@byok-sdk/client 0.6.0 → 0.6.1

package/dist/bin/byok-approval-mcp.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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{ createHash, createHmac, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';\nimport path from 'node:path';\nimport type { TaskState } from '@byok-sdk/protocol';\nimport type { ApprovalDecision, PendingApproval } from './approvals';\nimport type { StorageCategory } from './journal/journal';\nimport type { StoragePressureState } from './journal/storage-policy';\nimport type { OperationalHealthSnapshot } from './operational-health';\nimport type { LocalAgentReleaseIdentity } from '../release-identity';\n\n/**\n * M4 Phase 2: shared local-IPC contract between the daemon's control server\n * (`control-server.ts`) and the CLI's control client (`bin/control-client.ts`)\n * — frame shapes, endpoint path/pipe-name derivation, and the HMAC handshake\n * math. Both sides import from here so the two can never independently drift\n * (e.g. a mismatched HMAC label string, or a socket path computed two\n * slightly different ways).\n *\n * Transport: NDJSON (one JSON object per line) over a Unix domain socket\n * (darwin/linux) or a Windows named pipe — both addressed by the same\n * path-like string via Node's `net` module, so neither `control-server.ts`\n * nor `bin/control-client.ts` needs to special-case the transport itself,\n * only the path/pipe-name derivation below.\n */\n\nexport const CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION = 1;\n\n/** Handshake must complete within this long, on both sides — see each side's own timer. */\nexport const HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS = 3000;\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Endpoint path / pipe name derivation\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Conservative soft limit for a Unix domain socket path, in UTF-8 bytes.\n * macOS's `sockaddr_un.sun_path` is 104 bytes total (including the NUL\n * terminator and any prefix the kernel reserves), so anything comfortably\n * under 104 avoids `ENAMETOOLONG` at `bind()`/`connect()` time on the\n * tightest common platform.\n */\nconst UNIX_SOCKET_PATH_SOFT_LIMIT = 100;\n\n/**\n * The one fixed root the long-path fallback below binds under. Deliberately\n * NOT `os.tmpdir()`, which reads `TMPDIR`/`TMP`/`TEMP` — an endpoint address\n * that varies with the environment is not an endpoint both sides can find,\n * and a caller may have pointed `TMPDIR` INSIDE the very tree that made the\n * natural path too long, where `os.tmpdir()` yields an address LONGER than\n * the one being escaped (`bind()` then fails `EINVAL` and the daemon degrades\n * to no control socket at all). A literal `/tmp` is POSIX-guaranteed,\n * environment-independent, and short enough that this candidate always fits\n * the budget above. Same fix, same reasons as `daemon-owner.ts`'s\n * `STORE_MUTEX_FALLBACK_ROOT`; kept as its own constant because the two\n * derivations differ in name and ownership contract and must stay\n * independently readable.\n */\nconst CONTROL_SOCKET_FALLBACK_ROOT = '/tmp';\n\nfunction shortHash(input: string): string {\n  return createHash('sha256').update(input, 'utf8').digest('hex').slice(0, 16);\n}\n\n/**\n * The Unix domain socket path for a daemon rooted at `storeDir`. Prefers\n * `<storeDir>/control.sock` (keeps every one of this daemon's local state\n * files under one directory, which is already created+chmod'd 0700 by the\n * time this matters — see `control-server.ts`'s `startControlServer`);\n * falls back, whenever the natural path would risk exceeding {@link\n * UNIX_SOCKET_PATH_SOFT_LIMIT}, to a short, deterministic path nested under\n * a PER-DAEMON PRIVATE subdirectory of {@link CONTROL_SOCKET_FALLBACK_ROOT}\n * — derived from a hash of `storeDir` alone, so both the daemon and any CLI\n * invocation pointed at the same `storeDir` independently compute the\n * identical fallback path.\n *\n * That root was `os.tmpdir()` until it was proven to break both halves of\n * that sentence: it reads `TMPDIR`, so the daemon (under a service manager)\n * and the CLI (in an operator shell) derived DIFFERENT addresses for one\n * store, and under a `TMPDIR` nested in the same long tree the fallback came\n * out LONGER than the path it escaped — `bind()` `EINVAL`, and the daemon\n * ran on with no control socket at all.\n *\n * Nested one level deep (rather than a bare `<hash>.sock` file directly in\n * that shared, world-traversable root) specifically so\n * `control-server.ts`'s `bindControlEndpoint` can create+chmod that\n * subdirectory 0700 BEFORE ever binding inside it — the directory's own\n * mode gates traversal into it regardless of the socket file's own\n * (briefly default-permissioned, until the post-bind `chmod`) mode, closing\n * what would otherwise be a real window for another user on the same\n * machine to reach a socket living directly in a shared tmpdir.\n */\nexport function controlSocketPath(storeDir: string): string {\n  const candidate = path.join(storeDir, 'control.sock');\n  if (Buffer.byteLength(candidate, 'utf8') <= UNIX_SOCKET_PATH_SOFT_LIMIT) return candidate;\n  return path.join(CONTROL_SOCKET_FALLBACK_ROOT, `byok-${shortHash(storeDir)}`, 'sock');\n}\n\n/**\n * The Windows named pipe name for a daemon identified by `productId` +\n * (`path.resolve`-normalized) `storeDir`. Named pipes have no filesystem\n * path (no stale-file cleanup concern the way Unix sockets have — see\n * `control-server.ts`), but DO share one flat namespace across the whole\n * machine, so the name must be scoped to this exact daemon instance: two\n * different products, or two different store directories (e.g. two agents\n * of the same product — see `templates/service/README.md`'s \"running\n * multiple agents\" section), must never collide. `storeDir` is resolved\n * before hashing so a trivial path-form difference (trailing slash, etc.)\n * between the two sides can't split the name.\n *\n * NOT keyed by the OS user: a WinSW-installed service runs the daemon under\n * the Windows service account (e.g. `SYSTEM`) while the operator CLI runs\n * as the interactive user, so both sides must derive the identical name\n * from the same `storeDir` alone. Impostor servers are defeated by the\n * mutual HMAC handshake below, not by pipe-name secrecy — keying by user\n * was security theater that broke the service-account topology.\n */\nexport function controlPipeName(productId: string, storeDir: string): string {\n  const id = shortHash(`${productId}|${path.resolve(storeDir)}`);\n  return `\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\byok-${id}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Dispatches to {@link controlPipeName} on `win32`, {@link controlSocketPath}\n * everywhere else. `platform` defaults to `process.platform`; overridable\n * for tests exercising a specific platform's branch on any host (mirrors\n * `lifecycle/create-service-lifecycle.ts`'s identical `platform` override —\n * the REAL win32 named-pipe semantics can only be proven on actual Windows,\n * which CI's `ipc-smoke` job does; this override just makes the PATH-CHOICE\n * logic itself testable everywhere).\n */\nexport function controlEndpointPath(productId: string, storeDir: string, platform: NodeJS.Platform = process.platform): string {\n  return platform === 'win32' ? controlPipeName(productId, storeDir) : controlSocketPath(storeDir);\n}\n\n/** Where the daemon writes its per-session control-auth token (see the handshake section below). Always a real file, even on Windows (pipes have no path of their own to piggyback secrets on). */\nexport function controlTokenPath(storeDir: string): string {\n  return path.join(storeDir, 'control.token');\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Handshake: mutual HMAC proof, token never sent over the wire\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nconst SERVER_PROOF_LABEL = 'byok-control-server|';\nconst CLIENT_AUTH_LABEL = 'byok-control-client|';\n\nexport function randomNonceHex(): string {\n  return randomBytes(32).toString('hex');\n}\n\nfunction hmacHex(token: string, message: string): string {\n  return createHmac('sha256', token).update(message, 'utf8').digest('hex');\n}\n\n/** What the server proves to the client: it holds `token`, bound to the client's own nonce so a captured proof can't be replayed against a different handshake. */\nexport function computeServerProof(token: string, clientNonce: string): string {\n  return hmacHex(token, SERVER_PROOF_LABEL + clientNonce);\n}\n\n/** What the client proves to the server, symmetrically, bound to the server's nonce. */\nexport function computeClientAuth(token: string, serverNonce: string): string {\n  return hmacHex(token, CLIENT_AUTH_LABEL + serverNonce);\n}\n\n/** Constant-time hex-string comparison (`crypto.timingSafeEqual` requires equal-length buffers; a length mismatch is itself a safe, immediate \"not equal\" — no early-exit on content). */\nexport function timingSafeEqualHex(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  const bufA = Buffer.from(a, 'hex');\n  const bufB = Buffer.from(b, 'hex');\n  if (bufA.length !== bufB.length) return false;\n  return timingSafeEqual(bufA, bufB);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Handshake frame shapes + parsers\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface ClientHello {\n  v: 1;\n  hello: 'client';\n  nonce: string;\n}\nexport interface ServerHello {\n  v: 1;\n  hello: 'server';\n  proof: string;\n  nonce: string;\n}\nexport interface ClientAuth {\n  v: 1;\n  auth: string;\n}\nexport interface ServerReady {\n  v: 1;\n  ready: true;\n}\n\nexport function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {\n  return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null;\n}\n\nexport function parseClientHello(value: unknown): ClientHello | undefined {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return undefined;\n  if (value.v !== CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION || value.hello !== 'client' || typeof value.nonce !== 'string') return undefined;\n  return { v: CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION, hello: 'client', nonce: value.nonce };\n}\n\nexport function parseServerHello(value: unknown): ServerHello | undefined {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return undefined;\n  if (\n    value.v !== CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION ||\n    value.hello !== 'server' ||\n    typeof value.proof !== 'string' ||\n    typeof value.nonce !== 'string'\n  ) {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  return { v: CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION, hello: 'server', proof: value.proof, nonce: value.nonce };\n}\n\nexport function parseClientAuth(value: unknown): ClientAuth | undefined {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return undefined;\n  if (value.v !== CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION || typeof value.auth !== 'string') return undefined;\n  return { v: CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION, auth: value.auth };\n}\n\nexport function parseServerReady(value: unknown): ServerReady | undefined {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return undefined;\n  if (value.v !== CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION || value.ready !== true) return undefined;\n  return { v: CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ready: true };\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// RPC frame shapes (post-handshake)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface RawControlRequest {\n  /** Not narrowed to `1` here on purpose — an unexpected value is a `bad_version` RESPONSE, not a parse failure; see `control-server.ts`. */\n  v: unknown;\n  id: string;\n  method: string;\n  params?: unknown;\n}\n\n/** Loose shape check for an incoming request line: only `id`/`method` need to be well-formed for the server to be able to respond at all (including a `bad_version`/`unknown_method` response) — `v` is deliberately passed through unvalidated. */\nexport function parseRawControlRequest(value: unknown): RawControlRequest | undefined {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return undefined;\n  if (typeof value.id !== 'string' || typeof value.method !== 'string') return undefined;\n  return { v: value.v, id: value.id, method: value.method, params: value.params };\n}\n\nexport interface ControlErrorShape {\n  code: string;\n  message: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ControlResponseOk {\n  v: 1;\n  id: string;\n  ok: true;\n  result?: unknown;\n  /** Present (and `true`) only on the final frame of a streaming method — see `control-server.ts`'s dispatch. */\n  done?: true;\n}\n\nexport interface ControlResponseErr {\n  v: 1;\n  id: string;\n  ok: false;\n  error: ControlErrorShape;\n}\n\nexport type ControlResponse = ControlResponseOk | ControlResponseErr;\n\nexport interface ControlEventFrame {\n  v: 1;\n  id: string;\n  event: unknown;\n}\n\nexport function encodeFrame(frame: unknown): string {\n  return `${JSON.stringify(frame)}\\n`;\n}\n\n/** Thrown by a method handler to control the wire error `{code, message}` a caller sees — anything else thrown surfaces as a generic `internal_error`. See `control-server.ts`'s dispatch and `bin/control-client.ts`'s `request()` (which re-throws this same class on the client side). */\nexport class ControlError extends Error {\n  constructor(\n    public readonly code: string,\n    message: string,\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'ControlError';\n  }\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// NDJSON line framing\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Bound on a single NDJSON line's byte length. Every real frame this\n * protocol ever sends (handshake frames, requests/responses/events) is well\n * under this — it exists purely as a defensive cap against a misbehaving or\n * hostile peer streaming an unterminated line forever to grow `pending`\n * without bound. Exceeding it is a fail-closed condition: {@link\n * NdjsonLineReader.push} throws, and every caller (`control-server.ts`,\n * `bin/control-client.ts`) destroys the connection on that throw.\n */\nexport const MAX_LINE_BYTES = 64 * 1024;\n\n/**\n * Buffers raw socket bytes and yields complete lines. Splits on the raw byte\n * `0x0a` BEFORE any UTF-8 decoding (mirrors `bin/audit-log.ts`'s\n * `followAuditLog`) — `0x0A` can only ever appear as an actual newline in\n * valid UTF-8, so this never risks decoding a multi-byte character that\n * happened to straddle a chunk boundary.\n */\nexport class NdjsonLineReader {\n  private pending: Buffer = Buffer.alloc(0);\n\n  /** @throws if the still-unterminated remainder exceeds {@link MAX_LINE_BYTES} — see that constant's own doc comment. */\n  push(chunk: Buffer): string[] {\n    this.pending = this.pending.length > 0 ? Buffer.concat([this.pending, chunk]) : chunk;\n    const lines: string[] = [];\n    let newlineIndex: number;\n    // eslint-disable-next-line no-cond-assign\n    while ((newlineIndex = this.pending.indexOf(0x0a)) !== -1) {\n      const line = this.pending.subarray(0, newlineIndex).toString('utf8');\n      this.pending = this.pending.subarray(newlineIndex + 1);\n      if (line.length > 0) lines.push(line);\n    }\n    if (this.pending.length > MAX_LINE_BYTES) {\n      throw new Error(`NDJSON line exceeded ${MAX_LINE_BYTES} bytes without a terminating newline`);\n    }\n    return lines;\n  }\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Method contracts (Phase 2 surface) — shared by create-daemon.ts's control\n// method registry and the CLI commands that call them.\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface ControlActiveTask {\n  taskId: string;\n  state: TaskState;\n}\n\n/**\n * M4 Phase 4 (part B.3, observability): a cheap per-active-task queue-depth\n * watermark for the `status` result. The IDEAL metric here would be each\n * runtime adapter's own event-queue depth (`util/async-queue.ts`'s\n * `AsyncQueue`) — but that queue lives inside each adapter's concrete\n * `Session` implementation, and `Session.events` (`types.ts`) is typed only\n * as a plain `AsyncIterable<AgentEvent>`, which has no queryable backlog\n * size; reaching it would mean adding a new method to the `Session`\n * interface AND implementing it in all three bundled adapters\n * (pi/claude/codex), which is out of scope for this pass. This instead\n * reflects two things `TaskRunner` already cheaply knows about the SAME\n * task without any new plumbing: how much progress is buffered locally\n * (not yet flushed as a `task.progress` batch), and how many out-of-band\n * approval requests are currently in flight for it. See\n * `task-runner.ts`'s `getQueueWatermarks` for how each field is computed.\n */\nexport interface TaskQueueWatermark {\n  taskId: string;\n  /** Events buffered in this task's `ProgressBatcher`, not yet flushed as a `task.progress` batch. */\n  progressBatcherPending: number;\n  /** Approval requests currently in flight for this task: 1 if one is actively dispatched (registered + `task.await_approval` sent) plus however many more are queued behind it (M4 Phase 4 fold-in — see `TaskRunner.requestApproval`). */\n  pendingApprovals: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * S3b (L-003): local storage usage and pressure, as the `status` method\n * reports them (architecture §12.7.2.1).\n *\n * Named `storage*` throughout, NOT `watermark*`: {@link TaskQueueWatermark}\n * above is a per-task progress-buffer depth and has nothing to do with disk.\n * Two unrelated concepts sharing a name on one status result is how an\n * operator reads the wrong number during an incident.\n *\n * Present only when a daemon actually runs a storage policy\n * (`DaemonConfig.hostedJournal.storagePolicy`). Absent means \"not measured\",\n * which is a different statement from \"measured, and fine\" — so it is an\n * absent field rather than a zeroed one.\n */\nexport interface ControlStorageStatus {\n  /** §12.7.2.1's four states. `hard-pressure` declines new offers; `emergency` refuses to ack at all. */\n  pressureState: StoragePressureState;\n  /** `maxStoreBytes` — the budget `usedBytes` is measured against. */\n  budgetBytes: number;\n  /** Total across every category below, as of `measuredAt`. */\n  usedBytes: number;\n  /** Bytes available to this daemon on the store's filesystem — the free-space axis of the watermark, independent of the budget. */\n  freeBytes: number;\n  measuredAt: string;\n  /** The five §12.7.2.1 categories, always reported separately — a single total cannot drive a category-scoped cleanup order or a category-scoped never-delete list. */\n  categories: ControlStorageCategoryUsage[];\n  /** The most recent bounded WAL checkpoint + incremental vacuum, if one has run in this daemon's lifetime. */\n  lastCompaction?: ControlStorageCompaction;\n}\n\nexport interface ControlStorageCategoryUsage {\n  category: StorageCategory;\n  bytes: number;\n  /** `true` when this is a host-reported or sampled figure rather than one measured off the filesystem. */\n  approximate: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface ControlStorageCompaction {\n  checkpointed: boolean;\n  walFramesRemaining: number;\n  pagesVacuumed: number;\n  durationMs: number;\n  at: string;\n}\n\n/** Result shape for the `status` method — see `create-daemon.ts`'s control-method wiring for how each field is sourced, and `bin/format.ts`'s `formatLiveStatusLines` for how the CLI renders it. */\nexport interface ControlStatusResult {\n  /** Process-immutable Local Agent application release; absent only for an older control peer. */\n  localAgentRelease?: Readonly<LocalAgentReleaseIdentity>;\n  pid: number;\n  uptimeMs: number;\n  paired: boolean;\n  deviceId?: string;\n  /** The connection state machine's own current value (`ws-transport.ts`'s `ConnectionState`) — e.g. `'open'`, `'degraded'` (long-poll fallback), `'revoked'`, `'closed'`, `'connecting'`. */\n  transport: string;\n  activeTasks: ControlActiveTask[];\n  runtimeIds: string[];\n  /** M4 Phase 4 (part B.3): per-active-task queue watermarks — see {@link TaskQueueWatermark}. */\n  queueWatermarks: TaskQueueWatermark[];\n  /**\n   * Finding F4 (cross-model adversarial review): the actual pending\n   * approvals currently dispatched — the SAME entries `approvals.list`\n   * returns (`ApprovalRegistry.list()`), surfaced here too so a single\n   * `status` call can show an operator every `approvalId` they'd need to\n   * `approve`/`reject`, without a second control-socket round trip. This is\n   * `approvalsPending`'s own source list (`approvalsPending ===\n   * approvals.length`, always).\n   */\n  approvals: PendingApproval[];\n  /** M4 Phase 4 (part B.3): total approvals currently DISPATCHED (registered) across the whole daemon — the same count `approvals.list` returns, surfaced here too for a one-call status view. */\n  approvalsPending: number;\n  /** S3b (L-003): local storage usage + pressure — see {@link ControlStorageStatus}. Absent unless a storage policy is configured. */\n  storage?: ControlStorageStatus;\n  /** Local lifecycle/retry budget. This is not the transport state above. */\n  operationalHealth: OperationalHealthSnapshot;\n}\n\nexport interface ApprovalsListResult {\n  approvals: PendingApproval[];\n}\n\nexport type { ApprovalDecision, PendingApproval } from './approvals';\n\nexport interface ApprovalsResolveParams {\n  approvalId: string;\n  decision: ApprovalDecision;\n  reason?: string;\n}\n\nexport function parseApprovalsResolveParams(value: unknown): ApprovalsResolveParams | undefined {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return undefined;\n  if (typeof value.approvalId !== 'string') return undefined;\n  if (value.decision !== 'approve' && value.decision !== 'reject') return undefined;\n  if (value.reason !== undefined && typeof value.reason !== 'string') return undefined;\n  return { approvalId: value.approvalId, decision: value.decision, reason: value.reason };\n}\n\n/**\n * M4 Phase 3: the control method `byok-approval-mcp` (`bin/byok-approval-mcp.ts`)\n * calls FROM a claude-spawned MCP-server child process — a genuinely\n * different OS process from the daemon, reachable only over this same\n * control socket (see `../types.ts`'s `ApprovalChannel` doc comment for the\n * full why). `taskId` correlates the request to an active task;\n * `summary` is a short, human-readable description of the gated action\n * (carried verbatim into the wire `task.await_approval.summary`).\n */\nexport interface ApprovalsRequestParams {\n  taskId: string;\n  summary: string;\n}\n\nexport function parseApprovalsRequestParams(value: unknown): ApprovalsRequestParams | undefined {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return undefined;\n  if (typeof value.taskId !== 'string' || value.taskId.length === 0) return undefined;\n  if (typeof value.summary !== 'string') return undefined;\n  return { taskId: value.taskId, summary: value.summary };\n}\n\n/** Result of `approvals.request` — the outcome `byok-approval-mcp` translates into its own MCP `allow`/`deny` answer. */\nexport interface ApprovalsRequestResult {\n  approved: boolean;\n  reason?: string;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// `assertion.issue` (plan device-assertion-broker)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Params for `assertion.issue`: a sibling local process (the host's own CLI,\n * installed alongside this daemon) asking the daemon to mint one short-lived,\n * audience-scoped device assertion with the paired device key. See\n * `@byok-sdk/core`'s `device-assertion.ts` for the envelope, and\n * `create-daemon.ts`'s handler for the six fail-closed gates every call passes\n * through in a fixed order.\n *\n * One field, and nothing else. In particular there is deliberately no caller\n * identity, no requested TTL, and no requested claim set: every process running\n * as this UID can reach the control socket, so anything a caller \"tells\" the\n * daemon about itself is decoration, and a caller-chosen lifetime is just the\n * TTL ceiling handed to whoever asks.\n */\nexport interface AssertionIssueParams {\n  audience: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Bound on the `audience` a caller may send, in UTF-8 bytes — mirrors\n * `@byok-sdk/core`'s `DEVICE_ASSERTION_AUDIENCE_MAX_BYTES`. Restated here rather\n * than imported so the WIRE bound is checked before anything reaches the claim\n * schema: this is the frame-level shape gate, and it must reject an oversized\n * value without that value ever reaching a signer or an audit line.\n */\nexport const ASSERTION_AUDIENCE_MAX_BYTES = 256;\n\n/**\n * Strict shape check. `undefined` means `bad_request` — a distinct gate from\n * `audience_denied` (see `create-daemon.ts`): \"you sent something that is not a\n * request\" and \"you asked for an audience you may not have\" are different\n * facts, and collapsing them would let a caller probe the allowlist by\n * malforming requests.\n *\n * Rejects an unknown key outright rather than ignoring it. A tolerated extra\n * field is how a future caller comes to believe it can influence the claim set.\n */\nexport function parseAssertionIssueParams(value: unknown): AssertionIssueParams | undefined {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return undefined;\n  const keys = Object.keys(value);\n  if (keys.length !== 1 || keys[0] !== 'audience') return undefined;\n  const { audience } = value;\n  if (typeof audience !== 'string' || audience.length === 0) return undefined;\n  if (Buffer.byteLength(audience, 'utf8') > ASSERTION_AUDIENCE_MAX_BYTES) return undefined;\n  return { audience };\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of `assertion.issue`. `assertion` is the full signing envelope\n * (`DeviceAssertionEnvelopeV1`), carried as an opaque JSON value on this wire —\n * the caller hands it to the host's cloud, which parses and verifies it with\n * core's own `verifyDeviceAssertion`. `expiresAt` is repeated outside the\n * envelope purely so a caller can schedule a refresh without parsing claims it\n * has no business interpreting.\n */\nexport interface AssertionIssueResult {\n  assertion: unknown;\n  expiresAt: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * The six `ControlError` codes `assertion.issue` can answer with, in the exact\n * order the handler checks them (`create-daemon.ts`). Each one is a distinct\n * refusal with a distinct cause; none of them ever signs anything.\n *\n * - `assertion_disabled` — this daemon has no `deviceAssertion` config, or an\n *   empty audience allowlist. The feature is OFF by default.\n * - `bad_request` — params were not `{audience: string}` within the byte bound.\n * - `audience_denied` — the audience is not in the configured allowlist. The\n *   message never echoes the allowlist: a refusal must not be an enumeration\n *   oracle.\n * - `shutting_down` — a shutdown has been requested. Closes the window between\n *   the shutdown RPC being acknowledged and the control socket actually\n *   closing, during which a device that is being unpaired could otherwise still\n *   mint credentials.\n * - `revoked` — the server has revoked this device.\n * - `not_paired` — there is no device record on disk (never paired, or already\n *   cleared).\n */\nexport const ASSERTION_ISSUE_ERROR_CODES = [\n  'assertion_disabled',\n  'bad_request',\n  'audience_denied',\n  'shutting_down',\n  'revoked',\n  'not_paired',\n] as const;\n\nexport type AssertionIssueErrorCode = (typeof ASSERTION_ISSUE_ERROR_CODES)[number];\n\nexport type ShutdownReason = 'unpair' | 'operator';\n\nexport interface ShutdownParams {\n  reason?: ShutdownReason;\n}\n\nexport function parseShutdownParams(value: unknown): ShutdownParams {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return {};\n  return value.reason === 'unpair' || value.reason === 'operator' ? { reason: value.reason } : {};\n}\n","import { constants as fsConstants, promises as fs } from 'node:fs';\nimport net from 'node:net';\nimport {\n  CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION,\n  ControlError,\n  HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS,\n  NdjsonLineReader,\n  computeClientAuth,\n  computeServerProof,\n  controlEndpointPath,\n  controlTokenPath,\n  encodeFrame,\n  isRecord,\n  parseServerHello,\n  parseServerReady,\n  randomNonceHex,\n  timingSafeEqualHex,\n} from '../daemon/control-protocol';\n\n/**\n * M4 Phase 2: the CLI-side half of the control socket — connects, performs\n * the mutual HMAC handshake (`../daemon/control-protocol.ts`), and exposes a\n * small `request()`/`subscribe()` surface every rewired command\n * (`status`/`tasks --follow`/`unpair`/`approve`/`reject`) builds on.\n *\n * `connectControlClient` never throws for the ordinary \"daemon isn't\n * running\" case — it returns a typed `{ok:false, reason}` result instead\n * (see {@link ConnectControlResult}), so a caller can render a clean\n * fallback message rather than catching an exception. Missing\n * `control.token` (the daemon was never started, or was stopped) is by far\n * the most common reason; any other connect/handshake failure collapses\n * into the same shape — a CLI user doesn't need to know WHY the control\n * socket isn't reachable, only that it isn't and a fallback is being used.\n */\n\nexport interface ControlClientOptions {\n  storeDir: string;\n  productId: string;\n  /** Default: `HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS` (3000ms) — matches the server's own handshake timeout. */\n  handshakeTimeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Default 10000ms — applied per `request()` call; never applied to `subscribe()`, which is expected to stay open indefinitely. */\n  requestTimeoutMs?: number;\n}\n\nexport interface ControlClient {\n  /** Sends `{method, params}`, resolves with the server's `result`, or rejects with a {@link ControlError} (or a plain `Error` for a connection-level failure/timeout). */\n  request<T = unknown>(method: string, params?: unknown): Promise<T>;\n  /** Sends a streaming request; `onEvent` fires for each `event` frame. Returns a handle whose `close()` ends the WHOLE connection (per the protocol: \"client may just close the connection to unsubscribe\") — don't share a client between a `subscribe()` and other concurrent `request()` calls if you need them to outlive each other. */\n  subscribe(method: string, params: unknown, onEvent: (event: unknown) => void): { close: () => void };\n  /** Closes the underlying connection. Safe to call more than once. */\n  close(): void;\n}\n\nexport type ConnectControlResult = { ok: true; client: ControlClient } | { ok: false; reason: string };\n\nconst MAX_CONTROL_TOKEN_BYTES = 256;\n\nfunction errorMessage(err: unknown): string {\n  return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n}\n\nfunction sameFileState(left: import('node:fs').BigIntStats, right: import('node:fs').BigIntStats): boolean {\n  return (\n    left.dev === right.dev &&\n    left.ino === right.ino &&\n    left.size === right.size &&\n    left.mtimeNs === right.mtimeNs &&\n    left.ctimeNs === right.ctimeNs\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the authentication token through a bounded pathname-bound handle.\n * Diagnostics calls this client even when no daemon is expected, so a FIFO,\n * symlink swap, or oversized local file must become an ordinary offline result\n * rather than blocking the CLI or consuming unbounded memory.\n */\nasync function readControlToken(tokenPath: string): Promise<string | undefined> {\n  let namedBefore: import('node:fs').BigIntStats;\n  try {\n    namedBefore = await fs.lstat(tokenPath, { bigint: true });\n  } catch (err) {\n    if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'ENOENT') return undefined;\n    throw err;\n  }\n  if (!namedBefore.isFile() || namedBefore.isSymbolicLink()) {\n    throw new Error('control token is not a real regular file');\n  }\n  const handle = await fs.open(\n    tokenPath,\n    fsConstants.O_RDONLY | (fsConstants.O_NONBLOCK ?? 0) | (fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW ?? 0),\n  );\n  try {\n    const opened = await handle.stat({ bigint: true });\n    const namedAfterOpen = await fs.lstat(tokenPath, { bigint: true });\n    if (\n      !opened.isFile() ||\n      !namedAfterOpen.isFile() ||\n      namedAfterOpen.isSymbolicLink() ||\n      !sameFileState(namedBefore, opened) ||\n      !sameFileState(opened, namedAfterOpen)\n    ) {\n      throw new Error('control token pathname changed before safe open');\n    }\n    if (opened.size < 0 || opened.size > BigInt(MAX_CONTROL_TOKEN_BYTES)) {\n      throw new Error('control token exceeds the bounded read limit');\n    }\n    const size = Number(opened.size);\n    const bytes = Buffer.alloc(size);\n    const { bytesRead } = await handle.read(bytes, 0, size, 0);\n    const afterRead = await handle.stat({ bigint: true });\n    const namedAfterRead = await fs.lstat(tokenPath, { bigint: true });\n    if (\n      bytesRead !== size ||\n      namedAfterRead.isSymbolicLink() ||\n      !sameFileState(opened, afterRead) ||\n      !sameFileState(afterRead, namedAfterRead)\n    ) {\n      throw new Error('control token changed during bounded read');\n    }\n    return bytes.toString('utf8').trim();\n  } finally {\n    await handle.close();\n  }\n}\n\n/** Reads the control token, connects, and performs the handshake — see the module doc comment for why failures here collapse into `{ok:false, reason}` rather than throwing. */\nexport async function connectControlClient(opts: ControlClientOptions): Promise<ConnectControlResult> {\n  const tokenPath = controlTokenPath(opts.storeDir);\n  let token: string;\n  try {\n    const read = await readControlToken(tokenPath);\n    if (read === undefined) {\n      return { ok: false, reason: 'daemon is not running (no control.token found)' };\n    }\n    token = read;\n  } catch (err) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: `could not read the control token: ${errorMessage(err)}` };\n  }\n  if (!token) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: 'control token file is empty' };\n  }\n\n  const endpoint = controlEndpointPath(opts.productId, opts.storeDir);\n  try {\n    const client = await connectAndHandshake(endpoint, token, opts);\n    return { ok: true, client };\n  } catch (err) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: `daemon control socket not reachable: ${errorMessage(err)}` };\n  }\n}\n\nfunction connectAndHandshake(endpoint: string, token: string, opts: ControlClientOptions): Promise<ControlClient> {\n  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n    const socket = net.createConnection(endpoint);\n    const reader = new NdjsonLineReader();\n    let phase: 'server-hello' | 'ready' = 'server-hello';\n    let settled = false;\n    const clientNonce = randomNonceHex();\n\n    const timer = setTimeout(() => {\n      fail(new Error('handshake timed out'));\n    }, opts.handshakeTimeoutMs ?? HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS);\n    timer.unref?.();\n\n    function fail(err: unknown): void {\n      if (settled) return;\n      settled = true;\n      clearTimeout(timer);\n      socket.removeAllListeners();\n      socket.destroy();\n      reject(err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)));\n    }\n\n    function succeed(): void {\n      settled = true;\n      clearTimeout(timer);\n      socket.removeListener('error', onError);\n      socket.removeListener('data', onData);\n      resolve(createControlClient(socket, reader, opts));\n    }\n\n    function onData(chunk: Buffer): void {\n      // Hardening finding (P2 re-gate): `reader.push` throws once the\n      // still-unterminated remainder exceeds MAX_LINE_BYTES\n      // (control-protocol.ts) — a hostile/broken peer sending a >64KiB line\n      // with no newline. Uncaught, this would propagate out of the 'data'\n      // listener and crash the whole CLI process (Node has no default\n      // recovery for an exception thrown inside an EventEmitter callback).\n      // Mirrors control-server.ts's own identical guard around its matching\n      // `reader.push` call — route into this same handshake's `fail()` path\n      // instead, exactly like every other handshake failure here.\n      let lines: string[];\n      try {\n        lines = reader.push(chunk);\n      } catch (err) {\n        fail(err);\n        return;\n      }\n      for (const line of lines) {\n        let parsed: unknown;\n        try {\n          parsed = JSON.parse(line);\n        } catch {\n          fail(new Error('malformed handshake frame'));\n          return;\n        }\n        if (phase === 'server-hello') {\n          const hello = parseServerHello(parsed);\n          if (!hello) {\n            fail(new Error('malformed or unexpected server hello'));\n            return;\n          }\n          if (!timingSafeEqualHex(hello.proof, computeServerProof(token, clientNonce))) {\n            fail(new Error('server failed to prove it holds the control token'));\n            return;\n          }\n          socket.write(encodeFrame({ v: CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION, auth: computeClientAuth(token, hello.nonce) }));\n          phase = 'ready';\n          continue;\n        }\n        if (!parseServerReady(parsed)) {\n          fail(new Error('server did not confirm readiness'));\n          return;\n        }\n        succeed();\n        return;\n      }\n    }\n\n    function onError(err: unknown): void {\n      fail(err);\n    }\n\n    socket.once('error', onError);\n    socket.once('connect', () => {\n      socket.write(encodeFrame({ v: CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION, hello: 'client', nonce: clientNonce }));\n      socket.on('data', onData);\n    });\n  });\n}\n\ninterface PendingCall {\n  resolve: (value: unknown) => void;\n  reject: (err: unknown) => void;\n  onEvent?: (event: unknown) => void;\n}\n\nfunction withTimeout<T>(promise: Promise<T>, ms: number, message: string): Promise<T> {\n  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n    const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error(message)), ms);\n    timer.unref?.();\n    promise.then(\n      (value) => {\n        clearTimeout(timer);\n        resolve(value);\n      },\n      (err: unknown) => {\n        clearTimeout(timer);\n        reject(err);\n      },\n    );\n  });\n}\n\nfunction createControlClient(socket: net.Socket, reader: NdjsonLineReader, opts: ControlClientOptions): ControlClient {\n  const pending = new Map<string, PendingCall>();\n  let idSeq = 0;\n  let closed = false;\n\n  function handleFrame(parsed: unknown): void {\n    if (!isRecord(parsed) || typeof parsed.id !== 'string') return;\n    const entry = pending.get(parsed.id);\n    if (!entry) return;\n    if ('event' in parsed) {\n      entry.onEvent?.(parsed.event);\n      return;\n    }\n    if (parsed.ok === true) {\n      pending.delete(parsed.id);\n      entry.resolve(parsed.done === true ? undefined : (parsed as { result?: unknown }).result);\n      return;\n    }\n    pending.delete(parsed.id);\n    const shape = (parsed as { error?: { code?: unknown; message?: unknown } }).error;\n    entry.reject(\n      new ControlError(\n        typeof shape?.code === 'string' ? shape.code : 'internal_error',\n        typeof shape?.message === 'string' ? shape.message : 'unknown control error',\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  socket.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {\n    // Same hardening as connectAndHandshake's own onData above: `reader.push`\n    // throws on a >64KiB unterminated line (MAX_LINE_BYTES,\n    // control-protocol.ts) — uncaught, that would crash this CLI process\n    // from inside an EventEmitter 'data' callback. This connection is\n    // already past the handshake (there is no `fail()` closure here), so\n    // fail closed the same way a malformed/unexpected frame elsewhere in\n    // this function already does: destroy the connection (which rejects\n    // every pending call via the 'close' handler below) rather than risk\n    // continuing to read from a peer that just proved it doesn't speak this\n    // protocol.\n    let lines: string[];\n    try {\n      lines = reader.push(chunk);\n    } catch {\n      socket.destroy();\n      return;\n    }\n    for (const line of lines) {\n      let parsed: unknown;\n      try {\n        parsed = JSON.parse(line);\n      } catch {\n        continue; // ignore a malformed line rather than tearing down an otherwise-healthy connection\n      }\n      handleFrame(parsed);\n    }\n  });\n  socket.on('close', () => {\n    closed = true;\n    for (const entry of pending.values()) entry.reject(new Error('control connection closed'));\n    pending.clear();\n  });\n  socket.on('error', () => {\n    // 'close' always follows and rejects every pending call above — swallow\n    // here so a peer reset never becomes an unhandled 'error' crash.\n  });\n\n  function send(method: string, params: unknown, onEvent?: (event: unknown) => void): { id: string; promise: Promise<unknown> } {\n    const id = `c${++idSeq}`;\n    const promise = new Promise<unknown>((resolve, reject) => {\n      pending.set(id, { resolve, reject, onEvent });\n    });\n    socket.write(encodeFrame({ v: CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION, id, method, params }));\n    return { id, promise };\n  }\n\n  return {\n    async request<T>(method: string, params?: unknown): Promise<T> {\n      if (closed) throw new Error('control connection is closed');\n      const { promise } = send(method, params);\n      const result = await withTimeout(promise, opts.requestTimeoutMs ?? 10_000, `control request \"${method}\" timed out`);\n      return result as T;\n    },\n    subscribe(method, params, onEvent) {\n      const { id, promise } = send(method, params, onEvent);\n      promise.catch(() => {\n        // subscribe()'s lifetime is managed via close()/onEvent, not this\n        // promise — swallow so destroying the connection later (which\n        // rejects every pending call, this one included) never surfaces as\n        // an unhandled rejection.\n      });\n      return {\n        close: (): void => {\n          pending.delete(id);\n          socket.destroy();\n        },\n      };\n    },\n    close(): void {\n      socket.destroy();\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Unpair's own poll for \"has the daemon actually exited yet\" (see\n * `bin/commands/unpair.ts`): both the control token file being gone AND a\n * fresh connect attempt being refused, checked directly rather than through\n * a full `connectControlClient` handshake — cheaper per poll, and matches\n * the exact two-condition check the M4 design calls for.\n */\nexport async function isControlDaemonGone(storeDir: string, productId: string): Promise<boolean> {\n  const tokenGone = await fs.stat(controlTokenPath(storeDir)).then(\n    () => false,\n    (err) => (err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'ENOENT',\n  );\n  if (!tokenGone) return false;\n\n  const endpoint = controlEndpointPath(productId, storeDir);\n  return new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {\n    const socket = net.createConnection(endpoint);\n    const finish = (gone: boolean): void => {\n      socket.removeAllListeners();\n      socket.destroy();\n      resolve(gone);\n    };\n    socket.once('connect', () => finish(false));\n    socket.once('error', (err: NodeJS.ErrnoException) => finish(err.code === 'ECONNREFUSED' || err.code === 'ENOENT'));\n  });\n}\n","import { createInterface } from 'node:readline';\n\n/**\n * M4 Phase 3: the testable core of `byok-approval-mcp` (`byok-approval-mcp.ts`\n * is the thin stdio-wiring entry point — mirrors this repo's existing\n * `bin/commands/*.ts` split: real logic lives in a plain module, the bin\n * script itself is glue no test ever imports directly).\n *\n * `byok-approval-mcp` is the MCP stdio server `claude`'s own\n * `--permission-prompt-tool` spawns AS ITS OWN CHILD PROCESS when the claude\n * adapter runs a task under `PermissionPolicy.mode: 'confirm'` (see\n * `../adapters/claude/permission-mapping.ts`'s `confirm`-mode doc comment).\n * It implements just enough of the MCP stdio transport (JSON-RPC 2.0,\n * newline-delimited, per the spec) to expose ONE tool — empirically\n * confirmed end-to-end against the real installed claude 2.1.216 binary\n * (M4 Phase 3 STEP 0): `initialize` -> `notifications/initialized` ->\n * `tools/list` -> `tools/call`, with the tool's arguments shaped exactly\n * `{tool_name, input, tool_use_id}` (claude's own real wire shape,\n * live-captured) and its expected response shaped\n * `{content:[{type:'text', text: JSON.stringify({behavior:'allow',\n * updatedInput} | {behavior:'deny', message})}]}` — the SAME shape the\n * Claude Agent SDK's in-process `canUseTool` callback returns (see\n * platform.claude.com/docs/en/agent-sdk/user-input), just crossing a\n * process boundary via MCP instead of an in-process function call.\n */\n\nexport const APPROVAL_TOOL_NAME = 'approval_prompt';\n\n/** Bound on how much of a tool call's `input` gets folded into the wire `task.await_approval.summary` — mirrors `events.ts`'s `RESULT_DIAGNOSTIC_MAX_CHARS`/`truncateResultDiagnostic` convention: a human-facing summary, not a full audit record. */\nexport const APPROVAL_SUMMARY_MAX_CHARS = 500;\n\nfunction errorMessage(err: unknown): string {\n  return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n}\n\n/** `${toolName}: ${input}`, bounded — the human-readable description carried into `task.await_approval.summary` and (via the daemon/CLI's own rendering) whatever a real approver actually reads before deciding. */\nexport function summarizeToolCall(toolName: string, input: unknown): string {\n  let inputStr: string;\n  try {\n    inputStr = JSON.stringify(input);\n  } catch (err) {\n    inputStr = `<unserializable input: ${errorMessage(err)}>`;\n  }\n  const bounded =\n    inputStr.length > APPROVAL_SUMMARY_MAX_CHARS ? `${inputStr.slice(0, APPROVAL_SUMMARY_MAX_CHARS)}… [truncated]` : inputStr;\n  return `${toolName}: ${bounded}`;\n}\n\nexport interface ApprovalOutcome {\n  approved: boolean;\n  reason?: string;\n}\n\n/** What `byok-approval-mcp.ts` (the real entry point) injects — the one real dependency this module has on the outside world. */\nexport interface ApprovalMcpDeps {\n  /** Requests a decision from the daemon this task is running on. Any rejection/throw here is treated as fail-closed (deny) by `handleMcpRequest` — never surfaced to claude as a raw protocol error. */\n  requestApproval(taskId: string, summary: string): Promise<ApprovalOutcome>;\n}\n\ninterface JsonRpcRequestLike {\n  jsonrpc?: unknown;\n  id?: unknown;\n  method?: unknown;\n  params?: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * Handles exactly one already-parsed JSON-RPC request object and returns the\n * exact response object to write back (`undefined` for a notification that\n * expects no reply, e.g. `notifications/initialized`) — no stdio/process\n * concerns at all, so tests call this directly with a stub {@link\n * ApprovalMcpDeps} instead of spawning a real process or a real control\n * socket. `serveApprovalMcpOverStdio` below is the only caller in production.\n */\nexport async function handleMcpRequest(\n  req: JsonRpcRequestLike,\n  deps: ApprovalMcpDeps,\n  taskId: string,\n): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | undefined> {\n  const id = req.id;\n\n  if (req.method === 'initialize') {\n    const params = (req.params ?? {}) as { protocolVersion?: unknown };\n    return {\n      jsonrpc: '2.0',\n      id,\n      result: {\n        protocolVersion: typeof params.protocolVersion === 'string' ? params.protocolVersion : '2024-11-05',\n        capabilities: { tools: {} },\n        serverInfo: { name: 'byok-approval-mcp', version: '0.0.1' },\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  if (req.method === 'notifications/initialized') {\n    return undefined; // notification — no response\n  }\n\n  if (req.method === 'tools/list') {\n    return {\n      jsonrpc: '2.0',\n      id,\n      result: {\n        tools: [\n          {\n            name: APPROVAL_TOOL_NAME,\n            description:\n              'Requests operator approval for a pending tool call. Blocks until a human (or this device\\'s daemon) decides, or the configured timeout elapses (fail-closed deny on timeout).',\n            inputSchema: {\n              type: 'object',\n              properties: {\n                tool_name: { type: 'string' },\n                input: { type: 'object' },\n              },\n            },\n          },\n        ],\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  if (req.method === 'tools/call') {\n    const params = (req.params ?? {}) as { name?: unknown; arguments?: unknown };\n    if (params.name !== APPROVAL_TOOL_NAME) {\n      return { jsonrpc: '2.0', id, error: { code: -32602, message: `unknown tool \"${String(params.name)}\"` } };\n    }\n    const args = (params.arguments ?? {}) as { tool_name?: unknown; input?: unknown };\n    const toolName = typeof args.tool_name === 'string' ? args.tool_name : 'unknown tool';\n    const input = args.input ?? {};\n    const summary = summarizeToolCall(toolName, input);\n\n    let outcome: ApprovalOutcome;\n    try {\n      outcome = await deps.requestApproval(taskId, summary);\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Fail-closed (task's own mandate): a daemon that's unreachable, a\n      // control request that times out, or any other failure reaching the\n      // approving device must never leave claude's own MCP call unanswered\n      // — that risks claude abandoning the whole turn on its own (M4 Phase 3\n      // STEP 0 found claude gives up on a permission-prompt-tool call that\n      // never answers at all, ~1.5s in) rather than cleanly denying just\n      // this one tool call and letting the conversation continue.\n      outcome = { approved: false, reason: `could not reach the approving device: ${errorMessage(err)}` };\n    }\n\n    const payload = outcome.approved\n      ? { behavior: 'allow' as const, updatedInput: input }\n      : { behavior: 'deny' as const, message: outcome.reason ?? 'denied' };\n    return { jsonrpc: '2.0', id, result: { content: [{ type: 'text', text: JSON.stringify(payload) }] } };\n  }\n\n  if (id !== undefined) {\n    return { jsonrpc: '2.0', id, error: { code: -32601, message: `unknown method: ${String(req.method)}` } };\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nexport interface ServeApprovalMcpOptions {\n  taskId: string;\n  deps: ApprovalMcpDeps;\n  /** Defaults to `process.stdin`/`process.stdout` — overridable so tests can drive this over in-memory streams. */\n  input?: NodeJS.ReadableStream;\n  output?: NodeJS.WritableStream;\n}\n\n/**\n * Wires {@link handleMcpRequest} to real NDJSON stdio (the MCP stdio\n * transport: one JSON-RPC message per line, both directions) — the only\n * genuinely process-shaped piece of this module. Each line is handled\n * independently and asynchronously (never serialized against the others),\n * since claude's own parallel-tool-use can legitimately fire more than one\n * concurrent `tools/call` over the same connection.\n */\nexport function serveApprovalMcpOverStdio(opts: ServeApprovalMcpOptions): void {\n  const input = opts.input ?? process.stdin;\n  const output = opts.output ?? process.stdout;\n  const rl = createInterface({ input, terminal: false });\n\n  rl.on('line', (line) => {\n    const trimmed = line.trim();\n    if (!trimmed) return;\n    let parsed: unknown;\n    try {\n      parsed = JSON.parse(trimmed);\n    } catch {\n      return; // a stray non-JSON line is not this server's concern\n    }\n    void handleMcpRequest(parsed as JsonRpcRequestLike, opts.deps, opts.taskId).then((response) => {\n      if (response !== undefined) output.write(`${JSON.stringify(response)}\\n`);\n    });\n  });\n}\n","#!/usr/bin/env node\nimport { connectControlClient, type ControlClient } from './control-client';\nimport { serveApprovalMcpOverStdio, type ApprovalMcpDeps } from './approval-mcp-server';\n\n/**\n * `byok-approval-mcp`: the bin entry `claude`'s own `--permission-prompt-tool`\n * spawns as its child process under `PermissionPolicy.mode: 'confirm'` — see\n * `approval-mcp-server.ts`'s module doc comment for the full protocol/design\n * writeup and `../adapters/claude/permission-mapping.ts`'s `confirm`-mode\n * doc comment for the empirical basis. This file is intentionally thin (glue\n * only, never imported by a test — mirrors `byok-agent.ts`'s own split from\n * `bin/commands/*.ts`): read env, wire a real `ApprovalMcpDeps.requestApproval`\n * against the control socket, hand off to `serveApprovalMcpOverStdio`.\n *\n * Env vars (set by `../adapters/claude/claude-adapter.ts`'s `start()` via the\n * generated `--mcp-config`'s own `env` block — never read from the daemon's\n * ambient environment, since a DIFFERENT product/device's config must never\n * leak in):\n *   BYOK_STORE_DIR            — this daemon's control-socket storeDir.\n *   BYOK_PRODUCT_ID           — this daemon's productId.\n *   BYOK_TASK_ID              — the task this approval request belongs to.\n *   BYOK_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS  — `RuntimeOperationStartInput.approvalChannel.timeoutMs`,\n *                                echoed here so this process's OWN control\n *                                request waits at least that long (plus\n *                                slop) rather than timing out earlier than\n *                                the daemon's own authoritative deadline.\n */\n\nfunction errorMessage(err: unknown): string {\n  return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n}\n\n/** Slop added on top of the daemon's own approval timeout for this process's OWN control-socket request timeout — the daemon's `TaskRunner.requestApproval` is the authoritative deadline (see its own doc comment); this must never fire first and race it. */\nconst REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SLOP_MS = 5_000;\n\n/**\n * Reads a required env var, or exits fatally. Declared to RETURN `string`\n * (never `string | undefined`) so every caller gets a real, closure-safe\n * `string` type structurally — TypeScript's control-flow narrowing from an\n * `if (!x) process.exit(1)` guard does NOT survive being captured by a\n * nested function/closure (`getClient` below), so relying on that narrowing\n * directly on `process.env.X` would silently widen back to `string |\n * undefined` inside any closure that reads it. `process.exit` is typed\n * `never`, so this function's own control flow is sound without an explicit\n * `else`/`throw`.\n */\nfunction requireEnv(name: string): string {\n  const value = process.env[name];\n  if (!value) {\n    process.stderr.write(`byok-approval-mcp: missing required env var ${name} — refusing to start\\n`);\n    process.exit(1);\n  }\n  return value;\n}\n\nasync function main(): Promise<void> {\n  const storeDir = requireEnv('BYOK_STORE_DIR');\n  const productId = requireEnv('BYOK_PRODUCT_ID');\n  const taskId = requireEnv('BYOK_TASK_ID');\n  const timeoutMs = Number(process.env.BYOK_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS ?? '600000');\n\n  if (!Number.isFinite(timeoutMs) || timeoutMs <= 0) {\n    process.stderr.write('byok-approval-mcp: invalid BYOK_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS env var — refusing to start\\n');\n    process.exit(1);\n  }\n\n  // Connect lazily (on first tools/call, not at startup) and cache the\n  // in-flight connection attempt itself (not just the resolved client) so\n  // concurrent tools/call requests (claude's parallel tool use can fire more\n  // than one) share ONE connection attempt rather than racing several.\n  let clientPromise: Promise<ControlClient> | undefined;\n  function getClient(): Promise<ControlClient> {\n    if (!clientPromise) {\n      clientPromise = connectControlClient({ storeDir, productId, requestTimeoutMs: timeoutMs + REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SLOP_MS }).then(\n        (conn) => {\n          if (!conn.ok) {\n            clientPromise = undefined; // let the NEXT call retry a fresh connection rather than caching a permanent failure\n            throw new Error(conn.reason);\n          }\n          return conn.client;\n        },\n      );\n      clientPromise.catch(() => {\n        clientPromise = undefined;\n      });\n    }\n    return clientPromise;\n  }\n\n  const deps: ApprovalMcpDeps = {\n    requestApproval: async (tId, summary) => {\n      let client: ControlClient;\n      try {\n        client = await getClient();\n      } catch (err) {\n        throw new Error(`could not connect to the daemon control socket: ${errorMessage(err)}`);\n      }\n      try {\n        return await client.request('approvals.request', { taskId: tId, summary });\n      } catch (err) {\n        // The connection may be genuinely broken (daemon restarted, socket\n        // reset, etc.) — drop the cache so a LATER tools/call in this same\n        // claude session gets a fresh connection instead of repeating the\n        // same dead one forever. This call itself still fails closed via\n        // handleMcpRequest's own catch.\n        clientPromise = undefined;\n        throw err;\n      }\n    },\n  };\n\n  serveApprovalMcpOverStdio({ taskId, deps });\n}\n\nmain().catch((err: unknown) => {\n  process.stderr.write(`byok-approval-mcp: fatal error: ${errorMessage(err)}\\n`);\n  process.exit(1);\n});\n"]}
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{ createHash, createHmac, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';\nimport path from 'node:path';\nimport type { TaskState } from '@byok-sdk/protocol';\nimport type { ApprovalDecision, PendingApproval } from './approvals';\nimport type { StorageCategory } from './journal/journal';\nimport type { StoragePressureState } from './journal/storage-policy';\nimport type { OperationalHealthSnapshot } from './operational-health';\nimport type { LocalAgentReleaseIdentity } from '../release-identity';\nimport type { McpToolsetConfig, McpToolsetRegistryStatus } from '../types';\n\n/**\n * M4 Phase 2: shared local-IPC contract between the daemon's control server\n * (`control-server.ts`) and the CLI's control client (`bin/control-client.ts`)\n * — frame shapes, endpoint path/pipe-name derivation, and the HMAC handshake\n * math. Both sides import from here so the two can never independently drift\n * (e.g. a mismatched HMAC label string, or a socket path computed two\n * slightly different ways).\n *\n * Transport: NDJSON (one JSON object per line) over a Unix domain socket\n * (darwin/linux) or a Windows named pipe — both addressed by the same\n * path-like string via Node's `net` module, so neither `control-server.ts`\n * nor `bin/control-client.ts` needs to special-case the transport itself,\n * only the path/pipe-name derivation below.\n */\n\nexport const CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION = 1;\n\n/** Handshake must complete within this long, on both sides — see each side's own timer. */\nexport const HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS = 3000;\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Endpoint path / pipe name derivation\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Conservative soft limit for a Unix domain socket path, in UTF-8 bytes.\n * macOS's `sockaddr_un.sun_path` is 104 bytes total (including the NUL\n * terminator and any prefix the kernel reserves), so anything comfortably\n * under 104 avoids `ENAMETOOLONG` at `bind()`/`connect()` time on the\n * tightest common platform.\n */\nconst UNIX_SOCKET_PATH_SOFT_LIMIT = 100;\n\n/**\n * The one fixed root the long-path fallback below binds under. Deliberately\n * NOT `os.tmpdir()`, which reads `TMPDIR`/`TMP`/`TEMP` — an endpoint address\n * that varies with the environment is not an endpoint both sides can find,\n * and a caller may have pointed `TMPDIR` INSIDE the very tree that made the\n * natural path too long, where `os.tmpdir()` yields an address LONGER than\n * the one being escaped (`bind()` then fails `EINVAL` and the daemon degrades\n * to no control socket at all). A literal `/tmp` is POSIX-guaranteed,\n * environment-independent, and short enough that this candidate always fits\n * the budget above. Same fix, same reasons as `daemon-owner.ts`'s\n * `STORE_MUTEX_FALLBACK_ROOT`; kept as its own constant because the two\n * derivations differ in name and ownership contract and must stay\n * independently readable.\n */\nconst CONTROL_SOCKET_FALLBACK_ROOT = '/tmp';\n\nfunction shortHash(input: string): string {\n  return createHash('sha256').update(input, 'utf8').digest('hex').slice(0, 16);\n}\n\n/**\n * The Unix domain socket path for a daemon rooted at `storeDir`. Prefers\n * `<storeDir>/control.sock` (keeps every one of this daemon's local state\n * files under one directory, which is already created+chmod'd 0700 by the\n * time this matters — see `control-server.ts`'s `startControlServer`);\n * falls back, whenever the natural path would risk exceeding {@link\n * UNIX_SOCKET_PATH_SOFT_LIMIT}, to a short, deterministic path nested under\n * a PER-DAEMON PRIVATE subdirectory of {@link CONTROL_SOCKET_FALLBACK_ROOT}\n * — derived from a hash of `storeDir` alone, so both the daemon and any CLI\n * invocation pointed at the same `storeDir` independently compute the\n * identical fallback path.\n *\n * That root was `os.tmpdir()` until it was proven to break both halves of\n * that sentence: it reads `TMPDIR`, so the daemon (under a service manager)\n * and the CLI (in an operator shell) derived DIFFERENT addresses for one\n * store, and under a `TMPDIR` nested in the same long tree the fallback came\n * out LONGER than the path it escaped — `bind()` `EINVAL`, and the daemon\n * ran on with no control socket at all.\n *\n * Nested one level deep (rather than a bare `<hash>.sock` file directly in\n * that shared, world-traversable root) specifically so\n * `control-server.ts`'s `bindControlEndpoint` can create+chmod that\n * subdirectory 0700 BEFORE ever binding inside it — the directory's own\n * mode gates traversal into it regardless of the socket file's own\n * (briefly default-permissioned, until the post-bind `chmod`) mode, closing\n * what would otherwise be a real window for another user on the same\n * machine to reach a socket living directly in a shared tmpdir.\n */\nexport function controlSocketPath(storeDir: string): string {\n  const candidate = path.join(storeDir, 'control.sock');\n  if (Buffer.byteLength(candidate, 'utf8') <= UNIX_SOCKET_PATH_SOFT_LIMIT) return candidate;\n  return path.join(CONTROL_SOCKET_FALLBACK_ROOT, `byok-${shortHash(storeDir)}`, 'sock');\n}\n\n/**\n * The Windows named pipe name for a daemon identified by `productId` +\n * (`path.resolve`-normalized) `storeDir`. Named pipes have no filesystem\n * path (no stale-file cleanup concern the way Unix sockets have — see\n * `control-server.ts`), but DO share one flat namespace across the whole\n * machine, so the name must be scoped to this exact daemon instance: two\n * different products, or two different store directories (e.g. two agents\n * of the same product — see `templates/service/README.md`'s \"running\n * multiple agents\" section), must never collide. `storeDir` is resolved\n * before hashing so a trivial path-form difference (trailing slash, etc.)\n * between the two sides can't split the name.\n *\n * NOT keyed by the OS user: a WinSW-installed service runs the daemon under\n * the Windows service account (e.g. `SYSTEM`) while the operator CLI runs\n * as the interactive user, so both sides must derive the identical name\n * from the same `storeDir` alone. Impostor servers are defeated by the\n * mutual HMAC handshake below, not by pipe-name secrecy — keying by user\n * was security theater that broke the service-account topology.\n */\nexport function controlPipeName(productId: string, storeDir: string): string {\n  const id = shortHash(`${productId}|${path.resolve(storeDir)}`);\n  return `\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\byok-${id}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Dispatches to {@link controlPipeName} on `win32`, {@link controlSocketPath}\n * everywhere else. `platform` defaults to `process.platform`; overridable\n * for tests exercising a specific platform's branch on any host (mirrors\n * `lifecycle/create-service-lifecycle.ts`'s identical `platform` override —\n * the REAL win32 named-pipe semantics can only be proven on actual Windows,\n * which CI's `ipc-smoke` job does; this override just makes the PATH-CHOICE\n * logic itself testable everywhere).\n */\nexport function controlEndpointPath(productId: string, storeDir: string, platform: NodeJS.Platform = process.platform): string {\n  return platform === 'win32' ? controlPipeName(productId, storeDir) : controlSocketPath(storeDir);\n}\n\n/** Where the daemon writes its per-session control-auth token (see the handshake section below). Always a real file, even on Windows (pipes have no path of their own to piggyback secrets on). */\nexport function controlTokenPath(storeDir: string): string {\n  return path.join(storeDir, 'control.token');\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Handshake: mutual HMAC proof, token never sent over the wire\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nconst SERVER_PROOF_LABEL = 'byok-control-server|';\nconst CLIENT_AUTH_LABEL = 'byok-control-client|';\n\nexport function randomNonceHex(): string {\n  return randomBytes(32).toString('hex');\n}\n\nfunction hmacHex(token: string, message: string): string {\n  return createHmac('sha256', token).update(message, 'utf8').digest('hex');\n}\n\n/** What the server proves to the client: it holds `token`, bound to the client's own nonce so a captured proof can't be replayed against a different handshake. */\nexport function computeServerProof(token: string, clientNonce: string): string {\n  return hmacHex(token, SERVER_PROOF_LABEL + clientNonce);\n}\n\n/** What the client proves to the server, symmetrically, bound to the server's nonce. */\nexport function computeClientAuth(token: string, serverNonce: string): string {\n  return hmacHex(token, CLIENT_AUTH_LABEL + serverNonce);\n}\n\n/** Constant-time hex-string comparison (`crypto.timingSafeEqual` requires equal-length buffers; a length mismatch is itself a safe, immediate \"not equal\" — no early-exit on content). */\nexport function timingSafeEqualHex(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  const bufA = Buffer.from(a, 'hex');\n  const bufB = Buffer.from(b, 'hex');\n  if (bufA.length !== bufB.length) return false;\n  return timingSafeEqual(bufA, bufB);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Handshake frame shapes + parsers\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface ClientHello {\n  v: 1;\n  hello: 'client';\n  nonce: string;\n}\nexport interface ServerHello {\n  v: 1;\n  hello: 'server';\n  proof: string;\n  nonce: string;\n}\nexport interface ClientAuth {\n  v: 1;\n  auth: string;\n}\nexport interface ServerReady {\n  v: 1;\n  ready: true;\n}\n\nexport function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {\n  return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null;\n}\n\nexport function parseClientHello(value: unknown): ClientHello | undefined {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return undefined;\n  if (value.v !== CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION || value.hello !== 'client' || typeof value.nonce !== 'string') return undefined;\n  return { v: CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION, hello: 'client', nonce: value.nonce };\n}\n\nexport function parseServerHello(value: unknown): ServerHello | undefined {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return undefined;\n  if (\n    value.v !== CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION ||\n    value.hello !== 'server' ||\n    typeof value.proof !== 'string' ||\n    typeof value.nonce !== 'string'\n  ) {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  return { v: CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION, hello: 'server', proof: value.proof, nonce: value.nonce };\n}\n\nexport function parseClientAuth(value: unknown): ClientAuth | undefined {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return undefined;\n  if (value.v !== CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION || typeof value.auth !== 'string') return undefined;\n  return { v: CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION, auth: value.auth };\n}\n\nexport function parseServerReady(value: unknown): ServerReady | undefined {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return undefined;\n  if (value.v !== CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION || value.ready !== true) return undefined;\n  return { v: CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ready: true };\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// RPC frame shapes (post-handshake)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface RawControlRequest {\n  /** Not narrowed to `1` here on purpose — an unexpected value is a `bad_version` RESPONSE, not a parse failure; see `control-server.ts`. */\n  v: unknown;\n  id: string;\n  method: string;\n  params?: unknown;\n}\n\n/** Loose shape check for an incoming request line: only `id`/`method` need to be well-formed for the server to be able to respond at all (including a `bad_version`/`unknown_method` response) — `v` is deliberately passed through unvalidated. */\nexport function parseRawControlRequest(value: unknown): RawControlRequest | undefined {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return undefined;\n  if (typeof value.id !== 'string' || typeof value.method !== 'string') return undefined;\n  return { v: value.v, id: value.id, method: value.method, params: value.params };\n}\n\nexport interface ControlErrorShape {\n  code: string;\n  message: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ControlResponseOk {\n  v: 1;\n  id: string;\n  ok: true;\n  result?: unknown;\n  /** Present (and `true`) only on the final frame of a streaming method — see `control-server.ts`'s dispatch. */\n  done?: true;\n}\n\nexport interface ControlResponseErr {\n  v: 1;\n  id: string;\n  ok: false;\n  error: ControlErrorShape;\n}\n\nexport type ControlResponse = ControlResponseOk | ControlResponseErr;\n\nexport interface ControlEventFrame {\n  v: 1;\n  id: string;\n  event: unknown;\n}\n\nexport function encodeFrame(frame: unknown): string {\n  return `${JSON.stringify(frame)}\\n`;\n}\n\n/** Thrown by a method handler to control the wire error `{code, message}` a caller sees — anything else thrown surfaces as a generic `internal_error`. See `control-server.ts`'s dispatch and `bin/control-client.ts`'s `request()` (which re-throws this same class on the client side). */\nexport class ControlError extends Error {\n  constructor(\n    public readonly code: string,\n    message: string,\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'ControlError';\n  }\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// NDJSON line framing\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Bound on a single NDJSON line's byte length. Every real frame this\n * protocol ever sends (handshake frames, requests/responses/events) is well\n * under this — it exists purely as a defensive cap against a misbehaving or\n * hostile peer streaming an unterminated line forever to grow `pending`\n * without bound. Exceeding it is a fail-closed condition: {@link\n * NdjsonLineReader.push} throws, and every caller (`control-server.ts`,\n * `bin/control-client.ts`) destroys the connection on that throw.\n */\nexport const MAX_LINE_BYTES = 64 * 1024;\n\n/**\n * Buffers raw socket bytes and yields complete lines. Splits on the raw byte\n * `0x0a` BEFORE any UTF-8 decoding (mirrors `bin/audit-log.ts`'s\n * `followAuditLog`) — `0x0A` can only ever appear as an actual newline in\n * valid UTF-8, so this never risks decoding a multi-byte character that\n * happened to straddle a chunk boundary.\n */\nexport class NdjsonLineReader {\n  private pending: Buffer = Buffer.alloc(0);\n\n  /** @throws if the still-unterminated remainder exceeds {@link MAX_LINE_BYTES} — see that constant's own doc comment. */\n  push(chunk: Buffer): string[] {\n    this.pending = this.pending.length > 0 ? Buffer.concat([this.pending, chunk]) : chunk;\n    const lines: string[] = [];\n    let newlineIndex: number;\n    // eslint-disable-next-line no-cond-assign\n    while ((newlineIndex = this.pending.indexOf(0x0a)) !== -1) {\n      const line = this.pending.subarray(0, newlineIndex).toString('utf8');\n      this.pending = this.pending.subarray(newlineIndex + 1);\n      if (line.length > 0) lines.push(line);\n    }\n    if (this.pending.length > MAX_LINE_BYTES) {\n      throw new Error(`NDJSON line exceeded ${MAX_LINE_BYTES} bytes without a terminating newline`);\n    }\n    return lines;\n  }\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Method contracts (Phase 2 surface) — shared by create-daemon.ts's control\n// method registry and the CLI commands that call them.\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface ControlActiveTask {\n  taskId: string;\n  state: TaskState;\n}\n\n/**\n * M4 Phase 4 (part B.3, observability): a cheap per-active-task queue-depth\n * watermark for the `status` result. The IDEAL metric here would be each\n * runtime adapter's own event-queue depth (`util/async-queue.ts`'s\n * `AsyncQueue`) — but that queue lives inside each adapter's concrete\n * `Session` implementation, and `Session.events` (`types.ts`) is typed only\n * as a plain `AsyncIterable<AgentEvent>`, which has no queryable backlog\n * size; reaching it would mean adding a new method to the `Session`\n * interface AND implementing it in all three bundled adapters\n * (pi/claude/codex), which is out of scope for this pass. This instead\n * reflects two things `TaskRunner` already cheaply knows about the SAME\n * task without any new plumbing: how much progress is buffered locally\n * (not yet flushed as a `task.progress` batch), and how many out-of-band\n * approval requests are currently in flight for it. See\n * `task-runner.ts`'s `getQueueWatermarks` for how each field is computed.\n */\nexport interface TaskQueueWatermark {\n  taskId: string;\n  /** Events buffered in this task's `ProgressBatcher`, not yet flushed as a `task.progress` batch. */\n  progressBatcherPending: number;\n  /** Approval requests currently in flight for this task: 1 if one is actively dispatched (registered + `task.await_approval` sent) plus however many more are queued behind it (M4 Phase 4 fold-in — see `TaskRunner.requestApproval`). */\n  pendingApprovals: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * S3b (L-003): local storage usage and pressure, as the `status` method\n * reports them (architecture §12.7.2.1).\n *\n * Named `storage*` throughout, NOT `watermark*`: {@link TaskQueueWatermark}\n * above is a per-task progress-buffer depth and has nothing to do with disk.\n * Two unrelated concepts sharing a name on one status result is how an\n * operator reads the wrong number during an incident.\n *\n * Present only when a daemon actually runs a storage policy\n * (`DaemonConfig.hostedJournal.storagePolicy`). Absent means \"not measured\",\n * which is a different statement from \"measured, and fine\" — so it is an\n * absent field rather than a zeroed one.\n */\nexport interface ControlStorageStatus {\n  /** §12.7.2.1's four states. `hard-pressure` declines new offers; `emergency` refuses to ack at all. */\n  pressureState: StoragePressureState;\n  /** `maxStoreBytes` — the budget `usedBytes` is measured against. */\n  budgetBytes: number;\n  /** Total across every category below, as of `measuredAt`. */\n  usedBytes: number;\n  /** Bytes available to this daemon on the store's filesystem — the free-space axis of the watermark, independent of the budget. */\n  freeBytes: number;\n  measuredAt: string;\n  /** The five §12.7.2.1 categories, always reported separately — a single total cannot drive a category-scoped cleanup order or a category-scoped never-delete list. */\n  categories: ControlStorageCategoryUsage[];\n  /** The most recent bounded WAL checkpoint + incremental vacuum, if one has run in this daemon's lifetime. */\n  lastCompaction?: ControlStorageCompaction;\n}\n\nexport interface ControlStorageCategoryUsage {\n  category: StorageCategory;\n  bytes: number;\n  /** `true` when this is a host-reported or sampled figure rather than one measured off the filesystem. */\n  approximate: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface ControlStorageCompaction {\n  checkpointed: boolean;\n  walFramesRemaining: number;\n  pagesVacuumed: number;\n  durationMs: number;\n  at: string;\n}\n\n/** Result shape for the `status` method — see `create-daemon.ts`'s control-method wiring for how each field is sourced, and `bin/format.ts`'s `formatLiveStatusLines` for how the CLI renders it. */\nexport interface ControlStatusResult {\n  /** Process-immutable Local Agent application release; absent only for an older control peer. */\n  localAgentRelease?: Readonly<LocalAgentReleaseIdentity>;\n  pid: number;\n  uptimeMs: number;\n  paired: boolean;\n  deviceId?: string;\n  /** The connection state machine's own current value (`ws-transport.ts`'s `ConnectionState`) — e.g. `'open'`, `'degraded'` (long-poll fallback), `'revoked'`, `'closed'`, `'connecting'`. */\n  transport: string;\n  activeTasks: ControlActiveTask[];\n  runtimeIds: string[];\n  /** M4 Phase 4 (part B.3): per-active-task queue watermarks — see {@link TaskQueueWatermark}. */\n  queueWatermarks: TaskQueueWatermark[];\n  /**\n   * Finding F4 (cross-model adversarial review): the actual pending\n   * approvals currently dispatched — the SAME entries `approvals.list`\n   * returns (`ApprovalRegistry.list()`), surfaced here too so a single\n   * `status` call can show an operator every `approvalId` they'd need to\n   * `approve`/`reject`, without a second control-socket round trip. This is\n   * `approvalsPending`'s own source list (`approvalsPending ===\n   * approvals.length`, always).\n   */\n  approvals: PendingApproval[];\n  /** M4 Phase 4 (part B.3): total approvals currently DISPATCHED (registered) across the whole daemon — the same count `approvals.list` returns, surfaced here too for a one-call status view. */\n  approvalsPending: number;\n  /** S3b (L-003): local storage usage + pressure — see {@link ControlStorageStatus}. Absent unless a storage policy is configured. */\n  storage?: ControlStorageStatus;\n  /** Local lifecycle/retry budget. This is not the transport state above. */\n  operationalHealth: OperationalHealthSnapshot;\n  /** Redacted content-addressed status from the daemon's single local registry. */\n  toolsets: McpToolsetRegistryStatus;\n}\n\nexport interface ToolsetsReloadParams {\n  expectedRevision: string;\n  mcpToolsets: Record<string, McpToolsetConfig>;\n}\n\n/** Shape-only parser; executable definition validation remains registry-owned. */\nexport function parseToolsetsReloadParams(value: unknown): ToolsetsReloadParams | undefined {\n  if (!isRecord(value) || Object.keys(value).some((key) => key !== 'expectedRevision' && key !== 'mcpToolsets')) {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  if (typeof value.expectedRevision !== 'string' || !isRecord(value.mcpToolsets) || Array.isArray(value.mcpToolsets)) {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  return {\n    expectedRevision: value.expectedRevision,\n    mcpToolsets: value.mcpToolsets as Record<string, McpToolsetConfig>,\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface ApprovalsListResult {\n  approvals: PendingApproval[];\n}\n\nexport type { ApprovalDecision, PendingApproval } from './approvals';\n\nexport interface ApprovalsResolveParams {\n  approvalId: string;\n  decision: ApprovalDecision;\n  reason?: string;\n}\n\nexport function parseApprovalsResolveParams(value: unknown): ApprovalsResolveParams | undefined {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return undefined;\n  if (typeof value.approvalId !== 'string') return undefined;\n  if (value.decision !== 'approve' && value.decision !== 'reject') return undefined;\n  if (value.reason !== undefined && typeof value.reason !== 'string') return undefined;\n  return { approvalId: value.approvalId, decision: value.decision, reason: value.reason };\n}\n\n/**\n * M4 Phase 3: the control method `byok-approval-mcp` (`bin/byok-approval-mcp.ts`)\n * calls FROM a claude-spawned MCP-server child process — a genuinely\n * different OS process from the daemon, reachable only over this same\n * control socket (see `../types.ts`'s `ApprovalChannel` doc comment for the\n * full why). `taskId` correlates the request to an active task;\n * `summary` is a short, human-readable description of the gated action\n * (carried verbatim into the wire `task.await_approval.summary`).\n */\nexport interface ApprovalsRequestParams {\n  taskId: string;\n  summary: string;\n}\n\nexport function parseApprovalsRequestParams(value: unknown): ApprovalsRequestParams | undefined {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return undefined;\n  if (typeof value.taskId !== 'string' || value.taskId.length === 0) return undefined;\n  if (typeof value.summary !== 'string') return undefined;\n  return { taskId: value.taskId, summary: value.summary };\n}\n\n/** Result of `approvals.request` — the outcome `byok-approval-mcp` translates into its own MCP `allow`/`deny` answer. */\nexport interface ApprovalsRequestResult {\n  approved: boolean;\n  reason?: string;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// `assertion.issue` (plan device-assertion-broker)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Params for `assertion.issue`: a sibling local process (the host's own CLI,\n * installed alongside this daemon) asking the daemon to mint one short-lived,\n * audience-scoped device assertion with the paired device key. See\n * `@byok-sdk/core`'s `device-assertion.ts` for the envelope, and\n * `create-daemon.ts`'s handler for the six fail-closed gates every call passes\n * through in a fixed order.\n *\n * One field, and nothing else. In particular there is deliberately no caller\n * identity, no requested TTL, and no requested claim set: every process running\n * as this UID can reach the control socket, so anything a caller \"tells\" the\n * daemon about itself is decoration, and a caller-chosen lifetime is just the\n * TTL ceiling handed to whoever asks.\n */\nexport interface AssertionIssueParams {\n  audience: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Bound on the `audience` a caller may send, in UTF-8 bytes — mirrors\n * `@byok-sdk/core`'s `DEVICE_ASSERTION_AUDIENCE_MAX_BYTES`. Restated here rather\n * than imported so the WIRE bound is checked before anything reaches the claim\n * schema: this is the frame-level shape gate, and it must reject an oversized\n * value without that value ever reaching a signer or an audit line.\n */\nexport const ASSERTION_AUDIENCE_MAX_BYTES = 256;\n\n/**\n * Strict shape check. `undefined` means `bad_request` — a distinct gate from\n * `audience_denied` (see `create-daemon.ts`): \"you sent something that is not a\n * request\" and \"you asked for an audience you may not have\" are different\n * facts, and collapsing them would let a caller probe the allowlist by\n * malforming requests.\n *\n * Rejects an unknown key outright rather than ignoring it. A tolerated extra\n * field is how a future caller comes to believe it can influence the claim set.\n */\nexport function parseAssertionIssueParams(value: unknown): AssertionIssueParams | undefined {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return undefined;\n  const keys = Object.keys(value);\n  if (keys.length !== 1 || keys[0] !== 'audience') return undefined;\n  const { audience } = value;\n  if (typeof audience !== 'string' || audience.length === 0) return undefined;\n  if (Buffer.byteLength(audience, 'utf8') > ASSERTION_AUDIENCE_MAX_BYTES) return undefined;\n  return { audience };\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of `assertion.issue`. `assertion` is the full signing envelope\n * (`DeviceAssertionEnvelopeV1`), carried as an opaque JSON value on this wire —\n * the caller hands it to the host's cloud, which parses and verifies it with\n * core's own `verifyDeviceAssertion`. `expiresAt` is repeated outside the\n * envelope purely so a caller can schedule a refresh without parsing claims it\n * has no business interpreting.\n */\nexport interface AssertionIssueResult {\n  assertion: unknown;\n  expiresAt: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * The six `ControlError` codes `assertion.issue` can answer with, in the exact\n * order the handler checks them (`create-daemon.ts`). Each one is a distinct\n * refusal with a distinct cause; none of them ever signs anything.\n *\n * - `assertion_disabled` — this daemon has no `deviceAssertion` config, or an\n *   empty audience allowlist. The feature is OFF by default.\n * - `bad_request` — params were not `{audience: string}` within the byte bound.\n * - `audience_denied` — the audience is not in the configured allowlist. The\n *   message never echoes the allowlist: a refusal must not be an enumeration\n *   oracle.\n * - `shutting_down` — a shutdown has been requested. Closes the window between\n *   the shutdown RPC being acknowledged and the control socket actually\n *   closing, during which a device that is being unpaired could otherwise still\n *   mint credentials.\n * - `revoked` — the server has revoked this device.\n * - `not_paired` — there is no device record on disk (never paired, or already\n *   cleared).\n */\nexport const ASSERTION_ISSUE_ERROR_CODES = [\n  'assertion_disabled',\n  'bad_request',\n  'audience_denied',\n  'shutting_down',\n  'revoked',\n  'not_paired',\n] as const;\n\nexport type AssertionIssueErrorCode = (typeof ASSERTION_ISSUE_ERROR_CODES)[number];\n\nexport type ShutdownReason = 'unpair' | 'operator';\n\nexport interface ShutdownParams {\n  reason?: ShutdownReason;\n}\n\nexport function parseShutdownParams(value: unknown): ShutdownParams {\n  if (!isRecord(value)) return {};\n  return value.reason === 'unpair' || value.reason === 'operator' ? { reason: value.reason } : {};\n}\n","import { constants as fsConstants, promises as fs } from 'node:fs';\nimport net from 'node:net';\nimport {\n  CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION,\n  ControlError,\n  HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS,\n  NdjsonLineReader,\n  computeClientAuth,\n  computeServerProof,\n  controlEndpointPath,\n  controlTokenPath,\n  encodeFrame,\n  isRecord,\n  parseServerHello,\n  parseServerReady,\n  randomNonceHex,\n  timingSafeEqualHex,\n} from '../daemon/control-protocol';\n\n/**\n * M4 Phase 2: the CLI-side half of the control socket — connects, performs\n * the mutual HMAC handshake (`../daemon/control-protocol.ts`), and exposes a\n * small `request()`/`subscribe()` surface every rewired command\n * (`status`/`tasks --follow`/`unpair`/`approve`/`reject`) builds on.\n *\n * `connectControlClient` never throws for the ordinary \"daemon isn't\n * running\" case — it returns a typed `{ok:false, reason}` result instead\n * (see {@link ConnectControlResult}), so a caller can render a clean\n * fallback message rather than catching an exception. Missing\n * `control.token` (the daemon was never started, or was stopped) is by far\n * the most common reason; any other connect/handshake failure collapses\n * into the same shape — a CLI user doesn't need to know WHY the control\n * socket isn't reachable, only that it isn't and a fallback is being used.\n */\n\nexport interface ControlClientOptions {\n  storeDir: string;\n  productId: string;\n  /** Default: `HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS` (3000ms) — matches the server's own handshake timeout. */\n  handshakeTimeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Default 10000ms — applied per `request()` call; never applied to `subscribe()`, which is expected to stay open indefinitely. */\n  requestTimeoutMs?: number;\n}\n\nexport interface ControlClient {\n  /** Sends `{method, params}`, resolves with the server's `result`, or rejects with a {@link ControlError} (or a plain `Error` for a connection-level failure/timeout). */\n  request<T = unknown>(method: string, params?: unknown): Promise<T>;\n  /** Sends a streaming request; `onEvent` fires for each `event` frame. Returns a handle whose `close()` ends the WHOLE connection (per the protocol: \"client may just close the connection to unsubscribe\") — don't share a client between a `subscribe()` and other concurrent `request()` calls if you need them to outlive each other. */\n  subscribe(method: string, params: unknown, onEvent: (event: unknown) => void): { close: () => void };\n  /** Closes the underlying connection. Safe to call more than once. */\n  close(): void;\n}\n\nexport type ConnectControlResult = { ok: true; client: ControlClient } | { ok: false; reason: string };\n\nconst MAX_CONTROL_TOKEN_BYTES = 256;\n\nfunction errorMessage(err: unknown): string {\n  return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n}\n\nfunction sameFileState(left: import('node:fs').BigIntStats, right: import('node:fs').BigIntStats): boolean {\n  return (\n    left.dev === right.dev &&\n    left.ino === right.ino &&\n    left.size === right.size &&\n    left.mtimeNs === right.mtimeNs &&\n    left.ctimeNs === right.ctimeNs\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the authentication token through a bounded pathname-bound handle.\n * Diagnostics calls this client even when no daemon is expected, so a FIFO,\n * symlink swap, or oversized local file must become an ordinary offline result\n * rather than blocking the CLI or consuming unbounded memory.\n */\nasync function readControlToken(tokenPath: string): Promise<string | undefined> {\n  let namedBefore: import('node:fs').BigIntStats;\n  try {\n    namedBefore = await fs.lstat(tokenPath, { bigint: true });\n  } catch (err) {\n    if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'ENOENT') return undefined;\n    throw err;\n  }\n  if (!namedBefore.isFile() || namedBefore.isSymbolicLink()) {\n    throw new Error('control token is not a real regular file');\n  }\n  const handle = await fs.open(\n    tokenPath,\n    fsConstants.O_RDONLY | (fsConstants.O_NONBLOCK ?? 0) | (fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW ?? 0),\n  );\n  try {\n    const opened = await handle.stat({ bigint: true });\n    const namedAfterOpen = await fs.lstat(tokenPath, { bigint: true });\n    if (\n      !opened.isFile() ||\n      !namedAfterOpen.isFile() ||\n      namedAfterOpen.isSymbolicLink() ||\n      !sameFileState(namedBefore, opened) ||\n      !sameFileState(opened, namedAfterOpen)\n    ) {\n      throw new Error('control token pathname changed before safe open');\n    }\n    if (opened.size < 0 || opened.size > BigInt(MAX_CONTROL_TOKEN_BYTES)) {\n      throw new Error('control token exceeds the bounded read limit');\n    }\n    const size = Number(opened.size);\n    const bytes = Buffer.alloc(size);\n    const { bytesRead } = await handle.read(bytes, 0, size, 0);\n    const afterRead = await handle.stat({ bigint: true });\n    const namedAfterRead = await fs.lstat(tokenPath, { bigint: true });\n    if (\n      bytesRead !== size ||\n      namedAfterRead.isSymbolicLink() ||\n      !sameFileState(opened, afterRead) ||\n      !sameFileState(afterRead, namedAfterRead)\n    ) {\n      throw new Error('control token changed during bounded read');\n    }\n    return bytes.toString('utf8').trim();\n  } finally {\n    await handle.close();\n  }\n}\n\n/** Reads the control token, connects, and performs the handshake — see the module doc comment for why failures here collapse into `{ok:false, reason}` rather than throwing. */\nexport async function connectControlClient(opts: ControlClientOptions): Promise<ConnectControlResult> {\n  const tokenPath = controlTokenPath(opts.storeDir);\n  let token: string;\n  try {\n    const read = await readControlToken(tokenPath);\n    if (read === undefined) {\n      return { ok: false, reason: 'daemon is not running (no control.token found)' };\n    }\n    token = read;\n  } catch (err) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: `could not read the control token: ${errorMessage(err)}` };\n  }\n  if (!token) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: 'control token file is empty' };\n  }\n\n  const endpoint = controlEndpointPath(opts.productId, opts.storeDir);\n  try {\n    const client = await connectAndHandshake(endpoint, token, opts);\n    return { ok: true, client };\n  } catch (err) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: `daemon control socket not reachable: ${errorMessage(err)}` };\n  }\n}\n\nfunction connectAndHandshake(endpoint: string, token: string, opts: ControlClientOptions): Promise<ControlClient> {\n  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n    const socket = net.createConnection(endpoint);\n    const reader = new NdjsonLineReader();\n    let phase: 'server-hello' | 'ready' = 'server-hello';\n    let settled = false;\n    const clientNonce = randomNonceHex();\n\n    const timer = setTimeout(() => {\n      fail(new Error('handshake timed out'));\n    }, opts.handshakeTimeoutMs ?? HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS);\n    timer.unref?.();\n\n    function fail(err: unknown): void {\n      if (settled) return;\n      settled = true;\n      clearTimeout(timer);\n      socket.removeAllListeners();\n      socket.destroy();\n      reject(err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)));\n    }\n\n    function succeed(): void {\n      settled = true;\n      clearTimeout(timer);\n      socket.removeListener('error', onError);\n      socket.removeListener('data', onData);\n      resolve(createControlClient(socket, reader, opts));\n    }\n\n    function onData(chunk: Buffer): void {\n      // Hardening finding (P2 re-gate): `reader.push` throws once the\n      // still-unterminated remainder exceeds MAX_LINE_BYTES\n      // (control-protocol.ts) — a hostile/broken peer sending a >64KiB line\n      // with no newline. Uncaught, this would propagate out of the 'data'\n      // listener and crash the whole CLI process (Node has no default\n      // recovery for an exception thrown inside an EventEmitter callback).\n      // Mirrors control-server.ts's own identical guard around its matching\n      // `reader.push` call — route into this same handshake's `fail()` path\n      // instead, exactly like every other handshake failure here.\n      let lines: string[];\n      try {\n        lines = reader.push(chunk);\n      } catch (err) {\n        fail(err);\n        return;\n      }\n      for (const line of lines) {\n        let parsed: unknown;\n        try {\n          parsed = JSON.parse(line);\n        } catch {\n          fail(new Error('malformed handshake frame'));\n          return;\n        }\n        if (phase === 'server-hello') {\n          const hello = parseServerHello(parsed);\n          if (!hello) {\n            fail(new Error('malformed or unexpected server hello'));\n            return;\n          }\n          if (!timingSafeEqualHex(hello.proof, computeServerProof(token, clientNonce))) {\n            fail(new Error('server failed to prove it holds the control token'));\n            return;\n          }\n          socket.write(encodeFrame({ v: CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION, auth: computeClientAuth(token, hello.nonce) }));\n          phase = 'ready';\n          continue;\n        }\n        if (!parseServerReady(parsed)) {\n          fail(new Error('server did not confirm readiness'));\n          return;\n        }\n        succeed();\n        return;\n      }\n    }\n\n    function onError(err: unknown): void {\n      fail(err);\n    }\n\n    socket.once('error', onError);\n    socket.once('connect', () => {\n      socket.write(encodeFrame({ v: CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION, hello: 'client', nonce: clientNonce }));\n      socket.on('data', onData);\n    });\n  });\n}\n\ninterface PendingCall {\n  resolve: (value: unknown) => void;\n  reject: (err: unknown) => void;\n  onEvent?: (event: unknown) => void;\n}\n\nfunction withTimeout<T>(promise: Promise<T>, ms: number, message: string): Promise<T> {\n  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n    const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error(message)), ms);\n    timer.unref?.();\n    promise.then(\n      (value) => {\n        clearTimeout(timer);\n        resolve(value);\n      },\n      (err: unknown) => {\n        clearTimeout(timer);\n        reject(err);\n      },\n    );\n  });\n}\n\nfunction createControlClient(socket: net.Socket, reader: NdjsonLineReader, opts: ControlClientOptions): ControlClient {\n  const pending = new Map<string, PendingCall>();\n  let idSeq = 0;\n  let closed = false;\n\n  function handleFrame(parsed: unknown): void {\n    if (!isRecord(parsed) || typeof parsed.id !== 'string') return;\n    const entry = pending.get(parsed.id);\n    if (!entry) return;\n    if ('event' in parsed) {\n      entry.onEvent?.(parsed.event);\n      return;\n    }\n    if (parsed.ok === true) {\n      pending.delete(parsed.id);\n      entry.resolve(parsed.done === true ? undefined : (parsed as { result?: unknown }).result);\n      return;\n    }\n    pending.delete(parsed.id);\n    const shape = (parsed as { error?: { code?: unknown; message?: unknown } }).error;\n    entry.reject(\n      new ControlError(\n        typeof shape?.code === 'string' ? shape.code : 'internal_error',\n        typeof shape?.message === 'string' ? shape.message : 'unknown control error',\n      ),\n    );\n  }\n\n  socket.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {\n    // Same hardening as connectAndHandshake's own onData above: `reader.push`\n    // throws on a >64KiB unterminated line (MAX_LINE_BYTES,\n    // control-protocol.ts) — uncaught, that would crash this CLI process\n    // from inside an EventEmitter 'data' callback. This connection is\n    // already past the handshake (there is no `fail()` closure here), so\n    // fail closed the same way a malformed/unexpected frame elsewhere in\n    // this function already does: destroy the connection (which rejects\n    // every pending call via the 'close' handler below) rather than risk\n    // continuing to read from a peer that just proved it doesn't speak this\n    // protocol.\n    let lines: string[];\n    try {\n      lines = reader.push(chunk);\n    } catch {\n      socket.destroy();\n      return;\n    }\n    for (const line of lines) {\n      let parsed: unknown;\n      try {\n        parsed = JSON.parse(line);\n      } catch {\n        continue; // ignore a malformed line rather than tearing down an otherwise-healthy connection\n      }\n      handleFrame(parsed);\n    }\n  });\n  socket.on('close', () => {\n    closed = true;\n    for (const entry of pending.values()) entry.reject(new Error('control connection closed'));\n    pending.clear();\n  });\n  socket.on('error', () => {\n    // 'close' always follows and rejects every pending call above — swallow\n    // here so a peer reset never becomes an unhandled 'error' crash.\n  });\n\n  function send(method: string, params: unknown, onEvent?: (event: unknown) => void): { id: string; promise: Promise<unknown> } {\n    const id = `c${++idSeq}`;\n    const promise = new Promise<unknown>((resolve, reject) => {\n      pending.set(id, { resolve, reject, onEvent });\n    });\n    socket.write(encodeFrame({ v: CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION, id, method, params }));\n    return { id, promise };\n  }\n\n  return {\n    async request<T>(method: string, params?: unknown): Promise<T> {\n      if (closed) throw new Error('control connection is closed');\n      const { promise } = send(method, params);\n      const result = await withTimeout(promise, opts.requestTimeoutMs ?? 10_000, `control request \"${method}\" timed out`);\n      return result as T;\n    },\n    subscribe(method, params, onEvent) {\n      const { id, promise } = send(method, params, onEvent);\n      promise.catch(() => {\n        // subscribe()'s lifetime is managed via close()/onEvent, not this\n        // promise — swallow so destroying the connection later (which\n        // rejects every pending call, this one included) never surfaces as\n        // an unhandled rejection.\n      });\n      return {\n        close: (): void => {\n          pending.delete(id);\n          socket.destroy();\n        },\n      };\n    },\n    close(): void {\n      socket.destroy();\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Unpair's own poll for \"has the daemon actually exited yet\" (see\n * `bin/commands/unpair.ts`): both the control token file being gone AND a\n * fresh connect attempt being refused, checked directly rather than through\n * a full `connectControlClient` handshake — cheaper per poll, and matches\n * the exact two-condition check the M4 design calls for.\n */\nexport async function isControlDaemonGone(storeDir: string, productId: string): Promise<boolean> {\n  const tokenGone = await fs.stat(controlTokenPath(storeDir)).then(\n    () => false,\n    (err) => (err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'ENOENT',\n  );\n  if (!tokenGone) return false;\n\n  const endpoint = controlEndpointPath(productId, storeDir);\n  return new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {\n    const socket = net.createConnection(endpoint);\n    const finish = (gone: boolean): void => {\n      socket.removeAllListeners();\n      socket.destroy();\n      resolve(gone);\n    };\n    socket.once('connect', () => finish(false));\n    socket.once('error', (err: NodeJS.ErrnoException) => finish(err.code === 'ECONNREFUSED' || err.code === 'ENOENT'));\n  });\n}\n","import { createInterface } from 'node:readline';\n\n/**\n * M4 Phase 3: the testable core of `byok-approval-mcp` (`byok-approval-mcp.ts`\n * is the thin stdio-wiring entry point — mirrors this repo's existing\n * `bin/commands/*.ts` split: real logic lives in a plain module, the bin\n * script itself is glue no test ever imports directly).\n *\n * `byok-approval-mcp` is the MCP stdio server `claude`'s own\n * `--permission-prompt-tool` spawns AS ITS OWN CHILD PROCESS when the claude\n * adapter runs a task under `PermissionPolicy.mode: 'confirm'` (see\n * `../adapters/claude/permission-mapping.ts`'s `confirm`-mode doc comment).\n * It implements just enough of the MCP stdio transport (JSON-RPC 2.0,\n * newline-delimited, per the spec) to expose ONE tool — empirically\n * confirmed end-to-end against the real installed claude 2.1.216 binary\n * (M4 Phase 3 STEP 0): `initialize` -> `notifications/initialized` ->\n * `tools/list` -> `tools/call`, with the tool's arguments shaped exactly\n * `{tool_name, input, tool_use_id}` (claude's own real wire shape,\n * live-captured) and its expected response shaped\n * `{content:[{type:'text', text: JSON.stringify({behavior:'allow',\n * updatedInput} | {behavior:'deny', message})}]}` — the SAME shape the\n * Claude Agent SDK's in-process `canUseTool` callback returns (see\n * platform.claude.com/docs/en/agent-sdk/user-input), just crossing a\n * process boundary via MCP instead of an in-process function call.\n */\n\nexport const APPROVAL_TOOL_NAME = 'approval_prompt';\n\n/** Bound on how much of a tool call's `input` gets folded into the wire `task.await_approval.summary` — mirrors `events.ts`'s `RESULT_DIAGNOSTIC_MAX_CHARS`/`truncateResultDiagnostic` convention: a human-facing summary, not a full audit record. */\nexport const APPROVAL_SUMMARY_MAX_CHARS = 500;\n\nfunction errorMessage(err: unknown): string {\n  return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n}\n\n/** `${toolName}: ${input}`, bounded — the human-readable description carried into `task.await_approval.summary` and (via the daemon/CLI's own rendering) whatever a real approver actually reads before deciding. */\nexport function summarizeToolCall(toolName: string, input: unknown): string {\n  let inputStr: string;\n  try {\n    inputStr = JSON.stringify(input);\n  } catch (err) {\n    inputStr = `<unserializable input: ${errorMessage(err)}>`;\n  }\n  const bounded =\n    inputStr.length > APPROVAL_SUMMARY_MAX_CHARS ? `${inputStr.slice(0, APPROVAL_SUMMARY_MAX_CHARS)}… [truncated]` : inputStr;\n  return `${toolName}: ${bounded}`;\n}\n\nexport interface ApprovalOutcome {\n  approved: boolean;\n  reason?: string;\n}\n\n/** What `byok-approval-mcp.ts` (the real entry point) injects — the one real dependency this module has on the outside world. */\nexport interface ApprovalMcpDeps {\n  /** Requests a decision from the daemon this task is running on. Any rejection/throw here is treated as fail-closed (deny) by `handleMcpRequest` — never surfaced to claude as a raw protocol error. */\n  requestApproval(taskId: string, summary: string): Promise<ApprovalOutcome>;\n}\n\ninterface JsonRpcRequestLike {\n  jsonrpc?: unknown;\n  id?: unknown;\n  method?: unknown;\n  params?: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * Handles exactly one already-parsed JSON-RPC request object and returns the\n * exact response object to write back (`undefined` for a notification that\n * expects no reply, e.g. `notifications/initialized`) — no stdio/process\n * concerns at all, so tests call this directly with a stub {@link\n * ApprovalMcpDeps} instead of spawning a real process or a real control\n * socket. `serveApprovalMcpOverStdio` below is the only caller in production.\n */\nexport async function handleMcpRequest(\n  req: JsonRpcRequestLike,\n  deps: ApprovalMcpDeps,\n  taskId: string,\n): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | undefined> {\n  const id = req.id;\n\n  if (req.method === 'initialize') {\n    const params = (req.params ?? {}) as { protocolVersion?: unknown };\n    return {\n      jsonrpc: '2.0',\n      id,\n      result: {\n        protocolVersion: typeof params.protocolVersion === 'string' ? params.protocolVersion : '2024-11-05',\n        capabilities: { tools: {} },\n        serverInfo: { name: 'byok-approval-mcp', version: '0.0.1' },\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  if (req.method === 'notifications/initialized') {\n    return undefined; // notification — no response\n  }\n\n  if (req.method === 'tools/list') {\n    return {\n      jsonrpc: '2.0',\n      id,\n      result: {\n        tools: [\n          {\n            name: APPROVAL_TOOL_NAME,\n            description:\n              'Requests operator approval for a pending tool call. Blocks until a human (or this device\\'s daemon) decides, or the configured timeout elapses (fail-closed deny on timeout).',\n            inputSchema: {\n              type: 'object',\n              properties: {\n                tool_name: { type: 'string' },\n                input: { type: 'object' },\n              },\n            },\n          },\n        ],\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  if (req.method === 'tools/call') {\n    const params = (req.params ?? {}) as { name?: unknown; arguments?: unknown };\n    if (params.name !== APPROVAL_TOOL_NAME) {\n      return { jsonrpc: '2.0', id, error: { code: -32602, message: `unknown tool \"${String(params.name)}\"` } };\n    }\n    const args = (params.arguments ?? {}) as { tool_name?: unknown; input?: unknown };\n    const toolName = typeof args.tool_name === 'string' ? args.tool_name : 'unknown tool';\n    const input = args.input ?? {};\n    const summary = summarizeToolCall(toolName, input);\n\n    let outcome: ApprovalOutcome;\n    try {\n      outcome = await deps.requestApproval(taskId, summary);\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Fail-closed (task's own mandate): a daemon that's unreachable, a\n      // control request that times out, or any other failure reaching the\n      // approving device must never leave claude's own MCP call unanswered\n      // — that risks claude abandoning the whole turn on its own (M4 Phase 3\n      // STEP 0 found claude gives up on a permission-prompt-tool call that\n      // never answers at all, ~1.5s in) rather than cleanly denying just\n      // this one tool call and letting the conversation continue.\n      outcome = { approved: false, reason: `could not reach the approving device: ${errorMessage(err)}` };\n    }\n\n    const payload = outcome.approved\n      ? { behavior: 'allow' as const, updatedInput: input }\n      : { behavior: 'deny' as const, message: outcome.reason ?? 'denied' };\n    return { jsonrpc: '2.0', id, result: { content: [{ type: 'text', text: JSON.stringify(payload) }] } };\n  }\n\n  if (id !== undefined) {\n    return { jsonrpc: '2.0', id, error: { code: -32601, message: `unknown method: ${String(req.method)}` } };\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nexport interface ServeApprovalMcpOptions {\n  taskId: string;\n  deps: ApprovalMcpDeps;\n  /** Defaults to `process.stdin`/`process.stdout` — overridable so tests can drive this over in-memory streams. */\n  input?: NodeJS.ReadableStream;\n  output?: NodeJS.WritableStream;\n}\n\n/**\n * Wires {@link handleMcpRequest} to real NDJSON stdio (the MCP stdio\n * transport: one JSON-RPC message per line, both directions) — the only\n * genuinely process-shaped piece of this module. Each line is handled\n * independently and asynchronously (never serialized against the others),\n * since claude's own parallel-tool-use can legitimately fire more than one\n * concurrent `tools/call` over the same connection.\n */\nexport function serveApprovalMcpOverStdio(opts: ServeApprovalMcpOptions): void {\n  const input = opts.input ?? process.stdin;\n  const output = opts.output ?? process.stdout;\n  const rl = createInterface({ input, terminal: false });\n\n  rl.on('line', (line) => {\n    const trimmed = line.trim();\n    if (!trimmed) return;\n    let parsed: unknown;\n    try {\n      parsed = JSON.parse(trimmed);\n    } catch {\n      return; // a stray non-JSON line is not this server's concern\n    }\n    void handleMcpRequest(parsed as JsonRpcRequestLike, opts.deps, opts.taskId).then((response) => {\n      if (response !== undefined) output.write(`${JSON.stringify(response)}\\n`);\n    });\n  });\n}\n","#!/usr/bin/env node\nimport { connectControlClient, type ControlClient } from './control-client';\nimport { serveApprovalMcpOverStdio, type ApprovalMcpDeps } from './approval-mcp-server';\n\n/**\n * `byok-approval-mcp`: the bin entry `claude`'s own `--permission-prompt-tool`\n * spawns as its child process under `PermissionPolicy.mode: 'confirm'` — see\n * `approval-mcp-server.ts`'s module doc comment for the full protocol/design\n * writeup and `../adapters/claude/permission-mapping.ts`'s `confirm`-mode\n * doc comment for the empirical basis. This file is intentionally thin (glue\n * only, never imported by a test — mirrors `byok-agent.ts`'s own split from\n * `bin/commands/*.ts`): read env, wire a real `ApprovalMcpDeps.requestApproval`\n * against the control socket, hand off to `serveApprovalMcpOverStdio`.\n *\n * Env vars (set by `../adapters/claude/claude-adapter.ts`'s `start()` via the\n * generated `--mcp-config`'s own `env` block — never read from the daemon's\n * ambient environment, since a DIFFERENT product/device's config must never\n * leak in):\n *   BYOK_STORE_DIR            — this daemon's control-socket storeDir.\n *   BYOK_PRODUCT_ID           — this daemon's productId.\n *   BYOK_TASK_ID              — the task this approval request belongs to.\n *   BYOK_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS  — `RuntimeOperationStartInput.approvalChannel.timeoutMs`,\n *                                echoed here so this process's OWN control\n *                                request waits at least that long (plus\n *                                slop) rather than timing out earlier than\n *                                the daemon's own authoritative deadline.\n */\n\nfunction errorMessage(err: unknown): string {\n  return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n}\n\n/** Slop added on top of the daemon's own approval timeout for this process's OWN control-socket request timeout — the daemon's `TaskRunner.requestApproval` is the authoritative deadline (see its own doc comment); this must never fire first and race it. */\nconst REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SLOP_MS = 5_000;\n\n/**\n * Reads a required env var, or exits fatally. Declared to RETURN `string`\n * (never `string | undefined`) so every caller gets a real, closure-safe\n * `string` type structurally — TypeScript's control-flow narrowing from an\n * `if (!x) process.exit(1)` guard does NOT survive being captured by a\n * nested function/closure (`getClient` below), so relying on that narrowing\n * directly on `process.env.X` would silently widen back to `string |\n * undefined` inside any closure that reads it. `process.exit` is typed\n * `never`, so this function's own control flow is sound without an explicit\n * `else`/`throw`.\n */\nfunction requireEnv(name: string): string {\n  const value = process.env[name];\n  if (!value) {\n    process.stderr.write(`byok-approval-mcp: missing required env var ${name} — refusing to start\\n`);\n    process.exit(1);\n  }\n  return value;\n}\n\nasync function main(): Promise<void> {\n  const storeDir = requireEnv('BYOK_STORE_DIR');\n  const productId = requireEnv('BYOK_PRODUCT_ID');\n  const taskId = requireEnv('BYOK_TASK_ID');\n  const timeoutMs = Number(process.env.BYOK_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS ?? '600000');\n\n  if (!Number.isFinite(timeoutMs) || timeoutMs <= 0) {\n    process.stderr.write('byok-approval-mcp: invalid BYOK_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS env var — refusing to start\\n');\n    process.exit(1);\n  }\n\n  // Connect lazily (on first tools/call, not at startup) and cache the\n  // in-flight connection attempt itself (not just the resolved client) so\n  // concurrent tools/call requests (claude's parallel tool use can fire more\n  // than one) share ONE connection attempt rather than racing several.\n  let clientPromise: Promise<ControlClient> | undefined;\n  function getClient(): Promise<ControlClient> {\n    if (!clientPromise) {\n      clientPromise = connectControlClient({ storeDir, productId, requestTimeoutMs: timeoutMs + REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SLOP_MS }).then(\n        (conn) => {\n          if (!conn.ok) {\n            clientPromise = undefined; // let the NEXT call retry a fresh connection rather than caching a permanent failure\n            throw new Error(conn.reason);\n          }\n          return conn.client;\n        },\n      );\n      clientPromise.catch(() => {\n        clientPromise = undefined;\n      });\n    }\n    return clientPromise;\n  }\n\n  const deps: ApprovalMcpDeps = {\n    requestApproval: async (tId, summary) => {\n      let client: ControlClient;\n      try {\n        client = await getClient();\n      } catch (err) {\n        throw new Error(`could not connect to the daemon control socket: ${errorMessage(err)}`);\n      }\n      try {\n        return await client.request('approvals.request', { taskId: tId, summary });\n      } catch (err) {\n        // The connection may be genuinely broken (daemon restarted, socket\n        // reset, etc.) — drop the cache so a LATER tools/call in this same\n        // claude session gets a fresh connection instead of repeating the\n        // same dead one forever. This call itself still fails closed via\n        // handleMcpRequest's own catch.\n        clientPromise = undefined;\n        throw err;\n      }\n    },\n  };\n\n  serveApprovalMcpOverStdio({ taskId, deps });\n}\n\nmain().catch((err: unknown) => {\n  process.stderr.write(`byok-approval-mcp: fatal error: ${errorMessage(err)}\\n`);\n  process.exit(1);\n});\n"]}

package/dist/bin/commands/toolsets.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+import type { DaemonConfig } from '../../daemon/create-daemon';
+import { connectControlClient } from '../control-client';
+export interface ToolsetsReloadDeps {
+    log?: (line: string) => void;
+    connectControl?: typeof connectControlClient;
+}
+/** Reload from the CLI host's already-loaded config; the daemon never receives a pathname. */
+export declare function runToolsetsReloadCommand(config: DaemonConfig, deps?: ToolsetsReloadDeps): Promise<void>;

package/dist/bin/format.d.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import type { AgentEvent } from '@byok-sdk/protocol';
 import type { ConnectionState, DaemonBranding, DaemonEvent, DaemonTaskInfo, LocalAgentReleaseIdentity } from '../index';
 import type { ControlStatusResult, PendingApproval } from '../daemon/control-protocol';
+import type { McpToolsetReloadReceipt } from '../types';
 import type { ProbedRuntime } from './runtime-probe';
 import type { TaskCounts, DerivedTaskInfo } from './tasks-view';
 /**
@@ -71,6 +72,8 @@ export declare function formatStatusLines(view: StatusView): string[];
  * the historical/persisted view above them.
  */
 export declare function formatLiveStatusLines(live: ControlStatusResult): string[];
+/** Plain, redacted operator receipt for one host-owned registry reload. */
+export declare function formatToolsetsReloadReceiptLines(receipt: Readonly<McpToolsetReloadReceipt>): string[];
 /**
  * Finding F4: renders `approvals.list`'s registry entries for the new
  * `byok-agent approvals` command (`bin/commands/approvals.ts`) — columns

package/dist/daemon/agent-content-audit-store.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+import type { AgentContentAuditReceipt } from './agent-content-read';
+/**
+ * A durable audit ledger for explicit Agent content reads.
+ *
+ * This store deliberately knows only the content-free receipt shape. It does
+ * not accept a payload, pathname, MIME body, or a caller-supplied extension
+ * point. The content-read policy engine is the only component that should
+ * produce receipts; keeping the ledger narrow makes accidentally persisting a
+ * preview or transcript body a type- and runtime-visible failure.
+ */
+export declare class AgentContentAuditStoreError extends Error {
+    constructor(message: string);
+}
+/**
+ * Append-only, fsynced JSONL receipt store. A new instance can read the same
+ * path after a daemon restart; no in-memory cursor is authoritative.
+ */
+export declare class AgentContentAuditStore {
+    /**
+     * `agent.content.read` creates a policy engine per envelope. Queue ownership
+     * must therefore be keyed by the canonical Agent-home ledger path, not an
+     * individual store instance.
+     */
+    private static readonly queues;
+    readonly filePath: string;
+    constructor(filePath: string);
+    /** The daemon may address this ledger only through an AgentHomeLayout resolution. */
+    static forCanonicalAgentHome(canonicalHome: string): AgentContentAuditStore;
+    append(receipt: AgentContentAuditReceipt): Promise<AgentContentAuditReceipt>;
+    readAll(): Promise<readonly AgentContentAuditReceipt[]>;
+    /** Explicit name for restart/readback integrations. */
+    readback(): Promise<readonly AgentContentAuditReceipt[]>;
+    private readAllUnlocked;
+    private enqueue;
+}

package/dist/daemon/agent-content-read.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+import { AgentHomeLayout, type AgentRef } from '../agent-home';
+import { AgentContentAuditStore } from './agent-content-audit-store';
+export declare const AGENT_CONTENT_READ_SURFACES: readonly ['workspace', 'transcript', 'artifact'];
+export type AgentContentReadSurface = (typeof AGENT_CONTENT_READ_SURFACES)[number];
+/** Additive capability names. Each surface is independently admitted. */
+export declare const AGENT_CONTENT_READ_CAPABILITIES: Readonly<{
+    readonly workspace: "agent-content-workspace-read";
+    readonly transcript: "agent-content-transcript-read";
+    readonly artifact: "agent-content-artifact-read";
+}>;
+export declare const AGENT_CONTENT_READ_CAPABILITY_WORKSPACE: "agent-content-workspace-read";
+export declare const AGENT_CONTENT_READ_CAPABILITY_TRANSCRIPT: "agent-content-transcript-read";
+export declare const AGENT_CONTENT_READ_CAPABILITY_ARTIFACT: "agent-content-artifact-read";
+export declare const AGENT_CONTENT_READ_DECISIONS: readonly ['allow', 'deny'];
+export type AgentContentReadDecision = (typeof AGENT_CONTENT_READ_DECISIONS)[number];
+/**
+ * Reasons are stable policy observations, not user-facing prose. A denied
+ * read has exactly one reason and never returns any bytes.
+ */
+export declare const AGENT_CONTENT_READ_REASONS: readonly ['invalid-request', 'policy-disabled', 'capability-missing', 'policy-revision-mismatch', 'absolute-target', 'non-relative-target', 'dot-segment', 'sensitive-name', 'root-not-allowlisted', 'root-invalid', 'path-escape', 'target-missing', 'symlink', 'not-regular-file', 'byte-limit', 'mime-not-allowlisted', 'text-not-allowlisted', 'text-decode-failed', 'identity-mismatch'];
+export type AgentContentReadReason = (typeof AGENT_CONTENT_READ_REASONS)[number];
+export type AgentContentReadDropReason = AgentContentReadReason;
+export type AgentContentActorKind = 'user' | 'agent' | 'system';
+export interface AgentContentReadActor {
+    readonly kind: AgentContentActorKind;
+    readonly id: string;
+}
+/** Exact identity copied from the persisted Agent session handoff. */
+export interface AgentContentSessionIdentity {
+    readonly agentRef: AgentRef;
+    readonly sessionRef: string;
+    readonly runtimeId: string;
+    readonly cwd: string;
+}
+export type AgentContentReadRoot = {
+    readonly kind: 'agent-home';
+} | {
+    readonly kind: 'runtime-allowlisted';
+    readonly root: string;
+};
+/** The policy is one authority; no semantic defaults are inferred from a request. */
+export interface AgentContentReadPolicy {
+    readonly enabled: true;
+    readonly capability: string;
+    readonly root: AgentContentReadRoot;
+    readonly policyRevision: string;
+    /** Positive hard limit applied before allocating the file contents. */
+    readonly maxBytes: number;
+    /** Positive hard limit for an explicitly requested UTF-8 decode. */
+    readonly maxTextBytes: number;
+    /** Exact MIME strings. Wildcards are not accepted. */
+    readonly allowedMimeTypes: readonly string[];
+    /** Exact subset of allowedMimeTypes permitted with decodeAs=utf8. */
+    readonly textMimeTypes: readonly string[];
+    /** Product additions may tighten this list; SDK-reserved names cannot be removed. */
+    readonly sensitiveNames?: readonly string[];
+    /** Transcript reads must bind to this persisted identity, unless a resolver is supplied. */
+    readonly expectedTranscriptIdentity?: AgentContentSessionIdentity;
+}
+export type AgentContentReadPolicySelection = 'disabled' | AgentContentReadPolicy;
+export type ContentReadPolicy = AgentContentReadPolicy;
+export interface AgentContentReadRequest {
+    readonly requestId: string;
+    readonly actor: AgentContentReadActor;
+    readonly tenantId: string;
+    readonly deviceId: string;
+    readonly agentRef: AgentRef;
+    readonly surface: AgentContentReadSurface;
+    /** Portable, slash-separated relative target. */
+    readonly relativeTarget: string;
+    /** Caller-declared MIME. No extension or content inference is performed. */
+    readonly mimeType: string;
+    readonly capability: string;
+    readonly policyRevision: string;
+    /** Optional narrower request bound; it can never widen policy.maxBytes. */
+    readonly maxBytes?: number;
+    /** Optional narrower request MIME declaration; it can never widen policy allowlist. */
+    readonly allowedMimeTypes?: readonly string[];
+    /** Omit for bytes; utf8 is explicit and bounded by maxTextBytes. */
+    readonly decodeAs?: 'bytes' | 'utf8';
+    /** Required for transcript; optional for workspace/artifact projections. */
+    readonly session?: AgentContentSessionIdentity;
+}
+export interface AgentContentAuditReceipt {
+    readonly version: 1;
+    readonly requestId: string;
+    readonly actor: AgentContentReadActor;
+    readonly tenantId: string;
+    readonly deviceId: string;
+    readonly agentRef: AgentRef;
+    readonly surface: AgentContentReadSurface;
+    readonly session?: AgentContentSessionIdentity;
+    /** Canonical relative target only; no absolute pathname is ever recorded. */
+    readonly relativeTarget: string;
+    readonly policyRevision: string;
+    readonly byteCount: number;
+    readonly contentHash?: string;
+    readonly decision: AgentContentReadDecision;
+    readonly reason?: AgentContentReadReason;
+    readonly recordedAt: string;
+}
+export interface AgentContentReadAllowed {
+    readonly decision: 'allow';
+    readonly surface: AgentContentReadSurface;
+    readonly relativeTarget: string;
+    readonly mimeType: string;
+    readonly byteCount: number;
+    readonly contentHash: string;
+    readonly content: Uint8Array;
+    readonly text?: string;
+    readonly receipt: AgentContentAuditReceipt;
+}
+export interface AgentContentReadDenied {
+    readonly decision: 'deny';
+    readonly surface: AgentContentReadSurface;
+    readonly relativeTarget: string;
+    readonly reason: AgentContentReadReason;
+    readonly receipt: AgentContentAuditReceipt;
+}
+export type AgentContentReadResult = AgentContentReadAllowed | AgentContentReadDenied;
+export type AgentContentReadDecisionRecord = AgentContentReadResult;
+export declare class AgentContentReadPolicyError extends Error {
+    constructor(message: string);
+}
+export declare class AgentContentReadRequestError extends Error {
+    constructor(message: string);
+}
+export declare class AgentContentReadAuditError extends Error {
+    constructor(message: string, options?: ErrorOptions);
+}
+export interface AgentContentReadPolicyEngineOptions {
+    readonly agentHomeLayout?: AgentHomeLayout;
+    readonly policies: Readonly<Record<AgentContentReadSurface, AgentContentReadPolicySelection>>;
+    readonly capabilities: Iterable<string>;
+    readonly runtimeAllowlistedRoots?: readonly string[];
+    readonly auditStore: AgentContentAuditStore;
+    /** Optional all-surface session gate for hosts that require a live handoff before every read. */
+    readonly resolveSessionIdentity?: (request: AgentContentReadRequest) => Promise<AgentContentSessionIdentity | undefined> | AgentContentSessionIdentity | undefined;
+    /** Binds transcript claims to AgentSessionHandoffStore-backed exact identity. */
+    readonly resolveTranscriptIdentity?: (request: AgentContentReadRequest) => Promise<AgentContentSessionIdentity | undefined> | AgentContentSessionIdentity | undefined;
+}
+export declare const SDK_RESERVED_CONTENT_NAMES: readonly string[];
+export declare function createAgentContentReadPolicy(input: AgentContentReadPolicy): AgentContentReadPolicy;
+/**
+ * Independent local content-read policy engine. It reads one explicitly
+ * requested file at a time; it never walks, mirrors, indexes, or parses an
+ * Agent home or runtime directory.
+ */
+export declare class AgentContentReadPolicyEngine {
+    private readonly options;
+    private readonly policies;
+    private readonly capabilities;
+    private readonly runtimeRoots;
+    private readonly runtimeRootCache;
+    private readonly resolveSessionIdentity?;
+    private readonly resolveTranscriptIdentity?;
+    constructor(options: AgentContentReadPolicyEngineOptions);
+    read(input: AgentContentReadRequest): Promise<AgentContentReadResult>;
+    /** Alias used by integration adapters that call the operation request. */
+    readContent(request: AgentContentReadRequest): Promise<AgentContentReadResult>;
+    /** A request is one bounded read, never a directory listing or recursive mirror. */
+    request(request: AgentContentReadRequest): Promise<AgentContentReadResult>;
+    private resolveRoot;
+    private validateRuntimeRoot;
+    private checkSessionIdentity;
+    private checkTranscriptIdentity;
+    private deny;
+    private appendReceipt;
+}