@c9up/warden 0.2.5 → 0.2.7
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +74 -5
- package/dist/AccessToken.d.ts +257 -0
- package/dist/AccessToken.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/AccessToken.js +370 -0
- package/dist/AccessToken.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/AttemptStore.d.ts +16 -2
- package/dist/AttemptStore.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/AttemptStore.js +38 -12
- package/dist/AttemptStore.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/AuthManager.d.ts +44 -8
- package/dist/AuthManager.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/AuthManager.js +42 -11
- package/dist/AuthManager.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/AuthRateLimiter.d.ts +16 -3
- package/dist/AuthRateLimiter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/AuthRateLimiter.js +25 -6
- package/dist/AuthRateLimiter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/Authenticator.d.ts +98 -10
- package/dist/Authenticator.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/Authenticator.js +223 -19
- package/dist/Authenticator.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/Guard.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/Guard.js +17 -5
- package/dist/Guard.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/RedisBlacklistDriver.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/RedisBlacklistDriver.js +11 -0
- package/dist/RedisBlacklistDriver.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/RefreshTokenStore.d.ts +37 -6
- package/dist/RefreshTokenStore.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/RefreshTokenStore.js +51 -10
- package/dist/RefreshTokenStore.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/ResilientBlacklistDriver.d.ts +23 -6
- package/dist/ResilientBlacklistDriver.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/ResilientBlacklistDriver.js +26 -9
- package/dist/ResilientBlacklistDriver.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/TokenBlacklist.d.ts +3 -1
- package/dist/TokenBlacklist.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/TokenBlacklist.js +27 -1
- package/dist/TokenBlacklist.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/WardenProvider.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/WardenProvider.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/WardenProvider.js +4 -58
- package/dist/WardenProvider.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/authFinder.d.ts +58 -0
- package/dist/authFinder.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/authFinder.js +77 -0
- package/dist/authFinder.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/bearer.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/bearer.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/bearer.js +19 -0
- package/dist/bearer.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/bouncer/Bouncer.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/bouncer/Bouncer.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/bouncer/Bouncer.js +17 -4
- package/dist/bouncer/Bouncer.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/bouncer/PolicyAuthorizer.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/bouncer/PolicyAuthorizer.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/bouncer/PolicyAuthorizer.js +1 -1
- package/dist/bouncer/PolicyAuthorizer.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/bouncer/evaluate.d.ts +5 -1
- package/dist/bouncer/evaluate.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/bouncer/evaluate.js +7 -6
- package/dist/bouncer/evaluate.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/config.d.ts +8 -4
- package/dist/config.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/config.js +4 -1
- package/dist/config.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/errors.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/errors.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/errors.js +63 -2
- package/dist/errors.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +10 -6
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +6 -4
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/mfa/MfaManager.d.ts +33 -8
- package/dist/mfa/MfaManager.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/mfa/MfaManager.js +69 -20
- package/dist/mfa/MfaManager.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/mfa/TotpProvider.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/mfa/TotpProvider.js +8 -0
- package/dist/mfa/TotpProvider.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/mfa/WebauthnProvider.d.ts +22 -0
- package/dist/mfa/WebauthnProvider.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/mfa/WebauthnProvider.js +57 -12
- package/dist/mfa/WebauthnProvider.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/middleware.d.ts +13 -3
- package/dist/middleware.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/middleware.js +28 -6
- package/dist/middleware.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/native.d.ts +6 -2
- package/dist/native.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/native.js +19 -2
- package/dist/native.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/quasar.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/quasar.js +8 -1
- package/dist/quasar.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rights/RightsResolver.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/rights/RightsResolver.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rights/RightsResolver.js +23 -0
- package/dist/rights/RightsResolver.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/sanitize.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/sanitize.js +3 -1
- package/dist/sanitize.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/services/main.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/services/main.js +12 -2
- package/dist/services/main.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/standalone.d.ts +24 -3
- package/dist/standalone.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/standalone.js +22 -32
- package/dist/standalone.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/strategies/ApiKeyStrategy.d.ts +46 -12
- package/dist/strategies/ApiKeyStrategy.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/strategies/ApiKeyStrategy.js +76 -37
- package/dist/strategies/ApiKeyStrategy.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/strategies/BasicAuthStrategy.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/strategies/BasicAuthStrategy.js +5 -2
- package/dist/strategies/BasicAuthStrategy.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/strategies/JwtStrategy.d.ts +6 -2
- package/dist/strategies/JwtStrategy.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/strategies/JwtStrategy.js +58 -11
- package/dist/strategies/JwtStrategy.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/strategies/SessionStrategy.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/strategies/SessionStrategy.js +4 -1
- package/dist/strategies/SessionStrategy.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/templateTags.d.ts +42 -0
- package/dist/templateTags.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/templateTags.js +82 -0
- package/dist/templateTags.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vendor/nativeBinary.d.ts +26 -2
- package/dist/vendor/nativeBinary.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/vendor/nativeBinary.js +63 -6
- package/dist/vendor/nativeBinary.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/vendor/quasarConnection.d.ts +44 -3
- package/dist/vendor/quasarConnection.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/vendor/quasarConnection.js +64 -23
- package/dist/vendor/quasarConnection.js.map +1 -1
- package/index.darwin-arm64.node +0 -0
- package/index.darwin-x64.node +0 -0
- package/index.linux-arm64-gnu.node +0 -0
- package/index.linux-x64-gnu.node +0 -0
- package/index.win32-x64-msvc.node +0 -0
- package/package.json +9 -5
- package/src/AccessToken.ts +550 -0
- package/src/AttemptStore.ts +42 -13
- package/src/AuthManager.ts +75 -18
- package/src/AuthRateLimiter.ts +24 -8
- package/src/Authenticator.ts +282 -22
- package/src/Guard.ts +18 -5
- package/src/RedisBlacklistDriver.ts +11 -0
- package/src/RefreshTokenStore.ts +79 -13
- package/src/ResilientBlacklistDriver.ts +30 -9
- package/src/TokenBlacklist.ts +28 -1
- package/src/WardenProvider.ts +6 -83
- package/src/authFinder.ts +118 -0
- package/src/bearer.ts +16 -0
- package/src/bouncer/Bouncer.ts +21 -6
- package/src/bouncer/PolicyAuthorizer.ts +1 -1
- package/src/bouncer/evaluate.ts +7 -10
- package/src/config.ts +8 -4
- package/src/errors.ts +80 -2
- package/src/index.ts +29 -0
- package/src/mfa/MfaManager.ts +98 -22
- package/src/mfa/TotpProvider.ts +15 -2
- package/src/mfa/WebauthnProvider.ts +77 -13
- package/src/middleware.ts +52 -8
- package/src/native.ts +20 -4
- package/src/quasar.ts +13 -2
- package/src/rights/RightsResolver.ts +27 -0
- package/src/sanitize.ts +4 -2
- package/src/services/main.ts +14 -2
- package/src/standalone.ts +75 -37
- package/src/strategies/ApiKeyStrategy.ts +117 -42
- package/src/strategies/BasicAuthStrategy.ts +7 -2
- package/src/strategies/JwtStrategy.ts +61 -10
- package/src/strategies/SessionStrategy.ts +4 -1
- package/src/templateTags.ts +117 -0
- package/src/vendor/nativeBinary.ts +82 -6
- package/src/vendor/quasarConnection.ts +105 -22
- package/stubs/config/auth.stub +3 -0
- package/scripts/build-napi-types.mjs +0 -69
- package/scripts/copy-napi.mjs +0 -75
- package/scripts/generate-napi-types.mjs +0 -156
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@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ export class PolicyAuthorizer {
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return !(await this.execute(action, ...args)).authorized;
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}
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/** Resolves on allow; throws `
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/** Resolves on allow; throws `E_AUTHORIZATION_FAILURE` on deny (D2). */
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async authorize(action: string, ...args: unknown[]): Promise<void> {
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const response = await this.execute(action, ...args);
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if (!response.authorized) {
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package/src/bouncer/evaluate.ts
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*/
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import type { UserPayload } from "../AuthManager.js";
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import {
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import { E_AUTHORIZATION_FAILURE } from "../errors.js";
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import { AuthorizationResponse } from "./AuthorizationResponse.js";
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import type { AuthorizerResponse, HookResponse } from "./types.js";
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return typeof value === "function";
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}
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/**
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/**
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* Throw the canonical authorization failure for a denied response (D2) —
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* `E_AUTHORIZATION_FAILURE`, carrying the response so its status, message and
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* translation reach whoever handles the error.
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*/
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export function throwAuthorizationFailure(
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response: AuthorizationResponse,
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): never {
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throw new
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"AUTHORIZATION_FAILURE",
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response.message ?? "Authorization failed",
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{
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hint: "The current user is not authorized for this action.",
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status: response.status ?? 403,
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},
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);
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throw new E_AUTHORIZATION_FAILURE(response);
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}
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/** Run the D5 evaluation pipeline and resolve to the final response. */
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package/src/config.ts
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return new SessionStrategy(config);
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}
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/**
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/**
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* Build an access-tokens guard from its config (AdonisJS `tokensGuard()`
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* shape): `apiKeyGuard({ tokens: new AccessTokensProvider({ store }), findUser })`.
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*/
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export function apiKeyGuard(config: ApiKeyConfig): GuardFactory {
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*/
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session?: SessionStrategyConfig;
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/**
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*
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*
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*
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* Access-tokens strategy configuration: a `tokens` provider (hashed,
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* prefixed, expiring tokens with abilities) and `findUser`. Registered as
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* `access_tokens` and `api-key`; without it, `@Guard('access_tokens')`
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* throws.
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apiKey?: ApiKeyConfig;
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/**
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// `E_INVALID_CREDENTIALS`, bouncer's `E_AUTHORIZATION_FAILURE`) are
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// PRESERVED verbatim — they already start
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}
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*/
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interface Translator {
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t(
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data?: Record<string, unknown>,
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): string;
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}
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? translated
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}
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* `E_AUTHORIZATION_FAILURE` — thrown by a denied `authorize()` (AdonisJS
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export class E_AUTHORIZATION_FAILURE extends WardenError {
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/** The i18n key looked up when the response sets no translation. */
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/** The denial this error was thrown for. */
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constructor(response: AuthorizationResponse) {
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super("E_AUTHORIZATION_FAILURE", response.message || "Access denied", {
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hint: "The current user is not authorized for this action.",
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status: response.status || 403,
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}
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/**
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* The message to send for this denial (AdonisJS `getResponseMessage`): the
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* message otherwise. The translation falls back to the static identifier,
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}
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package/src/index.ts
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import "./augmentations.js";
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export type {
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AccessTokenAttributes,
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AccessTokenStore,
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AccessTokensProviderContract,
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AccessTokensProviderOptions,
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CreateAccessTokenOptions,
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StoredAccessToken,
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TokenOwner,
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} from "./AccessToken.js";
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export {
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AccessToken,
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AccessTokensProvider,
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crc32,
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MemoryAccessTokenStore,
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} from "./AccessToken.js";
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+
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|
export type {
|
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AttemptCount,
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AttemptRedisClient,
|
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|
|
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40
|
AuthConfig,
|
|
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41
|
AuthResult,
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|
AuthStrategy,
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CurrentAccessToken,
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|
UserPayload,
|
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|
} from "./AuthManager.js";
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export {
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AuthManager,
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authEventPrefix,
|
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+
tokenAllows,
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type WardenEmitter,
|
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51
|
} from "./AuthManager.js";
|
|
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52
|
export type {
|
|
@@ -36,6 +54,12 @@ export type {
|
|
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54
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AuthRateLimiterConfig,
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} from "./AuthRateLimiter.js";
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|
export { AuthRateLimiter } from "./AuthRateLimiter.js";
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+
export type {
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AuthFinder,
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AuthFinderHasher,
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AuthFinderOptions,
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} from "./authFinder.js";
|
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|
+
export { authFinder } from "./authFinder.js";
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|
export { AbilitiesBuilder } from "./bouncer/AbilitiesBuilder.js";
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|
export { AuthorizationResponse } from "./bouncer/AuthorizationResponse.js";
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65
|
export { BasePolicy } from "./bouncer/BasePolicy.js";
|
|
@@ -69,6 +93,7 @@ export { configure } from "./configure.js";
|
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69
93
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export type { TokenDuration } from "./duration.js";
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70
94
|
export { parseDurationSeconds } from "./duration.js";
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|
export {
|
|
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|
+
E_AUTHORIZATION_FAILURE,
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72
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|
E_INVALID_CREDENTIALS,
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E_UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS,
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WardenError,
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@@ -134,6 +159,7 @@ export type {
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export {
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MemoryWebauthnChallengeStore,
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MemoryWebauthnCredentialStore,
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WebauthnProvider,
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} from "./mfa/WebauthnProvider.js";
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export { quasarConnection } from "./quasar.js";
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|
@@ -143,12 +169,15 @@ export type {
|
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} from "./RedisBlacklistDriver.js";
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export { RedisBlacklistDriver } from "./RedisBlacklistDriver.js";
|
|
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|
export type {
|
|
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|
+
MintedRefreshToken,
|
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RefreshTokenDriver,
|
|
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|
StoredRefreshToken,
|
|
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|
} from "./RefreshTokenStore.js";
|
|
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|
export {
|
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generateRefreshToken,
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hashRefreshToken,
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|
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mintRefreshToken,
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} from "./RefreshTokenStore.js";
|
|
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|
export {
|
|
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|
DEFAULT_SECRET_LENGTH,
|
package/src/mfa/MfaManager.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -106,7 +106,11 @@ export interface MfaManagerConfig {
|
|
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106
106
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totp?: TotpProvider;
|
|
107
107
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backupCodes?: BackupCodesProvider;
|
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|
store?: MfaFactorStore;
|
|
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|
-
/**
|
|
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|
+
/**
|
|
110
|
+
* Per-user brute-force protection on `verify()`, `verifyTotp()`,
|
|
111
|
+
* `verifyBackupCode()` and `confirmTotp()`, one shared count. Defaults to
|
|
112
|
+
* 5 / 15 min.
|
|
113
|
+
*/
|
|
110
114
|
rateLimit?: MfaRateLimitConfig;
|
|
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115
|
}
|
|
112
116
|
|
|
@@ -157,10 +161,26 @@ export class MfaManager {
|
|
|
157
161
|
return { factorId: factor.id, secret, uri };
|
|
158
162
|
}
|
|
159
163
|
|
|
160
|
-
/**
|
|
161
|
-
|
|
164
|
+
/**
|
|
165
|
+
* Confirm a pending TOTP factor of `userId` by verifying a first code.
|
|
166
|
+
*
|
|
167
|
+
* Takes the owner beside the factor id and refuses a factor that belongs
|
|
168
|
+
* to someone else: a factor id is something an application passes through
|
|
169
|
+
* a request, and one leaked through a log or a support tool must not let
|
|
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|
+
* another account act on it. The attempt counts against the same lockout
|
|
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|
+
* as {@link verify}, so the first code cannot be guessed without limit.
|
|
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|
+
*/
|
|
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|
+
async confirmTotp(
|
|
174
|
+
userId: string,
|
|
175
|
+
factorId: string,
|
|
176
|
+
code: string,
|
|
177
|
+
): Promise<boolean> {
|
|
162
178
|
const totp = this.#requireTotp();
|
|
163
|
-
const
|
|
179
|
+
const key = lockoutKey(userId);
|
|
180
|
+
if (!(await this.#limiter.attempt(key)).allowed) {
|
|
181
|
+
return false;
|
|
182
|
+
}
|
|
183
|
+
const factor = await this.#ownedFactor(userId, factorId);
|
|
164
184
|
if (factor?.kind !== "totp" || !factor.secret) {
|
|
165
185
|
return false;
|
|
166
186
|
}
|
|
@@ -168,12 +188,27 @@ export class MfaManager {
|
|
|
168
188
|
return false;
|
|
169
189
|
}
|
|
170
190
|
await this.#store.save({ ...factor, confirmedAt: Date.now() });
|
|
191
|
+
await this.#limiter.clear(key);
|
|
171
192
|
return true;
|
|
172
193
|
}
|
|
173
194
|
|
|
174
|
-
/**
|
|
195
|
+
/**
|
|
196
|
+
* Verify a TOTP code against the user's confirmed authenticator factors.
|
|
197
|
+
*
|
|
198
|
+
* Counts against the same per-user lockout as {@link verify}: an app
|
|
199
|
+
* calling this directly (to tell the factors apart in its UI) must not get
|
|
200
|
+
* unlimited guesses at a six-digit code.
|
|
201
|
+
*/
|
|
175
202
|
async verifyTotp(userId: string, code: string): Promise<boolean> {
|
|
176
203
|
const totp = this.#requireTotp();
|
|
204
|
+
return this.#limited(userId, () => this.#checkTotp(totp, userId, code));
|
|
205
|
+
}
|
|
206
|
+
|
|
207
|
+
async #checkTotp(
|
|
208
|
+
totp: TotpProvider,
|
|
209
|
+
userId: string,
|
|
210
|
+
code: string,
|
|
211
|
+
): Promise<boolean> {
|
|
177
212
|
const factors = await this.#store.findByUser(userId);
|
|
178
213
|
// Sequential, not Promise.all: the replay guard must see one accepted
|
|
179
214
|
// code at a time, and stopping at the first match avoids burning the
|
|
@@ -220,9 +255,22 @@ export class MfaManager {
|
|
|
220
255
|
return codes;
|
|
221
256
|
}
|
|
222
257
|
|
|
223
|
-
/**
|
|
258
|
+
/**
|
|
259
|
+
* Verify and consume one backup code for the user. Counts against the same
|
|
260
|
+
* per-user lockout as {@link verify}.
|
|
261
|
+
*/
|
|
224
262
|
async verifyBackupCode(userId: string, code: string): Promise<boolean> {
|
|
225
263
|
const provider = this.#requireBackupCodes();
|
|
264
|
+
return this.#limited(userId, () =>
|
|
265
|
+
this.#checkBackupCode(provider, userId, code),
|
|
266
|
+
);
|
|
267
|
+
}
|
|
268
|
+
|
|
269
|
+
async #checkBackupCode(
|
|
270
|
+
provider: BackupCodesProvider,
|
|
271
|
+
userId: string,
|
|
272
|
+
code: string,
|
|
273
|
+
): Promise<boolean> {
|
|
226
274
|
const factors = await this.#store.findByUser(userId);
|
|
227
275
|
for (const factor of factors) {
|
|
228
276
|
if (factor.kind !== "backup_codes" || !factor.backupHashes) {
|
|
@@ -248,28 +296,40 @@ export class MfaManager {
|
|
|
248
296
|
* factors first, then falls back to consuming a backup code.
|
|
249
297
|
*/
|
|
250
298
|
async verify(userId: string, code: string): Promise<boolean> {
|
|
251
|
-
//
|
|
252
|
-
|
|
253
|
-
|
|
299
|
+
// One attempt for the code, whichever factor ends up answering it.
|
|
300
|
+
return this.#limited(userId, async () => {
|
|
301
|
+
const totp = this.#totp;
|
|
302
|
+
if (totp && (await this.#checkTotp(totp, userId, code))) return true;
|
|
303
|
+
const backupCodes = this.#backupCodes;
|
|
304
|
+
return (
|
|
305
|
+
backupCodes !== undefined &&
|
|
306
|
+
(await this.#checkBackupCode(backupCodes, userId, code))
|
|
307
|
+
);
|
|
308
|
+
});
|
|
309
|
+
}
|
|
310
|
+
|
|
311
|
+
/**
|
|
312
|
+
* Run one code check under the per-user lockout.
|
|
313
|
+
*
|
|
314
|
+
* Counted BEFORE the code is checked, by one atomic increment: reading
|
|
315
|
+
* "not locked" first and counting the failure after let a burst of
|
|
316
|
+
* concurrent attempts all reach the providers. A success clears the count.
|
|
317
|
+
*/
|
|
318
|
+
async #limited(
|
|
319
|
+
userId: string,
|
|
320
|
+
check: () => Promise<boolean>,
|
|
321
|
+
): Promise<boolean> {
|
|
254
322
|
const key = lockoutKey(userId);
|
|
255
323
|
if (!(await this.#limiter.attempt(key)).allowed) {
|
|
256
324
|
return false;
|
|
257
325
|
}
|
|
258
|
-
|
|
259
|
-
if (this.#totp && (await this.verifyTotp(userId, code))) {
|
|
260
|
-
ok = true;
|
|
261
|
-
} else if (
|
|
262
|
-
this.#backupCodes &&
|
|
263
|
-
(await this.verifyBackupCode(userId, code))
|
|
264
|
-
) {
|
|
265
|
-
ok = true;
|
|
266
|
-
}
|
|
326
|
+
const ok = await check();
|
|
267
327
|
if (ok) await this.#limiter.clear(key);
|
|
268
328
|
return ok;
|
|
269
329
|
}
|
|
270
330
|
|
|
271
331
|
/**
|
|
272
|
-
* Whether the user is currently locked out of
|
|
332
|
+
* Whether the user is currently locked out of the code checks after too many
|
|
273
333
|
* failed attempts. Use it to surface a "try again later" message.
|
|
274
334
|
*/
|
|
275
335
|
isLocked(userId: string): Promise<boolean> {
|
|
@@ -293,9 +353,25 @@ export class MfaManager {
|
|
|
293
353
|
return factors.some((f) => f.confirmedAt !== undefined);
|
|
294
354
|
}
|
|
295
355
|
|
|
296
|
-
/**
|
|
297
|
-
|
|
298
|
-
|
|
356
|
+
/**
|
|
357
|
+
* Remove one of `userId`'s factors (e.g. the user disables their
|
|
358
|
+
* authenticator). Answers whether a factor was removed: `false` for an
|
|
359
|
+
* unknown id or one owned by another user, which is left in place.
|
|
360
|
+
*/
|
|
361
|
+
async disableFactor(userId: string, factorId: string): Promise<boolean> {
|
|
362
|
+
const factor = await this.#ownedFactor(userId, factorId);
|
|
363
|
+
if (factor === null) return false;
|
|
364
|
+
await this.#store.delete(factor.id);
|
|
365
|
+
return true;
|
|
366
|
+
}
|
|
367
|
+
|
|
368
|
+
/** The factor, only when it belongs to `userId`. */
|
|
369
|
+
async #ownedFactor(
|
|
370
|
+
userId: string,
|
|
371
|
+
factorId: string,
|
|
372
|
+
): Promise<MfaFactor | null> {
|
|
373
|
+
const factor = await this.#store.findById(factorId);
|
|
374
|
+
return factor !== null && factor.userId === userId ? factor : null;
|
|
299
375
|
}
|
|
300
376
|
|
|
301
377
|
#requireTotp(): TotpProvider {
|
package/src/mfa/TotpProvider.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
|
|
|
9
9
|
|
|
10
10
|
import { createHmac, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
|
|
11
11
|
import { WardenError } from "../errors.js";
|
|
12
|
+
import { hasEnded } from "../vendor/quasarConnection.js";
|
|
12
13
|
import { base32Decode, base32Encode } from "./base32.js";
|
|
13
14
|
|
|
14
15
|
export type TotpAlgorithm = "SHA1" | "SHA256" | "SHA512";
|
|
@@ -124,6 +125,13 @@ export class RedisTotpReplayGuard implements TotpReplayGuard {
|
|
|
124
125
|
}
|
|
125
126
|
|
|
126
127
|
async claim(key: string, ttlMs: number): Promise<boolean> {
|
|
128
|
+
// Resolved again once the client has ended for good: quasar retires
|
|
129
|
+
// a connection whose retry strategy gave up and hands out a fresh one,
|
|
130
|
+
// and keeping the dead client refused every code until restart. A
|
|
131
|
+
// client handed in directly is kept whatever its state.
|
|
132
|
+
if (typeof this.#source === "function" && hasEnded(this.#resolved)) {
|
|
133
|
+
this.#resolved = undefined;
|
|
134
|
+
}
|
|
127
135
|
if (this.#resolved === undefined) {
|
|
128
136
|
this.#resolved =
|
|
129
137
|
typeof this.#source === "function"
|
|
@@ -149,8 +157,13 @@ export interface TotpEnrollment {
|
|
|
149
157
|
uri: string;
|
|
150
158
|
}
|
|
151
159
|
|
|
152
|
-
const DEFAULTS
|
|
153
|
-
algorithm:
|
|
160
|
+
const DEFAULTS: {
|
|
161
|
+
algorithm: TotpAlgorithm;
|
|
162
|
+
digits: number;
|
|
163
|
+
period: number;
|
|
164
|
+
window: number;
|
|
165
|
+
} = {
|
|
166
|
+
algorithm: "SHA1",
|
|
154
167
|
digits: 6,
|
|
155
168
|
period: 30,
|
|
156
169
|
window: 1,
|
|
@@ -117,6 +117,24 @@ export interface WebauthnChallengeStore {
|
|
|
117
117
|
take(state: string): Promise<WebauthnCeremony | null>;
|
|
118
118
|
}
|
|
119
119
|
|
|
120
|
+
/**
|
|
121
|
+
* Thrown by `WebauthnCredentialStore.save` when the credential id is already
|
|
122
|
+
* registered. `finishRegistration` turns it into `{ verified: false }`; any
|
|
123
|
+
* other error from the store is an outage and propagates.
|
|
124
|
+
*/
|
|
125
|
+
export class WebauthnCredentialExistsError extends WardenError {
|
|
126
|
+
constructor(credentialId: string) {
|
|
127
|
+
super(
|
|
128
|
+
"E_WARDEN_WEBAUTHN_CREDENTIAL_EXISTS",
|
|
129
|
+
`The WebAuthn credential "${credentialId}" is already registered.`,
|
|
130
|
+
{
|
|
131
|
+
hint: "A credential id belongs to the account that registered it first. Keep it unique in the store (INSERT, never upsert).",
|
|
132
|
+
},
|
|
133
|
+
);
|
|
134
|
+
this.name = "WebauthnCredentialExistsError";
|
|
135
|
+
}
|
|
136
|
+
}
|
|
137
|
+
|
|
120
138
|
/** A registered passkey, persisted between ceremonies. */
|
|
121
139
|
export interface StoredPasskey {
|
|
122
140
|
/** Base64URL credential id. */
|
|
@@ -131,6 +149,19 @@ export interface StoredPasskey {
|
|
|
131
149
|
}
|
|
132
150
|
|
|
133
151
|
export interface WebauthnCredentialStore {
|
|
152
|
+
/**
|
|
153
|
+
* Persist a NEW passkey. This is an INSERT, never an upsert.
|
|
154
|
+
*
|
|
155
|
+
* The credential id comes from authenticator data the client chose
|
|
156
|
+
* (attestation is `none`), and a victim's ids are listed to anyone who
|
|
157
|
+
* starts an authentication ceremony for them. A store that replaced an
|
|
158
|
+
* existing row let an attacker register their own key under the victim's
|
|
159
|
+
* id and take the passkey over. `finishRegistration` checks `findById`
|
|
160
|
+
* first; the store closes the race between that check and this write: a
|
|
161
|
+
* persistent store keeps `id` unique (primary key / unique index, Redis
|
|
162
|
+
* `SET … NX`) and throws `WebauthnCredentialExistsError` when the id is
|
|
163
|
+
* already taken, so a concurrent registration of the same id fails.
|
|
164
|
+
*/
|
|
134
165
|
save(passkey: StoredPasskey): Promise<void>;
|
|
135
166
|
findById(id: string): Promise<StoredPasskey | null>;
|
|
136
167
|
findByUser(userId: string): Promise<StoredPasskey[]>;
|
|
@@ -277,6 +308,11 @@ export class MemoryWebauthnChallengeStore implements WebauthnChallengeStore {
|
|
|
277
308
|
export class MemoryWebauthnCredentialStore implements WebauthnCredentialStore {
|
|
278
309
|
#store = new Map<string, StoredPasskey>();
|
|
279
310
|
async save(passkey: StoredPasskey): Promise<void> {
|
|
311
|
+
// Check and write with no `await` between them: atomic on a
|
|
312
|
+
// single-threaded runtime, so two registrations of one id cannot both land.
|
|
313
|
+
if (this.#store.has(passkey.id)) {
|
|
314
|
+
throw new WebauthnCredentialExistsError(passkey.id);
|
|
315
|
+
}
|
|
280
316
|
this.#store.set(passkey.id, passkey);
|
|
281
317
|
}
|
|
282
318
|
async findById(id: string): Promise<StoredPasskey | null> {
|
|
@@ -494,14 +530,31 @@ export class WebauthnProvider {
|
|
|
494
530
|
if (parsed === null || !this.#algorithms.includes(parsed.alg)) {
|
|
495
531
|
return { verified: false };
|
|
496
532
|
}
|
|
497
|
-
|
|
498
|
-
|
|
499
|
-
|
|
500
|
-
|
|
501
|
-
|
|
502
|
-
|
|
503
|
-
|
|
504
|
-
}
|
|
533
|
+
// WebAuthn L2 7.1 step 22: a credential id already registered, for ANY
|
|
534
|
+
// user, fails the ceremony. The id is client-chosen; replacing the row
|
|
535
|
+
// handed the victim's passkey to whoever sent it, and re-registering
|
|
536
|
+
// one's own id reset the counter that betrays a cloned authenticator.
|
|
537
|
+
const id = bufferToBase64url(parsed.credentialId);
|
|
538
|
+
if ((await this.#credentials.findById(id)) !== null) {
|
|
539
|
+
return { verified: false };
|
|
540
|
+
}
|
|
541
|
+
try {
|
|
542
|
+
await this.#credentials.save({
|
|
543
|
+
id,
|
|
544
|
+
userId,
|
|
545
|
+
publicKey: bufferToBase64url(parsed.publicKeyBytes),
|
|
546
|
+
alg: parsed.alg,
|
|
547
|
+
counter: parsed.signCount,
|
|
548
|
+
transports: response.response.transports,
|
|
549
|
+
});
|
|
550
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
551
|
+
// A concurrent registration took the id between the check and the
|
|
552
|
+
// insert. Any other store failure is infrastructure and propagates.
|
|
553
|
+
if (error instanceof WebauthnCredentialExistsError) {
|
|
554
|
+
return { verified: false };
|
|
555
|
+
}
|
|
556
|
+
throw error;
|
|
557
|
+
}
|
|
505
558
|
return { verified: true };
|
|
506
559
|
}
|
|
507
560
|
|
|
@@ -640,17 +693,28 @@ export class WebauthnProvider {
|
|
|
640
693
|
expectedType: "webauthn.create" | "webauthn.get",
|
|
641
694
|
expectedChallenge: string,
|
|
642
695
|
): boolean {
|
|
643
|
-
let parsed:
|
|
696
|
+
let parsed: unknown;
|
|
644
697
|
try {
|
|
645
698
|
parsed = JSON.parse(base64urlToBuffer(clientDataB64).toString("utf8"));
|
|
646
699
|
} catch {
|
|
647
700
|
return false;
|
|
648
701
|
}
|
|
702
|
+
// Attacker-supplied: `null`, an array or a scalar parse fine and are not
|
|
703
|
+
// client data. Reading a field off `null` threw a TypeError that escaped
|
|
704
|
+
// the ceremony as a 500 instead of a plain refusal.
|
|
705
|
+
if (
|
|
706
|
+
typeof parsed !== "object" ||
|
|
707
|
+
parsed === null ||
|
|
708
|
+
Array.isArray(parsed)
|
|
709
|
+
) {
|
|
710
|
+
return false;
|
|
711
|
+
}
|
|
712
|
+
const origin: unknown = Reflect.get(parsed, "origin");
|
|
649
713
|
return (
|
|
650
|
-
parsed
|
|
651
|
-
parsed
|
|
652
|
-
typeof
|
|
653
|
-
this.#origins.includes(
|
|
714
|
+
Reflect.get(parsed, "type") === expectedType &&
|
|
715
|
+
Reflect.get(parsed, "challenge") === expectedChallenge &&
|
|
716
|
+
typeof origin === "string" &&
|
|
717
|
+
this.#origins.includes(origin)
|
|
654
718
|
);
|
|
655
719
|
}
|
|
656
720
|
|