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: JoinGroupResponseData }>('/admin-api/groups/join', request),\n    );\n  }\n\n  async joinSubgroupInheritance(groupId: string): Promise<JoinSubgroupInheritanceResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: JoinSubgroupInheritanceResponseData }>(\n        `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/join-via-inheritance`,\n        {},\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  // ---- TEE ----\n\n  async getTeeInfo(): Promise<TeeInfoResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.get<{ data: TeeInfoResponseData }>('/admin-api/tee/info'));\n  }\n\n  async teeAttest(request: TeeAttestRequest): Promise<TeeAttestResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(await this.httpClient.post<{ data: TeeAttestResponseData }>('/admin-api/tee/attest', request));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * @deprecated Nodes no longer serve `/admin-api/tee/verify-quote` (removed in\n   * core#3262), so this fails. Verify quotes with `createQuoteVerifier`.\n   */\n  async teeVerifyQuote(request: TeeVerifyQuoteRequest): Promise<TeeVerifyQuoteResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: TeeVerifyQuoteResponseData }>('/admin-api/tee/verify-quote', request),\n    );\n  }\n\n  // ---- Network ----\n\n  async getPeersCount(): Promise<{ count: number }> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<{ count: number }>('/admin-api/peers');\n  }\n\n  /** Node network status (GET /admin-api/network/status). */\n  async getNetworkStatus(): Promise<unknown> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<unknown>('/admin-api/network/status');\n  }\n\n  /** Node storage/usage stats (GET /admin-api/usage). */\n  async getUsage(): Promise<unknown> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<unknown>('/admin-api/usage');\n  }\n\n  /** Node TLS certificate, PEM text (GET /admin-api/certificate). */\n  async getCertificate(): Promise<string> {\n    return this.httpClient.get<string>('/admin-api/certificate', { parse: 'text' });\n  }\n\n  // ---- Group / context / namespace membership ----\n\n  /** Create a standalone group (POST /admin-api/groups). */\n  async createGroup(request: CreateGroupRequest): Promise<CreateGroupResponseData> {\n    return unwrap(\n      await this.httpClient.post<{ data: CreateGroupResponseData }>('/admin-api/groups', request),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /** Leave a group (POST /admin-api/groups/:group_id/leave). */\n  async leaveGroup(groupId: string): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.post(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/leave`, {});\n  }\n\n  /** Leave a context (POST /admin-api/contexts/:context_id/leave). */\n  async leaveContext(contextId: string): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.post(`/admin-api/contexts/${contextId}/leave`, {});\n  }\n\n  /** Leave a namespace (POST /admin-api/namespaces/:namespace_id/leave). */\n  async leaveNamespace(namespaceId: string): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.post(`/admin-api/namespaces/${namespaceId}/leave`, {});\n  }\n\n  /** Issue a group ownership proof (POST /admin-api/groups/:group_id/issue-ownership-proof). */\n  async issueOwnershipProof(\n    groupId: string,\n    request: IssueOwnershipProofRequest,\n  ): Promise<IssueOwnershipProofResponseData> {\n    return this.httpClient.post<IssueOwnershipProofResponseData>(\n      `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/issue-ownership-proof`,\n      request,\n    );\n  }\n\n  /** Issue a namespace ownership proof (POST /admin-api/groups/:group_id/issue-namespace-ownership-proof). */\n  async issueNamespaceOwnershipProof(\n    groupId: string,\n    request: IssueNamespaceOwnershipProofRequest,\n  ): Promise<IssueOwnershipProofResponseData> {\n    return this.httpClient.post<IssueOwnershipProofResponseData>(\n      `/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/issue-namespace-ownership-proof`,\n      request,\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Set a member's auto-follow flag (PUT\n   * /admin-api/groups/:group_id/members/:identity/auto-follow).\n   *\n   * `identity` is the member's ACCOUNT (64 hex), as returned by\n   * {@link listGroupMembers} \u2014 not the signing key that added them. Both are\n   * 64 hex, so nothing but the source tells them apart.\n   */\n  async setMemberAutoFollow(\n    groupId: string,\n    identity: string,\n    request: SetMemberAutoFollowRequest,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.httpClient.put(`/admin-api/groups/${groupId}/members/${identity}/auto-follow`, request);\n  }\n\n  /** Abort a namespace migration (POST /admin-api/groups/:namespace_id/migration/abort). */\n  async abortMigration(namespaceId: string): Promise<unknown> {\n    return this.httpClient.post<unknown>(`/admin-api/groups/${namespaceId}/migration/abort`, {});\n  }\n}\n", "import type { DcapCollateral } from '../sealed/verify.js';\n\n// Admin API Types \u2014 aligned with core server routes\n// All types use camelCase to match core's #[serde(rename_all = \"camelCase\")]\n\n// Re-export shared types\nexport { ApiResponse } from '../http-client/index.js';\n\n// ---- Health and Status ----\n\nexport interface HealthStatus {\n  status: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * What `GET /admin-api/ready` reports: `ready` once the node has finished\n * starting up and its store answers. A node that is not ready answers `503`\n * with its lifecycle stage (or `store_unavailable`) as the status, which the\n * client surfaces as an `HTTPError`.\n */\nexport interface ReadinessStatus {\n  status: string;\n}\n\nexport interface AdminAuthStatus {\n  data: { status: string };\n}\n\n// ---- Applications ----\n\n/**\n * Install by coordinates. The node fetches only from its own configured\n * `[registry]`, so there is no caller-supplied URL; both halves are required.\n */\nexport interface InstallApplicationRequest {\n  package: string;\n  version: string;\n}\n\nexport interface InstallDevApplicationRequest {\n  path: string;\n}\n\nexport interface InstallApplicationResponseData {\n  applicationId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface UninstallApplicationResponseData {\n  applicationId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ApplicationBlob {\n  bytecode: string;\n  compiled: string;\n}\n\nexport interface Application {\n  id: string;\n  blob: ApplicationBlob;\n  size: number;\n  source: string;\n  metadata: number[];\n  /** Absent for a raw-wasm install (no signed bundle) and for bootstrap stubs. */\n  signer_id?: string;\n  /** Absent on a bootstrap stub row, written before the app's blob arrives. */\n  package?: string;\n  /** Absent when the stored version is empty or not valid semver. */\n  version?: string;\n  /** Named services of a multi-service bundle; absent for single-service apps. */\n  services?: Record<string, ApplicationBlob>;\n}\n\nexport interface ListApplicationsResponseData {\n  apps: Application[];\n}\n\nexport interface GetApplicationResponseData {\n  application: Application | null;\n}\n\n/** One installed blob for an application (distinct from the package registry). */\nexport interface ApplicationVersionEntry {\n  version: string;\n  blobId: string;\n  size: number;\n  package: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ListApplicationVersionsResponseData {\n  data: ApplicationVersionEntry[];\n}\n\n/** The application's `wasm-abi/1` manifest, returned verbatim by the node. */\nexport type GetApplicationAbiResponseData = Record<string, unknown>;\n\n// ---- Packages ----\n\nexport interface GetLatestVersionResponseData {\n  applicationId: string | null;\n  version: string | null;\n}\n\nexport interface ListPackagesResponseData {\n  packages: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface ListVersionsResponseData {\n  versions: string[];\n}\n\n// ---- Bundle migration metadata ----\n\n/**\n * Per-service migration descriptor carried in a multi-service bundle manifest,\n * emitted from the app's `#[app::migrate]` declaration. `toSchemaVersion` is the\n * ABI state version the migrate targets (from `#[app::state(version = N)]`,\n * the engine's gate) \u2014 NOT the bundle semver, which is `toVersion`, the\n * user-facing string an admin matches on; `method` is the migrate entrypoint.\n */\nexport interface BundleMigration {\n  method: string;\n  toSchemaVersion: number;\n  toVersion?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * The subset of a registry bundle manifest that `getRegistryVersions` consumes.\n * The registry serves these at `GET {registry}/api/v2/bundles?package={package}`;\n * installation itself needs only the coordinates, which the node resolves.\n */\nexport interface RegistryBundleManifest {\n  package: string;\n  appVersion: string;\n  /** Present when this bundle's app declares a migration. */\n  migration?: BundleMigration;\n}\n\n// ---- Contexts ----\n\nexport interface CreateContextRequest {\n  applicationId: string;\n  groupId: string;\n  serviceName?: string;\n  contextSeed?: string;\n  initializationParams?: number[];\n  identitySecret?: string;\n  /** Optional human-readable label for the context. */\n  name?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateContextResponseData {\n  contextId: string;\n  memberPublicKey: string;\n  groupId?: string;\n  groupCreated?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface DeleteContextResponseData {\n  isDeleted: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface Context {\n  id: string;\n  applicationId: string;\n  serviceName?: string;\n  /**\n   * Context state/root hash. Core's wire key is `contextStateHash` (part of the\n   * cross-DAG auth three-level naming: contextStateHash / groupStateHash /\n   * namespaceStateHash). Renamed from `rootHash`, which never populated.\n   */\n  contextStateHash: string;\n  /** Absent while the context has no deltas yet (core omits an empty list). */\n  dagHeads?: number[][];\n  /** Bundle semver of the installed application (skew #2). Absent on older nodes. */\n  applicationVersion?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ContextWithGroup extends Context {\n  groupId?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface GetContextsResponseData {\n  contexts: ContextWithGroup[];\n}\n\n// ---- Context Identity ----\n\nexport interface GenerateContextIdentityResponseData {\n  publicKey: string;\n}\n\nexport interface GetContextIdentitiesResponseData {\n  identities: string[];\n}\n\n// ---- Context join (group membership; POST /contexts/:id/join) ----\n\nexport interface JoinContextResponseData {\n  contextId: string;\n  memberPublicKey: string;\n}\n\n// ---- Open subgroup join via inheritance (POST /groups/:group_id/join-via-inheritance) ----\n\nexport interface JoinSubgroupInheritanceResponseData {\n  groupId: string;\n  memberPublicKey: string;\n  // `true` if the call had to publish a `MemberJoinedOpen` op to materialise\n  // inherited membership; `false` if the caller was already a direct member\n  // and the call was a no-op.\n  wasInherited: boolean;\n}\n\n// ---- Context group / storage / sync ----\n\nexport type ContextGroupResponseData = string | null;\n\nexport interface ContextStorageResponseData {\n  sizeInBytes: number;\n}\n\n// Sync context returns empty\nexport type SyncContextResponseData = null;\n\n// ---- Specialized Node Invite ----\n\nexport interface InviteSpecializedNodeRequest {\n  contextId: string;\n  inviterId?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface InviteSpecializedNodeResponseData {\n  nonce: string;\n}\n\n// ---- Update Context Application ----\n\nexport interface UpdateContextApplicationRequest {\n  applicationId: string;\n  executorPublicKey: string;\n}\n\n// Update context application returns empty\nexport type UpdateContextApplicationResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\n// ---- Resync Context ----\n\nexport interface ResyncContextRequest {\n  /** Force a full re-pull even if the context is not detected as stranded. */\n  force?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface ResyncContextResponseData {\n  contextId: string;\n  resyncStarted: boolean;\n}\n\n// ---- Contexts With Executors ----\n\nexport interface ContextWithExecutors {\n  contextId: string;\n  executors: string[];\n}\n\nexport type ContextsWithExecutorsResponseData = ContextWithExecutors[];\n\n// ---- Blobs ----\n\nexport interface UploadBlobRequest {\n  /** Raw blob bytes; streamed verbatim as the request body (octet-stream). */\n  data: Uint8Array | ArrayBuffer | Blob;\n  /** Optional expected blob hash; sent as the `hash` query param for server-side verification. */\n  hash?: string;\n  /** Optional context to announce the blob to; sent as the `context_id` query param. */\n  contextId?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface BlobInfo {\n  blobId: string;\n  size: number;\n}\n\nexport type UploadBlobResponseData = BlobInfo;\n\nexport interface DeleteBlobResponseData {\n  blobId: string;\n  deleted: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface ListBlobsResponseData {\n  blobs: BlobInfo[];\n}\n\nexport type GetBlobResponseData = BlobInfo;\n\n/**\n * Optional context for a blob read. Supplying `contextId` sends the\n * `context_id` query param (the same one {@link UploadBlobRequest} announces\n * with) and opts the read into network discovery instead of a local-only\n * lookup \u2014 see {@link AdminClient.getBlob}/{@link AdminClient.getBlobInfo} for\n * the latency this buys.\n */\nexport interface BlobReadOptions {\n  /** Context whose peers to probe for the blob; sent as the `context_id` query param. */\n  contextId?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface GetBlobInfoResponseData extends BlobInfo {\n  /** Absent when the answer came from a peer probe, which carries only presence and size. */\n  hash?: string;\n  /** Absent when the answer came from a peer probe, which carries only presence and size. */\n  mimeType?: string;\n  /**\n   * Where the node answered from, per the `x-blob-source` response header:\n   * `'local'` for its own blob store, `'peer'` for a context probe. Undefined\n   * on nodes that don't send the header.\n   */\n  source?: 'local' | 'peer';\n}\n\n// ---- Aliases ----\n\n// Core's CreateAliasRequest is `{ alias, #[serde(flatten)] value }`, so each\n// alias kind flattens a different id field at the top level of the body.\nexport interface CreateContextAliasRequest {\n  alias: string;\n  contextId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateApplicationAliasRequest {\n  alias: string;\n  applicationId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateDeviceAliasRequest {\n  alias: string;\n  deviceId: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Core's `ListAliasesResponse` is `{ data: BTreeMap<Alias<T>, T> }`, so once the\n * `data` envelope is stripped the payload is a flat `{ alias: id }` map \u2014 not a\n * list of entries. Applies to context, application, and device aliases.\n */\nexport type ListAliasesResponseData = Record<string, string>;\n\n// Create/delete alias returns empty\nexport type CreateAliasResponseData = Record<string, never>;\nexport type DeleteAliasResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\nexport interface LookupAliasResponseData {\n  value?: string;\n}\n\n// ---- Shared invitation types ----\n\n/**\n * The signed half of an invitation. Wire keys are snake_case: this type mirrors\n * a core primitive (`calimero_context_config::types`), which carries no\n * camelCase rename \u2014 unlike the admin DTOs that wrap it.\n */\nexport interface GroupInvitationFromAdmin {\n  readonly inviter_identity: number[];\n  readonly group_id: number[];\n  readonly expiration_timestamp: number;\n  /** Per-invitation nonce; core keeps the legacy `secret_salt` wire name. */\n  readonly secret_salt: number[];\n  readonly invited_role: number;\n  /**\n   * Accounts permitted to admit a claim of this invitation, 64 hex characters\n   * each \u2014 the same spelling every other account-addressing field uses.\n   *\n   * Empty means admission by broadcast: the joiner announces itself on the\n   * namespace topic and any ready peer answers \u2014 which publishes the invitation\n   * to every subscriber of that topic. Naming admitters keeps it off the topic,\n   * and the joiner presents it to one of them directly.\n   *\n   * Inside the inviter's signature, so it cannot be redirected.\n   */\n  readonly admitters?: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * An invitation blob the node signed. **Opaque: pass it through unchanged.**\n *\n * `inviter_signature` covers `invitation`, and the trailing bootstrap fields\n * (`application_id`, `app_key`) are needed by the joiner even though they sit\n * outside the signature \u2014 so a value that has been rebuilt field-by-field is\n * not the value the node signed. Rebuilding is what a schema derived from these\n * declarations does: an object schema drops the keys it wasn't told about, and\n * core may add more (both trailing fields were added this way). Carry the value\n * verbatim from the call that produced it to {@link JoinGroupRequest}, and treat\n * the fields below as read-only detail for display.\n *\n * The `never`-typed brand makes that structural: an object literal or a schema\n * result cannot satisfy this type, while a value the SDK returned \u2014 or one\n * recovered with `JSON.parse` after transport \u2014 still does.\n */\nexport interface SignedGroupOpenInvitation {\n  readonly invitation: GroupInvitationFromAdmin;\n  readonly inviter_signature: string;\n  /**\n   * libp2p addresses for the accounts in\n   * {@link GroupInvitationFromAdmin.admitters}, each a full multiaddr including\n   * its `/p2p/<peer-id>` suffix.\n   *\n   * The peer id travels with the address because a joiner cannot derive it:\n   * resolving an account to a peer needs governance state, which is exactly what\n   * a joiner has not synced yet.\n   *\n   * Outside the signature, like the other bootstrap fields. A wrong address\n   * costs a failed dial \u2014 libp2p authenticates the peer id on connect, and the\n   * admitting node still has to be in the signed list for its admission to\n   * count.\n   *\n   * Best-effort: absent on invitations from nodes predating the field, and empty\n   * when the minting node had no address for any admitter.\n   */\n  readonly admitter_addrs?: readonly string[];\n  /**\n   * The account the inviter acts as, as 64 hex characters \u2014 not the\n   * `inviter_identity` key inside the signed body is written in. Governance\n   * rows name accounts, and a joiner cannot derive this one: an account is a\n   * hash of a root it has never seen.\n   *\n   * Unsigned bootstrap field, and outside the signature deliberately \u2014 a\n   * client that round-trips an invitation through its own typed model would\n   * drop an unknown field and invalidate the signature with it. Absent on\n   * invitations from older nodes.\n   */\n  readonly inviter_account?: string;\n  /** Unsigned bootstrap field; absent on invitations from older nodes. */\n  readonly application_id?: number[];\n  /** Unsigned bootstrap field; absent on invitations from older nodes. */\n  /**\n   * The wire name is `app_key`; core's Rust field is `bytecode_id` behind a\n   * `rename` that covers both directions, and core pins this spelling in a test.\n   * `Option<[u8; 32]>` crosses JSON as an array of byte values, not as hex \u2014\n   * unlike `AccountId`, which has its own hex representation.\n   */\n  readonly app_key?: number[];\n  /** @internal Brand \u2014 never present at runtime, never write it. */\n  readonly __nodeSigned: never;\n}\n\nexport interface RecursiveInvitationEntry {\n  groupId: string;\n  invitation: SignedGroupOpenInvitation;\n  groupName?: string;\n}\n\n// ---- Namespaces ----\n\nexport interface Namespace {\n  namespaceId: string;\n  appKey: string;\n  targetApplicationId: string;\n  /**\n   * Absent from nodes that have dropped the concept, always `\"LazyOnAccess\"` on\n   * every released one. Optional because this SDK talks to both; it carries no\n   * information either way. Delete once no supported release still sends it.\n   */\n  upgradePolicy?: string;\n  createdAt: number;\n  name?: string;\n  memberCount: number;\n  contextCount: number;\n  subgroupCount: number;\n  /**\n   * Bundle version of this namespace's `appKey` blob \u2014 the per-namespace truth,\n   * where the application row only says \"latest fetched\". Absent when core\n   * cannot resolve it (raw-wasm app, legacy key, blob not retained locally).\n   */\n  appVersion?: string;\n}\n\nexport type ListNamespacesResponseData = Namespace[];\n\n/**\n * Who this node is: the account it writes as, the device it is, and the key it\n * signs with.\n *\n * Every field is node-level. One root key means one account, everywhere, and a\n * node signs with one key \u2014 so none of this varies by namespace, which is why\n * the endpoint behind it takes none.\n */\n/**\n * A member's request that a node run one method on their behalf.\n *\n * Delegated authorship exists for a holder that cannot run the application\n * itself \u2014 a device with only a signing key, which can neither compile the WASM\n * nor decrypt the state. What makes the resulting write *theirs* is the warrant:\n * a statement they signed, which travels with the change so every peer verifies\n * they consented rather than taking the node's word.\n */\nexport interface PerformIntentRequest {\n  /** The method to run. */\n  method: string;\n  /** Its arguments, as the JSON the guest will receive. */\n  argsJson: unknown;\n  /**\n   * The author's consent: hex-encoded borsh of a `Warrant`.\n   *\n   * Opaque on purpose. Its canonical form is those bytes \u2014 the signature covers\n   * them \u2014 so re-describing the fields as JSON would create a second spelling\n   * that could disagree with what was signed.\n   *\n   * Mint it with {@link signWarrant}, or out of band with `merod account\n   * warrant` / `meroctl context intent`.\n   *\n   * Signing here needs no dependency, which is why it is available at all: the\n   * hash is WebCrypto SHA-256, the signature is WebCrypto Ed25519, and every\n   * field of a warrant is fixed-width so the encoding is concatenation rather\n   * than borsh. The byte contract is pinned on the node's side, at\n   * `crates/account/src/tests/warrant_wire_fixture.rs`, because a drift there\n   * would otherwise surface here as a 403 rather than as an encoding error.\n   */\n  warrant: string;\n  /**\n   * Hex-encoded borsh of the author's `AccountProof<DeviceCert>`, proving the\n   * key that signed the warrant is a device of the account it names.\n   *\n   * Only the author's own half. The node attaches its own credential, so a\n   * caller never learns which of the node's processes runs the intent \u2014 and a\n   * re-key on its side does not void a warrant already issued.\n   */\n  authorProof: string;\n}\n\n/** What a performed intent reports back. */\n/**\n * A read of a context, run as the caller's account. Needs no warrant: a read\n * publishes nothing, so there is no peer to convince.\n */\nexport interface QueryContextRequest {\n  /**\n   * The method to call. It must be declared read-only in the application's ABI\n   * (a `&self` method in a Rust app); anything else is refused with a `409`,\n   * because a write needs a warrant ({@link PerformIntentRequest}).\n   */\n  method: string;\n  /** Its arguments, as the JSON the guest will receive. */\n  argsJson: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface QueryContextResponseData {\n  /** The method's own return value. */\n  returns: unknown | null;\n}\n\nexport interface PerformIntentResponseData {\n  /**\n   * The context's scope root after the run \u2014 how a caller sees that it wrote.\n   *\n   * Worth asserting on rather than the status alone: an accepted intent that\n   * advanced no state is a real failure mode, and it is cheaper to catch here\n   * than on a later read of a value that was never written.\n   */\n  rootHash: string;\n  /** The method's own return value, if it had one. */\n  returns: unknown | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * What a node says about running intents in one context \u2014 read before minting a\n * warrant, not after being refused one.\n *\n * Every input to a warrant is something the author already holds except two:\n * whose name goes in `executor`, and whether that node may act here at all. Both\n * belong to the node, so both are answered here, on the path the intent will be\n * presented to.\n *\n * Reading it first is what lets a client fail before signing. A warrant spends a\n * nonce from a monotonic per-device sequence, and one naming the wrong executor\n * is unspendable \u2014 the number is gone and the write never happened.\n */\nexport interface IntentRelayInfo {\n  /**\n   * The account a warrant for this node must name as its `executor`, 64 hex.\n   *\n   * An account, not the node's signing key: one of its processes re-keying must\n   * not void warrants already issued to it.\n   */\n  executorAccount: string;\n  /**\n   * Whether this node holds `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` on the group owning the\n   * context.\n   *\n   * `false` is an answer, not an error, and it is the *default* state of every\n   * context \u2014 the capability is implied by neither membership nor admin, and is\n   * not propagated by the subgroup cascade. A client reads it to tell \"ask an\n   * admin of `groupId`\" from \"retry later\".\n   */\n  canAuthorOnBehalf: boolean;\n  /** The group whose admin must grant that capability, 64 hex. */\n  groupId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface NodeIdentity {\n  /**\n   * The account this node writes as, 64 hex characters. This \u2014 not\n   * `publicKey` \u2014 is what member-addressing endpoints take, and what\n   * `listGroupMembers` entries are keyed by, so it is how a caller locates\n   * itself in a member list.\n   */\n  accountId: string;\n  /**\n   * The device this node is, 64 hex characters, or `null` before it has\n   * enrolled anywhere.\n   *\n   * `null` is a real answer rather than a missing one: the account id above\n   * exists as soon as the node has a root, and enrolment \u2014 which a join\n   * performs \u2014 is what adds the device that speaks for it.\n   */\n  deviceId: string | null;\n  /**\n   * The key this node signs ops with, 64 hex.\n   *\n   * The device's signing key, not the account root: the root signs\n   * certificates and never an op, so a signature on the wire verifies against\n   * this one.\n   */\n  publicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * The epoch-0 root **public** key of this node's account, 64 hex characters.\n   *\n   * What a second device needs to pair into this account, and public by\n   * construction \u2014 it is hashed into `accountId` and travels in every genesis.\n   * The private root never leaves the node over HTTP.\n   *\n   * Optional because a node at or below `0.11.0-rc.22` does not send it: the\n   * field landed after that release. Required in the type would make this SDK\n   * claim something the node the caller chose may not report.\n   */\n  accountRootPublicKey?: string;\n  /**\n   * Whether this node holds the root key of the account it speaks for. `false`\n   * means it runs on a delegate device key, so it cannot certify another device\n   * into the account \u2014 which is what a pairing invite needs to know before\n   * offering the option.\n   *\n   * Optional for the same reason as `accountRootPublicKey`: a node at or below\n   * `0.11.0-rc.30` does not send it. `undefined` is therefore \"this node is too\n   * old to say\", which is not the same answer as `false`, and a caller gating an\n   * invite on it should not collapse the two.\n   */\n  holdsAccountRoot?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Whether this node's device is certified into the account it speaks for.\n   *\n   * Pair-init mints a device but only pair-complete certifies it, and\n   * `holdsAccountRoot` is `false` across both states, so this is what tells\n   * them apart. Absent on a node predating the field.\n   */\n  deviceCertified?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Hex X25519 public agreement key of this node's device, `null` before it\n   * has a device row.\n   *\n   * The same key pairing calls `kemPublicKey`; core's name is kept here.\n   */\n  deviceAgreementKey?: string | null;\n  /**\n   * Hex id of the account namespace this node follows.\n   *\n   * A holder derives it before the namespace exists so an invite can carry\n   * it; a device records it at pair-init. `null` on a node that neither holds\n   * a root nor has paired with the id; absent on an old node.\n   */\n  accountNamespaceId?: string | null;\n  /**\n   * The account that withdrew this node's device, absent on a node no\n   * revocation has reached.\n   */\n  revokedFrom?: RevokedFromEntry;\n}\n\n/** Which account withdrew this node's device, and which device it was. */\nexport interface RevokedFromEntry {\n  /** The account the device spoke for, 64 hex characters. */\n  accountId: string;\n  /** The device that was withdrawn, 64 hex characters. */\n  deviceId: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * @deprecated Use {@link AdminApiClient.getNodeIdentity} instead. Nothing here\n * varies by namespace, so the parameter could only ever be decoration.\n */\nexport interface NamespaceIdentity {\n  /** Echoed back from the argument; it does not describe the identity. */\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /** The key this node signs with, 64 hex. */\n  publicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * The account this node writes as, 64 hex characters. This \u2014 not\n   * `publicKey` \u2014 is what member-addressing endpoints take, and what\n   * `listGroupMembers` entries are keyed by, so it is how a caller locates\n   * itself in a member list.\n   */\n  account: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateNamespaceRequest {\n  applicationId: string;\n  name?: string;\n  /** Hex 32-byte blob id; pins the namespace to a specific installed version. */\n  appKey?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateNamespaceResponseData {\n  namespaceId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface DeleteNamespaceResponseData {\n  isDeleted: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateNamespaceInvitationRequest {\n  expirationTimestamp?: number;\n  recursive?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateNamespaceInvitationResponseData {\n  invitation: SignedGroupOpenInvitation;\n  groupName?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateRecursiveInvitationResponseData {\n  invitations: RecursiveInvitationEntry[];\n}\n\nexport interface JoinNamespaceRequest {\n  invitation: SignedGroupOpenInvitation;\n  groupName?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface JoinNamespaceResponseData {\n  /**\n   * The namespace that was joined.\n   *\n   * core `0.11.0-rc.25` renamed this field on the wire from `groupId`\n   * (core#3598). The endpoint had been sharing a response DTO with\n   * `POST /admin-api/groups/join`, which leaked the internal \"a namespace is a\n   * root group\" detail into the namespace API and meant a caller could not use\n   * one spelling across the family.\n   *\n   * {@link AdminClient.joinNamespace} fills this in from whichever spelling the\n   * node sent, so it is populated against nodes on either side of that release.\n   */\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /**\n   * @deprecated The pre-`0.11.0-rc.25` spelling of {@link namespaceId}. Present\n   * only when the node predates that release \u2014 read `namespaceId` instead,\n   * which is always set.\n   */\n  groupId?: string;\n  /** The key the joiner signs with, 64 hex. */\n  memberIdentity: string;\n  /**\n   * The account that key joined as, 64 hex characters. This \u2014 not\n   * `memberIdentity` \u2014 is what every member-addressing endpoint takes, so it\n   * is how the caller addresses the member it just became.\n   */\n  memberAccount: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateGroupInNamespaceRequest {\n  groupName?: string;\n  /** Subgroup visibility at birth. Absent means `'restricted'`. */\n  visibility?: 'open' | 'restricted';\n}\n\nexport interface CreateGroupInNamespaceResponseData {\n  groupId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface SubgroupEntry {\n  groupId: string;\n  name?: string;\n}\n\n// ---- Account devices & pairing ----\n\n/**\n * Adopt an account that already lives on another device, and mint this node a\n * device of its own for it.\n *\n * The first half of pairing, run on the joining node. It publishes nothing and\n * needs no key: it produces the values the account holder's\n * {@link AdminApiClient.completeAccountPairing} certifies, plus a confirmation\n * code to read out to them.\n *\n * Account-level, and that is the whole point of it: both credentials pairing\n * mints were always account-wide - the certificate is root-signed and the\n * endorsement node-level, so neither ever named a namespace - while the older\n * per-namespace route still made the caller name one, and the device then\n * listened on that one topic while its holder's link fanned out across all of\n * them.\n */\nexport interface AccountPairInitRequest {\n  /**\n   * The epoch-0 root **public** key of the account to join, 64 hex characters -\n   * exactly what {@link NodeIdentity.accountRootPublicKey} reports on the node\n   * that already holds the account.\n   *\n   * Named for the half it carries. An ed25519 private and public key are both 32\n   * bytes and both hex, so nothing but the name tells them apart; the private\n   * root never crosses this boundary at all.\n   */\n  accountRootPublicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * Ids of the namespaces to enroll into, 64 hex characters each.\n   *\n   * The caller has to supply these, because the joining node cannot discover\n   * them - it is a member of nothing and holds no scope key, so it can neither\n   * read the account's namespace set off a DAG nor derive it. The device that\n   * already holds the account is the only party that knows it.\n   *\n   * This decides what the new device *listens* on, and it does not have to agree\n   * with the applications the holder scopes `pair-complete` to: a binding\n   * published where the device is not listening is picked up whenever it does\n   * subscribe, and a subscription the holder never reaches costs nothing.\n   *\n   * Core refuses only a request that names neither this nor `accountNamespace`.\n   * A caller that sends `accountNamespace` may leave this empty.\n   */\n  namespaces?: string[];\n  /**\n   * Hex id of the account namespace to follow - the value\n   * {@link NodeIdentity.accountNamespaceId} reports on the holder.\n   *\n   * The device then learns the account's namespaces from the account namespace\n   * itself, so the caller need not know them up front. A caller that does not\n   * send this must name at least one namespace above.\n   */\n  accountNamespace?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * What the joining device minted, for the account holder to certify.\n *\n * These are round-trip tokens: a caller copies them verbatim into\n * {@link AdminApiClient.completeAccountPairing}. The signing key is the NEW\n * device's, so it appears in no member listing yet and there is nothing here to\n * compare it against.\n *\n * One device is minted however many namespaces were named, so there is one of\n * each of these to hand over, not one per namespace.\n */\nexport interface AccountPairInitResponseData {\n  /** The account this device will speak for once linked, 64 hex characters. */\n  accountId: string;\n  /** The device that was minted, 64 hex characters. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /** X25519 agreement key a scope key must be wrapped under to reach this device, hex. */\n  kemPublicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * The Ed25519 key this device signs its ops with, hex.\n   *\n   * The account holder cannot derive this - it is minted here - and the\n   * certificate names it, so it has to travel with the other two.\n   */\n  signPublicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * Ed25519 signature over the account, the device id and both keys above, hex.\n   *\n   * Carried so the three values arrive as a statement by the device that minted\n   * them rather than as assertions by whoever relayed them; `pair-complete`\n   * refuses without it.\n   */\n  statement: string;\n  /**\n   * The value to read out to the account holder, who compares it against what\n   * their `pair-complete` reports.\n   *\n   * The part a substituting attacker cannot fake: it can re-sign its own\n   * statement, but it would have to make its own keys derive the code the other\n   * side is already reading.\n   */\n  confirmationCode: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Certify a device another node minted, link it, and deliver its scope keys.\n *\n * The second half of pairing, run on the node that holds the account root - the\n * only party that can sign the certificate that makes the device real. Every\n * field but `applications` is copied verbatim from that other node's\n * {@link AccountPairInitResponseData}.\n */\nexport interface AccountPairCompleteRequest {\n  /** The `deviceId` the other node minted, 64 hex characters. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /** That device's X25519 agreement key, 64 hex characters. */\n  kemPublicKey: string;\n  /** That device's Ed25519 signing key, 64 hex characters. */\n  signPublicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * The signature from that node's pair-init, 128 hex characters (64 bytes).\n   *\n   * Not optional: without it the three values above are only claims by whoever\n   * sent them, and certifying those would make attacker-supplied keys a trusted\n   * device of this account.\n   */\n  statement: string;\n  /**\n   * The code the account holder read off the pairing device, e.g.\n   * `7BC0-DAAC-CCB4-84A4`. Grouping and case are ignored.\n   *\n   * Required so the comparison cannot be skipped: this side re-derives the code\n   * for the key material that actually arrived and refuses a mismatch. Its value\n   * rests on the code reaching the holder independently of this payload - sent\n   * beside the keys, it proves nothing. One code covers the whole pairing,\n   * because one device was minted for it.\n   */\n  confirmationCode: string;\n  /**\n   * Which applications this device may speak for, 64 hex each. Omitted or empty means\n   * every one of them.\n   *\n   * Scoped by application rather than by namespace because a person can answer\n   * \"which apps may this device use\" and cannot answer \"which namespaces\" - a\n   * namespace is an implementation unit they never named. The node resolves\n   * these to namespaces through the same lookup\n   * {@link AdminApiClient.listNamespacesForApplication} reads.\n   */\n  applications?: string[];\n}\n\n/** What pairing established. */\nexport interface AccountPairCompleteResponseData {\n  /** The account the device now speaks for, 64 hex characters. */\n  accountId: string;\n  /** The device that was linked, 64 hex characters. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /**\n   * Whether the current scope key was wrapped and published for the device.\n   *\n   * `false` does not mean pairing failed - the link is what confers authority,\n   * and the device's own sync pull re-requests the key. It does mean the device\n   * cannot read until that lands.\n   */\n  keyDelivered: boolean;\n  /**\n   * The code for the key material this certified - the same value the request\n   * carried, echoed so the operator can see what the certificate names.\n   */\n  confirmationCode: string;\n  /**\n   * The `AccountProof<DeviceCert>` this pairing minted, hex-encoded borsh.\n   *\n   * The certified device needs this to present itself as a device of the\n   * account, and cannot read it off the DAG: doing so means being a member of a\n   * group the account speaks in, which a thin client never is. Not a secret - a\n   * certificate is public and proves nothing without the device key it names.\n   */\n  credential: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * A domain an outside verifier defined, which the account root may sign under.\n *\n * A name from a closed set, never the domain bytes. The node prepends the bytes\n * itself: \"sign these bytes with the account root\" would be a signing oracle\n * over the one key that can certify a device, which is account takeover. A node\n * refuses any name it does not know.\n *\n * Typed as a union plus `(string & {})` so a node newer than this SDK can be\n * reached without a cast, while the known names still autocomplete.\n */\nexport type ExternalSigningDomain =\n  | 'mdma.account-link'\n  | 'mdma.account-login'\n  | 'mdma.account-recovery'\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/ban-types\n  | (string & {});\n\n/**\n * Ask this node's account root to sign a payload an outside verifier specified.\n *\n * The verifier owns the format; the node supplies only the domain. For the cloud\n * this is how a challenge it sealed and issued gets signed by a root that\n * deliberately never leaves the node holding it.\n */\nexport interface AccountSignWithRootRequest {\n  /** Which verifier's domain to sign under. */\n  domain: ExternalSigningDomain;\n  /**\n   * The bytes to sign after the domain, hex-encoded.\n   *\n   * Hex rather than text because the field is bytes. For the cloud's challenge \u2014\n   * an ASCII string \u2014 that is the UTF-8 of it, hex-encoded; {@link hexEncodeUtf8}\n   * does exactly that and exists so each caller does not re-derive it.\n   */\n  payload: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Hex-encode a string's UTF-8 bytes, for {@link AccountSignWithRootRequest.payload}.\n *\n * Exists so each caller does not write the same loop. Every verifier this is\n * used with issues its challenge as text, and the node takes bytes \u2014 getting\n * that conversion subtly wrong (UTF-16 code units, a stray newline from a shell)\n * produces a signature over the wrong message, which fails at the verifier with\n * nothing local to point at.\n */\nexport function hexEncodeUtf8(text: string): string {\n  return Array.from(new TextEncoder().encode(text), (b) =>\n    b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'),\n  ).join('');\n}\n\n/** What the node signed, and the key to check it against. */\nexport interface AccountSignWithRootResponseData {\n  /** The account root's public key, 64 hex characters. */\n  rootPublicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * The signature over `domain \u2016 payload`, **base64**.\n   *\n   * Base64 rather than hex because that is what the consuming verifiers decode;\n   * re-encoding it on the way out is a step that fails silently at the far end.\n   */\n  signature: string;\n  /** The account the signing key belongs to, 64 hex characters. */\n  accountId: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Repair or widen the reach of a device this account already certified.\n *\n * Pairing is a snapshot: it bound the device wherever this node took part at the\n * time, so a namespace created or joined afterwards holds no binding for it and\n * the paired device silently never sees that namespace. This re-runs the fan-out\n * against the namespaces this node takes part in now. The device need not be\n * online, and nothing but its id is required - the certificate is already held\n * here, root-signed and naming no namespace, so a fresh endorsement and a key\n * wrap are all a later namespace is missing.\n */\nexport interface RelinkDeviceRequest {\n  /**\n   * Applications to add to the device's stored scope, 64 hex each.\n   *\n   * **Omitted or empty changes nothing** and repairs against the scope already\n   * stored, which is the request an operator makes to heal drift. Note that this\n   * is the one place an empty list does not mean \"all\": widening a narrow scope\n   * to every application is deliberately not expressible here, because\n   * overloading the empty list would make the accidental request the widest one.\n   */\n  applications?: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * The scope to hold: every application, or only the ones named.\n *\n * A tagged shape rather than a list whose emptiness means everything - `all`\n * and `only: []` differ by a whole order of magnitude in what they grant, and\n * an empty `only` is refused rather than treated as `all`.\n */\nexport type DeviceScope = 'all' | { only: string[] };\n\n/**\n * Replace a device's scope outright, in one root-signed op.\n *\n * {@link relinkAccountDevice} only ever adds applications; this is how a\n * scope is narrowed, or an `all` device is given a fixed list instead.\n */\nexport interface RescopeDeviceRequest {\n  scope: DeviceScope;\n}\n\n/** One namespace the relink published the device's link into. */\nexport interface RelinkOutcomeEntry {\n  /** The namespace id, 64 hex characters. */\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /**\n   * Whether the scope key was wrapped and published for the device here.\n   *\n   * `false` means the link landed and the delivery did not; the link is what\n   * confers authority, and the device's own sync pull re-requests the key.\n   */\n  keyDelivered: boolean;\n}\n\n/** One namespace the relink published nothing into, and why. */\nexport interface RelinkSkipEntry {\n  /** The namespace id, 64 hex characters. */\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /**\n   * Why nothing was published there. Currently one of `outOfScope`,\n   * `alreadyBound`, `noScopeKey`, `revoked`, `ownDevice`, `failed`; left as a\n   * string because a node may report a reason newer than this SDK.\n   */\n  reason: string;\n}\n\n/** One namespace a scope replacement no longer reaches. */\nexport interface RescopeDescopeEntry {\n  /** The namespace id, 64 hex characters. */\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /**\n   * Whether the scope key was rotated. `false` means the device stopped writing\n   * there but still holds the key it had, until an admin rotates.\n   */\n  keyRotated: boolean;\n}\n\n/** The scope a device now holds, and what each namespace did about it. */\nexport interface RescopeDeviceResponseData {\n  /** The account the device speaks for, 64 hex characters. */\n  accountId: string;\n  /** The device that was rescoped, 64 hex characters. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /** The scope after the request, 64 hex each. Empty means every application. */\n  applications: string[];\n  /** Namespaces the new scope no longer reaches. */\n  descoped: RescopeDescopeEntry[];\n  /** Namespaces the device was linked into by this call. */\n  linkedIn: RelinkOutcomeEntry[];\n  /** Namespaces nothing was published into, and why. */\n  skipped: RelinkSkipEntry[];\n}\n\n/** What the relink repaired, and what it left alone. */\nexport interface RelinkDeviceResponseData {\n  /** The account the device speaks for, 64 hex characters. */\n  accountId: string;\n  /** The device that was repaired, 64 hex characters. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /**\n   * The device's scope after the request, 64 hex each. Empty means every\n   * application, which is what a pairing that named none asked for.\n   */\n  applications: string[];\n  /**\n   * Namespaces the link was published into by this call. Reported per namespace\n   * because publication is per-DAG, so which namespaces a device actually\n   * reached is a state the caller has to be able to see.\n   */\n  linkedIn: RelinkOutcomeEntry[];\n  /** Namespaces nothing was published into. */\n  skipped: RelinkSkipEntry[];\n}\n\n/**\n * One device of this account, joined from the node-local certificate cache and\n * the live bindings of every namespace this node takes part in.\n */\nexport interface AccountDeviceEntry {\n  /** This device's id, 64 hex characters. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /** The key this device signs its ops with, 64 hex. */\n  signingKey: string;\n  /** Set only on the device this node itself presents. */\n  isSelf: boolean;\n  revoked: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Applications this device may speak for, 64 hex each. **Empty means every\n   * application**, the same convention the stored certificate uses - and the\n   * opposite of what an empty {@link RelinkDeviceRequest.applications} asks for.\n   * Empty also for a device this node holds no cached certificate for: one bound\n   * before the cache existed, or certified by another holder.\n   */\n  applications: string[];\n  /**\n   * Ids of the namespaces currently holding a live binding for this device, 64\n   * hex characters each. Empty for a certified device not yet bound anywhere.\n   */\n  namespaces: string[];\n  /**\n   * The replicated name the account gave this device, absent while it has\n   * none. Every device of the account reads the same one.\n   */\n  label?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Name a device of this account, for a listing to render.\n *\n * Run on the node holding the account root to name any device; a paired node\n * is accepted only for that device's own id.\n */\nexport interface LabelDeviceRequest {\n  /** Trimmed, non-empty, bounded and free of control characters. */\n  label: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * The name that was published, and the epoch that orders it against a rename\n * another device of the account made at the same time.\n */\nexport interface LabelDeviceResponseData {\n  /** The account the device speaks for, 64 hex characters. */\n  accountId: string;\n  /** The device that was named, 64 hex characters. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  label: string;\n  labelEpoch: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * One application this account speaks in, derived from the namespaces this node\n * takes part in that target it.\n *\n * An application installed with no namespace yet is absent here: it has no\n * cross-device meaning until a namespace exists, so there is nothing to scope a\n * device to.\n */\nexport interface AccountApplicationEntry {\n  /** The application id, 64 hex. */\n  applicationId: string;\n  /** Ids of the namespaces targeting it, 64 hex characters each. */\n  namespaces: string[];\n}\n\n/** Withdraw a device from an account, terminally. */\nexport interface RevokeAccountDeviceRequest {\n  /** The device to withdraw, 64 hex. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /**\n   * A hex-encoded, borsh-serialized signed revocation minted elsewhere -\n   * the output of `merod account revoke-proof`.\n   *\n   * The lost-device path: the account root that owns the device is not on this\n   * node, so the proof is signed offline and this node only publishes it. Omit\n   * it and the node mints its own proof if it owns the account, and otherwise\n   * revokes as an admin.\n   *\n   * Not a credential and not a secret - it authorises this one revocation of\n   * this one device, and only alongside a stored binding naming the same\n   * account.\n   */\n  proof?: string;\n}\n\n/** What a revocation withdrew in one namespace. */\nexport interface RevocationOutcome {\n  /** The namespace, 64 hex. */\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /**\n   * Whether the scope key rotated in the same op, in THIS namespace.\n   *\n   * `false` means the device stopped writing there at once but still holds the\n   * key it had, so it can keep READING until an admin rotates. Only an admin\n   * may rotate and an account holder revoking their own device usually is not\n   * one, so this is commonly owed rather than exceptional.\n   */\n  keyRotated: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface RevokeAccountDeviceResponseData {\n  /** The account the device spoke for, 64 hex. */\n  accountId: string;\n  /** The device that was withdrawn, 64 hex. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /**\n   * Whether the scope key rotated in the namespace named in the request.\n   *\n   * {@link revokedIn} is the full picture; prefer it. This reports only the one\n   * namespace the caller asked about and is retained because core keeps it for\n   * a released `calimero-client-py` wheel that requires the field.\n   */\n  keyRotated: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Every namespace the revocation was published into.\n   *\n   * A device belongs to an account rather than to a scope, so revoking it\n   * withdraws it from every namespace holding a binding for it - not only the\n   * one named in the request. Per namespace because publication is per-DAG: a\n   * namespace absent here did not receive the op, and a partially propagated\n   * revocation is a state the caller has to be able to see.\n   */\n  revokedIn: RevocationOutcome[];\n}\n\n// ---- Groups ----\n\nexport interface CreateGroupRequest {\n  applicationId: string;\n  groupId?: string;\n  appKey?: string;\n  name?: string;\n  parentGroupId?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateGroupResponseData {\n  groupId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface GroupUpgradeStatus {\n  fromVersion: string;\n  toVersion: string;\n  initiatedAt: number;\n  initiatedBy: string;\n  status: string;\n  /** Contexts THIS NODE enumerated for the upgrade. Node-local; fleet progress\n   * is the `getMigrationStatus` rollup. */\n  localContextsTotal?: number;\n  localContextsSwapped?: number;\n  /** Contexts whose swap failed on this node; a non-zero value is what\n   * `retryGroupUpgrade` picks up. */\n  localContextsFailed?: number;\n  /** Unix seconds at which THIS NODE finished its own context swaps. Not fleet\n   * convergence - that is `MigrationStatus.fleetCompletedAt`. */\n  completedAt?: number;\n}\n\n// ---- Migration status (migration-UX core surfaces) ----\n\nexport type MemberMigrationState =\n  | 'migrated'\n  | 'in_progress'\n  | 'unknown'\n  | 'failed';\n\n/** Why a member's migration did not complete. */\nexport type MigrationFailureReason =\n  | 'check_aborted'\n  | 'apply_failed'\n  | 'no_migration_path';\n\nexport interface MemberMigrationReport {\n  /** ABI state version the member has loaded, from `#[app::state(version = N)]` -\n   * the engine's migration gate, not the bundle semver and not a CRDT concept.\n   * The wrong reading here is how the core rollup defect (comparing bundle-semver\n   * majors instead of state versions) went unnoticed. */\n  schemaVersion: number;\n  residueAuto: number;\n  syncedUpToHlc: number;\n  reportedAt: number;\n  /** Member's self-reported pending-authored count (best-effort; skew #1). */\n  authoredRemaining: number;\n  /**\n   * Set when the member's migrate did not complete (its migration-check\n   * aborted, or the apply errored). Absent otherwise.\n   */\n  migrationFailed?: MigrationFailureReason;\n}\n\nexport interface MemberMigrationStatusEntry {\n  /** The reporting device's signing KEY, bs58. One account with two devices\n   * appears as two rows: the cohort is replicas, not people. */\n  peer: string;\n  /** The ACCOUNT `peer` speaks for, 64 hex - join it to `listGroupMembers` to\n   * name a person. Absent from nodes predating the field. */\n  account?: string;\n  /** Freshest reported facts. Omitted (not `null`) when the member's state is\n   * `unknown`, so test falsiness rather than `=== null`. */\n  report?: MemberMigrationReport | null;\n  state: MemberMigrationState;\n}\n\nexport interface MigrationStatusRollup {\n  migrated: number;\n  inProgress: number;\n  unknown: number;\n  /** Members whose migrate aborted (migration-check failed or apply errored). */\n  failed: number;\n  total: number;\n  allMigrated: boolean;\n  /** Count of members with authoredRemaining > 0 (owners still to re-sign). */\n  membersPendingSignature: number;\n}\n\nexport interface MigrationStatus {\n  targetVersion: number;\n  expectedMembers: number;\n  /** Governance HLC the cohort was pinned at, as an opaque display string.\n   * Absent when there is no migration record. */\n  cohortPinnedAtHlc?: string;\n  /** Unix seconds at which this node watched the FLEET converge, absent while it\n   * has not. Distinct from `GroupUpgradeStatus.completedAt`, which is this node's\n   * own local swap completion. Durable, unlike `rollup.allMigrated`, which is\n   * recomputed from in-TTL heartbeats and lapses when a member goes quiet. */\n  fleetCompletedAt?: number;\n  rollup: MigrationStatusRollup;\n  members: MemberMigrationStatusEntry[];\n}\n\n// ---- Cascade status ----\n\nexport interface CascadeStatusEntry {\n  groupId: string;\n  upgrade: GroupUpgradeStatus;\n  cascadeHlc?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface GroupInfo {\n  groupId: string;\n  appKey: string;\n  targetApplicationId: string;\n  /**\n   * Absent from nodes that have dropped the concept, always `\"LazyOnAccess\"` on\n   * every released one. Optional because this SDK talks to both; it carries no\n   * information either way. Delete once no supported release still sends it.\n   */\n  upgradePolicy?: string;\n  memberCount: number;\n  contextCount: number;\n  activeUpgrade?: GroupUpgradeStatus;\n  defaultCapabilities: number;\n  subgroupVisibility: string;\n  /**\n   * The group's generic metadata record (replaces the old `alias` field).\n   * `null` if no metadata has ever been set for this group.\n   */\n  metadata?: MetadataRecord | null;\n}\n\nexport type GroupInfoResponseData = GroupInfo;\n\nexport interface GroupMember {\n  /**\n   * The member's ACCOUNT: 64 hex characters.\n   *\n   * Not a signing key \u2014 a person may hold several keys\n   * and governance rows name the person. Both are 32 bytes, so nothing here or\n   * on the server will object if you pass the wrong one; it will simply name a\n   * principal that exists nowhere. Feed this value to\n   * {@link RemoveGroupMembersRequest} and {@link UpdateMemberRoleRequest}, not\n   * to {@link GroupMemberInput}.\n   */\n  identity: string;\n  role: string;\n  name?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ListGroupMembersResponseData {\n  members: GroupMember[];\n  /**\n   * @deprecated The server response uses `members`, not `data`. This alias\n   * is retained so existing callers compile during the upgrade window; it\n   * is never populated by the client and will be removed in the next\n   * major. Switch reads to `response.members`.\n   */\n  data?: GroupMember[];\n}\n\n/** One device bound to a member account. */\nexport interface MemberDevice {\n  /** 64 hex; the form `revokeAccountDevice` takes. */\n  deviceId: string;\n  /**\n   * The key this device's signatures carry, 64 hex. Joins against the\n   * identities a context lists.\n   */\n  signingKey: string;\n}\n\n/** A member account and the devices bound to it in the namespace. */\nexport interface MemberDevicesEntry {\n  /** The member's ACCOUNT, 64 hex. */\n  account: string;\n  devices: MemberDevice[];\n}\n\nexport interface ListMemberDevicesOptions {\n  offset?: number;\n  limit?: number;\n}\n\nexport interface ListMemberDevicesResponseData {\n  /**\n   * Every account in the group if the calling node is an admin; only its own\n   * entry if it is a plain member.\n   */\n  members: MemberDevicesEntry[];\n}\n\nexport interface SealToAccountRequest {\n  /**\n   * Hex-encoded plaintext. Small by design: the route exists to hand an account\n   * something like a list of namespace ids, and the node caps the size.\n   */\n  plaintext: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * A payload sealed to an account's root key. Only that account's root can open\n * it; the node that sealed it cannot.\n */\nexport interface SealedEnvelope {\n  /**\n   * The root-key epoch it was sealed under. A rotated root still opens envelopes\n   * from its own epoch, so a recipient holding several needs to know which.\n   */\n  accountRootEpoch: number;\n  /** Hex, 32 bytes: the one-shot sender key. */\n  ephemeralPublicKey: string;\n  /** Hex, 12 bytes: the AES-256-GCM nonce. */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** Hex: the ciphertext with its 16-byte tag appended. */\n  ciphertext: string;\n}\n\nexport interface GroupContextEntry {\n  contextId: string;\n  name?: string;\n}\n\nexport type ListGroupContextsResponseData = GroupContextEntry[];\n\nexport interface DeleteGroupResponseData {\n  isDeleted: boolean;\n}\n\n// ---- Group Members ----\n\nexport interface GroupMemberInput {\n  /**\n   * The invitee's signing KEY, 64 hex \u2014 NOT an account. It is spelled exactly\n   * like one, so only the field name says which this is.\n   *\n   * Adding is the one member-facing call that names a key: the node binds the\n   * key to an account as it admits it, so before that there is no account to\n   * name. Every call that names an EXISTING member takes the account instead.\n   */\n  identity: string;\n  role: string;\n}\n\nexport interface AddGroupMembersRequest {\n  members: GroupMemberInput[];\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type AddGroupMembersResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\nexport interface RemoveGroupMembersRequest {\n  /**\n   * The members to remove, as ACCOUNTS (64 hex) \u2014 the same ids\n   * {@link GroupMember.identity} returns, and not the keys\n   * {@link GroupMemberInput.identity} took to add them.\n   */\n  members: string[];\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type RemoveGroupMembersResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\nexport interface UpdateMemberRoleRequest {\n  role: string;\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type UpdateMemberRoleResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\n// ---- Group Capabilities & Settings ----\n\nexport interface MemberCapabilities {\n  capabilities: number;\n}\n\nexport interface SetMemberCapabilitiesRequest {\n  capabilities: number;\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type SetMemberCapabilitiesResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\nexport interface SetDefaultCapabilitiesRequest {\n  defaultCapabilities: number;\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type SetDefaultCapabilitiesResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\nexport interface SetMemberAutoFollowRequest {\n  /** Auto-join contexts registered in this group. */\n  autoFollowContexts: boolean;\n  /** Self-admit into subgroups nested under this group. */\n  autoFollowSubgroups: boolean;\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type SetMemberAutoFollowResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\nexport interface SetSubgroupVisibilityRequest {\n  subgroupVisibility: string;\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type SetSubgroupVisibilityResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\n/**\n * The signed-release form of a TEE admission policy: admit a TEE running any\n * mero-tee node release the mero-tee release workflow signed, if its quote\n * matches one of `allowedProfiles` in that release's `published-mrtds.json`.\n * Unlike the measurement lists, it does not need updating for each release.\n */\nexport interface SignedReleaseTeePolicy {\n  /** Image profiles to admit, e.g. `locked-read-only`. */\n  allowedProfiles: string[];\n  /** The oldest release admitted (`2.3.72`); any signed release when absent. */\n  minReleaseVersion?: string;\n}\n\n/** A policy that lists the measurements it admits. */\nexport interface MeasurementTeeAdmissionPolicyRequest {\n  allowedMrtd: string[];\n  allowedRtmr0: string[];\n  allowedRtmr1: string[];\n  allowedRtmr2: string[];\n  allowedRtmr3: string[];\n  allowedTcbStatuses: string[];\n  acceptMock: boolean;\n}\n\n/** A policy that admits by signed release. The node refuses measurement lists beside it. */\nexport interface SignedReleaseTeeAdmissionPolicyRequest {\n  signedRelease: SignedReleaseTeePolicy;\n  allowedTcbStatuses: string[];\n  acceptMock: boolean;\n}\n\nexport type SetTeeAdmissionPolicyRequest =\n  | MeasurementTeeAdmissionPolicyRequest\n  | SignedReleaseTeeAdmissionPolicyRequest;\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type SetTeeAdmissionPolicyResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\nexport interface GetTeeAdmissionPolicyResponseData {\n  allowedMrtd: string[];\n  allowedRtmr0: string[];\n  allowedRtmr1: string[];\n  allowedRtmr2: string[];\n  allowedRtmr3: string[];\n  allowedTcbStatuses: string[];\n  acceptMock: boolean;\n  /** Set when the policy admits by signed release; the lists are then empty. */\n  signedRelease?: SignedReleaseTeePolicy;\n}\n\n/**\n * Which admitted TEEs may author as the group's TEE authority (the writer behind\n * `TeeOnly` storage and `#[app::tee]` methods). A TEE whose attested MRTD is in\n * `allowedMrtd` may author; an empty list turns TEE authorship off.\n *\n * Namespace-scoped: set it on the namespace root. The node refuses it on a subgroup.\n */\nexport interface SetTeeAuthoringPolicyRequest {\n  allowedMrtd: string[];\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type SetTeeAuthoringPolicyResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\n// ---- Group / member / context metadata ----\n\n/**\n * Generic metadata record attached to a group, group member, or\n * context-registered-in-a-group (core `calimero_primitives::metadata::MetadataRecord`).\n *\n * `data` is application-defined and opaque to core \u2014 it is stored verbatim.\n * Server-enforced size limits: `name` <= 64 bytes; at most 64 entries in\n * `data`; each key <= 64 bytes; each value <= 4096 bytes. Clients do not need\n * to enforce these \u2014 the server validates.\n */\nexport interface MetadataRecord {\n  name: string | null;\n  data: Record<string, string>;\n  updatedAt: number;\n  /** Public key (hex) of the member that last updated the record. */\n  updatedBy: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Request body for setting a metadata record. **This wholly replaces the\n * record**: `data` defaults to `{}` server-side and replaces the stored map,\n * while omitting `name` keeps the current name. To change `name` while\n * preserving existing `data`, GET the record first and pass its `data` back.\n */\nexport interface SetMetadataRequest {\n  name?: string;\n  data?: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\nexport type SetGroupMetadataRequest = SetMetadataRequest;\nexport type SetMemberMetadataRequest = SetMetadataRequest;\nexport type SetContextMetadataRequest = SetMetadataRequest;\n\n// Set-metadata returns empty\nexport type SetMetadataResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\n/**\n * Inner payload of a GET metadata response. `data` is `null` if no metadata\n * has ever been set for the target group/member/context.\n */\nexport interface GetMetadataResponseData {\n  data: MetadataRecord | null;\n}\n\n// ---- Group Sync, Signing & Upgrades ----\n\nexport interface SyncGroupResponseData {\n  groupId: string;\n  appKey: string;\n  targetApplicationId: string;\n  memberCount: number;\n  contextCount: number;\n}\n\nexport interface UpgradeGroupRequest {\n  targetApplicationId: string;\n  /** Fan the upgrade out to every descendant subgroup running the same app\n   *  (one atomic cascade op). Without it the upgrade applies to the target\n   *  group only - members' subgroups never learn the migration. Server\n   *  default: false. */\n  cascade?: boolean;\n  /** Proceed code-only when the target build embeds no ABI. Core refuses such an\n   *  upgrade by default; setting this asserts the new code is layout-compatible\n   *  with the running state so the upgrade goes ahead. It never bypasses a\n   *  declared-migration or downgrade refusal. Wire name is camelCase passthrough;\n   *  older nodes ignore the unknown field. Server default: false. */\n  forceCodeOnly?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface UpgradeGroupResponseData {\n  groupId: string;\n  status: string;\n  localContextsTotal?: number;\n  localContextsSwapped?: number;\n  localContextsFailed?: number;\n}\n\nexport type GroupUpgradeStatusResponseData = GroupUpgradeStatus | null;\n\n// Retry returns same shape as upgrade\nexport type RetryGroupUpgradeResponseData = UpgradeGroupResponseData;\n\n// ---- Group Reparent & Context Attachments ----\n\nexport interface ReparentGroupRequest {\n  /** 64-char id of the destination parent group. */\n  newParentId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ReparentGroupResponseData {\n  reparented: boolean;\n}\n\n// Returns empty\nexport type DetachContextFromGroupResponseData = Record<string, never>;\n\n// ---- Group Ownership Proofs ----\n\nexport interface IssueOwnershipProofRequest {\n  /** Who the proof is for. Non-empty, <= 256 characters. */\n  audience: string;\n  /** 64-hex context id the proof is scoped to. */\n  contextId: string;\n  /** What is being claimed. Non-empty, <= 512 characters. */\n  subject: string;\n  /** Caller-chosen hex nonce, 32-128 characters (even length). */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** Requested expiry, unix ms. Core clamps it to issue time + 5 minutes. */\n  expiresAtMs: number;\n}\n\n/** Namespace-scoped sibling: identical minus `contextId`. */\nexport type IssueNamespaceOwnershipProofRequest = Omit<IssueOwnershipProofRequest, 'contextId'>;\n\nexport interface IssueOwnershipProofResponseData {\n  /** Hex 32-byte ed25519 public key of the signer. */\n  signerPublicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * Base64 opaque UTF-8 JSON bytes of the claim. Verifiers re-parse these exact\n   * bytes and sign over `\"calimero.ownership-claim.v1\\0\" || signedPayload`.\n   */\n  signedPayload: string;\n  /** Base64 64-byte ed25519 signature. */\n  signature: string;\n}\n\n// ---- Group Invitation & Join ----\n\nexport interface CreateGroupInvitationRequest {\n  expirationTimestamp?: number;\n  recursive?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Accounts permitted to admit a claim of this invitation, 64 hex each.\n   *\n   * Omitted or empty is filled in by the node from the group's admins and its\n   * TEE nodes; it refuses to mint if that set comes back empty, because an empty\n   * list on the wire authorises any node to admit. Naming admitters narrows that\n   * set.\n   *\n   * Core signs this list into the invitation, so it cannot be redirected after\n   * the fact.\n   */\n  admitters?: string[];\n  /**\n   * libp2p addresses for those admitters, each including its `/p2p/<peer-id>`\n   * suffix.\n   *\n   * Omitted or empty asks the node to fill them in from addresses it already has\n   * on file \u2014 which is usually what you want. Values supplied here are used as\n   * given rather than merged, on the grounds that a caller naming an address is\n   * correcting the node's view rather than extending it.\n   *\n   * Not signed, so a wrong address costs a failed dial and nothing more.\n   */\n  admitterAddrs?: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface CreateGroupInvitationResponseData {\n  invitation: SignedGroupOpenInvitation;\n  groupName?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateRecursiveGroupInvitationResponseData {\n  invitations: RecursiveInvitationEntry[];\n}\n\nexport interface JoinGroupRequest {\n  invitation: SignedGroupOpenInvitation;\n  groupName?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface JoinGroupResponseData {\n  groupId: string;\n  /** The key the joiner signs with, 64 hex. */\n  memberIdentity: string;\n  /**\n   * The account that key joined as, 64 hex characters. This \u2014 not\n   * `memberIdentity` \u2014 is what every member-addressing endpoint takes, so it\n   * is how the caller addresses the member it just became.\n   */\n  memberAccount: string;\n}\n\n// ---- TEE ----\n\nexport interface TeeInfoResponseData {\n  cloudProvider: string;\n  osImage: string;\n  mrtd: string;\n}\n\nexport interface TeeAttestRequest {\n  nonce: string;\n  applicationId?: string;\n  /**\n   * Bind the node's X25519 transport key into the quote; the response names it\n   * as `transportPublicKey`. See `fetchAttestedTransportKey`.\n   */\n  bindTransportKey?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Also return the Intel-signed collateral the quote is verified against, as\n   * `collateral`, so the quote can be verified with nothing but the node. See\n   * `createQuoteVerifier`. A node that predates it refuses the field.\n   */\n  includeCollateral?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface QuoteHeader {\n  version: number;\n  attestationKeyType: number;\n  teeType: number;\n  qeVendorId: string;\n  userData: string;\n}\n\nexport interface QuoteBody {\n  tdxVersion: string;\n  teeTcbSvn: string;\n  mrseam: string;\n  mrsignerseam: string;\n  seamattributes: string;\n  tdattributes: string;\n  xfam: string;\n  mrtd: string;\n  mrconfigid: string;\n  mrowner: string;\n  mrownerconfig: string;\n  rtmr0: string;\n  rtmr1: string;\n  rtmr2: string;\n  rtmr3: string;\n  reportdata: string;\n  teeTcbSvn2?: string;\n  mrservicetd?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface Quote {\n  header: QuoteHeader;\n  body: QuoteBody;\n  signature: string;\n  attestationKey: string;\n  certificationData: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface TeeAttestResponseData {\n  quoteB64: string;\n  quote: Quote;\n  /** Hex X25519 transport key, present only when the request set `bindTransportKey`. */\n  transportPublicKey?: string;\n  /**\n   * The Intel-signed collateral the quote verifies against, present only when\n   * the request set `includeCollateral` and the quote is not a mock.\n   */\n  collateral?: DcapCollateral;\n}\n\n/**\n * @deprecated Nodes no longer serve `/admin-api/tee/verify-quote` (removed in\n * core#3262), so a request for it fails. Verify quotes with\n * `createQuoteVerifier`.\n */\nexport interface TeeVerifyQuoteRequest {\n  quoteB64: string;\n  nonce: string;\n  expectedApplicationHash?: string;\n}\n\n/** @deprecated See {@link TeeVerifyQuoteRequest}. */\nexport interface TeeVerifyQuoteResponseData {\n  quoteVerified: boolean;\n  nonceVerified: boolean;\n  applicationHashVerified?: boolean;\n  quote: Quote;\n}\n\n// ---- Client Configuration ----\n\nexport interface AdminApiClientConfig {\n  baseUrl: string;\n  getAuthToken?: () => Promise<string | undefined>;\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n}\n\n/** A join signed by its subject, handed to an admitter to publish. */\nexport interface AdmitJoinRequest {\n  /** The invitation being claimed. Must name the admitter in `admitters`. */\n  readonly invitation: SignedGroupOpenInvitation;\n  /**\n   * The signed `SignedNamespaceOp`, borsh-encoded and hex.\n   *\n   * Signed by the joiner's device key, which is what stops an admitter\n   * substituting a different member: peers check the op's signer against the\n   * credential the op carries.\n   */\n  readonly signedOp: string;\n}\n\n/** What the admitter did with it. */\nexport interface AdmitJoinResponseData {\n  /**\n   * Whether the op reached the namespace topic.\n   *\n   * Not \"joined\" \u2014 membership lands when peers apply the op, which the admitter\n   * neither performs nor waits for.\n   */\n  readonly published: boolean;\n}\n", "import { AdminApiClient } from './admin-client.js';\nimport { AdminApiClientConfig } from './admin-types.js';\nimport {\n  HttpClient,\n  createBrowserHttpClient,\n  createNodeHttpClient,\n  createUniversalHttpClient,\n} from '../http-client/index.js';\n\n// Factory functions for creating Admin API clients\n\n/** Admin client over a browser HTTP transport (global `fetch`). */\nexport function createBrowserAdminApiClient(\n  config: AdminApiClientConfig,\n): AdminApiClient {\n  return new AdminApiClient(createBrowserHttpClient(config));\n}\n\n/** Admin client over a Node HTTP transport (Node 18+ `fetch`). */\nexport function createNodeAdminApiClient(\n  config: AdminApiClientConfig,\n): AdminApiClient {\n  return new AdminApiClient(createNodeHttpClient(config));\n}\n\n/** Admin client over whichever transport suits the current runtime. */\nexport function createAdminApiClient(\n  config: AdminApiClientConfig,\n): AdminApiClient {\n  return new AdminApiClient(createUniversalHttpClient(config));\n}\n\n/**\n * Admin client over a caller-supplied HTTP client \u2014 use this to share one\n * transport (and its token handling) with the other API clients.\n */\nexport function createAdminApiClientFromHttpClient(\n  httpClient: HttpClient,\n  _config: AdminApiClientConfig,\n): AdminApiClient {\n  return new AdminApiClient(httpClient);\n}\n", "export interface AuthCallbackResult {\n  accessToken: string;\n  refreshToken: string;\n  applicationId: string;\n  contextId: string;\n  contextIdentity: string;\n  nodeUrl: string;\n}\n\nexport interface AuthLoginOptions {\n  callbackUrl: string;\n  packageName?: string;\n  mode: string;\n  permissions?: string[];\n  registryUrl?: string;\n  packageVersion?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse an auth callback URL hash fragment.\n * Returns null if access_token is missing.\n */\nexport function parseAuthCallback(url: string): AuthCallbackResult | null {\n  try {\n    const hashIndex = url.indexOf('#');\n    if (hashIndex === -1) return null;\n\n    const hash = url.substring(hashIndex + 1);\n    const params = new URLSearchParams(hash);\n\n    const accessToken = params.get('access_token');\n    if (!accessToken) return null;\n\n    return {\n      accessToken,\n      refreshToken: params.get('refresh_token') ?? '',\n      applicationId: params.get('application_id') ?? '',\n      contextId: params.get('context_id') ?? '',\n      contextIdentity: params.get('context_identity') ?? '',\n      nodeUrl: params.get('node_url') ?? '',\n    };\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the auth login URL for redirecting users to the node's auth page.\n */\nexport function buildAuthLoginUrl(nodeUrl: string, opts: AuthLoginOptions): string {\n  const params = new URLSearchParams();\n  params.set('callback-url', opts.callbackUrl);\n\n  if (opts.permissions && opts.permissions.length > 0) {\n    params.set('permissions', opts.permissions.join(','));\n  }\n\n  params.set('mode', opts.mode);\n\n  if (opts.packageName) {\n    params.set('package-name', opts.packageName);\n    if (opts.packageVersion) {\n      params.set('package-version', opts.packageVersion);\n    }\n    if (opts.registryUrl) {\n      params.set('registry-url', opts.registryUrl);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Trim trailing slash from nodeUrl\n  const base = nodeUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n  return `${base}/auth/login?${params.toString()}`;\n}\n", "/**\n * Byte-level primitives shared by everything in this package that signs.\n *\n * Extracted from `warrant/warrant.ts` when the device-cert signer arrived and\n * needed the same `domainHash`, hex handling and ed25519 import. Keeping one\n * copy is the point: these have to stay byte-identical with core, and two\n * copies drifting apart is exactly the failure the byte-parity e2e exists to\n * catch. Internal \u2014 not exported from the package root.\n */\n\nconst PKCS8_ED25519_PREFIX = new Uint8Array([\n  0x30, 0x2e, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x30, 0x05, 0x06, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x70, 0x04,\n  0x22, 0x04, 0x20,\n]);\n\n/** Little-endian u32, for borsh fixed-width fields and epoch counters. */\nexport function u32le(value: number): Uint8Array {\n  const out = new Uint8Array(4);\n  new DataView(out.buffer).setUint32(0, value, true);\n  return out;\n}\n\nexport function hex(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  return Array.from(bytes, (b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');\n}\n\nexport function fromHex(value: string, label: string, expectedBytes: number): Uint8Array {\n  const clean = value.trim();\n  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]*$/.test(clean) || clean.length !== expectedBytes * 2) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `${label} must be ${expectedBytes * 2} hex characters, got ${clean.length}`,\n    );\n  }\n  // Indexed rather than `match(/../g)!`: the length is already validated above,\n  // so the assertion would only be telling the compiler what the guard proved,\n  // and this needs no assertion at all.\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(expectedBytes);\n  for (let i = 0; i < expectedBytes; i += 1) {\n    bytes[i] = Number.parseInt(clean.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);\n  }\n  return bytes;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode hex of an unknown length.\n *\n * The sized {@link fromHex} is the right default \u2014 every key and digest here\n * has a fixed width, and checking it catches a truncated paste at the edge\n * rather than deep inside a signature check. This one exists for the already-\n * encoded structures whose length is genuinely variable: a device certificate,\n * a login statement, a request signature. It still rejects odd-length and\n * non-hex input, so the only check it gives up is the one that cannot apply.\n */\nexport function fromHexUnsized(value: string, label: string): Uint8Array {\n  const clean = value.trim();\n  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]*$/.test(clean) || clean.length % 2 !== 0) {\n    throw new Error(`${label} must be an even number of hex characters`);\n  }\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(clean.length / 2);\n  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i += 1) {\n    bytes[i] = Number.parseInt(clean.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);\n  }\n  return bytes;\n}\n\nexport function u64le(value: number | bigint): Uint8Array {\n  const out = new Uint8Array(8);\n  new DataView(out.buffer).setBigUint64(0, BigInt(value), true);\n  return out;\n}\n\nexport function concat(...parts: Uint8Array[]): Uint8Array {\n  const out = new Uint8Array(parts.reduce((total, p) => total + p.length, 0));\n  let offset = 0;\n  for (const part of parts) {\n    out.set(part, offset);\n    offset += part.length;\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\n/**\n * core's `domain_hash`: SHA-256 over the length-prefixed domain, then each\n * length-prefixed part. The lengths are what stop two different field splits from\n * hashing alike.\n */\nexport async function domainHash(\n  domain: Uint8Array,\n  parts: Uint8Array[],\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [u64le(domain.length), domain];\n  for (const part of parts) {\n    chunks.push(u64le(part.length), part);\n  }\n  return new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', concat(...chunks)),\n  );\n}\n\nexport async function importSigningKey(secretHex: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const seed = fromHex(secretHex, 'deviceSecret', 32);\n  const pkcs8 = concat(PKCS8_ED25519_PREFIX, seed);\n  try {\n    return await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n      'pkcs8',\n      pkcs8,\n      { name: 'Ed25519' },\n      false,\n      ['sign'],\n    );\n  } catch (cause) {\n    // The original message is folded in rather than passed as `cause`: this\n    // package targets ES2020, where `Error` has no `cause` option.\n    const detail = cause instanceof Error ? `: ${cause.message}` : '';\n    throw new Error(\n      'this runtime has no WebCrypto Ed25519, so a warrant cannot be signed ' +\n        'here. Node 18.4+, Safari 17+, Firefox 129+ and Chrome 137+ have it; ' +\n        'otherwise mint the warrant with `merod account warrant`' +\n        detail,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * The public half of an ed25519 seed.\n *\n * Derived rather than taken as an argument, for the reason core does the same: a\n * caller able to name a key it does not hold could produce a warrant it cannot\n * sign, and the field would stop meaning \"who authorised this\".\n */\nexport async function derivePublicKey(secretHex: string): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const seed = fromHex(secretHex, 'deviceSecret', 32);\n  const pkcs8 = concat(PKCS8_ED25519_PREFIX, seed);\n  const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'pkcs8',\n    pkcs8,\n    { name: 'Ed25519' },\n    true,\n    ['sign'],\n  );\n  const jwk = await crypto.subtle.exportKey('jwk', key);\n  const raw = (jwk as JsonWebKey & { x: string }).x;\n  return Uint8Array.from(atob(raw.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/')), (c) =>\n    c.charCodeAt(0),\n  );\n}\n", "/**\n * Sign one HTTP request, so a caller's identity travels with it.\n *\n * This is the bottom link of the chain a delegated client presents. A session\n * has the node mint and remember something; this has the caller prove itself on\n * every call, so the node holds no session state and the same path works\n * whether or not the node runs a login provider at all.\n *\n * ```text\n * account root \u2500\u2500signs\u2500\u2500\u25B6 DeviceCert       cold, once, offline\n * device key   \u2500\u2500signs\u2500\u2500\u25B6 LoginStatement   once per session, hours\n * session key  \u2500\u2500signs\u2500\u2500\u25B6 RequestSig       per call   \u25C0\u2500\u2500 this module\n * ```\n *\n * **The middle link is optional.** A CLI or a server-side job signs with its\n * device key directly and presents two links; a browser keeping the device key\n * behind a hardware or extension boundary mints a session key and presents\n * three. The node's verifier handles both, so which you produce here is a\n * question about where your key lives, not about what the node accepts.\n *\n * **What it binds.** Method, path and a hash of the body. A signature for\n * `GET /a` is not a signature for `POST /a`, for `GET /b`, or for the same call\n * with different arguments.\n *\n * **The path excludes the query string**, deliberately: a proxy may legitimately\n * rewrite it \u2014 a token parameter most of all \u2014 and signing over bytes something\n * else is entitled to change means failing for reasons the caller cannot see.\n * Anything that must be bound belongs in the body.\n *\n * **The method is not normalized.** `HEAD` and `GET` are the same *permission*\n * and the node's permission layer folds them, but they are different requests.\n * Sign the method you are about to send.\n *\n * **Replay inside the window performs the identical request** and is bounded\n * rather than prevented \u2014 keep `expiresAt` short. A warrant, which authorizes a\n * change with lasting effect, carries a nonce ledger for this; a request\n * signature does not.\n *\n * **The byte contract is pinned in core**, at\n * `crates/account/src/tests/request_wire_fixture.rs`, for the same reason the\n * warrant and login ones are: the domains are `pub(crate)` there and the field\n * order is implicit in a `derive`, so nothing on that side forces anyone to\n * notice this file depends on both. This module's test asserts the same vectors.\n */\n\nimport {\n  concat,\n  domainHash,\n  fromHex,\n  hex,\n  importSigningKey,\n  u32le,\n  u64le,\n} from \"../crypto/internal.js\";\n\nconst SIGN_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode(\"calimero.auth.request.v1\");\n\n/**\n * Its own domain, distinct from the signing one.\n *\n * The two are different jobs on the same bytes: this produces the commitment,\n * the other signs over it. Sharing a domain would make the commitment a\n * truncated disclosure of bytes something signs.\n */\nconst BODY_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode(\"calimero.auth.request.body.v1\");\n\n/** A borsh `String`: its own `u32` little-endian length, then the UTF-8. */\nfunction borshString(value: string): Uint8Array {\n  const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(value);\n  return concat(u32le(bytes.length), bytes);\n}\n\n/**\n * Commit to a request body.\n *\n * Always call it, including for a body-less request: an empty body hashes to a\n * value like any other, and there is no \"absent body\" encoding for a verifier\n * to disagree with you about.\n */\nexport async function requestBodyHash(\n  body: Uint8Array | string = new Uint8Array(0),\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const bytes =\n    typeof body === \"string\" ? new TextEncoder().encode(body) : body;\n  return domainHash(BODY_DOMAIN, [bytes]);\n}\n\n/** What a caller is about to send. */\nexport interface RequestSigInput {\n  /**\n   * The HTTP method, exactly as it will appear on the wire \u2014 `GET`, `POST`,\n   * `HEAD`. Not folded: see the module note.\n   */\n  method: string;\n  /**\n   * The path, **without** the query string. `/admin-api/namespaces`, not\n   * `/admin-api/namespaces?token=\u2026`.\n   */\n  path: string;\n  /**\n   * The request body, or nothing. Pass exactly the bytes you will send: the\n   * signature commits to their hash, so a body re-serialized between signing\n   * and sending is a signature for a different request.\n   */\n  body?: Uint8Array | string;\n  /** Unix seconds at signing. */\n  issuedAt: number | bigint;\n  /**\n   * Unix seconds after which the node must refuse it.\n   *\n   * Keep it short \u2014 minutes, not hours. It is what bounds replay, and nothing\n   * else does.\n   */\n  expiresAt: number | bigint;\n  /**\n   * The ed25519 signing secret, hex (32 bytes): the session key on the\n   * three-link chain, the device key on the two-link one.\n   *\n   * Never sent anywhere. It signs locally and only the signature travels.\n   */\n  signerSecret: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign one request and return it hex-encoded, ready to present.\n *\n * Returns the encoding rather than an object for the reason `signWarrant` and\n * `signLoginStatement` do: the signature covers exactly these bytes, and a\n * caller that rebuilt the fields from JSON would have a second spelling able to\n * disagree with what was signed.\n */\nexport async function signRequest(input: RequestSigInput): Promise<string> {\n  const key = await importSigningKey(input.signerSecret);\n  const bodyHash = await requestBodyHash(input.body);\n\n  const issuedAt = u64le(input.issuedAt);\n  const expiresAt = u64le(input.expiresAt);\n\n  const encoder = new TextEncoder();\n  const preimage = await domainHash(SIGN_DOMAIN, [\n    encoder.encode(input.method),\n    encoder.encode(input.path),\n    bodyHash,\n    issuedAt,\n    expiresAt,\n  ]);\n\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign({ name: \"Ed25519\" }, key, preimage),\n  );\n\n  return hex(\n    concat(\n      borshString(input.method),\n      borshString(input.path),\n      bodyHash,\n      issuedAt,\n      expiresAt,\n      signature,\n    ),\n  );\n}\n\n/** Re-exported so a caller can check a hex signer key before signing with it. */\nexport { fromHex };\n", "/**\n * Assemble the credential a node reads from `X-Calimero-Proof`.\n *\n * A request-carried proof is three links, and the node needs all of them in one\n * header: the account root certified the device, the device (optionally)\n * certified a short-lived session key, and that key signed THIS request. Each\n * link is minted by its own function here \u2014 {@link signDeviceCert},\n * {@link signLoginStatement}, {@link signRequest} \u2014 and each already returns\n * the borsh encoding of the Rust type the node deserializes. Rust's\n * `CallerProof` is a plain struct of those three fields, and borsh writes a\n * struct as its fields back to back, so assembling the header is concatenation\n * rather than a fourth encoder.\n *\n * That is worth stating because it is load-bearing and it is not obvious: if it\n * were re-encoded here there would be a second spelling of a signed structure,\n * able to disagree with the one that was signed. `caller-proof.test.ts` pins the\n * concatenation against bytes produced by core itself.\n */\n\nimport { fromHexUnsized, hex, concat } from \"../crypto/internal.js\";\n\n/** The three links, each already hex-encoded by the function that signed it. */\nexport interface CallerProofInput {\n  /**\n   * `signDeviceCert(...)` \u2014 the account root's certificate over the device key,\n   * with the genesis that names the account.\n   */\n  credential: string;\n  /**\n   * `signLoginStatement(...)`, when signing with a session key.\n   *\n   * Omit it on the two-link chain, where the device key signs the request\n   * itself. Omitting is not the same as passing an empty string: borsh writes\n   * `Option` as a tag byte, so the two produce different bytes and only one of\n   * them parses.\n   */\n  session?: string;\n  /** `signRequest(...)` \u2014 the signature over this exact method, path and body. */\n  request: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Concatenate the three links into the header value.\n *\n * Returns hex, ready to present as `X-Calimero-Proof`.\n */\nexport function callerProof(input: CallerProofInput): string {\n  const credential = fromHexUnsized(input.credential, \"credential\");\n  const request = fromHexUnsized(input.request, \"request signature\");\n\n  // Borsh `Option<T>`: a single tag byte, then the value when present. A\n  // two-link chain is `None`, not an empty `Some` \u2014 the node reads the tag\n  // before anything else, so getting it backwards fails to parse rather than\n  // failing to verify, which at least is loud.\n  const session =\n    input.session === undefined\n      ? new Uint8Array([0])\n      : concat(new Uint8Array([1]), fromHexUnsized(input.session, \"session statement\"));\n\n  return hex(concat(credential, session, request));\n}\n", "/**\n * Turn a device key into something the HTTP client can call per request.\n *\n * A session is a bearer token: mint once, present many times. A request-carried\n * proof is the opposite \u2014 it commits to one method, one path and one body, so\n * it has to be produced at the moment of the call, by something holding the\n * signing key. This is that something, shaped like `getAuthToken` so the key\n * stays with the caller and never reaches the transport.\n */\n\nimport { callerProof } from \"./caller-proof.js\";\nimport { signRequest } from \"./request-sig.js\";\n\n/** What the transport knows about the call it is about to make. */\nexport interface ProofRequest {\n  /** `GET`, `POST`, \u2026 exactly as it will be sent. */\n  method: string;\n  /** The URL path the node will see, **without** the query string. */\n  path: string;\n  /** The exact bytes that will be sent, if any. */\n  body?: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface ProofSignerOptions {\n  /** `signDeviceCert(...)`, hex. */\n  credential: string;\n  /**\n   * `signLoginStatement(...)`, hex \u2014 the three-link chain.\n   *\n   * Omit for the two-link chain, where `signerSecret` is the device key itself.\n   */\n  session?: string;\n  /**\n   * The ed25519 secret that signs each request, hex: the session key when\n   * `session` is set, otherwise the device key.\n   */\n  signerSecret: string;\n  /**\n   * How long each signature stays valid. Seconds, default 120.\n   *\n   * This is what bounds replay and nothing else does, so it is deliberately\n   * short and deliberately not configurable to \"never\". A clock skew allowance\n   * lives on the node; this only has to outlive the flight time.\n   */\n  ttlSeconds?: number;\n  /** Unix seconds. Injectable so a test does not depend on the wall clock. */\n  now?: () => number;\n}\n\n/**\n * The bytes a body will actually be sent as.\n *\n * Refuses what it cannot hash without consuming or re-encoding. A stream can be\n * read once, and reading it here would send an empty body; `FormData` and\n * `URLSearchParams` are serialized by `fetch` in ways this cannot reproduce\n * byte for byte. Signing a guess would produce a signature over bytes that\n * never travelled, and the node would reject it with a signature error that\n * says nothing about the real cause \u2014 so this throws, naming the type.\n */\nfunction bodyBytes(body: unknown): Uint8Array | string {\n  if (body === undefined || body === null) return new Uint8Array(0);\n  if (typeof body === \"string\") return body;\n  if (body instanceof Uint8Array) return body;\n  if (body instanceof ArrayBuffer) return new Uint8Array(body);\n  if (ArrayBuffer.isView(body)) {\n    return new Uint8Array(body.buffer, body.byteOffset, body.byteLength);\n  }\n  throw new Error(\n    `a request-carried proof cannot commit to a ${\n      (body as { constructor?: { name?: string } })?.constructor?.name ?? typeof body\n    } body: pass a string or bytes, or use a session for this call`,\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the `X-Calimero-Proof` value for one request.\n *\n * Pass the result to the HTTP client's `getProof`.\n */\nexport function createProofSigner(\n  options: ProofSignerOptions,\n): (request: ProofRequest) => Promise<string> {\n  const ttl = options.ttlSeconds ?? 120;\n  const clock = options.now ?? (() => Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));\n\n  return async (request: ProofRequest): Promise<string> => {\n    const issuedAt = clock();\n    return callerProof({\n      credential: options.credential,\n      session: options.session,\n      request: await signRequest({\n        method: request.method,\n        path: request.path,\n        body: bodyBytes(request.body),\n        issuedAt,\n        expiresAt: issuedAt + ttl,\n        signerSecret: options.signerSecret,\n      }),\n    });\n  };\n}\n", "import type { HttpClient } from '../http-client/index.js';\n\n/** Result of the owner-driven `migrate_my_entries` convert (counts are u32). */\nexport interface MigrateMyEntriesSummary {\n  converted: number;\n  remaining: number;\n}\n\nexport interface ExecuteParams {\n  contextId: string;\n  method: string;\n  argsJson?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** @deprecated No longer used by the server. Ignored if provided. */\n  executorPublicKey?: string;\n}\n\nexport class RpcError extends Error {\n  code: number;\n  type?: string;\n  data?: unknown;\n\n  constructor(code: number, message: string, data?: unknown, type?: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'RpcError';\n    this.code = code;\n    this.data = data;\n    this.type = type;\n  }\n}\n\ninterface JsonRpcResponse {\n  jsonrpc: string;\n  id: number;\n  result?: {\n    output?: unknown;\n    [key: string]: unknown;\n  };\n  error?: {\n    // Standard JSON-RPC fields\n    code?: number;\n    message?: string;\n    // Server-specific fields\n    type?: string;\n    data?: unknown;\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * POST a JSON-RPC call and unwrap `result`, converting an `error` payload into\n * an `RpcError`. The node returns `{ type, data }` (not always `{ code,\n * message }`), so this is the one place that normalization lives \u2014 every\n * JSON-RPC caller in this SDK shares it rather than re-deriving a bare\n * `Error(message)` and dropping the typed detail.\n */\nexport async function jsonRpcCall<T>(\n  httpClient: HttpClient,\n  method: string,\n  params: unknown,\n): Promise<T> {\n  const response = await httpClient.post<JsonRpcResponse>('/jsonrpc', {\n    jsonrpc: '2.0',\n    id: 1,\n    method,\n    params,\n  });\n\n  if (response.error) {\n    const err = response.error;\n    throw new RpcError(err.code ?? -1, err.message ?? err.type ?? 'RPC error', err.data, err.type);\n  }\n\n  return response.result as T;\n}\n\nexport class RpcClient {\n  private httpClient: HttpClient;\n\n  constructor(opts: { httpClient: HttpClient }) {\n    this.httpClient = opts.httpClient;\n  }\n\n  async execute<T = unknown>(params: ExecuteParams): Promise<T> {\n    const result = await jsonRpcCall<JsonRpcResponse['result']>(this.httpClient, 'execute', {\n      contextId: params.contextId,\n      method: params.method,\n      argsJson: params.argsJson ?? {},\n    });\n\n    if (result && 'output' in result) {\n      return result.output as T;\n    }\n\n    return result as T;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * One-tap owner-driven convert: re-signs the caller's identity-gated entries\n   * to the current schema. The export converts all of the caller's\n   * below-target entries in a single sweep, so this issues one call and returns\n   * the resulting summary \u2014 it does not loop.\n   */\n  async migrateMyEntries(contextId: string): Promise<MigrateMyEntriesSummary> {\n    return this.execute<MigrateMyEntriesSummary>({ contextId, method: 'migrate_my_entries' });\n  }\n\n  /** Read-only count of the caller's entries still below the target schema. */\n  async countMyPending(contextId: string): Promise<number> {\n    return this.execute<number>({ contextId, method: 'count_my_pending' });\n  }\n}\n", "/** Parsed group-membership event (core's untagged `NodeEvent` group variant). */\nexport interface GroupMembershipEventData {\n  groupId: string;\n  type: 'MemberJoined' | 'MemberAdded' | 'MemberRemoved';\n  data: {\n    /** The member's ACCOUNT, hex-encoded 32 bytes (64 chars) - the principal the\n     * governance rows name. Not a signing key: the field this replaced\n     * carried one, and both are strings, so the rename is what makes a stale\n     * consumer fail loudly instead of comparing accounts against keys forever. */\n    memberAccount: string;\n    /** Absent on `MemberRemoved`, and on a `MemberJoined` inherited from an Open\n     * subgroup. Core's set is closed. */\n    role?: 'Admin' | 'Member' | 'ReadOnly' | 'ReadOnlyTee';\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * A migration was accepted and its target ABI state version resolved.\n * `toStateVersion` is the `#[app::state(version = N)]` number, not the bundle\n * semver (`toVersion`).\n */\nexport interface MigrationStartedData {\n  fromVersion: string;\n  toVersion: string;\n  toStateVersion: number;\n  /** Contexts the EMITTING NODE enumerated for the migration. Node-local, never\n   * the fleet cohort size that `MigrationProgressData.total` carries. */\n  localContextsTotal: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Fleet rollup counters, recomputed as peers' heartbeat facts change. Counters\n * only: the per-member detail behind them stays in the admin-gated\n * `getMigrationStatus` read.\n */\nexport interface MigrationProgressData {\n  migrated: number;\n  inProgress: number;\n  unknown: number;\n  failed: number;\n  /** The pinned FLEET COHORT size, never a node-local context count like\n   * `MigrationStartedData.localContextsTotal`. */\n  total: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * One subgroup's local context swaps advanced on the emitting node.\n *\n * Admin-only: it names a descendant subgroup, which a plain namespace member\n * may not enumerate, so core withholds it from non-admin subscribers. A\n * non-admin never receiving this variant is correct behaviour, not a gap.\n */\nexport interface CascadeProgressData {\n  /** Hex-encoded descendant subgroup id, never the namespace root the event is\n   * keyed on. */\n  subgroupId: string;\n  localContextsSwapped: number;\n  /** Contexts the emitting node holds for THIS SUBGROUP. Node-local and\n   * per-subgroup; unrelated to both sibling totals. */\n  localContextsTotal: number;\n}\n\n/** Every pinned-cohort member reported the target version. */\nexport interface MigrationCompletedData {\n  toVersion: string;\n  /** FLEET convergence, in seconds since the epoch: the same stamp\n   * `MigrationStatus.fleetCompletedAt` returns. Not `GroupUpgradeStatus.completedAt`,\n   * which is this node's own local swap completion. */\n  completedAt: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parsed group-migration event (core's `GroupMigration` `NodeEvent` variant),\n * keyed on the namespace root a client subscribes with.\n *\n * `MigrationStarted`, `MigrationProgress` and `MigrationCompleted` reach every\n * subscribed member; `CascadeProgress` reaches namespace admins only.\n */\nexport type GroupMigrationEventData =\n  | { groupId: string; type: 'MigrationStarted'; data: MigrationStartedData }\n  | { groupId: string; type: 'MigrationProgress'; data: MigrationProgressData }\n  | { groupId: string; type: 'CascadeProgress'; data: CascadeProgressData }\n  | { groupId: string; type: 'MigrationCompleted'; data: MigrationCompletedData };\n\nconst MIGRATION_EVENT_TYPES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  'MigrationStarted',\n  'MigrationProgress',\n  'CascadeProgress',\n  'MigrationCompleted',\n]);\n\n/** Narrows a raw `'event'` payload to the group-migration family by its tag. */\nexport function isGroupMigrationEvent(\n  event: { type?: string },\n): event is GroupMigrationEventData {\n  return event.type !== undefined && MIGRATION_EVENT_TYPES.has(event.type);\n}\n", "import type { GroupMembershipEventData, GroupMigrationEventData } from './group.js';\nimport { isGroupMigrationEvent } from './group.js';\nimport { AuthRevokedError, HTTPError } from '../http-client/index.js';\n\n/**\n * `x-auth-error` reasons that mean the whole token family is gone, mirroring\n * the request path in `web-client.ts`. Anything else \u2014 `token_expired` above\n * all \u2014 is recoverable by refreshing and reconnecting.\n */\nconst TERMINAL_AUTH_ERRORS = new Set(['token_reuse', 'token_revoked']);\n\n/**\n * Statuses a terminal `x-auth-error` can arrive on.\n *\n * Measured against merod 0.11.0-rc.41: a revoked token family answers\n * `GET /sse` and `POST /sse/subscription` with **403**, `x-auth-error:\n * token_revoked` and `content-length: 0` \u2014 `token_expired` is the 401.\n * Keying the check on 401 alone made the branch below unreachable for the one\n * reason a stream actually sees, so a dead token family surfaced as a bare\n * `HTTPError(403)` and reconnected on a timer forever.\n */\nconst TERMINAL_AUTH_STATUSES = new Set([401, 403]);\n\n/**\n * Whether a failed response means the whole token family is gone, so the caller\n * must re-authenticate and the client must stop reconnecting.\n *\n * The body carries nothing on this path (`content-length: 0`), so the header is\n * the only evidence there is.\n */\nfunction isTerminalAuthFailure(response: { status: number; headers: Headers }): string | null {\n  const authError = response.headers.get('x-auth-error');\n  if (!authError) return null;\n  if (!TERMINAL_AUTH_STATUSES.has(response.status)) return null;\n  return TERMINAL_AUTH_ERRORS.has(authError) ? authError : null;\n}\n\nexport type { GroupMembershipEventData, GroupMigrationEventData };\n\nexport interface SseEventData {\n  contextId: string;\n  /** The context-event discriminator (core serializes it as a sibling of\n   * `data`, e.g. `\"AppVersionChanged\"`). Undefined for events without a tag. */\n  type?: string;\n  data: unknown;\n}\n\n/** Parsed `AppVersionChanged` context event (bundle-version flip; skew #2). */\nexport interface AppVersionChangedEvent {\n  contextId: string;\n  fromVersion?: string;\n  toVersion?: string;\n}\n\n/** Anything the `'event'` stream can deliver: context events plus the\n * group-keyed membership and migration families. */\ntype SseEvent = SseEventData | GroupMembershipEventData | GroupMigrationEventData;\ntype SseEventHandler = (event: SseEvent) => void;\ntype SseConnectHandler = (sessionId: string) => void;\ntype SseErrorHandler = (error: Error) => void;\n\ninterface SseListeners {\n  connect: SseConnectHandler[];\n  event: SseEventHandler[];\n  error: SseErrorHandler[];\n}\n\nexport class SseClient {\n  private baseUrl: string;\n  private getAuthToken: () => Promise<string>;\n  private reconnectDelayMs: number;\n  private sessionId: string | null = null;\n  private abortController: AbortController | null = null;\n  private reconnectTimer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null = null;\n  private subscribedContextIds: Set<string> = new Set();\n  private subscribedGroupIds: Set<string> = new Set();\n  private closed = false;\n  private listeners: SseListeners = { connect: [], event: [], error: [] };\n  private fetchImpl: typeof fetch;\n\n  constructor(opts: {\n    baseUrl: string;\n    getAuthToken: () => Promise<string>;\n    reconnectDelayMs?: number;\n    fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  }) {\n    this.baseUrl = opts.baseUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n    this.getAuthToken = opts.getAuthToken;\n    this.reconnectDelayMs = opts.reconnectDelayMs ?? 3000;\n    // globalThis.fetch must be called as a method on globalThis, not through a\n    // variable, or browsers throw \"Illegal invocation\".\n    this.fetchImpl = (url: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) =>\n      opts.fetch ? opts.fetch(url, init) : globalThis.fetch(url, init);\n  }\n\n  on(event: 'connect', handler: SseConnectHandler): void;\n  on(event: 'event', handler: SseEventHandler): void;\n  on(event: 'error', handler: SseErrorHandler): void;\n  on(event: string, handler: SseConnectHandler | SseEventHandler | SseErrorHandler): void {\n    const key = event as keyof SseListeners;\n    if (key in this.listeners) {\n      // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n      const arr = this.listeners[key] as any[];\n      if (!arr.includes(handler)) arr.push(handler);\n    }\n  }\n\n  off(event: 'connect', handler: SseConnectHandler): void;\n  off(event: 'event', handler: SseEventHandler): void;\n  off(event: 'error', handler: SseErrorHandler): void;\n  off(event: string, handler: SseConnectHandler | SseEventHandler | SseErrorHandler): void {\n    const key = event as keyof SseListeners;\n    if (key in this.listeners) {\n      // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n      const arr = this.listeners[key] as any[];\n      const idx = arr.indexOf(handler);\n      if (idx !== -1) arr.splice(idx, 1);\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Typed convenience over the generic `'event'` stream: invokes `handler` only\n   * for `AppVersionChanged` context events, with the payload already parsed.\n   * Returns an unsubscribe closure (so callers need not retain the listener).\n   */\n  onAppVersionChanged(handler: (e: AppVersionChangedEvent) => void): () => void {\n    const listener: SseEventHandler = (ev) => {\n      // Core flattens the tagged payload: the event carries `type` as a sibling\n      // of `data`, and `data` is the `{ fromVersion?, toVersion? }` payload.\n      if (ev.type !== 'AppVersionChanged') return;\n      const d = ev.data as { fromVersion?: string; toVersion?: string } | undefined;\n      handler({ contextId: ev.contextId, fromVersion: d?.fromVersion, toVersion: d?.toVersion });\n    };\n    this.on('event', listener);\n    return () => this.off('event', listener);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Typed convenience over the generic `'event'` stream: invokes `handler` only\n   * for group-migration events, narrowed on `type` so `data` is the matching\n   * payload. Returns an unsubscribe closure.\n   *\n   * A non-admin subscriber sees `MigrationStarted`, `MigrationProgress` and\n   * `MigrationCompleted` but never `CascadeProgress`, which core delivers to\n   * namespace admins only.\n   */\n  onMigrationEvent(handler: (e: GroupMigrationEventData) => void): () => void {\n    const listener: SseEventHandler = (ev) => {\n      if (isGroupMigrationEvent(ev)) handler(ev);\n    };\n    this.on('event', listener);\n    return () => this.off('event', listener);\n  }\n\n  private emit(event: 'connect', sessionId: string): void;\n  private emit(event: 'event', data: SseEvent): void;\n  private emit(event: 'error', error: Error): void;\n  private emit(event: string, arg?: string | SseEvent | Error): void {\n    const key = event as keyof SseListeners;\n    if (key in this.listeners) {\n      for (const handler of this.listeners[key]) {\n        try {\n          // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n          (handler as any)(arg);\n        } catch {\n          // Swallow handler errors\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  async connect(): Promise<void> {\n    // Already connected \u2014 don't reconnect\n    if (this.abortController && !this.closed) {\n      return;\n    }\n    this.closed = false;\n    this.abortController = new AbortController();\n\n    try {\n      const token = await this.getAuthToken();\n      const url = `${this.baseUrl}/sse`;\n      const response = await this.fetchImpl(url, {\n        headers: {\n          'Authorization': `Bearer ${token}`,\n          'Accept': 'text/event-stream',\n        },\n        signal: this.abortController.signal,\n      });\n\n      if (!response.ok) {\n        // Throw the same typed errors the request path throws. A bare\n        // `Error(\"SSE connection failed: 401\")` forced callers to string-match\n        // the status and guess what it meant, and the honest guess \u2014 treat any\n        // 401 as fatal \u2014 logs the user out on a routine reconnect after the\n        // access token ages out, discarding a refresh token that was still\n        // good. The distinction is in the header; surface it.\n        const terminal = isTerminalAuthFailure(response);\n        const bodyText = await response.text().catch(() => undefined);\n\n        if (terminal) {\n          throw new AuthRevokedError(\n            terminal,\n            response.status,\n            response.statusText,\n            url,\n            response.headers,\n            bodyText,\n          );\n        }\n\n        throw new HTTPError(\n          response.status,\n          response.statusText,\n          url,\n          response.headers,\n          bodyText,\n        );\n      }\n\n      if (!response.body) {\n        throw new Error('SSE response has no body');\n      }\n\n      this.readStream(response.body).catch((err) => {\n        if (this.closed) return;\n        const error = err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err));\n        this.emit('error', error);\n        this.scheduleReconnect();\n      });\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (this.closed) return;\n      const error = err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err));\n      this.emit('error', error);\n      // Reconnecting against a revoked token family is a timer that never\n      // succeeds: every attempt re-sends the same dead credential. The caller\n      // has to re-authenticate, and an AuthRevokedError is how it is told.\n      if (error instanceof AuthRevokedError) return;\n      this.scheduleReconnect();\n    }\n  }\n\n  private async readStream(body: ReadableStream<Uint8Array>): Promise<void> {\n    const reader = body.getReader();\n    const decoder = new TextDecoder();\n    let buffer = '';\n\n    try {\n      for (;;) {\n        const { done, value } = await reader.read();\n        if (done) break;\n\n        buffer += decoder.decode(value, { stream: true });\n\n        const lines = buffer.split('\\n');\n        // Keep the last partial line in the buffer\n        buffer = lines.pop() ?? '';\n\n        for (const line of lines) {\n          if (line.startsWith('data:')) {\n            const jsonStr = line.slice(5).trim();\n            if (jsonStr) {\n              this.handleMessage(jsonStr);\n            }\n          }\n        }\n      }\n      // Flush remaining bytes from the decoder\n      buffer += decoder.decode();\n      if (buffer.startsWith('data:')) {\n        const jsonStr = buffer.slice(5).trim();\n        if (jsonStr) {\n          this.handleMessage(jsonStr);\n        }\n      }\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (this.closed) return;\n      const error = err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err));\n      this.emit('error', error);\n    }\n\n    // Stream ended, reconnect\n    if (!this.closed) {\n      this.scheduleReconnect();\n    }\n  }\n\n  private handleMessage(jsonStr: string): void {\n    try {\n      const msg = JSON.parse(jsonStr);\n\n      // Connection message\n      if (msg.type === 'connect' && msg.session_id) {\n        this.sessionId = msg.session_id;\n        this.emit('connect', msg.session_id);\n        // Re-subscribe after reconnect\n        if (this.subscribedContextIds.size > 0 || this.subscribedGroupIds.size > 0) {\n          this.sendSubscription('subscribe', {\n            contextIds: [...this.subscribedContextIds],\n            groupIds: [...this.subscribedGroupIds],\n          });\n        }\n        return;\n      }\n\n      if (!msg.result) return;\n\n      let eventData = msg.result.data;\n      // Decode byte-array data if needed\n      if (Array.isArray(eventData)) {\n        try {\n          const bytes = new Uint8Array(eventData);\n          const text = new TextDecoder().decode(bytes);\n          eventData = JSON.parse(text);\n        } catch {\n          // Keep raw data\n        }\n      }\n\n      // Context event message\n      if (msg.result.contextId) {\n        this.emit('event', {\n          contextId: msg.result.contextId,\n          // Forward the event tag (sibling of `data` in core's flattened\n          // payload) so typed helpers like `onAppVersionChanged` can discriminate.\n          type: msg.result.type,\n          data: eventData,\n        });\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Group-keyed event message (untagged NodeEvent's membership and\n      // migration variants; the `type` tag tells them apart).\n      if (msg.result.groupId) {\n        this.emit('event', {\n          groupId: msg.result.groupId,\n          type: msg.result.type,\n          data: eventData,\n        });\n      }\n    } catch {\n      // Invalid JSON, ignore\n    }\n  }\n\n  async subscribe(idsOrOpts: string[] | { contextIds?: string[]; groupIds?: string[] }): Promise<void> {\n    const opts = Array.isArray(idsOrOpts) ? { contextIds: idsOrOpts } : idsOrOpts;\n    const newContextIds = (opts.contextIds ?? []).filter(id => !this.subscribedContextIds.has(id));\n    const newGroupIds = (opts.groupIds ?? []).filter(id => !this.subscribedGroupIds.has(id));\n    for (const id of opts.contextIds ?? []) {\n      this.subscribedContextIds.add(id);\n    }\n    for (const id of opts.groupIds ?? []) {\n      this.subscribedGroupIds.add(id);\n    }\n    if ((newContextIds.length > 0 || newGroupIds.length > 0) && this.sessionId) {\n      await this.sendSubscription('subscribe', { contextIds: newContextIds, groupIds: newGroupIds });\n    }\n  }\n\n  async unsubscribe(idsOrOpts: string[] | { contextIds?: string[]; groupIds?: string[] }): Promise<void> {\n    const opts = Array.isArray(idsOrOpts) ? { contextIds: idsOrOpts } : idsOrOpts;\n    const hadContextIds = (opts.contextIds ?? []).filter(id => this.subscribedContextIds.has(id));\n    const hadGroupIds = (opts.groupIds ?? []).filter(id => this.subscribedGroupIds.has(id));\n    for (const id of opts.contextIds ?? []) {\n      this.subscribedContextIds.delete(id);\n    }\n    for (const id of opts.groupIds ?? []) {\n      this.subscribedGroupIds.delete(id);\n    }\n    if ((hadContextIds.length > 0 || hadGroupIds.length > 0) && this.sessionId) {\n      await this.sendSubscription('unsubscribe', { contextIds: hadContextIds, groupIds: hadGroupIds });\n    }\n  }\n\n  private async sendSubscription(\n    method: 'subscribe' | 'unsubscribe',\n    ids: { contextIds?: string[]; groupIds?: string[] },\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    try {\n      const token = await this.getAuthToken();\n      const params: { contextIds?: string[]; groupIds?: string[] } = {};\n      if (ids.contextIds && ids.contextIds.length > 0) params.contextIds = ids.contextIds;\n      if (ids.groupIds && ids.groupIds.length > 0) params.groupIds = ids.groupIds;\n      const response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/sse/subscription`, {\n        method: 'POST',\n        headers: {\n          'Authorization': `Bearer ${token}`,\n          'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n        },\n        body: JSON.stringify({\n          id: this.sessionId,\n          method,\n          params,\n        }),\n      });\n      if (!response.ok) {\n        // The subscribe path used to report only the status. On the one failure\n        // that matters it is the whole of what the caller got: a revoked family\n        // answers 403 with an empty body, so a bare `SSE subscribe failed: 403`\n        // discarded the only evidence of what went wrong \u2014 and a 403 here reads\n        // identically to the unrelated \"not the session owner\" refusal, which\n        // does carry a body.\n        const terminal = isTerminalAuthFailure(response);\n        const bodyText = await response.text().catch(() => undefined);\n        this.emit(\n          'error',\n          terminal\n            ? new AuthRevokedError(\n                terminal,\n                response.status,\n                response.statusText,\n                `${this.baseUrl}/sse/subscription`,\n                response.headers,\n                bodyText,\n              )\n            : new HTTPError(\n                response.status,\n                response.statusText,\n                `${this.baseUrl}/sse/subscription`,\n                response.headers,\n                bodyText,\n              ),\n        );\n      }\n    } catch (err) {\n      this.emit('error', err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(`SSE ${method} failed`));\n    }\n  }\n\n  private forceReconnect(): void {\n    if (this.abortController) {\n      this.abortController.abort();\n      this.abortController = null;\n    }\n    this.sessionId = null;\n    this.connect();\n  }\n\n  private scheduleReconnect(): void {\n    if (this.closed) return;\n    if (this.reconnectTimer) {\n      clearTimeout(this.reconnectTimer);\n    }\n    this.reconnectTimer = setTimeout(() => {\n      this.reconnectTimer = null;\n      this.forceReconnect();\n    }, this.reconnectDelayMs);\n  }\n\n  close(): void {\n    this.closed = true;\n    if (this.abortController) {\n      this.abortController.abort();\n      this.abortController = null;\n    }\n    if (this.reconnectTimer) {\n      clearTimeout(this.reconnectTimer);\n      this.reconnectTimer = null;\n    }\n    this.sessionId = null;\n    this.subscribedContextIds.clear();\n    this.subscribedGroupIds.clear();\n  }\n}\n", "import type { GroupMembershipEventData, GroupMigrationEventData } from './group.js';\n\nexport type { GroupMembershipEventData, GroupMigrationEventData };\n\nexport interface WsEventData {\n  contextId: string;\n  /** The context-event discriminator (core serializes it as a sibling of\n   * `data`, e.g. `\"AppVersionChanged\"`). Undefined for events without a tag. */\n  type?: string;\n  data: unknown;\n}\n\n/** Anything the `'event'` stream can deliver: context events plus the\n * group-keyed membership and migration families. */\ntype WsEvent = WsEventData | GroupMembershipEventData | GroupMigrationEventData;\ntype WsEventHandler = (event: WsEvent) => void;\ntype WsConnectHandler = () => void;\ntype WsErrorHandler = (error: Error) => void;\n\ninterface WsListeners {\n  connect: WsConnectHandler[];\n  event: WsEventHandler[];\n  error: WsErrorHandler[];\n}\n\n/**\n * @experimental WebSocket event client. The SSE client (`SseClient`) is the\n * recommended transport for production \u2014 use `MeroJs.events` instead of `MeroJs.ws`.\n */\nexport class WsClient {\n  private baseUrl: string;\n  private getAuthToken: () => Promise<string>;\n  private ws: WebSocket | null = null;\n  private closed = false;\n  private reconnectAttempt = 0;\n  private reconnectTimer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null = null;\n  private subscribedContextIds: Set<string> = new Set();\n  private subscribedGroupIds: Set<string> = new Set();\n  private listeners: WsListeners = { connect: [], event: [], error: [] };\n\n  private static readonly MAX_BACKOFF_MS = 30000;\n\n  constructor(opts: {\n    baseUrl: string;\n    getAuthToken: () => Promise<string>;\n  }) {\n    this.baseUrl = opts.baseUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n    this.getAuthToken = opts.getAuthToken;\n  }\n\n  on(event: 'connect', handler: WsConnectHandler): void;\n  on(event: 'event', handler: WsEventHandler): void;\n  on(event: 'error', handler: WsErrorHandler): void;\n  on(event: string, handler: WsConnectHandler | WsEventHandler | WsErrorHandler): void {\n    const key = event as keyof WsListeners;\n    if (key in this.listeners) {\n      // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n      const arr = this.listeners[key] as any[];\n      if (!arr.includes(handler)) arr.push(handler);\n    }\n  }\n\n  off(event: 'connect', handler: WsConnectHandler): void;\n  off(event: 'event', handler: WsEventHandler): void;\n  off(event: 'error', handler: WsErrorHandler): void;\n  off(event: string, handler: WsConnectHandler | WsEventHandler | WsErrorHandler): void {\n    const key = event as keyof WsListeners;\n    if (key in this.listeners) {\n      // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n      const arr = this.listeners[key] as any[];\n      const idx = arr.indexOf(handler);\n      if (idx !== -1) arr.splice(idx, 1);\n    }\n  }\n\n  private emit(event: 'connect'): void;\n  private emit(event: 'event', data: WsEvent): void;\n  private emit(event: 'error', error: Error): void;\n  private emit(event: string, arg?: WsEvent | Error): void {\n    const key = event as keyof WsListeners;\n    if (key in this.listeners) {\n      for (const handler of this.listeners[key]) {\n        try {\n          // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n          (handler as any)(arg);\n        } catch {\n          // Swallow handler errors\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  async connect(): Promise<void> {\n    if (this.ws && (this.ws.readyState === 0 /* CONNECTING */ || this.ws.readyState === 1 /* OPEN */)) {\n      return;\n    }\n    this.closed = false;\n\n    try {\n      const token = await this.getAuthToken();\n      if (!token) {\n        throw new Error('No authentication token available for WebSocket connection');\n      }\n      // Browser WebSocket API can't set headers, use query param\n      const wsUrl = this.baseUrl.replace(/^http/, 'ws');\n      this.ws = new WebSocket(`${wsUrl}/ws?token=${encodeURIComponent(token)}`);\n\n      this.ws.onopen = () => {\n        this.reconnectAttempt = 0;\n        this.emit('connect');\n        this.resubscribeAfterReconnect();\n      };\n\n      this.ws.onmessage = (event) => {\n        this.handleMessage(event.data);\n      };\n\n      this.ws.onerror = () => {\n        this.emit('error', new Error('WebSocket error'));\n      };\n\n      this.ws.onclose = () => {\n        if (!this.closed) {\n          this.scheduleReconnect();\n        }\n      };\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (this.closed) return;\n      const error = err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err));\n      this.emit('error', error);\n      this.scheduleReconnect();\n    }\n  }\n\n  private handleMessage(raw: string | ArrayBuffer | Blob): void {\n    if (typeof raw !== 'string') return;\n\n    try {\n      const msg = JSON.parse(raw);\n\n      if (!msg.result) return;\n\n      let eventData = msg.result.data;\n      if (Array.isArray(eventData)) {\n        try {\n          const bytes = new Uint8Array(eventData);\n          const text = new TextDecoder().decode(bytes);\n          eventData = JSON.parse(text);\n        } catch {\n          // Keep raw data\n        }\n      }\n\n      if (msg.result.contextId) {\n        this.emit('event', {\n          contextId: msg.result.contextId,\n          // Forward the event tag (sibling of `data` in core's flattened\n          // payload) so consumers can discriminate, matching `SseClient`.\n          type: msg.result.type,\n          data: eventData,\n        });\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Group-keyed event message (untagged NodeEvent's membership and\n      // migration variants; the `type` tag tells them apart).\n      if (msg.result.groupId) {\n        this.emit('event', {\n          groupId: msg.result.groupId,\n          type: msg.result.type,\n          data: eventData,\n        });\n      }\n    } catch {\n      // Invalid JSON, ignore\n    }\n  }\n\n  subscribe(idsOrOpts: string[] | { contextIds?: string[]; groupIds?: string[] }): void {\n    const opts = Array.isArray(idsOrOpts) ? { contextIds: idsOrOpts } : idsOrOpts;\n    for (const id of opts.contextIds ?? []) {\n      this.subscribedContextIds.add(id);\n    }\n    for (const id of opts.groupIds ?? []) {\n      this.subscribedGroupIds.add(id);\n    }\n\n    if (this.ws && this.ws.readyState === 1 /* OPEN */) {\n      this.sendMessage({\n        id: null,\n        method: 'subscribe',\n        params: this.buildSubscriptionParams(opts.contextIds ?? [], opts.groupIds ?? []),\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  unsubscribe(idsOrOpts: string[] | { contextIds?: string[]; groupIds?: string[] }): void {\n    const opts = Array.isArray(idsOrOpts) ? { contextIds: idsOrOpts } : idsOrOpts;\n    for (const id of opts.contextIds ?? []) {\n      this.subscribedContextIds.delete(id);\n    }\n    for (const id of opts.groupIds ?? []) {\n      this.subscribedGroupIds.delete(id);\n    }\n\n    if (this.ws && this.ws.readyState === 1 /* OPEN */) {\n      this.sendMessage({\n        id: null,\n        method: 'unsubscribe',\n        params: this.buildSubscriptionParams(opts.contextIds ?? [], opts.groupIds ?? []),\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  private resubscribeAfterReconnect(): void {\n    if (this.subscribedContextIds.size === 0 && this.subscribedGroupIds.size === 0) return;\n    this.sendMessage({\n      id: null,\n      method: 'subscribe',\n      params: this.buildSubscriptionParams([...this.subscribedContextIds], [...this.subscribedGroupIds]),\n    });\n  }\n\n  private buildSubscriptionParams(\n    contextIds: string[],\n    groupIds: string[],\n  ): { contextIds?: string[]; groupIds?: string[] } {\n    const params: { contextIds?: string[]; groupIds?: string[] } = {};\n    if (contextIds.length > 0) params.contextIds = contextIds;\n    if (groupIds.length > 0) params.groupIds = groupIds;\n    return params;\n  }\n\n  private sendMessage(msg: unknown): void {\n    if (this.ws && this.ws.readyState === 1 /* OPEN */) {\n      this.ws.send(JSON.stringify(msg));\n    }\n  }\n\n  private scheduleReconnect(): void {\n    if (this.closed) return;\n    if (this.reconnectTimer) {\n      clearTimeout(this.reconnectTimer);\n    }\n    const delay = Math.min(\n      1000 * Math.pow(2, this.reconnectAttempt),\n      WsClient.MAX_BACKOFF_MS,\n    );\n    this.reconnectAttempt++;\n    this.reconnectTimer = setTimeout(() => {\n      this.reconnectTimer = null;\n      this.connect();\n    }, delay);\n  }\n\n  close(): void {\n    this.closed = true;\n    if (this.reconnectTimer) {\n      clearTimeout(this.reconnectTimer);\n      this.reconnectTimer = null;\n    }\n    if (this.ws) {\n      this.ws.onclose = null;\n      this.ws.close();\n      this.ws = null;\n    }\n    this.subscribedContextIds.clear();\n    this.subscribedGroupIds.clear();\n  }\n}\n", "import type { Codec } from './types.js';\n\n/** Default codec: JSON text as a byte array. The wire carries `state` as\n * `number[]`, not a string, so this encodes to bytes rather than to text. */\nexport function jsonCodec<T>(): Codec<T> {\n  return {\n    encode(value: T): number[] {\n      return Array.from(new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(value)));\n    },\n    decode(bytes: number[]): T {\n      return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(new Uint8Array(bytes))) as T;\n    },\n  };\n}\n", "import type { HttpClient } from '../http-client/index.js';\nimport type { SseClient } from '../events/index.js';\nimport { jsonRpcCall } from '../rpc/index.js';\nimport { jsonCodec } from './codec.js';\nimport type { Codec, EphemeralEntry } from './types.js';\n\nexport { jsonCodec };\nexport type { Codec, EphemeralEntry };\n\n/**\n * Ephemeral presence: transient, encrypted, never-persisted state (cursors,\n * typing, presence) that gossips between nodes without a WASM run or DAG\n * growth.\n *\n * The write/read asymmetry is the model, not an oversight. `set` takes no\n * author: you can only ever write your OWN slot, and the node resolves the\n * author server-side from its owned context identity \u2014 which is also why a\n * client cannot publish as somebody else. `subscribe` returns everyone's\n * slots, so each carries its `author`. The store is N independent\n * single-writer registers keyed by author; there is no merge across authors.\n *\n * There is a single read path: `subscribe`. On subscribing to a context, the\n * node replays that context's current presence to this connection as\n * ordinary `Ephemeral` events (carrying `ageMs`), before any live deltas\n * (which carry no `ageMs`). There is no separate snapshot RPC.\n */\nexport class EphemeralClient {\n  private httpClient: HttpClient;\n  private sse: SseClient;\n\n  constructor(opts: { httpClient: HttpClient; sse: SseClient }) {\n    this.httpClient = opts.httpClient;\n    this.sse = opts.sse;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Publish your own presence slice, replacing it wholesale.\n   *\n   * Rejects with an `RpcError` (not a bare `Error`), so a typed failure such as\n   * an oversized slice keeps its `type` and `data` \u2014 e.g. `SliceTooLarge` with\n   * the offending size \u2014 and is `instanceof RpcError` like every other RPC in\n   * this SDK.\n   */\n  async set<T>(contextId: string, state: T, codec: Codec<T> = jsonCodec<T>()): Promise<void> {\n    await jsonRpcCall<Record<string, never>>(this.httpClient, 'set_ephemeral', {\n      contextId,\n      state: codec.encode(state),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Observe presence changes for a context.\n   *\n   * This adds NO transport \u2014 it is a typed filter over the existing SSE event\n   * stream, which already carries `{ contextId, type, data }`. On subscribing,\n   * the node replays that context's current presence to this connection as\n   * ordinary `Ephemeral` events before any live deltas; a replayed entry\n   * carries `ageMs`, a live delta does not (never synthesized as `0` \u2014 absent\n   * and zero mean different things). Returns an unsubscribe function.\n   */\n  subscribe<T>(\n    contextId: string,\n    handler: (entry: EphemeralEntry<T>) => void,\n    codec: Codec<T> = jsonCodec<T>(),\n  ): () => void {\n    const listener = (event: unknown): void => {\n      const e = event as { contextId?: string; type?: string; data?: unknown };\n      if (e.type !== 'Ephemeral' || e.contextId !== contextId) return;\n\n      const data = e.data as\n        | { author?: string; state?: number[]; removed?: boolean; ageMs?: number }\n        | undefined;\n      if (!data?.author) return;\n\n      // `removed` is omitted on an upsert, so normalize to a boolean here and\n      // spare every caller the truthiness rule.\n      const removed = Boolean(data.removed);\n      const entry: EphemeralEntry<T> = {\n        author: data.author,\n        state: removed || data.state === undefined ? undefined : codec.decode(data.state),\n        removed,\n      };\n      // `ageMs` is present only on a replayed seed entry; pass it through as-is\n      // rather than defaulting a live delta to 0.\n      if (data.ageMs !== undefined) entry.ageMs = data.ageMs;\n      handler(entry);\n    };\n\n    this.sse.on('event', listener);\n    // Errors surface via the SSE client's own 'error' event; nothing more to\n    // do with them here.\n    void this.sse.connect().catch(() => undefined);\n    void this.sse.subscribe([contextId]).catch(() => undefined);\n\n    return () => {\n      this.sse.off('event', listener);\n    };\n  }\n}\n", "/**\n * Minting and certifying a device offline, with a key that never reaches a node.\n *\n * This is the second half of the keyholder story. `signWarrant` lets an account\n * with no node *write*; this lets one exist in the first place \u2014 an account root\n * certifies a device, and the resulting credential is what a joiner presents.\n *\n * As with the warrant signer, the risk is that this reproduces core's encoding\n * and has to keep doing so. The answer is the same: a golden vector here, and an\n * e2e that diffs this output against `merod account sign-cert` byte for byte.\n *\n * Everything below is derived from core:\n *\n * - `DeviceCert::signing_payload` \u2014 `crates/account/src/device.rs`\n * - `DeviceId::mint`              \u2014 `crates/primitives/src/identity.rs`\n * - `AccountProof` / `AccountGenesis` borsh layout \u2014 `crates/account/src/{signed,account}.rs`\n */\nimport {\n  concat,\n  derivePublicKey,\n  domainHash,\n  fromHex,\n  hex,\n  importSigningKey,\n  u32le,\n} from '../crypto/internal.js';\n\nconst CERT_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode('calimero.device.cert.v1');\nconst ACCOUNT_ID_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode('calimero.account.genesis.v1');\nconst DEVICE_ID_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode('calimero.device.id.v1');\n\n/** `AccountGenesis::version`, which the credential's borsh encoding leads with. */\n/**\n * Core's `ACCOUNT_GENESIS_VERSION`. It is part of the `AccountId` preimage, so\n * this value decides which account a root key names \u2014 a mismatch does not fail\n * as a version error at the edge, it silently derives a different account and\n * core refuses the credential as unverifiable.\n *\n * `2` since the genesis dropped its per-namespace nonce. This was `1`, which\n * produced credentials current core rejects outright; the shape was already v2,\n * only the tag was stale.\n */\nconst ACCOUNT_GENESIS_VERSION = 2;\n\n/** What a root certifies about one device. */\nexport interface DeviceCertInput {\n  /** The account root's signing secret, 64 hex. Signs the certificate. */\n  rootSecret: string;\n  /** The device being certified, 64 hex \u2014 see {@link mintDeviceId}. */\n  device: string;\n  /** The key that device signs with, 64 hex. */\n  signPublicKey: string;\n  /** The key the group key is delivered to, 64 hex (X25519). */\n  kemPublicKey: string;\n  /**\n   * Must strictly exceed any epoch already folded for this device.\n   *\n   * The projection refuses a link that does not advance it, so a re-issued\n   * certificate reusing an epoch is inert rather than a rollback.\n   */\n  deviceEpoch: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a device id: `H(DEVICE_ID_DOMAIN, account \u2016 nonce)`.\n *\n * Derived from the account and a fresh nonce rather than from the device's keys,\n * so rotating a keypair keeps the replica identity \u2014 and with it the counter\n * slots and HLC lineage \u2014 intact.\n */\nexport async function mintDeviceId(\n  account: string,\n  nonce: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<string> {\n  if (nonce.length !== 16) {\n    throw new Error(`nonce must be 16 bytes, got ${nonce.length}`);\n  }\n  const accountBytes = fromHex(account, 'account', 32);\n  return hex(await domainHash(DEVICE_ID_DOMAIN, [accountBytes, nonce]));\n}\n\n/**\n * The 32 bytes a root signs to certify a device.\n *\n * Both keys are covered, so neither the signing key nor the delivery key can be\n * substituted into a certificate that otherwise verifies \u2014 which is what stops a\n * relay carrying someone's credential from making itself the reader.\n */\nexport async function deviceCertPayload(input: {\n  account: string;\n  device: string;\n  signPublicKey: string;\n  kemPublicKey: string;\n  keyEpoch: number;\n  deviceEpoch: number;\n}): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  return domainHash(CERT_DOMAIN, [\n    fromHex(input.account, 'account', 32),\n    fromHex(input.device, 'device', 32),\n    fromHex(input.signPublicKey, 'signPublicKey', 32),\n    fromHex(input.kemPublicKey, 'kemPublicKey', 32),\n    u32le(input.keyEpoch),\n    u32le(input.deviceEpoch),\n  ]);\n}\n\n/**\n * Borsh-encode an `AccountProof<DeviceCert>` \u2014 what core calls a\n * `JoinAccountCredential`.\n *\n * Extracted so the device-cert path and the namespace-op signer encode this from\n * one implementation. Two copies of a borsh layout drift silently: the encoding\n * is only checked by a peer rejecting a signature, which points at the signature\n * rather than at whichever copy went stale.\n *\n * Layout is `AccountProof { genesis, chain, statement }`:\n * `AccountGenesis` (version u8 + root pk 32) + `chain` (empty Vec, u32 len) +\n * `DeviceCert` (account 32 + device 32 + sign pk 32 + kem pk 32 + key_epoch u32\n * + device_epoch u32 + signature 64) = 237 bytes with an empty chain.\n */\nexport function accountProofBytes(input: {\n  rootPublicKey: Uint8Array;\n  account: string;\n  device: string;\n  signPublicKey: string;\n  kemPublicKey: string;\n  keyEpoch: number;\n  deviceEpoch: number;\n  signature: Uint8Array;\n}): Uint8Array {\n  return concat(\n    new Uint8Array([ACCOUNT_GENESIS_VERSION]),\n    input.rootPublicKey,\n    u32le(0),\n    fromHex(input.account, 'account', 32),\n    fromHex(input.device, 'device', 32),\n    fromHex(input.signPublicKey, 'signPublicKey', 32),\n    fromHex(input.kemPublicKey, 'kemPublicKey', 32),\n    u32le(input.keyEpoch),\n    u32le(input.deviceEpoch),\n    input.signature,\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Certify a device, returning the hex credential `merod account sign-cert`\n * prints \u2014 a borsh-encoded `AccountProof<DeviceCert>`.\n *\n * The layout, field for field, is core's:\n *\n * ```\n * AccountProof { genesis: AccountGenesis, chain: Vec<RootKeyHandoff>, statement: DeviceCert }\n *   AccountGenesis { version: u8, root_sign_pk: [u8; 32] }\n *   chain          \u2192 u32-LE count, then that many handoffs\n *   DeviceCert     { account, device, sign_pk, kem_pk: [u8; 32] x4,\n *                    key_epoch: u32, device_epoch: u32, signature: [u8; 64] }\n * ```\n *\n * Borsh for plain fixed-width data is concatenation; the only variable part is\n * the chain's length prefix. `chain` is empty here for the same reason it is in\n * `sign-cert`: a root that has never been handed off signs directly, and a\n * handoff chain is only needed once it has.\n *\n * `keyEpoch` is 0 for the same reason \u2014 it names the root epoch that signed, and\n * an un-rotated root is at 0. Re-signing after a handoff is a separate flow that\n * needs the chain, so this deliberately does not take it as an argument rather\n * than accepting a value it would then have to ignore.\n */\nexport async function signDeviceCert(input: DeviceCertInput): Promise<string> {\n  const rootPublicKey = await derivePublicKey(input.rootSecret);\n  const account = hex(\n    await domainHash(ACCOUNT_ID_DOMAIN, [\n      concat(new Uint8Array([ACCOUNT_GENESIS_VERSION]), rootPublicKey),\n    ]),\n  );\n\n  const keyEpoch = 0;\n  const payload = await deviceCertPayload({\n    account,\n    device: input.device,\n    signPublicKey: input.signPublicKey,\n    kemPublicKey: input.kemPublicKey,\n    keyEpoch,\n    deviceEpoch: input.deviceEpoch,\n  });\n\n  const key = await importSigningKey(input.rootSecret);\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign('Ed25519', key, payload),\n  );\n\n  const credential = accountProofBytes({\n    rootPublicKey,\n    account,\n    device: input.device,\n    signPublicKey: input.signPublicKey,\n    kemPublicKey: input.kemPublicKey,\n    keyEpoch,\n    deviceEpoch: input.deviceEpoch,\n    signature,\n  });\n\n  return hex(credential);\n}\n\n/** The account this root owns \u2014 the content address of its genesis. */\nexport async function accountForRoot(rootSecret: string): Promise<string> {\n  const rootPublicKey = await derivePublicKey(rootSecret);\n  return hex(\n    await domainHash(ACCOUNT_ID_DOMAIN, [\n      concat(new Uint8Array([ACCOUNT_GENESIS_VERSION]), rootPublicKey),\n    ]),\n  );\n}\n", "/**\n * The BIP39 English wordlist, verbatim \u2014 2048 words, index order significant.\n *\n * Vendored rather than depended on because this package ships with no runtime\n * dependencies, and a recovery phrase is useless if the list it was written\n * against is not the one everybody else implements. The list is content-checked\n * in `account.test.ts` against its canonical SHA-256\n * (`2f5eed53a4727b4bf8880d8f3f199efc90e58503646d9ff8eff3a2ed3b24dbda` over the\n * newline-joined, newline-terminated file), so a stray edit here fails the suite\n * instead of silently minting phrases no other wallet can restore.\n *\n * Its own module so bundlers can drop it: nothing outside `account/` imports it,\n * and the package is `sideEffects: false`, so a consumer who only signs never\n * pays for the ~13 KB.\n */\nexport const ENGLISH_WORDLIST: readonly string[] = [\n  'abandon', 'ability', 'able', 'about', 'above', 'absent', 'absorb', 'abstract',\n  'absurd', 'abuse', 'access', 'accident', 'account', 'accuse', 'achieve', 'acid',\n  'acoustic', 'acquire', 'across', 'act', 'action', 'actor', 'actress', 'actual',\n  'adapt', 'add', 'addict', 'address', 'adjust', 'admit', 'adult', 'advance',\n  'advice', 'aerobic', 'affair', 'afford', 'afraid', 'again', 'age', 'agent',\n  'agree', 'ahead', 'aim', 'air', 'airport', 'aisle', 'alarm', 'album',\n  'alcohol', 'alert', 'alien', 'all', 'alley', 'allow', 'almost', 'alone',\n  'alpha', 'already', 'also', 'alter', 'always', 'amateur', 'amazing', 'among',\n  'amount', 'amused', 'analyst', 'anchor', 'ancient', 'anger', 'angle', 'angry',\n  'animal', 'ankle', 'announce', 'annual', 'another', 'answer', 'antenna', 'antique',\n  'anxiety', 'any', 'apart', 'apology', 'appear', 'apple', 'approve', 'april',\n  'arch', 'arctic', 'area', 'arena', 'argue', 'arm', 'armed', 'armor',\n  'army', 'around', 'arrange', 'arrest', 'arrive', 'arrow', 'art', 'artefact',\n  'artist', 'artwork', 'ask', 'aspect', 'assault', 'asset', 'assist', 'assume',\n  'asthma', 'athlete', 'atom', 'attack', 'attend', 'attitude', 'attract', 'auction',\n  'audit', 'august', 'aunt', 'author', 'auto', 'autumn', 'average', 'avocado',\n  'avoid', 'awake', 'aware', 'away', 'awesome', 'awful', 'awkward', 'axis',\n  'baby', 'bachelor', 'bacon', 'badge', 'bag', 'balance', 'balcony', 'ball',\n  'bamboo', 'banana', 'banner', 'bar', 'barely', 'bargain', 'barrel', 'base',\n  'basic', 'basket', 'battle', 'beach', 'bean', 'beauty', 'because', 'become',\n  'beef', 'before', 'begin', 'behave', 'behind', 'believe', 'below', 'belt',\n  'bench', 'benefit', 'best', 'betray', 'better', 'between', 'beyond', 'bicycle',\n  'bid', 'bike', 'bind', 'biology', 'bird', 'birth', 'bitter', 'black',\n  'blade', 'blame', 'blanket', 'blast', 'bleak', 'bless', 'blind', 'blood',\n  'blossom', 'blouse', 'blue', 'blur', 'blush', 'board', 'boat', 'body',\n  'boil', 'bomb', 'bone', 'bonus', 'book', 'boost', 'border', 'boring',\n  'borrow', 'boss', 'bottom', 'bounce', 'box', 'boy', 'bracket', 'brain',\n  'brand', 'brass', 'brave', 'bread', 'breeze', 'brick', 'bridge', 'brief',\n  'bright', 'bring', 'brisk', 'broccoli', 'broken', 'bronze', 'broom', 'brother',\n  'brown', 'brush', 'bubble', 'buddy', 'budget', 'buffalo', 'build', 'bulb',\n  'bulk', 'bullet', 'bundle', 'bunker', 'burden', 'burger', 'burst', 'bus',\n  'business', 'busy', 'butter', 'buyer', 'buzz', 'cabbage', 'cabin', 'cable',\n  'cactus', 'cage', 'cake', 'call', 'calm', 'camera', 'camp', 'can',\n  'canal', 'cancel', 'candy', 'cannon', 'canoe', 'canvas', 'canyon', 'capable',\n  'capital', 'captain', 'car', 'carbon', 'card', 'cargo', 'carpet', 'carry',\n  'cart', 'case', 'cash', 'casino', 'castle', 'casual', 'cat', 'catalog',\n  'catch', 'category', 'cattle', 'caught', 'cause', 'caution', 'cave', 'ceiling',\n  'celery', 'cement', 'census', 'century', 'cereal', 'certain', 'chair', 'chalk',\n  'champion', 'change', 'chaos', 'chapter', 'charge', 'chase', 'chat', 'cheap',\n  'check', 'cheese', 'chef', 'cherry', 'chest', 'chicken', 'chief', 'child',\n  'chimney', 'choice', 'choose', 'chronic', 'chuckle', 'chunk', 'churn', 'cigar',\n  'cinnamon', 'circle', 'citizen', 'city', 'civil', 'claim', 'clap', 'clarify',\n  'claw', 'clay', 'clean', 'clerk', 'clever', 'click', 'client', 'cliff',\n  'climb', 'clinic', 'clip', 'clock', 'clog', 'close', 'cloth', 'cloud',\n  'clown', 'club', 'clump', 'cluster', 'clutch', 'coach', 'coast', 'coconut',\n  'code', 'coffee', 'coil', 'coin', 'collect', 'color', 'column', 'combine',\n  'come', 'comfort', 'comic', 'common', 'company', 'concert', 'conduct', 'confirm',\n  'congress', 'connect', 'consider', 'control', 'convince', 'cook', 'cool', 'copper',\n  'copy', 'coral', 'core', 'corn', 'correct', 'cost', 'cotton', 'couch',\n  'country', 'couple', 'course', 'cousin', 'cover', 'coyote', 'crack', 'cradle',\n  'craft', 'cram', 'crane', 'crash', 'crater', 'crawl', 'crazy', 'cream',\n  'credit', 'creek', 'crew', 'cricket', 'crime', 'crisp', 'critic', 'crop',\n  'cross', 'crouch', 'crowd', 'crucial', 'cruel', 'cruise', 'crumble', 'crunch',\n  'crush', 'cry', 'crystal', 'cube', 'culture', 'cup', 'cupboard', 'curious',\n  'current', 'curtain', 'curve', 'cushion', 'custom', 'cute', 'cycle', 'dad',\n  'damage', 'damp', 'dance', 'danger', 'daring', 'dash', 'daughter', 'dawn',\n  'day', 'deal', 'debate', 'debris', 'decade', 'december', 'decide', 'decline',\n  'decorate', 'decrease', 'deer', 'defense', 'define', 'defy', 'degree', 'delay',\n  'deliver', 'demand', 'demise', 'denial', 'dentist', 'deny', 'depart', 'depend',\n  'deposit', 'depth', 'deputy', 'derive', 'describe', 'desert', 'design', 'desk',\n  'despair', 'destroy', 'detail', 'detect', 'develop', 'device', 'devote', 'diagram',\n  'dial', 'diamond', 'diary', 'dice', 'diesel', 'diet', 'differ', 'digital',\n  'dignity', 'dilemma', 'dinner', 'dinosaur', 'direct', 'dirt', 'disagree', 'discover',\n  'disease', 'dish', 'dismiss', 'disorder', 'display', 'distance', 'divert', 'divide',\n  'divorce', 'dizzy', 'doctor', 'document', 'dog', 'doll', 'dolphin', 'domain',\n  'donate', 'donkey', 'donor', 'door', 'dose', 'double', 'dove', 'draft',\n  'dragon', 'drama', 'drastic', 'draw', 'dream', 'dress', 'drift', 'drill',\n  'drink', 'drip', 'drive', 'drop', 'drum', 'dry', 'duck', 'dumb',\n  'dune', 'during', 'dust', 'dutch', 'duty', 'dwarf', 'dynamic', 'eager',\n  'eagle', 'early', 'earn', 'earth', 'easily', 'east', 'easy', 'echo',\n  'ecology', 'economy', 'edge', 'edit', 'educate', 'effort', 'egg', 'eight',\n  'either', 'elbow', 'elder', 'electric', 'elegant', 'element', 'elephant', 'elevator',\n  'elite', 'else', 'embark', 'embody', 'embrace', 'emerge', 'emotion', 'employ',\n  'empower', 'empty', 'enable', 'enact', 'end', 'endless', 'endorse', 'enemy',\n  'energy', 'enforce', 'engage', 'engine', 'enhance', 'enjoy', 'enlist', 'enough',\n  'enrich', 'enroll', 'ensure', 'enter', 'entire', 'entry', 'envelope', 'episode',\n  'equal', 'equip', 'era', 'erase', 'erode', 'erosion', 'error', 'erupt',\n  'escape', 'essay', 'essence', 'estate', 'eternal', 'ethics', 'evidence', 'evil',\n  'evoke', 'evolve', 'exact', 'example', 'excess', 'exchange', 'excite', 'exclude',\n  'excuse', 'execute', 'exercise', 'exhaust', 'exhibit', 'exile', 'exist', 'exit',\n  'exotic', 'expand', 'expect', 'expire', 'explain', 'expose', 'express', 'extend',\n  'extra', 'eye', 'eyebrow', 'fabric', 'face', 'faculty', 'fade', 'faint',\n  'faith', 'fall', 'false', 'fame', 'family', 'famous', 'fan', 'fancy',\n  'fantasy', 'farm', 'fashion', 'fat', 'fatal', 'father', 'fatigue', 'fault',\n  'favorite', 'feature', 'february', 'federal', 'fee', 'feed', 'feel', 'female',\n  'fence', 'festival', 'fetch', 'fever', 'few', 'fiber', 'fiction', 'field',\n  'figure', 'file', 'film', 'filter', 'final', 'find', 'fine', 'finger',\n  'finish', 'fire', 'firm', 'first', 'fiscal', 'fish', 'fit', 'fitness',\n  'fix', 'flag', 'flame', 'flash', 'flat', 'flavor', 'flee', 'flight',\n  'flip', 'float', 'flock', 'floor', 'flower', 'fluid', 'flush', 'fly',\n  'foam', 'focus', 'fog', 'foil', 'fold', 'follow', 'food', 'foot',\n  'force', 'forest', 'forget', 'fork', 'fortune', 'forum', 'forward', 'fossil',\n  'foster', 'found', 'fox', 'fragile', 'frame', 'frequent', 'fresh', 'friend',\n  'fringe', 'frog', 'front', 'frost', 'frown', 'frozen', 'fruit', 'fuel',\n  'fun', 'funny', 'furnace', 'fury', 'future', 'gadget', 'gain', 'galaxy',\n  'gallery', 'game', 'gap', 'garage', 'garbage', 'garden', 'garlic', 'garment',\n  'gas', 'gasp', 'gate', 'gather', 'gauge', 'gaze', 'general', 'genius',\n  'genre', 'gentle', 'genuine', 'gesture', 'ghost', 'giant', 'gift', 'giggle',\n  'ginger', 'giraffe', 'girl', 'give', 'glad', 'glance', 'glare', 'glass',\n  'glide', 'glimpse', 'globe', 'gloom', 'glory', 'glove', 'glow', 'glue',\n  'goat', 'goddess', 'gold', 'good', 'goose', 'gorilla', 'gospel', 'gossip',\n  'govern', 'gown', 'grab', 'grace', 'grain', 'grant', 'grape', 'grass',\n  'gravity', 'great', 'green', 'grid', 'grief', 'grit', 'grocery', 'group',\n  'grow', 'grunt', 'guard', 'guess', 'guide', 'guilt', 'guitar', 'gun',\n  'gym', 'habit', 'hair', 'half', 'hammer', 'hamster', 'hand', 'happy',\n  'harbor', 'hard', 'harsh', 'harvest', 'hat', 'have', 'hawk', 'hazard',\n  'head', 'health', 'heart', 'heavy', 'hedgehog', 'height', 'hello', 'helmet',\n  'help', 'hen', 'hero', 'hidden', 'high', 'hill', 'hint', 'hip',\n  'hire', 'history', 'hobby', 'hockey', 'hold', 'hole', 'holiday', 'hollow',\n  'home', 'honey', 'hood', 'hope', 'horn', 'horror', 'horse', 'hospital',\n  'host', 'hotel', 'hour', 'hover', 'hub', 'huge', 'human', 'humble',\n  'humor', 'hundred', 'hungry', 'hunt', 'hurdle', 'hurry', 'hurt', 'husband',\n  'hybrid', 'ice', 'icon', 'idea', 'identify', 'idle', 'ignore', 'ill',\n  'illegal', 'illness', 'image', 'imitate', 'immense', 'immune', 'impact', 'impose',\n  'improve', 'impulse', 'inch', 'include', 'income', 'increase', 'index', 'indicate',\n  'indoor', 'industry', 'infant', 'inflict', 'inform', 'inhale', 'inherit', 'initial',\n  'inject', 'injury', 'inmate', 'inner', 'innocent', 'input', 'inquiry', 'insane',\n  'insect', 'inside', 'inspire', 'install', 'intact', 'interest', 'into', 'invest',\n  'invite', 'involve', 'iron', 'island', 'isolate', 'issue', 'item', 'ivory',\n  'jacket', 'jaguar', 'jar', 'jazz', 'jealous', 'jeans', 'jelly', 'jewel',\n  'job', 'join', 'joke', 'journey', 'joy', 'judge', 'juice', 'jump',\n  'jungle', 'junior', 'junk', 'just', 'kangaroo', 'keen', 'keep', 'ketchup',\n  'key', 'kick', 'kid', 'kidney', 'kind', 'kingdom', 'kiss', 'kit',\n  'kitchen', 'kite', 'kitten', 'kiwi', 'knee', 'knife', 'knock', 'know',\n  'lab', 'label', 'labor', 'ladder', 'lady', 'lake', 'lamp', 'language',\n  'laptop', 'large', 'later', 'latin', 'laugh', 'laundry', 'lava', 'law',\n  'lawn', 'lawsuit', 'layer', 'lazy', 'leader', 'leaf', 'learn', 'leave',\n  'lecture', 'left', 'leg', 'legal', 'legend', 'leisure', 'lemon', 'lend',\n  'length', 'lens', 'leopard', 'lesson', 'letter', 'level', 'liar', 'liberty',\n  'library', 'license', 'life', 'lift', 'light', 'like', 'limb', 'limit',\n  'link', 'lion', 'liquid', 'list', 'little', 'live', 'lizard', 'load',\n  'loan', 'lobster', 'local', 'lock', 'logic', 'lonely', 'long', 'loop',\n  'lottery', 'loud', 'lounge', 'love', 'loyal', 'lucky', 'luggage', 'lumber',\n  'lunar', 'lunch', 'luxury', 'lyrics', 'machine', 'mad', 'magic', 'magnet',\n  'maid', 'mail', 'main', 'major', 'make', 'mammal', 'man', 'manage',\n  'mandate', 'mango', 'mansion', 'manual', 'maple', 'marble', 'march', 'margin',\n  'marine', 'market', 'marriage', 'mask', 'mass', 'master', 'match', 'material',\n  'math', 'matrix', 'matter', 'maximum', 'maze', 'meadow', 'mean', 'measure',\n  'meat', 'mechanic', 'medal', 'media', 'melody', 'melt', 'member', 'memory',\n  'mention', 'menu', 'mercy', 'merge', 'merit', 'merry', 'mesh', 'message',\n  'metal', 'method', 'middle', 'midnight', 'milk', 'million', 'mimic', 'mind',\n  'minimum', 'minor', 'minute', 'miracle', 'mirror', 'misery', 'miss', 'mistake',\n  'mix', 'mixed', 'mixture', 'mobile', 'model', 'modify', 'mom', 'moment',\n  'monitor', 'monkey', 'monster', 'month', 'moon', 'moral', 'more', 'morning',\n  'mosquito', 'mother', 'motion', 'motor', 'mountain', 'mouse', 'move', 'movie',\n  'much', 'muffin', 'mule', 'multiply', 'muscle', 'museum', 'mushroom', 'music',\n  'must', 'mutual', 'myself', 'mystery', 'myth', 'naive', 'name', 'napkin',\n  'narrow', 'nasty', 'nation', 'nature', 'near', 'neck', 'need', 'negative',\n  'neglect', 'neither', 'nephew', 'nerve', 'nest', 'net', 'network', 'neutral',\n  'never', 'news', 'next', 'nice', 'night', 'noble', 'noise', 'nominee',\n  'noodle', 'normal', 'north', 'nose', 'notable', 'note', 'nothing', 'notice',\n  'novel', 'now', 'nuclear', 'number', 'nurse', 'nut', 'oak', 'obey',\n  'object', 'oblige', 'obscure', 'observe', 'obtain', 'obvious', 'occur', 'ocean',\n  'october', 'odor', 'off', 'offer', 'office', 'often', 'oil', 'okay',\n  'old', 'olive', 'olympic', 'omit', 'once', 'one', 'onion', 'online',\n  'only', 'open', 'opera', 'opinion', 'oppose', 'option', 'orange', 'orbit',\n  'orchard', 'order', 'ordinary', 'organ', 'orient', 'original', 'orphan', 'ostrich',\n  'other', 'outdoor', 'outer', 'output', 'outside', 'oval', 'oven', 'over',\n  'own', 'owner', 'oxygen', 'oyster', 'ozone', 'pact', 'paddle', 'page',\n  'pair', 'palace', 'palm', 'panda', 'panel', 'panic', 'panther', 'paper',\n  'parade', 'parent', 'park', 'parrot', 'party', 'pass', 'patch', 'path',\n  'patient', 'patrol', 'pattern', 'pause', 'pave', 'payment', 'peace', 'peanut',\n  'pear', 'peasant', 'pelican', 'pen', 'penalty', 'pencil', 'people', 'pepper',\n  'perfect', 'permit', 'person', 'pet', 'phone', 'photo', 'phrase', 'physical',\n  'piano', 'picnic', 'picture', 'piece', 'pig', 'pigeon', 'pill', 'pilot',\n  'pink', 'pioneer', 'pipe', 'pistol', 'pitch', 'pizza', 'place', 'planet',\n  'plastic', 'plate', 'play', 'please', 'pledge', 'pluck', 'plug', 'plunge',\n  'poem', 'poet', 'point', 'polar', 'pole', 'police', 'pond', 'pony',\n  'pool', 'popular', 'portion', 'position', 'possible', 'post', 'potato', 'pottery',\n  'poverty', 'powder', 'power', 'practice', 'praise', 'predict', 'prefer', 'prepare',\n  'present', 'pretty', 'prevent', 'price', 'pride', 'primary', 'print', 'priority',\n  'prison', 'private', 'prize', 'problem', 'process', 'produce', 'profit', 'program',\n  'project', 'promote', 'proof', 'property', 'prosper', 'protect', 'proud', 'provide',\n  'public', 'pudding', 'pull', 'pulp', 'pulse', 'pumpkin', 'punch', 'pupil',\n  'puppy', 'purchase', 'purity', 'purpose', 'purse', 'push', 'put', 'puzzle',\n  'pyramid', 'quality', 'quantum', 'quarter', 'question', 'quick', 'quit', 'quiz',\n  'quote', 'rabbit', 'raccoon', 'race', 'rack', 'radar', 'radio', 'rail',\n  'rain', 'raise', 'rally', 'ramp', 'ranch', 'random', 'range', 'rapid',\n  'rare', 'rate', 'rather', 'raven', 'raw', 'razor', 'ready', 'real',\n  'reason', 'rebel', 'rebuild', 'recall', 'receive', 'recipe', 'record', 'recycle',\n  'reduce', 'reflect', 'reform', 'refuse', 'region', 'regret', 'regular', 'reject',\n  'relax', 'release', 'relief', 'rely', 'remain', 'remember', 'remind', 'remove',\n  'render', 'renew', 'rent', 'reopen', 'repair', 'repeat', 'replace', 'report',\n  'require', 'rescue', 'resemble', 'resist', 'resource', 'response', 'result', 'retire',\n  'retreat', 'return', 'reunion', 'reveal', 'review', 'reward', 'rhythm', 'rib',\n  'ribbon', 'rice', 'rich', 'ride', 'ridge', 'rifle', 'right', 'rigid',\n  'ring', 'riot', 'ripple', 'risk', 'ritual', 'rival', 'river', 'road',\n  'roast', 'robot', 'robust', 'rocket', 'romance', 'roof', 'rookie', 'room',\n  'rose', 'rotate', 'rough', 'round', 'route', 'royal', 'rubber', 'rude',\n  'rug', 'rule', 'run', 'runway', 'rural', 'sad', 'saddle', 'sadness',\n  'safe', 'sail', 'salad', 'salmon', 'salon', 'salt', 'salute', 'same',\n  'sample', 'sand', 'satisfy', 'satoshi', 'sauce', 'sausage', 'save', 'say',\n  'scale', 'scan', 'scare', 'scatter', 'scene', 'scheme', 'school', 'science',\n  'scissors', 'scorpion', 'scout', 'scrap', 'screen', 'script', 'scrub', 'sea',\n  'search', 'season', 'seat', 'second', 'secret', 'section', 'security', 'seed',\n  'seek', 'segment', 'select', 'sell', 'seminar', 'senior', 'sense', 'sentence',\n  'series', 'service', 'session', 'settle', 'setup', 'seven', 'shadow', 'shaft',\n  'shallow', 'share', 'shed', 'shell', 'sheriff', 'shield', 'shift', 'shine',\n  'ship', 'shiver', 'shock', 'shoe', 'shoot', 'shop', 'short', 'shoulder',\n  'shove', 'shrimp', 'shrug', 'shuffle', 'shy', 'sibling', 'sick', 'side',\n  'siege', 'sight', 'sign', 'silent', 'silk', 'silly', 'silver', 'similar',\n  'simple', 'since', 'sing', 'siren', 'sister', 'situate', 'six', 'size',\n  'skate', 'sketch', 'ski', 'skill', 'skin', 'skirt', 'skull', 'slab',\n  'slam', 'sleep', 'slender', 'slice', 'slide', 'slight', 'slim', 'slogan',\n  'slot', 'slow', 'slush', 'small', 'smart', 'smile', 'smoke', 'smooth',\n  'snack', 'snake', 'snap', 'sniff', 'snow', 'soap', 'soccer', 'social',\n  'sock', 'soda', 'soft', 'solar', 'soldier', 'solid', 'solution', 'solve',\n  'someone', 'song', 'soon', 'sorry', 'sort', 'soul', 'sound', 'soup',\n  'source', 'south', 'space', 'spare', 'spatial', 'spawn', 'speak', 'special',\n  'speed', 'spell', 'spend', 'sphere', 'spice', 'spider', 'spike', 'spin',\n  'spirit', 'split', 'spoil', 'sponsor', 'spoon', 'sport', 'spot', 'spray',\n  'spread', 'spring', 'spy', 'square', 'squeeze', 'squirrel', 'stable', 'stadium',\n  'staff', 'stage', 'stairs', 'stamp', 'stand', 'start', 'state', 'stay',\n  'steak', 'steel', 'stem', 'step', 'stereo', 'stick', 'still', 'sting',\n  'stock', 'stomach', 'stone', 'stool', 'story', 'stove', 'strategy', 'street',\n  'strike', 'strong', 'struggle', 'student', 'stuff', 'stumble', 'style', 'subject',\n  'submit', 'subway', 'success', 'such', 'sudden', 'suffer', 'sugar', 'suggest',\n  'suit', 'summer', 'sun', 'sunny', 'sunset', 'super', 'supply', 'supreme',\n  'sure', 'surface', 'surge', 'surprise', 'surround', 'survey', 'suspect', 'sustain',\n  'swallow', 'swamp', 'swap', 'swarm', 'swear', 'sweet', 'swift', 'swim',\n  'swing', 'switch', 'sword', 'symbol', 'symptom', 'syrup', 'system', 'table',\n  'tackle', 'tag', 'tail', 'talent', 'talk', 'tank', 'tape', 'target',\n  'task', 'taste', 'tattoo', 'taxi', 'teach', 'team', 'tell', 'ten',\n  'tenant', 'tennis', 'tent', 'term', 'test', 'text', 'thank', 'that',\n  'theme', 'then', 'theory', 'there', 'they', 'thing', 'this', 'thought',\n  'three', 'thrive', 'throw', 'thumb', 'thunder', 'ticket', 'tide', 'tiger',\n  'tilt', 'timber', 'time', 'tiny', 'tip', 'tired', 'tissue', 'title',\n  'toast', 'tobacco', 'today', 'toddler', 'toe', 'together', 'toilet', 'token',\n  'tomato', 'tomorrow', 'tone', 'tongue', 'tonight', 'tool', 'tooth', 'top',\n  'topic', 'topple', 'torch', 'tornado', 'tortoise', 'toss', 'total', 'tourist',\n  'toward', 'tower', 'town', 'toy', 'track', 'trade', 'traffic', 'tragic',\n  'train', 'transfer', 'trap', 'trash', 'travel', 'tray', 'treat', 'tree',\n  'trend', 'trial', 'tribe', 'trick', 'trigger', 'trim', 'trip', 'trophy',\n  'trouble', 'truck', 'true', 'truly', 'trumpet', 'trust', 'truth', 'try',\n  'tube', 'tuition', 'tumble', 'tuna', 'tunnel', 'turkey', 'turn', 'turtle',\n  'twelve', 'twenty', 'twice', 'twin', 'twist', 'two', 'type', 'typical',\n  'ugly', 'umbrella', 'unable', 'unaware', 'uncle', 'uncover', 'under', 'undo',\n  'unfair', 'unfold', 'unhappy', 'uniform', 'unique', 'unit', 'universe', 'unknown',\n  'unlock', 'until', 'unusual', 'unveil', 'update', 'upgrade', 'uphold', 'upon',\n  'upper', 'upset', 'urban', 'urge', 'usage', 'use', 'used', 'useful',\n  'useless', 'usual', 'utility', 'vacant', 'vacuum', 'vague', 'valid', 'valley',\n  'valve', 'van', 'vanish', 'vapor', 'various', 'vast', 'vault', 'vehicle',\n  'velvet', 'vendor', 'venture', 'venue', 'verb', 'verify', 'version', 'very',\n  'vessel', 'veteran', 'viable', 'vibrant', 'vicious', 'victory', 'video', 'view',\n  'village', 'vintage', 'violin', 'virtual', 'virus', 'visa', 'visit', 'visual',\n  'vital', 'vivid', 'vocal', 'voice', 'void', 'volcano', 'volume', 'vote',\n  'voyage', 'wage', 'wagon', 'wait', 'walk', 'wall', 'walnut', 'want',\n  'warfare', 'warm', 'warrior', 'wash', 'wasp', 'waste', 'water', 'wave',\n  'way', 'wealth', 'weapon', 'wear', 'weasel', 'weather', 'web', 'wedding',\n  'weekend', 'weird', 'welcome', 'west', 'wet', 'whale', 'what', 'wheat',\n  'wheel', 'when', 'where', 'whip', 'whisper', 'wide', 'width', 'wife',\n  'wild', 'will', 'win', 'window', 'wine', 'wing', 'wink', 'winner',\n  'winter', 'wire', 'wisdom', 'wise', 'wish', 'witness', 'wolf', 'woman',\n  'wonder', 'wood', 'wool', 'word', 'work', 'world', 'worry', 'worth',\n  'wrap', 'wreck', 'wrestle', 'wrist', 'write', 'wrong', 'yard', 'year',\n  'yellow', 'you', 'young', 'youth', 'zebra', 'zero', 'zone', 'zoo',\n];\n", "/**\n * Creating an account root, and proving you hold one.\n *\n * `signDeviceCert` assumes an account root already exists and asks only what it\n * certifies. This is the step before that: where the root comes from, how a\n * person keeps it, and how they show a server they have it.\n *\n * Two things live here because they are the two halves of onboarding:\n *\n * - {@link generateAccountRoot} mints a root and hands back a 24-word recovery\n *   phrase. The phrase *is* the key \u2014 see the interop note on that function \u2014\n *   so a holder who writes it down can restore the account on any device.\n * - {@link signAccountLink} signs a cloud-issued challenge with that root, which\n *   is how Calimero Cloud binds a billing login to a Calimero account.\n * - {@link signAccountLogin} signs a different cloud-issued challenge with the\n *   same root to claim the account outright and open a session as it \u2014 the\n *   password-free counterpart to signing in with Google.\n *\n * Both are offline and hold no state. Nothing here talks to a node or to the\n * cloud; `CloudClient.linkAccount` is the wrapper that does.\n *\n * Derived from:\n *\n * - `ACCOUNT_LINK_DOMAIN` / `ACCOUNT_LOGIN_DOMAIN`, and\n *   `verify_account_link_proof` / `verify_login_proof` \u2014 mdma's\n *   `manager/app/account_proof.py`\n * - the account derivation \u2014 `accountForRoot` in `../device-cert`, which is\n *   core's `AccountId` preimage\n */\nimport {\n  concat,\n  derivePublicKey,\n  fromHex,\n  hex,\n  importSigningKey,\n} from '../crypto/internal.js';\nimport { accountForRoot } from '../device-cert/index.js';\nimport { ENGLISH_WORDLIST } from './wordlist.js';\n\n/**\n * mdma's `ACCOUNT_LINK_DOMAIN`, trailing NUL included.\n *\n * Prefixed raw rather than run through `domainHash`: mdma verifies\n * `ed25519_verify(root_pk, ACCOUNT_LINK_DOMAIN \u2016 nonce_utf8)` over exactly these\n * bytes. The separator is what stops a signature gathered here being replayable\n * into any other protocol that has a root sign opaque bytes, so it is not\n * cosmetic \u2014 and the NUL is part of it.\n */\nconst ACCOUNT_LINK_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode(\n  'calimero.mdma.account-link.v1\u0000',\n);\n\n/**\n * mdma's `ACCOUNT_LOGIN_DOMAIN`, trailing NUL included.\n *\n * A separate domain from {@link ACCOUNT_LINK_DOMAIN} because the two\n * exchanges are otherwise byte-identical \u2014 both are a root signature over a\n * cloud-issued nonce \u2014 and a signature gathered while linking is gathered from\n * someone already signed in and trusting the page. Without the separation it\n * would be replayable as a login by whoever collected it.\n */\nconst ACCOUNT_LOGIN_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode(\n  'calimero.mdma.account-login.v1\\0',\n);\n\n/** Entropy carried by a phrase. 256 bits \u2014 32 bytes, an ed25519 seed exactly. */\nconst ENTROPY_BITS = 256;\n/** BIP39's checksum length: one bit per 32 bits of entropy. */\nconst CHECKSUM_BITS = ENTROPY_BITS / 32;\n/** 11 bits per word, so (256 + 8) / 11 = 24 words. */\nconst PHRASE_WORDS = (ENTROPY_BITS + CHECKSUM_BITS) / 11;\n\n/** An account root: the secret, the key it derives, and the account it names. */\nexport interface AccountRoot {\n  /**\n   * The root signing secret, 64 hex.\n   *\n   * The whole account. It signs device certificates and cloud links, and there\n   * is no recovery path that does not go through it or its phrase \u2014 so it is\n   * never sent anywhere, and in a browser it does not belong in `localStorage`.\n   */\n  secret: string;\n  /** The root's ed25519 public key, 64 hex. Safe to publish. */\n  publicKey: string;\n  /** The account this root names, 64 hex \u2014 the content address of its genesis. */\n  accountId: string;\n}\n\n/** An account root together with the phrase that restores it. */\nexport interface RecoverableAccountRoot extends AccountRoot {\n  /**\n   * A 24-word BIP39 English recovery phrase, single-space separated.\n   *\n   * Show it once, have the holder write it down, and do not keep it: it is the\n   * secret in a form a person can copy by hand without transcription errors.\n   */\n  phrase: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a brand-new account root from the platform CSPRNG.\n *\n * This is the \"generate a new key\" half of cloud registration \u2014 the other half\n * being a root the holder already has, on a desktop app or a hardware key, which\n * signs without this ever running.\n *\n * **Interop note, and it matters.** The phrase encodes the root secret as BIP39\n * *entropy*, not as a BIP39 *seed*. A tool restoring it must call the equivalent\n * of `mnemonicToEntropy(phrase)` \u2014 32 bytes \u2014 and use those bytes as the ed25519\n * secret directly. `mnemonicToSeed(phrase)`, which most wallet libraries reach\n * for first, runs PBKDF2 and returns 64 different bytes; feeding those in names\n * a different account and fails as \"wrong account\", not as a decoding error.\n * There is no passphrase and no BIP32 derivation path: the 24 words are the key.\n */\nexport async function generateAccountRoot(): Promise<RecoverableAccountRoot> {\n  const entropy = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(ENTROPY_BITS / 8));\n  return withPhrase(hex(entropy), await encodePhrase(entropy));\n}\n\n/**\n * Restore an account root from its recovery phrase.\n *\n * Whitespace and case are normalised, so a phrase pasted out of a text editor\n * with a trailing newline or a stray double space restores fine. A word outside\n * the list, a wrong word count, or a failed checksum throws rather than\n * returning some other account \u2014 a single mistyped word is the common case, and\n * BIP39's checksum catches all but 1 in 256 of them.\n */\nexport async function accountRootFromPhrase(\n  phrase: string,\n): Promise<RecoverableAccountRoot> {\n  const words = normalisePhrase(phrase);\n  return withPhrase(hex(await decodePhrase(words)), words.join(' '));\n}\n\n/** The public half of a root you already hold, without re-deriving it by hand. */\nexport async function accountRootFromSecret(\n  secret: string,\n): Promise<AccountRoot> {\n  // Validates the length and alphabet before anything derives from it, so a\n  // truncated paste fails here rather than naming an unrelated account.\n  fromHex(secret, 'secret', 32);\n  return {\n    secret,\n    publicKey: hex(await derivePublicKey(secret)),\n    accountId: await accountForRoot(secret),\n  };\n}\n\n/** What {@link signAccountLink} needs. */\nexport interface AccountLinkInput {\n  /** The account root's signing secret, 64 hex. */\n  rootSecret: string;\n  /**\n   * The challenge from `GET /api/cloud/me/accounts/challenge`, verbatim.\n   *\n   * Signed as its UTF-8 bytes, not decoded first: mdma seals it as an opaque\n   * string and verifies over the same string it issued.\n   */\n  nonce: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign a cloud link challenge with the account root. Returns base64.\n *\n * Standard base64, not base64url \u2014 mdma decodes it with `validate=True`, so the\n * `-`/`_` alphabet is rejected outright rather than silently mis-decoded.\n *\n * Root-signed rather than device-signed on purpose: this is the credential\n * someone still holds after losing a device, which is the case linking exists to\n * serve.\n */\nexport async function signAccountLink(\n  input: AccountLinkInput,\n): Promise<string> {\n  if (!input.nonce) throw new Error('nonce is required to sign an account link');\n  const key = await importSigningKey(input.rootSecret);\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign(\n      'Ed25519',\n      key,\n      concat(ACCOUNT_LINK_DOMAIN, new TextEncoder().encode(input.nonce)),\n    ),\n  );\n  return base64(signature);\n}\n\n/** What {@link signAccountLogin} needs. */\nexport interface AccountLoginInput {\n  /** The account root's signing secret, 64 hex. */\n  rootSecret: string;\n  /** The challenge from `GET /api/auth/account/challenge`, verbatim UTF-8. */\n  nonce: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign a cloud login challenge with the account root. Returns base64.\n *\n * The statement this makes is *\"I hold the root of account X\"*, and it is the\n * one statement a device credential can never make. A routing read proves the\n * caller holds a device the root certified \u2014 the credential carries the root's\n * signature over that device \u2014 but a certificate is public and travels in the\n * clear inside every device-link op, so anyone who has seen one can say \"a\n * device of X is asking\". Only the root can say the account is theirs.\n *\n * Which is why this is worth doing **once**: the cloud records the claim, and\n * from then on it knows the account behind a device proof was proven by its\n * owner. The session it also mints is the ordinary MDMA session token, accepted\n * everywhere a Google-issued one is.\n *\n * Standard base64, not base64url \u2014 mdma decodes with `validate=True`.\n */\nexport async function signAccountLogin(\n  input: AccountLoginInput,\n): Promise<string> {\n  if (!input.nonce) throw new Error('nonce is required to sign an account login');\n  const key = await importSigningKey(input.rootSecret);\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign(\n      'Ed25519',\n      key,\n      concat(ACCOUNT_LOGIN_DOMAIN, new TextEncoder().encode(input.nonce)),\n    ),\n  );\n  return base64(signature);\n}\n\nasync function withPhrase(\n  secret: string,\n  phrase: string,\n): Promise<RecoverableAccountRoot> {\n  return { ...(await accountRootFromSecret(secret)), phrase };\n}\n\nfunction normalisePhrase(phrase: string): string[] {\n  // NFKD per BIP39. A no-op for the English list, which is ASCII, but the\n  // normalisation is what the spec pins and costs nothing to honour.\n  const words = phrase.normalize('NFKD').toLowerCase().trim().split(/\\s+/);\n  const count = words[0] === '' ? 0 : words.length;\n  if (count !== PHRASE_WORDS) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `recovery phrase must be ${PHRASE_WORDS} words, got ${count}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return words;\n}\n\n/** Entropy then checksum, chopped into 11-bit indices. */\nasync function encodePhrase(entropy: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  const bits = bitsOf(entropy) + (await checksumBits(entropy));\n  const words: string[] = [];\n  for (let i = 0; i < PHRASE_WORDS; i += 1) {\n    const index = Number.parseInt(bits.slice(i * 11, i * 11 + 11), 2);\n    words.push(ENGLISH_WORDLIST[index]);\n  }\n  return words.join(' ');\n}\n\nasync function decodePhrase(words: string[]): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  let bits = '';\n  for (const word of words) {\n    const index = ENGLISH_WORDLIST.indexOf(word);\n    if (index < 0) {\n      throw new Error(`\"${word}\" is not a word in the recovery phrase list`);\n    }\n    bits += index.toString(2).padStart(11, '0');\n  }\n\n  const entropy = new Uint8Array(ENTROPY_BITS / 8);\n  for (let i = 0; i < entropy.length; i += 1) {\n    entropy[i] = Number.parseInt(bits.slice(i * 8, i * 8 + 8), 2);\n  }\n  if (bits.slice(ENTROPY_BITS) !== (await checksumBits(entropy))) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'recovery phrase checksum failed \u2014 check for a mistyped or transposed word',\n    );\n  }\n  return entropy;\n}\n\n/** The leading `CHECKSUM_BITS` of SHA-256 over the entropy, as a bit string. */\nasync function checksumBits(entropy: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  const digest = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', entropy));\n  return bitsOf(digest).slice(0, CHECKSUM_BITS);\n}\n\nfunction bitsOf(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  let bits = '';\n  for (const byte of bytes) bits += byte.toString(2).padStart(8, '0');\n  return bits;\n}\n\nfunction base64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  // Built a character at a time rather than spreading into `String.fromCharCode`:\n  // the spread is fine for a 64-byte signature but blows the argument limit on\n  // anything larger, and this has no such cliff to remember.\n  let binary = '';\n  for (const byte of bytes) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);\n  return btoa(binary);\n}\n", "/**\n * Proving an account to the cloud for the one read a joiner cannot avoid.\n *\n * `GET /api/cloud/namespaces/{ns}/admitters` answers where to send a signed\n * membership op. A joiner needs it and *cannot* hold a cloud login: it is by\n * construction not the namespace owner, and not needing an account on the cloud\n * is the entire point of the path \u2014 a keyholder mints a root, certifies a\n * device and signs its own join offline, and this read is the only thing that\n * tells it where to post the result.\n *\n * So the caller proves possession of the credential it already holds. The cloud\n * mints a sealed, namespace-bound nonce; the device signs it; the read carries\n * the certificate and that signature.\n *\n * ## What this establishes, and what it does not\n *\n * It establishes that the caller holds a device key certified by some account\n * root, and *which* account that is. It does **not** establish that the account\n * was invited to the namespace, nor that it is a member \u2014 the cloud cannot\n * check either, because membership is governance state held by the nodes.\n * Anyone can mint an account root offline, so this is not a wall. It buys\n * attribution (every read names an account and can be rate-limited) and it ends\n * anonymous bulk discovery. Authorization stays where it always was: at the\n * node, on the signed op.\n *\n * ## Why the DEVICE signs, not the root\n *\n * The opposite choice from {@link signAccountLink}, deliberately. That one\n * exists for the device-loss case, so only the root will do. This one runs on\n * every routing read from a browser that discards the root immediately after\n * certifying its device \u2014 requiring the root would mean re-entering a 24-word\n * phrase to look up a URL.\n *\n * The certificate alone is not enough and the signature is not redundant with\n * it: a certificate travels in the clear inside every device-link op, so anyone\n * who has seen one can replay it. Only the nonce signature binds the presenter\n * to the device.\n */\n\nimport { concat, fromHex, importSigningKey } from '../crypto/internal.js';\n\n/**\n * The signing domain, followed immediately by the nonce as UTF-8.\n *\n * A flat prefix rather than this SDK's usual length-prefixed `domainHash`,\n * because the verifier is MDMA's `verify_routing_proof` and it checks\n * `DOMAIN \u2016 nonce` against the raw message. The trailing NUL is part of the\n * domain string on both sides; it is what stops a domain that is a prefix of\n * some future one from colliding with it.\n */\nconst ROUTING_PROOF_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode(\n  'calimero.mdma.routing-read.v1\\0',\n);\n\n/**\n * The credential a routing read presents: a certificate, and the key to sign\n * the challenge with.\n *\n * `credential` is the 237-byte `AccountProof<DeviceCert>` as hex \u2014 exactly what\n * {@link signDeviceCert} returns, and the same string a login statement and a\n * warrant carry. It is public by construction.\n *\n * `deviceSecret` never leaves the process. It signs the challenge locally and\n * only the signature travels.\n */\nexport interface RoutingCredential {\n  /** The `AccountProof<DeviceCert>`, hex borsh, as `signDeviceCert` returns it. */\n  credential: string;\n  /** The certified device's ed25519 signing secret, hex (32 bytes). */\n  deviceSecret: string;\n}\n\n/** A challenge to sign, as the cloud minted it. */\nexport interface RoutingChallenge {\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /** Opaque and sealed \u2014 the client neither parses nor constructs this. */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** Epoch **milliseconds**, as MDMA reports it. Nonces live about two minutes. */\n  expiresAtMs: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * A challenge bound to an ACCOUNT rather than a namespace, for asking which\n * relays serve that account.\n *\n * Separate from {@link RoutingChallenge} because the binding is the security\n * property, not a field name: MDMA seals the account into this one and the\n * namespace into that one, and refuses each at the other's route. Keeping the\n * TypeScript types distinct is what stops a caller passing the wrong one and\n * learning about it as a 403.\n */\nexport interface DiscoveryChallenge {\n  accountId: string;\n  /** Opaque and sealed \u2014 the client neither parses nor constructs this. */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** Epoch **milliseconds**, as MDMA reports it. Nonces live about two minutes. */\n  expiresAtMs: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * The three header values a proven routing read carries.\n *\n * Intersected with `Record<string, string>` rather than declared as a plain\n * interface so it drops straight into a headers bag: an interface has no index\n * signature, so TypeScript refuses it where `Record<string, string>` is wanted\n * even though every field is a string.\n */\nexport type RoutingProofHeaders = Record<string, string> & {\n  'X-Calimero-Credential': string;\n  'X-Calimero-Nonce': string;\n  'X-Calimero-Signature': string;\n};\n\n/**\n * Sign a routing challenge with the device key.\n *\n * Returns base64, which is what the header carries and what MDMA's verifier\n * decodes \u2014 the one place this SDK does not spell a signature as hex, because\n * the wire format is not ours to choose.\n */\nexport async function signRoutingChallenge(\n  nonce: string,\n  deviceSecret: string,\n): Promise<string> {\n  // Validate the secret the same way every other signing path does, so a\n  // truncated or mis-cased key fails here rather than as a 403 from the cloud.\n  fromHex(deviceSecret, 'deviceSecret', 32);\n  const key = await importSigningKey(deviceSecret);\n\n  const message = concat(\n    ROUTING_PROOF_DOMAIN,\n    new TextEncoder().encode(nonce),\n  );\n\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign({ name: 'Ed25519' }, key, message),\n  );\n\n  return base64(signature);\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the headers for one routing read, from a challenge the cloud minted.\n *\n * Separated from the request so a caller that fetches its own challenge \u2014 a\n * test, or a client batching several reads against one nonce \u2014 can use the same\n * encoding rather than a second spelling of it.\n *\n * Takes either challenge kind: only the nonce is signed and both are signed\n * over the same domain, so one encoder serves both. What separates them is what\n * MDMA sealed inside, which is checked server-side.\n */\nexport async function routingProofHeaders(\n  challenge: RoutingChallenge | DiscoveryChallenge,\n  credential: RoutingCredential,\n): Promise<RoutingProofHeaders> {\n  return {\n    'X-Calimero-Credential': credential.credential,\n    'X-Calimero-Nonce': challenge.nonce,\n    'X-Calimero-Signature': await signRoutingChallenge(\n      challenge.nonce,\n      credential.deviceSecret,\n    ),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * base64, the encoding the header carries.\n *\n * `btoa` is global in every browser and in Node since 16, and this package\n * requires Node 18 \u2014 so there is no runtime here that needs a `Buffer`\n * fallback, and adding one would pull a Node-only global into browser code.\n */\nfunction base64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  let binary = '';\n  for (const byte of bytes) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);\n  return btoa(binary);\n}\n", "/**\n * Calimero Cloud (MDMA) client.\n *\n * # Why the SDK knows about the cloud at all\n *\n * Delegated execution lets an account that holds one signing key write into a\n * context without running a node \u2014 but only through a *relay*, and a relay is\n * something the client has to be told about. A warrant names an executor\n * account, so a client that cannot discover which relay serves its namespace,\n * and which account that relay writes as, cannot mint a usable warrant at all.\n *\n * For a self-hosted namespace the operator hands those two facts over out of\n * band. For the hosted tier the cloud is the directory: the user signs in, the\n * cloud knows which namespaces they own and which attested TEE nodes are\n * assigned to each, and it answers with the relay's URL and executor account.\n * That is what this client is for \u2014 it is the discovery half of\n * {@link RelayClient}, not a second way to talk to a node.\n *\n * # What it deliberately is not\n *\n * It never sees a warrant, a device secret, or an intent. Discovery goes\n * through the cloud; the write goes straight from the client to the relay. A\n * cloud that proxied intents would read every method and argument its users\n * ever sent, and would be a throughput bottleneck on a path that has no reason\n * to involve it.\n */\n\nimport {\n  accountRootFromSecret,\n  signAccountLink,\n  signAccountLogin,\n} from '../account/index.js';\nimport { HTTPError } from '../http-client/web-client.js';\nimport {\n  routingProofHeaders,\n  type DiscoveryChallenge,\n  type RoutingChallenge,\n  type RoutingCredential,\n} from './routing-proof.js';\n\n/** Where the hosted cloud lives when a caller names no other. */\nconst DEFAULT_CLOUD_BASE_URL = 'https://cloud.calimero.network';\n\nexport interface CloudClientConfig {\n  cloudBaseUrl?: string;\n  /**\n   * An MDMA session token to start out authenticated with \u2014 from a previous\n   * {@link CloudClient.signInWithGoogle}, persisted by the app.\n   *\n   * Sessions are 7-day JWTs with a rolling refresh, so a stored one is usually\n   * still live and re-running the Google flow on every launch is avoidable.\n   */\n  sessionToken?: string;\n  /**\n   * Called whenever the session token changes \u2014 a sign-in, an explicit\n   * refresh, or a rolling refresh the server performed mid-request. Persist it\n   * here; errors thrown are swallowed so a storage failure cannot mask the\n   * response the caller is waiting for.\n   */\n  onSession?: (session: CloudSession | null) => void | Promise<void>;\n  /** Injected for tests and non-browser runtimes. Defaults to global `fetch`. */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  /** Per-request timeout. Defaults to 10s, as the node clients do. */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * The device credential to prove an account with on the routing read.\n   *\n   * Nothing to do with {@link sessionToken}: a cloud session says who is signed\n   * in, this says which account holds the key. A joiner has the second and\n   * cannot have the first \u2014 see `routing-proof.ts` for why that is not an\n   * oversight.\n   *\n   * Omitting it leaves {@link CloudClient.getNamespaceRouting} anonymous, which\n   * the cloud still answers while `require_routing_proof` is off. Supply it and\n   * the read is attributed; the cloud verifies a supplied proof either way, so\n   * a wrong one surfaces immediately rather than on the day the flag flips.\n   */\n  routingCredential?: RoutingCredential;\n}\n\n/** Who is signed in, and until when. */\nexport interface CloudSession {\n  sessionToken: string;\n  /** Epoch **seconds**, as MDMA reports it \u2014 not milliseconds. */\n  expiresAt: number;\n  user: { email: string; name?: string; picture?: string };\n}\n\n/** One namespace the signed-in user owns. */\nexport interface CloudNamespace {\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /** Always equal to `namespaceId`; MDMA keeps it for wire compatibility. */\n  groupId: string;\n  /** `'enabled' | 'disabled' | 'none'` \u2014 `'none'` means HA was never enabled. */\n  haStatus: string;\n  haEnabledAt?: string | null;\n  contexts: string[];\n  fleetReplicas?: { current?: number; limit?: number } | unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * One attested node the cloud has assigned to a namespace, described as a\n * relay.\n *\n * `authorshipReady` is the field that decides whether a write can happen, and\n * it is reported rather than assumed because it is not the cloud's to grant:\n * `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` is a governance capability, set by an admin of the\n * namespace, and the cloud only relays what the node observed. A relay that is\n * `active` with `authorshipReady: false` is a healthy node waiting for a grant.\n */\nexport interface CloudRelay {\n  peerId: string;\n  /** Base URL to present intents to, or `null` when the cloud knows none yet. */\n  relayUrl: string | null;\n  /** The account a warrant for this relay must name as its `executor`, hex. */\n  executorAccount: string | null;\n  /** `'assigned'` (admitted pending confirm) or `'active'`. */\n  status: string;\n  /** Whether this relay holds `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` on the namespace. */\n  authorshipReady: boolean;\n  lastSeenAt?: string | null;\n  confirmedAt?: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * One node serving a namespace, as a caller with no cloud account sees it.\n *\n * The public counterpart to {@link CloudRelay}: same fleet rows, but keyed on a\n * namespace id anyone holding an invitation already has, and answering both\n * things a keyholder needs from a node rather than one of them.\n */\n/**\n * One relay that serves an account, as the bootstrap read reports it.\n *\n * `fresh` and a null `relayUrl` are reported rather than filtered, because\n * \"your relay is down\", \"we have no address for it\" and \"you have no relay\"\n * need different actions from a caller and an empty list erases the\n * distinction. A caller looking for somewhere to talk to wants\n * `fresh && relayUrl`; one diagnosing wants the rest.\n */\nexport interface CloudAccountRelay {\n  peerId: string;\n  relayUrl: string | null;\n  fresh: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface CloudNamespaceNode {\n  peerId: string;\n  /**\n   * The node's own account id, hex.\n   *\n   * Intersect this against the invitation's signed `admitters` list before\n   * using the node. That list is a MINT-TIME SNAPSHOT, so a node assigned after\n   * an invitation was created is live, healthy, listed here, and still refused\n   * with 403 \u2014 the cloud cannot know which invitation you hold.\n   */\n  account: string | null;\n  /** Base URL, or `null` when the cloud knows none yet. */\n  relayUrl: string | null;\n  /** Ready-made admission URL, so a caller never rebuilds the path. */\n  admitUrl: string | null;\n  /** `'assigned'` (admitted pending confirm) or `'active'`. */\n  status: string;\n  /** Whether the node's heartbeat for this namespace is recent. */\n  fresh: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Whether a signed join can be presented here now.\n   *\n   * Deliberately independent of {@link CloudNamespaceNode.authorshipReady}:\n   * relaying a join the joiner already signed is not authoring on anyone's\n   * behalf, so a node with no grant admits perfectly well.\n   */\n  canAdmit: boolean;\n  /** Whether the node holds `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` on the namespace root group. */\n  authorshipReady: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Whether a delegated write can be posted here now \u2014 a URL, an account, a\n   * fresh heartbeat and the grant.\n   *\n   * Namespace-level. A context in a RESTRICTED SUBGROUP is governed by that\n   * subgroup, so per-context routing remains the exact answer if a write is\n   * refused despite this being true.\n   */\n  canExecute: boolean;\n}\n\n/** What {@link CloudClient.getNamespaceRouting} reports. */\nexport interface CloudNamespaceRouting {\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /** Usable nodes first, then a stable order, so a polling caller sees no shuffle. */\n  nodes: CloudNamespaceNode[];\n  /** Whether any listed node can take a join now. */\n  servable: boolean;\n  /** Whether any listed node can take a delegated write now. */\n  writable: boolean;\n}\n\n/** One namespace of the caller's that a machine is serving. */\nexport interface CloudMachineNamespace {\n  namespaceId: string;\n  /** `'assigned'` (admitted pending confirm) or `'active'`. */\n  status: string;\n  /** Whether the machine holds `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` on this namespace. */\n  authorshipReady: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Whether the machine's heartbeat for this namespace is recent.\n   *\n   * The same freshness rule the per-plan fleet cap uses, so a replica that\n   * stopped polling reads as stale here rather than continuing to look\n   * healthy \u2014 otherwise \"my writes stopped working\" has no visible cause.\n   */\n  fresh: boolean;\n  confirmedAt?: string | null;\n  lastSeenAt?: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * One attested machine serving this account.\n *\n * A narrow view on purpose: the zone, machine type, instance name, public IP\n * and KMS ids are operator data with no client use, and a cloud user is not an\n * operator.\n */\nexport interface CloudMachine {\n  peerId: string;\n  relayUrl: string | null;\n  executorAccount: string | null;\n  /**\n   * Whether this machine can write for the caller *somewhere* \u2014 a URL, an\n   * executor account, and the grant on at least one namespace.\n   *\n   * Folded here so a client does not re-derive the three-way precondition and\n   * get a refusal it cannot explain.\n   */\n  canExecute: boolean;\n  /** Only the caller's own namespaces, even on a machine shared with others. */\n  namespaces: CloudMachineNamespace[];\n}\n\n/** A Calimero account linked to this cloud login. */\nexport interface CloudLinkedAccount {\n  /** The account id, 64 hex. */\n  accountId: string;\n  linkedAt?: string | null;\n  /**\n   * Whether a recovery envelope has been stored for this account, so a UI can\n   * say \"recoverable\" without fetching the blob.\n   */\n  hasRecoveryEnvelope: boolean;\n}\n\n/** What {@link CloudClient.getMyAccounts} reports. */\nexport interface CloudLinkedAccounts {\n  accounts: CloudLinkedAccount[];\n  /** How many the caller's plan allows. `null` means no limit. */\n  limit: number | null;\n}\n\n/** A single-use challenge to sign with an account root. */\nexport interface AccountLinkChallenge {\n  /** Sign this verbatim \u2014 it is an opaque sealed string, not a decodable id. */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** When it stops being accepted, epoch milliseconds. */\n  expiresAtMs: number | null;\n}\n\n/** A proof assembled by whoever holds the root, for {@link CloudClient.submitAccountLink}. */\nexport interface AccountLinkProof {\n  /** The account being claimed, 64 hex. */\n  accountId: string;\n  /** The root that names it, 64 hex. */\n  rootPublicKey: string;\n  /** The challenge that was signed. */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** `signAccountLink`'s output \u2014 standard base64. */\n  signature: string;\n}\n\n/** Where to send someone so a cloud login can consent to linking an account. */\nexport interface AccountLinkHandoff {\n  /** The cloud portal URL to open \u2014 a new tab, a popup, or the system browser. */\n  url: string;\n  /** The account the consent will be for, echoed so a caller can show it. */\n  accountId: string;\n}\n\n/** What comes back on the callback: a grant, a refusal, or neither. */\nexport interface AccountLinkCallback {\n  /** The grant to spend with {@link CloudClient.linkAccountWithGrant}. */\n  grant?: string;\n  /** The account the grant is for, as the portal echoed it. */\n  accountId?: string;\n  /** `'denied'` when the person cancelled. Absent on success. */\n  error?: string;\n}\n\n/** A single-use challenge for an account root to sign itself in with. */\nexport interface AccountLoginChallenge {\n  /** Sign this verbatim. Opaque and sealed by the cloud; nonces live ~2 minutes. */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** When it stops being accepted, epoch milliseconds. */\n  expiresAtMs: number;\n}\n\n/** A proof assembled by whoever holds the root, for {@link CloudClient.submitAccountLogin}. */\nexport interface AccountLoginProof {\n  /**\n   * The root that names the account, 64 hex.\n   *\n   * No `accountId` field, unlike {@link AccountLinkProof}: the cloud derives\n   * the account from this key rather than accepting one alongside it, so there\n   * is nothing a caller could state that the signature would then contradict.\n   */\n  rootPublicKey: string;\n  /** The challenge that was signed. */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** `signAccountLogin`'s output \u2014 standard base64. */\n  signature: string;\n}\n\n/** The outcome of {@link CloudClient.linkAccount}. */\nexport interface CloudAccountLink {\n  accountId: string;\n  linkedAt?: string | null;\n  /**\n   * True when this account was already linked to this same login, which the\n   * cloud treats as a 200 no-op rather than an error. A caller re-running\n   * onboarding gets success, not a confusing failure.\n   */\n  alreadyLinked: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface EnableHAOptions {\n  groupId: string;\n  contextId: string;\n  redirectUrl?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface DisableHAOptions {\n  groupId: string;\n  contextId: string;\n  redirectUrl?: string;\n}\n\n/** Response headers MDMA uses to hand back a rolling-refreshed session. */\nconst REFRESH_HEADER = 'x-mdma-session-refresh';\nconst REFRESH_EXPIRES_HEADER = 'x-mdma-session-expires';\n\nexport class CloudClient {\n  private baseUrl: string;\n  private session: CloudSession | null = null;\n  private readonly onSession?: CloudClientConfig['onSession'];\n  private readonly fetchImpl: typeof fetch;\n  private readonly timeoutMs: number;\n  private readonly routingCredential?: RoutingCredential;\n\n  constructor(config: CloudClientConfig = {}) {\n    this.baseUrl = (config.cloudBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CLOUD_BASE_URL).replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n    this.onSession = config.onSession;\n    // Bound through an arrow function: an unbound `globalThis.fetch` throws\n    // \"Illegal invocation\" in a browser, the same reason the node HTTP clients\n    // wrap it.\n    const injected = config.fetch;\n    this.fetchImpl = injected\n      ? (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => injected(input, init)\n      : (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => globalThis.fetch(input, init);\n    this.timeoutMs = config.timeoutMs ?? 10_000;\n    this.routingCredential = config.routingCredential;\n\n    if (config.sessionToken) {\n      // Expiry unknown until the server tells us; 0 means \"do not reason about\n      // it locally\", never \"expired\" \u2014 the server is the only judge and it\n      // answers 401 when it disagrees.\n      this.session = {\n        sessionToken: config.sessionToken,\n        expiresAt: 0,\n        user: { email: '' },\n      };\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** The current session, or `null` when nobody is signed in. */\n  getSession(): CloudSession | null {\n    return this.session;\n  }\n\n  /** Whether a session token is held. Says nothing about the server agreeing. */\n  isSignedIn(): boolean {\n    return this.session !== null;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Exchange a Google OAuth2 ID token for an MDMA session.\n   *\n   * The app owns the Google flow (One Tap, an auth-code popup, a native\n   * browser) and hands the resulting ID token here once. Everything after this\n   * uses the returned session token, so the Google credential does not have to\n   * be kept or re-minted per call.\n   */\n  async signInWithGoogle(idToken: string): Promise<CloudSession> {\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      session_token: string;\n      expires_at: number;\n      user: { email: string; name?: string; picture?: string };\n    }>('POST', '/api/auth/google', { body: { id_token: idToken }, anonymous: true });\n    return this.adoptSession(body);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Sign in as a Calimero account, proving it with its root key.\n   *\n   * The password-free counterpart to {@link signInWithGoogle}: no Google, no\n   * password, no server-held secret \u2014 the cloud mints a challenge, the account\n   * root signs it, and the session that comes back is the same MDMA session\n   * token every other cloud route already accepts.\n   *\n   * Doing this **once** is what makes an account's later device proofs mean\n   * something. A routing read shows that the caller holds a device the root\n   * certified, but certificates are public, so it can never show that anyone\n   * held the root; the cloud records this claim and from then on knows the\n   * account behind those reads was claimed by its owner. The claim is recorded\n   * even when the session is refused.\n   *\n   * @param rootSecret the account root's signing secret, 64 hex. It never\n   *   leaves this process \u2014 only a signature over the cloud's nonce travels.\n   *\n   * A `403` means either the signature did not verify, or the account is not\n   * linked to a cloud login: ownership alone says who you are, and the link\n   * says what you are entitled to. Anyone can mint a root offline, so a session\n   * on the proof alone would authenticate perfectly and authorize nothing. The\n   * ownership claim is recorded either way, so linking later needs no re-proof.\n   */\n  async signInWithAccount(rootSecret: string): Promise<CloudSession> {\n    const root = await accountRootFromSecret(rootSecret);\n    const { nonce } = await this.getAccountLoginChallenge();\n    return this.submitAccountLogin({\n      rootPublicKey: root.publicKey,\n      nonce,\n      signature: await signAccountLogin({ rootSecret, nonce }),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Mint a challenge for an account root to sign.\n   *\n   * Public, and deliberately so: the caller has no session \u2014 obtaining one is\n   * what this exchange does. The nonce is not a capability, it is the thing a\n   * capability gets demonstrated against, and demonstrating it needs the root.\n   *\n   * Split out of {@link signInWithAccount} for the case that call cannot serve:\n   * a root held by a hardware key, a desktop app or an air-gapped machine,\n   * which signs without the secret ever reaching this process.\n   */\n  async getAccountLoginChallenge(): Promise<AccountLoginChallenge> {\n    const body = await this.request<{ nonce: string; expires_at_ms: number }>(\n      'GET',\n      '/api/auth/account/challenge',\n      { anonymous: true },\n    );\n    return { nonce: body.nonce, expiresAtMs: body.expires_at_ms };\n  }\n\n  /** Post a proof assembled elsewhere. The other half of {@link getAccountLoginChallenge}. */\n  async submitAccountLogin(proof: AccountLoginProof): Promise<CloudSession> {\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      session_token: string;\n      expires_at: number;\n      user: { email: string; name?: string; picture?: string };\n    }>('POST', '/api/auth/account', {\n      body: {\n        root_public_key: proof.rootPublicKey,\n        nonce: proof.nonce,\n        signature: proof.signature,\n      },\n      anonymous: true,\n    });\n    return this.adoptSession(body);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Refresh the session token explicitly.\n   *\n   * Rarely needed: MDMA rolling-refreshes on ordinary authenticated calls and\n   * this client adopts the replacement automatically. Use it when an app wants\n   * a fresh token before going idle rather than on the next request.\n   */\n  async refreshSession(): Promise<CloudSession> {\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      session_token: string;\n      expires_at: number;\n      user: { email: string; name?: string; picture?: string };\n    }>('POST', '/api/auth/refresh');\n    return this.adoptSession(body);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Revoke this session server-side and forget it locally.\n   *\n   * Local state is cleared even if the server call fails: the caller asked to\n   * be signed out, and keeping a token they believe is gone is the worse of the\n   * two failures.\n   */\n  async signOut(): Promise<void> {\n    try {\n      if (this.session) await this.request<void>('POST', '/api/auth/logout', { parse: 'none' });\n    } finally {\n      this.session = null;\n      void this.notifySession(null);\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Namespaces the signed-in user owns. */\n  async getMyNamespaces(): Promise<CloudNamespace[]> {\n    const rows = await this.request<Array<Record<string, unknown>>>(\n      'GET',\n      '/api/cloud/me/namespaces',\n    );\n    return rows.map((row) => ({\n      namespaceId: String(row.namespace_id ?? row.group_id ?? ''),\n      groupId: String(row.group_id ?? row.namespace_id ?? ''),\n      haStatus: String(row.ha_status ?? 'none'),\n      haEnabledAt: (row.ha_enabled_at as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      contexts: Array.isArray(row.contexts) ? (row.contexts as string[]) : [],\n      fleetReplicas: row.fleet_replicas,\n    }));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The relays serving one namespace: where to present an intent, and as whom.\n   *\n   * Everything a client needs in order to mint a warrant it can actually\n   * spend. Filter on `authorshipReady` before signing \u2014 a warrant presented to\n   * a relay with no grant is refused *after* the author has burned a nonce from\n   * its monotonic sequence on it.\n   */\n  async getNamespaceRelays(namespaceId: string): Promise<CloudRelay[]> {\n    const body = await this.request<{ relays?: Array<Record<string, unknown>> }>(\n      'GET',\n      `/api/cloud/me/namespaces/${encodeURIComponent(namespaceId)}/relays`,\n    );\n    return (body.relays ?? []).map((row) => ({\n      peerId: String(row.peer_id ?? ''),\n      relayUrl: (row.relay_url as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      executorAccount: (row.executor_account as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      status: String(row.status ?? ''),\n      authorshipReady: row.authorship_ready === true,\n      lastSeenAt: (row.last_seen_at as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      confirmedAt: (row.confirmed_at as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n    }));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The first relay for `namespaceId` that can actually run an intent, or\n   * `null`.\n   *\n   * \"Can actually run one\" is three conditions, and a client that checks fewer\n   * gets a refusal it cannot explain: the cloud must know a URL, the relay must\n   * have reported the executor account a warrant has to name, and the grant\n   * must be in place.\n   */\n  async findExecutingRelay(namespaceId: string): Promise<CloudRelay | null> {\n    const relays = await this.getNamespaceRelays(namespaceId);\n    return (\n      relays.find((r) => r.authorshipReady && r.relayUrl !== null && r.executorAccount !== null) ??\n      null\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Where to reach a namespace without owning it: one read, both verbs.\n   *\n   * **Anonymous.** A joiner is by construction not the namespace owner and holds\n   * no cloud session \u2014 needing one is exactly what this path exists to avoid.\n   * Discovery is not authorization: merod refuses an `/admit` call unless the\n   * relaying node's account is on the invitation's signed `admitters` list, and\n   * refuses an intent unless the warrant is genuinely the member's, so naming a\n   * node grants the caller nothing it did not already have.\n   *\n   * A keyholder resolves a namespace to a node ONCE and then admits, reads and\n   * posts intents against that same node, which is why admission and writability\n   * are answered together rather than across two endpoints \u2014 the per-context\n   * read needs a context id a joiner does not yet have.\n   *\n   * An empty `nodes` list is a state, not an error: a namespace with no fleet\n   * assignment has no cloud node, and the joiner must use one of the\n   * invitation's other admitters \u2014 another admin's node, or a self-hosted peer.\n   */\n  async getNamespaceRouting(namespaceId: string): Promise<CloudNamespaceRouting> {\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      namespace_id?: unknown;\n      admitters?: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;\n      servable?: unknown;\n      writable?: unknown;\n    }>('GET', `/api/cloud/namespaces/${encodeURIComponent(namespaceId)}/admitters`, {\n      anonymous: true,\n      headers: await this.routingProof(namespaceId),\n    });\n    return {\n      namespaceId: String(body.namespace_id ?? namespaceId),\n      nodes: (body.admitters ?? []).map((row) => ({\n        peerId: String(row.peer_id ?? ''),\n        account: (row.account as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n        relayUrl: (row.relay_url as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n        admitUrl: (row.admit_url as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n        status: String(row.status ?? ''),\n        fresh: row.fresh === true,\n        canAdmit: row.can_admit === true,\n        authorshipReady: row.authorship_ready === true,\n        canExecute: row.can_execute === true,\n      })),\n      servable: body.servable === true,\n      writable: body.writable === true,\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Ask the cloud for a challenge to prove an account against.\n   *\n   * Public and unauthenticated on purpose, and safe to be: the nonce is sealed\n   * and bound to this one namespace, so it is not a capability \u2014 it is the\n   * thing a capability gets demonstrated against. A caller with no credential\n   * gains nothing by holding one.\n   *\n   * {@link getNamespaceRouting} calls this for you when the client was\n   * constructed with a `routingCredential`. Call it directly only to sign a\n   * challenge somewhere this client cannot reach the key.\n   */\n  async getRoutingChallenge(namespaceId: string): Promise<RoutingChallenge> {\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      namespace_id?: unknown;\n      nonce?: unknown;\n      expires_at_ms?: unknown;\n    }>('GET', `/api/cloud/namespaces/${encodeURIComponent(namespaceId)}/challenge`, {\n      anonymous: true,\n    });\n    return {\n      namespaceId: String(body.namespace_id ?? namespaceId),\n      nonce: String(body.nonce ?? ''),\n      expiresAtMs: Number(body.expires_at_ms ?? 0),\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The proof headers for one routing read, or nothing when no credential was\n   * configured.\n   *\n   * A challenge per read rather than a cached one: they expire in about two\n   * minutes and are single-namespace, so caching would trade one cheap request\n   * for a class of expiry bug that only shows up on a slow client.\n   */\n  private async routingProof(\n    namespaceId: string,\n  ): Promise<Record<string, string> | undefined> {\n    if (!this.routingCredential) return undefined;\n    const challenge = await this.getRoutingChallenge(namespaceId);\n    return routingProofHeaders(challenge, this.routingCredential);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Ask the cloud for a challenge bound to one ACCOUNT.\n   *\n   * Public and unauthenticated like {@link getRoutingChallenge}: an account id\n   * is `H(genesis(root_pk))` and travels in the clear in every device-link op,\n   * so naming one here reveals nothing and authorises nothing. MDMA re-derives\n   * the account from the certificate and refuses a mismatch.\n   */\n  async getAccountRelaysChallenge(accountId: string): Promise<DiscoveryChallenge> {\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      account_id?: unknown;\n      nonce?: unknown;\n      expires_at_ms?: unknown;\n    }>('GET', `/api/cloud/accounts/${encodeURIComponent(accountId)}/challenge`, {\n      anonymous: true,\n    });\n    return {\n      accountId: String(body.account_id ?? accountId),\n      nonce: String(body.nonce ?? ''),\n      expiresAtMs: Number(body.expires_at_ms ?? 0),\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Which relays serve this account \u2014 the bootstrap, and nothing more.\n   *\n   * A device holding a certificate can resolve a namespace it can *name*\n   * ({@link getNamespaceRouting}) and can ask a node it can *reach* what its\n   * account belongs to. It starts with neither. This closes that one gap.\n   *\n   * **It does not return namespaces, deliberately.** The node answers that from\n   * the governance DAG, scoped to the calling account: log in at one of these\n   * relays with an account proof and read its namespace listing. A cloud-side\n   * copy would be a second source of truth built from rows that linger for an\n   * account which left a namespace.\n   *\n   * So the sequence is: this \u2192 log in at a relay \u2192 ask it what you are in.\n   *\n   * Proven with the **device certificate**, not a cloud session, so it needs a\n   * `routingCredential` and throws without one rather than returning an empty\n   * list \u2014 \"you configured no credential\" and \"you have no relays\" are\n   * different answers and must not look alike.\n   */\n  async getAccountRelays(accountId: string): Promise<CloudAccountRelay[]> {\n    if (!this.routingCredential) {\n      throw new Error(\n        'getAccountRelays needs a routingCredential: construct the client with the device ' +\n          'certificate and its signing secret, since this read is proven by the device, not by a session.',\n      );\n    }\n    const challenge = await this.getAccountRelaysChallenge(accountId);\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      account_id?: unknown;\n      relays?: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;\n    }>('GET', `/api/cloud/accounts/${encodeURIComponent(accountId)}/relays`, {\n      anonymous: true,\n      headers: await routingProofHeaders(challenge, this.routingCredential),\n    });\n    return (body.relays ?? []).map((row) => ({\n      peerId: String(row.peer_id ?? ''),\n      relayUrl: (row.relay_url as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      fresh: row.fresh === true,\n    }));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The node to send a signed join to, chosen from those an invitation names.\n   *\n   * Pass the invitation's `admitters` and the intersection is done here, because\n   * skipping it is the failure this method exists to prevent: the cloud lists\n   * every node assigned to the namespace, while `admitters` is a snapshot signed\n   * when the invitation was minted. A node added afterwards looks perfect in\n   * every field here and answers 403.\n   *\n   * Omit `admitters` only for an invitation that names none \u2014 an empty list on\n   * the wire authorises any node to admit.\n   */\n  async findAdmitter(\n    namespaceId: string,\n    admitters?: readonly string[],\n  ): Promise<CloudNamespaceNode | null> {\n    const { nodes } = await this.getNamespaceRouting(namespaceId);\n    const allowed =\n      admitters && admitters.length > 0 ? new Set(admitters.map((a) => a.toLowerCase())) : null;\n    return (\n      nodes.find(\n        (n) =>\n          n.canAdmit &&\n          (allowed === null || (n.account !== null && allowed.has(n.account.toLowerCase()))),\n      ) ?? null\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Every attested machine currently serving something this account owns.\n   *\n   * The account-wide view of the same rows {@link getNamespaceRelays} returns\n   * per namespace, keyed by machine \u2014 so a UI can answer \"what is running for\n   * me?\" in one call. `canExecute` folds the three-way precondition, so a\n   * caller does not re-derive it.\n   *\n   * Only the caller's own namespaces appear on each machine. A plan's\n   * `usersPerMachine` is greater than one, so a fleet node routinely serves\n   * several accounts at once.\n   */\n  async getMyMachines(): Promise<CloudMachine[]> {\n    const body = await this.request<{ machines?: Array<Record<string, unknown>> }>(\n      'GET',\n      '/api/cloud/me/machines',\n    );\n    return (body.machines ?? []).map((row) => ({\n      peerId: String(row.peer_id ?? ''),\n      relayUrl: (row.relay_url as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      executorAccount: (row.executor_account as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      canExecute: row.can_execute === true,\n      namespaces: (Array.isArray(row.namespaces) ? row.namespaces : []).map((n) => {\n        const ns = n as Record<string, unknown>;\n        return {\n          namespaceId: String(ns.namespace_id ?? ''),\n          status: String(ns.status ?? ''),\n          authorshipReady: ns.authorship_ready === true,\n          fresh: ns.fresh === true,\n          confirmedAt: (ns.confirmed_at as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n          lastSeenAt: (ns.last_seen_at as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n        };\n      }),\n    }));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Claim a namespace under this account, proving ownership.\n   *\n   * The cloud has no other way to learn a namespace exists \u2014 namespaces are\n   * created on a node, and there is deliberately no \"create namespace\" in the\n   * cloud. `ownershipProof` comes from\n   * `admin.issueNamespaceOwnershipProof(namespaceId, \u2026)` on a node that is a\n   * **direct admin** of that namespace; merod refuses to issue one otherwise.\n   *\n   * Pass merod's response object straight through. The cloud accepts core's\n   * `signerPublicKey`/`signedPayload` casing as well as snake_case, so there is\n   * no re-keying step \u2014 and getting that wrong used to surface as a `422`\n   * naming three missing fields.\n   *\n   * Idempotent for the same account. A namespace already claimed by someone\n   * else is a `409`; a replayed proof nonce is a `403`.\n   */\n  async claimNamespace(namespaceId: string, ownershipProof: unknown): Promise<void> {\n    await this.request<unknown>('POST', '/api/cloud/namespaces/claim', {\n      body: { namespace_id: namespaceId, ownership_proof: ownershipProof },\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Ask the fleet to host a claimed namespace \u2014 the step that gets a relay\n   * assigned.\n   *\n   * Carries no proof: {@link claimNamespace} already established ownership,\n   * and this is the separate \"now host it\" half. Idempotent.\n   *\n   * `admitterAddrs` is where the owner's own node can be dialed \u2014 take it from\n   * that node's network status with {@link admitterAddrsFromNetworkStatus}.\n   * The first fleet node placed on a namespace has nobody but the owner to ask\n   * for admission, and without these it can only broadcast and hope the\n   * owner's node \u2014 often a laptop behind a relay \u2014 hears it. They are a dial\n   * hint, not a grant: the owner's node admits by its own policy. Omit them to\n   * leave whatever the cloud already holds; pass them again when the node's\n   * relay address changes, and they replace the stored ones.\n   *\n   * Not to be confused with {@link enableHA}, which opens the cloud's web flow\n   * in a browser tab for a user to complete by hand. This is the API call.\n   */\n  async enableNamespaceHa(\n    namespaceId: string,\n    options: { admitterAddrs?: readonly string[] } = {},\n  ): Promise<unknown> {\n    const body =\n      options.admitterAddrs === undefined\n        ? {}\n        : { admitter_addrs: [...options.admitterAddrs] };\n    return this.request<unknown>(\n      'POST',\n      `/api/cloud/namespaces/${encodeURIComponent(namespaceId)}/enable-ha`,\n      { body },\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Stop hosting a claimed namespace.\n   *\n   * The fleet's own reconcile loop does the rest: each assigned node notices\n   * the namespace is no longer assigned to it and **self-leaves**, which makes\n   * core evict it and purge its local data and keys. So this is not just a\n   * billing flip.\n   */\n  async disableNamespaceHa(namespaceId: string): Promise<unknown> {\n    return this.request<unknown>(\n      'POST',\n      `/api/cloud/namespaces/${encodeURIComponent(namespaceId)}/disable-ha`,\n      { body: {} },\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The node assigned to the signed-in user, or `null`.\n   *\n   * @deprecated Use {@link getMyMachines}. This reads the cloud's retired\n   * `NodeAssignment` ledger, which nothing has written since the v1\n   * retirement, so it answers `null` for every namespace-native account \u2014\n   * which reads as \"you have no machine\" when the truth is \"that is no longer\n   * how a machine is assigned\".\n   */\n  async getMyNode(): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null> {\n    const body = await this.request<{ node: Record<string, unknown> | null }>(\n      'GET',\n      '/api/cloud/me/node',\n    );\n    return body.node ?? null;\n  }\n\n  enableHA(options: EnableHAOptions): void {\n    const params = new URLSearchParams({\n      group_id: options.groupId,\n      context_id: options.contextId,\n    });\n    if (options.redirectUrl) {\n      params.set('redirect_url', options.redirectUrl);\n    }\n    window.open(`${this.baseUrl}/enable-ha?${params.toString()}`);\n  }\n\n  disableHA(options: DisableHAOptions): void {\n    const params = new URLSearchParams({\n      group_id: options.groupId,\n      context_id: options.contextId,\n    });\n    if (options.redirectUrl) {\n      params.set('redirect_url', options.redirectUrl);\n    }\n    window.open(`${this.baseUrl}/disable-ha?${params.toString()}`);\n  }\n\n  /** Record a freshly-issued session and tell the app to persist it. */\n  /**\n   * Link a Calimero account to this cloud login, proving possession of its root.\n   *\n   * Two hops, folded into one call because they are useless apart: fetch a\n   * single-use challenge, then sign it with the account root and post the proof.\n   * The secret never leaves this process \u2014 only a signature over a nonce the\n   * cloud minted does.\n   *\n   * This is the binding the cloud bills against. A relay does not need it to run\n   * an intent; the cloud needs it to know whose plan a hosted node is spending,\n   * and to sign that account back in later.\n   *\n   * @param rootSecret the account root's signing secret, 64 hex \u2014 from\n   *   {@link generateAccountRoot}, from a restored recovery phrase, or from a\n   *   desktop app or hardware key that already holds one.\n   *\n   * Idempotent for the same login. An account already linked to a *different*\n   * cloud login is a `409`; a replayed or expired challenge is a `403`; and\n   * exceeding the plan's account limit is a `402`.\n   */\n  async linkAccount(rootSecret: string): Promise<CloudAccountLink> {\n    const root = await accountRootFromSecret(rootSecret);\n    const { nonce } = await this.getAccountLinkChallenge();\n    return this.submitAccountLink({\n      accountId: root.accountId,\n      rootPublicKey: root.publicKey,\n      nonce,\n      signature: await signAccountLink({ rootSecret, nonce }),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Mint a single-use challenge for an account root to sign.\n   *\n   * The split half of {@link linkAccount}, for the case that call cannot serve:\n   * a root held by a desktop app, a hardware key or an air-gapped machine, which\n   * signs without the secret ever reaching this process. Fetch the challenge\n   * here, have the holder sign it, then hand the proof to\n   * {@link submitAccountLink}.\n   *\n   * Bound to the signed-in login and short-lived, so it is not a standing\n   * capability if it leaks \u2014 but it IS single-use, so a challenge fetched and\n   * abandoned is spent.\n   */\n  async getAccountLinkChallenge(): Promise<AccountLinkChallenge> {\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      nonce: string;\n      expires_at_ms?: number | null;\n    }>('GET', '/api/cloud/me/accounts/challenge');\n    return { nonce: body.nonce, expiresAtMs: body.expires_at_ms ?? null };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Post a proof assembled elsewhere. The other half of\n   * {@link getAccountLinkChallenge}.\n   *\n   * `accountId` must be the account `rootPublicKey` names \u2014 the cloud refuses a\n   * valid signature by a key that names a different account, or a caller could\n   * prove one root and link somebody else's account. Derive both from the same\n   * key rather than letting a user type either.\n   */\n  async submitAccountLink(proof: AccountLinkProof): Promise<CloudAccountLink> {\n    const body = await this.request<Record<string, unknown>>(\n      'POST',\n      '/api/cloud/me/accounts',\n      {\n        body: {\n          account_id: proof.accountId,\n          root_public_key: proof.rootPublicKey,\n          nonce: proof.nonce,\n          signature: proof.signature,\n        },\n      },\n    );\n    return {\n      accountId: String(body.account_id ?? proof.accountId),\n      linkedAt: (body.linked_at as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      alreadyLinked: body.already_linked === true,\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Where to send someone to authorise linking this account, and what to expect\n   * back. Pairs with {@link readAccountLinkCallback} and\n   * {@link linkAccountWithGrant}.\n   *\n   * This exists because a browser app is in a bind: it holds an account root and\n   * can never hold a *first* cloud session, since only Google issues one. So the\n   * person goes to the cloud, where they are signed in, and consents there. What\n   * comes back is a grant \u2014 consent to link this one account, spendable only by\n   * whoever can sign with its root.\n   *\n   * @param callbackUrl where the portal sends the person back. Must be an origin\n   *   the cloud allows; unlisted ones are refused when the grant is minted, not\n   *   here. The grant arrives in the URL **fragment**, which browsers do not\n   *   send to servers.\n   *\n   * Static, so it needs no client and no session: there is nothing to\n   * authenticate as yet.\n   */\n  static accountLinkHandoff(options: {\n    /** The cloud portal's origin, e.g. `https://cloud.calimero.network`. */\n    portalUrl: string;\n    /** The account to be linked, 64 hex \u2014 derive it, never let a user type it. */\n    accountId: string;\n    /** Where to come back to. */\n    callbackUrl: string;\n  }): AccountLinkHandoff {\n    const portal = options.portalUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n    const query = new URLSearchParams({\n      'link-account': options.accountId,\n      'callback-url': options.callbackUrl,\n    });\n    return { url: `${portal}/?${query.toString()}`, accountId: options.accountId };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Read the portal's answer out of a callback URL's fragment.\n   *\n   * Returns `{}` when there is nothing to read, so it is safe to call on every\n   * load \u2014 which is how a redirected app finds out it has been sent back.\n   *\n   * @param href defaults to the current location, when there is one.\n   */\n  static readAccountLinkCallback(href?: string): AccountLinkCallback {\n    const source = href ?? (typeof window === 'undefined' ? '' : window.location.href);\n    if (!source) return {};\n    let hash: string;\n    try {\n      hash = new URL(source).hash;\n    } catch {\n      return {};\n    }\n    const params = new URLSearchParams(hash.replace(/^#/, ''));\n    const grant = params.get('grant');\n    const accountId = params.get('account');\n    const error = params.get('error');\n    const out: AccountLinkCallback = {};\n    if (grant) out.grant = grant;\n    if (accountId) out.accountId = accountId;\n    if (error) out.error = error;\n    return out;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Spend a link grant: sign it with the account root and post the pair.\n   *\n   * Anonymous, and it has to be \u2014 the app doing this holds no cloud session,\n   * which is the whole reason the grant exists. The grant carries the consenting\n   * login sealed inside it, so nothing here names one; a caller-supplied email\n   * would be a field to lie in.\n   *\n   * The signature is an ordinary account-link signature with the grant as the\n   * nonce, so the same {@link signAccountLink} every other link path uses signs\n   * this one. Both halves are required: a grant without the key links nothing,\n   * which is what makes it safe to carry through a browser redirect.\n   *\n   * A `403` means the grant was bad, expired, already spent, or signed by a key\n   * that names a different account; `409` that the account belongs to another\n   * login; `402` that the plan is full.\n   */\n  async linkAccountWithGrant(options: {\n    grant: string;\n    /** The root of the account the grant names, 64 hex. */\n    rootSecret: string;\n  }): Promise<CloudAccountLink> {\n    const root = await accountRootFromSecret(options.rootSecret);\n    const body = await this.request<Record<string, unknown>>(\n      'POST',\n      '/api/cloud/accounts/link',\n      {\n        body: {\n          grant: options.grant,\n          root_public_key: root.publicKey,\n          signature: await signAccountLink({\n            rootSecret: options.rootSecret,\n            nonce: options.grant,\n          }),\n        },\n        anonymous: true,\n      },\n    );\n    return {\n      accountId: String(body.account_id ?? root.accountId),\n      linkedAt: (body.linked_at as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      alreadyLinked: body.already_linked === true,\n    };\n  }\n\n  /** The accounts linked to this login, and how many the plan allows. */\n  async getMyAccounts(): Promise<CloudLinkedAccounts> {\n    const body = await this.request<{\n      accounts?: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;\n      limit?: number | null;\n    }>('GET', '/api/cloud/me/accounts');\n    return {\n      accounts: (body.accounts ?? []).map((row) => ({\n        accountId: String(row.account_id ?? ''),\n        linkedAt: (row.linked_at as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n        hasRecoveryEnvelope: row.has_recovery_envelope === true,\n      })),\n      limit: body.limit ?? null,\n    };\n  }\n\n  private adoptSession(body: {\n    session_token: string;\n    expires_at: number;\n    user: { email: string; name?: string; picture?: string };\n  }): CloudSession {\n    this.session = {\n      sessionToken: body.session_token,\n      expiresAt: body.expires_at,\n      user: body.user,\n    };\n    void this.notifySession(this.session);\n    return this.session;\n  }\n\n  private async notifySession(session: CloudSession | null): Promise<void> {\n    try {\n      await this.onSession?.(session);\n    } catch {\n      // A failing persistence callback must not mask the call's own result.\n    }\n  }\n\n  private async request<T>(\n    method: string,\n    path: string,\n    options: {\n      body?: unknown;\n      anonymous?: boolean;\n      parse?: 'json' | 'none';\n      /** Extra request headers. Never overrides `Authorization` \u2014 see below. */\n      headers?: Record<string, string>;\n    } = {},\n  ): Promise<T> {\n    if (!options.anonymous && !this.session) {\n      throw new Error(\n        'Not signed in to Calimero Cloud: call signInWithGoogle() or construct the client with a sessionToken',\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Caller headers go in FIRST, so the lines below win on any collision: a\n    // per-call header must never be able to replace the session's\n    // `Authorization` or change how the body is parsed.\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n      ...options.headers,\n      Accept: 'application/json',\n    };\n    if (options.body !== undefined) headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';\n    if (!options.anonymous && this.session) {\n      headers.Authorization = `Bearer ${this.session.sessionToken}`;\n    }\n\n    const controller = new AbortController();\n    const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), this.timeoutMs);\n    let response: Response;\n    try {\n      response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`, {\n        method,\n        headers,\n        body: options.body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(options.body),\n        signal: controller.signal,\n      });\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Same shape the node clients use for a transport failure: an `HTTPError`\n      // with `status: 0`, so a caller has one error type to handle rather than\n      // one per layer.\n      throw new HTTPError(\n        0,\n        err instanceof Error ? err.name : 'NetworkError',\n        `${this.baseUrl}${path}`,\n        new Headers(),\n        err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),\n      );\n    } finally {\n      clearTimeout(timer);\n    }\n\n    this.adoptRollingRefresh(response);\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      const bodyText = await response.text().catch(() => undefined);\n      throw new HTTPError(\n        response.status,\n        response.statusText,\n        `${this.baseUrl}${path}`,\n        response.headers,\n        bodyText,\n      );\n    }\n\n    if (options.parse === 'none' || response.status === 204) return undefined as T;\n    return (await response.json()) as T;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Adopt a session token the server refreshed mid-request.\n   *\n   * MDMA rotates the token on activity and returns the replacement in a\n   * response header rather than making the client ask. Ignoring it costs\n   * nothing immediately and then logs the user out a week later, which is the\n   * kind of bug that is impossible to reproduce in a short session.\n   *\n   * The user identity is carried over: the header holds only a token, and the\n   * refresh is the same logical session as the sign-in that named the user.\n   */\n  private adoptRollingRefresh(response: Response): void {\n    const token = response.headers.get(REFRESH_HEADER);\n    if (!token || !this.session) return;\n    const expiresRaw = response.headers.get(REFRESH_EXPIRES_HEADER);\n    const expiresAt = Number(expiresRaw);\n    this.session = {\n      sessionToken: token,\n      expiresAt: Number.isFinite(expiresAt) && expiresAt > 0 ? expiresAt : this.session.expiresAt,\n      user: this.session.user,\n    };\n    void this.notifySession(this.session);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * The addresses a fleet node can dial to ask this node for admission, from the\n * node's `GET /admin-api/network/status` (see `AdminApiClient`).\n *\n * Its `externalAddrs`, each made to end in `/p2p/<localPeerId>`: that is the\n * shape core dials, and an external address is usually reported without it. A\n * relay-circuit address already contains `/p2p/` \u2014 the relay's \u2014 so the test is\n * whether it ends in this node's own id, not whether it names a peer at all.\n * Anything that is not a multiaddr is dropped. Empty when the status names no\n * peer id or no external address, which is an honest \"not dialable yet\".\n */\nexport function admitterAddrsFromNetworkStatus(status: unknown): string[] {\n  const record =\n    status && typeof status === 'object'\n      ? ((status as { data?: unknown }).data ?? status)\n      : undefined;\n  if (!record || typeof record !== 'object') return [];\n  const peerId = (record as { localPeerId?: unknown }).localPeerId;\n  const external = (record as { externalAddrs?: unknown }).externalAddrs;\n  if (typeof peerId !== 'string' || !peerId || !Array.isArray(external)) return [];\n  const suffix = `/p2p/${peerId}`;\n  const out: string[] = [];\n  for (const entry of external) {\n    if (typeof entry !== 'string') continue;\n    const addr = entry.trim();\n    if (!addr.startsWith('/')) continue;\n    const dialable = addr.endsWith(suffix) ? addr : `${addr}${suffix}`;\n    if (!out.includes(dialable)) out.push(dialable);\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n", "import { createBrowserHttpClient } from './http-client/index.js';\nimport { createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient } from './auth-api/index.js';\nimport { createAdminApiClientFromHttpClient } from './admin-api/index.js';\nimport type { AuthApiClient } from './auth-api/index.js';\nimport type { AdminApiClient } from './admin-api/index.js';\nimport type { HttpClient } from './http-client/index.js';\nimport type { TokenStore } from './token-store/index.js';\nimport { parseAuthCallback, buildAuthLoginUrl } from './auth/index.js';\nimport { createProofSigner } from './request/index.js';\nimport type { ProofRequest, ProofSignerOptions } from './request/index.js';\nimport type { AuthCallbackResult, AuthLoginOptions } from './auth/index.js';\nimport { RpcClient } from './rpc/index.js';\nimport { SseClient } from './events/sse.js';\nimport { WsClient } from './events/ws.js';\nimport { EphemeralClient } from './ephemeral/index.js';\nimport { CloudClient } from './cloud/cloud-client.js';\nimport type { CloudClientConfig } from './cloud/cloud-client.js';\n\ntype ProofCallback = (\n  request: ProofRequest,\n) => Promise<string | undefined>;\n\n/**\n * Accept either the keys or a ready signer.\n *\n * Taking a callback as well as an options object is not a convenience: it is\n * how a caller keeps the signing key out of the SDK entirely when it lives\n * somewhere the SDK cannot reach.\n */\nfunction resolveProofSigner(\n  config: MeroJsConfig['requestProof'],\n): ProofCallback | undefined {\n  if (!config) return undefined;\n  return typeof config === 'function' ? config : createProofSigner(config);\n}\n\nexport interface MeroJsConfig {\n  /** Base URL for the Calimero node */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  /** Initial credentials for authentication */\n  credentials?: {\n    username: string;\n    password: string;\n  };\n  /** Custom HTTP client timeout in milliseconds */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Request credentials mode for fetch (omit, same-origin, include) */\n  requestCredentials?: RequestCredentials;\n  /** Custom fetch for every HTTP request (`auth`, `admin`, `rpc`, `events`). Defaults to global `fetch`. */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  /** Optional token store for persistence */\n  tokenStore?: TokenStore;\n  /**\n   * Called when the node reports that the credential family is gone\n   * (`x-auth-error: token_reuse` / `token_revoked`). Terminal: the tokens have\n   * already been cleared by the time this runs and nothing is retried, so use it\n   * to send the user back through login. Errors thrown here are swallowed \u2014\n   * never let a UI failure mask the auth error.\n   */\n  onAuthRevoked?: () => Promise<void> | void;\n  /**\n   * Calimero Cloud, reachable as `sdk.cloud`.\n   *\n   * A node connection and a cloud account are separate things a client can have\n   * either of, both of, or neither \u2014 a desktop app with a local node and a\n   * cloud subscription has both, and needs them from one object. So this is\n   * configuration on the existing SDK rather than a second SDK: pass the\n   * session token (or none, and sign in through `sdk.cloud`) and the node half\n   * is unaffected.\n   *\n   * For a caller with *no* node at all, `connectCloud` is the entry point\n   * instead \u2014 it returns a connection that can write without one.\n   */\n  cloud?: CloudClientConfig;\n  /**\n   * Sign every request with a device key, instead of or alongside a session.\n   *\n   * A session is a bearer token: obtained once, presented many times. A\n   * request-carried proof commits to one method, one path and one body, so it\n   * is minted per call and cannot be lifted onto another request. It is what\n   * lets a client talk to a relay it has no account on \u2014 nothing was ever\n   * issued to it.\n   *\n   * Pass the keys and let the SDK mint each proof:\n   *\n   * ```ts\n   * new MeroJs({\n   *   baseUrl,\n   *   requestProof: { credential, session, signerSecret },\n   * });\n   * ```\n   *\n   * \u2026or pass your own signer, when the key must not reach the SDK at all \u2014 a\n   * hardware token, or a worker that holds it:\n   *\n   * ```ts\n   * new MeroJs({ baseUrl, requestProof: (req) => myWorker.sign(req) });\n   * ```\n   *\n   * The node only honours this when it runs with `--delegated-access`; a node\n   * that does not answers `403`, which is distinct from the `401` a bad proof\n   * gets.\n   *\n   * Applies to the request/response API. `events` (SSE) and `ws` are long-lived\n   * connections rather than requests, so a per-request signature does not\n   * describe them \u2014 they still use the session.\n   */\n  requestProof?:\n    | ProofSignerOptions\n    | ((request: ProofRequest) => Promise<string | undefined>);\n}\n\nexport interface TokenData {\n  access_token: string;\n  refresh_token: string;\n  expires_at: number;\n}\n\n/** Name of the Web Lock that serializes token refresh across tabs / webviews. */\nconst REFRESH_LOCK_NAME = 'mero-js:token-refresh';\n\n/** Minimal structural view of the Web Locks API (not available in every runtime). */\ninterface LockManagerLike {\n  request<T>(name: string, callback: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T>;\n}\n\n/** Returns `navigator.locks` when the runtime supports the Web Locks API. */\nfunction getLockManager(): LockManagerLike | null {\n  const nav = (globalThis as unknown as { navigator?: { locks?: LockManagerLike } }).navigator;\n  const locks = nav?.locks;\n  return locks && typeof locks.request === 'function' ? locks : null;\n}\n\n/** Try to extract `exp` (seconds) from a JWT, return ms timestamp or fallback. */\nfunction expiresAtFromJwt(token: string, fallbackMs: number): number {\n  try {\n    const parts = token.split('.');\n    if (parts.length === 3) {\n      // JWT uses base64url encoding: replace -/_ with +// and add padding\n      let b64 = parts[1].replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/');\n      while (b64.length % 4) b64 += '=';\n      const payload = JSON.parse(atob(b64));\n      if (typeof payload.exp === 'number') {\n        return payload.exp * 1000;\n      }\n    }\n  } catch {\n    // not a JWT or can't parse\n  }\n  return fallbackMs;\n}\n\n/**\n * Main MeroJs SDK class that manages all API clients and authentication\n */\nexport class MeroJs {\n  private config: MeroJsConfig;\n  private httpClient: HttpClient;\n  private authClient: AuthApiClient;\n  private adminClient: AdminApiClient;\n  private tokenData: TokenData | null = null;\n  private refreshPromise: Promise<TokenData> | null = null;\n  private tokenStore: TokenStore | null;\n  private rpcClient: RpcClient | null = null;\n  private sseClient: SseClient | null = null;\n  private wsClient: WsClient | null = null;\n  private wsWarned = false;\n  private ephemeralClient?: EphemeralClient;\n  private cloudClient?: CloudClient;\n\n  constructor(config: MeroJsConfig) {\n    this.config = {\n      timeoutMs: 10000,\n      ...config,\n    };\n\n    this.tokenStore = config.tokenStore ?? null;\n\n    // Restore tokens from store if available\n    if (this.tokenStore) {\n      this.tokenData = this.tokenStore.getTokens();\n    }\n\n    // Create HTTP client with token management\n    // For Tauri, explicitly set credentials to 'omit' to avoid network errors\n    const isTauri = typeof window !== 'undefined' && '__TAURI_INTERNALS__' in window;\n    // One signer for the whole connection: `authClient` and `adminClient` are\n    // both built FROM this transport, so wiring it here covers every request\n    // either of them makes.\n    const getProof = resolveProofSigner(this.config.requestProof);\n\n    this.httpClient = createBrowserHttpClient({\n      baseUrl: this.config.baseUrl,\n      fetch: this.config.fetch,\n      getProof,\n      getAuthToken: async () => {\n        const token = await this.getValidToken();\n        return token?.access_token || '';\n      },\n      refreshToken: async () => {\n        const refreshed = await this.performTokenRefresh();\n        return refreshed.access_token;\n      },\n      onTokenRefresh: async (newToken: string) => {\n        if (this.tokenData) {\n          this.tokenData.access_token = newToken;\n          this.tokenStore?.setTokens(this.tokenData);\n        }\n      },\n      onAuthRevoked: async () => {\n        // The refresh-token family is gone (a single-use refresh token was\n        // replayed, or the token was revoked). Nothing left to refresh with \u2014\n        // drop the bundle so the app can force a re-login, then let the app react.\n        this.clearToken();\n        try {\n          await this.config.onAuthRevoked?.();\n        } catch {\n          // A failing app callback must not mask the auth error.\n        }\n      },\n      timeoutMs: this.config.timeoutMs,\n      credentials: this.config.requestCredentials ?? (isTauri ? 'omit' : undefined),\n    });\n\n    // Create API clients\n    this.authClient = createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient(this.httpClient, {\n      baseUrl: this.config.baseUrl,\n      getAuthToken: async () => {\n        const token = await this.getValidToken();\n        return token?.access_token || '';\n      },\n      timeoutMs: this.config.timeoutMs,\n    });\n\n    this.adminClient = createAdminApiClientFromHttpClient(this.httpClient, {\n      baseUrl: this.config.baseUrl,\n      getAuthToken: async () => {\n        const token = await this.getValidToken();\n        return token?.access_token || '';\n      },\n      timeoutMs: this.config.timeoutMs,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get the Auth API client\n   */\n  get auth(): AuthApiClient {\n    return this.authClient;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get the Admin API client\n   */\n  get admin(): AdminApiClient {\n    return this.adminClient;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get the RPC client (lazy initialized)\n   */\n  get rpc(): RpcClient {\n    if (!this.rpcClient) {\n      this.rpcClient = new RpcClient({ httpClient: this.httpClient });\n    }\n    return this.rpcClient;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get the SSE event client (lazy initialized)\n   */\n  get events(): SseClient {\n    if (!this.sseClient) {\n      this.sseClient = new SseClient({\n        baseUrl: this.config.baseUrl,\n        fetch: this.config.fetch,\n        getAuthToken: async () => {\n          const token = await this.getValidToken();\n          return token?.access_token || '';\n        },\n      });\n    }\n    return this.sseClient;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get the ephemeral-presence client (lazy initialized).\n   *\n   * Shares this instance's SSE client, so `subscribe` reuses the one event\n   * stream rather than opening a second connection.\n   */\n  get ephemeral(): EphemeralClient {\n    if (!this.ephemeralClient) {\n      this.ephemeralClient = new EphemeralClient({\n        httpClient: this.httpClient,\n        sse: this.events,\n      });\n    }\n    return this.ephemeralClient;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Calimero Cloud (lazy initialized).\n   *\n   * Available whether or not `cloud` was configured \u2014 an app that signs in\n   * later gets an unauthenticated client it can call `signInWithGoogle` on,\n   * which is one fewer construction path than making the getter conditional.\n   * It is entirely independent of this instance's node credential: the cloud\n   * knows nothing about the node's tokens and the node knows nothing about the\n   * cloud session.\n   */\n  get cloud(): CloudClient {\n    if (!this.cloudClient) {\n      this.cloudClient = new CloudClient(this.config.cloud ?? {});\n    }\n    return this.cloudClient;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get the WebSocket event client (lazy initialized).\n   * @experimental Use `events` (SSE) for production. WsClient is experimental.\n   */\n  get ws(): WsClient {\n    if (!this.wsWarned) {\n      this.wsWarned = true;\n      console.warn('[mero-js] WsClient is experimental. Use mero.events (SSE) for production.');\n    }\n    if (!this.wsClient) {\n      this.wsClient = new WsClient({\n        baseUrl: this.config.baseUrl,\n        getAuthToken: async () => {\n          const token = await this.getValidToken();\n          return token?.access_token || '';\n        },\n      });\n    }\n    return this.wsClient;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Authenticate with the provided credentials\n   * This will create the root key on first use\n   */\n  async authenticate(credentials?: {\n    username: string;\n    password: string;\n  }): Promise<TokenData> {\n    const creds = credentials || this.config.credentials;\n    if (!creds) {\n      throw new Error('No credentials provided for authentication');\n    }\n\n    try {\n      const requestBody = {\n        auth_method: 'user_password',\n        public_key: creds.username,\n        client_name: 'mero-js-sdk',\n        permissions: ['admin'],\n        timestamp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),\n        provider_data: {\n          username: creds.username,\n          password: creds.password,\n        },\n      };\n\n      const response = await this.authClient.generateTokens(requestBody);\n\n      const accessToken = response.data.access_token;\n      this.tokenData = {\n        access_token: accessToken,\n        refresh_token: response.data.refresh_token,\n        expires_at: expiresAtFromJwt(accessToken, Date.now() + 3600_000),\n      };\n\n      this.tokenStore?.setTokens(this.tokenData);\n\n      return this.tokenData;\n    } catch (error) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Authentication failed: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error'}`,\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get a valid token. Returns the current token as-is.\n   * The server rejects refresh attempts while the access token is still valid,\n   * so we never proactively refresh. Instead, the WebHttpClient handles 401\n   * responses reactively via the refreshToken transport hook.\n   */\n  private async getValidToken(): Promise<TokenData | null> {\n    return this.tokenData;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Refresh the access token. Single-flight: every caller (including the HTTP\n   * transport's 401 hook) goes through here.\n   *\n   * Refresh tokens are single-use (calimero-network/core#3083): each refresh\n   * consumes the presented token and returns a new one, and replaying a consumed\n   * token makes the server revoke the whole family. A refresh must therefore\n   * happen exactly once per rotation, which needs three layers:\n   *  - an in-process promise, so concurrent 401s in this instance share one call;\n   *  - a Web Lock (when available), so other tabs/webviews don't refresh at the\n   *    same time on the same stored token;\n   *  - a re-read of the token store inside the lock, so a bundle that another\n   *    instance already rotated is adopted instead of replaying a stale token.\n   */\n  private async performTokenRefresh(): Promise<TokenData> {\n    if (this.refreshPromise) {\n      return this.refreshPromise;\n    }\n\n    // The access token that triggered this refresh. If the store holds a different\n    // one by the time we get the lock, someone else already rotated for us.\n    const triggeringAccessToken = this.tokenData?.access_token;\n\n    const promise = this.withRefreshLock(() =>\n      this.performTokenRefreshLocked(triggeringAccessToken),\n    );\n    this.refreshPromise = promise;\n\n    try {\n      return await promise;\n    } finally {\n      if (this.refreshPromise === promise) {\n        this.refreshPromise = null;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Run `fn` under the cross-tab refresh lock, or directly if Web Locks are unavailable. */\n  private withRefreshLock<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {\n    const locks = getLockManager();\n    return locks ? locks.request(REFRESH_LOCK_NAME, fn) : fn();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Perform the actual token refresh. Runs with the refresh lock held.\n   */\n  private async performTokenRefreshLocked(\n    triggeringAccessToken?: string,\n  ): Promise<TokenData> {\n    // Another instance/tab may have rotated the bundle while we were queued behind\n    // the lock \u2014 the store, not our in-memory copy, is the source of truth.\n    const stored = this.tokenStore?.getTokens() ?? null;\n    if (stored?.refresh_token) {\n      this.tokenData = stored;\n\n      if (triggeringAccessToken && stored.access_token !== triggeringAccessToken) {\n        // Someone else already refreshed. Reuse their bundle rather than replaying\n        // our (now consumed) refresh token, which would revoke the family.\n        return stored;\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!this.tokenData?.refresh_token) {\n      throw new Error('No refresh token available');\n    }\n\n    try {\n      const response = await this.authClient.refreshToken({\n        access_token: this.tokenData.access_token,\n        refresh_token: this.tokenData.refresh_token,\n      });\n\n      const accessToken = response.data.access_token;\n      this.tokenData = {\n        access_token: accessToken,\n        // The refresh token is rotated on every refresh \u2014 persist the new one or\n        // the next refresh replays a consumed token.\n        refresh_token: response.data.refresh_token,\n        expires_at: expiresAtFromJwt(accessToken, Date.now() + 3600_000),\n      };\n\n      this.tokenStore?.setTokens(this.tokenData);\n\n      return this.tokenData;\n    } catch (error) {\n      // Don't clear tokens on refresh failure \u2014 the access token may still be\n      // valid (server rejects refresh while access token hasn't expired yet).\n      // A genuinely dead family arrives as `x-auth-error: token_reuse` and is\n      // handled by the onAuthRevoked transport hook. Let the caller handle this.\n      throw new Error(\n        `Token refresh failed: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error'}`,\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Clear the current token\n   */\n  public clearToken(): void {\n    this.refreshPromise = null;\n    this.tokenData = null;\n    this.tokenStore?.clear();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Check if the SDK is authenticated\n   */\n  public isAuthenticated(): boolean {\n    return this.tokenData !== null;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Set token data directly (e.g., from auth callback).\n   * If `expires_at` is missing or 0, attempts to parse the JWT exp claim,\n   * falling back to 1 hour from now.\n   */\n  public setTokenData(data: TokenData): void {\n    const expiresAt = data.expires_at || expiresAtFromJwt(data.access_token, Date.now() + 3600_000);\n    this.tokenData = { ...data, expires_at: expiresAt };\n    this.tokenStore?.setTokens(this.tokenData);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get the current token data (for debugging)\n   */\n  public getTokenData(): TokenData | null {\n    return this.tokenData;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Close all event connections and clean up resources\n   */\n  public close(): void {\n    this.sseClient?.close();\n    this.wsClient?.close();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Parse an auth callback URL hash fragment (static utility)\n   */\n  static parseAuthCallback(url: string): AuthCallbackResult | null {\n    return parseAuthCallback(url);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Build an auth login URL (static utility)\n   */\n  static buildAuthLoginUrl(nodeUrl: string, opts: AuthLoginOptions): string {\n    return buildAuthLoginUrl(nodeUrl, opts);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Create a new MeroJs SDK instance\n */\nexport function createMeroJs(config: MeroJsConfig): MeroJs {\n  return new MeroJs(config);\n}\n", "import type { TokenData } from '../mero-js.js';\n\nexport interface TokenStore {\n  getTokens(): TokenData | null;\n  setTokens(data: TokenData): void;\n  clear(): void;\n}\n\nexport class MemoryTokenStore implements TokenStore {\n  private tokens: TokenData | null = null;\n\n  getTokens(): TokenData | null {\n    return this.tokens;\n  }\n\n  setTokens(data: TokenData): void {\n    this.tokens = data;\n  }\n\n  clear(): void {\n    this.tokens = null;\n  }\n}\n\nconst STORAGE_KEY = 'mero-tokens';\n\nexport class LocalStorageTokenStore implements TokenStore {\n  private readonly key: string;\n\n  constructor(key: string = STORAGE_KEY) {\n    this.key = key;\n  }\n\n  getTokens(): TokenData | null {\n    try {\n      if (typeof localStorage === 'undefined') return null;\n      const raw = localStorage.getItem(this.key);\n      if (!raw) return null;\n      const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);\n      if (parsed && parsed.access_token && parsed.refresh_token) {\n        return {\n          access_token: parsed.access_token,\n          refresh_token: parsed.refresh_token,\n          expires_at: typeof parsed.expires_at === 'number' ? parsed.expires_at : Date.now() + 3600_000,\n        };\n      }\n      return null;\n    } catch {\n      return null;\n    }\n  }\n\n  setTokens(data: TokenData): void {\n    try {\n      if (typeof localStorage === 'undefined') return;\n      localStorage.setItem(this.key, JSON.stringify(data));\n    } catch {\n      // Storage unavailable\n    }\n  }\n\n  clear(): void {\n    try {\n      if (typeof localStorage === 'undefined') return;\n      localStorage.removeItem(this.key);\n    } catch {\n      // Storage unavailable\n    }\n  }\n}\n", "/**\n * Mint a warrant: the author's consent for one relay to run one intent, once.\n *\n * This exists because the case delegated authorship is *for* is an account that\n * holds no node \u2014 a browser tab, a Node service, a bot. Every one of those is a\n * JS runtime, and until now the only thing that could mint a warrant was `merod`,\n * so \"a member with no node\" in practice meant \"a member with a node it is not\n * allowed to use for anything else\".\n *\n * **No dependencies, and that is not incidental.** The primitives are all built\n * in: `crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256')` for the hash, `crypto.subtle` Ed25519\n * for the signature, and `DataView` for the integers.\n *\n * Warrant v2 (core#3933) gave up the fixed-width encoding that used to make this\n * pure concatenation: `method` travels in the clear as a string and each cited\n * head list is a vector, so three borsh `u32` counts now sit inside the bytes.\n * Two widths to keep straight, and they are not the same: the counts **inside\n * the encoding** are `u32`, while the counts the **signing preimage** hashes are\n * `u64`. Same numbers, different serialization \u2014 reusing one for the other\n * produces a warrant that is well-formed and verifies nowhere.\n *\n * **The byte contract is pinned in core**, at\n * `crates/account/src/tests/warrant_wire_fixture.rs`. The domain strings below\n * are `pub(crate)` there, so nothing in that repository forces anyone to notice\n * this file depends on them \u2014 which is exactly why the fixture lives on that side\n * and this module's test asserts the same vectors. A drift would otherwise leave\n * this producing well-formed warrants whose signatures verify nowhere, surfacing\n * at a relay as a 403: an authorization refusal, nowhere near the cause.\n */\n\nimport {\n  concat,\n  derivePublicKey,\n  domainHash,\n  fromHex,\n  hex,\n  importSigningKey,\n  u32le,\n  u64le,\n} from '../crypto/internal.js';\n\nconst SIGN_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode('calimero.warrant.v2');\nconst INTENT_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode('calimero.warrant.intent.v1');\n\n/**\n * core's `MAX_WARRANT_CITED_HEADS`. A node refuses more than this before doing\n * any Ed25519 work, so minting past it produces a warrant nothing will spend.\n */\nconst MAX_CITED_HEADS = 64;\n\n/** 32 zero bytes \u2014 the `appVersion` default. See {@link WarrantInput.appVersion}. */\nconst UNPINNED_APP = '00'.repeat(32);\n\n/** Ed25519 PKCS#8 prefix, so a raw 32-byte seed can be imported by WebCrypto. */\n/** What a warrant authorises. */\nexport interface WarrantInput {\n  /**\n   * The context, hex \u2014 the same string every other method here takes.\n   *\n   * Hex like everything else on this interface. It was base58 while the node\n   * spelled `ContextId` and `PublicKey` that way and `AccountId` and `DeviceId`\n   * in hex; that split is gone, so this module no longer needs a rule per field\n   * and no longer needs a base58 decoder to enforce one.\n   */\n  context: string;\n  /** The author's account, hex \u2014 whose consent this is. */\n  authorAccount: string;\n  /** The relay authorised to act, hex. An account, not a key. */\n  executor: string;\n  /**\n   * The application build this warrant is signed against, hex (32 bytes).\n   *\n   * Pins the code rather than a version string, so a relay cannot wait for an\n   * upgrade that widens what `method` does and then spend a warrant signed\n   * against the narrower one. Read it from the context\n   * (`GET /admin-api/contexts/{id}` \u2192 `applicationId`); a value guessed here\n   * pins the wrong build, which is worse than not pinning.\n   *\n   * Defaults to 32 zero bytes, matching `merod account sign-warrant`'s\n   * `--app-version` default. Nothing verifies the field yet \u2014 core#3933 landed\n   * the field set ahead of its enforcement so a signer is written once against\n   * the final bytes \u2014 but a warrant minted with the default will be refused once\n   * pinning lands, so pass the real value for anything meant to outlive it.\n   */\n  appVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * The method the relay may run.\n   *\n   * Carried in the clear as of v2, so a peer can select a per-method write-set\n   * without reversing a hash against the app's ABI. The *arguments* are still\n   * committed to rather than carried \u2014 see {@link intentHash}.\n   */\n  method: string;\n  /** Its arguments, as the JSON the guest will receive. */\n  argsJson: unknown;\n  /**\n   * Monotonic per author **device**.\n   *\n   * Per device rather than per account because two devices of one account are\n   * independent replicas: they cannot coordinate on a counter, so an\n   * account-scoped sequence would have them refusing each other's warrants.\n   */\n  nonce: number | bigint;\n  /**\n   * Account-log heads this author saw when signing, each hex (32 bytes).\n   *\n   * Empty by default, and empty is the honest answer for a client that tracks\n   * no log \u2014 a fabricated view is worse than none. At most\n   * {@link MAX_CITED_HEADS}.\n   */\n  accountHeads?: string[];\n  /**\n   * Governance heads this author's view descended from, each hex (32 bytes).\n   *\n   * **Where these come from decides whether they mean anything.** A floor the\n   * relay supplied is a floor the relay chose: a relay that withholds a\n   * governance op can hand you a stale view and collect a warrant citing it.\n   * Take the value from the account's own devices or a co-signing peer outside\n   * the relay's operator. As it stands this detects an honest relay's staleness\n   * and does not constrain a dishonest one.\n   */\n  governanceFloor?: string[];\n  /** Unix seconds after which the relay must refuse it. */\n  notAfter: number | bigint;\n  /**\n   * The author device's ed25519 signing secret, hex (32 bytes).\n   *\n   * Never sent anywhere. It signs locally and only the signature travels, which\n   * is the whole reason a warrant can be minted by something holding no node.\n   */\n  deviceSecret: string;\n}\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n/**\n * The commitment a warrant carries in place of the intent itself.\n *\n * Its own domain, distinct from the signing one, so a value computed for one\n * purpose cannot be presented for the other.\n */\nexport async function intentHash(\n  method: string,\n  argsJson: unknown,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const args = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(argsJson));\n  return domainHash(INTENT_DOMAIN, [new TextEncoder().encode(method), args]);\n}\n\n\n/**\n * Sign a warrant and return it hex-encoded, ready for `performIntent`.\n *\n * Returns the encoding rather than an object because the signature covers\n * exactly these bytes: a caller that rebuilt the fields from JSON would have a\n * second spelling able to disagree with what was signed.\n */\nexport async function signWarrant(input: WarrantInput): Promise<string> {\n  const context = fromHex(input.context, 'context', 32);\n  const authorAccount = fromHex(input.authorAccount, 'authorAccount', 32);\n  const executor = fromHex(input.executor, 'executor', 32);\n  const appVersion = fromHex(\n    input.appVersion ?? UNPINNED_APP,\n    'appVersion',\n    32,\n  );\n  const accountHeads = citedHeads(input.accountHeads, 'accountHeads');\n  const governanceFloor = citedHeads(input.governanceFloor, 'governanceFloor');\n\n  const key = await importSigningKey(input.deviceSecret);\n  const publicKey = await derivePublicKey(input.deviceSecret);\n\n  const method = new TextEncoder().encode(input.method);\n  const commitment = await intentHash(input.method, input.argsJson);\n  const nonce = u64le(input.nonce);\n  const notAfter = u64le(input.notAfter);\n\n  // Each head list is preceded by its own count. `domainHash` length-prefixes\n  // every part it is given, so the heads are individually unambiguous \u2014 but the\n  // two lists are adjacent, so without the counts `accountHeads = [a, b],\n  // governanceFloor = []` hashes identically to `[a], [b]`, and a relay could\n  // relabel which plane a head was cited from. u64 HERE; u32 in the encoding.\n  const preimage = await domainHash(SIGN_DOMAIN, [\n    context,\n    authorAccount,\n    publicKey,\n    executor,\n    appVersion,\n    method,\n    commitment,\n    u64le(accountHeads.length),\n    ...accountHeads,\n    u64le(governanceFloor.length),\n    ...governanceFloor,\n    nonce,\n    notAfter,\n  ]);\n\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign({ name: 'Ed25519' }, key, preimage),\n  );\n\n  // Borsh: a `String` is a u32 length then its UTF-8 bytes; a `Vec<[u8; 32]>` is\n  // a u32 count then the elements. u32 HERE; u64 in the preimage above.\n  return hex(\n    concat(\n      context,\n      authorAccount,\n      publicKey,\n      executor,\n      appVersion,\n      u32le(method.length),\n      method,\n      commitment,\n      u32le(accountHeads.length),\n      ...accountHeads,\n      u32le(governanceFloor.length),\n      ...governanceFloor,\n      nonce,\n      notAfter,\n      signature,\n    ),\n  );\n}\n\n/** Decode a cited-head list, refusing one longer than a node will accept. */\nfunction citedHeads(heads: string[] | undefined, label: string): Uint8Array[] {\n  const list = heads ?? [];\n  if (list.length > MAX_CITED_HEADS) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `${label} cites ${list.length} heads, over the ${MAX_CITED_HEADS} a node accepts`,\n    );\n  }\n  return list.map((head, i) => fromHex(head, `${label}[${i}]`, 32));\n}\n\n/** A warrant's fields, as hex, decoded from the wire encoding. */\nexport interface WarrantFields {\n  context: string;\n  authorAccount: string;\n  /** The author device key `signWarrant` derived from the secret. */\n  deviceKey: string;\n  executor: string;\n  appVersion: string;\n  method: string;\n  intentHash: string;\n  accountHeads: string[];\n  governanceFloor: string[];\n  /** u64 little-endian, as it sits on the wire. */\n  nonce: string;\n  /** u64 little-endian, as it sits on the wire. */\n  notAfter: string;\n  signature: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a hex warrant back into its fields.\n *\n * Exists because v2's offsets are no longer constants: `method` is a string and\n * the head lists are vectors, so everything after `appVersion` moves with the\n * method's length. Anything reading a warrant by fixed offset \u2014 a test, a client\n * inspecting one it was handed \u2014 silently reads the wrong field instead of\n * failing, which is how the three call sites that did so passed while comparing\n * the method's length prefix to a nonce.\n *\n * One copy of the layout, beside the encoder that produces it, so the two cannot\n * drift. Internal: not exported from the package root, because a client that\n * needs a warrant's fields has the input it signed.\n */\nexport function parseWarrant(warrant: string): WarrantFields {\n  const at = (start: number, bytes: number) =>\n    warrant.slice(start * 2, (start + bytes) * 2);\n  // A borsh u32 is little-endian, so the hex pairs read back to front.\n  const u32At = (start: number) =>\n    Number.parseInt((at(start, 4).match(/../g) ?? []).reverse().join(''), 16);\n\n  let o = 0;\n  const take = (bytes: number) => {\n    const field = at(o, bytes);\n    o += bytes;\n    return field;\n  };\n\n  const context = take(32);\n  const authorAccount = take(32);\n  const deviceKey = take(32);\n  const executor = take(32);\n  const appVersion = take(32);\n  const methodLen = u32At(o);\n  o += 4;\n  const method = take(methodLen);\n  const intentHashField = take(32);\n  const accountCount = u32At(o);\n  o += 4;\n  const accountHeads = Array.from({ length: accountCount }, () => take(32));\n  const governanceCount = u32At(o);\n  o += 4;\n  const governanceFloor = Array.from({ length: governanceCount }, () =>\n    take(32),\n  );\n  const nonce = take(8);\n  const notAfter = take(8);\n  const signature = take(64);\n\n  if (o * 2 !== warrant.length) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `warrant is ${warrant.length / 2} bytes but its fields account for ${o}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  return {\n    context,\n    authorAccount,\n    deviceKey,\n    executor,\n    appVersion,\n    method,\n    intentHash: intentHashField,\n    accountHeads,\n    governanceFloor,\n    nonce,\n    notAfter,\n    signature,\n  };\n}\n", "/**\n * Write to a context through a relay, holding nothing but a signing key.\n *\n * # What this replaces\n *\n * `sdk.rpc.execute` asks a node to run a method *as itself*: it needs a node,\n * that node needs to be a member, and the caller needs a credential on it. For\n * a browser tab, a phone, or an agent, none of those three is available \u2014 the\n * runtime cannot compile WASM against materialized state, never received the\n * scope key that seals the deltas, and has no account on anybody's node.\n *\n * This client is the other path. The caller signs a warrant locally, the relay\n * runs the method as the *author's* principal, and the resulting delta is\n * attributed to the author's account and device \u2014 their replica slot, their\n * membership, their name in the app. The relay's key signs the envelope and\n * nothing else.\n *\n * # The three preconditions, and why they are checked in this order\n *\n * `describe()` answers the first two in one call, before anything is signed:\n * the relay's executor account (which the warrant must name) and whether it\n * holds `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` on the owning group. The third \u2014 that the\n * author's account is a member \u2014 only the group knows, and it surfaces as a\n * refusal.\n *\n * Checking before signing is not politeness. A warrant consumes a nonce from a\n * monotonic per-device sequence, and one minted against the wrong executor is\n * unspendable: the number is gone and the write never happened.\n */\n\nimport { signWarrant } from '../warrant/warrant.js';\nimport { HTTPError } from '../http-client/web-client.js';\nimport type { NonceSource } from './nonce-source.js';\n\n/** How long a freshly minted warrant stays presentable, in seconds. */\nconst DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS = 300;\n\n/** Where and as whom to write, plus the key that consents. */\nexport interface RelayClientConfig {\n  /**\n   * The relay's base URL \u2014 the node's origin, not a path.\n   *\n   * Discover it from {@link CloudClient.getNamespaceRelays} for a hosted\n   * namespace, or take it from the operator for a self-hosted one.\n   */\n  relayUrl: string;\n  /**\n   * The account the relay writes as, hex \u2014 a warrant's `executor`.\n   *\n   * An account rather than a key, so one of the relay's processes rotating its\n   * signing key does not void warrants already issued to it. Left unset, the\n   * first `execute` learns it from {@link RelayClient.describe}.\n   */\n  executorAccount?: string;\n  /** The author's account, hex \u2014 whose consent the warrant carries. */\n  authorAccount: string;\n  /**\n   * The author's `AccountProof<DeviceCert>`, hex-encoded borsh.\n   *\n   * Proves the key that signed the warrant is a device of the account it names.\n   * The author sends only its own half; the relay attaches its own.\n   */\n  authorProof: string;\n  /**\n   * The author device's ed25519 signing secret, hex (32 bytes).\n   *\n   * Never transmitted. It signs in this process and only the signature leaves,\n   * which is the whole reason a keyholder can author without a node.\n   */\n  deviceSecret: string;\n  /** Where nonces come from. See {@link NonceSource} \u2014 a reset replays. */\n  nonces: NonceSource;\n  /**\n   * Seconds a minted warrant stays valid. Defaults to 300.\n   *\n   * Checked by the relay against its own clock and deliberately never by peers,\n   * so this bounds how long *this* request may sit in flight \u2014 not how long the\n   * network will accept the delta.\n   */\n  ttlSeconds?: number;\n  /** Injected for tests and non-browser runtimes. Defaults to global `fetch`. */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n}\n\n/** What a relay says about its ability to run intents in one context. */\nexport interface RelayDescription {\n  /** The account a warrant must name as `executor`, hex. */\n  executorAccount: string;\n  /** Whether the relay holds `CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF` on the owning group. */\n  canAuthorOnBehalf: boolean;\n  /** The group whose admin grants that capability, hex. */\n  groupId: string;\n}\n\n/** Where an accepted intent landed. */\nexport interface IntentResult<T = unknown> {\n  /** The context's scope root after the run \u2014 did this change anything? */\n  rootHash: string;\n  /** The method's own return value. */\n  returns: T | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Thrown when a relay refuses an intent, carrying which precondition failed.\n *\n * The distinction is the whole reason this type exists. A `403` from this\n * endpoint means one of three unrelated things \u2014 no grant on the relay, the\n * author is not a member, or the nonce was already spent \u2014 and they send a\n * caller somewhere completely different: ask an admin, ask for an invitation,\n * or just retry. Collapsing them into \"forbidden\" makes a retryable replay look\n * like a permissions bug.\n */\nexport class IntentRefusedError extends Error {\n  name = 'IntentRefusedError';\n\n  constructor(\n    /** The relay's own explanation, verbatim. */\n    public readonly reason: string,\n    /** `true` when re-presenting the same intent under a *fresh* warrant may work. */\n    public readonly retryable: boolean,\n    public readonly status: number,\n  ) {\n    super(`relay refused the intent (HTTP ${status}): ${reason}`);\n  }\n}\n\nexport class RelayClient {\n  private readonly baseUrl: string;\n  private executorAccount: string | undefined;\n  private readonly config: RelayClientConfig;\n  private readonly fetchImpl: typeof fetch;\n  private readonly timeoutMs: number;\n\n  constructor(config: RelayClientConfig) {\n    this.config = config;\n    this.baseUrl = config.relayUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n    this.executorAccount = config.executorAccount;\n    const injected = config.fetch;\n    this.fetchImpl = injected\n      ? (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => injected(input, init)\n      : (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => globalThis.fetch(input, init);\n    this.timeoutMs = config.timeoutMs ?? 10_000;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Ask the relay what it can do in `contextId`.\n   *\n   * Cheap and unauthenticated on a relay that serves delegated execution\n   * publicly, which is what makes it usable as a precondition check rather than\n   * as diagnostics after a failure.\n   */\n  async describe(contextId: string): Promise<RelayDescription> {\n    const body = await this.json<{\n      data: { executorAccount: string; canAuthorOnBehalf: boolean; groupId: string };\n    }>('GET', `/admin-api/contexts/${encodeURIComponent(contextId)}/intents`);\n    // Learned, not merely returned: a client that called `describe` should not\n    // then have to pass the account back in to `execute`.\n    this.executorAccount = body.data.executorAccount;\n    return body.data;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Mint a warrant for `method(args)` and present it to the relay.\n   *\n   * One intent, once: the warrant authorizes exactly this method and these\n   * arguments in exactly this context, and its nonce is spent by the network on\n   * apply. Nothing accumulates and nothing is reusable.\n   */\n  async execute<T = unknown>(\n    contextId: string,\n    method: string,\n    argsJson: unknown = {},\n  ): Promise<IntentResult<T>> {\n    const executor = this.executorAccount ?? (await this.describe(contextId)).executorAccount;\n\n    const nonce = await this.config.nonces.next();\n    const ttl = this.config.ttlSeconds ?? DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS;\n    const warrant = await signWarrant({\n      context: contextId,\n      authorAccount: this.config.authorAccount,\n      executor,\n      method,\n      argsJson,\n      nonce,\n      notAfter: BigInt(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)) + BigInt(ttl),\n      deviceSecret: this.config.deviceSecret,\n    });\n\n    const body = await this.json<{ data: { rootHash: string; returns: T | null } }>(\n      'POST',\n      `/admin-api/contexts/${encodeURIComponent(contextId)}/intents`,\n      { method, argsJson, warrant, authorProof: this.config.authorProof },\n    );\n    return { rootHash: body.data.rootHash, returns: body.data.returns ?? null };\n  }\n\n  private async json<T>(method: string, path: string, body?: unknown): Promise<T> {\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = { Accept: 'application/json' };\n    if (body !== undefined) headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';\n\n    const controller = new AbortController();\n    const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), this.timeoutMs);\n    let response: Response;\n    try {\n      response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`, {\n        method,\n        headers,\n        body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body),\n        signal: controller.signal,\n      });\n    } catch (err) {\n      throw new HTTPError(\n        0,\n        err instanceof Error ? err.name : 'NetworkError',\n        `${this.baseUrl}${path}`,\n        new Headers(),\n        err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),\n      );\n    } finally {\n      clearTimeout(timer);\n    }\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      const text = await response.text().catch(() => '');\n      // 400 and 403 are both caller preconditions and core separates them\n      // deliberately: 400 means re-sending the same bytes cannot help, 403\n      // means the bytes are genuine but authority is missing. Only the spent\n      // nonce is worth retrying, and only under a fresh warrant.\n      if (response.status === 400 || response.status === 403) {\n        const reason = extractReason(text);\n        throw new IntentRefusedError(reason, /nonce/i.test(reason), response.status);\n      }\n      throw new HTTPError(\n        response.status,\n        response.statusText,\n        `${this.baseUrl}${path}`,\n        response.headers,\n        text,\n      );\n    }\n\n    return (await response.json()) as T;\n  }\n}\n\n/** Pull the relay's explanation out of its error body, or fall back to the raw text. */\nfunction extractReason(bodyText: string): string {\n  if (!bodyText) return 'no reason given';\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(bodyText) as { error?: unknown; message?: unknown };\n    for (const candidate of [parsed.error, parsed.message]) {\n      if (typeof candidate === 'string' && candidate) return candidate;\n    }\n  } catch {\n    // Not JSON \u2014 the text itself is the best available explanation.\n  }\n  return bodyText;\n}\n", "/**\n * Where a warrant's nonce comes from.\n *\n * # Why this is a named concept and not a counter in the relay client\n *\n * A warrant's nonce is spent, once, per `(context, author device)` on every\n * node that applies the delta. So the sequence a client emits is not a local\n * detail \u2014 it is state the network remembers, and the client is the only party\n * that can keep it.\n *\n * The receiving ledger is a **sliding window** 64 wide, not a high-water mark,\n * which is what makes the two failure modes so different:\n *\n * - **Skipping** numbers is free. Gossip gives no ordering, so the window\n *   exists precisely to accept whatever unseen nonce arrives.\n * - **Restarting** the sequence is fatal. A tab that reloads and resumes at `1`\n *   re-presents nonces the network has already spent, and every one of those\n *   writes is refused as a replay \u2014 indistinguishable, to the user, from the\n *   app silently not saving.\n *\n * That asymmetry is why persistence is the default here and an in-memory source\n * is the one you have to ask for. It is also why a source may jump: reserving a\n * block and losing the tail is the correct trade.\n */\n\n/** Produces the next nonce for one author device. Must never go backwards. */\nexport interface NonceSource {\n  next(): Promise<bigint>;\n}\n\n/**\n * A counter in memory, starting at `start`.\n *\n * Correct only for a process whose lifetime is the whole sequence \u2014 a script, a\n * server-side worker that owns its own device key, a test. In a browser tab it\n * resets on reload and replays; use {@link createLocalStorageNonceSource}\n * there.\n */\nexport function createMemoryNonceSource(start: number | bigint = 1): NonceSource {\n  let next = BigInt(start);\n  if (next < 1n) {\n    throw new Error('nonce sequence starts at 1');\n  }\n  return {\n    next(): Promise<bigint> {\n      const value = next;\n      next += 1n;\n      return Promise.resolve(value);\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * A counter persisted in `localStorage`, so a reload continues the sequence.\n *\n * Key it per author **device**, not per account: two devices of one account are\n * independent replicas with independent sequences, and sharing a counter would\n * have them refusing each other's warrants.\n *\n * **Reserve-then-hand-out.** The stored value is advanced *before* the nonce is\n * returned, so a crash between the two loses a number rather than reusing one.\n * Losing a number costs nothing (the window accepts gaps); reusing one costs a\n * write.\n *\n * Concurrent tabs are the case this cannot fully solve, because `localStorage`\n * has no atomic read-modify-write. Two tabs racing can hand out the same nonce,\n * and the loser's write is refused as a replay rather than silently\n * misattributed \u2014 a visible error, not corruption. An app that genuinely writes\n * from several tabs at once should hold a Web Lock around `next()` or give each\n * tab its own device.\n */\nexport function createLocalStorageNonceSource(\n  key: string,\n  storage?: { getItem(k: string): string | null; setItem(k: string, v: string): void },\n): NonceSource {\n  const store =\n    storage ?? (globalThis as unknown as { localStorage?: typeof storage }).localStorage;\n  if (!store) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'no localStorage in this runtime: pass a storage implementation, or use createMemoryNonceSource for a process that owns its whole sequence',\n    );\n  }\n  return {\n    next(): Promise<bigint> {\n      const raw = store.getItem(key);\n      // A missing, empty, or corrupted value means \"no sequence recorded\", and\n      // the safe reading of that is not 1 \u2014 a cleared storage on a device that\n      // has already written would replay. But the client cannot know, and 1 is\n      // the only defensible start, so it is what a fresh key gets. This is why\n      // the doc above tells apps to key per device: a device whose storage was\n      // cleared should be re-paired rather than resumed.\n      let current = 0n;\n      if (raw !== null && raw !== '') {\n        try {\n          const parsed = BigInt(raw);\n          if (parsed > 0n) current = parsed;\n        } catch {\n          current = 0n;\n        }\n      }\n      const value = current + 1n;\n      store.setItem(key, value.toString());\n      return Promise.resolve(value);\n    },\n  };\n}\n", "/**\n * The Noise NK handshake (`Noise_NK_25519_AESGCM_SHA256`) that opens a sealed\n * session, written against WebCrypto from the Noise specification\n * (revision 34, http://www.noiseprotocol.org/noise.html). The node runs the\n * other side with `snow`; core's published vectors check the two against each\n * other.\n *\n * NK: the initiator knows the responder's static key in advance \u2014 here the\n * transport key the node's quote commits to \u2014 and sends nothing but an\n * ephemeral key before both ephemerals are mixed in, so everything after the\n * handshake has forward secrecy.\n */\n\nimport { concat } from '../crypto/internal.js';\n\nconst PROTOCOL_NAME = 'Noise_NK_25519_AESGCM_SHA256';\nconst DH_LEN = 32;\nconst TAG_LEN = 16;\n/** PKCS#8 wrapping of a raw X25519 private key (RFC 8410). */\nconst PKCS8_X25519_PREFIX = new Uint8Array([\n  0x30, 0x2e, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x30, 0x05, 0x06, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x04,\n  0x22, 0x04, 0x20,\n]);\n\n/** Noise's `SymmetricState`: the chaining key, the handshake hash and the cipher key. */\nexport class SymmetricState {\n  private ck: Uint8Array;\n  private h: Uint8Array;\n  private k: CryptoKey | null = null;\n  private n = 0;\n\n  private constructor(h: Uint8Array) {\n    this.ck = h;\n    this.h = h;\n  }\n\n  static async initialize(): Promise<SymmetricState> {\n    // A name of 32 bytes or fewer is used as the hash, zero-padded.\n    const name = new TextEncoder().encode(PROTOCOL_NAME);\n    const h = new Uint8Array(32);\n    h.set(name);\n    return new SymmetricState(h);\n  }\n\n  async mixHash(data: Uint8Array): Promise<void> {\n    this.h = await sha256(concat(this.h, data));\n  }\n\n  async mixKey(inputKeyMaterial: Uint8Array): Promise<void> {\n    const [ck, key] = await hkdf2(this.ck, inputKeyMaterial);\n    this.ck = ck;\n    this.k = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', key, 'AES-GCM', false, ['encrypt', 'decrypt']);\n    this.n = 0;\n  }\n\n  async encryptAndHash(plaintext: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    if (!this.k) throw new Error('Noise: no cipher key yet');\n    const ciphertext = new Uint8Array(\n      await crypto.subtle.encrypt(\n        { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: noiseNonce(this.n), additionalData: this.h },\n        this.k,\n        plaintext,\n      ),\n    );\n    this.n += 1;\n    await this.mixHash(ciphertext);\n    return ciphertext;\n  }\n\n  async decryptAndHash(ciphertext: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    if (!this.k) throw new Error('Noise: no cipher key yet');\n    const plaintext = new Uint8Array(\n      await crypto.subtle.decrypt(\n        { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: noiseNonce(this.n), additionalData: this.h },\n        this.k,\n        ciphertext,\n      ),\n    );\n    this.n += 1;\n    await this.mixHash(ciphertext);\n    return plaintext;\n  }\n\n  /** The initiator-to-responder key, then the responder-to-initiator key. */\n  split(): Promise<[Uint8Array, Uint8Array]> {\n    return hkdf2(this.ck, new Uint8Array());\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface X25519KeyPair {\n  privateKey: CryptoKey;\n  publicKey: Uint8Array;\n}\n\n/**\n * Start an NK handshake to `remoteStatic`. `fixedEphemeral` pins the\n * ephemeral secret, for the published test vectors only; leave it out.\n */\nexport async function initiate(\n  remoteStatic: Uint8Array,\n  prologue: Uint8Array,\n  fixedEphemeral?: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<{\n  message1: Uint8Array;\n  finish(message2: Uint8Array): Promise<{ payload: Uint8Array; split: [Uint8Array, Uint8Array] }>;\n}> {\n  const state = await SymmetricState.initialize();\n  await state.mixHash(prologue);\n  // <- s (known in advance)\n  await state.mixHash(remoteStatic);\n  // -> e, es\n  const ephemeral = await x25519KeyPair(fixedEphemeral);\n  await state.mixHash(ephemeral.publicKey);\n  await state.mixKey(await dh(ephemeral.privateKey, remoteStatic));\n  const message1 = concat(ephemeral.publicKey, await state.encryptAndHash(new Uint8Array()));\n\n  return {\n    message1,\n    async finish(message2) {\n      if (message2.length < DH_LEN + TAG_LEN) throw new Error('Noise: message 2 is too short');\n      // <- e, ee\n      const remoteEphemeral = message2.slice(0, DH_LEN);\n      await state.mixHash(remoteEphemeral);\n      await state.mixKey(await dh(ephemeral.privateKey, remoteEphemeral));\n      const payload = await state.decryptAndHash(message2.slice(DH_LEN));\n      return { payload, split: await state.split() };\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nexport async function x25519KeyPair(secret?: Uint8Array): Promise<X25519KeyPair> {\n  if (!secret) {\n    let pair: CryptoKeyPair;\n    try {\n      pair = (await crypto.subtle.generateKey({ name: 'X25519' }, true, [\n        'deriveBits',\n      ])) as CryptoKeyPair;\n    } catch (error) {\n      throw new Error(\n        'Sealed transport needs WebCrypto with X25519, which this runtime lacks ' +\n          `(${(error as Error)?.name ?? 'no crypto.subtle'}). Current browsers and Node have ` +\n          'it; in React Native, install react-native-quick-crypto as the global crypto.',\n      );\n    }\n    const publicKey = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.exportKey('raw', pair.publicKey));\n    return { privateKey: pair.privateKey, publicKey };\n  }\n  const privateKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'pkcs8',\n    concat(PKCS8_X25519_PREFIX, secret),\n    { name: 'X25519' },\n    true,\n    ['deriveBits'],\n  );\n  const jwk = await crypto.subtle.exportKey('jwk', privateKey);\n  return { privateKey, publicKey: base64UrlDecode(jwk.x as string) };\n}\n\nexport async function dh(privateKey: CryptoKey, publicKey: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const peer = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', publicKey, { name: 'X25519' }, false, []);\n  return new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.deriveBits({ name: 'X25519', public: peer } as EcdhKeyDeriveParams, privateKey, 256),\n  );\n}\n\n/** Noise's AESGCM nonce: 32 zero bits, then the counter as a big-endian u64. */\nfunction noiseNonce(n: number): Uint8Array {\n  const nonce = new Uint8Array(12);\n  new DataView(nonce.buffer).setBigUint64(4, BigInt(n), false);\n  return nonce;\n}\n\nasync function sha256(data: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', data));\n}\n\nasync function hmacSha256(key: Uint8Array, data: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const hmacKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', key, { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' }, false, [\n    'sign',\n  ]);\n  return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', hmacKey, data));\n}\n\n/** Noise's `HKDF` with two outputs. */\nasync function hkdf2(chainingKey: Uint8Array, inputKeyMaterial: Uint8Array): Promise<[Uint8Array, Uint8Array]> {\n  const temp = await hmacSha256(chainingKey, inputKeyMaterial);\n  const first = await hmacSha256(temp, new Uint8Array([1]));\n  const second = await hmacSha256(temp, concat(first, new Uint8Array([2])));\n  return [first, second];\n}\n\nfunction base64UrlDecode(value: string): Uint8Array {\n  const base64 = value.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/');\n  const binary = atob(base64 + '='.repeat((4 - (base64.length % 4)) % 4));\n  return Uint8Array.from(binary, (char) => char.charCodeAt(0));\n}\n", "/**\n * Sealed transport: requests encrypted end to end to a TEE node's attested key.\n *\n * A node speaks plain HTTP and any TLS in front of it ends outside the enclave,\n * at whatever proxy or relay the operator runs, so everything crossing that hop\n * (the bearer token, JSON-RPC arguments, results) is readable there. Sealing\n * encrypts it so that only the attested TD can read it, and only the TD can\n * produce a response the client accepts.\n *\n * The client opens a session with a Noise NK handshake to the X25519 transport\n * key the node's quote commits to ({@link fetchAttestedTransportKey}). The\n * transport key only authenticates the node: the session keys come from both\n * sides' ephemeral keys, so once a session is gone (an hour at most) what was\n * sent in it cannot be opened, not even with the transport key. Each request\n * is sealed under the session; each response streams back in sealed frames, so\n * server-sent events are sealed too. WebSockets cannot be, and the node\n * refuses one inside the envelope with a 501.\n *\n * The node's side, and the wire format this implements byte for byte, are in\n * core's `crates/server/src/sealed.rs`:\n *\n * ```text\n * handshake   Noise_NK_25519_AESGCM_SHA256, prologue \"calimero/sealed-http/v2\"\n *   request   POST /sealed/v2/handshake   0x02 || transport_pk || Noise message 1\n *   response  0x02 || Noise message 2 (payload = session_id(16) || lifetime secs, u32 BE)\n *   keys      (req key, resp key) = Split()\n * exchange    POST /sealed/v2\n *   header    0x02 || session_id(16) || request_id (u64 BE; from 1, each used once)\n *   request   header || AES-256-GCM(req key, nonce = request_id || 0u32, aad = header, inner)\n *   response  frames, each u32 BE length || AES-256-GCM(resp key,\n *             nonce = request_id || frame index (u32 BE, from 0), aad = header, kind || data)\n *             kind 0 = head (JSON), 1 = body bytes, 2 = end; no end frame = cut short\n *   inner     u32 BE head length || head (JSON) || body\n * ```\n *\n * Use it by handing {@link createSealedFetch} to `MeroJsConfig.fetch`.\n */\n\nimport { concat, fromHex, hex } from '../crypto/internal.js';\nimport type { TeeAttestRequest, TeeAttestResponseData } from '../admin-api/admin-types.js';\nimport { initiate } from './noise.js';\nimport type { DcapCollateral } from './verify.js';\n\n/** Where a session is opened, relative to the node's base URL. */\nexport const HANDSHAKE_PATH = '/sealed/v2/handshake';\n/** Where sealed requests are posted, relative to the node's base URL. */\nexport const SEALED_PATH = '/sealed/v2';\n/** Content type of every sealed body. */\nexport const SEALED_CONTENT_TYPE = 'application/vnd.calimero.sealed';\n\nconst VERSION = 2;\nconst PROLOGUE = new TextEncoder().encode('calimero/sealed-http/v2');\nconst SESSION_ID_LEN = 16;\nconst HEADER_LEN = 1 + SESSION_ID_LEN + 8;\nconst FRAME_HEAD = 0;\nconst FRAME_DATA = 1;\nconst FRAME_END = 2;\n/**\n * The largest frame the node sends: a kind byte, at most 64 KiB of data, a tag.\n * Anything larger is refused before it is buffered, so a proxy cannot make the\n * client hold an unbounded frame it has yet to authenticate.\n */\nconst MAX_FRAME_LEN = 1 + 64 * 1024 + 16;\n/** Far more than a handshake reply (69 bytes) ever is. */\nconst MAX_HANDSHAKE_REPLY = 1024;\n/** Open a new session this long before the node would drop the current one. */\nconst RENEW_BEFORE_MS = 60_000;\nconst TRANSPORT_BINDING_DOMAIN = 'calimero.tee-attest.transport-key.v1';\nconst NULL_BODY_STATUSES = [101, 204, 205, 304];\n\nconst utf8 = new TextEncoder();\n\n/** The node no longer holds the transport key this client attested (it restarted). */\nexport class StaleTransportKeyError extends Error {\n  name = 'StaleTransportKeyError';\n\n  constructor() {\n    super('The node no longer holds the attested transport key; attest again for the current one');\n  }\n}\n\n/** The node refused the envelope itself, before anything inside it ran. */\nexport class SealedTransportError extends Error {\n  name = 'SealedTransportError';\n\n  constructor(\n    public status: number,\n    public code: string | undefined,\n    message: string,\n    /** How long the node asked to wait before retrying (`Retry-After`), if it did. */\n    public retryAfterMs?: number,\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * What the attest endpoint puts in report data bytes `32..64` when asked to\n * bind its transport key. `inner` is what would have been there otherwise: the\n * expected application hash, or 32 zero bytes when none was asked for.\n * Mirrors core's `attest_transport_binding`.\n */\nexport async function transportKeyBinding(\n  inner: Uint8Array,\n  transportKey: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest(\n    'SHA-256',\n    concat(utf8.encode(TRANSPORT_BINDING_DOMAIN), inner, transportKey),\n  );\n  return new Uint8Array(digest);\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyTransportQuote {\n  /**\n   * Verify `quoteB64` \u2014 never by asking the node being attested \u2014 and check\n   * that its report data is `nonce || reportDataSuffix` (both hex). Resolve\n   * true only when the quote is genuine, its measurements are ones you accept,\n   * and the report data matches. {@link createQuoteVerifier} does all of this\n   * in the page. `collateral` is what the node sent with the quote, when the\n   * verifier asked for it.\n   */\n  (args: {\n    quoteB64: string;\n    nonce: string;\n    reportDataSuffix: string;\n    collateral?: DcapCollateral;\n  }): Promise<boolean>;\n  /**\n   * Ask the node for the collateral its quote verifies against, and pass it\n   * in as `collateral`. Off unless set, because a node that predates the field\n   * refuses the request.\n   */\n  readonly includeCollateral?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Ask a node for its transport key and accept it only if a quote you verified\n * commits to it.\n *\n * `applicationHash` (hex), when given, is the bytecode hash you expect the\n * attested application to have; the node is asked to bind that application,\n * and the quote only verifies if it runs that exact bytecode.\n */\nexport async function fetchAttestedTransportKey(\n  admin: { teeAttest(request: TeeAttestRequest): Promise<TeeAttestResponseData> },\n  verify: VerifyTransportQuote,\n  options: { applicationId?: string; applicationHash?: string } = {},\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  if ((options.applicationId === undefined) !== (options.applicationHash === undefined)) {\n    throw new Error('applicationId and applicationHash are given together or not at all');\n  }\n  const nonce = hex(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)));\n  const attested = await admin.teeAttest({\n    nonce,\n    applicationId: options.applicationId,\n    bindTransportKey: true,\n    ...(verify.includeCollateral ? { includeCollateral: true } : {}),\n  });\n  if (!attested.transportPublicKey) {\n    throw new Error('The node did not report a transport key; it predates sealed transport');\n  }\n  const transportKey = fromHex(attested.transportPublicKey, 'transportPublicKey', 32);\n  const inner = options.applicationHash\n    ? fromHex(options.applicationHash, 'applicationHash', 32)\n    : new Uint8Array(32);\n  const reportDataSuffix = hex(await transportKeyBinding(inner, transportKey));\n  const verified = await verify({\n    quoteB64: attested.quoteB64,\n    nonce,\n    reportDataSuffix,\n    collateral: attested.collateral,\n  });\n  if (!verified) {\n    throw new Error('The attestation did not verify, so its transport key is not trusted');\n  }\n  return transportKey;\n}\n\nexport interface AttestedSealedFetchOptions {\n  /** The node's base URL. */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  /**\n   * Decides whether the node's quote is one you trust \u2014 typically\n   * {@link createQuoteVerifier}. Asked again whenever the node restarts.\n   */\n  verify: VerifyTransportQuote;\n  /** Also require the node to run this application with this bytecode hash. */\n  applicationId?: string;\n  applicationHash?: string;\n  /** Fetch that carries the attestation and the envelopes. Defaults to global `fetch`. */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n}\n\n/**\n * {@link createSealedFetch} for a node you know only by URL: it attests the\n * node's transport key with `verify`, over `POST /admin-api/tee/attest` (the\n * one call that needs no credential and is never sealed), and seals everything\n * else to it. A restarted node is attested again, through the same verifier.\n *\n * This is what to hand a {@link RelayClient} for a TEE relay, so the warrant\n * and the method's arguments reach only the attested TD:\n *\n * ```ts\n * const relay = new RelayClient({\n *   relayUrl,\n *   fetch: createAttestedSealedFetch({ baseUrl: relayUrl, verify: createQuoteVerifier(...) }),\n *   ...\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function createAttestedSealedFetch(options: AttestedSealedFetchOptions): typeof fetch {\n  const baseFetch = options.fetch ?? ((input, init) => fetch(input, init));\n  const attestUrl = `${options.baseUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '')}/admin-api/tee/attest`;\n  const admin = {\n    async teeAttest(request: TeeAttestRequest): Promise<TeeAttestResponseData> {\n      const response = await baseFetch(attestUrl, {\n        method: 'POST',\n        headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },\n        body: JSON.stringify(request),\n      });\n      if (!response.ok) {\n        throw new Error(`The node refused to attest: HTTP ${response.status}`);\n      }\n      const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: TeeAttestResponseData };\n      if (!body.data) throw new Error('The attestation response is malformed');\n      return body.data;\n    },\n  };\n  return createSealedFetch({\n    baseUrl: options.baseUrl,\n    transportPublicKey: () =>\n      fetchAttestedTransportKey(admin, options.verify, {\n        applicationId: options.applicationId,\n        applicationHash: options.applicationHash,\n      }),\n    fetch: baseFetch,\n  });\n}\n\nexport interface SealedFetchOptions {\n  /** The node's base URL, as given to `MeroJsConfig.baseUrl`. */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  /**\n   * The node's attested transport key, or a function that attests and returns\n   * it \u2014 typically `() => fetchAttestedTransportKey(admin, verify)`. Given a\n   * function, a restarted node is handled: the key is attested again, through\n   * your verifier, and the request retried once. Given bytes, a restart\n   * surfaces as {@link StaleTransportKeyError}.\n   */\n  transportPublicKey: Uint8Array | (() => Promise<Uint8Array>);\n  /** Fetch that carries the sealed envelope. Defaults to global `fetch`. */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n}\n\n/**\n * A `fetch` that seals every request to the node's attested transport key.\n * Pass it as `MeroJsConfig.fetch`.\n *\n * A request for any URL outside `baseUrl` is refused rather than sent in the\n * clear: falling back to plaintext would silently undo the point of sealing.\n */\nexport function createSealedFetch(options: SealedFetchOptions): typeof fetch {\n  const base = new URL(options.baseUrl);\n  const basePath = base.pathname.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n  const nodeUrl = `${base.origin}${basePath}`;\n  const baseFetch = options.fetch ?? ((input, init) => fetch(input, init));\n  const attest =\n    typeof options.transportPublicKey === 'function' ? options.transportPublicKey : undefined;\n  let transportKey: Promise<Uint8Array> = attest\n    ? Promise.resolve().then(attest)\n    : Promise.resolve(options.transportPublicKey as Uint8Array);\n  // Attesting starts now, before any request awaits it. A node that fails to\n  // attest must surface on the request that needed the key, not earlier as an\n  // unhandled rejection; the failure is still thrown to every awaiter.\n  transportKey.catch(() => undefined);\n  let session: Promise<Session> | undefined;\n\n  const openSession = async (): Promise<Session> => {\n    try {\n      return await handshake(baseFetch, nodeUrl, await checkedKey(transportKey));\n    } catch (error) {\n      if (!(error instanceof StaleTransportKeyError) || !attest) throw error;\n      transportKey = Promise.resolve().then(attest);\n      return handshake(baseFetch, nodeUrl, await checkedKey(transportKey));\n    }\n  };\n  /** The session to use now, and the promise it came from, to name it if it turns out stale. */\n  const currentSession = async (): Promise<[Session, Promise<Session>]> => {\n    const pending = session ?? renew(undefined);\n    const open = await pending;\n    if (Date.now() < open.renewAt) return [open, pending];\n    const renewed = renew(pending);\n    return [await renewed, renewed];\n  };\n  // Replace the session only if it is still the one found stale, so concurrent\n  // requests that all find it stale open one new session between them.\n  const renew = (stale: Promise<Session> | undefined): Promise<Session> => {\n    if (session === stale) {\n      const opening = openSession();\n      session = opening;\n      opening.catch(() => {\n        if (session === opening) session = undefined;\n      });\n    }\n    return session as Promise<Session>;\n  };\n\n  return async (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response> => {\n    const request = new Request(input, init);\n    const url = new URL(request.url);\n    if (url.origin !== base.origin || !url.pathname.startsWith(`${basePath}/`)) {\n      throw new Error(`Refusing to send ${url.href} outside the sealed node at ${options.baseUrl}`);\n    }\n    const headers: Array<[string, string]> = [];\n    request.headers.forEach((value, name) => headers.push([name, value]));\n    const head = { method: request.method, path: url.pathname.slice(basePath.length) + url.search, headers };\n    const body = new Uint8Array(await request.arrayBuffer());\n\n    const send = async (open: Session): Promise<Response> => {\n      const { requestId, header, envelope } = await sealRequest(open, head, body);\n      const response = await baseFetch(`${nodeUrl}${SEALED_PATH}`, {\n        method: 'POST',\n        headers: { 'content-type': SEALED_CONTENT_TYPE },\n        body: envelope,\n        signal: request.signal,\n      });\n      if (response.headers.get('content-type') !== SEALED_CONTENT_TYPE) {\n        throw await envelopeRefusal(response);\n      }\n      return openResponse(response, open.responseKey, header, requestId);\n    };\n\n    const [open, pending] = await currentSession();\n    try {\n      return await send(open);\n    } catch (error) {\n      // The node refused the envelope before running anything in it, so the\n      // request can be sent again safely under a new session.\n      if (!(error instanceof SealedTransportError) || error.code !== 'unknown_session') throw error;\n      return send(await renew(pending));\n    }\n  };\n}\n\nasync function checkedKey(key: Promise<Uint8Array>): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const bytes = await key;\n  if (bytes.length !== 32) throw new Error('transportPublicKey must be 32 bytes');\n  return bytes;\n}\n\nexport interface Session {\n  requestKey: CryptoKey;\n  responseKey: CryptoKey;\n  nextRequestId: number;\n  renewAt: number;\n  header(requestId: number): Uint8Array;\n}\n\nasync function handshake(\n  baseFetch: typeof fetch,\n  nodeUrl: string,\n  transportKey: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Session> {\n  try {\n    return await handshakeOnce(baseFetch, nodeUrl, transportKey);\n  } catch (error) {\n    // The node limits how fast sessions open. A refused handshake opened\n    // nothing, so trying once more after the pause it asks for is safe.\n    if (!(error instanceof SealedTransportError) || error.code !== 'busy') throw error;\n    await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, error.retryAfterMs ?? 1000));\n    return handshakeOnce(baseFetch, nodeUrl, transportKey);\n  }\n}\n\nasync function handshakeOnce(\n  baseFetch: typeof fetch,\n  nodeUrl: string,\n  transportKey: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Session> {\n  const noise = await initiate(transportKey, PROLOGUE);\n  const response = await baseFetch(`${nodeUrl}${HANDSHAKE_PATH}`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'content-type': SEALED_CONTENT_TYPE },\n    body: concat(new Uint8Array([VERSION]), transportKey, noise.message1),\n  });\n  if (response.headers.get('content-type') !== SEALED_CONTENT_TYPE) {\n    throw await envelopeRefusal(response);\n  }\n  const reply = await readAtMost(response, MAX_HANDSHAKE_REPLY);\n  return sessionFrom(noise, reply);\n}\n\n/** Finish the handshake with the node's reply. Exported for the published vectors. */\nexport async function sessionFrom(\n  noise: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof initiate>>,\n  reply: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Session> {\n  if (reply[0] !== VERSION) throw new Error('The handshake reply is malformed');\n  let finished: Awaited<ReturnType<(typeof noise)['finish']>>;\n  try {\n    finished = await noise.finish(reply.slice(1));\n  } catch {\n    throw new Error('The handshake reply did not open: it did not come from the attested node');\n  }\n  const { payload, split } = finished;\n  if (payload.length !== SESSION_ID_LEN + 4) throw new Error('The handshake reply is malformed');\n  const sessionId = payload.slice(0, SESSION_ID_LEN);\n  const lifetimeSecs = new DataView(payload.buffer, payload.byteOffset).getUint32(SESSION_ID_LEN, false);\n  const [requestKey, responseKey] = await Promise.all([\n    crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', split[0], 'AES-GCM', false, ['encrypt']),\n    crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', split[1], 'AES-GCM', false, ['decrypt']),\n  ]);\n  split[0].fill(0);\n  split[1].fill(0);\n  return {\n    requestKey,\n    responseKey,\n    nextRequestId: 1,\n    renewAt: Date.now() + lifetimeSecs * 1000 - RENEW_BEFORE_MS,\n    header(requestId) {\n      const header = new Uint8Array(HEADER_LEN);\n      header[0] = VERSION;\n      header.set(sessionId, 1);\n      new DataView(header.buffer).setBigUint64(1 + SESSION_ID_LEN, BigInt(requestId), false);\n      return header;\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/** Seal one request under the session's next request id. */\nexport async function sealRequest(\n  session: Session,\n  head: RequestHead,\n  body: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<{ requestId: number; header: Uint8Array; envelope: Uint8Array }> {\n  const requestId = session.nextRequestId;\n  session.nextRequestId += 1;\n  const header = session.header(requestId);\n  const sealed = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: nonce(requestId, 0), additionalData: header },\n    session.requestKey,\n    joinInner(head, body),\n  );\n  return { requestId, header, envelope: concat(header, new Uint8Array(sealed)) };\n}\n\n/** `request_id || index`, as the node numbers them. */\nfunction nonce(requestId: number, index: number): Uint8Array {\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(12);\n  const view = new DataView(bytes.buffer);\n  view.setBigUint64(0, BigInt(requestId), false);\n  view.setUint32(8, index, false);\n  return bytes;\n}\n\nexport interface RequestHead {\n  method: string;\n  path: string;\n  headers: Array<[string, string]>;\n}\n\nexport interface ResponseHead {\n  status: number;\n  headers: Array<[string, string]>;\n}\n\nfunction joinInner(head: RequestHead, body: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n  const encoded = utf8.encode(JSON.stringify(head));\n  const len = new Uint8Array(4);\n  new DataView(len.buffer).setUint32(0, encoded.length, false);\n  return concat(len, encoded, body);\n}\n\n/**\n * Open a sealed response as it streams: wait for its head, then hand back a\n * `Response` whose body opens each frame as it arrives. A frame that does not\n * open, arrives out of order, or a stream that stops before its end frame\n * errors the body rather than passing anything unauthenticated on.\n */\nexport async function openResponse(\n  response: Response,\n  responseKey: CryptoKey,\n  header: Uint8Array,\n  requestId: number,\n): Promise<Response> {\n  if (!response.body) throw new Error('The sealed response has no body');\n  const frames = frameReader(response.body.getReader());\n  let index = 0;\n  const next = async (): Promise<{ kind: number; data: Uint8Array } | null> => {\n    const sealed = await frames.next();\n    if (!sealed) return null;\n    let plain: Uint8Array;\n    try {\n      plain = new Uint8Array(\n        await crypto.subtle.decrypt(\n          { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: nonce(requestId, index), additionalData: header },\n          responseKey,\n          sealed,\n        ),\n      );\n    } catch {\n      throw new Error('A sealed response frame did not open: it was not sealed by the attested node');\n    }\n    index += 1;\n    return { kind: plain[0], data: plain.slice(1) };\n  };\n\n  const first = await next();\n  if (!first || first.kind !== FRAME_HEAD) throw new Error('The sealed response is malformed');\n  const head = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(first.data)) as ResponseHead;\n  if (NULL_BODY_STATUSES.includes(head.status)) {\n    await frames.cancel();\n    return new Response(null, { status: head.status, headers: head.headers });\n  }\n\n  const body = new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({\n    async pull(controller) {\n      try {\n        const frame = await next();\n        if (!frame) {\n          controller.error(new Error('The sealed response was cut short'));\n        } else if (frame.kind === FRAME_DATA) {\n          controller.enqueue(frame.data);\n        } else if (frame.kind === FRAME_END) {\n          controller.close();\n          await frames.cancel();\n        } else {\n          controller.error(new Error('The sealed response is malformed'));\n        }\n      } catch (error) {\n        controller.error(error);\n      }\n    },\n    cancel() {\n      return frames.cancel();\n    },\n  });\n  return new Response(body, { status: head.status, headers: head.headers });\n}\n\n/** Split a byte stream into length-prefixed frames. */\nfunction frameReader(reader: ReadableStreamDefaultReader<Uint8Array>): {\n  next(): Promise<Uint8Array | null>;\n  cancel(): Promise<void>;\n} {\n  let buffer = new Uint8Array();\n  const fill = async (length: number): Promise<boolean> => {\n    while (buffer.length < length) {\n      const { done, value } = await reader.read();\n      if (done) return false;\n      buffer = concat(buffer, value);\n    }\n    return true;\n  };\n  return {\n    async next() {\n      if (!(await fill(4))) return null;\n      const length = new DataView(buffer.buffer, buffer.byteOffset).getUint32(0, false);\n      if (length > MAX_FRAME_LEN) {\n        await reader.cancel();\n        throw new Error('The sealed response is malformed: a frame is larger than the node sends');\n      }\n      if (!(await fill(4 + length))) return null;\n      const frame = buffer.slice(4, 4 + length);\n      buffer = buffer.slice(4 + length);\n      return frame;\n    },\n    cancel: () => reader.cancel(),\n  };\n}\n\n/** Read a body, refusing one longer than `limit` rather than buffering it. */\nasync function readAtMost(response: Response, limit: number): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  if (!response.body) return new Uint8Array();\n  const reader = response.body.getReader();\n  let bytes = new Uint8Array();\n  for (;;) {\n    const { done, value } = await reader.read();\n    if (done) return bytes;\n    bytes = concat(bytes, value);\n    if (bytes.length > limit) {\n      await reader.cancel();\n      throw new Error('The handshake reply is malformed: it is too long');\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nasync function envelopeRefusal(response: Response): Promise<Error> {\n  let code: string | undefined;\n  let message = `Sealed request refused: HTTP ${response.status}`;\n  try {\n    const body = (await response.json()) as { error?: { code?: string; message?: string } };\n    code = body?.error?.code;\n    if (body?.error?.message) message = `Sealed request refused: ${body.error.message}`;\n  } catch {\n    // Not the node's JSON refusal \u2014 a proxy's page, most likely. The status is\n    // all that can honestly be reported.\n  }\n  if (code === 'stale_transport_key') return new StaleTransportKeyError();\n  const retryAfter = Number(response.headers.get('retry-after'));\n  const retryAfterMs =\n    Number.isFinite(retryAfter) && retryAfter > 0 ? Math.min(retryAfter, 5) * 1000 : undefined;\n  return new SealedTransportError(response.status, code, message, retryAfterMs);\n}\n", "/**\n * The second way to log in: sign in to Calimero Cloud instead of connecting to\n * a node.\n *\n * # Two connection shapes, one SDK\n *\n * `createMeroJs({ baseUrl })` is the node connection: point at a node, hold a\n * credential on it, and drive its admin API and JSON-RPC. It assumes the caller\n * has a node \u2014 their own, or one they have an account on.\n *\n * `connectCloud(...)` is for the caller who has neither. They sign in with the\n * identity they already use (Google, through the cloud), and the cloud answers\n * with an attested TEE relay serving their namespace. Writes then go through\n * delegated execution: signed here, run there, attributed here.\n *\n * The two are not alternatives to be picked at random \u2014 they answer different\n * questions. \"Which node do I talk to?\" has an answer for a desktop app and no\n * answer at all for a web app whose user has never installed anything. This\n * function is that missing answer, which is why the login step it replaces is\n * the *node URL prompt* rather than the authentication.\n *\n * # What it does not do\n *\n * # Sealing the relay\n *\n * TLS in front of a relay ends outside its TD, at the host's ingress, where\n * the warrant and the method's arguments are readable. Pass `seal` (a quote\n * verifier) and every call to the relay is sealed to the key its attested TD\n * holds, so they are readable only inside it.\n *\n * It does not read state. A relay writes on the author's behalf; reads still\n * come from a node the client can query, or from the app's own projection of\n * the events it receives. `connectCloud` is deliberately narrow about this\n * rather than presenting a half-working `MeroJs` whose `admin` and `rpc` would\n * need a credential nobody holds.\n */\n\nimport { CloudClient } from './cloud-client.js';\nimport type { CloudClientConfig, CloudNamespace, CloudRelay } from './cloud-client.js';\nimport { RelayClient } from '../relay/relay-client.js';\nimport type { IntentResult, NonceSource } from '../relay/index.js';\nimport { createLocalStorageNonceSource, createMemoryNonceSource } from '../relay/nonce-source.js';\nimport { derivePublicKey, hex } from '../crypto/internal.js';\nimport { createAttestedSealedFetch } from '../sealed/sealed.js';\nimport type { VerifyTransportQuote } from '../sealed/sealed.js';\n\nexport interface ConnectCloudOptions {\n  /** Defaults to the hosted cloud. */\n  cloudBaseUrl?: string;\n  /** A stored MDMA session token. Provide this or `googleIdToken`. */\n  sessionToken?: string;\n  /** A Google ID token to exchange for a session. Provide this or `sessionToken`. */\n  googleIdToken?: string;\n  /** Persist a new or rolling-refreshed session. See {@link CloudClientConfig.onSession}. */\n  onSession?: CloudClientConfig['onSession'];\n\n  /** The author's account, hex \u2014 whose writes these will be. */\n  authorAccount: string;\n  /** The author's `AccountProof<DeviceCert>`, hex-encoded borsh. */\n  authorProof: string;\n  /** The author device's ed25519 signing secret, hex. Never transmitted. */\n  deviceSecret: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Which namespace to write in.\n   *\n   * Optional only when the user owns exactly one: guessing among several would\n   * pick a tenant for them, and the failure would be a write landing in the\n   * wrong place rather than an error.\n   */\n  namespaceId?: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Where nonces come from.\n   *\n   * Defaults to `localStorage`, keyed by the author's device public key, so a\n   * reload continues the sequence instead of replaying it. Pass\n   * {@link createMemoryNonceSource} explicitly for a process that owns its\n   * whole sequence, or your own source to coordinate across tabs.\n   */\n  nonces?: NonceSource;\n  /** Seconds a minted warrant stays presentable. Defaults to 300. */\n  ttlSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Seal every call to the relay to its attested TEE, verified with this \u2014 for\n   * example {@link createQuoteVerifier} with the MRTDs you trust. The warrant\n   * and the method's arguments then reach only the relay's TD, not whatever\n   * terminates TLS in front of it, and the relay is one this client checked\n   * itself rather than one the cloud vouched for. Calls to the cloud are not\n   * sealed; they carry no intent.\n   *\n   * Without it, calls to the relay are plain HTTPS.\n   */\n  seal?: VerifyTransportQuote;\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n}\n\n/** A signed-in cloud session with a relay ready to write through. */\nexport interface CloudConnection {\n  /** The cloud API, for namespaces, billing, HA and sign-out. */\n  cloud: CloudClient;\n  /** The relay chosen for this namespace. */\n  relay: RelayClient;\n  /** The namespace writes will land in. */\n  namespaceId: string;\n  namespace: CloudNamespace;\n  /** What the cloud reported about the chosen relay. */\n  relayInfo: CloudRelay;\n  /** Run one method in one context, on the author's behalf. */\n  execute<T = unknown>(\n    contextId: string,\n    method: string,\n    argsJson?: unknown,\n  ): Promise<IntentResult<T>>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign in to the cloud and return a connection that can write.\n *\n * Throws rather than returning a half-usable connection, and the message says\n * which step is missing \u2014 no namespace, several to choose between, HA not\n * enabled, or no relay holding the authorship grant. Every one of those is\n * something the user has to go and do, and a client that reports them alike\n * cannot tell them what.\n */\nexport async function connectCloud(options: ConnectCloudOptions): Promise<CloudConnection> {\n  if (!options.sessionToken && !options.googleIdToken) {\n    throw new Error('connectCloud needs either a sessionToken or a googleIdToken');\n  }\n\n  const cloud = new CloudClient({\n    cloudBaseUrl: options.cloudBaseUrl,\n    sessionToken: options.sessionToken,\n    onSession: options.onSession,\n    fetch: options.fetch,\n    timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs,\n  });\n\n  if (!options.sessionToken && options.googleIdToken) {\n    await cloud.signInWithGoogle(options.googleIdToken);\n  }\n\n  const namespaces = await cloud.getMyNamespaces();\n  const namespace = pickNamespace(namespaces, options.namespaceId);\n\n  // One read, used for both the choice and the diagnostic. `findExecutingRelay`\n  // would fetch again to explain itself, and a second call can disagree with the\n  // first \u2014 reporting \"waiting for the grant\" about a relay that was already\n  // usable a moment ago.\n  const relays = await cloud.getNamespaceRelays(namespace.namespaceId);\n  const relayInfo =\n    relays.find((r) => r.authorshipReady && r.relayUrl !== null && r.executorAccount !== null) ??\n    null;\n  if (!relayInfo) {\n    throw new Error(explainNoRelay(namespace, relays));\n  }\n\n  const relay = new RelayClient({\n    // Checked by `findExecutingRelay`, which is the only thing that returns a\n    // relay \u2014 narrowed here rather than re-validated, so the invariant lives in\n    // one place.\n    relayUrl: relayInfo.relayUrl as string,\n    executorAccount: relayInfo.executorAccount as string,\n    authorAccount: options.authorAccount,\n    authorProof: options.authorProof,\n    deviceSecret: options.deviceSecret,\n    nonces: options.nonces ?? (await defaultNonceSource(options.deviceSecret)),\n    ttlSeconds: options.ttlSeconds,\n    // Only the relay is sealed: a sealed fetch is bound to one node and refuses\n    // any other URL, and the cloud calls above carry no intent.\n    fetch: options.seal\n      ? createAttestedSealedFetch({\n          baseUrl: relayInfo.relayUrl as string,\n          verify: options.seal,\n          fetch: options.fetch,\n        })\n      : options.fetch,\n    timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs,\n  });\n\n  return {\n    cloud,\n    relay,\n    namespaceId: namespace.namespaceId,\n    namespace,\n    relayInfo,\n    execute: (contextId, method, argsJson) => relay.execute(contextId, method, argsJson),\n  };\n}\n\n/** The one namespace to write in, or an error naming the actual ambiguity. */\nfunction pickNamespace(namespaces: CloudNamespace[], requested?: string): CloudNamespace {\n  if (requested) {\n    const found = namespaces.find((n) => n.namespaceId === requested);\n    if (!found) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `this account owns no namespace ${requested}; it owns: ${\n          namespaces.map((n) => n.namespaceId).join(', ') || '(none)'\n        }`,\n      );\n    }\n    return found;\n  }\n  if (namespaces.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'this account owns no namespaces in the cloud: claim one first, then enable HA on it so a relay is assigned',\n    );\n  }\n  if (namespaces.length > 1) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `this account owns ${namespaces.length} namespaces \u2014 pass namespaceId to say which: ${namespaces\n        .map((n) => n.namespaceId)\n        .join(', ')}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return namespaces[0];\n}\n\n/**\n * Why no relay can write here \u2014 the three states, kept apart.\n *\n * They are three different asks of the user (turn HA on, wait, or get an admin\n * to grant a capability) and one message for all of them would send them to\n * the wrong one.\n */\nfunction explainNoRelay(namespace: CloudNamespace, relays: CloudRelay[]): string {\n  if (relays.length === 0) {\n    return namespace.haStatus === 'enabled'\n      ? `namespace ${namespace.namespaceId} has HA enabled but no relay has been assigned to it yet \u2014 retry shortly`\n      : `namespace ${namespace.namespaceId} has no relays: enable HA on it in the cloud to have an attested node assigned`;\n  }\n  const waitingOnGrant = relays.filter((r) => !r.authorshipReady);\n  if (waitingOnGrant.length === relays.length) {\n    // Name the call, not just the capability. The grant is a governance op only\n    // a namespace admin can publish, so this message is read by someone who has\n    // to go ask for it \u2014 and \"grant CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF\" alone leaves them\n    // relaying a constant to an admin who then has to work out the command.\n    // `openToDelegatedExecution` is the durable half (every relay assigned from\n    // then on lands open), `grantAuthorship` the one for relays already here.\n    return (\n      `every relay on namespace ${namespace.namespaceId} is waiting for the authorship grant: ` +\n      `an admin of the namespace must grant CAN_AUTHOR_ON_BEHALF to ${\n        waitingOnGrant.map((r) => r.executorAccount ?? r.peerId).join(', ') || 'the relay account'\n      } \u2014 with AdminClient.grantAuthorship(namespaceId, account) for these relays, and ` +\n      `AdminClient.openToDelegatedExecution(namespaceId) so relays assigned later need no further op`\n    );\n  }\n  return `namespace ${namespace.namespaceId} has ${relays.length} relay(s), but none reported both a URL and an executor account yet \u2014 retry shortly`;\n}\n\n/**\n * A persisted nonce source keyed by the author's device public key.\n *\n * The key is the *public* key, derived locally: a per-device key is required\n * (two devices of one account are independent replicas) and the secret must\n * never end up in a storage key an extension or another script can enumerate.\n *\n * Falls back to memory where there is no `localStorage` \u2014 Node, a worker, an\n * edge runtime. Those are processes that own their whole sequence, which is\n * exactly the case a memory counter is correct for.\n */\nasync function defaultNonceSource(deviceSecret: string): Promise<NonceSource> {\n  const key = `mero-js:warrant-nonce:${hex(await derivePublicKey(deviceSecret))}`;\n  try {\n    return createLocalStorageNonceSource(key);\n  } catch {\n    return createMemoryNonceSource(1);\n  }\n}\n", "/**\n * Verifying a TEE node's quote in the page, before trusting the key it binds.\n *\n * A quote proves what runs in a TD only once it has been checked: its\n * signatures against Intel's root, the TCB status of the platform, the\n * measurements of the image, and that its report data is the nonce and the\n * binding this client asked for. {@link createQuoteVerifier} does all of that\n * here, with nothing but the node: the node hands over the Intel-signed\n * collateral with its quote (`includeCollateral`), and a node cannot forge\n * collateral, only choose which valid collateral to serve.\n *\n * The DCAP verification itself \u2014 parsing the quote, checking its signature\n * chain and appraising its TCB level against the collateral \u2014 comes from a\n * library you pass in, normally `verify` from `@phala/dcap-qvl`, a pure\n * JavaScript implementation that runs in browsers, Node and React Native. It\n * is passed in rather than bundled so this SDK keeps no runtime dependencies,\n * and applications that never talk to a TEE node pay nothing for it.\n */\n\nimport { hex } from '../crypto/internal.js';\nimport type { VerifyTransportQuote } from './sealed.js';\n\n/**\n * The collateral a quote is verified against \u2014 TCB info, QE identity, CRLs and\n * their chains \u2014 in dcap-qvl's form: byte fields are hex strings or byte\n * arrays. What `/admin-api/tee/attest` returns with `includeCollateral`, and\n * what `@phala/dcap-qvl`'s `getCollateral` fetches.\n */\nexport interface DcapCollateral {\n  pck_crl_issuer_chain: string;\n  root_ca_crl: number[] | string;\n  pck_crl: number[] | string;\n  tcb_info_issuer_chain: string;\n  tcb_info: string;\n  tcb_info_signature: number[] | string;\n  qe_identity_issuer_chain: string;\n  qe_identity: string;\n  qe_identity_signature: number[] | string;\n}\n\n/** The fields of a TDX report this verifier reads. */\ninterface TdReport {\n  mrTd: Uint8Array;\n  rtMr0: Uint8Array;\n  rtMr1: Uint8Array;\n  rtMr2: Uint8Array;\n  rtMr3: Uint8Array;\n  reportData: Uint8Array;\n}\n\n/** What a DCAP verifier returns for a quote whose signature chain verified. */\nexport interface DcapVerifiedReport {\n  status: string;\n  advisory_ids?: string[];\n  report: { type: string; data: unknown };\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a quote's signature chain against `collateral` as of `nowSecs`, and\n * appraise its TCB level. Throws when it does not verify. `verify` from\n * `@phala/dcap-qvl` has exactly this shape.\n */\nexport type DcapVerify = (\n  quote: Uint8Array,\n  collateral: DcapCollateral,\n  nowSecs: number,\n) => DcapVerifiedReport;\n\nexport interface QuoteVerifierOptions {\n  /** DCAP verification: `verify` from `@phala/dcap-qvl`. */\n  dcapVerify: DcapVerify;\n  /**\n   * MRTDs (hex) of the images trusted. Required: the MRTD names the image a TD\n   * booted, and a quote that proves only \"some genuine TD\" proves nothing\n   * about which code reads the traffic.\n   */\n  allowedMrtd: string[];\n  /** RTMR allowlists (hex); a register is not checked when its list is left out. */\n  allowedRtmr0?: string[];\n  allowedRtmr1?: string[];\n  allowedRtmr2?: string[];\n  allowedRtmr3?: string[];\n  /**\n   * TCB statuses accepted. Defaults to `['UpToDate']`. `Revoked` is refused\n   * even when listed.\n   */\n  allowedTcbStatuses?: string[];\n  /**\n   * Where to get collateral when the node sends none (it predates\n   * `includeCollateral`): for example\n   * `(quote) => getCollateral(PHALA_PCCS_URL, quote)` from `@phala/dcap-qvl`.\n   * Without it, such a node's quote is refused.\n   */\n  fetchCollateral?: (quote: Uint8Array) => Promise<DcapCollateral>;\n  /** The current time in milliseconds; defaults to `Date.now`. For tests. */\n  now?: () => number;\n}\n\n/** A verifier for {@link fetchAttestedTransportKey}, which asks the node for collateral. */\nexport type QuoteVerifier = VerifyTransportQuote & { readonly includeCollateral: true };\n\nconst MEASUREMENT_HEX = /^[0-9a-f]{96}$/;\n\n/**\n * A verifier that checks a TEE node's quote here, in the page, and accepts it\n * only when every check passes:\n *\n * - its signatures verify against Intel's root, with collateral that is valid\n *   now;\n * - the platform's TCB status is one allowed (`UpToDate` by default), and\n *   never `Revoked`;\n * - the MRTD, and any RTMRs given, are ones allowed;\n * - its report data is the nonce followed by the binding the client computed.\n *\n * Any failure rejects with the reason; nothing is trusted from a quote that\n * does not pass. Mock quotes never pass: they carry no signature.\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { verify as dcapVerify } from '@phala/dcap-qvl';\n *\n * const verifier = createQuoteVerifier({ dcapVerify, allowedMrtd: [trustedMrtd] });\n * const fetch = createSealedFetch({\n *   baseUrl,\n *   transportPublicKey: () => fetchAttestedTransportKey(admin, verifier),\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function createQuoteVerifier(options: QuoteVerifierOptions): QuoteVerifier {\n  const allowedMrtd = measurements(options.allowedMrtd, 'allowedMrtd');\n  if (allowedMrtd.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error('allowedMrtd is empty, so no quote would ever be accepted');\n  }\n  const allowedRtmr = [\n    measurements(options.allowedRtmr0 ?? [], 'allowedRtmr0'),\n    measurements(options.allowedRtmr1 ?? [], 'allowedRtmr1'),\n    measurements(options.allowedRtmr2 ?? [], 'allowedRtmr2'),\n    measurements(options.allowedRtmr3 ?? [], 'allowedRtmr3'),\n  ];\n  const allowedStatuses = options.allowedTcbStatuses ?? ['UpToDate'];\n  const now = options.now ?? Date.now;\n\n  const verifier = async ({\n    quoteB64,\n    nonce,\n    reportDataSuffix,\n    collateral,\n  }: Parameters<VerifyTransportQuote>[0]): Promise<boolean> => {\n    const quote = fromBase64(quoteB64);\n    const against = collateral ?? (await options.fetchCollateral?.(quote));\n    if (!against) {\n      throw new Error(\n        'The node sent no collateral for its quote, and no fetchCollateral was given to get it',\n      );\n    }\n\n    let verified: DcapVerifiedReport;\n    try {\n      verified = options.dcapVerify(quote, against, Math.floor(now() / 1000));\n    } catch (error) {\n      throw new Error(`The quote did not verify: ${(error as Error)?.message ?? String(error)}`);\n    }\n\n    if (verified.status === 'Revoked' || !allowedStatuses.includes(verified.status)) {\n      throw new Error(`The platform's TCB status is ${verified.status}, which is not accepted`);\n    }\n    const td = tdReport(verified.report);\n    if (!allowedMrtd.includes(hex(td.mrTd))) {\n      throw new Error(`MRTD ${hex(td.mrTd)} is not an image this verifier trusts`);\n    }\n    const registers = [td.rtMr0, td.rtMr1, td.rtMr2, td.rtMr3];\n    registers.forEach((register, index) => {\n      const allowed = allowedRtmr[index];\n      if (allowed.length > 0 && !allowed.includes(hex(register))) {\n        throw new Error(`RTMR${index} ${hex(register)} is not one this verifier trusts`);\n      }\n    });\n    if (hex(td.reportData) !== `${nonce}${reportDataSuffix}`.toLowerCase()) {\n      throw new Error('The quote does not commit to this nonce and binding');\n    }\n    return true;\n  };\n  return Object.assign(verifier, { includeCollateral: true as const });\n}\n\nfunction measurements(values: string[], label: string): string[] {\n  return values.map((value) => {\n    const normalized = value.trim().toLowerCase();\n    if (!MEASUREMENT_HEX.test(normalized)) {\n      throw new Error(`${label} holds ${JSON.stringify(value)}, which is not a 48-byte hex measurement`);\n    }\n    return normalized;\n  });\n}\n\n/** The TD report of a TDX quote (1.0 or 1.5); anything else is refused. */\nfunction tdReport(report: DcapVerifiedReport['report']): TdReport {\n  const data = report.data as (TdReport & { base?: TdReport }) | undefined;\n  if (report.type === 'td10' && data) return data;\n  if (report.type === 'td15' && data?.base) return data.base;\n  throw new Error(`The quote is a ${report.type} quote, not a TDX one`);\n}\n\nfunction fromBase64(value: string): Uint8Array {\n  const binary = atob(value);\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length);\n  for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i += 1) bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);\n  return bytes;\n}\n", "/**\n * Sign a namespace governance op from the SDK \u2014 specifically the membership op a\n * keyholder needs to join without running a node.\n *\n * `admitJoin` carries an already-signed op to a node the inviter named as an\n * admitter. Producing that op is the piece a keyholder could not do before: the\n * op must be signed by the device key in the credential it carries, because every\n * peer checks `signer == credential.statement.sign_pk` when applying a join. An\n * admitter can relay it and can never author it.\n *\n * The encoding is borsh, hand-written to match core's structs. Correctness is not\n * asserted against bytes recorded here \u2014 a layout transcribed by eye is exactly\n * how a golden ends up confidently wrong. It is asserted by a node accepting the\n * op, which is what the e2e does.\n */\nimport type { SignedGroupOpenInvitation } from '../admin-api/admin-types.js';\nimport {\n  concat,\n  derivePublicKey,\n  fromHex,\n  hex,\n  importSigningKey,\n  u32le,\n  u64le,\n} from '../crypto/internal.js';\n\n/** Core's `SIGNED_NAMESPACE_OP_SCHEMA_VERSION`. A node refuses any other value. */\nexport const SIGNED_NAMESPACE_OP_SCHEMA_VERSION = 8;\n\n/** Domain prefixed to the signable bytes; core's `NAMESPACE_GOVERNANCE_SIGN_DOMAIN`. */\nconst NAMESPACE_SIGN_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode('calimero.namespace.v1');\n\n/** `NamespaceOp::Root` is the first variant. */\nconst NAMESPACE_OP_ROOT = 0;\n\n/**\n * `RootOp` discriminants, in declaration order. Only the two join variants are\n * emitted here; the rest are listed so the numbering is checkable against core\n * rather than inferred from the two in use.\n */\nconst ROOT_OP = {\n  GroupCreated: 0,\n  GroupReparented: 1,\n  GroupDeleted: 2,\n  AdminChanged: 3,\n  PolicyUpdated: 4,\n  MemberJoined: 5,\n  KeyDelivery: 6,\n  MemberJoinedOpen: 7,\n  MemberJoinedAt: 8,\n  NamespaceCreated: 9,\n  MemberJoinedViaTeeAttestation: 10,\n} as const;\n\n/** A required `[u8; 32]`, as JSON carries it: 32 byte values. */\nfunction bytes32(value: readonly number[], label: string): Uint8Array {\n  if (value.length !== 32) {\n    throw new Error(`${label} must be 32 bytes, got ${value.length}`);\n  }\n  return new Uint8Array(value);\n}\n\n/**\n * Borsh `Option<[u8; 32]>` from the byte array JSON carries it as.\n *\n * `[u8; 32]` crosses JSON as 32 numbers, not as hex \u2014 the hex spelling belongs to\n * `AccountId`, which has its own representation. Encoding one of these from a hex\n * string would silently produce the wrong 32 bytes.\n */\nfunction optionalBytes32(\n  value: readonly number[] | null | undefined,\n  label: string,\n): Uint8Array {\n  if (value === null || value === undefined) {\n    return new Uint8Array([0]);\n  }\n  if (value.length !== 32) {\n    throw new Error(`${label} must be 32 bytes, got ${value.length}`);\n  }\n  return concat(new Uint8Array([1]), new Uint8Array(value));\n}\n\n/** Borsh `String`: u32 length then UTF-8 bytes. */\nfunction borshString(value: string): Uint8Array {\n  const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(value);\n  return concat(u32le(bytes.length), bytes);\n}\n\n\n/**\n * Borsh-encode a `SignedGroupOpenInvitation`.\n *\n * Re-encoded rather than passed through, because it has to go inside the op that\n * gets signed. That makes this function version-locked to core: a field added to\n * the invitation and omitted here produces an op whose inner invitation no longer\n * matches the inviter's signature over it. That exact drift, in client-py, broke\n * 93 scenarios \u2014 the failure surfaces as `invalid invitation signature` and points\n * nowhere near the encoder.\n */\nexport function encodeSignedInvitation(signed: SignedGroupOpenInvitation): Uint8Array {\n  const body = signed.invitation;\n  const admitters = body.admitters ?? [];\n  const admitterAddrs = signed.admitter_addrs ?? [];\n\n  return concat(\n    // GroupInvitationFromAdmin.\n    //\n    // `SignerId` and `ContextGroupId` cross JSON as 32 numbers; `AccountId`\n    // crosses as hex. Same width, different spelling, and reading either the\n    // wrong way yields 32 bytes that encode cleanly and verify as nothing.\n    bytes32(body.inviter_identity, 'inviter_identity'),\n    bytes32(body.group_id, 'group_id'),\n    u64le(body.expiration_timestamp),\n    bytes32(body.secret_salt, 'secret_salt'),\n    new Uint8Array([body.invited_role]),\n    u32le(admitters.length),\n    ...admitters.map((a, i) => fromHex(a, `admitters[${i}]`, 32)),\n    // ...then the enclosing SignedGroupOpenInvitation, in declaration order.\n    // `inviter_account` sits between the signature and the addresses; putting it\n    // anywhere else still encodes 32 bytes and still verifies as nothing.\n    borshString(signed.inviter_signature),\n    signed.inviter_account\n      ? concat(new Uint8Array([1]), fromHex(signed.inviter_account, 'inviter_account', 32))\n      : new Uint8Array([0]),\n    // A `Vec<String>`, so each entry is a bare borsh string. This carried an\n    // enum until core dropped the URL variant, and an enum writes a\n    // discriminant byte ahead of each entry \u2014 encoding one here now would shift\n    // every following byte and fail as `invalid invitation signature`, pointing\n    // nowhere near this line.\n    u32le(admitterAddrs.length),\n    ...admitterAddrs.map(borshString),\n    optionalBytes32(signed.application_id, 'application_id'),\n    // Borsh order follows core's field order, where this is `bytecode_id`; the\n    // JSON key is `app_key`, a rename covering both directions that core pins in\n    // a test. Encoding by the Rust name would read `undefined` and emit a None\n    // where the inviter signed a Some.\n    optionalBytes32(signed.app_key, 'app_key'),\n  );\n}\n\nexport interface SignMemberJoinInput {\n  /** The namespace being joined, 64 hex. */\n  readonly namespaceId: string;\n  /** The account joining, 64 hex \u2014 the subject of the credential. */\n  readonly member: string;\n  /** The invitation, as the admin API returned it. */\n  readonly invitation: SignedGroupOpenInvitation;\n  /**\n   * The joiner's `AccountProof<DeviceCert>`, hex \u2014 from `signDeviceCert`.\n   *\n   * Its `sign_pk` must be the public key of `deviceSecret`; a peer checks that\n   * when applying the join and refuses otherwise.\n   */\n  readonly credential: string;\n  /** The device signing secret, 64 hex. Must match the credential's `sign_pk`. */\n  readonly deviceSecret: string;\n  /**\n   * Heads this op is written against. Empty means \"signed against an empty head\"\n   * \u2014 which is NOT the same as genesis, and a node with a non-empty head will\n   * reject it as stale rather than treat it as a first op.\n   */\n  readonly parentOpHashes?: readonly string[];\n  /** Anti-replay nonce; a node keeps a window per signer. */\n  readonly nonce: number | bigint;\n  /**\n   * When the join happened, unix seconds. Defaults to now.\n   *\n   * Carried only by `MemberJoinedAt`, which is the variant used whenever the\n   * invitation expires \u2014 and since core clamps every invitation to\n   * `MAX_INVITATION_VALIDITY_SECS`, that is every invitation. The variant is\n   * inferred from the invitation rather than selected by a flag: an expiring\n   * invitation joined with plain `MemberJoined` is refused at apply with\n   * \"expiration is set but joined_at is absent\", which is not a mistake worth\n   * leaving available.\n   */\n  readonly joinedAt?: number | bigint;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign a `MemberJoined` (or `MemberJoinedAt`) namespace op and return it\n * borsh-encoded and hex \u2014 the `signedOp` that `admitJoin` takes.\n */\nexport async function signMemberJoinOp(input: SignMemberJoinInput): Promise<string> {\n  const parents = input.parentOpHashes ?? [];\n  const credential = fromHex(input.credential, 'credential', input.credential.length / 2);\n\n  // An invitation that expires must be claimed with `MemberJoinedAt`, which\n  // carries `joined_at` between the invitation and the credential. Choosing the\n  // variant from the invitation keeps the two in step: the discriminant and the\n  // presence of that field are one decision, and splitting them produces bytes\n  // that decode into the wrong shape rather than failing to decode.\n  const expires = BigInt(input.invitation.invitation.expiration_timestamp ?? 0) !== 0n;\n  const joinedAt =\n    input.joinedAt ?? BigInt(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));\n\n  const rootOp = expires\n    ? concat(\n        new Uint8Array([ROOT_OP.MemberJoinedAt]),\n        fromHex(input.member, 'member', 32),\n        encodeSignedInvitation(input.invitation),\n        u64le(joinedAt),\n        credential,\n      )\n    : concat(\n        new Uint8Array([ROOT_OP.MemberJoined]),\n        fromHex(input.member, 'member', 32),\n        encodeSignedInvitation(input.invitation),\n        credential,\n      );\n\n  const op = concat(new Uint8Array([NAMESPACE_OP_ROOT]), rootOp);\n\n  const key = await importSigningKey(input.deviceSecret);\n  const signer = await derivePublicKey(input.deviceSecret);\n\n  const signable = concat(\n    new Uint8Array([SIGNED_NAMESPACE_OP_SCHEMA_VERSION]),\n    fromHex(input.namespaceId, 'namespaceId', 32),\n    u32le(parents.length),\n    ...parents.map((p, i) => fromHex(p, `parentOpHashes[${i}]`, 32)),\n    signer,\n    u64le(input.nonce),\n    op,\n  );\n\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign('Ed25519', key, concat(NAMESPACE_SIGN_DOMAIN, signable)),\n  );\n\n  // The signed struct repeats the signable fields, then the signature, then the\n  // admitter endorsement. The domain is a signing prefix only and is never part\n  // of the encoded op.\n  //\n  // The endorsement is written as borsh `None` \u2014 a single `0x00` \u2014 and that is\n  // the correct value from here, not a placeholder. It authorises the membership\n  // and can only be signed by an account the invitation named as an admitter,\n  // which a keyholder is not. The admitter attaches its own as it relays the op\n  // through `admitJoin`.\n  //\n  // It sits outside `signable`, so it is outside this signature and outside the\n  // op's id. That is what makes attaching it possible: the admitter changes\n  // neither what was signed here nor which op this is.\n  const unendorsed = new Uint8Array([0]);\n\n  return hex(concat(signable, signature, unendorsed));\n}\n", "/**\n * Sign the statement a device key presents to obtain a session on a node.\n *\n * This is the half of password-free login that has to run where the device key\n * lives, and for the case delegated execution exists for that is a browser tab.\n * Until this module, the only thing that could produce a login statement was\n * `merod account login-statement` \u2014 which is to say, a client had to hold a node\n * to ask a node for a session.\n *\n * **What this gets you, and what it does not.** A statement proves a device key\n * asked for this session. It says nothing about which account that device\n * belongs to: that is the `AccountProof` travelling beside it, which the node\n * checks separately. Signing here and presenting no proof gets a 401 that looks\n * exactly like a bad signature.\n *\n * **The session key is minted by the caller, not here.** The device key signs\n * once, over a short-lived key the caller generates and keeps; that key does the\n * talking for the rest of the session, which is what keeps the device key off\n * the wire. Passing a key you do not hold the private half of produces a session\n * you cannot speak on.\n *\n * **`node` must come from something you pinned.** Not from the challenge\n * response, and not from any field the node itself chose \u2014 an attacker who can\n * answer on the node's behalf would otherwise pick what your device signs about,\n * which is the whole reason the field exists. Read it out of band from the node\n * operator.\n *\n * **The byte contract is pinned in core**, at\n * `crates/account/src/tests/login_wire_fixture.rs`, for the same reason the\n * warrant one is: `AUTH_LOGIN_SIGN_DOMAIN` is `pub(crate)` there and the field\n * order is implicit in a `derive`, so nothing on that side forces anyone to\n * notice this file depends on both. This module's test asserts the same vectors.\n */\n\nimport {\n  concat,\n  derivePublicKey,\n  domainHash,\n  fromHex,\n  hex,\n  importSigningKey,\n  u32le,\n  u64le,\n} from '../crypto/internal.js';\n\nconst SIGN_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode('calimero.auth.login.v1');\n\n/**\n * The client surface a session is bound to.\n *\n * A session minted for one surface cannot be presented from another, so a single\n * compromised surface does not yield sessions usable everywhere.\n */\nexport type Audience =\n  | {\n      /**\n       * A browser origin, spelled exactly as the browser spells it\n       * (`https://host:port`, no trailing slash).\n       *\n       * Compared byte for byte by the node. Do not normalize it here: two\n       * spellings of one origin would mean a verifier that disagrees with the\n       * browser about which one a token was for. `location.origin` is already\n       * the spelling you want.\n       */\n      kind: 'webOrigin';\n      origin: string;\n    }\n  | {\n      /** A signed native client, named by its code-signing identity. */\n      kind: 'codeSigningId';\n      id: string;\n    }\n  | {\n      /**\n       * A command-line client, which has no origin and no signing identity.\n       *\n       * Carries no payload deliberately: a string here would be an audience that\n       * binds nothing while looking like it binds something.\n       */\n      kind: 'cli';\n    };\n\n/** The borsh enum tag for each variant, in core's declaration order. */\nconst AUDIENCE_TAG: Record<Audience['kind'], number> = {\n  webOrigin: 0,\n  codeSigningId: 1,\n  cli: 2,\n};\n\n/** The variant's payload as UTF-8 \u2014 empty for the payload-free `cli`. */\nfunction audienceBody(audience: Audience): Uint8Array {\n  const encoder = new TextEncoder();\n  switch (audience.kind) {\n    case 'webOrigin':\n      return encoder.encode(audience.origin);\n    case 'codeSigningId':\n      return encoder.encode(audience.id);\n    case 'cli':\n      return new Uint8Array(0);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * What the audience contributes to the **signing preimage**: tag then body, with\n * no length between them.\n *\n * `domainHash` length-prefixes every part it is handed, so a length written here\n * would be counted twice and the preimage would verify nowhere. This is the one\n * field spelled differently in the two encodings \u2014 see {@link audienceWire}.\n */\nfunction audienceSigningBytes(audience: Audience): Uint8Array {\n  return concat(\n    Uint8Array.from([AUDIENCE_TAG[audience.kind]]),\n    audienceBody(audience),\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * What the audience contributes to the **wire encoding**: the borsh enum tag,\n * then for the two payload-carrying variants a borsh `String` \u2014 its own `u32`\n * little-endian length, then the UTF-8.\n *\n * `cli` is a bare tag. Writing a `u32` zero after it instead produces four extra\n * bytes that a node reads as the start of the challenge, so the statement fails\n * as a bad signature rather than as a malformed one.\n */\nfunction audienceWire(audience: Audience): Uint8Array {\n  const tag = Uint8Array.from([AUDIENCE_TAG[audience.kind]]);\n  if (audience.kind === 'cli') {\n    return tag;\n  }\n  const body = audienceBody(audience);\n  return concat(tag, u32le(body.length), body);\n}\n\n/** What a device is asking for. */\nexport interface LoginStatementInput {\n  /**\n   * The node this session is for, hex (32 bytes) \u2014 its identity public key, as\n   * you pinned it. See the module note: this must not come from the node.\n   */\n  node: string;\n  /** The client surface the session is bound to. */\n  audience: Audience;\n  /** The challenge this node issued, hex (32 bytes). Proves freshness. */\n  challenge: string;\n  /**\n   * The public half of the ephemeral key this session will speak with, hex (32\n   * bytes). Minted per session by the caller and thrown away with it.\n   */\n  sessionKey: string;\n  /** Unix seconds at signing. */\n  issuedAt: number | bigint;\n  /** Unix seconds after which the node must refuse it. */\n  expiresAt: number | bigint;\n  /**\n   * The device's ed25519 signing secret, hex (32 bytes).\n   *\n   * Never sent anywhere. It signs locally and only the signature travels, which\n   * is what lets a statement be minted by something holding no node.\n   */\n  deviceSecret: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign a login statement and return it hex-encoded, ready to present with an\n * account proof.\n *\n * Returns the encoding rather than an object for the reason `signWarrant` does:\n * the signature covers exactly these bytes, and a caller that rebuilt the fields\n * from JSON would have a second spelling able to disagree with what was signed.\n */\nexport async function signLoginStatement(\n  input: LoginStatementInput,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const node = fromHex(input.node, 'node', 32);\n  const challenge = fromHex(input.challenge, 'challenge', 32);\n  const sessionKey = fromHex(input.sessionKey, 'sessionKey', 32);\n\n  const key = await importSigningKey(input.deviceSecret);\n  const deviceKey = await derivePublicKey(input.deviceSecret);\n\n  const issuedAt = u64le(input.issuedAt);\n  const expiresAt = u64le(input.expiresAt);\n\n  const preimage = await domainHash(SIGN_DOMAIN, [\n    node,\n    audienceSigningBytes(input.audience),\n    challenge,\n    sessionKey,\n    deviceKey,\n    issuedAt,\n    expiresAt,\n  ]);\n\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign({ name: 'Ed25519' }, key, preimage),\n  );\n\n  return hex(\n    concat(\n      node,\n      audienceWire(input.audience),\n      challenge,\n      sessionKey,\n      deviceKey,\n      issuedAt,\n      expiresAt,\n      signature,\n    ),\n  );\n}\n", "/**\n * Obtain a session on a node using only a device key \u2014 the handshake around\n * {@link signLoginStatement}.\n *\n * Signing a statement was never the whole job. A client also has to fetch a\n * challenge, mint a session keypair, assemble a request body whose shape it\n * cannot see from here, and read a token out of the reply. Until now every\n * consumer wrote those two HTTP calls by hand, which is how the same three\n * mistakes kept being available to make:\n *\n * 1. **Asking for permissions.** `POST /auth/token` takes an optional\n *    `permissions` list. Left unset, the node grants the account-proof\n *    provider's own scopes \u2014 `context:intent`, `context:query`,\n *    `context:subscribe` \u2014 which are the whole delegated surface and\n *    deliberately nothing above it. This module never sends the field.\n *    `authenticate()` in this same package hardcodes `['admin']` (#84); a\n *    device-key session would be refused for that and should never ask.\n * 2. **Learning the node's key from the node.** {@link LoginConfig.node} is\n *    required and has no default, because a value read from the challenge\n *    response would let whoever answered choose what the device signs about.\n *    That is the whole attack the field exists to stop, so the awkwardness of\n *    having to supply it is the point rather than something to smooth away.\n * 3. **Losing the refresh token.** A browser tab outlives a short-lived\n *    session, so both tokens are returned. Nothing here refreshes on a timer\n *    (#87, #88 track that); this only makes it possible without a second\n *    breaking change.\n *\n * **The session key never leaves.** It is minted here, the device key signs\n * over it once, and the secret half is handed back to the caller. That is what\n * keeps a device key off the wire for the life of a session: a leaked token\n * cannot be escalated into use of the key that authorised it.\n */\n\nimport { HTTPError } from '../http-client/web-client.js';\nimport { derivePublicKey, hex } from '../crypto/internal.js';\nimport { signLoginStatement, type Audience } from './login.js';\n\n/** Seconds a statement stays valid unless told otherwise. */\nconst DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS = 300;\n\n/** A freshly minted ephemeral keypair, hex-encoded. */\nexport interface SessionKeyPair {\n  /** The public half \u2014 what the statement is signed over. */\n  publicKey: string;\n  /** The private half. Held by the caller; never sent anywhere. */\n  secret: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint the ephemeral keypair a session speaks with.\n *\n * An ed25519 secret *is* 32 random bytes, so this needs no key generation\n * ceremony \u2014 `getRandomValues` and the same derivation every other signer here\n * uses. Exported because a caller that wants to persist a session across a page\n * reload needs to mint the pair itself and keep the secret.\n */\nexport async function generateSessionKey(): Promise<SessionKeyPair> {\n  const secret = hex(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)));\n  return { publicKey: hex(await derivePublicKey(secret)), secret };\n}\n\n/** What a device needs in order to ask for a session. */\nexport interface LoginConfig {\n  /** The node's base URL, e.g. `https://node.example`. */\n  nodeUrl: string;\n  /**\n   * The node's device signing key, hex (32 bytes), **as this client pinned it**.\n   *\n   * Learn it out of band \u2014 from the node's operator, or a certificate you\n   * already trust. Never from the node you are about to log in to: see the\n   * module note.\n   */\n  node: string;\n  /** The device's ed25519 signing secret, hex (32 bytes). Never sent. */\n  deviceSecret: string;\n  /**\n   * The device's account proof, hex \u2014 the credential certifying that this\n   * device belongs to its account.\n   *\n   * Travels beside the statement and is what settles *which account* is asking.\n   * The statement alone proves only that a device key asked, so logging in\n   * without this yields a 401 that looks exactly like a bad signature.\n   */\n  accountProof: string;\n  /** The client surface this session is bound to. */\n  audience: Audience;\n  /**\n   * How this client names itself to the node. Defaults to the audience's own\n   * spelling, which is the honest answer: a session bound to an origin should\n   * say that origin.\n   */\n  clientName?: string;\n  /** Seconds the statement stays valid. Defaults to {@link DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS}. */\n  ttlSeconds?: number;\n  /** Injectable for tests and non-browser runtimes. */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  /** Per-request timeout. Defaults to 10s. */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n}\n\n/** A session minted without a password. */\nexport interface DelegatedSession {\n  /** Bearer token for the delegated surface. */\n  accessToken: string;\n  /** Presented to renew the access token. See #87/#88 \u2014 nothing here schedules it. */\n  refreshToken: string;\n  /** The session's public half, as the node knows it. */\n  sessionKey: string;\n  /** The session's private half. The caller keeps this; it was never sent. */\n  sessionSecret: string;\n}\n\n/** The audience's own spelling, used as the default client name. */\nfunction audienceLabel(audience: Audience): string {\n  switch (audience.kind) {\n    case 'webOrigin':\n      return audience.origin;\n    case 'codeSigningId':\n      return audience.id;\n    case 'cli':\n      return 'cli';\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Log in with a device key and return the session.\n *\n * The challenge is fetched immediately before signing on purpose: it is\n * single-use and short-lived, so a statement minted against a stale one is\n * refused before any signature work is done.\n *\n * @throws {HTTPError} if the node refuses the challenge or the token request.\n */\nexport async function login(config: LoginConfig): Promise<DelegatedSession> {\n  const baseUrl = config.nodeUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n  const timeoutMs = config.timeoutMs ?? 10_000;\n\n  const request = async (path: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<unknown> => {\n    const controller = new AbortController();\n    const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);\n    let response: Response;\n    try {\n      const requestInit = { ...init, signal: controller.signal };\n      // globalThis.fetch must be called as a method on globalThis, not through a\n      // variable, or browsers throw \"Illegal invocation\".\n      response = config.fetch\n        ? await config.fetch(`${baseUrl}${path}`, requestInit)\n        : await globalThis.fetch(`${baseUrl}${path}`, requestInit);\n    } catch (err) {\n      throw new HTTPError(\n        0,\n        err instanceof Error ? err.name : 'NetworkError',\n        `${baseUrl}${path}`,\n        new Headers(),\n        err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),\n      );\n    } finally {\n      clearTimeout(timer);\n    }\n    const text = await response.text().catch(() => '');\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      throw new HTTPError(\n        response.status,\n        response.statusText,\n        `${baseUrl}${path}`,\n        response.headers,\n        text,\n      );\n    }\n    return text ? (JSON.parse(text) as unknown) : {};\n  };\n\n  const challengeBody = (await request('/auth/challenge', {\n    method: 'GET',\n    headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },\n  })) as { challenge?: string; data?: { challenge?: string } };\n  // The node has spelled this both bare and wrapped in `data`; accept either\n  // rather than couple a login to one envelope revision.\n  const challenge = challengeBody.challenge ?? challengeBody.data?.challenge;\n  if (!challenge) {\n    throw new Error('the node issued no challenge');\n  }\n\n  const session = await generateSessionKey();\n  const issuedAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n  const statement = await signLoginStatement({\n    node: config.node,\n    audience: config.audience,\n    challenge,\n    sessionKey: session.publicKey,\n    issuedAt,\n    expiresAt: issuedAt + (config.ttlSeconds ?? DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS),\n    deviceSecret: config.deviceSecret,\n  });\n\n  // `timestamp` is required and the request refuses unknown fields, so a body\n  // missing it is rejected during deserialization \u2014 before the provider runs,\n  // and with an error that names the request shape rather than the login.\n  //\n  // `permissions` is omitted, not empty: see the module note.\n  const tokenBody = (await request('/auth/token', {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Accept: 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify({\n      auth_method: 'account_proof',\n      public_key: session.publicKey,\n      client_name: config.clientName ?? audienceLabel(config.audience),\n      timestamp: issuedAt,\n      provider_data: {\n        challenge,\n        login_statement: statement,\n        account_proof: config.accountProof,\n      },\n    }),\n  })) as {\n    access_token?: string;\n    refresh_token?: string;\n    data?: { access_token?: string; refresh_token?: string };\n  };\n\n  const accessToken = tokenBody.access_token ?? tokenBody.data?.access_token;\n  const refreshToken = tokenBody.refresh_token ?? tokenBody.data?.refresh_token;\n  if (!accessToken) {\n    throw new Error('the node minted no session');\n  }\n\n  return {\n    accessToken,\n    refreshToken: refreshToken ?? '',\n    sessionKey: session.publicKey,\n    sessionSecret: session.secret,\n  };\n}\n", "/**\n * Local-node discovery.\n *\n * Calimero dev/desktop nodes expose a public, unauthenticated health endpoint\n * at `GET {nodeUrl}/admin-api/health` that returns `{ \"data\": { \"status\":\n * \"alive\" } }`. The most common local layouts run on a small, well-known set of\n * ports, so instead of forcing the user to type a URL we probe those ports and\n * offer whatever is actually running.\n */\n\n/**\n * Default ports probed when discovering local nodes. Covers the two-node dev\n * stacks used across the Calimero apps (RPC + alt ports for node1 / node2).\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_LOCAL_NODE_PORTS = [2428, 2429, 2528, 2529] as const;\n\n/** Host used to build local candidate URLs. */\nconst LOCAL_HOST = 'localhost';\n\n/** Per-probe timeout. A reachable local node answers almost instantly; a\n * closed port rejects fast, but a firewalled/black-holed one can hang, so we\n * cap each probe. */\nconst DEFAULT_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS = 2000;\n\nexport interface DiscoverLocalNodesOptions {\n  /** Ports to probe. Defaults to {@link DEFAULT_LOCAL_NODE_PORTS}. */\n  ports?: readonly number[];\n  /** Per-probe timeout in ms. Defaults to 2000. */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Abort the whole discovery (e.g. when the modal closes). */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n}\n\n/** Build the canonical base URL for a local node on the given port. */\nexport function localNodeUrl(port: number): string {\n  return `http://${LOCAL_HOST}:${port}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve an API `path` against a node `baseUrl`. Ensures the base ends with a\n * slash first, so a base that carries a path prefix (e.g. a `NODE_PATH_PREFIX`\n * deployment like `http://host/node1`) keeps that segment instead of having it\n * stripped by relative URL resolution.\n */\nexport function nodeEndpoint(baseUrl: string, path: string): string {\n  const base = baseUrl.endsWith('/') ? baseUrl : `${baseUrl}/`;\n  return new URL(path, base).toString();\n}\n\n/**\n * Probe a single node's health endpoint. Resolves `true` only when the node\n * answers with a 2xx and (when the body is JSON) reports a non-dead status.\n * Any network error, timeout, or non-ok response resolves `false` \u2014 never\n * throws (except on an external abort, which is swallowed as `false`).\n */\nexport async function probeNodeHealth(\n  baseUrl: string,\n  options: { timeoutMs?: number; signal?: AbortSignal } = {},\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const { timeoutMs = DEFAULT_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS, signal } = options;\n\n  // Already cancelled before we start \u2014 don't fetch, and don't register a\n  // timer or listener that would then need cleanup.\n  if (signal?.aborted) return false;\n\n  // Per-probe timeout, also linked to the caller's abort signal so closing the\n  // modal cancels every in-flight probe. Bind the signal to a local so the\n  // cleanup below stays symmetric with registration without re-narrowing.\n  const controller = new AbortController();\n  const onAbort = () => controller.abort();\n  const abortSignal = signal;\n  if (abortSignal) abortSignal.addEventListener('abort', onAbort, { once: true });\n  const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);\n\n  try {\n    const url = nodeEndpoint(baseUrl, 'admin-api/health');\n    const res = await fetch(url, {\n      method: 'GET',\n      signal: controller.signal,\n    });\n\n    if (!res.ok) return false;\n\n    // Health body is `{ data: { status: \"alive\" } }`, but tolerate plain\n    // `{ status }` and non-JSON 2xx responses. A *missing* status is treated as\n    // alive (the 2xx is enough); a status that is present but not \"alive\"\n    // (including an explicit `null`) is treated as unhealthy.\n    try {\n      const body = (await res.json()) as\n        | { data?: { status?: string | null }; status?: string | null }\n        | undefined;\n      const status =\n        body?.data?.status !== undefined ? body?.data?.status : body?.status;\n      if (status === undefined) return true;\n      return typeof status === 'string' && status.toLowerCase() === 'alive';\n    } catch {\n      return true;\n    }\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  } finally {\n    clearTimeout(timer);\n    if (abortSignal) abortSignal.removeEventListener('abort', onAbort);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Probe the configured local ports in parallel and return the base URLs that\n * responded as healthy, in the same order as the `ports` argument (which\n * defaults to ascending). Returns an empty array when nothing local is running.\n */\nexport async function discoverLocalNodes(\n  options: DiscoverLocalNodesOptions = {},\n): Promise<string[]> {\n  const { ports = DEFAULT_LOCAL_NODE_PORTS, timeoutMs, signal } = options;\n\n  const results = await Promise.all(\n    ports.map(async (port) => {\n      const url = localNodeUrl(port);\n      const ok = await probeNodeHealth(url, { timeoutMs, signal });\n      return ok ? url : null;\n    }),\n  );\n\n  return results.filter((url): url is string => url !== null);\n}\n"],
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"REFRESH_HEADER", "REFRESH_EXPIRES_HEADER", "CloudClient", "config", "injected", "input", "init", "idToken", "body", "rootSecret", "root", "accountRootFromSecret", "nonce", "signAccountLogin", "proof", "row", "namespaceId", "challenge", "routingProofHeaders", "accountId", "admitters", "nodes", "allowed", "a", "n", "ns", "ownershipProof", "options", "params", "signAccountLink", "portal", "query", "href", "source", "hash", "grant", "error", "out", "session", "method", "path", "headers", "controller", "timer", "response", "err", "HTTPError", "bodyText", "token", "expiresRaw", "expiresAt", "admitterAddrsFromNetworkStatus", "status", "record", "peerId", "external", "suffix", "entry", "addr", "dialable", "resolveProofSigner", "config", "createProofSigner", "REFRESH_LOCK_NAME", "getLockManager", "locks", "expiresAtFromJwt", "token", "fallbackMs", "parts", "b64", "payload", "MeroJs", "isTauri", "getProof", "createBrowserHttpClient", "newToken", "createAuthApiClientFromHttpClient", "createAdminApiClientFromHttpClient", "RpcClient", "SseClient", "EphemeralClient", "CloudClient", "WsClient", "credentials", "creds", "requestBody", "response", "accessToken", "error", "triggeringAccessToken", "promise", "fn", "stored", "data", "expiresAt", "url", "parseAuthCallback", "nodeUrl", "opts", "buildAuthLoginUrl", "createMeroJs", "MemoryTokenStore", "data", "STORAGE_KEY", "LocalStorageTokenStore", "key", "raw", "parsed", "SIGN_DOMAIN", "INTENT_DOMAIN", "MAX_CITED_HEADS", "UNPINNED_APP", "intentHash", "method", "argsJson", "args", "domainHash", "signWarrant", "input", "context", "fromHex", "authorAccount", "executor", "appVersion", "accountHeads", "citedHeads", "governanceFloor", "key", "importSigningKey", "publicKey", "derivePublicKey", "commitment", "nonce", "u64le", "notAfter", "preimage", "signature", "hex", "concat", "u32le", "heads", "label", "list", "head", "i", "DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS", "IntentRefusedError", "reason", "retryable", "status", "RelayClient", "config", "injected", "input", "init", "contextId", "body", "method", "argsJson", "executor", "nonce", "ttl", "warrant", "signWarrant", "path", "headers", "controller", "timer", "response", "err", "HTTPError", "text", "extractReason", "bodyText", "parsed", "candidate", "createMemoryNonceSource", "start", "next", "value", "createLocalStorageNonceSource", "key", "storage", "store", "raw", "current", "parsed", "PROTOCOL_NAME", "DH_LEN", "TAG_LEN", "PKCS8_X25519_PREFIX", "SymmetricState", "_SymmetricState", "h", "name", "data", "sha256", "concat", "inputKeyMaterial", "ck", "key", "hkdf2", "plaintext", "ciphertext", "noiseNonce", "initiate", "remoteStatic", "prologue", "fixedEphemeral", "state", "ephemeral", "x25519KeyPair", "dh", "message2", "remoteEphemeral", "secret", "pair", "error", "publicKey", "privateKey", "jwk", "base64UrlDecode", "peer", "nonce", "hmacSha256", "hmacKey", "chainingKey", "temp", "first", "second", "value", "base64", "binary", "char", "HANDSHAKE_PATH", "SEALED_PATH", "SEALED_CONTENT_TYPE", "VERSION", "PROLOGUE", "SESSION_ID_LEN", "HEADER_LEN", "FRAME_HEAD", "FRAME_DATA", "FRAME_END", "MAX_FRAME_LEN", "MAX_HANDSHAKE_REPLY", "RENEW_BEFORE_MS", "TRANSPORT_BINDING_DOMAIN", "NULL_BODY_STATUSES", "utf8", "StaleTransportKeyError", "SealedTransportError", "status", "code", "message", "retryAfterMs", "transportKeyBinding", "inner", "transportKey", "digest", "concat", "fetchAttestedTransportKey", "admin", "verify", "options", "nonce", "hex", "attested", "fromHex", "reportDataSuffix", "createAttestedSealedFetch", "baseFetch", "input", "init", "attestUrl", "request", "response", "body", "createSealedFetch", "base", "basePath", "nodeUrl", "attest", "session", "openSession", "handshake", "checkedKey", "error", "currentSession", "pending", "renew", "open", "renewed", "stale", "opening", "url", "headers", "value", "name", "head", "send", "requestId", "header", "envelope", "sealRequest", "envelopeRefusal", "openResponse", "key", "bytes", "handshakeOnce", "resolve", "noise", "initiate", "reply", "readAtMost", "sessionFrom", "finished", "payload", "split", "sessionId", "lifetimeSecs", "requestKey", "responseKey", "sealed", "joinInner", "index", "view", "encoded", "len", "frames", "frameReader", "next", "plain", "first", "controller", "frame", "reader", "buffer", "fill", "length", "done", "limit", "retryAfter", "connectCloud", "options", "cloud", "CloudClient", "namespaces", "namespace", "pickNamespace", "relays", "relayInfo", "r", "explainNoRelay", "relay", "RelayClient", "defaultNonceSource", "createAttestedSealedFetch", "contextId", "method", "argsJson", "requested", "found", "n", "waitingOnGrant", "deviceSecret", "key", "hex", "derivePublicKey", "createLocalStorageNonceSource", "createMemoryNonceSource", "MEASUREMENT_HEX", "createQuoteVerifier", "options", "allowedMrtd", "measurements", "allowedRtmr", "allowedStatuses", "now", "quoteB64", "nonce", "reportDataSuffix", "collateral", "quote", "fromBase64", "against", "verified", "error", "td", "tdReport", "hex", "register", "index", "allowed", "values", "label", "value", "normalized", "report", "data", "binary", "bytes", "i", "SIGNED_NAMESPACE_OP_SCHEMA_VERSION", "NAMESPACE_SIGN_DOMAIN", "NAMESPACE_OP_ROOT", "ROOT_OP", "bytes32", "value", "label", "optionalBytes32", "concat", "borshString", "bytes", "u32le", "encodeSignedInvitation", "signed", "body", "admitters", "admitterAddrs", "u64le", "a", "fromHex", "signMemberJoinOp", "input", "parents", "credential", "expires", "joinedAt", "rootOp", "op", "key", "importSigningKey", "signer", "derivePublicKey", "signable", "p", "i", "signature", "unendorsed", "hex", "SIGN_DOMAIN", "AUDIENCE_TAG", "audienceBody", "audience", "encoder", "audienceSigningBytes", "concat", "audienceWire", "tag", "body", "u32le", "signLoginStatement", "input", "node", "fromHex", "challenge", "sessionKey", "key", "importSigningKey", "deviceKey", "derivePublicKey", "issuedAt", "u64le", "expiresAt", "preimage", "domainHash", "signature", "hex", "DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS", "generateSessionKey", "secret", "hex", "derivePublicKey", "audienceLabel", "audience", "login", "config", "baseUrl", "timeoutMs", "request", "path", "init", "controller", "timer", "response", "requestInit", "err", "HTTPError", "text", "challengeBody", "challenge", "session", "issuedAt", "statement", "signLoginStatement", "tokenBody", "accessToken", "refreshToken", "DEFAULT_LOCAL_NODE_PORTS", "LOCAL_HOST", "DEFAULT_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS", "localNodeUrl", "port", "nodeEndpoint", "baseUrl", "path", "base", "probeNodeHealth", "options", "timeoutMs", "signal", "controller", "onAbort", "abortSignal", "timer", "url", "res", "body", "status", "discoverLocalNodes", "ports"]
 }