@byok-sdk/protocol 0.29.0 → 0.30.1

package/dist/capability-constants.d.ts

@@ -36,8 +36,37 @@ export declare const AGENT_MEMORY_INTENT_CAPABILITY: 'agent-memory-intent.v1';
 export declare const AGENT_MEMORY_PROJECTION_CAPABILITY: 'agent.memory.projection';
 /** Device capability required before an ordinary Agent offer may carry `agentMemory`. */
 export declare const AGENT_MEMORY_SELECTION_CAPABILITY: 'agent-memory-selection';
+/** Device capability required before an ordinary Agent offer may carry `agentMemory: 'read-if-admitted'`. */
+export declare const AGENT_MEMORY_READ_IF_ADMITTED_CAPABILITY: 'agent-memory-read-if-admitted';
+/** Device capability required before an ordinary Agent offer may carry `agentMemory: 'read-write-if-admitted'`. */
+export declare const AGENT_MEMORY_READ_WRITE_IF_ADMITTED_CAPABILITY: 'agent-memory-read-write-if-admitted';
 /** Exact capability of the single input-preparation wire authority. */
 export declare const AGENT_INPUT_PREPARATION_CAPABILITY: "agent-input-preparation-v9";
+/**
+ * Sealed payload v1 (#654). A device advertises it before a Host may send it
+ * a sealed offer or steer; a server advertises it before a device may send it
+ * sealed task output or a sealed decline code. Both gates read
+ * `WIRE_ADDITIONS`.
+ */
+export declare const SEALED_PAYLOAD_CAPABILITY: 'sealed-payload-v1';
+/**
+ * A server advertises it before a device may send a sealed task output that
+ * names its ciphertext blob (`sealed.ciphertextRef`) instead of carrying it
+ * inline. The server then holds the blob for the life of the task.
+ */
+export declare const SEALED_OUTPUT_CIPHERTEXT_REF_CAPABILITY: 'sealed-output-ciphertext-ref';
+/**
+ * A server advertises it before a device may send `task.fail.failure`, the
+ * machine-readable runtime failure class (#869).
+ */
+export declare const RUNTIME_FAILURE_CLASS_CAPABILITY: 'runtime-failure-class';
+/**
+ * The closed classes of `task.fail.failure.class`: the vendored OAR
+ * `FailureClass` values. `unknown` means the runtime gave no structured
+ * evidence. Single value authority shared by schema validation and
+ * schema-free consumers.
+ */
+export declare const RUNTIME_FAILURE_CLASSES: readonly ['auth', 'quota', 'rate_limited', 'billing', 'model_unavailable', 'input_too_large', 'invalid_request', 'overloaded', 'provider', 'runtime_exited', 'limit_reached', 'output_schema', 'unknown'];
 /** Single value authority shared by schema validation and schema-free consumers. */
 export declare const PREPARED_AGENT_MEMORY_MODES: readonly ['none', 'read', 'read-write'];
 export declare function isPreparedAgentMemoryMode(value: unknown): value is (typeof PREPARED_AGENT_MEMORY_MODES)[number];

package/dist/codec.d.ts

@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ interface EnvelopeShapeOptions {
         taskId?: never;
         seq: number;
     };
+    'e2ee.key_package.available': {
+        taskId?: never;
+        seq: number;
+    };
     'agent.content.receipt': {
         taskId?: string;
         seq?: number;
@@ -150,6 +154,58 @@ interface EnvelopeShapeOptions {
         taskId: string;
         seq?: number;
     };
+    'task.offer_sealed': {
+        taskId: string;
+        seq: number;
+    };
+    'task.offer_with_toolsets_sealed': {
+        taskId: string;
+        seq: number;
+    };
+    'task.offer_for_agent_sealed': {
+        taskId: string;
+        seq: number;
+    };
+    'task.offer_for_agent_with_egress_sealed': {
+        taskId: string;
+        seq: number;
+    };
+    'task.offer_for_agent_with_egress_fresh_sealed': {
+        taskId: string;
+        seq: number;
+    };
+    'task.steer_sealed': {
+        taskId: string;
+        seq: number;
+    };
+    'task.complete_sealed': {
+        taskId: string;
+        seq?: number;
+    };
+    'task.fail_sealed': {
+        taskId: string;
+        seq?: number;
+    };
+    'task.decline_sealed': {
+        taskId: string;
+        seq?: number;
+    };
+    'task.cancelled_sealed': {
+        taskId: string;
+        seq?: number;
+    };
+    'task.progress_sealed': {
+        taskId: string;
+        seq?: number;
+    };
+    'task.artifact_sealed': {
+        taskId: string;
+        seq?: number;
+    };
+    'task.await_approval_sealed': {
+        taskId: string;
+        seq?: number;
+    };
 }
 interface EnvelopeCommonOptions {
     id?: string;

package/dist/constants.js

@@ -15,7 +15,27 @@ var PROVIDER_PROVISIONING_CAPABILITY = "provider-provisioning.v1";
 var AGENT_MEMORY_INTENT_CAPABILITY = "agent-memory-intent.v1";
 var AGENT_MEMORY_PROJECTION_CAPABILITY = "agent.memory.projection";
 var AGENT_MEMORY_SELECTION_CAPABILITY = "agent-memory-selection";
+var AGENT_MEMORY_READ_IF_ADMITTED_CAPABILITY = "agent-memory-read-if-admitted";
+var AGENT_MEMORY_READ_WRITE_IF_ADMITTED_CAPABILITY = "agent-memory-read-write-if-admitted";
 var AGENT_INPUT_PREPARATION_CAPABILITY = `agent-input-preparation-v${INPUT_PREPARATION_WIRE_VERSION}`;
+var SEALED_PAYLOAD_CAPABILITY = "sealed-payload-v1";
+var SEALED_OUTPUT_CIPHERTEXT_REF_CAPABILITY = "sealed-output-ciphertext-ref";
+var RUNTIME_FAILURE_CLASS_CAPABILITY = "runtime-failure-class";
+var RUNTIME_FAILURE_CLASSES = [
+  "auth",
+  "quota",
+  "rate_limited",
+  "billing",
+  "model_unavailable",
+  "input_too_large",
+  "invalid_request",
+  "overloaded",
+  "provider",
+  "runtime_exited",
+  "limit_reached",
+  "output_schema",
+  "unknown"
+];
 var PREPARED_AGENT_MEMORY_MODES = ["none", "read", "read-write"];
 function isPreparedAgentMemoryMode(value) {
   return typeof value === "string" && PREPARED_AGENT_MEMORY_MODES.some((mode) => mode === value);
@@ -56,7 +76,12 @@ var CAPABILITY_FLAGS = [
   PROVIDER_PROVISIONING_CAPABILITY,
   AGENT_MEMORY_INTENT_CAPABILITY,
   AGENT_MEMORY_SELECTION_CAPABILITY,
-  "agent-message-draft"
+  AGENT_MEMORY_READ_IF_ADMITTED_CAPABILITY,
+  AGENT_MEMORY_READ_WRITE_IF_ADMITTED_CAPABILITY,
+  "agent-message-draft",
+  SEALED_PAYLOAD_CAPABILITY,
+  SEALED_OUTPUT_CIPHERTEXT_REF_CAPABILITY,
+  RUNTIME_FAILURE_CLASS_CAPABILITY
 ];
 
 // src/task-state.ts
@@ -87,6 +112,6 @@ var AGENT_MEMORY_MAX_SNAPSHOT_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;
 var AGENT_MEMORY_MAX_SNAPSHOT_FILES = 128;
 var RUNTIME_IDS = Object.freeze(["pi", "claude", "codex"]);
 
-export { AGENT_CONTENT_ARTIFACT_READ_CAPABILITY, AGENT_CONTENT_TRANSCRIPT_READ_CAPABILITY, AGENT_CONTENT_WORKSPACE_READ_CAPABILITY, AGENT_EGRESS_FRESH_SESSION_CAPABILITY, AGENT_EGRESS_POLICY_CAPABILITY, AGENT_EGRESS_RELIABLE_ACK_CAPABILITY, AGENT_HOME_PROJECTION_CAPABILITY, AGENT_HOME_READERS_CAPABILITY, AGENT_INPUT_PREPARATION_CAPABILITY, AGENT_MEMORY_INTENT_CAPABILITY, AGENT_MEMORY_MAX_SNAPSHOT_BYTES, AGENT_MEMORY_MAX_SNAPSHOT_FILES, AGENT_MEMORY_PROJECTION_CAPABILITY, AGENT_MEMORY_SELECTION_CAPABILITY, AGENT_MESSAGE_EGRESS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY_FLAGS, CUSTOM_HARNESS_CAPABILITY, HOST_MCP_TASK_CONTEXT_CAPABILITY, INPUT_PREPARATION_WIRE_VERSION, MAILBOX_READ_AHEAD_CAPABILITY, MAILBOX_READ_AHEAD_MAX_SEQS, PREPARED_AGENT_MEMORY_MODES, PROTOCOL_VERSION, PROVIDER_PROFILE_BINDING_CAPABILITY, PROVIDER_PROVISIONING_CAPABILITY, RUNTIME_IDS, STRICT_AGENT_ONLY_CAPABILITY, TASK_STATES, TASK_TRANSITIONS, TERMINAL_PROJECTION_SELECTION_CAPABILITY, canTransition, isPreparedAgentMemoryMode };
+export { AGENT_CONTENT_ARTIFACT_READ_CAPABILITY, AGENT_CONTENT_TRANSCRIPT_READ_CAPABILITY, AGENT_CONTENT_WORKSPACE_READ_CAPABILITY, AGENT_EGRESS_FRESH_SESSION_CAPABILITY, AGENT_EGRESS_POLICY_CAPABILITY, AGENT_EGRESS_RELIABLE_ACK_CAPABILITY, AGENT_HOME_PROJECTION_CAPABILITY, AGENT_HOME_READERS_CAPABILITY, AGENT_INPUT_PREPARATION_CAPABILITY, AGENT_MEMORY_INTENT_CAPABILITY, AGENT_MEMORY_MAX_SNAPSHOT_BYTES, AGENT_MEMORY_MAX_SNAPSHOT_FILES, AGENT_MEMORY_PROJECTION_CAPABILITY, AGENT_MEMORY_READ_IF_ADMITTED_CAPABILITY, AGENT_MEMORY_READ_WRITE_IF_ADMITTED_CAPABILITY, AGENT_MEMORY_SELECTION_CAPABILITY, AGENT_MESSAGE_EGRESS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY_FLAGS, CUSTOM_HARNESS_CAPABILITY, HOST_MCP_TASK_CONTEXT_CAPABILITY, INPUT_PREPARATION_WIRE_VERSION, MAILBOX_READ_AHEAD_CAPABILITY, MAILBOX_READ_AHEAD_MAX_SEQS, PREPARED_AGENT_MEMORY_MODES, PROTOCOL_VERSION, PROVIDER_PROFILE_BINDING_CAPABILITY, PROVIDER_PROVISIONING_CAPABILITY, RUNTIME_FAILURE_CLASSES, RUNTIME_FAILURE_CLASS_CAPABILITY, RUNTIME_IDS, SEALED_OUTPUT_CIPHERTEXT_REF_CAPABILITY, SEALED_PAYLOAD_CAPABILITY, STRICT_AGENT_ONLY_CAPABILITY, TASK_STATES, TASK_TRANSITIONS, TERMINAL_PROJECTION_SELECTION_CAPABILITY, canTransition, isPreparedAgentMemoryMode };
 //# sourceMappingURL=constants.js.map
 //# sourceMappingURL=constants.js.map

package/dist/constants.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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See `INPUT_PREPARATION_VERSION` in the client for what each version\n * changed.\n */\nexport const INPUT_PREPARATION_WIRE_VERSION = 9 as const;\n\n\n/** Additive daemon capability names. Server/cloud admission consumes these exactly. */\nexport const AGENT_EGRESS_POLICY_CAPABILITY = 'agent-egress-policy' as const;\n\nexport const AGENT_EGRESS_RELIABLE_ACK_CAPABILITY = 'agent-egress-reliable-ack' as const;\n\n/** Admits the distinct offer whose runtime mints its session only after start. */\nexport const AGENT_EGRESS_FRESH_SESSION_CAPABILITY = 'agent-egress-fresh-session' as const;\n\n/** Admits the distinct Agent-authored message lane; activity policy remains independent. */\nexport const AGENT_MESSAGE_EGRESS_CAPABILITY = 'agent-message-egress' as const;\n\nexport const AGENT_CONTENT_WORKSPACE_READ_CAPABILITY = 'agent-content-workspace-read' as const;\n\nexport const AGENT_CONTENT_TRANSCRIPT_READ_CAPABILITY = 'agent-content-transcript-read' as const;\n\nexport const AGENT_CONTENT_ARTIFACT_READ_CAPABILITY = 'agent-content-artifact-read' as const;\n\n/** Capability required before a task-free Agent-home projection is admitted. */\nexport const AGENT_HOME_PROJECTION_CAPABILITY = 'agent-home-projection' as const;\n\n/** Capability required before an offer may select terminal projection behavior. */\nexport const TERMINAL_PROJECTION_SELECTION_CAPABILITY = 'terminal-projection-selection' as const;\n\n/** Contract §8.1's capability gate for `byok-task-assertion-v1` tool authority. */\nexport const HOST_MCP_TASK_CONTEXT_CAPABILITY = 'host-mcp-task-context' as const;\n\n/** Daemon capability required before an exact local provider profile may be offered. */\nexport const PROVIDER_PROFILE_BINDING_CAPABILITY = 'provider-profile-binding' as const;\n\n/** Device capability required before a Host may enqueue `provider.provisioning.available`. */\nexport const PROVIDER_PROVISIONING_CAPABILITY = 'provider-provisioning.v1' as const;\n\n/** Device capability required before a Host may enqueue `agent.memory.intent.available`. */\nexport const AGENT_MEMORY_INTENT_CAPABILITY = 'agent-memory-intent.v1' as const;\n\n/** Capability required before the optional hosted Agent-memory projection can be used. */\nexport const AGENT_MEMORY_PROJECTION_CAPABILITY = 'agent.memory.projection' as const;\n\n/** Device capability required before an ordinary Agent offer may carry `agentMemory`. */\nexport const AGENT_MEMORY_SELECTION_CAPABILITY = 'agent-memory-selection' as const;\n\n/** Exact capability of the single input-preparation wire authority. */\nexport const AGENT_INPUT_PREPARATION_CAPABILITY =\n  `agent-input-preparation-v${INPUT_PREPARATION_WIRE_VERSION}` as const;\n\n/** Single value authority shared by schema validation and schema-free consumers. */\nexport const PREPARED_AGENT_MEMORY_MODES = ['none', 'read', 'read-write'] as const;\n\nexport function isPreparedAgentMemoryMode(value: unknown): value is (typeof PREPARED_AGENT_MEMORY_MODES)[number] {\n  return typeof value === 'string' && PREPARED_AGENT_MEMORY_MODES.some(mode => mode === value);\n}\n","/** Bounded volatile navigation; only cursor is a durable acknowledgement. */\nexport const MAILBOX_READ_AHEAD_MAX_SEQS = 4096;\nexport const MAILBOX_READ_AHEAD_CAPABILITY = 'mailbox-read-ahead';\n\n/**\n * Wire protocol version. Every v3 change is a version bump, a gated addition\n * or a strip-safe addition: see docs/protocol.md \"Freeze rule\", which is the\n * one statement of the rule, and `src/wire-additions.ts`, which declares the\n * receiver-capability gates and additions. No v3 release has been published\n * yet, so `src/__tests__/compat.test.ts` has no published v3 decoder to prove\n * additions against; cross-release gates stay unproven until one exists.\n *\n * v3 makes `schema` required on the `terminalProjection.mode:\n * 'result-document'` arm (`terminal-projection.ts`, `result-schema.ts`): the\n * offer freezes the outcome schema, and the outcome reaches the Host only as\n * `task.complete.document`. That narrows a strict shape, so it is a wire\n * major. A v2 envelope is rejected; there is no v2 reader and no capability\n * negotiation between the two result-document shapes. Drain, then upgrade\n * server and client together. Every addition v2 declared is part of the v3\n * baseline, and the v2 `result-document` capability flag is gone: every v3\n * server keeps `task.complete.document`.\n *\n * v2 removed the task offer's `policy` (`PermissionPolicy`), the runtime\n * capability `permissionModes` and the input-preparation `permissionMode`.\n * Sessions run without an SDK permission gate; each local agent keeps its\n * own guardrails. A v1 envelope is rejected; there is no v1 reader.\n * v2 also removed the egress policy's `metadata-status` activity mode, its\n * `activity.mode` field and the `sanitizer_rejected` drop reason. Agent\n * egress goes to the Host as the runtime produced it.\n * v2 also removed the input-preparation artifact's `toolImplementationKinds`\n * and the readiness reason `executor_identity_unproven`. The SDK does not\n * attest tool executables. The artifact names its counted tools in\n * `toolNames`.\n */\nexport const PROTOCOL_VERSION = 3;\n\n/** Host declares that this device accepts only Agent-bound offer variants. */\nexport const STRICT_AGENT_ONLY_CAPABILITY = 'strict-agent-only' as const;\n\n/**\n * The device runs `homeAccess: 'memory-reader'` Agent offers: each reader\n * Attempt gets its own run directory under the Agent home, and readers are\n * counted apart from the one writer. The Agent offers are strict, so a host\n * must refuse a reader offer to a device without this flag before it creates\n * the task.\n */\nexport const AGENT_HOME_READERS_CAPABILITY = 'agent-home-readers' as const;\n\n/**\n * Capability flags exchanged during the connection handshake (`conn.hello` /\n * `conn.ack`). Additional flags may be introduced without a protocol version\n * bump; unrecognized flags must be ignored by both sides.\n *\n * `interactive-approval` is RESERVED as of this addition: it gates the\n * (currently unexercised) approval seam — a server must not route an\n * approval-requiring policy to a daemon that hasn't advertised this flag. No\n * bundled runtime adapter emits it yet; that's expected until interactive\n * approval is actually wired up in a later wave.\n *\n * `approval_resolved` (additive-minor): a SERVER-advertised flag meaning\n * \"I understand the `task.approval_resolved` message\" (`messages.ts`). This\n * is the N/N-1 answer for that new daemon -> server message: an old server's\n * `CAPABILITY_FLAGS`/`conn.ack.capabilities` never includes it, so a new\n * daemon talking to an old server never sends `task.approval_resolved` at\n * all (see `packages/client`'s `task-runner.ts`) and falls back to the\n * pre-existing implicit-resume inference\n * (`ConnectionHub.resumeIfImplicitlyApproved`, `packages/server/src/hub.ts`)\n * unconditionally, exactly as before this flag existed. Unlike\n * `interactive-approval`, this one IS exercised the moment both sides\n * support it — there is no reserved/dormant period for it.\n */\n/**\n * `approval-targeting` (M5, additive-minor): unlike `approval_resolved`\n * above, this flag is purely INFORMATIONAL/semantic, not a functional gate.\n * `task.await_approval`/`task.approve`/`task.reject` all carry their new\n * `approvalId` field UNCONDITIONALLY on both sides once each peer is\n * upgraded -- the wire is tolerant (a plain, non-`.strict()` `z.object()`\n * field, `messages.ts`), so no version/capability negotiation is needed just\n * to send it safely; an older peer that doesn't recognize the field simply\n * never reads it. Receivers decide whether to apply exact-match targeting\n * by FIELD PRESENCE on the specific message at hand (does this particular\n * `task.approve`/`task.reject`/`onApprovalResolved` payload carry an\n * `approvalId`, and does a stored one exist to compare it against?), never\n * by checking this flag -- see `ConnectionHub.approveTask`/`rejectTask`/\n * `onApprovalResolved` and `TaskRunner.handleApprove`/`handleReject`\n * (`packages/client`'s `task-runner.ts`). This flag exists only so each side\n * can advertise, and an embedder/operator can observe (`ConnectionHub.\n * getDeviceCapabilities`), whether the OTHER side is new enough to\n * participate in targeting at all -- the same N/N-1-safe shape as every\n * other flag here, just consumed for observability instead of gating.\n */\n/**\n * `dispatch-selection` (additive-minor) is a correctness gate for the\n * optional `task.offer.dispatchSelection` control field. An older v1 daemon\n * legally strips unknown optional fields, so a server must never send an\n * authoritative provider/model selection unless the target connection\n * advertises this flag. Absence means reject before task creation, not send\n * a legacy runtime-only offer that could reach a different provider.\n *\n * `toolset-selection` (additive-minor) means the daemon understands\n * `task.offer_with_toolsets` and can resolve its logical ids against local\n * MCP configuration. The distinct message type is also the N/N-1 safety\n * boundary for long-poll: an older daemon skips it as unknown and therefore\n * cannot accidentally execute the instruction without the required tools.\n */\nexport const CUSTOM_HARNESS_CAPABILITY = 'custom-harness' as const;\n\nexport const CAPABILITY_FLAGS = [\n  'steer',\n  'blob-upload',\n  'interactive-approval',\n  'approval_resolved',\n  'approval-targeting',\n  'dispatch-selection',\n  PROVIDER_PROFILE_BINDING_CAPABILITY,\n  'toolset-selection',\n  'agent-home-contract',\n  AGENT_HOME_READERS_CAPABILITY,\n  STRICT_AGENT_ONLY_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_EGRESS_POLICY_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_EGRESS_RELIABLE_ACK_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_MESSAGE_EGRESS_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_EGRESS_FRESH_SESSION_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_CONTENT_WORKSPACE_READ_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_CONTENT_TRANSCRIPT_READ_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_CONTENT_ARTIFACT_READ_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_HOME_PROJECTION_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_INPUT_PREPARATION_CAPABILITY,\n  TERMINAL_PROJECTION_SELECTION_CAPABILITY,\n  HOST_MCP_TASK_CONTEXT_CAPABILITY,\n  CUSTOM_HARNESS_CAPABILITY,\n  MAILBOX_READ_AHEAD_CAPABILITY,\n  PROVIDER_PROVISIONING_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_MEMORY_INTENT_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_MEMORY_SELECTION_CAPABILITY,\n  'agent-message-draft',\n] as const;\n\nexport type CapabilityFlag = (typeof CAPABILITY_FLAGS)[number];\nimport {\n  AGENT_EGRESS_POLICY_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_EGRESS_RELIABLE_ACK_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_EGRESS_FRESH_SESSION_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_MESSAGE_EGRESS_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_CONTENT_WORKSPACE_READ_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_CONTENT_TRANSCRIPT_READ_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_CONTENT_ARTIFACT_READ_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_HOME_PROJECTION_CAPABILITY,\n  TERMINAL_PROJECTION_SELECTION_CAPABILITY,\n  HOST_MCP_TASK_CONTEXT_CAPABILITY,\n  PROVIDER_PROFILE_BINDING_CAPABILITY,\n  PROVIDER_PROVISIONING_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_MEMORY_INTENT_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_MEMORY_SELECTION_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_INPUT_PREPARATION_CAPABILITY,\n} from './capability-constants';\n","export const TASK_STATES = [\n  'Offered',\n  'Claimed',\n  'Running',\n  'AwaitApproval',\n  'Complete',\n  'Failed',\n  'Cancelled',\n] as const;\n\nexport type TaskState = (typeof TASK_STATES)[number];\n\n/**\n * Legal state transitions for a task. `Complete` / `Failed` / `Cancelled` are\n * terminal (no outgoing edges). `Running` and `AwaitApproval` form a loop:\n * the daemon can request approval mid-run and resume once the server\n * approves (or fail/cancel out of the approval wait).\n *\n * `Offered -> Failed` (M1 gap #5, \"Declined vs. Failed\"): a daemon that\n * declines an offer pre-claim (`task.decline`) reports it through the\n * existing `Failed` state rather than a new `Declined` state. A decline and\n * a post-claim failure are the same outcome from the dispatcher's point of\n * view — this attempt produced no result, `reason`/`retryable` say why and\n * whether retrying elsewhere makes sense — so reusing `Failed` keeps the\n * state machine minimal instead of forking every terminal-state consumer\n * into \"Failed or Declined, handle both\". See docs/protocol.md for the full\n * writeup.\n */\nexport const TASK_TRANSITIONS: Readonly<Record<TaskState, readonly TaskState[]>> = {\n  Offered: ['Claimed', 'Cancelled', 'Failed'],\n  Claimed: ['Running', 'Failed', 'Cancelled'],\n  Running: ['AwaitApproval', 'Complete', 'Failed', 'Cancelled'],\n  AwaitApproval: ['Running', 'Failed', 'Cancelled'],\n  Complete: [],\n  Failed: [],\n  Cancelled: [],\n};\n\n/** Whether `from -> to` is a legal transition per {@link TASK_TRANSITIONS}. */\nexport function canTransition(from: TaskState, to: TaskState): boolean {\n  return TASK_TRANSITIONS[from].includes(to);\n}\n","/** Schema-free protocol values. Import this entry when runtime schemas are unnecessary. */\nexport * from './version';\nexport * from './task-state';\nexport * from './capability-constants';\n\n/** Maximum raw UTF-8 content bytes in one local Host Agent-memory export; no truncation. */\nexport const AGENT_MEMORY_MAX_SNAPSHOT_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;\n/** Maximum memory files in one local Host export, including MEMORY.md. */\nexport const AGENT_MEMORY_MAX_SNAPSHOT_FILES = 128;\n\n/** The frozen wire runtime ids. Any other adapter id is a custom harness (`harnessId`). */\nexport const RUNTIME_IDS = Object.freeze(['pi', 'claude', 'codex'] as const);\n"]}
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See `INPUT_PREPARATION_VERSION` in the client for what each version\n * changed.\n */\nexport const INPUT_PREPARATION_WIRE_VERSION = 9 as const;\n\n\n/** Additive daemon capability names. Server/cloud admission consumes these exactly. */\nexport const AGENT_EGRESS_POLICY_CAPABILITY = 'agent-egress-policy' as const;\n\nexport const AGENT_EGRESS_RELIABLE_ACK_CAPABILITY = 'agent-egress-reliable-ack' as const;\n\n/** Admits the distinct offer whose runtime mints its session only after start. */\nexport const AGENT_EGRESS_FRESH_SESSION_CAPABILITY = 'agent-egress-fresh-session' as const;\n\n/** Admits the distinct Agent-authored message lane; activity policy remains independent. */\nexport const AGENT_MESSAGE_EGRESS_CAPABILITY = 'agent-message-egress' as const;\n\nexport const AGENT_CONTENT_WORKSPACE_READ_CAPABILITY = 'agent-content-workspace-read' as const;\n\nexport const AGENT_CONTENT_TRANSCRIPT_READ_CAPABILITY = 'agent-content-transcript-read' as const;\n\nexport const AGENT_CONTENT_ARTIFACT_READ_CAPABILITY = 'agent-content-artifact-read' as const;\n\n/** Capability required before a task-free Agent-home projection is admitted. */\nexport const AGENT_HOME_PROJECTION_CAPABILITY = 'agent-home-projection' as const;\n\n/** Capability required before an offer may select terminal projection behavior. */\nexport const TERMINAL_PROJECTION_SELECTION_CAPABILITY = 'terminal-projection-selection' as const;\n\n/** Contract §8.1's capability gate for `byok-task-assertion-v1` tool authority. */\nexport const HOST_MCP_TASK_CONTEXT_CAPABILITY = 'host-mcp-task-context' as const;\n\n/** Daemon capability required before an exact local provider profile may be offered. */\nexport const PROVIDER_PROFILE_BINDING_CAPABILITY = 'provider-profile-binding' as const;\n\n/** Device capability required before a Host may enqueue `provider.provisioning.available`. */\nexport const PROVIDER_PROVISIONING_CAPABILITY = 'provider-provisioning.v1' as const;\n\n/** Device capability required before a Host may enqueue `agent.memory.intent.available`. */\nexport const AGENT_MEMORY_INTENT_CAPABILITY = 'agent-memory-intent.v1' as const;\n\n/** Capability required before the optional hosted Agent-memory projection can be used. */\nexport const AGENT_MEMORY_PROJECTION_CAPABILITY = 'agent.memory.projection' as const;\n\n/** Device capability required before an ordinary Agent offer may carry `agentMemory`. */\nexport const AGENT_MEMORY_SELECTION_CAPABILITY = 'agent-memory-selection' as const;\n\n/** Device capability required before an ordinary Agent offer may carry `agentMemory: 'read-if-admitted'`. */\nexport const AGENT_MEMORY_READ_IF_ADMITTED_CAPABILITY = 'agent-memory-read-if-admitted' as const;\n\n/** Device capability required before an ordinary Agent offer may carry `agentMemory: 'read-write-if-admitted'`. */\nexport const AGENT_MEMORY_READ_WRITE_IF_ADMITTED_CAPABILITY = 'agent-memory-read-write-if-admitted' as const;\n\n/** Exact capability of the single input-preparation wire authority. */\nexport const AGENT_INPUT_PREPARATION_CAPABILITY =\n  `agent-input-preparation-v${INPUT_PREPARATION_WIRE_VERSION}` as const;\n\n/**\n * Sealed payload v1 (#654). A device advertises it before a Host may send it\n * a sealed offer or steer; a server advertises it before a device may send it\n * sealed task output or a sealed decline code. Both gates read\n * `WIRE_ADDITIONS`.\n */\nexport const SEALED_PAYLOAD_CAPABILITY = 'sealed-payload-v1' as const;\n\n/**\n * A server advertises it before a device may send a sealed task output that\n * names its ciphertext blob (`sealed.ciphertextRef`) instead of carrying it\n * inline. The server then holds the blob for the life of the task.\n */\nexport const SEALED_OUTPUT_CIPHERTEXT_REF_CAPABILITY = 'sealed-output-ciphertext-ref' as const;\n\n/**\n * A server advertises it before a device may send `task.fail.failure`, the\n * machine-readable runtime failure class (#869).\n */\nexport const RUNTIME_FAILURE_CLASS_CAPABILITY = 'runtime-failure-class' as const;\n\n/**\n * The closed classes of `task.fail.failure.class`: the vendored OAR\n * `FailureClass` values. `unknown` means the runtime gave no structured\n * evidence. Single value authority shared by schema validation and\n * schema-free consumers.\n */\nexport const RUNTIME_FAILURE_CLASSES = [\n  'auth', 'quota', 'rate_limited', 'billing', 'model_unavailable', 'input_too_large', 'invalid_request',\n  'overloaded', 'provider', 'runtime_exited', 'limit_reached', 'output_schema', 'unknown',\n] as const;\n\n/** Single value authority shared by schema validation and schema-free consumers. */\nexport const PREPARED_AGENT_MEMORY_MODES = ['none', 'read', 'read-write'] as const;\n\nexport function isPreparedAgentMemoryMode(value: unknown): value is (typeof PREPARED_AGENT_MEMORY_MODES)[number] {\n  return typeof value === 'string' && PREPARED_AGENT_MEMORY_MODES.some(mode => mode === value);\n}\n","/** Bounded volatile navigation; only cursor is a durable acknowledgement. */\nexport const MAILBOX_READ_AHEAD_MAX_SEQS = 4096;\nexport const MAILBOX_READ_AHEAD_CAPABILITY = 'mailbox-read-ahead';\n\n/**\n * Wire protocol version. Every v3 change is a version bump, a gated addition\n * or a strip-safe addition: see docs/protocol.md \"Freeze rule\", which is the\n * one statement of the rule, and `src/wire-additions.ts`, which declares the\n * receiver-capability gates and additions. No v3 release has been published\n * yet, so `src/__tests__/compat.test.ts` has no published v3 decoder to prove\n * additions against; cross-release gates stay unproven until one exists.\n *\n * v3 makes `schema` required on the `terminalProjection.mode:\n * 'result-document'` arm (`terminal-projection.ts`, `result-schema.ts`): the\n * offer freezes the outcome schema, and the outcome reaches the Host only as\n * `task.complete.document`. That narrows a strict shape, so it is a wire\n * major. A v2 envelope is rejected; there is no v2 reader and no capability\n * negotiation between the two result-document shapes. Drain, then upgrade\n * server and client together. Every addition v2 declared is part of the v3\n * baseline, and the v2 `result-document` capability flag is gone: every v3\n * server keeps `task.complete.document`.\n *\n * v2 removed the task offer's `policy` (`PermissionPolicy`), the runtime\n * capability `permissionModes` and the input-preparation `permissionMode`.\n * Sessions run without an SDK permission gate; each local agent keeps its\n * own guardrails. A v1 envelope is rejected; there is no v1 reader.\n * v2 also removed the egress policy's `metadata-status` activity mode, its\n * `activity.mode` field and the `sanitizer_rejected` drop reason. Agent\n * egress goes to the Host as the runtime produced it.\n * v2 also removed the input-preparation artifact's `toolImplementationKinds`\n * and the readiness reason `executor_identity_unproven`. The SDK does not\n * attest tool executables. The artifact names its counted tools in\n * `toolNames`.\n */\nexport const PROTOCOL_VERSION = 3;\n\n/** Host declares that this device accepts only Agent-bound offer variants. */\nexport const STRICT_AGENT_ONLY_CAPABILITY = 'strict-agent-only' as const;\n\n/**\n * The device runs `homeAccess: 'memory-reader'` Agent offers: each reader\n * Attempt gets its own run directory under the Agent home, and readers are\n * counted apart from the one writer. The Agent offers are strict, so a host\n * must refuse a reader offer to a device without this flag before it creates\n * the task.\n */\nexport const AGENT_HOME_READERS_CAPABILITY = 'agent-home-readers' as const;\n\n/**\n * Capability flags exchanged during the connection handshake (`conn.hello` /\n * `conn.ack`). Additional flags may be introduced without a protocol version\n * bump; unrecognized flags must be ignored by both sides.\n *\n * `interactive-approval` is RESERVED as of this addition: it gates the\n * (currently unexercised) approval seam — a server must not route an\n * approval-requiring policy to a daemon that hasn't advertised this flag. No\n * bundled runtime adapter emits it yet; that's expected until interactive\n * approval is actually wired up in a later wave.\n *\n * `approval_resolved` (additive-minor): a SERVER-advertised flag meaning\n * \"I understand the `task.approval_resolved` message\" (`messages.ts`). This\n * is the N/N-1 answer for that new daemon -> server message: an old server's\n * `CAPABILITY_FLAGS`/`conn.ack.capabilities` never includes it, so a new\n * daemon talking to an old server never sends `task.approval_resolved` at\n * all (see `packages/client`'s `task-runner.ts`) and falls back to the\n * pre-existing implicit-resume inference\n * (`ConnectionHub.resumeIfImplicitlyApproved`, `packages/server/src/hub.ts`)\n * unconditionally, exactly as before this flag existed. Unlike\n * `interactive-approval`, this one IS exercised the moment both sides\n * support it — there is no reserved/dormant period for it.\n */\n/**\n * `approval-targeting` (M5, additive-minor): unlike `approval_resolved`\n * above, this flag is purely INFORMATIONAL/semantic, not a functional gate.\n * `task.await_approval`/`task.approve`/`task.reject` all carry their new\n * `approvalId` field UNCONDITIONALLY on both sides once each peer is\n * upgraded -- the wire is tolerant (a plain, non-`.strict()` `z.object()`\n * field, `messages.ts`), so no version/capability negotiation is needed just\n * to send it safely; an older peer that doesn't recognize the field simply\n * never reads it. Receivers decide whether to apply exact-match targeting\n * by FIELD PRESENCE on the specific message at hand (does this particular\n * `task.approve`/`task.reject`/`onApprovalResolved` payload carry an\n * `approvalId`, and does a stored one exist to compare it against?), never\n * by checking this flag -- see `ConnectionHub.approveTask`/`rejectTask`/\n * `onApprovalResolved` and `TaskRunner.handleApprove`/`handleReject`\n * (`packages/client`'s `task-runner.ts`). This flag exists only so each side\n * can advertise, and an embedder/operator can observe (`ConnectionHub.\n * getDeviceCapabilities`), whether the OTHER side is new enough to\n * participate in targeting at all -- the same N/N-1-safe shape as every\n * other flag here, just consumed for observability instead of gating.\n */\n/**\n * `dispatch-selection` (additive-minor) is a correctness gate for the\n * optional `task.offer.dispatchSelection` control field. An older v1 daemon\n * legally strips unknown optional fields, so a server must never send an\n * authoritative provider/model selection unless the target connection\n * advertises this flag. Absence means reject before task creation, not send\n * a legacy runtime-only offer that could reach a different provider.\n *\n * `toolset-selection` (additive-minor) means the daemon understands\n * `task.offer_with_toolsets` and can resolve its logical ids against local\n * MCP configuration. The distinct message type is also the N/N-1 safety\n * boundary for long-poll: an older daemon skips it as unknown and therefore\n * cannot accidentally execute the instruction without the required tools.\n */\nexport const CUSTOM_HARNESS_CAPABILITY = 'custom-harness' as const;\n\nexport const CAPABILITY_FLAGS = [\n  'steer',\n  'blob-upload',\n  'interactive-approval',\n  'approval_resolved',\n  'approval-targeting',\n  'dispatch-selection',\n  PROVIDER_PROFILE_BINDING_CAPABILITY,\n  'toolset-selection',\n  'agent-home-contract',\n  AGENT_HOME_READERS_CAPABILITY,\n  STRICT_AGENT_ONLY_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_EGRESS_POLICY_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_EGRESS_RELIABLE_ACK_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_MESSAGE_EGRESS_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_EGRESS_FRESH_SESSION_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_CONTENT_WORKSPACE_READ_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_CONTENT_TRANSCRIPT_READ_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_CONTENT_ARTIFACT_READ_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_HOME_PROJECTION_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_INPUT_PREPARATION_CAPABILITY,\n  TERMINAL_PROJECTION_SELECTION_CAPABILITY,\n  HOST_MCP_TASK_CONTEXT_CAPABILITY,\n  CUSTOM_HARNESS_CAPABILITY,\n  MAILBOX_READ_AHEAD_CAPABILITY,\n  PROVIDER_PROVISIONING_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_MEMORY_INTENT_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_MEMORY_SELECTION_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_MEMORY_READ_IF_ADMITTED_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_MEMORY_READ_WRITE_IF_ADMITTED_CAPABILITY,\n  'agent-message-draft',\n  SEALED_PAYLOAD_CAPABILITY,\n  SEALED_OUTPUT_CIPHERTEXT_REF_CAPABILITY,\n  RUNTIME_FAILURE_CLASS_CAPABILITY,\n] as const;\n\nexport type CapabilityFlag = (typeof CAPABILITY_FLAGS)[number];\nimport {\n  AGENT_EGRESS_POLICY_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_EGRESS_RELIABLE_ACK_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_EGRESS_FRESH_SESSION_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_MESSAGE_EGRESS_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_CONTENT_WORKSPACE_READ_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_CONTENT_TRANSCRIPT_READ_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_CONTENT_ARTIFACT_READ_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_HOME_PROJECTION_CAPABILITY,\n  TERMINAL_PROJECTION_SELECTION_CAPABILITY,\n  HOST_MCP_TASK_CONTEXT_CAPABILITY,\n  PROVIDER_PROFILE_BINDING_CAPABILITY,\n  PROVIDER_PROVISIONING_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_MEMORY_INTENT_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_MEMORY_SELECTION_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_MEMORY_READ_IF_ADMITTED_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_MEMORY_READ_WRITE_IF_ADMITTED_CAPABILITY,\n  AGENT_INPUT_PREPARATION_CAPABILITY,\n  SEALED_PAYLOAD_CAPABILITY,\n  SEALED_OUTPUT_CIPHERTEXT_REF_CAPABILITY,\n  RUNTIME_FAILURE_CLASS_CAPABILITY,\n} from './capability-constants';\n","export const TASK_STATES = [\n  'Offered',\n  'Claimed',\n  'Running',\n  'AwaitApproval',\n  'Complete',\n  'Failed',\n  'Cancelled',\n] as const;\n\nexport type TaskState = (typeof TASK_STATES)[number];\n\n/**\n * Legal state transitions for a task. `Complete` / `Failed` / `Cancelled` are\n * terminal (no outgoing edges). `Running` and `AwaitApproval` form a loop:\n * the daemon can request approval mid-run and resume once the server\n * approves (or fail/cancel out of the approval wait).\n *\n * `Offered -> Failed` (M1 gap #5, \"Declined vs. Failed\"): a daemon that\n * declines an offer pre-claim (`task.decline`) reports it through the\n * existing `Failed` state rather than a new `Declined` state. A decline and\n * a post-claim failure are the same outcome from the dispatcher's point of\n * view — this attempt produced no result, `reason`/`retryable` say why and\n * whether retrying elsewhere makes sense — so reusing `Failed` keeps the\n * state machine minimal instead of forking every terminal-state consumer\n * into \"Failed or Declined, handle both\". See docs/protocol.md for the full\n * writeup.\n */\nexport const TASK_TRANSITIONS: Readonly<Record<TaskState, readonly TaskState[]>> = {\n  Offered: ['Claimed', 'Cancelled', 'Failed'],\n  Claimed: ['Running', 'Failed', 'Cancelled'],\n  Running: ['AwaitApproval', 'Complete', 'Failed', 'Cancelled'],\n  AwaitApproval: ['Running', 'Failed', 'Cancelled'],\n  Complete: [],\n  Failed: [],\n  Cancelled: [],\n};\n\n/** Whether `from -> to` is a legal transition per {@link TASK_TRANSITIONS}. */\nexport function canTransition(from: TaskState, to: TaskState): boolean {\n  return TASK_TRANSITIONS[from].includes(to);\n}\n","/** Schema-free protocol values. Import this entry when runtime schemas are unnecessary. */\nexport * from './version';\nexport * from './task-state';\nexport * from './capability-constants';\n\n/** Maximum raw UTF-8 content bytes in one local Host Agent-memory export; no truncation. */\nexport const AGENT_MEMORY_MAX_SNAPSHOT_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;\n/** Maximum memory files in one local Host export, including MEMORY.md. */\nexport const AGENT_MEMORY_MAX_SNAPSHOT_FILES = 128;\n\n/** The frozen wire runtime ids. Any other adapter id is a custom harness (`harnessId`). */\nexport const RUNTIME_IDS = Object.freeze(['pi', 'claude', 'codex'] as const);\n"]}

package/dist/e2ee-member.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+/**
+ * Member keys, the member chain and scope key packages as the Host stores
+ * them (#654 design §7.2–§7.4, E2c).
+ *
+ * The Host checks shapes only. It never hashes an entry or verifies a
+ * signature: members walk the chain themselves (§7.3), so a Host check adds
+ * no trust. `@byok-sdk/core/sealed-payload` creates and verifies these values.
+ * Protocol does not depend on core, so this module repeats core's shape
+ * rules; a cross-package test in `@byok-sdk/cloud` keeps the two equal.
+ */
+import { z } from 'zod';
+/** The most chain entries one append accepts. */
+export declare const E2EE_MEMBER_CHAIN_APPEND_MAX_ENTRIES = 64;
+/** The largest canonical JSON entry, in UTF-8 bytes. */
+export declare const E2EE_MEMBER_CHAIN_ENTRY_MAX_BYTES = 65536;
+/** The most chain entries one read returns. */
+export declare const E2EE_MEMBER_CHAIN_READ_MAX_ENTRIES = 256;
+/** The most scope key packages one put accepts. */
+export declare const E2EE_SCOPE_KEY_PACKAGE_PUT_MAX = 256;
+/**
+ * The longest scope id, in UTF-16 code units, as for other opaque Host ids.
+ * Core sets no maximum, so the scope key package shape (which the parity test
+ * compares with core) leaves it out, and the Host checks it on every put and
+ * read. The key package notice is Host-built wire, so its schema carries it.
+ */
+export declare const E2EE_SCOPE_ID_MAX_LENGTH = 512;
+/** Register the device's member key bundle and its device pairing MAC (§7.2 step 3). */
+export declare const E2EE_MEMBER_KEY_REGISTER_OPERATION: 'e2ee-member-key.register';
+/** Append member chain entries. */
+export declare const E2EE_MEMBER_CHAIN_APPEND_OPERATION: 'e2ee-member-chain.append';
+/** Put scope key packages. */
+export declare const E2EE_SCOPE_KEY_PACKAGE_PUT_OPERATION: 'e2ee-scope-key-package.put';
+/** A member's public key bundle. A device member names its SDK device id; a client member has none. */
+export declare const E2eeMemberKeyBundleSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    v: z.ZodLiteral<1>;
+    memberId: z.ZodString;
+    signingPublicJwk: z.ZodObject<{
+        kty: z.ZodLiteral<"EC">;
+        crv: z.ZodLiteral<"P-256">;
+        x: z.ZodString;
+        y: z.ZodString;
+    }, z.core.$strict>;
+    kemPublicJwk: z.ZodObject<{
+        kty: z.ZodLiteral<"EC">;
+        crv: z.ZodLiteral<"P-256">;
+        x: z.ZodString;
+        y: z.ZodString;
+    }, z.core.$strict>;
+    kemEpoch: z.ZodNumber;
+    kemSig: z.ZodString;
+    deviceId: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+}, z.core.$strict>;
+export type E2eeMemberKeyBundle = z.infer<typeof E2eeMemberKeyBundleSchema>;
+export declare const E2EE_MEMBER_CHAIN_OPS: readonly ['add', 'remove', 'rotate', 'scope-policy', 'shred'];
+/**
+ * One signed member chain entry. `subject` must be a JSON object; the Host
+ * stores the entry as canonical JSON, which refuses any value outside JSON.
+ * A `shred` subject must also be exactly `{ scopeId }`.
+ */
+export declare const E2eeMemberChainEntrySchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    v: z.ZodLiteral<1>;
+    tenantId: z.ZodString;
+    seq: z.ZodNumber;
+    prev: z.ZodUnion<readonly [z.ZodNull, z.ZodString]>;
+    op: z.ZodEnum<{
+        add: "add";
+        remove: "remove";
+        rotate: "rotate";
+        "scope-policy": "scope-policy";
+        shred: "shred";
+    }>;
+    subject: z.ZodCustom<Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>, Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>>;
+    signer: z.ZodString;
+    sig: z.ZodString;
+}, z.core.$strict>;
+export type E2eeMemberChainEntry = z.infer<typeof E2eeMemberChainEntrySchema>;
+/** One scope key wrapped to one member (§7.4). */
+export declare const E2eeScopeKeyPackageSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    v: z.ZodLiteral<1>;
+    tenantId: z.ZodString;
+    scopeId: z.ZodString;
+    epoch: z.ZodNumber;
+    keyId: z.ZodString;
+    recipient: z.ZodString;
+    sender: z.ZodString;
+    enc: z.ZodString;
+    ciphertext: z.ZodString;
+    sig: z.ZodString;
+}, z.core.$strict>;
+export type E2eeScopeKeyPackage = z.infer<typeof E2eeScopeKeyPackageSchema>;
+/** A pairing MAC (§7.2 steps 3 and 4): HMAC-SHA-256 under `pv`, which the Host never holds. */
+export declare const E2eePairingMacSchema: z.ZodString;
+/**
+ * The device registration body. `member` is the device's own bundle, so it
+ * names the device id; `mac` is the device pairing MAC over it under `pv`.
+ */
+export declare const E2eeMemberKeyRegisterRequestSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    member: z.ZodObject<{
+        v: z.ZodLiteral<1>;
+        memberId: z.ZodString;
+        signingPublicJwk: z.ZodObject<{
+            kty: z.ZodLiteral<"EC">;
+            crv: z.ZodLiteral<"P-256">;
+            x: z.ZodString;
+            y: z.ZodString;
+        }, z.core.$strict>;
+        kemPublicJwk: z.ZodObject<{
+            kty: z.ZodLiteral<"EC">;
+            crv: z.ZodLiteral<"P-256">;
+            x: z.ZodString;
+            y: z.ZodString;
+        }, z.core.$strict>;
+        kemEpoch: z.ZodNumber;
+        kemSig: z.ZodString;
+        deviceId: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    }, z.core.$strict>;
+    mac: z.ZodString;
+}, z.core.$strict>;
+export type E2eeMemberKeyRegisterRequest = z.infer<typeof E2eeMemberKeyRegisterRequestSchema>;
+/** What the client relays to the device in pairing step 4. The client member has no device id. */
+export declare const E2eeClientPairingMacSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    mac: z.ZodString;
+    member: z.ZodObject<{
+        v: z.ZodLiteral<1>;
+        memberId: z.ZodString;
+        signingPublicJwk: z.ZodObject<{
+            kty: z.ZodLiteral<"EC">;
+            crv: z.ZodLiteral<"P-256">;
+            x: z.ZodString;
+            y: z.ZodString;
+        }, z.core.$strict>;
+        kemPublicJwk: z.ZodObject<{
+            kty: z.ZodLiteral<"EC">;
+            crv: z.ZodLiteral<"P-256">;
+            x: z.ZodString;
+            y: z.ZodString;
+        }, z.core.$strict>;
+        kemEpoch: z.ZodNumber;
+        kemSig: z.ZodString;
+        deviceId: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    }, z.core.$strict>;
+    chainHead: z.ZodObject<{
+        seq: z.ZodNumber;
+        hash: z.ZodString;
+    }, z.core.$strict>;
+}, z.core.$strict>;
+export type E2eeClientPairingMac = z.infer<typeof E2eeClientPairingMacSchema>;
+/**
+ * Server -> daemon `e2ee.key_package.available` (E2c-3): the Host stored a
+ * scope key package for this device's member. The payload names only the
+ * scope epoch; the device fetches the package from its device route (§7.4,
+ * notice-and-fetch), so a mailbox row never holds key material. Gated by
+ * `sealed-payload-v1`.
+ */
+export declare const E2eeKeyPackageAvailablePayloadSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    scopeId: z.ZodString;
+    epoch: z.ZodNumber;
+}, z.core.$strict>;
+export type E2eeKeyPackageAvailablePayload = z.infer<typeof E2eeKeyPackageAvailablePayloadSchema>;