@cairnkeep/cli 2.22.3 → 2.22.5

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,83 @@ All notable user-facing changes are documented here. This project follows
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [2.22.5] - 2026-10-08
+
+### Operations
+
+- Add an explicit post-publication verifier for exact-tree CI candidates,
+  release and registry bytes, npm signatures/attestations, anonymous
+  dual-architecture OCI images, bound SBOMs and exact-source signed provenance.
+  Refuse partial verification and report replacement; keep artifact evidence
+  separate from deployment readiness. Add offline positive/mutation controls.
+
+### Security
+
+- Bind note-transaction pre-image hashes to bounded inspected descriptors;
+  reject linked, replaced, growing or over-64-MiB files before accepting their
+  hashes. Create developer note fixtures exclusively without overwriting a
+  competing file. Add actual runtime replacement and fixture race controls.
+- Use bounded descriptor reads for developer benchmark/import/note snapshots,
+  capability leases, corrupt-database controls and runtime-evidence files.
+  Preserve existing corruption, permissions and exact-byte assertions; keep
+  remote-context test labels static so provider values cannot forge log lines.
+  These controls do not make note publication a directory-wide transaction or
+  certify that every historical security-analysis finding is resolved.
+
+## [2.22.4] - 2026-10-07
+
+### Security
+
+- Remove ambiguous nested path expressions from failure signatures. Crafted
+  slash-heavy messages no longer cause exponential backtracking; existing v1
+  fixture signatures remain byte-equivalent. Add timeout-isolated regression
+  inputs and a reproducible generated corpus.
+- Bind capability compatibility configuration, skill artifacts/targets/backups
+  and work-evidence reads to inspected descriptors with fixed byte bounds,
+  identity rechecks and strict UTF-8. Reject replacement, growth and special-file
+  substitution; preserve private-ledger permissions and ordinary project-file
+  modes. Keep schemas, feature defaults and explicit approval gates unchanged.
+  Update security guidance and the learning/video supplement; historical
+  analysis findings remain subject to individual triage.
+- Bind evaluation inputs/note snapshots, OKF import/export, graph artifacts,
+  playbook receipts and progressive-context cache reads to bounded inspected
+  descriptors. Reject replacement and growth before accepting content; publish
+  snapshots from the validated bytes instead of reopening source paths.
+  Rebuild unsafe derived caches deterministically without changing pack
+  enablement or skill approval. Add public-reader regression controls and
+  update security, learning and video guidance.
+- Bound setup policy/state/ownership and instruction-file reads to 1 MiB;
+  bound OMP staged candidates to 8 KiB and exclude linked or oversized files.
+  Recheck observed setup/instruction targets before publication; preserve
+  caller edits detected after inspection, original instruction modes and
+  failed-operation state. Keep private approvals and machine sync explicit.
+  On Windows, use content ownership rather than POSIX executable-mode bits
+  when reconciling generated files; keep private-state ACL enforcement.
+- Publish evaluation overlays and Windows managed files through exclusive
+  descriptor-written temporary files. Reject substituted targets, clean only
+  owned temporary files, and never unlink live Windows data to retry a denied
+  replacement. Bound compressed and expanded memory imports to 512 MiB.
+- Keep container health checks on a validated numeric loopback port, using the
+  server's bounded credential resolver. Refuse provider URL credentials and
+  redirects, bound AnythingLLM query responses to 8 MiB, and sanitize provider
+  HTTP, network and stream failures without including response bodies.
+  Reject workspace dot segments, including shorthand OpenViking traversal.
+  Preserve default retrieval providers and successful response shapes.
+
+### CI
+
+- Preserve the bundled evaluation task set's canonical LF bytes in native
+  Windows source checkouts. Add a real Git CRLF-conversion regression control;
+  keep the installed-package exact-byte integrity check unchanged.
+- Canonicalize bounded-read fixture paths before injecting file changes, covering
+  Windows short temporary-directory names and a real POSIX alias control.
+- Run focused bounded-input controls before the longer Windows smoke shards on
+  all supported Node versions; retain every complete-catalog and install gate.
+- Wait for completed OpenCode V2 fixture capture before reading its database,
+  under a bounded event-stream completion deadline. A deterministic delayed
+  completion control rejects the old file-existence readiness assumption;
+  production capture behavior is unchanged.
+
 ## [2.22.3] - 2026-10-07
 
 ### Fixed
@@ -727,7 +804,8 @@ stored memories.
 - Preserve executable permissions and Bash 3.2 portability on macOS.
 - Add backup-first uninstall and SQLite-safe memory export/import guidance.
 
-[Unreleased]: https://github.com/cairnkeep/cairnkeep/compare/v2.20.0...HEAD
+[Unreleased]: https://github.com/cairnkeep/cairnkeep/compare/v2.22.4...HEAD
+[2.22.4]: https://github.com/cairnkeep/cairnkeep/compare/v2.22.3...v2.22.4
 [2.20.0]: https://github.com/cairnkeep/cairnkeep/compare/v2.19.1...v2.20.0
 [2.19.1]: https://github.com/cairnkeep/cairnkeep/compare/v2.19.0...v2.19.1
 [2.19.0]: https://github.com/cairnkeep/cairnkeep/compare/v2.18.0...v2.19.0

package/containers/healthcheck.mjs

@@ -1,22 +1,6 @@
-import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
-
-const port = process.env.MCP_HTTP_PORT?.trim();
-if (!port) {
-    process.exit(0);
-}
-
-let token = process.env.CAIRN_MEMORY_HTTP_TOKEN?.trim();
-const tokenFile = process.env.CAIRN_MEMORY_HTTP_TOKEN_FILE?.trim();
-if (!token && tokenFile) {
-    try {
-        token = readFileSync(tokenFile, "utf8").trim();
-    } catch {
-        process.exit(1);
-    }
-}
-if (!token) {
-    process.exit(1);
-}
+import { realpathSync } from "node:fs";
+import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
+import { parseHttpPort, resolveHttpToken } from "../mcp-memory-server/dist/http-security.js";
 
 const body = {
     jsonrpc: "2.0",
@@ -29,18 +13,28 @@ const body = {
     },
 };
 
-try {
-    const response = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/mcp`, {
-        method: "POST",
-        headers: {
-            Authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,
-            "Content-Type": "application/json",
-            Accept: "application/json, text/event-stream",
-        },
-        body: JSON.stringify(body),
-        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(4000),
-    });
-    process.exit(response.ok ? 0 : 1);
-} catch {
-    process.exit(1);
+export async function containerHealthcheck(env = process.env) {
+    const port = parseHttpPort(env.MCP_HTTP_PORT);
+    if (!port.enabled) return "error" in port ? 1 : 0;
+    const token = resolveHttpToken(env);
+    if (!token.ok) return 1;
+    try {
+        const response = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port.port}/mcp`, {
+            method: "POST",
+            headers: {
+                Authorization: `Bearer ${token.token}`,
+                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                Accept: "application/json, text/event-stream",
+            },
+            body: JSON.stringify(body),
+            redirect: "manual",
+            signal: AbortSignal.timeout(4000),
+        });
+        await response.body?.cancel();
+        return response.ok ? 0 : 1;
+    } catch { return 1; }
+}
+
+if (process.argv[1] && pathToFileURL(realpathSync(process.argv[1])).href === import.meta.url) {
+    process.exitCode = await containerHealthcheck();
 }

package/containers/quadlet/cairnkeep.container

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ ContainerName=cairnkeep
 Exec=http
 UserNS=keep-id:uid=10001,gid=10001
 Volume=cairnkeep-data.volume:/data:Z
-Secret=cairnkeep-http-token,type=mount,target=http-token
+Secret=cairnkeep-http-token,type=mount,target=http-token,uid=10001,gid=10001,mode=0400
 Environment=MCP_HTTP_HOST=0.0.0.0
 Environment=MCP_HTTP_PORT=7801
 Environment=CAIRN_MEMORY_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS=localhost:7801,127.0.0.1:7801

package/docs/containers.md

@@ -80,6 +80,18 @@ cairn-container http \
 
 The container always adds its own loopback address for health checks.
 
+The health-check security follow-up validates `MCP_HTTP_PORT` with the server's
+numeric port parser and uses its bounded private token resolver. Invalid
+configuration fails without issuing a request; probes target only
+`127.0.0.1` and refuse redirects. The existing
+`/usr/local/lib/cairnkeep/container-healthcheck.mjs` command remains available
+as an alias to the packaged probe. Stdio mode requires no HTTP probe.
+File-based probes require a private token readable by the container user;
+world-readable secret mounts fail closed. The Quadlet example explicitly mounts
+its secret as UID/GID 10001 with mode `0400`. For other engines, verify the
+effective in-container ownership and mode rather than relying on a secret
+declaration that the engine may not honor.
+
 One HTTP server and bearer token form one trust domain. They are not a
 multi-tenant authorization boundary; see [Memory storage and
 deployment](storage.md).

package/docs/domain-knowledge.md

@@ -32,6 +32,17 @@ work exactly the same without them.
 | `CAIRN_ANYTHINGLLM_PROJECTS_FILE` | Optional config path for the bundled sync script. Default `${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-~/.config}/cairnkeep/anythingllm-projects.json`. |
 | `CAIRN_ANYTHINGLLM_STATE_FILE` | Optional state path for the bundled sync script. Default `${XDG_STATE_HOME:-~/.local/state}/cairnkeep/anythingllm-sync.json`. |
 
+The query security follow-up validates HTTP(S) URLs and rejects embedded
+credentials, query strings and fragments before fetching. Redirects are not
+followed, and workspace names cannot be empty or URL dot segments. Responses
+are streamed under an 8 MiB cap and must be UTF-8 JSON
+objects; successful answer-field selection is unchanged. Failed requests
+report only a controlled failure class or HTTP status, never a provider error
+body or raw network/stream diagnostic. The existing two-minute query deadline
+remains. Configure HTTPS outside loopback: remote plaintext HTTP remains
+accepted for compatibility, not as a recommendation. Document synchronization
+uses a separate script and does not inherit these query-specific guarantees.
+
 The workspaces the tools target come from the project's **memory config** — the
 first of `.agent/memory.json`, `.opencode/memory.json`, `.claude/memory.json`, or
 `memory.json` that exists:
@@ -117,6 +128,10 @@ CAIRN_OPENVIKING_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:1933
 
 Plain HTTP is limited to loopback. Use HTTPS for any other host. Credentials in
 the URL, redirects, invalid response shapes, and oversized bodies are rejected.
+The response cap is 1 MiB. Network and stream failures are payload-free in the
+security follow-up, including failures during response cleanup.
+Shorthand workspace names and explicit `viking://resources` URIs share the
+same decoded traversal checks before any request is sent.
 Authenticated remote MCP use requires the additional explicit consent setting
 `CAIRN_OPENVIKING_MCP_HTTP=1`.
 

package/docs/learning/CURRICULUM-MAP.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Curriculum Coverage Map
 
-**Baseline:** Cairnkeep 2.22.3
+**Baseline:** Cairnkeep 2.22.5
 **Last reviewed:** 2026-10-07
 
 This map prevents the course from drifting behind the product. It assigns each

package/docs/learning/FEATURE-GUIDE.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Cairnkeep feature guide
 
-**Baseline:** Cairnkeep 2.22.3
+**Baseline:** Cairnkeep 2.22.5
 
 This is the step-back map for choosing and operating Cairnkeep features. The
 [course labs](https://github.com/cairnkeep/cairnkeep-course-labs) provide one

package/docs/learning/lessons/L00-why-cairnkeep.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 **Status:** Ready
 **Track:** Quickstart
 **Time:** 10 minutes
-**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.3
+**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.5
 
 ## Outcome
 

package/docs/learning/lessons/L01-safe-trial.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 **Status:** Ready
 **Track:** Quickstart
 **Time:** 15 minutes
-**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.3
+**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.5
 
 ## Outcome
 
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ephemeral; the named course volume is persistent.
 1. Pull the public image:
 
    ```bash
-   podman pull ghcr.io/cairnkeep/cairnkeep:2.22.3
+   podman pull ghcr.io/cairnkeep/cairnkeep:2.22.5
    ```
 
 2. Start the stdio server with a read-only root filesystem and no Linux
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ ephemeral; the named course volume is persistent.
      --read-only --cap-drop=all --security-opt=no-new-privileges \
      --tmpfs=/tmp:rw,noexec,nosuid,size=64m,mode=1777 \
      --volume cairnkeep-course-data:/data:Z,U \
-     ghcr.io/cairnkeep/cairnkeep:2.22.3 stdio
+     ghcr.io/cairnkeep/cairnkeep:2.22.5 stdio
    ```
 
 3. The process waits quietly for MCP input. Press `Ctrl-C` after confirming it

package/docs/learning/lessons/L02-installation.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 **Status:** Ready
 **Track:** Quickstart
 **Time:** 25 minutes
-**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.3 and Node.js 22 or newer
+**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.5 and Node.js 22 or newer
 
 ## Outcome
 
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ sync. Codex project trust remains an explicit operator decision.
 2. Install Cairnkeep:
 
    ```bash
-   npm install --global @cairnkeep/cli@2.22.3
+   npm install --global @cairnkeep/cli@2.22.5
    cairn --version
    ```
 

package/docs/learning/lessons/L03-first-project.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 **Status:** Ready
 **Track:** Quickstart
 **Time:** 25 minutes
-**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.3
+**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.5
 
 ## Outcome
 

package/docs/learning/lessons/L19-validated-skill-improvement.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 **Status:** Ready
 **Track:** Evidence and Evaluation
 **Time:** 50 minutes
-**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.3
+**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.5
 
 ## Outcome
 

package/docs/learning/lessons/L20-mcp-tool-profiles.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # L20 - Least-authority MCP tool profiles
 
 **Status:** Ready
-**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.3 and Node.js 22 or newer
+**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.5 and Node.js 22 or newer
 **Time:** 25 minutes
 
 ## Outcome

package/docs/learning/lessons/L21-context-packs.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # L21 - Immutable context packs and skill approval
 
 **Status:** Ready
-**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.3 and Node.js 22 or newer
+**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.5 and Node.js 22 or newer
 **Time:** 40 minutes
 
 ## Outcome

package/docs/learning/lessons/L22-native-windows.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 **Status:** Ready
 **Track:** Operator
 **Time:** 30 minutes
-**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.3, Windows x64, and Node.js 22 or newer
+**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.5, Windows x64, and Node.js 22 or newer
 
 ## Outcome
 
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ perform a reversible uninstall without relying on WSL or Git Bash.
 From PowerShell:
 
 ```powershell
-npm install --global @cairnkeep/cli@2.22.3
+npm install --global @cairnkeep/cli@2.22.5
 cairn version
 
 $Lab = Join-Path $env:TEMP 'Cairnkeep Windows Lab'

package/docs/learning/lessons/L23-guided-setup.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 **Status:** Ready
 **Track:** Quickstart and Operator
 **Time:** 35 minutes
-**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.3; Pi 0.84.1; Node.js 22, 24, and 26
+**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.5; Pi 0.84.1; Node.js 22, 24, and 26
 
 ## Outcome
 

package/docs/learning/lessons/L24-okf-exchange.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # L24 - Reviewed knowledge exchange
 
 **Status:** Ready
-**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.3 and Node.js 22 or newer
+**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.5 and Node.js 22 or newer
 **Time:** 35 minutes
 
 ## Outcome

package/docs/learning/lessons/L25-playbooks.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # L25 - Bounded workflow playbooks
 
 **Status:** Ready
-**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.3 and Node.js 22 or newer
+**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.5 and Node.js 22 or newer
 **Time:** 35 minutes
 
 ## Outcome

package/docs/learning/lessons/L26-context-intelligence.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # L26 - Context intelligence with explicit authority
 
 **Status:** Ready
-**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.3 and Node.js 22 or newer
+**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.5 and Node.js 22 or newer
 
 ## Outcome
 

package/docs/learning/lessons/L27-ecosystem-evidence.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # L27 - Evaluate context companions without moving authority
 
-**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.3 and Node.js 22 or newer
+**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.5 and Node.js 22 or newer
 
 ## Outcome
 

package/docs/learning/lessons/L28-security-assurance.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # L28 - Verify Cairnkeep's security posture
 
 **Status:** Ready
-**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.3 and Node.js 22 or newer
+**Tested with:** Cairnkeep 2.22.5 and Node.js 22 or newer
 
 ## Outcome
 
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ and choose least authority for a network-facing MCP client.
 
 ## Prerequisites
 
-- Install Cairnkeep 2.22.3 or use a disposable source checkout.
+- Install Cairnkeep 2.22.5 or use a disposable source checkout.
 - Complete [L20 - Least-authority MCP tool profiles](L20-mcp-tool-profiles.md).
 - Use synthetic values only; never paste a real bearer token into a recording,
   terminal transcript, or issue.
@@ -68,6 +68,16 @@ scripts/test-security-baseline.sh
 npm --prefix mcp-memory-server run check:security-assurance
 npm --prefix mcp-memory-server run check:http-guard
 node mcp-memory-server/scripts/smoke-context-pack-state.mjs
+node mcp-memory-server/scripts/smoke-note-signatures.mjs
+node mcp-memory-server/scripts/smoke-runtime-file-reads.mjs
+node mcp-memory-server/scripts/smoke-bounded-input-reads.mjs
+node mcp-memory-server/scripts/smoke-workspace-file-security.mjs
+node mcp-memory-server/scripts/smoke-outbound-security.mjs
+node scripts/test-runtime-file-security.mjs
+node scripts/test-omp-staged-security.mjs
+node scripts/test-container-health.mjs
+node mcp-memory-server/scripts/smoke-note-mcp.mjs --fixture-security-only
+node scripts/verify-phase19-runtime-evidence.mjs --self-test
 ```
 
 The baseline rejects unpinned external Actions, `pull_request_target` and
@@ -81,6 +91,15 @@ These are static contract checks, not a live publication test. The npm secret
 is a separate credential, and steps within one job share its token authority.
 Do not republish an immutable version to demonstrate the test.
 
+For post-publication evidence, run `node scripts/test-release-verification.mjs`
+and read [Repeatable post-publication verification](../../releasing.md#repeatable-post-publication-verification).
+The offline mutations reject mismatched trees/assets and failed signature or
+provenance decisions; they do not validate real signatures. The explicit live
+verifier checks the published artifacts with npm and the GitHub CLI and writes
+a new report only after success. Its report says `deployment_verified: false`:
+server backups, canaries and project doctors remain separate rollout evidence.
+Never publish or upgrade a service just to record this exercise.
+
 The smoke tests cover token non-disclosure, request bounds, and deterministic
 portable-path adversarial cases.
 
@@ -91,6 +110,57 @@ under bounded reads. A resolved review thread or green CodeQL job does not mean
 all historical alerts are fixed: inspect current findings and test the actual
 boundary without dismissing results merely to improve an advisory score.
 
+In a checkout containing the runtime-security follow-up, the signature control
+keeps existing v1 fingerprints byte-equivalent and isolates crafted path inputs
+behind a five-second child-process timeout. The runtime file-read control
+substitutes valid capability configuration, skill targets/ledgers/backups and
+work-evidence records after inspection. Readers reject those replacements,
+bound growth, reject special files without waiting for a writer and close their
+descriptors. Ordinary project configuration may remain `0644`; private evidence
+and approval ledgers still require private ownership/ACLs. Build the server
+before running source-checkout controls. The generated parser corpus is
+reproducible regression coverage, not integrated coverage-guided fuzzing.
+
+The bounded-input follow-up extends descriptor-bound reads to evaluation,
+OKF import/export, graph artifacts, private playbook receipts and derived
+progressive-context caches. Compare a replaced valid file with same-inode
+growth: rejecting oversized content after `readFile` has allocated it is not
+a bounded read. Note snapshots publish the bytes that were inspected and
+hashed, not a later reopened file. Unsafe derived caches can be rebuilt from
+immutable content; read-only doctor reports them without deletion. Cache
+rebuilding never changes project enablement or skill approval. This exercise
+does not certify directory-wide transactions against other same-account
+processes.
+
+The publication follow-up extends the exercise to setup, instruction files,
+evaluation overlays and native Windows managed writes. Inspect a concurrent
+caller edit: rechecking the observed target before publication must preserve
+it. A denied Windows replacement must retain the live database, not unlink it
+to retry. A substituted overlay symlink must leave its outside sentinel intact.
+Exclusive descriptor-written temporaries retain modes and clean only their own
+files. These are point-in-time safeguards, not all-project transactions or
+protection against another hostile process using your account. Native Windows
+and container/package verification remain required before shipping.
+
+The OMP control reads only synthetic staged candidates, never invokes a model,
+and shows that linked, growing or over-8-KiB content cannot become wakeup
+evidence or `/cairn-staged` output. It does not approve or persist a candidate.
+The outbound and health controls stub network calls: provider redirects and
+oversized bodies fail, private error sentinels never appear in diagnostics,
+and a malformed health port never becomes a network destination. Successful
+retrieval still sends a query to the explicitly configured external provider.
+AnythingLLM responses have an 8 MiB cap; OpenViking retains its 1 MiB cap and
+separate consent gates. Prefer HTTPS outside loopback.
+
+In a checkout with the developer-evidence follow-up, the focused note control
+shows that exclusive fixture creation preserves a competing file and that the
+actual note transaction rejects a substituted pre-image. Hashing is bounded
+at 64 MiB, including same-inode growth checks. The runtime-evidence self-test
+rejects changed or replaced log files under its existing 16 MiB cap. Developer
+snapshots and corrupt-database controls still compare exact bytes; static log
+labels cannot turn provider text into forged passing results. This does not
+make multi-file note publication atomic or prove an empty analysis backlog.
+
 ## Common failures
 
 - A private `.ai` file is group/world accessible on POSIX: restore mode `0600`.

package/docs/learning/tracks/operator.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Audience:** advanced users and platform maintainers
 **Prerequisite:** Practitioner track; L13 before operating captured evidence
-**Total time:** about 6 hours 45 minutes
+**Total time:** about 6 hours 45 minutes, plus optional evidence/security supplements
 
 1. [L09 - Domain knowledge with RAG](../lessons/L09-domain-knowledge.md)
 2. [L10 - Faster context exploration](../lessons/L10-context-exploration.md)
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
 11. [L24 - Reviewed knowledge exchange](../lessons/L24-okf-exchange.md)
 12. [L25 - Bounded workflow playbooks](../lessons/L25-playbooks.md)
 13. [L26 - Context intelligence with explicit authority](../lessons/L26-context-intelligence.md)
+14. [L27 - Evaluate ecosystem ideas with bounded evidence](../lessons/L27-ecosystem-evidence.md)
+15. [L28 - Verify Cairnkeep's security posture](../lessons/L28-security-assurance.md)
 
 All modules are optional. The track is complete when the operator can add and
 remove each integration without breaking the standalone local workflow and can
@@ -27,6 +29,9 @@ L24 adds portable exchange only after the immutable-pack and privacy boundaries
 are understood.
 L25 adds policy enforcement and the unauthenticated local actor boundary before
 any future team deployment.
+L27 separates protocol observations from measured task benefits. L28 adds
+deployment posture, adversarial source-checkout controls and exact-source
+release verification; a verified artifact is not a verified fleet rollout.
 
 Hands-on spine: `course-04-operation`, `course-06-governance`, and
 `course-07-evaluation`, `course-10-trust-context`, and

package/docs/learning/video-scripts/V28-security-assurance.md

@@ -3,6 +3,11 @@
 Target length: 10–12 minutes. Audience: experienced developers operating an
 agent-memory service locally or behind authenticated HTTP.
 
+The source-checkout security follow-up blocks below are optional supplemental
+clips, not part of the original 10–12-minute timing. Record them as a separate
+segment after their branch passes the complete release gates; do not present
+unreleased controls as installed-package behavior.
+
 ## Recording outline
 
 ### 0:00–1:20 — Threat model before tooling
@@ -69,6 +74,46 @@ rejection, bounded growth and cleanup; use no real private pointer/approval
 data. Distinguish resolved old review comments from current analysis findings,
 and do not imply a green CI run certifies an empty security backlog.
 
+For the runtime-security follow-up, show
+`node mcp-memory-server/scripts/smoke-note-signatures.mjs` and
+`node mcp-memory-server/scripts/smoke-runtime-file-reads.mjs` from a built source
+checkout. Explain that a tiny crafted path used to stall signature parsing,
+while the fixed parser preserves the existing v1 fixture fingerprints. The
+child-process timeout makes a regression fail instead of freezing the demo.
+Then show valid-file replacement rejection through capability, skill and
+work-evidence readers. Explain fixed byte bounds and descriptor cleanup, and
+distinguish private ledger permissions from ordinary project-file modes. Do not
+call the generated corpus coverage-guided fuzzing or claim that this patch
+resolves every historical analysis alert. Use only the synthetic fixtures.
+
+In a checkout with the bounded-input follow-up, run
+`node mcp-memory-server/scripts/smoke-bounded-input-reads.mjs`. Zoom into
+valid-file substitution and same-inode growth through evaluation, OKF, graph,
+receipt and cache entry points. Contrast a byte cap checked after allocation
+with a fixed descriptor-read allocation. Show that note snapshots publish the
+validated bytes and rejected derived cache data is rebuilt, while read-only
+doctor never deletes it. Explain that this does not enable a pack or approve a
+skill, make directory-wide publication transactional, or substitute for native
+Windows verification. Keep a pause between the failure and remediation.
+
+For the publication follow-up, show
+`node scripts/test-runtime-file-security.mjs` beside
+`node mcp-memory-server/scripts/smoke-workspace-file-security.mjs`. Pause on the
+concurrent caller edit and denied-replacement controls: the previous content
+must survive. Contrast a direct path write with an exclusive, flushed temporary
+file followed by publication. State that immediate parent/target checks are
+not directory-wide transactions or a same-account sandbox. Native Windows
+verification is still required; POSIX fixture execution is not proof of it.
+
+Run `node scripts/test-omp-staged-security.mjs` and explain the 8 KiB candidate
+bound, symlink exclusion and unchanged agent-review requirement. Then show
+`node mcp-memory-server/scripts/smoke-outbound-security.mjs` and
+`node scripts/test-container-health.mjs`: synthetic provider errors must stay
+out of diagnostics, redirects are refused, response bytes are bounded, and
+the health probe cannot turn an unvalidated port into an outside destination.
+These controls stub network calls; never show real credentials or imply that
+the exercise contacted a provider. Leave a reading pause after each result.
+
 Briefly open `.github/workflows/publish.yml` beside the permission table in
 `docs/releasing.md`. Contrast the read-only preparation job with the necessary
 npm and OCI publication grants. Explain that explicit maps deny unspecified
@@ -76,6 +121,26 @@ permissions, but steps in a job still share authority and the npm secret is
 separate. The baseline checks declared grants; do not present it as a successful
 live publish or rerun a release merely for this recording.
 
+In the release-verification supplement, run
+`node scripts/test-release-verification.mjs` using only the synthetic corpus.
+Show a mismatched tree, altered asset and failed provenance decision, then
+contrast offline policy coverage with the explicitly invoked live verifier in
+`docs/releasing.md`. Show only public artifact metadata from an already
+completed release, never tokens or raw diagnostics. Pause on
+`deployment_verified: false`: signed artifact evidence does not prove that a
+server was upgraded or its project routes still work. Do not publish or
+upgrade production for a demonstration.
+
+For the developer-evidence supplement, run
+`node mcp-memory-server/scripts/smoke-note-mcp.mjs --fixture-security-only` and
+`node scripts/verify-phase19-runtime-evidence.mjs --self-test` in a built source
+checkout. Pause on the competing-file preservation and actual transaction
+pre-image replacement controls. Explain that hashing uses one bounded inspected
+descriptor, not a pathname check followed by reopening. Contrast integrity of
+a read with atomicity of a multi-file transaction: this patch improves the
+former, not the latter. Use synthetic files and keep historical alert status
+separate from a green test result; record only after the release gates pass.
+
 ### 9:20–10:30 — Read the residual risks
 
 End on `docs/security-assurance.md`, not on a green checkmark. Call out the

package/docs/native-windows.md

@@ -125,6 +125,16 @@ access, or background synchronization.
 uses `sqlite3.exe` `.backup` for a consistent snapshot of each live WAL database
 and then writes the same portable `.tgz` format used on Unix.
 
+The archive/publication security follow-up binds compressed input to one
+descriptor with a 512 MiB cap; decompressed tar output is independently capped
+at 512 MiB. Managed writes use exclusive descriptor-written temporary files,
+flush them and recheck the immediate parent/target before publication. Sharing
+violations get bounded retries with at most 250 ms total backoff. A denied
+replacement never unlinks the live destination; its prior contents survive.
+These checks do not make a multi-database import transactional, and a post-write
+ACL failure is not a rollback. Keep the pre-import backup and diagnose the
+failure before retrying.
+
 ## Scheduling and process cleanup
 
 `cairn audit-timer` registers the opt-in `Cairnkeep Memory Audit` task through