@byollm/server 0.1.0-alpha.4 → 0.1.0-alpha.40

package/README.md

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 > [!WARNING]
-> **Alpha (`0.1.0-alpha.4`) — under active development. Don't use this yet.**
+> **Alpha (`0.1.0-alpha.40`) — under active development. Don't use this yet.**
 >
 > Install it deliberately: `npm install @byollm/server@alpha`.
 >
@@ -11,9 +11,82 @@
 > npm assigns `latest` on a first publish and won't let it be removed, so a
 > bare install resolves here too. This notice is the only guard — deliberately
 > not an npm deprecation, which would read as *abandoned* rather than *early*.
-> Ask for `@alpha` explicitly so your lockfile records that you meant to.
+> Ask for `@alpha` explicitly so your lockfile records that you meant to.>
+> **`alpha.15` is a breaking wire change, and it breaks daemons and relays —
+> not app authors.** If you call `app.enqueue(...)` and read results, nothing
+> in your code changes. If you run a daemon or an upstream, every package must
+> move together: a mixed pair refuses on both sides, because both ends parse
+> `.strict()`.
 >
-> **`alpha.4` breaks every integration.** Three things changed for you:
+> What moved, all of it reconciling the frozen `byollm_009` with its code:
+> `JobStub` gains `site` (the site's identity key id) and loses
+> `audienceAllow`; `ResultRequest` gains `leaseId`; `HeartbeatResponse` loses
+> `leases`, which nothing read; `WireErrorCode` gains `not-ready`,
+> `clock-skew` and `forbidden`, and `403` is `forbidden` rather than
+> `unauthorized`. `RESULT_PROVENANCE` is superseded by
+> `PROVENANCE_NAMES_DEVICE`. See `byollm_009` Amendment A.>
+> **`alpha.16` is a breaking wire change — daemons and relays again, not app
+> authors.** `app.enqueue(...)` and reading results are unchanged. All five
+> packages move together: both ends parse `.strict()`, so a mixed pair
+> refuses.
+>
+> What moved, all of it Tier 2 of `cloud_008`: `model`, `backendClass` and
+> `durationMs` come off `ResultRequest` and are sealed **inside** the result
+> envelope as `SealedOutcome = { outcome, ran }` — so a daemon can no longer
+> declare a model it did not sign, and a relay carries neither.
+> `HeartbeatResponse` loses `leases` (nothing read it) and now reports real
+> cancellations instead of an empty list. `WireErrorCode` gains `forbidden`
+> for 403, leaving `unauthorized` at exactly 401. The relay gained a
+> site-plane `cancel` endpoint, honours `stub.deadlineAt`, honours
+> `stub.audience`, and remembers a refusal.>
+> **`alpha.17` is additive** — no wire change. It exports `ReleaseReason`,
+> which `RoutingStore.releaseLeases` names and the package did not export, so
+> the interface was unimplementable outside this repo.>
+> **`alpha.18` is a breaking wire change — daemons and relays, not app
+> authors.** `app.enqueue(...)` and reading results are unchanged. All five
+> packages move together.
+>
+> The **bearer token is gone**: off `PairPollResponse`, off the runner row,
+> off the daemon's pairings file, out of the adapter's schema. It was minted,
+> hashed and stored on two disks and never sent, looked up or compared —
+> `REQUESTS_SIGNED_NOT_BEARER` was enforced by signatures the whole time. If
+> you run the Supabase adapter, apply
+> `20260819000000_drop_runner_token.sql`; `byollm_approve_pairing` now takes
+> one argument. A pairings file written by an older daemon still loads.
+>
+> `model`, `backendClass` and `durationMs` moved **inside** the sealed result
+> (`SealedOutcome = { outcome, ran }`), so a daemon cannot declare a model it
+> did not sign and a relay carries none of them. Writing a `RoutingStore`?
+> `releaseLeases` takes an optional `reason` and `complete` requires
+> `leaseId`, and **an implementation that ignores either still typechecks** —
+> run the store contract tests.>
+> **`alpha.19` is additive on the wire and a behaviour change in every
+> store.** `ResultResponse` gains an optional `duplicate`. Nothing is removed,
+> so an older daemon keeps working — but the *order* two rules are checked in
+> has changed, and a `RoutingStore` implementation must change with it.
+>
+> `complete` now checks **terminal state before holder**, scoped to the device
+> that finished the job: a replay from that device is answered `duplicate:
+> true` with a 2xx, and anyone else gets exactly the refusal they would get
+> for a job that is not terminal. Previously `RESULT_IDEMPOTENT` held only
+> because the lease is nulled on success, so the holder check tripped first —
+> deleting the idempotency branch failed no test. Run the store contract
+> tests; the compiler cannot see this.
+>
+> **`alpha.7` breaks nobody who is not implementing a relay.** `@byollm/relay`'s
+> projection gains `devices` — the device keys a control plane has approved —
+> and the relay refuses to pair a device that is not in it. `revoked` becomes
+> `{owner, siteId}` instead of a composite string. Sites, daemons, stores and
+> the wire format are all untouched; no runner re-pairs.
+>
+> **`alpha.5` broke store adapters, and nothing else.** If you implement
+> `JobStore` yourself, two changes are required: a new `adopt(args)` method
+> (record a lease granted by an upstream this store does not own), and
+> `CompleteArgs.runnerId` is replaced by `holder` — a discriminated union
+> naming either a runner or a lease. Apps, daemons and the wire format are
+> unaffected; `@byollm/conformance` will tell you if you missed one.
+>
+> **`alpha.4` broke every integration.** Three things changed for you:
 >
 > 1. **`siteKeys` is required.** Run `npx @byollm/server@alpha keygen` once,
 >    set `BYOLLM_SITE_KEYS`, and pass it to `ByollmApp` and `createHandler`.
@@ -26,6 +99,31 @@
 > Your store adapter is unaffected: payloads and results are sealed before they
 > reach it, and `JobStore` did not change.
 
+<!-- release-note 0.1.0-alpha.21 -->
+> [!NOTE]
+> **`0.1.0-alpha.20` is not a complete release — do not pin it.** Four
+> packages published and `@byollm/server` did not: a Sigstore
+> transparency-log 409 on its provenance attestation. The workflow's
+> "already published" guard correctly refuses to resume a partial publish,
+> so `0.1.0-alpha.40` is that release, whole.
+>
+> If you run the Supabase adapter, `alpha.21` needs
+> `20260819010000_completed_by_lease_id.sql`: alpha.19 shipped §3.6's
+> ordering without the column it stores the grant in.
+
+<!-- release-note 0.1.0-alpha.40 -->
+**`byollm install` — stop keeping a terminal open.** The daemon can now run
+under your machine's own supervisor and restart itself if it stops: a launchd
+agent on macOS, a `systemd --user` unit on Linux, a logon task on Windows. All
+user-level — no root, no system directories, and `byollm uninstall` takes it
+away. `byollm status` gained a line saying whether it is actually supervised
+right now, including the state that matters most: installed but not running,
+which looks fine from an app's dashboard and serves nothing.
+
+If you are running via `npx`, install properly first (`npm install -g
+byollm@alpha`) — `install` refuses to supervise a copy in npx's cache, because
+npm deletes that directory and the service would fail at some later boot.
+
 # `@byollm/server`
 
 What app developers drop into their backend: framework-agnostic protocol

package/dist/{chunk-MGJX6626.js → chunk-K5E6JS5A.js}

@@ -9,9 +9,6 @@ var USER_CODE_ALPHABET = "ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRTWXYZ2346789";
 function generateDeviceCode() {
   return randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
 }
-function generateRunnerToken() {
-  return randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
-}
 function generateRunnerId() {
   return `runner_${randomUUID()}`;
 }
@@ -43,13 +40,11 @@ var generateLeaseId = () => randomUUID();
 
 // src/handlers.ts
 import {
-  ENVELOPE_MAX_AGE_MS,
   FetchRequest,
-  seal,
-  JobOutcome,
-  keyId,
-  open,
-  publicIdentityOf,
+  SealedOutcome,
+  keyId as keyId2,
+  open as open2,
+  publicIdentityOf as publicIdentityOf2,
   RequestSignature,
   verifyRequest,
   verifyPublicIdentity,
@@ -62,6 +57,54 @@ import {
   ResultRequest,
   provenanceFor
 } from "@byollm/protocol";
+
+// src/reseal.ts
+import {
+  ENVELOPE_MAX_AGE_MS,
+  keyId,
+  open,
+  publicIdentityOf,
+  seal
+} from "@byollm/protocol";
+async function resealForDevice(input) {
+  const senderKeyId = keyId(publicIdentityOf(input.siteKeys).identity);
+  const opened = await open({
+    envelope: input.job.envelope,
+    recipientKeys: input.siteKeys,
+    senderIdentityPublic: input.siteKeys.identityPublic,
+    expected: {
+      jobId: input.job.id,
+      senderKeyId,
+      recipientKeyId: senderKeyId,
+      direction: "payload"
+    }
+  });
+  if (!opened.ok) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "unopenable" };
+  }
+  const envelope = await seal({
+    plaintext: opened.plaintext,
+    senderKeys: input.siteKeys,
+    recipientEncryptionPublic: input.device.encryption,
+    context: {
+      jobId: input.job.id,
+      senderKeyId,
+      recipientKeyId: keyId(input.device.identity),
+      // From the record, never recomputed from a fresh clock read — the
+      // envelope's own deadline is what the signature bound.
+      deadlineAt: input.job.createdAt + ENVELOPE_MAX_AGE_MS,
+      direction: "payload"
+    }
+  });
+  return { ok: true, envelope };
+}
+
+// src/records.ts
+function deadlineFor(job, now) {
+  return job.deadlineAt ?? (job.claimableAt ?? now) + job.ttlMs;
+}
+
+// src/handlers.ts
 var DEFAULTS = {
   leaseMs: 6e4,
   pairingTtlMs: 10 * 6e4,
@@ -89,14 +132,17 @@ var ByollmHandlers = class {
   #pollIntervalMs;
   #now;
   #siteKeys;
+  /** This site's identity key id — Amendment A's `stub.site`. Derived once. */
+  #siteKeyId;
   constructor(config) {
     this.#store = config.store;
-    if (!verifyPublicIdentity(publicIdentityOf(config.siteKeys))) {
+    if (!verifyPublicIdentity(publicIdentityOf2(config.siteKeys))) {
       throw new Error(
         "siteKeys are not internally consistent: the encryption key is not signed by the identity key. Generate a fresh pair with `npx @byollm/server keygen`."
       );
     }
     this.#siteKeys = config.siteKeys;
+    this.#siteKeyId = keyId2(publicIdentityOf2(config.siteKeys).identity);
     this.#verificationUrl = config.verificationUrl;
     this.#leaseMs = config.leaseMs ?? DEFAULTS.leaseMs;
     this.#pairingTtlMs = config.pairingTtlMs ?? DEFAULTS.pairingTtlMs;
@@ -121,8 +167,7 @@ var ByollmHandlers = class {
           auth,
           body,
           HeartbeatRequest,
-          this.#heartbeat.bind(this),
-          { allowRevoked: true }
+          this.#heartbeat.bind(this)
         );
       case "fetch":
         return this.#authed(auth, body, FetchRequest, this.#fetch.bind(this));
@@ -188,34 +233,15 @@ var ByollmHandlers = class {
     if (!job || job.lease?.runnerId !== runner.id || job.lease.id !== request.leaseId) {
       return fail("not-found", "no such lease on this job");
     }
-    const senderKeyId = keyId(publicIdentityOf(this.#siteKeys).identity);
-    const opened = await open({
-      envelope: job.envelope,
-      recipientKeys: this.#siteKeys,
-      senderIdentityPublic: this.#siteKeys.identityPublic,
-      expected: {
-        jobId: job.id,
-        senderKeyId,
-        recipientKeyId: senderKeyId,
-        direction: "payload"
-      }
+    const resealed = await resealForDevice({
+      siteKeys: this.#siteKeys,
+      job: { id: job.id, envelope: job.envelope, createdAt: job.createdAt },
+      device: runner.device
     });
-    if (!opened.ok) {
+    if (!resealed.ok) {
       return fail("server-error", "this job's payload could not be opened");
     }
-    const resealed = await seal({
-      plaintext: opened.plaintext,
-      senderKeys: this.#siteKeys,
-      recipientEncryptionPublic: runner.device.encryption,
-      context: {
-        jobId: job.id,
-        senderKeyId,
-        recipientKeyId: keyId(runner.device.identity),
-        deadlineAt: job.createdAt + ENVELOPE_MAX_AGE_MS,
-        direction: "payload"
-      }
-    });
-    return ok({ envelope: resealed });
+    return ok({ envelope: resealed.envelope });
   }
   // -- 1. pair --------------------------------------------------------------
   async #pair(body) {
@@ -242,7 +268,7 @@ var ByollmHandlers = class {
         state: "pending",
         owner: null,
         runnerId: null,
-        runnerTokenOnce: null,
+        collected: false,
         label: request.daemon.label,
         platform: request.daemon.platform,
         daemonVersion: request.daemon.version,
@@ -271,15 +297,19 @@ var ByollmHandlers = class {
     if (pairing.expiresAt <= now && pairing.state === "pending") {
       return ok({ status: "expired" });
     }
-    if (pairing.state === "approved" && pairing.runnerTokenOnce !== null && pairing.runnerId !== null && pairing.owner !== null) {
+    if (pairing.state === "approved" && !pairing.collected && pairing.runnerId !== null && pairing.owner !== null) {
       const response = {
         status: "approved",
-        runnerToken: pairing.runnerTokenOnce,
         runnerId: pairing.runnerId,
         owner: pairing.owner,
         // Only on approval: a pending or denied poll learns nothing, so an
         // unapproved code cannot be used to enumerate a site's keys.
-        site: publicIdentityOf(this.#siteKeys)
+        //
+        // One entry, because a direct site *is* one site — the same shape a
+        // hub answers with rather than a special case (cloud_009 §5). The
+        // daemon's lookup is one map read on every lane, which is what keeps
+        // the two lanes one protocol.
+        sites: { [this.#siteKeyId]: publicIdentityOf2(this.#siteKeys) }
       };
       await this.#store.consumePairingToken(pairing.deviceCodeHash);
       return ok(response);
@@ -309,6 +339,13 @@ var ByollmHandlers = class {
         kind: job.kind,
         audience: job.audience,
         owner: job.owner,
+        // This site, named by its identity key id — Amendment A §A.3. The
+        // daemon pinned this exact value at pairing, so it can check the stub
+        // against the envelope it later opens rather than taking our word for
+        // which site sent it. On this plane that is redundant, which is the
+        // point: the direct and relayed stubs are the same shape, and a daemon
+        // serving both cannot tell which upstream it is talking to.
+        site: this.#siteKeyId,
         // Bucketed, not measured: an exact size is a stronger fingerprint
         // than routing needs (byollm_009 §6).
         sizeClass: job.sizeClass,
@@ -317,8 +354,19 @@ var ByollmHandlers = class {
         // The stub's deadline bounds how long a captured envelope is worth
         // keeping, so it is always present — falling back to the TTL window
         // when the app named no absolute one.
-        deadlineAt: job.deadlineAt ?? (job.claimableAt ?? now) + job.ttlMs,
-        ...job.audienceAllow === void 0 ? {} : { audienceAllow: [...job.audienceAllow] },
+        deadlineAt: deadlineFor(job, now),
+        // `audienceAllow` is not sent — cloud_008 §0.2. The list stays on
+        // `JobRecord`, where `claim` already filtered candidates with it; the
+        // daemon's own allowlist is what decides `named` (byollm_001 Rev 1
+        // §B) and always was.
+        //
+        // Removing it from `JobStub` did **not** make this line a type error.
+        // A conditional spread is not excess-property-checked, so the field
+        // would have gone on being sent to a daemon whose `.strict()` parse
+        // now rejects the entire claim response — every daemon on the version
+        // pair, refusing all work, for a field nobody read. Worth stating
+        // where it happened: the schema is the contract, and the compiler
+        // does not enforce it through a spread.
         // No fallback. A job returned from `claim` holds a lease by
         // definition, and synthesising one here would hand the daemon a lease
         // id the store has never heard of — every later release naming it
@@ -336,18 +384,6 @@ var ByollmHandlers = class {
       return fail("unauthorized", "runner id does not match the signing key");
     }
     const now = this.#now();
-    const revoked = runner.revokedAt !== null;
-    if (revoked) {
-      const held = await this.#store.listClaimedBy(runner.id);
-      const response2 = {
-        revoked: true,
-        cancel: [],
-        leases: [],
-        lost: held.map((job) => job.id),
-        serverTime: now
-      };
-      return ok(response2);
-    }
     await this.#store.touchRunner({
       runnerId: runner.id,
       capabilities: request.capabilities,
@@ -355,7 +391,7 @@ var ByollmHandlers = class {
       paused: request.paused,
       now
     });
-    const { renewed, lost } = await this.#store.renewLeases({
+    const { lost } = await this.#store.renewLeases({
       runnerId: runner.id,
       leases: request.activeLeases,
       leaseMs: this.#leaseMs,
@@ -363,9 +399,11 @@ var ByollmHandlers = class {
     });
     const cancel = await this.#store.listCancelRequests(runner.id);
     const response = {
-      revoked: false,
-      cancel,
-      leases: renewed.map((r) => ({ jobId: r.jobId, expiresAt: r.expiresAt })),
+      sites: { [this.#siteKeyId]: publicIdentityOf2(this.#siteKeys) },
+      // A direct site has no disclosure of its own to go stale: consent to it
+      // *is* the pairing, and withdrawing it empties the set above.
+      awaitingConsent: [],
+      cancel: [...cancel],
       lost: [...lost],
       serverTime: now
     };
@@ -385,18 +423,35 @@ var ByollmHandlers = class {
       audience: job.audience,
       runnerId: runner.id,
       runnerOwner: runner.owner,
-      backendClass: request.backendClass,
-      model: request.model
+      // From the envelope the device signed, not from the request beside it
+      // — cloud_008 §2.5. A daemon can no longer seal one answer and declare
+      // it came from a different model.
+      backendClass: outcome.value.ran.backendClass,
+      model: outcome.value.ran.model
     });
-    const { accepted, job: updated } = await this.#store.complete({
+    const {
+      accepted,
+      duplicate,
+      job: updated
+    } = await this.#store.complete({
       jobId: request.jobId,
+      // Who is asking, for the duplicate answer only — §3.6. Authorisation
+      // is `holder`, below, and still is.
       runnerId: runner.id,
-      outcome: outcome.value,
+      // The grant, not the runner — cloud_008 §1.4a. `CompleteHolder`'s own
+      // docstring already called the lease "the more exact check anyway";
+      // this plane simply had no lease id to give it until now.
+      holder: { by: "lease", leaseId: request.leaseId },
+      outcome: outcome.value.outcome,
       provenance,
       now
     });
     const response = {
       accepted,
+      // Only when true — cloud_008 §3.6. Absent means "not a duplicate", and
+      // an optional field that is always present is a required one wearing a
+      // question mark.
+      ...duplicate === true ? { duplicate: true } : {},
       state: updated?.state ?? job.state
     };
     return ok(response);
@@ -417,14 +472,14 @@ var ByollmHandlers = class {
    */
   async #openResult(request, runner) {
     const refuse = (why) => ({ ok: false, failure: fail("bad-request", why) });
-    const opened = await open({
+    const opened = await open2({
       envelope: request.envelope,
       recipientKeys: this.#siteKeys,
       senderIdentityPublic: runner.device.identity,
       expected: {
         jobId: request.jobId,
-        senderKeyId: keyId(runner.device.identity),
-        recipientKeyId: keyId(publicIdentityOf(this.#siteKeys).identity),
+        senderKeyId: keyId2(runner.device.identity),
+        recipientKeyId: keyId2(publicIdentityOf2(this.#siteKeys).identity),
         direction: "result"
       }
     });
@@ -437,12 +492,12 @@ var ByollmHandlers = class {
     } catch {
       return refuse("the sealed result was not valid JSON");
     }
-    const outcome = JobOutcome.safeParse(parsed);
-    if (!outcome.success) return refuse("the sealed result was not an outcome");
-    if (outcome.data.outcome !== request.disposition) {
+    const sealed = SealedOutcome.safeParse(parsed);
+    if (!sealed.success) return refuse("the sealed result was not an outcome");
+    if (sealed.data.outcome.outcome !== request.disposition) {
       return refuse("the declared disposition is not the one that was sealed");
     }
-    return { ok: true, value: outcome.data };
+    return { ok: true, value: sealed.data };
   }
   // -- 5. release -----------------------------------------------------------
   async #release(request, runner) {
@@ -583,17 +638,18 @@ function json(status, body) {
 
 export {
   generateDeviceCode,
-  generateRunnerToken,
   generateRunnerId,
   generateJobId,
   generateUserCode,
   hashSecret,
   secretsMatch,
   generateLeaseId,
+  deadlineFor,
+  resealForDevice,
   ByollmHandlers,
   SERVED_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
   routeEndpoint,
   signatureFrom,
   createFetchHandler
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-MGJX6626.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-K5E6JS5A.js.map

package/dist/chunk-K5E6JS5A.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/ids.ts","../src/handlers.ts","../src/reseal.ts","../src/records.ts","../src/http.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import {\n  createHash,\n  randomBytes,\n  randomUUID,\n  timingSafeEqual,\n} from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/**\n * Alphabet for the user-facing pairing code.\n *\n * Excludes `0/O`, `1/I/L`, `5/S` and `U/V` — a code is read aloud or copied\n * off a terminal into a browser, and a user who mistypes it gets a failure\n * they cannot diagnose. 27 symbols over 8 characters is ~38 bits, which is\n * ample for a code that lives ten minutes, is single-use, and is rate-limited.\n */\nconst USER_CODE_ALPHABET = \"ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRTWXYZ2346789\";\n\n/** A device code: the secret the daemon polls with. Never shown to a user. */\nexport function generateDeviceCode(): string {\n  return randomBytes(32).toString(\"base64url\");\n}\n\n/** A runner id. */\nexport function generateRunnerId(): string {\n  return `runner_${randomUUID()}`;\n}\n\n/** A job id. */\nexport function generateJobId(): string {\n  // A bare UUID, not a prefixed one.\n  //\n  // The app mints this now, because byollm_009 §6 binds the job id into the\n  // envelope's signature — so the id must exist before the row does. A\n  // `job_`-prefixed string is not a `uuid`, and the Supabase adapter's column\n  // is, so the prefix would have made every enqueue fail there while passing\n  // in memory. Ids are opaque to the protocol; the prefix was only ever\n  // decoration.\n  return randomUUID();\n}\n\n/**\n * A short code the user reads and confirms, formatted `XXXX-XXXX`.\n * Drawn with rejection sampling so the alphabet stays uniform.\n */\nexport function generateUserCode(): string {\n  const chars: string[] = [];\n  while (chars.length < 8) {\n    for (const byte of randomBytes(16)) {\n      // 256 % 28 !== 0, so bytes at or above the largest whole multiple are\n      // discarded rather than folded — folding would bias the low symbols.\n      const limit = 256 - (256 % USER_CODE_ALPHABET.length);\n      if (byte >= limit) continue;\n      const symbol = USER_CODE_ALPHABET[byte % USER_CODE_ALPHABET.length];\n      if (symbol === undefined) continue;\n      chars.push(symbol);\n      if (chars.length === 8) break;\n    }\n  }\n  return `${chars.slice(0, 4).join(\"\")}-${chars.slice(4).join(\"\")}`;\n}\n\n/** SHA-256, hex. Tokens and device codes are stored only as this. */\nexport function hashSecret(secret: string): string {\n  return createHash(\"sha256\").update(secret, \"utf8\").digest(\"hex\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Compare two hex digests without leaking their difference through timing.\n * Lengths are compared first because `timingSafeEqual` throws on a mismatch.\n */\nexport function secretsMatch(aHex: string, bHex: string): boolean {\n  if (aHex.length !== bHex.length) return false;\n  return timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(aHex, \"hex\"), Buffer.from(bHex, \"hex\"));\n}\n\n/**\n * A fresh id for one lease grant.\n *\n * Not a secret and not guessed at — a daemon is told its lease id in the claim\n * response. It exists to distinguish *this* grant from the next one over the\n * same job by the same runner, which is what stops a replayed release landing\n * on a lease the sender never meant.\n */\nexport const generateLeaseId = (): string => randomUUID();\n","import {\n  FetchRequest,\n  SealedOutcome,\n  keyId,\n  open,\n  publicIdentityOf,\n  type FetchResponse,\n  RequestSignature,\n  verifyRequest,\n  verifyPublicIdentity,\n  type StoredKeys,\n  ClaimRequest,\n  type ClaimRequest as ClaimRequestType,\n  type HeartbeatRequest as HeartbeatRequestType,\n  type ReleaseRequest as ReleaseRequestType,\n  type ResultRequest as ResultRequestType,\n  ERROR_STATUS,\n  HeartbeatRequest,\n  PairRequest,\n  PROTOCOL_VERSION,\n  ReleaseRequest,\n  ResultRequest,\n  provenanceFor,\n  type ClaimResponse,\n  type Endpoint,\n  type HeartbeatResponse,\n  type PairPollResponse,\n  type PairStartResponse,\n  type ReleaseResponse,\n  type ResultResponse,\n  type WireErrorCode,\n} from \"@byollm/protocol\";\nimport { generateDeviceCode, generateUserCode, hashSecret } from \"./ids.js\";\nimport { resealForDevice } from \"./reseal.js\";\nimport { deadlineFor } from \"./records.js\";\nimport type { JobRecord, RunnerRecord } from \"./records.js\";\nimport type { ByollmStore } from \"./store.js\";\n\n/** Everything a mount needs to serve the protocol. */\n/**\n * What a transport must hand the handler to authenticate a call.\n *\n * `rawBody` is the exact bytes received, not a re-serialisation of the parsed\n * object: JSON.stringify does not round-trip byte-for-byte, and a signature\n * over re-serialised input verifies something the sender never signed.\n */\nexport interface AuthContext {\n  readonly endpoint: string;\n  readonly rawBody: string;\n  readonly signature: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface HandlerConfig {\n  readonly store: ByollmStore;\n  /**\n   * Absolute URL of the page where a user approves a pairing. The device code\n   * is *not* appended — the user types the short code into the app's own\n   * authenticated page, which is what keeps pairing interactive.\n   */\n  readonly verificationUrl: string;\n  /** How long a lease lasts. Default 60s — six heartbeats of headroom. */\n  readonly leaseMs?: number;\n  /** How long an unapproved pairing code lives. Default 10 minutes. */\n  readonly pairingTtlMs?: number;\n  /** How often a daemon may poll for pairing approval. Default 2s. */\n  readonly pollIntervalMs?: number;\n  /** Injectable clock, so tests can move time without sleeping. */\n  readonly now?: () => number;\n  /**\n   * This site's keypairs (byollm_009 §5) — **supplied, never generated here.**\n   *\n   * A site is usually more than one process. Generating keys at startup would\n   * work perfectly in development and fail only in production, silently: each\n   * instance would have a different identity, a daemon would pin whichever\n   * one approved its pairing, and every request routed to a different\n   * instance would fail a signature check it had no way to explain. So this\n   * is a required input, and there is a `keygen` script that produces one.\n   */\n  readonly siteKeys: StoredKeys;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULTS = {\n  leaseMs: 60_000,\n  pairingTtlMs: 10 * 60_000,\n  pollIntervalMs: 2_000,\n} as const;\n\n/** A handled protocol call: a status and a JSON body. */\nexport interface HandlerResult {\n  readonly status: number;\n  readonly body: unknown;\n  /** Set for `rate-limited` and `server-error`. */\n  readonly retryAfterSeconds?: number;\n}\n\nfunction fail(\n  error: WireErrorCode,\n  message: string,\n  retryAfterSeconds?: number,\n): HandlerResult {\n  return {\n    status: ERROR_STATUS[error],\n    body: {\n      error,\n      message,\n      ...(retryAfterSeconds === undefined\n        ? {}\n        : { retryAfter: retryAfterSeconds }),\n    },\n    ...(retryAfterSeconds === undefined ? {} : { retryAfterSeconds }),\n  };\n}\n\nfunction ok(body: unknown): HandlerResult {\n  return { status: 200, body };\n}\n\n/**\n * The five protocol endpoints, over any {@link ByollmStore}.\n *\n * Transport-free on purpose: a mount adapts `Request`/`Response` (or Express,\n * or whatever) onto {@link ByollmHandlers.handle}, and everything the\n * protocol actually specifies lives here where the conformance kit can reach\n * it without an HTTP server in the way.\n */\nexport class ByollmHandlers {\n  readonly #store: ByollmStore;\n  readonly #verificationUrl: string;\n  readonly #leaseMs: number;\n  readonly #pairingTtlMs: number;\n  readonly #pollIntervalMs: number;\n  readonly #now: () => number;\n  readonly #siteKeys: StoredKeys;\n  /** This site's identity key id — Amendment A's `stub.site`. Derived once. */\n  readonly #siteKeyId: string;\n\n  constructor(config: HandlerConfig) {\n    this.#store = config.store;\n    // Fail at construction, not at the first pairing. A site whose keys are\n    // malformed should not start and then refuse its users one at a time.\n    if (!verifyPublicIdentity(publicIdentityOf(config.siteKeys))) {\n      throw new Error(\n        \"siteKeys are not internally consistent: the encryption key is not \" +\n          \"signed by the identity key. Generate a fresh pair with \" +\n          \"`npx @byollm/server keygen`.\",\n      );\n    }\n    this.#siteKeys = config.siteKeys;\n    this.#siteKeyId = keyId(publicIdentityOf(config.siteKeys).identity);\n    this.#verificationUrl = config.verificationUrl;\n    this.#leaseMs = config.leaseMs ?? DEFAULTS.leaseMs;\n    this.#pairingTtlMs = config.pairingTtlMs ?? DEFAULTS.pairingTtlMs;\n    this.#pollIntervalMs = config.pollIntervalMs ?? DEFAULTS.pollIntervalMs;\n    this.#now = config.now ?? Date.now;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Dispatch one protocol call.\n   *\n   * @param endpoint - which of the five, already routed from the path\n   * @param body - the parsed JSON request body, untrusted\n   * @param auth - the signature and the exact bytes it covers\n   */\n  async handle(\n    endpoint: Endpoint,\n    body: unknown,\n    auth: AuthContext,\n  ): Promise<HandlerResult> {\n    switch (endpoint) {\n      case \"pair\":\n        return this.#pair(body);\n      case \"claim\":\n        return this.#authed(auth, body, ClaimRequest, this.#claim.bind(this));\n      case \"heartbeat\":\n        // Heartbeat is the channel revocation travels on — and since V1-2 it\n        // travels as the refusal itself ({@link MUSTS.REVOCATION_HONORED}).\n        //\n        // It used to be answered with an empty site set, which the daemon\n        // read as \"revoked\". That reading is gone: an empty set now means\n        // \"nothing is consented right now\", because a projection can arrive\n        // empty by accident and the daemon's response to revocation is to\n        // delete its pairing. So the one call every daemon always makes — a\n        // daemon with no working backend never claims — carries the\n        // unambiguous version: 403 with `revoked`, which is a code and not an\n        // inference.\n        return this.#authed(\n          auth,\n          body,\n          HeartbeatRequest,\n          this.#heartbeat.bind(this),\n        );\n      case \"fetch\":\n        return this.#authed(auth, body, FetchRequest, this.#fetch.bind(this));\n      case \"result\":\n        return this.#authed(auth, body, ResultRequest, this.#result.bind(this));\n      case \"release\":\n        return this.#authed(\n          auth,\n          body,\n          ReleaseRequest,\n          this.#release.bind(this),\n        );\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Shared preamble for the four authenticated endpoints: verify the\n   * signature, reject a revoked runner, and parse the body.\n   *\n   * Authentication happens before schema validation so a stranger probing the\n   * endpoint learns nothing about the wire format.\n   */\n  async #authed<T>(\n    auth: AuthContext,\n    body: unknown,\n    schema: { safeParse: (v: unknown) => { success: boolean; data?: T } },\n    run: (request: T, runner: RunnerRecord) => Promise<HandlerResult>,\n    options: { allowRevoked?: boolean } = {},\n  ): Promise<HandlerResult> {\n    const signature = RequestSignature.safeParse(auth.signature);\n    if (!signature.success) {\n      return fail(\"unauthorized\", \"this request is not signed\");\n    }\n\n    const runner = await this.#store.getRunner(signature.data.runnerId);\n    if (!runner) {\n      return fail(\"unauthorized\", \"this runner is not recognised\");\n    }\n\n    // Verified against the identity pinned when the user approved this\n    // machine — not against anything the request carries. A signature that\n    // authenticates itself authenticates nothing.\n    const failure = verifyRequest({\n      identityPublic: runner.device.identity,\n      endpoint: auth.endpoint,\n      body: auth.rawBody,\n      signature: signature.data,\n      now: this.#now(),\n    });\n    if (failure !== null) {\n      // Deliberately one message for both causes. Telling a caller whether\n      // their clock or their key is wrong tells an attacker which half of a\n      // forgery already works.\n      return fail(\"unauthorized\", \"this request's signature is not valid\");\n    }\n    if (runner.revokedAt !== null && options.allowRevoked !== true) {\n      // A distinct truth from \"unauthorized\": the daemon should stop and say\n      // so, not retry or re-pair silently.\n      return fail(\"revoked\", \"this runner has been revoked by its owner\");\n    }\n\n    const parsed = schema.safeParse(body);\n    if (!parsed.success || parsed.data === undefined) {\n      return fail(\"bad-request\", \"request body failed schema validation\");\n    }\n    return run(parsed.data, runner);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Hand over the payload for a lease this runner holds — byollm_009 §6.\n   *\n   * The second half of claim-then-fetch. A claim answers with a stub, and the\n   * work itself is collected separately by the device that took it, because a\n   * payload can only be sealed once its recipient is known.\n   *\n   * Scoped to the lease, not the job: answering for whatever lease happens to\n   * exist would hand the work to a runner whose grant had already been\n   * superseded.\n   */\n  async #fetch(\n    request: FetchRequest,\n    runner: RunnerRecord,\n  ): Promise<HandlerResult> {\n    const job = await this.#store.get(request.jobId);\n    if (\n      !job ||\n      job.lease?.runnerId !== runner.id ||\n      job.lease.id !== request.leaseId\n    ) {\n      // One answer for \"no such job\", \"not yours\" and \"a lease you no longer\n      // hold\". A caller who is allowed to know already knows which.\n      return fail(\"not-found\", \"no such lease on this job\");\n    }\n    // One implementation of open-and-reseal, shared with the cloud lane: the\n    // deadline and key ids are bound into a signature, and two copies of a\n    // bound value is the bug this codebase keeps finding.\n    const resealed = await resealForDevice({\n      siteKeys: this.#siteKeys,\n      job: { id: job.id, envelope: job.envelope, createdAt: job.createdAt },\n      device: runner.device,\n    });\n    if (!resealed.ok) {\n      return fail(\"server-error\", \"this job's payload could not be opened\");\n    }\n    return ok({ envelope: resealed.envelope } satisfies FetchResponse);\n  }\n\n  // -- 1. pair --------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  async #pair(body: unknown): Promise<HandlerResult> {\n    const parsed = PairRequest.safeParse(body);\n    if (!parsed.success) {\n      return fail(\"bad-request\", \"pair request failed schema validation\");\n    }\n    const request = parsed.data;\n    const now = this.#now();\n\n    if (request.action === \"start\") {\n      const deviceCode = generateDeviceCode();\n      const userCode = generateUserCode();\n      const expiresAt = now + this.#pairingTtlMs;\n\n      // The machine must prove its encryption key belongs to the identity it\n      // is presenting, before either is stored. Otherwise a caller could pair\n      // a real identity with an encryption key it holds the secret for, and\n      // read everything later sealed to that runner.\n      if (!verifyPublicIdentity(request.device)) {\n        return fail(\n          \"bad-request\",\n          \"the device's encryption key is not signed by the identity it was presented with\",\n        );\n      }\n\n      await this.#store.createPairing({\n        device: request.device,\n        deviceCodeHash: hashSecret(deviceCode),\n        userCode,\n        state: \"pending\",\n        owner: null,\n        runnerId: null,\n        collected: false,\n        label: request.daemon.label,\n        platform: request.daemon.platform,\n        daemonVersion: request.daemon.version,\n        capabilities: request.capabilities,\n        expiresAt,\n        createdAt: now,\n      });\n\n      const response: PairStartResponse = {\n        deviceCode,\n        userCode,\n        verificationUrl: this.#verificationUrl,\n        expiresAt,\n        pollIntervalMs: this.#pollIntervalMs,\n      };\n      return ok(response);\n    }\n\n    // action === \"poll\"\n    const pairing = await this.#store.getPairingByDeviceCodeHash(\n      hashSecret(request.deviceCode),\n    );\n    if (!pairing) {\n      return fail(\"not-found\", \"unknown device code\");\n    }\n    if (pairing.state === \"denied\") {\n      return ok({ status: \"denied\" } satisfies PairPollResponse);\n    }\n    // Expiry is checked before approval state so a code approved after it\n    // lapsed is still dead ({@link MUSTS.PAIR_CODE_EXPIRES}).\n    if (pairing.expiresAt <= now && pairing.state === \"pending\") {\n      return ok({ status: \"expired\" } satisfies PairPollResponse);\n    }\n    if (\n      pairing.state === \"approved\" &&\n      !pairing.collected &&\n      pairing.runnerId !== null &&\n      pairing.owner !== null\n    ) {\n      const response: PairPollResponse = {\n        status: \"approved\",\n        runnerId: pairing.runnerId,\n        owner: pairing.owner,\n        // Only on approval: a pending or denied poll learns nothing, so an\n        // unapproved code cannot be used to enumerate a site's keys.\n        //\n        // One entry, because a direct site *is* one site — the same shape a\n        // hub answers with rather than a special case (cloud_009 §5). The\n        // daemon's lookup is one map read on every lane, which is what keeps\n        // the two lanes one protocol.\n        sites: { [this.#siteKeyId]: publicIdentityOf(this.#siteKeys) },\n      };\n      // Delivered exactly once — a replayed device code gets nothing.\n      await this.#store.consumePairingToken(pairing.deviceCodeHash);\n      return ok(response);\n    }\n    if (pairing.state === \"approved\") {\n      return fail(\"not-found\", \"this pairing has already been collected\");\n    }\n    return ok({ status: \"pending\" } satisfies PairPollResponse);\n  }\n\n  // -- 2. claim -------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  async #claim(\n    request: ClaimRequestType,\n    runner: RunnerRecord,\n  ): Promise<HandlerResult> {\n    if (request.runnerId !== runner.id) {\n      return fail(\"unauthorized\", \"runner id does not match the signing key\");\n    }\n    const now = this.#now();\n\n    // Capabilities from *this* request, never the stored matrix — a daemon\n    // that just lost a backend must not be handed work for it\n    // ({@link MUSTS.CLAIM_REQUIRES_CAPABILITY}).\n    const jobs = await this.#store.claim({\n      runnerId: runner.id,\n      runnerOwner: runner.owner,\n      capabilities: request.capabilities,\n      max: request.max,\n      leaseMs: this.#leaseMs,\n      now,\n    });\n\n    const response: ClaimResponse = {\n      jobs: jobs.map((job) => ({\n        id: job.id,\n        kind: job.kind,\n        audience: job.audience,\n        owner: job.owner,\n        // This site, named by its identity key id — Amendment A §A.3. The\n        // daemon pinned this exact value at pairing, so it can check the stub\n        // against the envelope it later opens rather than taking our word for\n        // which site sent it. On this plane that is redundant, which is the\n        // point: the direct and relayed stubs are the same shape, and a daemon\n        // serving both cannot tell which upstream it is talking to.\n        site: this.#siteKeyId,\n        // Bucketed, not measured: an exact size is a stronger fingerprint\n        // than routing needs (byollm_009 §6).\n        sizeClass: job.sizeClass,\n        // Reserved for byollm_006; no job declares it yet.\n        streaming: false,\n        // The stub's deadline bounds how long a captured envelope is worth\n        // keeping, so it is always present — falling back to the TTL window\n        // when the app named no absolute one.\n        deadlineAt: deadlineFor(job, now),\n        // `audienceAllow` is not sent — cloud_008 §0.2. The list stays on\n        // `JobRecord`, where `claim` already filtered candidates with it; the\n        // daemon's own allowlist is what decides `named` (byollm_001 Rev 1\n        // §B) and always was.\n        //\n        // Removing it from `JobStub` did **not** make this line a type error.\n        // A conditional spread is not excess-property-checked, so the field\n        // would have gone on being sent to a daemon whose `.strict()` parse\n        // now rejects the entire claim response — every daemon on the version\n        // pair, refusing all work, for a field nobody read. Worth stating\n        // where it happened: the schema is the contract, and the compiler\n        // does not enforce it through a spread.\n        // No fallback. A job returned from `claim` holds a lease by\n        // definition, and synthesising one here would hand the daemon a lease\n        // id the store has never heard of — every later release naming it\n        // would silently match nothing. A store that returns an unleased job\n        // has broken its contract, and this says so.\n        lease: leaseOf(job),\n      })),\n      leaseMs: this.#leaseMs,\n    };\n    return ok(response);\n  }\n\n  // -- 3. heartbeat ---------------------------------------------------------\n\n  async #heartbeat(\n    request: HeartbeatRequestType,\n    runner: RunnerRecord,\n  ): Promise<HandlerResult> {\n    if (request.runnerId !== runner.id) {\n      return fail(\"unauthorized\", \"runner id does not match the signing key\");\n    }\n    const now = this.#now();\n    // No revoked branch here any more — V1-2. A revoked runner is refused by\n    // `#authed` before this handler is reached, on heartbeat as on every\n    // other endpoint, because \"revoked\" and \"nothing consented right now\"\n    // must not arrive as the same empty body.\n\n    await this.#store.touchRunner({\n      runnerId: runner.id,\n      capabilities: request.capabilities,\n      daemonVersion: request.daemonVersion,\n      paused: request.paused,\n      now,\n    });\n\n    // `renewed` is not reported back — cloud_008 §1.4b. The grants are still\n    // extended; the daemon simply never read the list, and `lost` is the\n    // signal it acts on.\n    const { lost } = await this.#store.renewLeases({\n      runnerId: runner.id,\n      leases: request.activeLeases,\n      leaseMs: this.#leaseMs,\n      now,\n    });\n\n    const cancel = await this.#store.listCancelRequests(runner.id);\n\n    const response: HeartbeatResponse = {\n      sites: { [this.#siteKeyId]: publicIdentityOf(this.#siteKeys) },\n      // A direct site has no disclosure of its own to go stale: consent to it\n      // *is* the pairing, and withdrawing it empties the set above.\n      awaitingConsent: [],\n      cancel: [...cancel],\n      lost: [...lost],\n      serverTime: now,\n    };\n    return ok(response);\n  }\n\n  // -- 4. result ------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  async #result(\n    request: ResultRequestType,\n    runner: RunnerRecord,\n  ): Promise<HandlerResult> {\n    if (request.runnerId !== runner.id) {\n      return fail(\"unauthorized\", \"runner id does not match the signing key\");\n    }\n    const now = this.#now();\n    const job = await this.#store.get(request.jobId);\n    if (!job) return fail(\"not-found\", \"unknown job\");\n\n    const outcome = await this.#openResult(request, runner);\n    if (!outcome.ok) return outcome.failure;\n\n    // Provenance is built here, from the job's audience and the authenticated\n    // runner — never from anything the daemon asserted\n    // ({@link MUSTS.PROVENANCE_NAMES_DEVICE}).\n    const provenance = provenanceFor({\n      audience: job.audience,\n      runnerId: runner.id,\n      runnerOwner: runner.owner,\n      // From the envelope the device signed, not from the request beside it\n      // — cloud_008 §2.5. A daemon can no longer seal one answer and declare\n      // it came from a different model.\n      backendClass: outcome.value.ran.backendClass,\n      model: outcome.value.ran.model,\n    });\n\n    const {\n      accepted,\n      duplicate,\n      job: updated,\n    } = await this.#store.complete({\n      jobId: request.jobId,\n      // Who is asking, for the duplicate answer only — §3.6. Authorisation\n      // is `holder`, below, and still is.\n      runnerId: runner.id,\n      // The grant, not the runner — cloud_008 §1.4a. `CompleteHolder`'s own\n      // docstring already called the lease \"the more exact check anyway\";\n      // this plane simply had no lease id to give it until now.\n      holder: { by: \"lease\", leaseId: request.leaseId },\n      outcome: outcome.value.outcome,\n      provenance,\n      now,\n    });\n\n    const response: ResultResponse = {\n      accepted,\n      // Only when true — cloud_008 §3.6. Absent means \"not a duplicate\", and\n      // an optional field that is always present is a required one wearing a\n      // question mark.\n      ...(duplicate === true ? { duplicate: true } : {}),\n      state: updated?.state ?? job.state,\n    };\n    return ok(response);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Open a sealed result, or refuse it.\n   *\n   * The mirror of the daemon's `#openPayload`, and refuses for the same\n   * reason: an outcome that does not verify against the device's pinned key is\n   * an assertion by whoever relayed it, and storing it would let an\n   * intermediary write answers into the app.\n   *\n   * The clear-text `disposition` is checked here rather than trusted. It is on\n   * the wire so a relay can route without opening anything, which means the\n   * one thing it must not be is authoritative — a daemon that sealed an error\n   * and declared `ok` would otherwise have its declaration believed by\n   * everything upstream of this line.\n   */\n  async #openResult(\n    request: ResultRequestType,\n    runner: RunnerRecord,\n  ): Promise<\n    { ok: true; value: SealedOutcome } | { ok: false; failure: HandlerResult }\n  > {\n    const refuse = (why: string) =>\n      ({ ok: false as const, failure: fail(\"bad-request\", why) }) as const;\n\n    const opened = await open({\n      envelope: request.envelope,\n      recipientKeys: this.#siteKeys,\n      senderIdentityPublic: runner.device.identity,\n      expected: {\n        jobId: request.jobId,\n        senderKeyId: keyId(runner.device.identity),\n        recipientKeyId: keyId(publicIdentityOf(this.#siteKeys).identity),\n        direction: \"result\",\n      },\n    });\n    if (!opened.ok) {\n      return refuse(\"the result did not verify as coming from this device\");\n    }\n\n    let parsed: unknown;\n    try {\n      parsed = JSON.parse(opened.plaintext);\n    } catch {\n      return refuse(\"the sealed result was not valid JSON\");\n    }\n    const sealed = SealedOutcome.safeParse(parsed);\n    if (!sealed.success) return refuse(\"the sealed result was not an outcome\");\n\n    if (sealed.data.outcome.outcome !== request.disposition) {\n      return refuse(\"the declared disposition is not the one that was sealed\");\n    }\n    return { ok: true, value: sealed.data };\n  }\n\n  // -- 5. release -----------------------------------------------------------\n\n  async #release(\n    request: ReleaseRequestType,\n    runner: RunnerRecord,\n  ): Promise<HandlerResult> {\n    if (request.runnerId !== runner.id) {\n      return fail(\"unauthorized\", \"runner id does not match the signing key\");\n    }\n    const released = await this.#store.release({\n      runnerId: runner.id,\n      leases: request.leases,\n      reason: request.reason,\n      now: this.#now(),\n    });\n    const response: ReleaseResponse = { released };\n    return ok(response);\n  }\n}\n\n/** The protocol version this build speaks. */\nexport const SERVED_PROTOCOL_VERSION = PROTOCOL_VERSION;\n\n/** The lease a claimed job must have, or a loud failure. */\nfunction leaseOf(job: JobRecord): NonNullable<JobRecord[\"lease\"]> {\n  if (!job.lease) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `store returned job ${job.id} from claim with no lease — the store ` +\n        `contract requires a claimed job to hold one`,\n    );\n  }\n  return job.lease;\n}\n","import {\n  ENVELOPE_MAX_AGE_MS,\n  keyId,\n  open,\n  publicIdentityOf,\n  seal,\n  type PublicIdentity,\n  type SealedEnvelope,\n  type StoredKeys,\n} from \"@byollm/protocol\";\n\n/**\n * Open this site's own at-rest envelope and re-seal it to a claiming device.\n *\n * The single operation that makes byollm_009 §6 work, and it now has two\n * callers: {@link ByollmHandlers} answering `fetch` on the direct plane, and\n * the cloud lane answering the relay's \"who claimed it\" poll. Both do exactly\n * this, and the reason it lives in one file is the reason everything else in\n * this codebase does: the deadline, the key ids and the direction are all\n * bound into a signature, and two implementations of a bound value is the same\n * bug as two clock readings — it works until they disagree, and then nothing\n * opens.\n *\n * The plaintext exists for one statement and never reaches a wire, a store, or\n * a log. That is the whole guarantee: the site is an endpoint, so it is\n * entitled to read its own work, and it is the only party between the app and\n * the device that is.\n */\n\ntype ResealFailure = \"unopenable\";\n\nexport type ResealResult =\n  | { readonly ok: true; readonly envelope: SealedEnvelope }\n  | { readonly ok: false; readonly reason: ResealFailure };\n\nexport async function resealForDevice(input: {\n  siteKeys: StoredKeys;\n  /** The job's identity and its at-rest ciphertext. */\n  job: {\n    readonly id: string;\n    readonly envelope: SealedEnvelope;\n    readonly createdAt: number;\n  };\n  /** The device that claimed it, as the upstream reported. */\n  device: PublicIdentity;\n}): Promise<ResealResult> {\n  const senderKeyId = keyId(publicIdentityOf(input.siteKeys).identity);\n\n  const opened = await open({\n    envelope: input.job.envelope,\n    recipientKeys: input.siteKeys,\n    senderIdentityPublic: input.siteKeys.identityPublic,\n    expected: {\n      jobId: input.job.id,\n      senderKeyId,\n      recipientKeyId: senderKeyId,\n      direction: \"payload\",\n    },\n  });\n  if (!opened.ok) {\n    // The store holds something this site cannot open: rotated keys, a\n    // corrupted row, or someone else's envelope. Not the device's problem and\n    // not something a retry fixes.\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"unopenable\" };\n  }\n\n  const envelope = await seal({\n    plaintext: opened.plaintext,\n    senderKeys: input.siteKeys,\n    recipientEncryptionPublic: input.device.encryption,\n    context: {\n      jobId: input.job.id,\n      senderKeyId,\n      recipientKeyId: keyId(input.device.identity),\n      // From the record, never recomputed from a fresh clock read — the\n      // envelope's own deadline is what the signature bound.\n      deadlineAt: input.job.createdAt + ENVELOPE_MAX_AGE_MS,\n      direction: \"payload\",\n    },\n  });\n  return { ok: true, envelope };\n}\n","import type {\n  PublicIdentity,\n  Audience,\n  Capability,\n  JobKind,\n  JobOutcome,\n  JobPayload,\n  SealedEnvelope,\n  SizeClass,\n  JobState,\n  Lease,\n  ResultProvenance,\n} from \"@byollm/protocol\";\n\n/**\n * A job as the server stores it.\n *\n * Adapters map this shape onto their own storage; the field meanings are\n * normative because the conformance kit asserts behaviour that depends on\n * them (TTL clock start, dependency gating, refusal tracking).\n */\nexport interface JobRecord {\n  readonly id: string;\n  readonly kind: JobKind;\n  /**\n   * The work, sealed to this site's own encryption key (byollm_009 §10).\n   *\n   * The store never holds plaintext. The app sees plaintext at enqueue and at\n   * result because the app *is* the endpoint; everything in between —\n   * database, backups, log aggregators, a support engineer with read access —\n   * sees ciphertext.\n   *\n   * This is not protection from the application the user deliberately sent\n   * their work to. It is protection from everything the application's storage\n   * touches, which is a longer list than most people picture.\n   */\n  readonly envelope: SealedEnvelope;\n  /** Fixed at enqueue, where the plaintext is. */\n  readonly sizeClass: SizeClass;\n  readonly audience: Audience;\n  /** The app's id for the user who enqueued it. */\n  readonly owner: string;\n  /** Server-side restriction on which runner owners may take a `named` job. */\n  readonly audienceAllow: readonly string[] | undefined;\n  /** Job ids that must all be `ok` before this becomes claimable. */\n  readonly dependsOn: readonly string[];\n  readonly state: JobState;\n  readonly lease: Lease | null;\n  /**\n   * The grant that recorded this job's result — cloud_008 §3.6.\n   *\n   * Kept after `lease` is nulled, because \"who finished this\" outlives \"who\n   * holds this\" and the two are asked for different reasons. It is what lets\n   * a replay from the device that finished the job be answered *as a\n   * duplicate* rather than as a stale lease — and lets a replay from any\n   * other device be refused exactly as it would be for a job that is not\n   * terminal, so a job id is not a terminality probe.\n   */\n  readonly completedByLeaseId: string | null;\n  readonly createdAt: number;\n  /**\n   * When the job became claimable — enqueue time for a job with no\n   * dependencies, or the moment its last dependency reached `ok`.\n   *\n   * **The TTL clock starts here, not at `createdAt`.** Starting it at enqueue\n   * would expire a dependent job for the crime of waiting on a slow\n   * dependency (byollm_001 Rev 1 §D, TTL clock resolved in build review).\n   * `null` means still blocked.\n   */\n  readonly claimableAt: number | null;\n  /** How long an unclaimed job may wait once claimable. */\n  readonly ttlMs: number;\n  /** Optional absolute deadline, independent of the TTL. */\n  readonly deadlineAt: number | null;\n  /**\n   * Runners that released this job with reason `refused` — their local\n   * allowlist declined it. Never offered to them again\n   * ({@link MUSTS.REFUSAL_NOT_REOFFERED}).\n   */\n  readonly refusedBy: readonly string[];\n  /** How many times this job has been claimed, including lease-expiry retries. */\n  readonly attempts: number;\n  readonly outcome: JobOutcome | null;\n  readonly provenance: ResultProvenance | null;\n  readonly updatedAt: number;\n}\n\n/** A paired daemon as the server stores it. */\nexport interface RunnerRecord {\n  readonly id: string;\n  /** The app's id for the user this runner is bound to — exactly one. */\n  readonly owner: string;\n  readonly label: string;\n  readonly platform: \"darwin\" | \"linux\" | \"win32\";\n  readonly daemonVersion: string;\n  readonly capabilities: readonly Capability[];\n  readonly paused: boolean;\n  /** Set once; a revoked runner never un-revokes. */\n  readonly revokedAt: number | null;\n  readonly lastHeartbeatAt: number;\n  readonly createdAt: number;\n  /**\n   * The device's pinned public keys. What later signatures verify against —\n   * a runner id names a machine, this proves it.\n   */\n  readonly device: PublicIdentity;\n}\n\n/** An in-flight device-code pairing. */\nexport interface PairingRecord {\n  /** SHA-256 of the device code. The code itself is never stored. */\n  readonly deviceCodeHash: string;\n  /** The short code the user reads. Unique among live pairings. */\n  readonly userCode: string;\n  readonly state: \"pending\" | \"approved\" | \"denied\";\n  /** Set when approved — learned from the approving user's own session. */\n  readonly owner: string | null;\n  readonly runnerId: string | null;\n  /**\n   * Whether this approval has already been collected — cloud_008 §2.4.\n   *\n   * This was `runnerTokenOnce`, a bearer token held until the daemon's next\n   * poll and then nulled. The token is gone (finding 37: minted, hashed,\n   * written to two disks, never sent or compared), but the *deliver-once*\n   * property it carried is real and separate: a replayed device code must get\n   * nothing, or a code seen in a shell history is a second pairing.\n   *\n   * So the flag stays and the secret does not. Nulling a token to mean\n   * \"collected\" was one field doing two jobs, and only one of them was load\n   * bearing.\n   */\n  readonly collected: boolean;\n  readonly label: string;\n  readonly platform: \"darwin\" | \"linux\" | \"win32\";\n  readonly daemonVersion: string;\n  readonly capabilities: readonly Capability[];\n  /**\n   * The device's public keys, presented at pair start (byollm_009 §5).\n   *\n   * Kept on the pairing so the approving user is approving a *specific\n   * machine*, not a code that any machine could later redeem. It is copied\n   * onto the runner at approval.\n   */\n  readonly device: PublicIdentity;\n  readonly expiresAt: number;\n  readonly createdAt: number;\n}\n\n/** What the app supplies to enqueue a job. */\nexport interface EnqueueInput {\n  readonly kind: JobKind;\n  /** The work, in plaintext. The server seals it before it is stored. */\n  readonly payload: JobPayload;\n  readonly owner: string;\n  /** Defaults to `self` — the safe direction. */\n  readonly audience?: Audience;\n  readonly audienceAllow?: readonly string[];\n  readonly dependsOn?: readonly string[];\n  /** Defaults to the server config's `defaultTtlMs`. */\n  readonly ttlMs?: number;\n  readonly deadlineAt?: number;\n  /** Caller-supplied id, for idempotent enqueue. */\n  readonly id?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * What the *store* is given — the sealed form.\n *\n * Distinct from {@link EnqueueInput} because the two are genuinely different\n * things: an app hands over work in plaintext, and what gets written down is\n * sealed. Collapsing them into one type would mean a field that is sometimes\n * readable and sometimes not, which is the kind of ambiguity that ends with\n * plaintext in a database.\n */\nexport interface StoredJobInput extends Omit<EnqueueInput, \"payload\" | \"id\"> {\n  readonly id: string;\n  readonly envelope: SealedEnvelope;\n  readonly sizeClass: SizeClass;\n}\n\n/**\n * When a job's ciphertext stops being worth carrying — cloud_008 §31.\n *\n * One function because it was two expressions. The direct plane computed\n * `job.deadlineAt ?? (job.claimableAt ?? now) + job.ttlMs`; the cloud lane\n * computed `record.deadlineAt ?? record.createdAt + <a local constant>`. The\n * first branch agreed and the fallback did not, so a job with no explicit\n * deadline got two different ones depending on which lane published it — and\n * the difference is largest exactly where it matters, for a job blocked on a\n * dependency, whose `claimableAt` may be hours after `createdAt`.\n *\n * The TTL clock starts when a job becomes *claimable*, which is the rule\n * `DEPENDS_ON_GATING` and `TTL_EXPIRY` already share: a dependent job must not\n * spend its life waiting for its dependency.\n */\nexport function deadlineFor(\n  job: Pick<JobRecord, \"deadlineAt\" | \"claimableAt\" | \"ttlMs\">,\n  now: number,\n): number {\n  return job.deadlineAt ?? (job.claimableAt ?? now) + job.ttlMs;\n}\n","import {\n  ENDPOINTS,\n  ERROR_STATUS,\n  PROTOCOL_PREFIX,\n  checkProtocolVersion,\n  type Endpoint,\n} from \"@byollm/protocol\";\nimport { ByollmHandlers, type HandlerConfig } from \"./handlers.js\";\n\n/**\n * Largest protocol request body accepted, before schema validation.\n *\n * A payload is capped at 4 MB of text by the protocol; this leaves room for\n * JSON overhead and a batch of results, and refuses anything wilder at the\n * door rather than after parsing it.\n */\nconst MAX_BODY_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024;\n\n/**\n * Where the protocol endpoints are mounted.\n *\n * Defaults to {@link PROTOCOL_PREFIX}. Pass the real mount point when it is\n * anything else — a Next.js route at `app/api/byollm/[...route]/route.ts`\n * serves `/api/byollm/...`, so it needs `basePath: \"/api/byollm\"`.\n *\n * @throws if the path is not an absolute, single-segment-per-slash path. A\n * mount point is configuration, and a malformed one should fail at startup\n * rather than silently match nothing.\n */\nfunction normalizeBasePath(basePath: string): string {\n  const trimmed = basePath.endsWith(\"/\") ? basePath.slice(0, -1) : basePath;\n  if (!trimmed.startsWith(\"/\")) {\n    throw new Error(`basePath must start with \"/\": got ${basePath}`);\n  }\n  if (trimmed.includes(\"//\") || /[?#*]/.test(trimmed)) {\n    throw new Error(`basePath must be a plain path: got ${basePath}`);\n  }\n  return trimmed;\n}\n\n/**\n * Pull the endpoint name out of a URL path, or null if it isn't ours.\n *\n * The full path must match `<basePath>/<endpoint>` exactly. This used to\n * compare only the *last* segment, which meant `/anything/at/all/claim`\n * dispatched to `claim` and {@link PROTOCOL_PREFIX} was decorative — it\n * appeared in a 404 message and was never matched against. For the handler\n * that serves claim, result and heartbeat, dispatching on a suffix is a\n * looser rule than anyone reading the constant would assume, and loose\n * matching in a security surface should at least be a decision.\n *\n * The cost is that the mount point is now something a deployment has to state\n * rather than something that works by accident. That is the intended trade:\n * a 404 at startup naming the mount point beats a handler answering on paths\n * nobody meant to expose.\n */\nexport function routeEndpoint(\n  pathname: string,\n  basePath: string = PROTOCOL_PREFIX,\n): Endpoint | null {\n  const base = normalizeBasePath(basePath);\n  const path = pathname.endsWith(\"/\") ? pathname.slice(0, -1) : pathname;\n  if (!path.startsWith(`${base}/`)) return null;\n  const rest = path.slice(base.length + 1);\n  return (ENDPOINTS as readonly string[]).includes(rest)\n    ? (rest as Endpoint)\n    : null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the request signature from headers (byollm_009 §4.2).\n *\n * In headers rather than the body so the signature covers the body whole,\n * with no field to exclude from its own hash — a scheme that signs a body\n * minus one field has to agree, byte for byte, on how that field is removed.\n */\nexport function signatureFrom(headers: Headers): unknown {\n  const runnerId = headers.get(\"x-byollm-runner\");\n  const rawIssuedAt = headers.get(\"x-byollm-issued-at\");\n  const signature = headers.get(\"x-byollm-signature\");\n  if (runnerId === null || signature === null || rawIssuedAt === null) {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  // Checked against null *before* Number(), because `Number(null)` is 0 —\n  // finite, plausible-looking, and wrong. A missing timestamp would have\n  // become a timestamp of the epoch, which the freshness check would then\n  // reject for the wrong reason.\n  const issuedAt = Number(rawIssuedAt);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(issuedAt)) return undefined;\n  return { runnerId, issuedAt, signature };\n}\n\n/**\n * A `Request` → `Response` handler for the whole protocol.\n *\n * Web-standard types, so this works unchanged in Next.js route handlers, Hono,\n * Bun, Deno, Cloudflare Workers, and anything else that speaks fetch.\n */\nexport function createFetchHandler(\n  config: HandlerConfig & {\n    /**\n     * Where these endpoints are mounted. Defaults to\n     * {@link PROTOCOL_PREFIX}; set it when the app serves them elsewhere.\n     */\n    readonly basePath?: string;\n  },\n): (request: Request) => Promise<Response> {\n  const handlers = new ByollmHandlers(config);\n  // Validate once, at construction: a bad mount point is a deployment bug and\n  // should surface when the server starts, not as a silent 404 per request.\n  const basePath = normalizeBasePath(config.basePath ?? PROTOCOL_PREFIX);\n\n  return async function handle(request: Request): Promise<Response> {\n    if (request.method !== \"POST\") {\n      return json(405, {\n        error: \"bad-request\",\n        message: \"protocol endpoints accept POST only\",\n      });\n    }\n\n    const endpoint = routeEndpoint(new URL(request.url).pathname, basePath);\n    if (endpoint === null) {\n      return json(404, {\n        error: \"not-found\",\n        message: `not a ${basePath} endpoint`,\n      });\n    }\n\n    const declared = request.headers.get(\"content-length\");\n    if (declared !== null && Number(declared) > MAX_BODY_BYTES) {\n      return json(400, {\n        error: \"bad-request\",\n        message: \"request body too large\",\n      });\n    }\n\n    let body: unknown;\n    let rawBody: string;\n    try {\n      rawBody = await request.text();\n      const text = rawBody;\n      if (text.length > MAX_BODY_BYTES) {\n        return json(400, {\n          error: \"bad-request\",\n          message: \"request body too large\",\n        });\n      }\n      body = JSON.parse(text);\n    } catch {\n      // Deliberately not echoing the parse error: it would quote attacker\n      // input back into a response an operator later reads in a terminal.\n      return json(400, {\n        error: \"bad-request\",\n        message: \"request body is not valid JSON\",\n      });\n    }\n\n    // byollm_009 §4: version before anything else. A mismatch must name the\n    // disagreement and the fix, not surface as a generic bad-request from a\n    // schema literal buried in an endpoint — which is what happened before,\n    // and is why \"the connection is versionless\" was listed as a defect.\n    const refusal = checkProtocolVersion(body);\n    if (refusal) {\n      return json(ERROR_STATUS[refusal.error], refusal);\n    }\n\n    const result = await handlers.handle(endpoint, body, {\n      endpoint,\n      // The bytes as received. Re-serialising the parsed object would verify\n      // a signature over something the sender never sent.\n      rawBody,\n      signature: signatureFrom(request.headers),\n    });\n\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n      \"content-type\": \"application/json\",\n      \"cache-control\": \"no-store\",\n    };\n    if (result.retryAfterSeconds !== undefined) {\n      headers[\"retry-after\"] = String(result.retryAfterSeconds);\n    }\n    return new Response(JSON.stringify(result.body), {\n      status: result.status,\n      headers,\n    });\n  };\n}\n\nfunction json(status: number, body: unknown): Response {\n  return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {\n    status,\n    headers: {\n      \"content-type\": \"application/json\",\n      \"cache-control\": \"no-store\",\n    },\n  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package/dist/{handlers-CF3yE-t2.d.ts → handlers-BJYm2kdq.d.ts}

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { StoredKeys, Endpoint } from '@byollm/protocol';
-import { B as ByollmStore } from './store-gFEEN1Dt.js';
+import { B as ByollmStore } from './store-Dno2fnHH.js';
 
 /** Everything a mount needs to serve the protocol. */
 /**