@calimero-network/mero-js 19.26.0 → 19.27.1

package/dist/cloud/connect.d.ts

@@ -21,6 +21,13 @@
  *
  * # What it does not do
  *
+ * # Sealing the relay
+ *
+ * TLS in front of a relay ends outside its TD, at the host's ingress, where
+ * the warrant and the method's arguments are readable. Pass `seal` (a quote
+ * verifier) and every call to the relay is sealed to the key its attested TD
+ * holds, so they are readable only inside it.
+ *
  * It does not read state. A relay writes on the author's behalf; reads still
  * come from a node the client can query, or from the app's own projection of
  * the events it receives. `connectCloud` is deliberately narrow about this
@@ -31,6 +38,7 @@ import { CloudClient } from './cloud-client.js';
 import type { CloudClientConfig, CloudNamespace, CloudRelay } from './cloud-client.js';
 import { RelayClient } from '../relay/relay-client.js';
 import type { IntentResult, NonceSource } from '../relay/index.js';
+import type { VerifyTransportQuote } from '../sealed/sealed.js';
 export interface ConnectCloudOptions {
     /** Defaults to the hosted cloud. */
     cloudBaseUrl?: string;
@@ -65,6 +73,17 @@ export interface ConnectCloudOptions {
     nonces?: NonceSource;
     /** Seconds a minted warrant stays presentable. Defaults to 300. */
     ttlSeconds?: number;
+    /**
+     * Seal every call to the relay to its attested TEE, verified with this — for
+     * example {@link createQuoteVerifier} with the MRTDs you trust. The warrant
+     * and the method's arguments then reach only the relay's TD, not whatever
+     * terminates TLS in front of it, and the relay is one this client checked
+     * itself rather than one the cloud vouched for. Calls to the cloud are not
+     * sealed; they carry no intent.
+     *
+     * Without it, calls to the relay are plain HTTPS.
+     */
+    seal?: VerifyTransportQuote;
     fetch?: typeof fetch;
     timeoutMs?: number;
 }

package/dist/cloud/connect.js

@@ -21,6 +21,13 @@
  *
  * # What it does not do
  *
+ * # Sealing the relay
+ *
+ * TLS in front of a relay ends outside its TD, at the host's ingress, where
+ * the warrant and the method's arguments are readable. Pass `seal` (a quote
+ * verifier) and every call to the relay is sealed to the key its attested TD
+ * holds, so they are readable only inside it.
+ *
  * It does not read state. A relay writes on the author's behalf; reads still
  * come from a node the client can query, or from the app's own projection of
  * the events it receives. `connectCloud` is deliberately narrow about this
@@ -31,6 +38,7 @@ import { CloudClient } from './cloud-client.js';
 import { RelayClient } from '../relay/relay-client.js';
 import { createLocalStorageNonceSource, createMemoryNonceSource } from '../relay/nonce-source.js';
 import { derivePublicKey, hex } from '../crypto/internal.js';
+import { createAttestedSealedFetch } from '../sealed/sealed.js';
 /**
  * Sign in to the cloud and return a connection that can write.
  *
@@ -77,7 +85,15 @@ export async function connectCloud(options) {
         deviceSecret: options.deviceSecret,
         nonces: options.nonces ?? (await defaultNonceSource(options.deviceSecret)),
         ttlSeconds: options.ttlSeconds,
-        fetch: options.fetch,
+        // Only the relay is sealed: a sealed fetch is bound to one node and refuses
+        // any other URL, and the cloud calls above carry no intent.
+        fetch: options.seal
+            ? createAttestedSealedFetch({
+                baseUrl: relayInfo.relayUrl,
+                verify: options.seal,
+                fetch: options.fetch,
+            })
+            : options.fetch,
         timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs,
     });
     return {