@calimero-network/mero-js 19.25.0 → 19.27.0

package/dist/admin-api/admin-client.d.ts

@@ -534,6 +534,10 @@ export declare class AdminApiClient {
     joinSubgroupInheritance(groupId: string): Promise<JoinSubgroupInheritanceResponseData>;
     getTeeInfo(): Promise<TeeInfoResponseData>;
     teeAttest(request: TeeAttestRequest): Promise<TeeAttestResponseData>;
+    /**
+     * @deprecated Nodes no longer serve `/admin-api/tee/verify-quote` (removed in
+     * core#3262), so this fails. Verify quotes with `createQuoteVerifier`.
+     */
     teeVerifyQuote(request: TeeVerifyQuoteRequest): Promise<TeeVerifyQuoteResponseData>;
     getPeersCount(): Promise<{
         count: number;

package/dist/admin-api/admin-client.js

@@ -1002,6 +1002,10 @@ export class AdminApiClient {
     async teeAttest(request) {
         return unwrap(await this.httpClient.post('/admin-api/tee/attest', request));
     }
+    /**
+     * @deprecated Nodes no longer serve `/admin-api/tee/verify-quote` (removed in
+     * core#3262), so this fails. Verify quotes with `createQuoteVerifier`.
+     */
     async teeVerifyQuote(request) {
         return unwrap(await this.httpClient.post('/admin-api/tee/verify-quote', request));
     }

package/dist/admin-api/admin-types.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import type { DcapCollateral } from '../sealed/verify.js';
 export { ApiResponse } from '../http-client/index.js';
 export interface HealthStatus {
     status: string;
@@ -1577,6 +1578,12 @@ export interface TeeAttestRequest {
      * as `transportPublicKey`. See `fetchAttestedTransportKey`.
      */
     bindTransportKey?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Also return the Intel-signed collateral the quote is verified against, as
+     * `collateral`, so the quote can be verified with nothing but the node. See
+     * `createQuoteVerifier`. A node that predates it refuses the field.
+     */
+    includeCollateral?: boolean;
 }
 export interface QuoteHeader {
     version: number;
@@ -1617,12 +1624,23 @@ export interface TeeAttestResponseData {
     quote: Quote;
     /** Hex X25519 transport key, present only when the request set `bindTransportKey`. */
     transportPublicKey?: string;
+    /**
+     * The Intel-signed collateral the quote verifies against, present only when
+     * the request set `includeCollateral` and the quote is not a mock.
+     */
+    collateral?: DcapCollateral;
 }
+/**
+ * @deprecated Nodes no longer serve `/admin-api/tee/verify-quote` (removed in
+ * core#3262), so a request for it fails. Verify quotes with
+ * `createQuoteVerifier`.
+ */
 export interface TeeVerifyQuoteRequest {
     quoteB64: string;
     nonce: string;
     expectedApplicationHash?: string;
 }
+/** @deprecated See {@link TeeVerifyQuoteRequest}. */
 export interface TeeVerifyQuoteResponseData {
     quoteVerified: boolean;
     nonceVerified: boolean;

package/dist/admin-api/admin-types.js

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-// Admin API Types — aligned with core server routes
-// All types use camelCase to match core's #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 /**
  * Hex-encode a string's UTF-8 bytes, for {@link AccountSignWithRootRequest.payload}.
  *

package/dist/cloud/connect.d.ts

@@ -21,6 +21,13 @@
  *
  * # What it does not do
  *
+ * # Sealing the relay
+ *
+ * TLS in front of a relay ends outside its TD, at the host's ingress, where
+ * the warrant and the method's arguments are readable. Pass `seal` (a quote
+ * verifier) and every call to the relay is sealed to the key its attested TD
+ * holds, so they are readable only inside it.
+ *
  * It does not read state. A relay writes on the author's behalf; reads still
  * come from a node the client can query, or from the app's own projection of
  * the events it receives. `connectCloud` is deliberately narrow about this
@@ -31,6 +38,7 @@ import { CloudClient } from './cloud-client.js';
 import type { CloudClientConfig, CloudNamespace, CloudRelay } from './cloud-client.js';
 import { RelayClient } from '../relay/relay-client.js';
 import type { IntentResult, NonceSource } from '../relay/index.js';
+import type { VerifyTransportQuote } from '../sealed/sealed.js';
 export interface ConnectCloudOptions {
     /** Defaults to the hosted cloud. */
     cloudBaseUrl?: string;
@@ -65,6 +73,17 @@ export interface ConnectCloudOptions {
     nonces?: NonceSource;
     /** Seconds a minted warrant stays presentable. Defaults to 300. */
     ttlSeconds?: number;
+    /**
+     * Seal every call to the relay to its attested TEE, verified with this — for
+     * example {@link createQuoteVerifier} with the MRTDs you trust. The warrant
+     * and the method's arguments then reach only the relay's TD, not whatever
+     * terminates TLS in front of it, and the relay is one this client checked
+     * itself rather than one the cloud vouched for. Calls to the cloud are not
+     * sealed; they carry no intent.
+     *
+     * Without it, calls to the relay are plain HTTPS.
+     */
+    seal?: VerifyTransportQuote;
     fetch?: typeof fetch;
     timeoutMs?: number;
 }

package/dist/cloud/connect.js

@@ -21,6 +21,13 @@
  *
  * # What it does not do
  *
+ * # Sealing the relay
+ *
+ * TLS in front of a relay ends outside its TD, at the host's ingress, where
+ * the warrant and the method's arguments are readable. Pass `seal` (a quote
+ * verifier) and every call to the relay is sealed to the key its attested TD
+ * holds, so they are readable only inside it.
+ *
  * It does not read state. A relay writes on the author's behalf; reads still
  * come from a node the client can query, or from the app's own projection of
  * the events it receives. `connectCloud` is deliberately narrow about this
@@ -31,6 +38,7 @@ import { CloudClient } from './cloud-client.js';
 import { RelayClient } from '../relay/relay-client.js';
 import { createLocalStorageNonceSource, createMemoryNonceSource } from '../relay/nonce-source.js';
 import { derivePublicKey, hex } from '../crypto/internal.js';
+import { createAttestedSealedFetch } from '../sealed/sealed.js';
 /**
  * Sign in to the cloud and return a connection that can write.
  *
@@ -77,7 +85,15 @@ export async function connectCloud(options) {
         deviceSecret: options.deviceSecret,
         nonces: options.nonces ?? (await defaultNonceSource(options.deviceSecret)),
         ttlSeconds: options.ttlSeconds,
-        fetch: options.fetch,
+        // Only the relay is sealed: a sealed fetch is bound to one node and refuses
+        // any other URL, and the cloud calls above carry no intent.
+        fetch: options.seal
+            ? createAttestedSealedFetch({
+                baseUrl: relayInfo.relayUrl,
+                verify: options.seal,
+                fetch: options.fetch,
+            })
+            : options.fetch,
         timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs,
     });
     return {